Condemnation raining down on Israel Francesca Albanese, the Italian layer and UN Special Rapporteur on Palestine does not mince words in her continuing one-sided condemnation of Israel and its actions. After the recent Israeli bombing run on two prominent members of Hamas, that led to a horrible fire and the death of dozens of civilians, she once more took to X, writing: “More horror in the #GazaGhetto. The Israeli occupation forces have bombed a camp for displaced Palestinians in #Rafah, causing plastic tents to catch fire and tragically burning people alive. This cruelty, along with blatant defiance of the int'l law and system, is unacceptable. The #GazaGenocide will not easily end without external pressure: Israel must face sanctions, justice, suspension of agreements, trade, partnership and investments, as well as participation in int'l forums.” (X, May27, 2024). The activist rapporteur has been a consistent critic of Israel, not losing many words on Hamas’ atrocities. Soon after the October 7 abominations, she warned that Palestinians were in grave danger of mass ethnic cleansing, arguing according to the Palestinian Chronicle that “There is a grave danger that what we are witnessing may be a repeat of the 1948 Nakba, and the 1967 Naksa, yet on a larger scale. The international community must do everything to stop this from happening again,”… noting that Israeli officials have openly advocated for another Nakba” (Palestinian Chronicle October 14, 2023). Francesca Albanese’s voiced her extreme views soon after the October 7 massacre and the hostage taking, but similar thoughtless shooting-from-the-hip condemnation is now raining down on Israel, its leadership and its attempts to eliminate Hamas. Like many others UN’s Antonio Guterres took to X to write: ““I condemn Israel’s actions which killed scores of innocent civilians who were only seeking shelter from this deadly conflict. There is no safe place in Gaza. This horror must stop.” EU Foreign Policy chief Josep Borrell: “Horrified by news coming out of #Rafah on Israeli strikes killing dozens of displaced persons, including small children. I condemn this in the strongest terms. There is no safe place in Gaza. These attacks must stop immediately. ICJ orders & IHL must be respected by all parties.” Emmanuel Macron joined the chorus of lamenting voices: “Outraged by the Israeli strikes that have killed many displaced persons in Rafah. These operations must stop. There are no safe areas in Rafah for Palestinian civilians. I call for full respect for international law and an immediate ceasefire”. Not to outdone Erdogan promised: “We will do everything possible to hold these barbarians and murders accountable who have nothing to do with humanity.” (Strangely he wasn’t thinking of Hamas, …) While the Palestinian Authority accused Israel of “deliberately targeting” the tents of displaced people, and said the perpetration “of this heinous massacre by the Israeli occupation forces is a challenge to all international legitimacy resolutions.” These immediate unthinking reflex-like condemnations show world leaders giving up all pretense of fairness. Justitia’s scales are longer balanced, un-reflected opinion is weighing the Israeli side down. World leaders have evidently sunk to the level of the widespread student protests against Israel. Perhaps even taking their lead from the protests and their reflections in mainstream media? Not all have yet sunken to the level of Yolanda Diaz, Minister of Labor and Social Policy of Spain, who recently tweeted “We welcome today the fact that Spain recognizes the State of Palestine, but we cannot stop there. Palestine will be free from river to the Sea” (Emphasis added). A few are holding back apparently still remembering why Israel is attacking Hamas in Gaza and even wanting to know what really happened on the that fateful Sunday on May 26, when dozens were killed. Among them a surprisingly subdued response from an U.S. official and even from an UN official. From the U.S. Biden is taking his time, leaving a first response to a national security council (NSC) official who said: "Israel has a right to go after Hamas, and we understand this strike killed two senior Hamas terrorists who are responsible for attacks against Israeli civilians. But as we've been clear, Israel must take every precaution possible to protect civilians." Later White House spokesperson John Kirby, indicated the strike did not cross a red line for the U.S. “As a result of this strike on Sunday, I have no policy changes to speak to. It just happened. The Israelis are going to investigate it. We’re going to be taking great interest in what they find in that investigation. And we’ll see where it goes from there.” While Volker Turk, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, is noting “that the IDF has announced a review, but what is shockingly clear is that by striking such an area, densely packed with civilians, this was an entirely predictable outcome. It is crucial that such reviews lead to accountability and changes in policy and practices.” Adding that “Palestinian armed groups must stop the firing of rockets which are inherently indiscriminate, in clear violation of international humanitarian law. They must also unconditionally release all hostages at once.” Preliminary response from Israel In Israel Netanyahu has said “Despite our best effort not to harm those not involved, unfortunately a tragic mistake happened last night. We are investigating the case. On May 28 ABC news is reporting that “the U.S. received information from the Israelis overnight that they believe shrapnel or something else from the strike ignited a fuel tank 100 meters away, which engulfed a tent, creating a massive fire, according to a U.S. official.” While it may explain the devastating fire, it would seem that something else must have happened, to explain the horrible carnage. A secondary explosion perhaps? IDF spokesperson, Rear admiral Hagari, later tried to provide a little more detail. Explaining that IDF had taken a number of steps before the strike to eliminate the two Hamas commanders Yassin Rabia and Khaled Najjar, in order to avoid civilian casualties. Using two small missiles with a 17 Kilogram warhead (might indicate the use of U.S. made GBU39 missiles), and waiting till the area around the strike was clear. Hagari also provided IDF infographics indicating that the IDF the strike was hitting in an area 180 meters distant from the tent shelters. While Hamas claims the strike hit the tent area. IDF has also been accused of striking an area designated as a humanitarian safe zone. Here Hagari again used an IDF infographic to show that the strike hit more than a kilometer outside the humanitarian safe zone at al-Mawasi. In relation to the possibility of a secondary explosions causing the devastation Hagari referred to what he called phone call intercepts, between two Palestinians in Gaza apparently heard saying: “"Yes, this is an ammunition warehouse. I tell you it exploded. The Jewish bombing wasn't strong, it was a small missile, because it didn't create a large hole. And afterward a lot of secondary explosions.” That is what Hagari had to say on May 28. Independent verification is not possible Still investigations are ongoing, meaning that hasty conclusions like the ones provided by certain political leaders ought to be avoided. While this might explain the tragedy, it may indicate that Israel now is being judged before we know what happened. Perhaps this is also the case in relation to the cases against Israel in The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and The International Criminal Court (ICC). In the following focusing on the ICC’s action against Israel. The sensational ICC application for Israeli arrest warrants On may 20 Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan of the International Criminal Court in The Hague announced he was filing applications for warrants to arrest Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, and Yoav gallant, Minister of Defence of Israel. In the same announcement he also sought warrants to arrest three prominent members of Hamas. Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masuri and Ismael Haniyeh. Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan certainly succeeded in lighting a media explosion with this sensationalist announcement. Three prominent members of Hamas or Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (Islamic Resistance Movement), an organization that is designated as a foreign terrorist group by the U.S. and found on the EU terrorist list, suddenly listed and grouped together with the two most prominent ministers of the only democracy in Middle East, a “Rechtsstaat” characterized by the rule of law. Grouping them like in a Western in your face “Wanted poster.” One may certainly ask why they grouped together in the prosecutor’s application, and may also ask, why the Karim Khan has not sought arrest warrants for the members of Hamas much earlier, after all they have made no heal of their involvement in in the October 7 barbarism. Or why he is now ready to file warrants for arrests of Netanyahu and Gallant? Does he have any clear evidence that they have committed crimes against humanity.
Let’s see his arguments especially in relation to Netanyahu and Gallant. With reference to the so-called Rome-Statute he argues that they after October 8, 20223, bear criminal responsibility for the following war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on the territory of the State of Palestine (The Rome Statute can be found at https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf). It is important to remember that Israel is not among the 124 signatories, and neither is the U.S. Raising the question of the ICC jurisdiction. There is also the question of jurisdiction over Gaza, a non-state. Apparently, the Prosecutor believes he has jurisdiction in relation to crimes against humanity in both Gaza and the Hamas attacks in Israel. Here the accusations against the two Israeli leaders: Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare as a war crime contrary to article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Statute; Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health contrary to article 8(2)(a)(iii), or cruel treatment as a war crime contrary to article 8(2)(c)(i); Wilful killing contrary to article 8(2)(a)(i), or Murder as a war crime contrary to article 8(2)(c)(i); Intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as a war crime contrary to articles 8(2)(b)(i), or 8(2)(e)(i); Extermination and/or murder contrary to articles 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(a), including in the context of deaths caused by starvation, as a crime against humanity; Persecution as a crime against humanity contrary to article 7(1)(h); Other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity contrary to article 7(1)(k). Karim Khan “submits that these acts were committed as part of a common plan to use starvation as a method of war and other acts of violence against the Gazan civilian population as a means to (i) eliminate Hamas; (ii) secure the return of the hostages which Hamas has abducted, and (iii) collectively punish the civilian population of Gaza, whom they perceived as a threat to Israel.” And the evidence…? Karim Khan says that applications for arrest warrants were “the outcome of an independent and impartial investigation by my Office. Guided by our obligation to investigate incriminating and exonerating evidence equally, my Office has worked painstakingly to separate claims from facts and to soberly present conclusions based on evidence to the Pre-Trial Chamber.” In his statement on May 20, 2024, he does present any facts at all! What he does is listen the kind of evidence that has been collected, consisting of “interviews with survivors and eyewitnesses, authenticated video, photo and audio material, satellite imagery and statements from the alleged perpetrator group.” He also asserts that 1.1 million people in Gaza are facing catastrophic hunger. Sounds more like a postulate, as evidence is again lacking in the statement. Karim Khan states that he convened a panel of experts on international law “to support the evidence review and legal analysis in relation to these arrest warrant applications.” He argues that since last year he has warned Israel to take immediate action to allow access to humanitarian aid in Gaza at scale, threatening that those who do not comply “should not complain later when my Office takes action. That day has come.”“That day has come.” Strange expression from someone who should sound objective. It sounds ominously as if ICC prosecutor is finally ready to seek revenge for Israel’s disobedience. A kind of Israeli doomsday, where they are to be judged not by God, but by a small earthly group of men and women, that may have all sorts of politically motivated biases. Let us have a look at the prosecutor’s backing group A “Panel of Experts” chosen by a prosecutor out to get Israel The panel convened by Karim Khan consisted of 6 experts in international law, and two extra advisors. The panel was asked in January 2024 “to provide an opinion on whether there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that the persons named in the warrants have committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.” The panel agrees that ICC has jurisdiction “relation to crimes committed on the territory of Palestine, including Gaza,” and likewise that ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed by Palestinian Nationals in Israel. This is a consequence of an earlier Palestinian acceptance of ICC having that jurisdiction. Here the panel argues that Palestine including Gaza is a state for the purpose of the ICC statute. Not a view one would expect to find with all legal scholars. A UK government spokesperson reiterated the UK’s opposition to the ICC’s jurisdiction: “… we do not think the ICC has jurisdiction in this case. The UK has not yet recognized Palestine as state and Israel is not a State Party to the Rome Statute.” Among the panel’s review of the separate charges brought by the prosecutor we find some strange examples, where beliefs seem to play the role of evidence. Take this one: “… based on a review of material presented by the Prosecutor, the Panel assesses that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Netanyahu and Gallant formed a common plan, together with others, to jointly perpetrate the crime of using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. (Emphasis added). Don’t we need more than believes to accuse Netanyahu and Gallant of crimes against humanity? Or take this one: “The Prosecutor has also sought charges against Netanyahu and Gallant for the war crimes of willful killing or murder and intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, as well as the crimes against humanity of extermination or murder and persecution for deaths resulting from the use of starvation and related acts of violence including attacks on civilians gathering to obtain food and on humanitarian workers.” Again supported by belief: “In the Panel’s view, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects committed these crimes. The Panel also considers that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the crimes were committed in the context of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Gaza, pursuant to State policy.” (Emphasis added) Really? Are these and other similar beliefs enough to provide legal support to the prosecutor Karim Khan’s seeking arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant? Apparently in the panel’s own unified view they are. For having examined the warrants applications and the underlying evidence, with no evidence presented in the panel’s report, they conclude that “the Panel is satisfied that the process was fair, rigorous and independent and that the Prosecutor’s applications for arrest warrants are grounded in the law and the facts.” Among the members of the panel, we find the starlike media celebrity quality of Amal Clooney, Adjunct Professor at Columbia Law School and a Senior Fellow at the Columbia Law School Human Rights Institute. Co-founder of the Clooney Foundation for Justice, which provides free legal support to victims of human rights abuses in over 40 countries. On May 20 she wrote an article in the Financial Times about her reason for joining the panels and referred to the panel’s unanimous conclusion that supported the ICC’s prosecutor’s application. According to Amal Clooney “we felt we had a duty to accept the invitation to provide an impartial and independent legal opinion based on evidence. We were selected because of our expertise in public international law, international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law, and, in the case of two of us, experience as former judges of international criminal tribunals. Our common goal is advancing accountability and we have reached our conclusions based on an assessment of the warrant applications against an objective legal standard.” She also argued that the step taken by the ICC prosecutor “is a milestone in the history of international criminal law.” And a legal exclamation mark it certainly was, but perhaps also millstone around the international criminal law. Inadvertently she is giving rise to our suspicion by saying out loud “The law we apply is humanity’s law, not the law of any given side.” Somehow Amal Clooney’s “law of humanity” seem to transcend the earthly influence of states and power or might, seemingly locating humanity’s law in political appointed institutions with a few earthly members, ready to provide justice to the world, like the ICC. Other scholar warns: Recently, some publicists have started to speak of the “law of humanity” in order to challenge the role of nations and states in determining the world’s legal order. While this new usage captures the necessary universalism of supranational justice, it also threatens the premise that support just institutions, by confusing the nature and purposes of law, nations, peoples and the state.” (M.N.S Sellers “Republican Principles in International Law”). Does grandstanding and prejudice play a role? Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan certainly seems to be a man with a mission. While the ICC has been accused in the past of having mainly focused on Africa, Karim Khan created quite a stir when turning his focus other parts of the World. In 2022 he sought arrest warrants against President Putin and the Kremlin official Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Commissioner for Children’s Rights, over their involvement in the deportation of Ukrainian children. He has faced controversy in his earlier work, for instance as defender of the Kenyan President William Ruto, where accusations of witness intimidations led the ICC to drop charges. He has also done work for the sect like Ahmadiyya Muslim community, of which he is a member. Amal Clooney had been silent on Israel Gaza, until it was revealed that she had been member of Karim Khan’s panel. Activists expecting her to take side for the Palestinians and against Israel. Venting their anger on social media and elsewhere. “This so called ‘humanitarian lawyer’ vocally stood up for Ukraine but is dead silent on Gaza,” a social media user wrote. When she showed up at British fashion awards, another wrote “arriving at the british (Sic) fashion awards, but hiding from genocide”. Perhaps these comments show what social media masses had expected from Amal Clooney. Now with her presence in panel revealed and her article in the Financial Times, it suddenly turned out that she had not disappointed them. Indicating perhaps on which side of Justitia’s scales she put her weight. Among the other members of the panel convened by the Karim Khan are Baroness Helena Kennedy KC, lawyer and human rights activist, who quite early seems to made up her mind in relation to Israel. In an interview in already October 2023 she condemned the atrocities committed by Hamas, but she also warned Israel against collective punishment saying that Gaza is being reduced to rubble” and condemned Israel’s actions to cut off water supply. “Water is a basic human right and its denial violates international law. It is a war crime.” The flimsy argument for claiming ICC jurisdiction over Israel Karim Khan’s simultaneous application for arrest warrants for Hamas terrorists and leaders of democratic state might have been made to sound impartial and to demonstrate that nobody is above the law. This has the appalling consequence of equating democratic leaders of state with an apparently well-functioning legal system and independent courts with a terrorist regime in a non-state acting without regard for legal and moral constraints. This seems to be legally and morally abhorrent, and destroying the credibility of the ICC. Here it is important to remember what the The Rome Statute says about jurisdicion: Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; ( Article 17, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). This can of cause only mean that the ICC normally would not have jurisdiction over a state, where state in questions has showed that it willing and able to prosecute in cases involving its own citizens if involved crimes against humanity. To Israel itself and a neutral outsider it would seem that Israel with its legal systems and independent courts has shown that it is both willing and capable of prosecuting crimes against humanity on its own turf, and against invading terrorists. Meaning that either ICC and its prosecutor have some kind of knowledge or is it just the belief that Israel is not willing to punish crime against humanity and/or are incapable of doing so. Past experience does not seem to confirm Israel is either unwilling or incapable of doing so. This would mean that ICC and Karim Khan are acting outside the stated jurisdiction of ICC. With a fig leaf of an argument, the ICC prosecutor seems to believe he has found reason for the ICC’s jurisdiction: “The Government of The State of Palestine lodged a declaration under article 12(3) of the Rome Statute accepting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court ("ICC") over alleged crimes committed "in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014" Fine, then seek warrants for prosecution for members of Hamas, for in Gaza there is neither the willingness nor the capability for Hamas to prosecute itself for crimes against humanity. And as for “The State of Palestine” it would seem that this is not a state in the usual understanding of what constitute a state. North South division loading on Justitia’s scales Underlaying all this may a divisive struggle between what can be loosely seen Northern states and the Global South. One has to remember the sequence of events: On November 23 South Africa wrote Karim Khan, requesting the prosecutor to investigate the situation in Palestine “for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with commission of such crimes” (South African Embassy, The Hague, November 17, 2023). South Africa acting on behalf of The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, The Plurinational State of Bolivia, The Union of the Comoros, and The Republic of Djibouti. At the other side of the division, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak condemned the prosecutors’ decision: “There is no moral equivalence between a democratic state exercising its lawful right to self-defence and the terrorist group Hamas … This is a deeply unhelpful development. Of course. it is still subject to a final decision, but it remains deeply unhelpful nonetheless.” (Rishi Sunak, May 21, 2024) The speaker of the House of Representatives, Michael Johnson, voiced a fiery attack on the ICC’s action. “America should punish the ICC and put Karim Khan back in his place …If the ICC is allowed to threaten Israel’s leaders, we know that America will be next … There is a reason that we’ve never endorsed the International Criminal Court, because it is a direct affront to our own sovereignty… We don’t put any international body above American sovereignty, and Israel doesn’t do that either” (Michael Johnson, May 23, 2024). On May 28 the South African Minister of International Relations, Naledi Pandor, replied by saying “Of cause!” Countries aiding Israel should be liable for ICC prosecution. The German government first tried a little fence sitting. Letting The Federal Foreign Office comment on the ICC prosecutor’s decision: “Durch die gleichzeitige Beantragung der Haftbefehle gegen die Hamas-Führer auf der einen und die beiden israelischen Amtsträger auf der anderen Seite ist der unzutreffende Eindruck einer Gleichsetzung entstanden.“ (Auswärtiges Amt, May 21, 2024). Then the spokesperson for the Government, Steffen Hebstreit, really waded into dangerous water, when asked if Germany would arrest Netanyahu on a visit to Germany, if the ICC prosecutor actually got his arrest warrants. His answer “„Natürlich, wir halten uns an Recht und Gesetz” (Hebestreit, May 22, 2024). An answer resulting in a strong reaction form the leader of the opposition: “Ein Scandal.” ICC on the verge of destroying its legitimacy? Prosecutor Karim Khan evidently attempted to demonstrate impartiality, that nobody is above the law. But his attempt to demonstrate that ICC is not only an institution with single minded focus on injustice in Africa may be doing the ICC a serious disservice. Explicitly equating Israel political leaders with leaders of the terrorist group of Hamas, looks legally, morally and politically outrageous, for the reasons we have discussed. The prosecutor attempts to cloak his applications for the simultaneous arrest warrant against Israeli leaders and Hamas leaders under the guise of equality before the law, arguing “if we do not demonstrate our willingness to apply the law equally, if it is seen as being applied selectively, we will be creating the conditions for its collapse. …This is the true risk we face in this moment.” (Karam Khan, Statement, May 20, 2024). In reality he seems to do the opposite, applying his view of the law equally to extremely unequal cases. This must have been done for ideological and political reasons, and does certainly not demonstrate impartiality. One is tempted to ask if the prosecutor is waging a novel kind of lawfare under the thin guise of impartiality? The prosecutor and perhaps the ICC as such is on the verge making a grave error of judgement. It will certainly be seen divisive, with supporters of Hamas and a non-existing state of Palestine greeting the so-called impartiality, while the other side will see it as ideological and political decision destroying the legitimacy of the ICC. Wahrlich, die Menschen gaben sich alles ihr Gutes und Böses. Wahrlich, sie nahmen es nicht, sie fanden es nicht, nicht fiel es ihnen als Stimme vom Himmel. Werthe legte erst der Mensch in die Dinge, sich zu erhalten, - er schuf erst den Dingen Sinn, einen Menschen-Sinn! Darum nennt er sich "Mensch'', das ist: der Schätzende … Wandel der Werthe, - das ist Wandel der Schaffenden. Immer vernichtet, wer ein Schöpfer sein muss. Friedrich Nietzsche “Also sprach Zarathustra” HABITS OF THE MIND Suppose for a moment that making a moral judgement is in some way analogous to recognising a face of a person we knew a long time ago. It may seem strange, but please humour me for a moment. It is rather difficult to know the particulars of what makes us recognise a face that we have never seen in exactly this shape before, perhaps because it is 20 years ago that we saw this face last. We are of course presuming that the person in question does not have some very recognisable feature, like a large mole on the tip of his nose. That would give the game away. We are also able to recognise a whole range of facial expressions, although we may not be able to state the particulars of this process. We just do it. If routine moral judgements are made in the same way, we may not be able to give a lot of reasons for our judgements; we may just be able to state that we feel that this would be the right or the wrong thing to do. When asked why this would be right or wrong, we are unable to appeal either to universality, utility or any other criterion. To us it might be evident almost in the same way that it would be evident that this is the face of Peter. A simpler example might involve discerning between a genuine smile and a faked smile. I suppose that almost everyone would know immediately what I mean by a genuine and a faked smile. Not that most people know anything about the muscles of face; we just say that a faked smile would be revealed by the eyes. Damasio has the story of the particulars. A smile of real joy requires the combined involuntary contraction of two muscles, the zygotic major and the orbicularis oculi. We can wilfully control the first while the orbicularis oculi is beyond wilful control. Normally we would not be able to explain that, but we recognise the effect. We see the smile of joy. In other words, we are able to recognise faces, genuine smiles, faked smiles, chairs, sexual harassment, and make judgements on things and behaviours violating our moral sense. To argue why this is possible we have to show the plausibility and importance of a tacit and ineffable foundation of our value judgements. We begin with the tentative list of sources for the habits of the mind outlined in this table: THE INTERNAL CAUTIONER Some inside cautioner warns me to stay in my place in spite of the urge I feel, like the cautioner in Baudelaire’s poem: Each man who’s worth the name must know A yellow Serpent is at home Within his heart, as on a throne, Which, if he says: ‘I want!’ says: No!’ Written rules and explicit threats of external sanctions prohibiting or limiting a certain kind of behaviour would never be able to equal the internal tacit cautioner saying “no” to me. Is this perhaps the only place where we can locate our much sought after individual sense of responsibility? We shall see. Perhaps we may glean some insight on this internal cautioner by employing Damasio’s concept of somatic markers. Instead of committing the mistake of believing that we act as advanced electronic calculators when faced with an ethical dilemma, Damasio almost follows Dennett in believing that our minds rapidly create sketches of multiple scenarios of possible responses and actions. In the case of an ethical dilemma, a silent patron of our minds may help us produce and evaluate the multiple fleeting sketches of possible decisions and actions, before we reason consciously about what we do. This production and evaluation seem to happen before any conscious reasoning. It comes preselected to our conscious mind. Preselected perhaps with the aid of somatic markers. A somatic marker may force “attention on the negative outcome to which a given action may lead, and functions as an automated alarm signal which says: Beware of danger ahead if you choose the option which leads to this outcome. The signal may lead you to reject, immediately, the negative course of action and thus make you choose among other alternatives.” The important lesson we can draw is that a somatic marker may kick in, before any conscious reasoning about the problem. This marker represents a more sophisticated version of what we may call gut feeling. The unpleasant feeling that shows that we may not be comfortable with a certain decision or action. This also seems to be the reason for the name ‘somatic marker’. ‘Soma’ for body, or bodily reactions and ‘marker’ because it marks the sketches of the mind. A somatic marker may act more subtly than that, no queasy feeling in the stomach is necessary, the uneasiness may show itself in a bias that we are unaware of. It may reveal itself in no more than the expression: “I feel it would be right.” This fits well with the way somatic markers are supposed to be created. “When the choice of option X, which leads to bad outcome Y, is followed by punishment and thus painful body states, the somatic marker system acquires the hidden, dispositional representation of this experience-driven, non-inherited, arbitrary connection.” It does not have to be punishment; many diverse experiences such as displeasure, acceptance and praise may of course lead to the creation of somatic markers, which are activated automatically before and during our reasoning process. Somatic markers represent special feelings generated by emotions, a conditioned feeling that we have somehow learned, and which guide and restrict our judgements. We may think of them as biasing devices; they do not put us on a kind of autopilot, but subtly guide and restrict us in our judgements as well as in our actions. Somatic markers may be felt when we talk about a certain action giving us a bad taste, or a queasy feeling in the stomach. In ways we cannot individually understand and explain they signify a bias of our feelings, and there is not much we can consciously do about that. Deacon does not talk about somatic markers, but his arguments in relation to the role of emotion in reasoning made us aware of how somatic markers may play a role in reasoning. “Powerful mental images can elicit a vicarious emotional charge that makes them capable of outcompeting current sensory stimuli and intrinsic drives for control of attention and emotion, resulting in a kind of virtual emotional experience.” During our reasoning we may thus be emotionally influenced by the images that are evoked. It is not just any emotion that is allowed to pass through and influence actions. We are talking about conditioned feelings, feelings like embarrassment, shame and remorse. Feelings “acquired by experience, under the control of an internal preference system and under the influence of an external set of circumstances which include not only entities and events with which the organism must interact, but also social conventions and ethical rules.” Perhaps these feelings and markers are also what compel us to act, making us feel that we have to, almost without thinking. The internal cautioner may in some cases urge us to act, in other cases put up a warning sign saying: “No way!” Any reference to Kantian principles or any calculation of pros and cons will not be enough to compel us to act. This may bring us an accusation of subjectivism. Not so, there might be a kind of non-subjective common foundation for the biases and somatic markers that we possess, without being able to state explicitly what these biases are. THE SOCIAL ETHICAL GRAMMAR We shall argue that moral judgements are made according to what might be seen as a social and ethical grammar. Here we use both terms, social and ethical, because we want to underline the social part of this grammar, realising of course that certain parts of the grammar may be social, but not necessarily have anything to do with ethics. Table manners, dress codes and so on come to mind as something that may belong to a social grammar, but have little relevance for ethics and morals. Perhaps our concept of grammar may have more in common with Wittgenstein’s “Sprachspiele.” In Philosophischen Untersuchungen he writes “Grammatik sagt nicht, wie die Sprache gebaut sein muß, um ihre Zwecke zu erfüllen, um so und so auf die Menschen zu wirken. Sie beschreibt nur, aber erklärt in keiner Weise, den Gebrauch der Zeichen.” A small example from Cosmides and Toby may demonstrate how such a grammar might work. We have to consider two sentence samples: 1 If he’s the victim of an unlucky tragedy, then we should pitch in to help him out. 2 If he spends his time loafing and living off others, then he doesn’t deserve our help. Contrast this with: 3 If he’s the victim of an unlucky tragedy, then he doesn’t deserve our help. 4 If he spends his time loafing and living off of others, then we should pitch in to help him out. I suspect that most readers would find nothing wrong with sentences 1 and 2, while sentences 3 and 4 may seem rather odd or disturbing. Why should anyone want to say something like that? In a sense sentences 3 and 4 are as good as the first two sentences. What is wrong is that sentences 3 and 4 state something that seems unjust to our moral senses, perhaps leading to us to blurt out: “This wouldn’t be fair would it?” Presumably most people intuitively see these sentences as stating something that would be unjust. It would be seen as evident, not as something that had to or could be explained. What is happening may be analogous to what is happening when we recognise a face. We cannot tell what particulars are involved, we just recognise it. It may be in this sense that the two sentences violate an ineffable grammar of ethical and social reasoning. Our biases and somatic markers may be based on a shared social and ethical grammar, which may reveal itself in the feeling that there is something odd about sentences 3 and 4. This is the kind of grammar that may lead us to nod approvingly at sentences 1 and 2, and to feel that there is something strange about sentences 3 and 4. It is a grammar that consists partly of overt rules and examples and partly of covert norms and predispositions, making us able to judge and act in relation to specific cases, almost in the same sense that we are able to construct sentences, without looking up explicit rules or making prolonged calculations. “In the study of reasoning, a grammar is a finite set of rules that can generate all appropriate inferences while not simultaneously generating inappropriate ones. If it is a grammar of social reasoning, then these inferences are about the domain of social motivation and behaviour; an ‘inappropriate’ inference is defined as one that members of a social community would judge as incomprehensible or nonsensical.” Or, may we add, unethical. We assume that a social grammar would be characterised by being: • layered, and contingent, not derivable from simple principles; • shared as a collective conscience, internalised by individuals; • generative and non-determinative. Layered We presume that parts of the social grammar may be found in the explicit rules regulating and limiting the behaviour of people in a community, all the way from the Declaration of Human Rights, parts of national constitutions, via specific laws against corruption or sexual harassment, to family and personnel policies. These rules would seem to represent a surface layer of explicit ethical norms that either have or can be given a written expression. The explicit rules of the surface layer would then represent the upper tip of a whole root-like structure of ethical norms, experiences and knowledge. When we discuss the foundations of these norms, we are in a way attempting to follow the reasoning down along the roots, trying to understand the foundation of these rules. On the intermediate level we might find vaguely defined expressions like fairness. On the next level we argue that ethical judgements apparently involve much more than following written ethical codes and laws regulating behaviour. It involves as we have seen an internalised ethical grammar, or a set of tacit norms, and a certain level of knowledge. At this intermediate level judgements seem to relate to some vaguely defined norms that we can only talk about in a roundabout way. They are not usually written down, but are expressible in a general way, like fairness or justice. They may also be likened to the tacit rules of a moderately skilful chess player, who according to Black is “guided by memories of his own previous successes and failures and, still more importantly, by the sifted experience of whole generations of masters. The accessible tradition supplies defeasible general maxims, standardised routines for accomplishing particular subtasks, detailed models for initial deployment of pieces ... and much else.” We can think consciously about the norms and values, and they seem to be part of our common sense. Maybe this is the level where we can locate the philosophical discussions of ethics and instances of ethical appeal. Maybe this is the level where we can find expressions like: “It is in the interest of all ... that this kind of behaviour is not condoned.” At this level we are still able to give some kind of reason for the judgements we make, although the arguments may be rather philosophical. An even deeper level would represent the really unconscious layers of the mind, containing ethical norms and feelings, inclinations and emotions that belong to the collective unconscious. In our conception we see no need for complete hierarchical consistency, only an overall coherence, anchored in decentralised way in the collective unconscious. There is no single overriding principle either Kantian or utilitarian, only a tacit consistency between a multitude of possible practical judgements on the surface and the deeper layers; like a linguistic grammar a social grammar is in no need of a single overriding principle. What we have instead are mutually supporting decentral elements. According to our model Kant and Mill may respectively have distilled as it were some of the general elements that seem to belong to reasoning on the basis of these layers, but their ethical principles cannot be used the other way round to determine practical ethical judgement. This would be an attempt to make them into first principles, first principles that would tear up a much more subtle decentralised structure, in effect making them sterile and impotent as principles for judging concrete cases. Shared and silent Angell argues that every group of people have to share something in the nature of moral order. “People cannot work together without overt or tacit standards of conduct corresponding to their common values.” He argues that even a family would not be held together solely by mutual affection; there has to be some moral integration, consisting of shared views of what it means to be a family and what is proper conduct for family members. Perhaps this may represent what Durkheim has called the collective conscience of a society. Here we want to emphasise something else, something we might for want of better expression call the collective unconscious. The unconscious part of this consists in “everything of which I know, but of which I am not at the moment thinking; everything of which I was once conscious but have now forgotten; everything perceived by my senses, but not noted by my conscious mind; everything which, involuntarily and without paying attention to it, I feel, think, remember, want, and do; all the future things that are taking shape in me and will sometime come to consciousness: all this is the content of the unconscious.” The unconscious may partly be personal, partly shared and thus collective. We want to emphasise the collective part of the unconscious, the part that is shared across a community of individuals, and owes its existence not to the single individual but like a linguistic grammar is shared collectively. A community would expect that the grammar they are using would be shared by everyone else in the community, so that when they act according to the grammar, they can count upon the other members of the community. We must have this implicit faith in judgement and actions of our fellow human beings or we would have no community. “A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs.” In fact it is the tacit belief that others will do their part that will help create the fact that will be desired by all. Or as James would have said: “There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming. And where faith in a fact can help create the fact …” To use a grammar is to observe and follow a certain social habit, usage or “rule.” “Ist, was wir ‘einer Regel folgen’ nennen, etwas, was nur ein Mensch, nur einmal im Leben, tun könnte? … Es kann nicht ein einziges Mal nur ein Mensch einer Regel gefolgt sein. Es kann nicht ein einziges Mal nur eine Mitteilung gemacht, ein Befehl gegeben, oder verstanden worden sein, etc. – Einer Regel folgen, eine Mitteilung machen, einen Befehl geben, eine Schachpartie spielen sind Gepflogenheiten (Gebrauche, Institutionen).” There are social limits to the values that individuals and groups can hold if the community in question has to survive as a community. This is a problem of coherence. Different groups and communities may have different grammars, but only to a certain degree, and like Cosmides, Tooby and Aitchison we assume that there are elements of a universal grammar in all the local grammars. We may guess that there has to be a certain universality in every community of people. Examples of widely held grammars or collective consciences might be the protestant ethic described by Weber as characterising a certain period in Western capitalism, while Confucianism might point to some of the basic elements of an Eastern grammar. Generativity We do not have to learn a preconceived set of sentences by heart, we form our own sentences. As long they are formed according to more or less tacit demands of the grammar, they may be regarded as instances of well-formed sentences. We can form sentences never heard before, and still they would be recognised as applications of the grammar. In a way it may be like playing according to well-understood general rules of a game. They define the game, but they do not define the individual actions. This shows the general generativity of a linguistic grammar. A generative grammar is thus a set of explicit and tacit rules that can be used to create new sentences, which would be regarded as well-formed and grammatical in a given language. A generative grammar will not allow the generation of sentences that are ungrammatical, meaning that they would be regarded as ill formed in a given language. Practices showing up in social habits, habitus, rituals and so on are all part the imprints left in us of the evolution of man and community. GROSSVATERS ZOPF Writing about our virtues, Nietzsche looks to their origin. He asks “What does it mean to believe in one’s virtue?” and whether this “isn't this at bottom the same thing that was formerly called one's "good conscience," that venerable long pigtail of a concept [Begriffs-Zopf] which our grandfathers fastened to the backs of their heads, and often enough also to the backside of their understanding? So, it seems that however little we may seem old-fashioned and grandfatherly-honorable to ourselves in other matters, in one respect we are nevertheless the worthy grandsons of these grandfathers, we last Europeans with a good conscience: we, too, still wear their pigtail.” We still carry our grandfather’s pigtail of virtue on and especially in our heads. One may wonder whether Nietzsche already had a notion about the importance of amygdala for emotions that we cannot explain and now perhaps even virtues. We are looking for the origin of the social grammar. Perhaps this pigtail of history and evolution shows where the social grammar originates, in the history of man’s development, in the evolution of man and of community. Parts of our social grammar may consist of remnants of values that evolved in periods during the evolution of communities that we have either no evidence or only very circumstantial evidence of. The deepest and most durable elements of our social grammar may very well be a result of this evolution, all of it. Some of our fundamental notions of and feelings about morality will have origins hidden so deep in our evolution that we can only transmit them from generation to generation as habits and inclinations we are not even aware of, and if we are, then we cannot give any explanation for them. We may of course guess as to their possible purpose and function, but in fact it might be even more difficult to explain why we should have certain moral dispositions than it would be to explain why we have the morphology that most human beings have today. Why this relation among the different parts of our bodies and not another? Why this number of fingers, this placement of the eyes, the larynx and so on. Such a question might even sound curious, but a similar question with regard to our basic moral dispositions would sound even curiouser. Might we not be fairly confident in assuming that, although many other configurations might have been possible, the configuration that we have is consistent and important to a degree that we may only begin to comprehend. It is not arbitrary; there is a “reason” but we may never be able to comprehend it. The “reason” has been produced and reproduced during man’s evolution, transmitted from generation to generation, leaving an echo in somatic markers, deeply held convictions and in cultural habits. This reason is not transcendental, is not given a priori and it does not represent a decree from God. It is located on the earth, in man. Like God and the transcendental this reason has been produced by man, but we can have no recollection of the process; we may only carry the faint imprint in our feelings and reactions. This does mean that this reason is innate; it may be imprinted in other ways, and if it is hardwired in any sense it might be in the neural network of our brain. This reason acts as the field of an invisible magnet on iron particles, orientating us into patterns or into grooves that we cannot comprehend. These patterns, grooves or imprints are ineffable and tacit, in the same way that a part of our knowledge is. We only experience the feelings, not the reasons, not the explanations. These imprints may be so much part of what it means to be human that we cannot really think about them or question them; they make themselves felt in the way they influence our thoughts. The elements of the grammar we become aware of may likewise be regarded as “natural” intuitions, natural in the sense that we suppose they are shared by other human beings. Perhaps we assume that we may be able to learn an infinite number of social grammars, but the one we learn is the one characterising our community. In this way social and ethical grammar come to be shared among the members of a community. Like the linguistic grammar it is neither freely chosen nor arbitrary, but the result is that “human thoughts … run along pre-ordained grooves.” It is in these “natural” imprints we locate the roots of those intuitions that philosophers have grappled with and attempted to anchor in first principles; attempts that we have to regard as rather futile in the light of our theses. If the imprints are not a result of transcendental a priori categories, or God-given commands, or innate dispositions, they have to stem from somewhere else. The imprints we are talking about seem to exist independent of any specific individual, but where do they originate, and what has kept them alive during the evolution, if they are not located in the genes? The answer is of course the values instilled and transmitted from grandfathers to fathers, to sons and to their sons; the values instilled by a community of grandfathers – and grandmothers. This points to the importance of symbolic representations, of rituals, of religious convictions and of ideologies This would mean that repetition of rituals, the meaning of which might elude us, would by the sheer repetition lead an individual subject to these repetitions to absorb the general aspects of the social grammar, without being able to explain what they are. This represents once again a parallel to the first acquisition of linguistic grammar. In a sense it can be said that we learn the grammar by repetitive use of a language based upon this grammar. We seem able to generalise from this repetition, but we may never have understood explicitly any of the fundamental rules underlying our use of the language. We do not learn the grammar directly by being taught social grammatical rules; we learn it indirectly from people who use it, by imitating, by approval and disapproval, expectations, praise, and so on.66 The importance of ritual is also underlined in Bourdieu’s writings. His concept of habitus represents a set of dispositions that disposes an individual member of a community to judge, act and react in certain way. “Symbols are the instruments par excellence of ‘social integration’: as instruments of knowledge and communication …, they make it possible for there to be a consensus on the meaning of the social world, a consensus which contributes fundamentally to the reproduction of the social order. ‘Logical’ integration is the precondition of ‘moral’ integration.”68 Social inculcation through participation in a collective practice produces habitus “that are capable of generating practices regulated without express regulation or any institutionalized call to order.” Practices showing up in social habits, habitus, rituals and so on are all part the imprints left in us of the evolution of man and community. This essay is based upon an excerpt from my book “Beyond rules in society and business” Edward Elgar 2002 & 2204. Was überzeugt mich denn, daß der Andere ein gewöhnliches Bild dreidimensional sieht? – Daß er’s sagt? Unsinn–wie weiß ich denn, was er mit dieser Versicherung meint? Nun, daß er sich darin auskennt; die Ausdrücke auf das Bild verwendet, die er auf den Raum anwendet; sich vor einem Landshaftsbild benimmt, wie vor einer Landschaft, etc. etc. Ludwig Wittgenstein Hog futures have declined in sympathy … The subtitle is taken from a radio announcement in DeLillo’s book White Noise.1 It made me wonder how much knowledge is taken for granted.2 Most educated people at least in the developed countries would probably have some gist of understanding what this announcement could mean and be able to attach some sense to it. A child listening to an announcement like this might only understand the expression “hog,” and part of the rest of the expression, which ends with: “adding bearishness to market.” An educated person might understand most, but have some trouble with futures, perhaps having only the vague notion that it is somehow related to the stock exchange, to certain television programmes and special pages in the newspaper. “Bearishness” might also give trouble, but with all the interest in prices of shares and derivatives, he or she might even have an understanding of that. To those selling and buying futures the announcement is immediately understandable, although perhaps they wonder with what the futures have declined in sympathy. The announcement might lead them to take action in reaction to the news, selling their futures, whatever. To a farmer in the hog business the announcement might mean something else, and might even galvanise him into action, perhaps leading him to make decisions resulting in long-term changes in the production of hogs. There are many levels of understanding, and it would seem that in order to understand the announcement the recipient would have to draw on a vast storage of preconceived notions. The announcement may be compared to a coded message that can be picked up by a recipient with the right decoding apparatus; not only an apparatus that would make it possible to make sense of the phonemes. The apparatus would have to consist of stored knowledge that would make it possible to understand the meaning of expressions like hog, hog futures, decline, sympathy, bearishness and market, and the possible relations between these expressions. The argot of the stock exchange demands an implicit understanding with the recipient, because such an announcement is usually not accompanied by a very detailed explanation of what hogs, futures and sympathy means, or indeed what the whole expression might mean. Some sort of taken-for-granted knowledge is necessary in all human communication. There is never enough information in the expressions we use to make them self-explanatory.3 Context and prior knowledge are necessary. This goes to show that our everyday language rests upon a lot of built-in tacit assumptions or we would not even know what it means when someone says: “It is raining.” In order to understand common expressions we have to possess some kind of taken-for-granted knowledge. Usually we do not have to think about this knowledge, it just seems to be readily available. Knowing more than one can say … Take a look at a skilled mountain biker, picking his way down a difficult slope. Does he know what he is doing? In a particular sense certainly, or he would not be able to stay on his bike. In another sense perhaps not. He may not be able to explain what he is doing very well. He is speeding down a complicated cross-country track without really thinking about what he is doing, letting some part of his mind and body adjust to the varying conditions without consciously thinking about what should be done. If he had to think of how a sudden obstacle could be tackled, he would either react too late or attempt an evasive manoeuvre bound to result in a fall. This I believe to be a plausible result taking into account the time it takes for the obstacle to register in the brain, the time to think consciously about the problem and then react by transmitting messages to various parts of the body, causing muscles to contract, making the knees bend, and the body sway this way or that, ultimately shifting balance and so on. He seems to have the problem well in hand. In fact it is as if he is thinking with his hands or perhaps the whole body, without being involved in too much conscious thought. Libet’s experiment in the 1980s confirms at least part of this supposition. Libet made experiments in which he asked volunteers move their hands whenever they wanted to, while he was measuring the activity of the test subject’s brain. It turned out that brain impulses associated with the movement of the hand began a few hundred milliseconds before the test subject reported any intent to make a movement. This would mean that the “voluntary action did not originate consciously.”7 In the case of the skilled mountain biker it would seem that part of the brain handles processes and initiates actions independently of conscious thought. This seems to happen all the time when we move around, pick up things, write, play an instrument. A special report on this phenomenon in the New Scientist carried the heading: “Don’t look now there’s someone else running your body.”8 In a fairly naïve way this is evidently right, at least for some of our motoric activity; we do not have to think consciously about walking in order to walk, except possibly when inebriated or handicapped in a certain way. We are interested in other aspects though, such as the tacit foundation of our knowledge and judgements. “We say: ‘Take this chair’ and it doesn’t occur to us that we might be mistaken, that perhaps it isn’t really a chair, that later experience may show us something different.”9 But ask someone to describe a chair, and he might get into trouble. When asking this question, or rather asking in Danish for a general description of a stol, typical answers range from “Something to sit on” to “A horizontal plane supported by four legs, and perhaps with a back.” Often the respondents describe a chair as consisting of a seat back, a seat and maybe four legs. This does not characterise all chairs. Some modern chairs have one or three massive legs for instance, in fact the definition found would exclude a lot of chairs. Sometimes chairs might be so strange that we only recognise them as chairs in relation to their surroundings, in their context so to speak. What is important is that we may not be able to give a general description of a chair that would cover all chairs. In order to recognise something as a chair we need a lot of context and some tacit, gestalt-like perception of what we have come to regard as chairishness. Even the chair legs themselves would be impossible to define if they are not seen in relation to the rest. We really would not know what was meant. Legs are only relevant in relation to the rest, to the context. That means we only understand them as attached to chairs, tables, persons or as the legs of a journey. In fact we rely on something reminding us of a gestalt or a patterned definition, perhaps like the way a chess player may describe patterns in a game of chess.12 This means that our concept of what constitutes a chair refers to a whole gestalt-like complex of meanings and interpretations relating to it. Recognising something as a chair fit for sitting on demands more than just recognising the chairishness of the form. Somehow we also seem able to see that a certain configuration has a certain solidity. I am not sure that a chair constructed of single sheets of normal copying paper glued together in the shape of a chair would be seen as chair. Instead it might be seen as a model of a chair, a paper chair, or perhaps as a piece of art. The notion of solidity is presumably based on former experience with the solidity of materials like the ones apparently used for constructing the object, the chairishness of which we are judging. Somehow our skill to judge the ability of a chair to support our weight must be based on all sorts of hands-on experience and tacit calculations that we are unaware of. “The expert performer knows how to proceed without any detached deliberation about his situation or actions, and without any conscious contemplation of alternatives.”13 This fits well with Polanyi, who asserts that it is a well-known fact “that the aim of skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the person following them.”14 This is exactly the level of performance most of us have attained in order to cope with everyday problems. We recognise patterns, pictures, signs, faces and facial expressions without thinking and analysing at length.15 “When we turn our eyes to the face of another human being, we often seek and usually find a meaning in all that it does or fails to do. Grins, sneers, grimaces, and frowns, fleeting smiles and lingering stares, animated faces and poker faces are not merely utilitarian contractions and relaxations of the muscles, but glimpses into the heart of the other – or so it seems.”16 We may understand “fleeting” and “lingering” in relation to facial expressions, but can we explain what the expressions mean precisely? Presumably not and still we seem to be able to read a lot into a facial expression, and make some quick inferences. That facial expressions are understood may be inferred from the reactions we show, looking for dangers if we see fear in another face, reacting with fear if we see angry expression or echoing the knowing smile of someone who sees the same joke that we did.17 We understand words and noises without usually having to think consciously about their meaning. We use a large part of native language as expert performers. We drive bikes, and cars, like expert performers, negotiating every day obstacle courses without much conscious thought. Spending much of our time thinking that some of our fellow rush-hour travellers are morons driving with their heads under their arms. What these examples indicate is that from a certain level of performance we all depend upon some kind of tacit knowledge we are not really aware of. “In some cases, we were once aware of the understandings which were subsequently internalized in our feeling for the stuff of action. In other cases, we may never have been aware of them. In both cases, however, we are usually unable to describe the knowing which our action reveals.”18 In a study of the professional knowledge of nurses Josefson describes a case involving a middle-aged nurse, with many years of experience. In this case a man is admitted to her ward after surgery. After having a short conversation with the patient the nurse concludes that there is something wrong with him, although she cannot put her finger on what exactly it is that has convinced her of that. She calls a doctor, apparently someone with only little experience. He checks the patient’s vital signs and finds nothing wrong. “Later in the day, the patient died, and the post mortem uncovered a complication that could not have been diagnosed by an examination of his vital signs. The nurse’s comment was that she noticed something was out of the ordinary, but could not explain how she had arrived at this conclusion.”20 Previous experience was a decisive factor. Care is central in a nurse’s profession and Josefson mentions that nurses receive theoretical training that inculcates important medical knowledge and information. But this is not enough in a non-routine situation, or as Josefson sees it, when there are unexpected complications. “To deal with this degree of complexity nurses must have the ability to make a reasonable interpretation of events not covered by the descriptions in the rule book. This requires multi-faceted practical experience, through which the information acquired through formal training can be developed into knowledge. That knowledge is built up from a long series of examples which give different perspectives on an illness.”21 One may ask whether we can learn this kind of knowledge. Wittgenstein’s answer is: “Yes; some can. Not, however, by taking a course in it, but through ‘experience’. – Can someone else be a man’s teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right tip – This is what ‘learning’ and ‘ teaching’ are like here. – What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgement. There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating rules.”22 Recent research on what has been called naturalistic decision making seems to confirm that Wittgenstein had the right idea. In empirical research it has been shown that situated and contextual learning are important for developing expertise, and insight. “[C]ontext provides examples of the conditions that call for actions, the range of permissible actions, and the consequences of actions. It provides opportunities to develop tacit knowledge about subtle features of the situation …”23 “But I have it in my hands” the branch manager of a Danish bank exclaimed after showing the miserable result of an attempt to write a description for making a Windsor knot in a tie. He was frustrated because he knew how to tie his tie into a Windsor knot, but he was not able to make a description of how it was done, even though his hands seemed to know what to do. The tie problem may seem naïve compared with the problems that branch managers and employees of banks have to solve every day, but when they are deciding whether to lend money to a given customer or not, they apparently often find it necessary to go beyond the written instructions, and use knowledge based on experience, vague perceptions and impressions. “It is very difficult just to walk through the swing door and rate a company the first time. One has to have some experience, some knowledge, one has to have some understanding, some impression of what kind of company it is …”26 A branch manager agrees: “As I am often saying, this it not something that one can pronounce, it consists in looking at people, look deep into the eyes, what kind of person is this?”27 Experience, knowledge, understanding, impression, a look deep into the eyes. The terms used are fairly vague. It is not something that can be easily incorporated into a set of guidelines or rules for credit-rating. In fact some of the employees interviewed said that in their opinion they had to go beyond the written instructions, when credit-rating a company. “… much of it is subjective reflections.”28 It is based on a judgement involving written instructions, impressions and inexplicable notions. An area manager talks of the need to be able to get a scent, almost like a tracker dog, when talking to the customer, apparently also listening for the things that are not said. “I am in the habit of saying that one shouldn’t rely on what one is seeing. No, one must use all one’s senses, it has to include Fingerspitzengefühl. The hairs at the back of one’s neck have to bristle, when sitting with someone who is dangerous.”29 Dangerous in the sense that the bank may lose money on that person, if they are persuaded by his business plan. In another bank an employee says that making decisions “has much to do with trust, and this here ‘Fingerspitzengefühl’, also in everyday transactions.”30 Scents, impressions at the tip of one’s fingers, bristling hairs at the back of one’s neck, trust, what kind of knowledge is that? Even CEOs seem to rely on such strange sensations. The CEO of one Danish bank trusts his nose and his guts to give him an idea of how well a branch is run. He talks of relying on structured and unstructured information, from many sources when judging the branches and their managers. All these structured and unstructured impulses decide “whether I have or I haven’t a good feeling in the gut.”31 It would seem that when judging a customer and credit rating a company, bank managers and employees rely on aspects of knowledge they cannot really explain, but which manifest themselves in feelings, impressions and physical signs like bristling hair, conditions of the stomach and taste; in a way thinking with their hands and judging with their guts, as if they possessed some kind of body knowledge. It is important to note though that the impressions and feelings influencing credit rating were apparently used alongside more explicit information and knowledge when making a decision. When stating the reasons for the decisions in writing the emphasis would be on the formal knowledge, on the reference to rules, guidelines and numbers so to speak. In fact one sometimes got the impression that the decision of whether to lend money to certain customers would be based mostly on impressions, experience with the customer and be clothed in more rational terms afterwards, with explicit references to credit instructions and so forth. Bristling hair, Gefühl, gut feelings and taste are translated into terms of formal knowledge and almost algorithm-like reasoning. In this way the decisions are seen as resulting from such algorithm-like reasoning processes, but it is important to remember that these reasons are constructed after the decisions have been made. It would seem that tacit knowledge is important for making professional decisions, but one feels weary using this knowledge in arguments for a certain decision. Instead making it look as if explicit or formal knowledge is the only form of knowledge used in making the decisions. Pointing to something that one cannot put one’s finger on, or using expressions that may sound as if one’s body and not the brain is the place where the ability to make judgements resides, somehow seems irrational and must be covered up in the written reasons given for a decision. Tentative knowledge of knowledge While writing about all these examples and reading and thinking about them at the same time, hitherto strange, unconnected lumps of knowledge about knowledge seemed to coalesce in ways beyond the control of my consciousness. They popped up and disappeared, combined and separated and made new conscious blobs of often fleeting thoughts, like the kind of tentative drafts that emerge, are pushed about, connected and correlated with what one already knows. Often the whole process involves the physical action of finding a theoretical fragment in an article or book, and/or actually the drawing of sketches of what might be termed a semantic network, or in a modern parlance mindmap, looking for relationship, inconsistencies, while the mental sketches change, under the influence of what is now stated on a piece of paper or a computer screen. During one of the sketch drawing sessions, the thought that this could somehow be related to Dennett’s multiple drafts model of consciousness also popped up. “According to the Multiple Drafts model, all varieties of perception – indeed, all varieties of thought or mental activity – are accomplished in the brain by parallel, multitrack processes of interpretation and elaboration of sensory inputs. Information entering the nervous system is under continuous ‘editorial revision’.”34 Dennett’s examples concern perception, for instance visual perception. Most of these multiple drafts or sketches as we call them “play short-lived roles in the modulation of current activity.”35 These sketches, hastily caught on pieces of paper and in elaborate verbal sketches on the computer screen, somehow lead to new sketches, alas often only vaguely related to each other. Even so the sketches seem to contain bigger and bigger lumps, and what emerges is a tentative structure for discussing the different aspects of knowledge in a more systematic way. The tentative typology containing some of the aspects we find important is shown in Table 4.1. Table 4.1 Tentative typology of knowledge What we can say In some of the former examples we have tried to show that one can know more than one can say. Let us now take a look at a kind of knowledge, where one can say what one knows. This knowledge is formal and can be stated explicitly. Declarative knowledge may be represented by statements about facts, relationships, causes and states. An example of a propositional statement might be the expression “the melting point of x-material is y-degrees.” Facts and formal rules used in building radios may represent propositional knowledge. Explicit procedural knowledge describes actions, for instance encoding how to achieve a particular result. An example might be the “Sieve of Eratosthenes,” a simple but tedious method for finding prime numbers.36 Although rather simple for people conversant with mathematics, many may have a problem understanding the meaning of a propositional statement and the Sieve of Eratosthenes may mean nothing to them, which just goes to show that although declarative or propositional knowledge can be expressed very explicitly, it stills demands a kind of implicit or taken-for-granted knowledge. What characterises formal knowledge is that it is overt and almost tangible, it can exist independently of an individual mind, as an expression in a book, or at an obscure Internet address. “The important thing about it is that, being formulated in texts, equations, and the like, it can be discussed, criticized, amended, compared, and rather directly taught. All this is in sharp contrast to the other kinds of knowledge …”40 There is no doubt about the importance of formal knowledge in modern society where most of the knowledge is “outsourced” and located outside us, in all sorts of storages. The question is instead whether the emphasis on formal knowledge erodes the more tacit parts of knowledge that we all depend on, but cannot see or touch or transmit or store in the same way that we can with formal knowledge. I believe that this actually is happening at the moment, as a result of the current emphasis on the explicit and algorithm-like aspects of knowledge. The silent patron In Fodor’s Modularity of the Mind we may find an illustration of the kind of knowledge that does not seem to be formal, although it is stated in a textbook. “Whether John’s utterance of ‘Mary might do it, but Joan is above that sort of thing’ is ironical, say, is a question that can’t be answered short of using a lot of what you know about John, Mary and Joan. Worse yet, there doesn’t seem to be any way to say, in the general case, how much, or precisely what, of what you know about them might need to be accessed in making such determinations.”41 The kind of knowledge that one would need in order to judge whether John’s utterance was meant ironically is difficult to state as formal declarative knowledge. It may represent an informal knowledge that a good friend of John, Mary, and Joan would possess, without really being able to state it explicitly. Most of the knowledge would also be tied to the specific relationships with the involved persons. Someone able to judge whether John’s utterance was meant ironically might not be able to do it if some unknown person had said it; meaning that the knowledge would be situated, except of course for a general ability to discern an ironical tone or lack of same, in an utterance, if we hear it spoken out aloud. In a series of lectures Polanyi in the 1960s tried to work out a whole structure of tacit knowing.42 His starting point is somewhat like ours, that we can know more than we can say. Polanyi shows that there is a certain structure to tacit knowing. Polanyi would say that we attend from the silent perception of the sounds to the meaning of the expression. Or in face recognition, from the silent recognition of particular features of the face to the face. We somehow use the elementary features of sounds or faces to get at their joint meaning. What Polanyi seems to be saying is that we go from particulars to what may be seen as a gestalt. We perceive the particulars of a chair, the legs, seat, back, size, material and so on, without conscious thought and from them we move to the overall gestalt, to the phenomenon, and to the meaning of these perceptions, to the chair. We recognise the chair as a chair without recounting all these particulars, which might be dissolved in even more particular particulars, if we start thinking about what makes up a chair. Now perhaps it is understandable that we have difficulties in giving an all encompassing definition of a chair. Even if we would somehow be able to recount all the tacit from relations, the particulars that give rise to the impression of a chair, we would have difficulty in defining a chair. We tacitly seem to integrate the particulars to a whole, a chair or whatever. “Since we were not attending to the particulars in themselves, we could not identify them.”45 Polanyi draws the conclusion that too much lucidity can in fact be counter-productive. “Scrutinize closely the particulars of a comprehensive entity and their meaning is effaced, our conception of the entity is destroyed. … Speaking more generally, the belief that, since particulars are more tangible, their knowledge offers a true conception of things is fundamentally mistaken.”46 In our chair example this would presumably mean that an attempt to define a chair by recounting all the features, the particulars as it were, would lead to a loss of comprehension of what a chair might be. Perhaps we may also hazard the hypothesis that an attempt to isolate and enumerate the qualities of leadership might lead to a loss of comprehension of leadership and even quality. Somehow those who see different chairs just as chairs must be able to ignore many aspects of the chairs. It is almost as if they reduce or discard information that is irrelevant to the problem at hand without being able to explain how they do it. I wonder whether this ability hints at an important aspect of expertise.48 In fact the breakdown of the world into particulars, legs, seat backs and seats may get us close to a kind self-willed autism. Autistics who have become able to describe their experience reported that they could not make sense of the world. They were focused, nay obsessed with the particulars of the world and these particulars represented meaningless fragments. An article in the New Scientist tells how a sufferer “could not see faces, just collections of noses, eyes and mouths. Words were just strange noises.”49 In other cases it looks as if missing parts are filled in in order to see something. This apparently happens when making sense of sentences that have lost parts in transmission. It may look as if the mind recognises something in a jumble of words or suddenly sees a meaning in an incomplete sentence, usually without much in the way of explicit analysis. With these qualifications in mind it is important to emphasise that attempts to list all the particulars would be futile. On every level and in every profession explicit knowledge rests on tacit knowing. This assertion is important because it flies in the face of many attempts of modern science, including social science and management science. “The declared aim of modern science is to establish a strictly detached, objective knowledge. Any falling short of this ideal is accepted only as a temporary imperfection, which we must aim at eliminating. But suppose that tacit thought forms an indispensable part of all knowledge, then the ideal of eliminating all personal elements of knowledge would, in effect, aim at the destruction of all knowledge.”50 Lumpy knowledge The knowledge of building radios may be distributed over many individual minds, and in books and articles and other repositories of knowledge. When we are building a radio, we are not just assembling bits and pieces of transistors, resistors, diode and so on, but also lumps of knowledge that we cannot explain, like the knowledge of constructing a transistor or a diode.The engineer constructing a radio must somehow operate withthese lumps of knowledge that has to be taken as given. The people designing the cabinet operate with other lumps of knowledge, while those responsible for the production and sale of the radio operate with their specific lumps of knowledge. Going in the other direction, we can see that integrated circuits are constructed and produced using lumps of knowledge that may be found in the construction and production of transistors. This knowledge may again include the lumps of knowledge of physicists working with basic research in different fields. Using the concept of stratified knowledge and hierarchy we can argue that when we are for instance talking or writing, we use knowledge of principles belonging say to phonetics or grammar, without thinking about it. It seems to be a kind of taken-for-granted knowledge that allows us to concentrate on expressing a thought while a more tacit part of our mind takes care of grammar, spelling of words, phonemes and so on, and our hand presses keys that make some filtered version of our thoughts appear on screen, without much conscious intervention from us. Polanyi sees this stratified knowledge as a hierarchy of entities, in which the laws, rules or principles of one level operate under the control of the level above. The voice is shaped into words belonging to a vocabulary, while the vocabulary is shaped into sentences according to the rules of a grammar, and so forth. It is important to note the use of the word “shaped.” This means that the lower level is somehow controlled by the next higher. If the sentences lose control of the words the succession of words may become meaningless. The vocabulary cannot be accounted for by the laws governing phonetics, but in order to talk, the laws of phonetics must somehow be observed. “Accordingly, the operations of a higher level cannot be accounted for by the laws governing its particulars forming the lower level. You cannot derive a vocabulary from phonetics; you cannot derive the grammar of a language from its vocabulary … it is impossible to represent the organizing principles of a higher level by the laws governing its isolated particulars.”51 Knowledge of the radio “shapes” the use of integrated circuits and transistors. A jumble of integrated circuits or transistors would not work as a radio, unless we were very lucky. A chair cannot be derived from particulars of legs, seats, knowledge of materials and so on, because “it is impossible to represent the organizing principle of a higher level by the laws governing its isolated particulars.” Poincare once said that science is built up with facts, as a house with stones. But a collection of facts is no more a science than a heap of stones is a house.52 Emergence Emergence describes the phenomenon that patterns, structures and properties can arise in a way that cannot be adequately explained by referring only to the pre-existing components and their interaction. All the same a radio, as well as a chair, emerges from the local interactions between the already known components. Even so a radio cannot be adequately explained by components like transistors, resistors or other of the components it may include. Emergent patterns are unpredictable and not deducible from the preexisting components. Many social phenomena seem to be a result of emergence, for instance markets, states, communities, cultural and social trends. Somewhat analogous to the example with speech we may presume that the higher levels have to obey the laws of the components, but at the same time the higher level influences the lower level components. The market is a collection of individual agents and behaviours but it also influences the behaviour of these agents.55 Perhaps emergence may in some vague way help us to understand the emergence of new knowledge, beginning with a hunch. Often when attempting to get to grips with something we have a hunch, but what kind of knowledge is a hunch? Apparently it just pops up like a flickering will-o’-the-wisp. When we attempt to follow the weak light, it may turn out to be nothing, or it may be the first step we are aware of when solving a problem or understanding something for the first time. It is as if a hidden and silent patron in one’s mind wants to help, by leaving a clue here and there for me to see, the me that is aware, to pick up and work with. Or by collecting a ready-made solution from some forgotten shelf of one’s memory and leaving it at the doorstep of my consciousness, for me to use, without offering any further explanation. Or by suddenly presenting a new thought in one’s consciousness. While being immersed in an attempt to understand something, for instance tacit knowledge, a new idea suddenly presents itself, a thought one has never had before makes itself heard in the cacophony of thoughts.56 In relation to a question concerning values Polanyi argued that “when originality breeds new values, it breeds them tacitly, by implication; we cannot choose explicitly a set of new values, but must submit to them by the very act of creating or adopting them.”57 Just now I have a hunch that the whole concept as presented here, simple and complex at the same time, is perhaps not entirely convincing. While writing this I was having fragments of several thoughts alternating in the mind at the same time, but one thing is certain I was not thinking about the computer I am sitting in front of, the keyboard, the keys, the work of my hands and fingers, nor the construction of words and sentences according to I know not what rules. This all seems to works automatically without intruding upon the conscious thoughts that I have. This cannot be said to represent a from–to relation in Polanyi’s sense. In fact this seems closer to the thoughts on thinking and knowing in Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. For instance when he writes: “Beobachte dich beim Schreiben, und wie die Hand die Buchstaben formt, ohne daß du es eigentlich veranlaßt. Du fühlst wohl etwas in deiner Hand, allerlei Spannungen und Drücke, aber daß die dazu nötig sind, diese Buchstaben zu erzeugen, davon weißt du nichts.”58 In a way I am moving in the opposite direction of the from–to relation, from the to part, the gestalts in the shape of my thoughts, to the from part, the particulars, the hand and finger movements, the words on the screen, the checks of spelling and grammar. My thoughts somehow dissolve in the intricate workings of tacit skills, using the keyboard, tactile and visual feedback, to adjust position and place letters on the screen, where they assemble in expressions that seem to result from my thoughts, although in an odd way they seem to be a little different from what I was thinking. Grammar, syntax and other things may influence what I am writing, filtering out thoughts that are difficult to express or form into sentences. Perhaps this explains why the thoughts appear to come out different than the thoughts I seem to be aware of. Community and heritage At least part of the knowledge that we find in our use of a common language seems to be based upon a kind of shared common or social knowledge. We usually come to think of the same things when we hear certain words in a certain context. “It is raining;” “This is a luxury car;” “I noticed the bike was yellowish;” “It bubbled like boiling water.” In this case we are able to “make inductions in the same way as others do in the world of concerted action.” 61 In some way it would seem that almost all of our knowledge is social. “Luxury”and “yellowish” would seem to be expressions that rely on some kind of common conception of what is meant. Wittgenstein gives support to this idea. “Wenn die Menschen nicht im allgemeinen über die Farben der Dinge übereinstimmten, wenn Unstimmigkeiten nicht Ausnahmen wären, könnte es unseren Farbbegriff nicht geben. Nein: – gäbe es unsern Farbbegriff nicht.”62 But is that not the case for most of what we call knowledge? This community aspect of knowledge also seems to be implied in common sense. Several times we have asked participants in our courses on value-based leadership and management to answer the question: What is “sound reason?” They were also asked whether it was common to all. Many answered that sound reason was individually determined and different from person to person. Others realised that there was an element of community in it, with quiet adjustments to the views of the majority, as can be seen from the answer: “Sound reason can be said to be the decision, that will win general approval with the great majority of a representative sample of a population.”64 Still the majority felt that their sound reason was individual and different from the sound reason of others, perhaps in a curious way this is an impression they also have from the community they are living in and the organisation they are working in. It has become part of their shared and tacit cultural knowledge. One is reminded of a chorus of people shouting: “We are all individuals,” in a Monty Python movie. “Cultural skills include the ability to make inductions in the same way as others in the world of concerted action. It is our cultural skills that enable us to make the world of concerted behaviour. We do this by agreeing that a certain object is, say, a Rembrandt, or a certain symbol is an s. That is how we digitize the world. It is our common culture that makes it possible to come to these agreements that comprises our culture.”65 “Our faith is faith in some one else’s faith, and in the greatest matters this is mostly the case. Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for each other – what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire, in which our social system backs us up?”66 It is supposed that most of the shared or social knowledge described here would consist of tacit taken for granted knowledge. But knowledge is not only social; in our view it is also inherited from earlier generations, like the language we use, the traditions we observe, the rites we follow, the values we hold, the culture we express. Wittgenstein expresses the idea like this: “Mein Weltbild habe ich nicht, weil ich mich von seiner Richtigkeit überzeugt habe; auch nicht weil ich von seiner Richtigkeit überzeugt bin. Sondern es ist der überkommene Hintergrund, auf welchem ich zwischen wahr und falsch unterscheide.”68 The cell walls of our minds I wonder whether there is another sense in which knowledge might be said to be tacit than the ones we have discussed up until now. Think for instance of standing in the kitchen mixing some ingredients. Often it is important that the mixture has the right degree of viscosity, or fluidness, but when is that achieved and how does one achieve the right viscosity by adding more ingredients? The answer might be that one learns to sense when this is the case almost in the same way that one learns to tie a knot in a tie. But might there not be a something else helping us, perhaps even the mixture itself? To Brown et al. the answer to this question is affirmative. They see problem solving as being carried out in conjunction with the environment, not solely inside the heads of the problem solver. “Instead of taking problems out of the context of their creation and providing them with an extraneous framework, JPFs [Just Plain Folks] and practitioners seem particularly adept at solving them within the framework of the context that produced them. This allows them to share the burden – of both defining and solving the problem – with the task environment as they respond directly to emerging issues. The adequacy of the solution they reach becomes apparent in relation to the role it must play in allowing activity to continue.”72 Bates mentions the examples somewhat like these and called them cooking problems. The examples are from the work of Lévi-Strauss and concern the seemingly deep principles that underlie cooking and eating of foods across cultures. Bates concludes by noting “that the universal facts reside in the structure of the cooking problem, and not in the environment per se. Such task structures … lie neither in the organism nor in the environment, but at some emergent level between the two.”73 The classic example would be the creation of the hexagonal structure of the honeycombs found in beehives. This almost perfect hexagonal structure need not depend on a kind of architectural intelligence, or innate geometrical instinct of the bees. Instead it is the inevitable outcome of the packing principle, the physical laws governing the behaviour of spheres being packed under pressure from all sides. “The bees ‘innate knowledge of hexagons’ need to consist of nothing more than a tendency to pack wax with their hemispherical heads from a wide variety of directions.”74 Could this perhaps be compared to for instance the operation of the market. No one needs to have much tacit nor explicit knowledge of the market. Market forces determine the result behind the back of the individual actors in a market. On the basis of these arguments might one dare suggest that an attempt to substitute the packing principle or the market would demand, in the case of the bees, that every bee be endowed with a sense of geometry, and ability to calculate even better than it already can (for instance when communicating the distance and direction to flowers to other bees of the hive), and in the case of the market that human beings be endowed with an extremely comprehensive knowledge of economic relations and fantastic calculating abilities in order to create a command economy that would outperform the market. This essay represents work from my book “ Beyoond rules in society and business” Edward Elgar 2002 & 2004 . Notes 1 DeLillo (1984/1986) p. 149. 2 Before attempting to show the importance of tacit knowledge it is important to emphasise that when we are talking about knowledge we are painting with a broad brush, partly taking for granted what is meant by knowledge. In order not to leave too much to interpretation a few hints may be necessary though. In common usage one might discern between “know about” or knowledge and “knowhow” or skill, in other words between Wissen and Können. Here we see Wissen and Können as different aspects of knowledge and include both meanings. Ryle discusses “knowing how” and “knowing why” and shows the differences and parallelism in small examples. We may forget how to tie a reef knot, and forget that the German word for knife is Messer (Ryle 1949). According to the German Duden dictionary “können” may be regarded as “erworbenes Vermögen, auf einem bestimmten Gebiet mit Sachverstand, Kunstfertigkeit o. Ä. Etwas [Besonderes] zu leisten: sportliches, handwerkliches … While “Wissen” includes “Gesamtheit der Kenntnisse” that someone has, but also “Kenntniss, das Wissen von etw.: ein wortloses, untrügliches Wissen” (Duden 1996). Bereiter and Scardamalia mention that to a cognitive psychologist, knowledge would be formal or declarative knowledge, while skills would represent procedural knowledge (Bereiter & Scardamalia 1993). In Philosophische Untersuchungen Wittgenstein writes: “Die Grammatik des Wortes ‘wissen’ ist offenbar eng verwandt der Grammatik der Worte ‘können’, ‘imstande sein’. Aber auch eng verwandt der des Wortes ‘verstehen’ (Eine Technik ‘ beherrschen’).” (Wittgenstein 1953) part I, p. 150. 3 The letters in “It is raining” do not contain enough information to understand the expression without prior knowledge. It seems to be just a kind of shorthand convention. To see this one only has to read the absurd conversation about whether it is raining or not in DeLillo’s White Noise, (DeLillo 1984/1986), pp. 22–25. 7 Reported in Holmes (1998), p. 35. 8 New Scientist (5 September 1998). 9 Wittgenstein (1976), p. 397. 12 Black (1990). 13 Dreyfus (1987), p. 51. See also the discussion in Dreyfus (1997) and in Bereiter & Scardamalia (1993). 14 Polanyi (1958/1962), p. 49. 15 I suddenly see that what I have written here is similar to a thought found in Wittgenstein’s later work: “Wer ein Blick für Familienähnlichkeiten hat, kann erkennen, daß zwei Leute mit einander verwandt sind, ohne sagen zu können, worin die Ähnlichkeit besteht…” Wittgenstein (1980), p. 97. 16 Russell & Fernández-Dols (1997a), p. 3. 17 Frijda & Tcherkassof (1997), pp. 85ff. Compare with Wittgenstein’s remarks in Wittgenstein (1980), passim. 18 Schön (1983), p. 54. 20 Josefson (1987), p. 27. 21 Ibid., p. 26. 22 Wittgenstein (1958), parts II/XI. 23 Beach et al. (1997), p. 33. 26 Quoted in Petersen (1997). 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Quoted from interview made by members of CREDO in Jyske Bank A/S 1996. 31 Quoted from interview with the CEO of Jyske Bank A/S 1996. 34 Dennett (1991), p. 111. 35 Quoted in Dennett (1991), p. 258. 36 Hoffman (1998). 40 Bereiter & Scardamalia (1993), p. 62. 41 Fodor (1983), p. 88. 42 Polanyi (1967). 45 Polanyi (1967), p. 18. 46 Ibid., p. 18–19. 48 Expertise is discussed in a series of articles in Chi et al. (1988). 49 McCrone (1998). 50 Polanyi (1967), p. 20 51 Ibid., p. 36. 52 This is mentioned in Aitchison (1996), p. 12. 55 As an example of how individuals and community interact one may use the following: “When ants are looking for food, they walk to a certain distance from their nest, and then they go about randomly. When one of them finds food, it goes back to the nest, dispersing pheromones on its way. These pheromones attract other ants, which disperse more pheromones, and so on. In this manner, an organized ant-trail is formed, although no-one planned it in advance. It emerges from the collective behaviour of the individual ants. A significant point is that pheromones evaporate quickly, so that once the food is finished, the trail disappears. Perhaps we should learn from this how to let go of accepted institutions and modes of thinking once they have stopped serving their original purpose” (From an interview with C. Langton from the Santa Fe Institute found at http://www.santafe.edu/~cgl/). 56 A similar idea based on somewhat different arguments is presented by many cognitive scientists. Jackendorff argues that what happens in the brain is mostly unconscious. We only become aware of the result of the activities, or as Jackendorff would have it, computations. See for instance Jackendorff (1987) and Jackendorff (1994). 57 Polanyi (1967), p. xi. 58 Wittgenstein (1980), part II/49. 61 Collins (1990), p. 109. 62 Wittgenstein (1970), p. 351. 64 Results from a questionnaire used in Course 2 on Value-based leadership and management, Jyske bank A/S, 24. Silkeborg, November 1997. In a way they were saying in chorus, like the mob in Monty Python’s Life of Brian, “We are all individuals”. 65 Collins (1990), p. 109 66 James (1896/1987), p. 206. 68 Wittgenstein (1969), p. 15. See also Haller (1981), p. 65. 72 Brown et al. (1988), p. 14. 73 Bates (1984), p. 189. The is a topic that touches upon developmental psychology, as represented in the classical ideas of Waddington, Piaget and Vygotsky, and modern attempts as found in connectionist perspectives on development. See for instance Waddington (1957), Piaget (1952), Vygotsky (1978) and Elman et al. (1996). 74 Bates (1984), p. 189. Ship of fools by vcp, with inspiration from a “Springbrunnen” in Nuremberg Narrenschyff ad Narragonia
In the “The ship of fools,” published more than 500 years ago, Sebastian Brant, is imagining that mankind is assembled on a ship sailing through the sea of time bound for the imaginary land of Narragonia, the land of fools. Brant entertains his readers with more than a hundred small poems illustrating the follies of the people on board. Brant paints a picture of human beings acting not out of any greater sense of purpose, but out of self-love, low motives and stupidity. Fools giving in to the most base instincts and motives. Today’s Narrenschiff The fools occupying important positions on the present ship sailing through the sea of time bound for the imaginary land are the foolish and arrogant leaders of Western nations engaged in a proxy war in Ukraine. It is President Biden, with no real guts, but daring anyway, spurred on by his two whisperers, Blinken and Sullivan, with Biden acting “like a feather pillow, bearing the impression of the last person who sat on him.” President Macron with lots of exuberant verbal activity and little else. A confused and bewildered NATO General Secretary Stoltenberg, standing or rather bowing to Ukraine. A Mark Rutte tacking along, looking for a new job. A reluctant and anxious Chancellor Scholz, trying to sound more warlike that he is. Aggressive leaders of countries with no real influence on the ship of fool’s manoeuvres, like the Nordic countries, the Baltic states, and several other lesser gestalts. All accompanied by mainstream media screaming the “1984” slogan “War is Peace. More war then meaning more peace or what? No one taking notice of President Orban, or Premier Fico loudly yelling “Dangerous storm ahead,” or the ragged collection of miscellaneous out of tune academics. Let’s take a look at direction the ship of fools is heading. Pushing new assistance to Ukraine With the adoption of “H.R.8035 - Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024” in the House of Representatives on April 17, nearly 61 billion dollars has been made available for various kinds of U.S. support for the proxy war in Ukraine. Of cause, this also means a significant boost for the U.S. armament industry. On April 24 the Biden administration could therefore announce the first deliveries of significant new security assistance for Ukraine to tune of $1 billion, meaning new weapon deliveries. It “includes capabilities to support Ukraine's most urgent requirements, including air defense interceptors, artillery rounds, armored vehicles, and anti-tank weapons.” (see details below). Earlier NATO General Secretary Stoltenberg, had aired a proposal of “creating a 100 billion-euro ($108 billion), five-year fund for Ukraine in a push to get the alliance more involved in sending weapons to Kyiv.“ (Radio Free Europe). Boots on the ground? While Western leaders vehemently rejected President Macron’s ideas of troops on the ground in Ukraine, it is evident that there are already troops on the ground assisting Ukraine. This was also revealed in the Russian eavesdropping on the German officers discussing a Taurus missile deployment in Ukraine. Now Politico can reveal that the U.S. is considering sending more military advisors to Ukraine. Their mission: “The additional troops will support logistics and oversight efforts for the weapons the U.S. is sending Ukraine, according to four U.S. officials and a person familiar with the plans, who were granted anonymity to speak about a sensitive topic.” (Politico April 20, 2024). According to rumours there is talk of sending about 60 U.S. troops. Others have talked of sending European troops in similar roles. Not to be seen as troops from NATO, but as individual countries’ contributions to help Ukraine in unknown ways to make the most of the weapons sent to Ukraine. Just recently Stoltenberg admitted that military personnel was present in Ukraine, attached to their respective embassies. Various NATO members seem surreptitiously to put boots on the ground in Ukraine. Indicating that the U.S. and NATO are getting more involved in the war efforts in Ukraine. Are Western troops perhaps directly involved in using the sophisticated weapons system to hit Russian troops? Only letting Ukrainian troops push the final firing button. If that is the case, NATO troops must be seen as directly involved in fighting Russia. Fighter planes and rockets in the air Ukraine is waiting for the F16 fighter planes. According to Le Monde “The Netherlands has pledged to provide 24 units, Norway 22, Denmark 19 and Belgium an unspecified number. The first deliveries are expected in mid-2024”. Now it seems that the Ukraine pilots training to fly and fight with F16’s, are found to be relatively inexperienced. They are taking longer time to train. What is next, if that means that they won’t be able to fight the Russians effectively? Surreptitiously also putting western pilots, who may officially have left the service, into those planes. Again, involving NATO members directly in the fight against the Russians. Some time ago it was revealed that the U.S. had given in to Ukraine’s clamouring for long range ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) that can be used by the HIMARS rocket launchers already in Ukraine. The have a range up to 300 kms carrying a heavy warhead. For a long time, the U.S. has apparently warned Ukraine against attacks in Russia proper. Evidently the Ukrainians are not listening, and now there they are giving more weapons that can be used for such attacks. Nuclear weapons getting closer The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently told of a Polish bid to allow nuclear weapons in Poland. “This could happen several ways, including by hosting B61 nuclear weapons on its territory, certifying its F-35A aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, or assuming a more significant role in decision-making regarding NATO’s nuclear doctrine.” It is certainly not unexpected that such plans have led to a Russian reaction, with Russia threatening to attack Poland. “It is not difficult to assume that if American nuclear weapons appear on Polish territory, the corresponding objects will immediately join the list of legitimate targets for destruction in the case of direct military conflict with NATO,” said Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, according to Reuters. On a fool’s errand On gets the impression that Western leaders not have any kind of idea of how to end the war in Ukraine, are embarking on a fool’s errand like those in Sebastian Brandt’s “Ship of fools.” Not really knowing what they are doing and for what ulterior purpose. But their creeping escalation is in a struggle that involves combatants possessing the world’s biggest nuclear arsenals. Thus, their aimless escalating struggle may end in something destroying everything. Time to turn the ship around and find ways to de-escalate, and like we have argued previously, aim to freeze the war, perhaps agreeing to a kind of Korean solution, in order to change the dangerous course of the “ship of fools.” BTW, The Springbrunnen i Nuremberg carries this inscription: “Gewalt+Teknik und Resignation zertören das Leben, der Tod lacht Hohn.” New security assistance for Ukraine to tune of $ 1 billion Biden Administration Announces Significant New Security Assistance for Ukraine April 24, 2024 Today, following the passage of the national security supplemental which the President just signed into law, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced a significant new security assistance to urgently meet Ukraine's critical security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration's fifty-sixth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories to Ukraine since August 2021. This Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package has an estimated value of $1 billion and includes capabilities to support Ukraine's most urgent requirements, including air defense interceptors, artillery rounds, armored vehicles, and anti-tank weapons. The capabilities in this announcement include:
This package will surge munitions, weapons, and equipment forward to support Ukraine's ability to defend its frontlines, protect its cities, and counter Russia's continued attacks. With the bipartisan support of Congress, Ukraine can count on strong and resolute U.S. leadership to provide consistent security assistance support – together with some 50 Allies and partners – to ensure its brave defenders receive the critical capabilities needed to fight Russian aggression. (https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3754238/) ParaPumping up NATO with lofty words Stronger, bigger, and more united than ever? Secretary Blinken self-gratulatory view on the eve of NATO’s 75th anniversary: “The work tomorrow, the work at the summit is really about the next 75 and everything that we need to do now to ensure that this Alliance remains what it has been – as Jens [Stoltenberg] said, the most successful in history – a defensive alliance with no designs on the territory of any other country but with a determination to protect the territory of each of its members, and to do it in a way that is – has been unique in human history, based on the principle that we have each other’s backs, that if one of is the victim of aggression, all of us will be in to help. And that’s the most effective way to actually prevent aggression from happening in the first place, and to create an environment in each of our countries where people don’t have to worry about security in that sense and they can make the most of their lives and reach their full potential.” (state.gov.) No surprise that Russia has a different view of the alliance. Foreign Ministry spokeswomen saying “Today, in relations with Russia, the bloc has returned to Cold War settings” arguing that the NATO alliance had no place in today’s multipolar world. In one sense she is right isn’t she, today NATO – Russia relations have certainly returned to a cold war, a cold war that is as close as it has ever been to a hot war. And as for Blinken’s argument about an alliance preventing aggression and creating security, the opposite seems to be the case today. In fact, the foremost or perhaps only reason for seeing a need for the NATO alliance today is that that it wasn’t abolished, when it had become obsolete. At the time after dissolution of the Soviet Union, the opening up of Eastern Europe, the German re-unification and the possibility of an entente with Russia, supported by a belief in “Wandel durch Handel/Wandel durch Annäherung.” To see what happened take a look at these topics: NATO obsolescence years ago U.S. – bully in the schoolyard of nations NATO resuscitation with eastward expansion U.S. getting caught in its own trap The trap clicking shut with a world war looming NATO obsolescence years ago In 2017 President-elect Donald Trump certainly got the attention of political leaders in Europe when he said that NATO was obsolete. Apparently, his concern was not Russia, but the Europeans. They did not contribute their fair share to NATO. And he was right, wasn’t he? The NATO umbrella over the members countries in Europe was first and foremost a U.S. umbrella. Paid to large degree by U.S. tax payers. Trump’s grievances were perhaps not really with NATO, but with its freeriding European members. Later, in 2019, President Macron argued that NATO was “brain dead.” He was worried that Europe could no longer depend on the U.S. Arguing that Europe stood on “the edge of a precipice”, and that it needed to start thinking of itself strategically as a geopolitical power. Otherwise, we would “no longer be in control of our destiny.” (The Economist November 7, 2019). President Macron later argued that Europe should gain “military sovereignty” and open a dialogue with Russia. Failing to do so would be a great mistake. But NATO had lost its purpose much earlier and for a different reason. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the opening up of Eastern Europe, it had lost the reason for its own existence in the 1990s. According to NATO’s own historic reasoning “the Alliance’s creation was part of a broader effort to serve three purposes: deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration.” (nato.int) Looking at the 1990’s one might argue that there was no longer a need to deter Soviet expansionism. The Soviet Union was rapidly dissolving and descending into something that could not be seen to as threat to Europe or the U.S. Nationalist militarism in Europe had long disappeared, and European political integration was seen as having a glowing future, now that the Soviet Union had disappeared and Eastern Europe was poised to participate in the European political integration. Remnants of former times only remained in the Balkans. This is how a former CIA analyst and areas expert on Russia, with 30 years of experience, saw the time when the Iron Curtain came down: “As the Iron Curtain came down and the Soviet empire began disintegrating, the opportunity to construct a post-Cold War peace was there for the taking. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker assured Gorbachev in a Feb. 9, 1990 meeting that, following the unification of Germany, NATO would expand “not one inch eastward”… It’s difficult now to describe the feeling of those halcyon days. We who had chosen careers in the U.S. security apparatus enjoyed a sense of euphoria. The Cold War was coming to a peaceful conclusion without a catastrophic conflict, and we had played a small part in that historic turn of events. After the initial celebration, we increasingly realized that the world we had been born into had reached its end. It was time to rethink what national security meant in what was already being described by foreign policy wonks as a “unipolar world,” with the United States as the lone and dominant world power.” (Allensworth, Chronicles Magazine, March 2024). In other words, time to dismantle a NATO, as its original purpose had disappeared. Time for thinking of a whole new peace architecture in Europe, involving not the least the remnants off the former Soviet Union. Alas, although “the NATO bureaucracy lost the reason for its existence in the early 1990s”… [it] “carried on anyway, as bureaucracies are prone to do.” (Allensworth). Instead of a new peace architecture involving a Russia on equal footing, a totally obsolete NATO carried on, but at least peace was in the air, and thus NATO found a limited purpose for itself in creating something called “Partnerships for Peace” under its auspices. “On 27 May 1997, NATO leaders and President Boris Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act, expressing their determination to “build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.” The Act established the goal of cooperation in areas such as peacekeeping, arms control, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and theatre missile defence. In the Founding Act, NATO and Russia agreed to base their cooperation on the principles of human rights and civil liberties, refraining from the threat or use of force against each other or any other state.” (nato.int) Meanwhile the U.S. as the dominant force in NATO had it its own ulterior motives and plans for upholding and enlarging NATO as we shall see. U.S. – bully in the schoolyard of nations After 1990 that the U.S. realized that it had become the undisputed hegemon, the superstate, able to dominate everywhere. Intoxicated with its power it made plans for a “Pax Americana. Just listen to this: "Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia … There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” (pbs.org). This is an excerpt from a Defence Planning Guidance in February 1992. A secret memorandum by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz. The secret Wolfowitz 1992 memorandum, now partly de-classified, states that “after the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States may be said to be the world’s sole superpower, enjoying a predominance on the world political-military stage that is unprecedented in the last century” (Wolfowitz, National Security Archive, gwu.edu). But it had a choice… “With the Soviet Union gone, the United States had a choice. It could capitalize on the euphoria of the moment by nurturing cooperative relations and developing multilateral structures to help guide the global realignment then taking place; or it could consolidate its power and pursue a strategy of unilateralism and global dominance. It chose the latter course.” (Wolfowitz memorandum). Also, in relation to Europe, as it can gleaned from the memorandum: “The end of the Warsaw Pact, unilateral Soviet force reductions, and the CFE agreement [Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1992] go a long way towards increasing stability and reducing Soviet military threat to U.S. interests in Europe. The emergence of democratic, increasingly Western-oriented states in Eastern Europe is a development of immense strategic significance, and it is critical to U.S. interests in Europe to assist the new democracies in East/Central Europe to consolidate their democratic institutions and national independence. In this regard we must give particular attention to the problems of security and political and economic stability in Eastern Europe, in order to remove the potential for regional instability or Soviet reentry into the region.” (Wolfowitz memorandum). The memorandum foresees that developments in Eastern Europe will lead to different kinds of friction and an “appreciable risk of conflict” in the future. Conflicts that may not be contained to the conflicting parties alone, meaning presumable that the U.S. (and NATO) might become involved. Therefore, the memorandum argues, “A substantial American presence in Europe and continued cohesion within the western Alliance remain vital. This presence will provide reassurance and stability as the new democracies of Eastern Europe that are integrated into a larger and evolving Europe. While its mission may be changed in this new area, the North Atlantic Alliance remains indispensable to peace and stability in Europe.” (Wolfowitz memorandum). An article based upon classified material in the Washington Post in March 1992 entitled “Keeping the U.S. first,” reveals some of the scenarios that seem to have been almost prescient. Envisioning for instance a conflict involving an American led defense of Lithuania and Poland against an invasion by Russia. NATO resuscitation with eastward expansion Declassified material now found in a National Security Archive show at least part of the story of broken promises behind the NATO expansion eastwards. When U.S. secretary of State James Baker met with Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, he was one in a long row of Western leaders to assure the new Russia that NATO had no plans for an eastward expansion. “Not one inch eastward” Baker assured Gorbachev. Three times Baker is said to have assured Gorbachev that there would be no NATO expansion: “Neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place, … not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.“ (National Security Archive). During an Open Skies Conference in Ottawa in 1992, Baker also assured Russian Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: “And if U[nited] G[ermany] stays in NATO, we should take care about non-expansion of its jurisdiction to the east.” (Notes from the meeting, National Security Archive). “The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels.” (National Security Archive). German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, heavily involved in the German Re-unification process, made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.” (National Security Archive). Genscher may have been sincere and believed in the guarantees, others less so. At a decisive meeting in Moscow on February 10, 1990, between Chancellor Kohl and Gorbachev, Kohl achieved “Soviet assent in principle to German unification in NATO, as long as NATO did not expand to the east.” (National Security Archive). French President Mitterand also chimed in, arguing that he was personally in favour “gradually dismantling the military blocs” and demanded that the West should “certainly not refuse to detail the guarantees that he [President Gorbachev] would have a right to expect for his country’s security.” Prime Minister Thatcher seemed to be in favour of a transformation of NATO “towards a more political, less militarily threatening, alliance instead as a kind of umbrella and giving Russia the assurance that its security would be assured.” Finally, President Bush in a phone call assured Gorbachev: “So what we tried to do was to take account of your concerns expressed to me and others, and we did it in the following ways: by our joint declaration on non-aggression; in our invitation to you to come to NATO; in our agreement to open NATO to regular diplomatic contact with your government and those of the Eastern European countries … We also fundamentally changed our military approach on conventional and nuclear forces. We conveyed the idea of an expanded, stronger CSCE with new institutions in which the USSR can share and be part of the new Europe.” (George H.W. Bush Presidential Library). Thus, there were certainly enough verbal and written assurances from Western leaders, that President Gorbachev, and later Russian leaders, were led to believe that NATO would not expand eastwards. Taking a look back at the U.S. Pax Americana visions, one may suspect that the U.S. had ulterior designs for Europa and NATO, “Inside the U.S. government, a different discussion continued, a debate about relations between NATO and Eastern Europe. Opinions differed, but the suggestion from the Defense Department as of October 25, 1990 was to leave “the door ajar” for East European membership in NATO.” Though it seems that this a view was not shared by President Bush in 1990. Later though “leaving the door ajar” later became “an open door,” accompanied by a widening set of invitations to join NATO as we have seen. NATO expansion eastwards “Some say we no longer need NATO because there is no powerful threat to our security now. I say there is no powerful threat in part because NATO is there. And enlargement will help make it stronger. (President Clinton). “In 1991 as in 1949, NATO was to be the foundation stone for a larger, pan-European security architecture. In December 1991, the Allies established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. This forum brought the Allies together with their Central European, Eastern European, and Central Asian neighbours for joint consultations. Many of these newly liberated countries – or partners, as they were soon called – saw a relationship with NATO as fundamental to their own aspirations for stability, democracy, and European integration.” (A short history of NATO-declassified, nato.int). Here NATO found it new raison d'être, its new calling so to speak, given it a renewed vitality. A few years later the first countries from Eastern Europe joined NATO, apart from Eastern Germany that somehow became included in the re-unification. In 1997 President Clinton gave voice to NATO’s new mission: “To build and secure a new Europe, peaceful, democratic, and undivided at last, there must be a new NATO, with new missions, new members, and new partners. We have been building that kind of NATO for the last 3 years with new partners in the Partnership for Peace and NATO's first out-of-area mission in Bosnia. In Paris last week, we took another giant stride forward when Russia entered a new partnership with NATO, choosing cooperation over confrontation, as both sides affirmed that the world is different now. European security is no longer a zero-sum contest between Russia and NATO but a cherished common goal. In a little more than a month, I will join with other NATO leaders in Madrid to invite the first of Europe's new democracies in Central Europe to join our alliance, with the consent of the Senate, by 1999, the 50th anniversary of NATO's founding.” (presidency.ucsb.edu). The expansion eastwards may have been welcomed by the new members as a way to guarantee their inclusion the rest of Europe and the West. To paraphrase former President Clinton, the eastward expansion of NATO will help secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe, and provide a secure climate where freedom, democracy, and prosperity can flourish. It was hope shared by most countries in Europe and the West at the time. At a Washington NATO Summit in 1999 “three former Partners – Czechia, Hungary and Poland – took their seats as full Alliance members following their completion of a political and military reform programme. (A short history of NATO- declassified, nato.int). In March 2004 NATO moved even closer to Russia’s borders. Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became members of NATO. On April fool’s day in 2009, Albania and Croatia became NATO members. Fast forward to June 2017, when Montenegro became a member, and in 2020 Northern Macedonia, after Greece had finally accepted that it could become a member. The next step proved to have been a step to far for the U.S. and NATO. U.S. getting caught in its own trap Instead of a situation in 90’s really advantageous for creating a new security architecture with Russia as an equal partner, we now have proxy war in Ukraine. A proxy war that is more or less a direct result of the resuscitation of a NATO that had become irrelevant. In a sense the resuscitated NATO now seems to be slipping back into its old role as guardian against Russia, forcing unity on its members, and demanding “kriegstüchtigkeit.” Arming itself against self-imagined threat from a Russia that has become the new old enemy. So much for peace after the demise of the Soviet Union. How did that happen? The sad history of NATO and Ukraine At the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008 passionate members encouraged Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. “We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO …Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP [Membership Action Plan]. Therefore, we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications.” (NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008). Encouragement came from the Bush administration now eager to expand NATO. Ignoring warnings from Russia that Ukrainian member ship would force Russia to treat Ukraine as an enemy. Some western leaders still lacked conviction, with Germany and France blocking Ukrainian membership of NATO, arguing that Ukraine was not ready and perhaps also heeding Russian warnings. French Prime Minister Fillon arguing: “We are opposed to the entry of Georgia and Ukraine because we think that it is not a good answer to the balance of power within Europe and between Europe and Russia.” The issue of NATO membership then lay more or less dormant until the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the fighting in the Donbas. Previous lukewarm and Ukrainian public support for NATO membership slowly changed to public support for membership. Leading to Ukraine’s passionate press for NATO membership. In 2019 “The Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, … approved in its final reading a constitutional amendment that reflects the country's strategic goal of becoming a member of NATO and the European Union.” (Radio Free Europe). When President Zelensky visited President Biden in September 2021, he pressed Biden on the issue of NATO membership saying “I would like to discuss with President Biden here his vision, his government’s vision of Ukraine’s chances to join NATO and the timeframe for this accession, if it is possible; and the role the United States can play being involved in a peaceful settlement in Donbas that we would like to reach.” (The White House). Biden at the time seemed to lack conviction and remained noncommittal. Later becoming more passionate he voiced support for the Ukraine’s wish. In December 2021 Zelensky’s chief of staff told Reuters: "President Biden said very clearly that the decision on Ukraine's accession to NATO is the decision of the Ukrainian people only, this is a sovereign and independent Ukrainian state." An attitude certain to encourage Ukraine and anger Russia. Blind passion and ill-advised belief Is the present war in Ukraine a result of the U.S. almost messianic striving to bring peace and democracy by imprinting its idea of rules-based order upon the rest of the World? A few weeks after the new Secretary of State, Blinken, had been sworn in, he outlined his idea of “A Foreign Policy for the American People.” Saying: “We will renew democracy, because it’s under threat…But we will not promote democracy through costly military interventions or by attempting to overthrow authoritarian regimes by force. We have tried these tactics in the past. However well intentioned, they haven’t worked. They’ve given democracy promotion a bad name.” (Emphasis added). (Secretary of State Blinken, March 3,2021). A year later the U.S. is fighting a proxy war in Ukraine, to save what U.S. sees as a Ukrainian democracy, but perhaps first and foremost to humiliate or overthrow a Russian authoritarian regime by military means. So much for avoiding costly military interventions. How did that happen? When the U.S. Senate in 1998 overwhelmingly approved the eastward expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech, Republican Senator Joseph Biden Jr. said: “…this, in fact, is the beginning of another 50 years of peace, … "In a larger sense," he added, "we'll be righting an historical injustice forced upon the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians by Joseph Stalin." (Washingtonpost.com). No one listened to warnings of someone like George F. Kennan, the American diplomat and historian, who saw the expansion as a fateful error. “The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.” (NYT 1996). Wise words, but no match for the U.S. eagerness to bring democracy peace and prosperity to the eastern European states. Especially for the new Biden administration with its inexperienced but aggressive and un-diplomatic believers in Pax Americana. Thus, the question of Ukrainian NATO membership propped up again in 2021. A few days after President Biden had spoken to President Putin in an attempt to defuse the situation at Ukraine’s border, he assured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy that Kyiv's bid to join the NATO military alliance was in its own hands. Russian demands and NATO/U.S. arrogant rejection To Russia Ukrainian NATO membership was unacceptable. Russian grievances and the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO explains why Russia handed the U.S. and NATO a draft proposal for a new treaty on security guarantees (Dated December 17, 2021). Among the proposals is article 6: “All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States.” The leaked written answers to the Russian proposals from NATO and the U.S. gave no indication that Russia’s demands would be taken seriously. Here is part NATO’s reply to article 6 of the Russian Proposal: “All states respecting the right of other states to choose and change security arrangements, and to decide their own future and foreign policy free from outside interference. In this light, we reaffirm our commitment to NATO’s Open Door Policy under Article of the Washington Treaty.” (El País). The U.S. own reply likewise continued to firmly support NATO’s Open Door Policy In his reaction before the invasion of Ukraine, a visibly angry President Putin stated: “I would like to be clear and straightforward: in the current circumstances, when our proposals for an equal dialogue on fundamental issues have actually remained unanswered by the United States and NATO, when the level of threats to our country has increased significantly, Russia has every right to respond in order to ensure its security. That is exactly what we will do.” (en.kremlin.ru). Next, we had the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the strong reaction from U.S., followed a little later more timidly by Europe. The trap clicking shut with a world war looming A few days after Putin’s statement Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24,2022. The U.S. and NATO was drawn into a proxy war with Russia, leading to the re-revitalization of NATO eagerly promoted by the Biden administration and its suddenly scared European partners. Pumping up NATO with strong worded lofty statements, and setting aside billions for new armament. A dangerous escalation race is now on, spurred along by passionate and irresponsible voices. Take a speech by the Chair of the NATO Military Committee, The Dutch admiral Rob Bauer, in a security conference in Berlin: “For NATO, Russia’s pattern of aggressive and ruthlessly destructive behaviour has ushered in a new era of collective defence … We have developed several military strategies and plans that outline how we will protect ourselves - now and in the future - against the two main threats listed in the new Strategic Concept: Russia and Terrorist Groups.” What is new, and certainly scary, is that in order to strengthen collective defence and support Ukraine in its existential fight “we need a whole of society approach … We need public and private actors to change their mind-set, from an era in which everything was plannable… foreseeable… controllable… to an era where anything can happen at any time … Ready for war. Fit to fight.” With the West playing a major role in this escalation, stationing more and more troops and equipment closer to Russia’s borders. In Poland, in the Baltic region, in Romania, In Italy, In Spain and in the United Kingdom. For 2024 NATO is preparing to engage in large exercises like NATO’s “Steadfast Defender” with upwards of 90,000 soldiers involved and running for months. Or take the announcement that the U.S. is planning to place nuclear warheads at the RAF Lakenheath Airbase in the UK, in addition modernizing the nuclear arsenal placed in Belgium, Germany and elsewhere. In Orwell’s “1984. Oceania’s motto was “war is peace” We are getting there, with recent clamouring for involving all of society in preparations for war to avoid war. “This is our 1937 moment. We are not at war - but we must act rapidly so that we aren’t drawn into one through a failure to contain territorial expansion” (British Chief of the General Staff, Sir Patrick Sander, June 28, 2022). We know the result of such attitudes in 1914 and in 1939, so what can we expect now…? A change of attitude needed urgently. See for instance: Freezing the war in Ukraine? https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/freezing-the-war-in-ukraine Stalemate in Ukraine – and doubt is creeping in https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/stalemate-in-ukraine-and-doubt-is-creeping-in "Getting out of the Ukrainian quagmire? Part One" Part 2 https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/getting-out-of-the-ukrainian-quagmire-part-two "Getting out of the Ukrainian quagmire? Part One" https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/getting-out-of-the-ukrainian-quagmire-part-one No Taurus for Ukraine? On Thursday March 14, 2024, The German Bundestag again discussed the Taurus for Ukraine question, after Chancellor Scholz continued refusal to send long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine. After attacks from the CDU/CSU led opposition, the leader of SPD (The Social Democratic Party) in Bundestag, Dr. Rolf Mützenich, defended Chancellor Scholz’s decision not to send Taurus to Ukraine and derided the opposition. Freeze the War In a “don’t mention the war” moment he said: “I think we should focus on more important things… I also say in your direction – especially to those who to feel addressed by it –: Don’t we also need a clever debate on how we can involve countries, who interpret or instrumentalize the war in Ukraine differently from us, towards the goal of ending the war. Unfortunately – and we have to say this – Outside of Europe, many countries have a different look at this war. And that brings me to the question – in the Bundestag this is obviously often seen as shameful just to ask it –: Isn't it time we didn't just talk about how to wage a war, but also think about how one can freeze a war and later also end it? Aren't these questions also politically important?” (Emphasis added). (From Plenarprotokoll 20/157, Deutsche Bundestag). Mützenich also argued that support for Ukraine and the Zeitenwende for the West should not be subject to political games. Instead, reason, prudence and clarity were needed. “The Chancellor has supported Ukraine from the start and guaranteed the national security of our country. He has achieved both, and that needs appreciation and support and not insult, ladies and gentlemen. That's why I say it very clearly: “Zeitenwende” is not something for political games. Reason, prudence and clarity are needed, and that is what the Federal Chancellor has to consider in the decisions he has to make. To put it a little more clearly, so that you from the opposition can understand what it is all about… In October 2022, the American government feared the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine [By the Russia of cause]. That should make us sit up and take notice. Some were convinced back then that this possibility had to be taken into account… and we can be grateful that there is an American President in the White House, who, I believe, has sent all the necessary signals to Moscow. That's why I say very clearly: my group [in the Bundestag] provides the Chancellor with space for such prudent decisions and also for prudence in the international politics; because the contribution to international national security, and the security of Ukraine is bigger than any discussion about any weapon system, dear colleagues.” (Plenarprotokoll 20/157, Deutsche Bundestag). Outrage in Germany Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, chairman of the Bundestag Defence Committee, member of the FDP and thus belonging to the government coalition, was outraged. During the war in Ukraine, she never left anyone in doubt that she would support Ukraine with everything they might wish for and then some. Called “Kriegstreiberin” by her adversaries at the time of the Taurus debate, she prominently displayed a Taurus illustration on her blouse. She did not mince her words: “If that is the attitude of the Social Democrats, we will of course clarify that internally, then it is a paradigm shift … I am sure that Ukraine was just as horrified as all of us in the Bundestag when we heard that.” (Rheinische Post). The Green Party, with roots in earlier peace movements, but now almost as warlike as Strack-Zimmermann also criticized Mützenich. Green Party chief Nouripour: “Ukraine is not only defending itself, but also the security of Europe from the next Russian aggression ...We should be very clear about what is at stake: our peace and security in Europe.” (Rheinische Post). Annalena Baerbock from the Greens and Foreign Minister in the Scholz government had this somewhat strange argument against freezing the war in Ukraine: “What a freeze means for all the people who still have to live under Russian violence every day and every night…Women in particular repeatedly report about night time crimes committed by the Kremlin troops: "They don't know whether Russian soldiers will come to rape them again." That's why everything is being done to ensure that Ukraine can defend itself better” (t-online). Even Defence Minister Boris Pistorius from SPD distanced himself from Mützenich’s words about the war in Ukraine. “Freezing the conflict "would only help Putin in the end," said the SPD politician during a visit to the Polish capital Warsaw. It must always be about bringing about peace, "but there must not be a dictated peace," nor a "ceasefire or a freeze in which Putin emerges stronger in the end and continues the conflict whenever he pleases.” (Der Spiegel. March 18, 2024). Most disgusting German politician The always aggressive and outspoken former Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany, Andrij Melnyk, wrote this on X targeting Mützenich: “This guy was and remains the most disgusting German politician. Forever and ever.” (Dieser Typ war und bleibt der widerlichste deutsche Politiker. Für immer und ewig). Ridiculous discussion Chancellor Olaf Scholz, days later: “The debate in Germany cannot be surpassed in terms of ridiculousness,” said the Chancellor on Tuesday at the Europe 2024 conference in Berlin. “This is embarrassing for us as a country.” The discussion, which is primarily about the delivery of Taurus cruise missiles, is not understood outside of Germany. Scholz pointed out that Germany is Ukraine's second largest arms supplier. This must first be recognized, he demanded. He would like to see a debate in Germany that does not discredit prudence as hesitation.” (FAZ, March 19, 20224) Shifts in German opinion Perhaps Mützenich’s talk about freezing the war in Ukraine was a shrewdly calculated move, that may even have had the tacit backing of Chancellor Scholz. It could indicate that the Social Democrats have finally become aware that opinion about the war is shifting in Germany. A recent poll (Meinungsumfrage) may indicate this shift. In February 2024 64% of the population indicate that they think that the war in Ukraine is lost. Only 28% believe that a Ukrainian victory is possible, an opinion mostly found among supporters of the Greens. (Die Welt, February 13, 2024). A more recent poll also indicate another decisive shift. In answer to the question “Should Ukraine stick to the attitude, that negotiations with Russia should only take place after Russia returned the occupied areas of Ukraine? 45% said “Yes,” while 46% said “No, they should negotiate even though Russia might still occupy large areas of Ukraine.” Looking at answers from supporters of some of the parties we get this: (Source RTL Deutschland, March 19, 2024): AfD or Alternative für Deutschland is the right-wing party that has achieved around 18-19% in recent polls, more than the SPD, which has declined to around at 15-16%. The new socialist/realist BSW party (Bundniss Sarah Wagenknecht) sees rising acceptance, hovering around 7%. Both AfD and BSW are against sending weapons to Ukraine, instead they argue in favour of some kind of armistice followed by negotiations.
Leading Social Democrats may have seen the writing on the wall, and decided to test the waters, having Mützenich airing ideas of freezing the war in order to make negotiations possible. Evidently the Scholz government’s Ampel-coalition has serious a problem in relation to Ukraine support. With Social Democrats in population rather split on Ukraine. The Greens having a much more warlike attitude, advocating for weapons to Ukraine including Taurus and no negotiations. The third member of the so-called Ampel-coalition, FDP, also have views contrary to SPD, but due to their overall lack of support in the population (hovering about 4%), they may be less important. One wonders how this may play out. For the moment at least Chancellor Scholz is still using the often repeated, but increasingly meaningless words of support for Ukraine. In a Regierungserklärung in the Bundestag on March 20 he: “We will support Ukraine for as long as it is necessary. At the same time, we will ensure that NATO does not become a party to this conflict. And we will not accept a dictated peace at the expense of Ukraine. - These are the common three points that we have noted.” (Plenarprotokoll 20/159, Deutsche Bundestag). Note that he said “necessary” not the more usual “as long as it takes.” In the meantime: What is going on Ukraine? Those supporting Ukraine not least because it is a “real” democracy, may be erring. In The Freedom House measure of Ukraine’s democracy, the country achieves a score of 39,29 out 100, meaning that it characterized as a “transitional or hybrid regime.” (Freedom House, 2023). Thus, certainly not a real democracy. In a University of Würzburg ranking of “Quality of Democracy” Ukraine ends up as number 92 and is seen as a hybrid regime. Scoring below Burma/Myanmar, but above Sri Lanka – somewhat curious companions in democracy. The reality of those scoring measures may be in doubt, but this what we get from recent rankings. Even worse is the corruption ranking, with Ukraine ending up as number 104 out of 180 countries (https://cpi.ti-ukraine.org/en/). According to a recent article in Le Monde the Ukrainian opposition is increasingly critical of the Zelensky administration, which presumable means they are critical of President Zelensky “In recent months, several lawmakers belonging to the opposition parties Holos and European Solidarity (of former president Petro Poroshenko) have publicly complained that they have not received the authorization required by the authorities to attend an international event. In power from 2014 to 2019 and now a member of parliament, Poroshenko even went so far as to send a letter, at the end of February, to the European commissioner for neighborhood and enlargement, Oliver Varhelyi, to contest the "misuse" of martial law and war with the aim, in his view, to "cleanse the political field from opposition and isolate it from international communication." Emphasis added. (Le Monde March 19, 2024). At the very least this might indicate that Verkhovna Rada, the parliament, is losing parliamentary control to President Zelensky. Which might indicate authoritarian tendencies. In earlier essays we have tried to argue that the West’s cozying up to President Zelensky is problematic and perhaps not in the best interest of Ukraine and the West. Taurus Marschflugkörper over Kerch Bridge (based upon ESA sat photo from 2020) The Russian wiretapping
Last Friday Margarita Simonyan, editor at the Russian TV-Network RT, revealed the Russian wiretapping of four German Luftwaffe officers during a secret meeting on February 19. At the meeting it was discussed how the German Taurus missile might be used by Ukraine, and how direct assistance by specialists from the Luftwaffe might be concealed. To understand the importance of the Russian intercept of the discussion that took place on WebEx, it is relevant to know more about the Taurus missile, why Ukraine has been clamouring for Taurus missiles, and reactions to the leak. Before taking a look at excerpts from the wiretapping. Taurus capabilities The Taurus KEPD 350 air to ground missile is made by Taurus Systems, a joint venture between Saab and MBDA Deutschland. It is “designed to penetrate thick, hardened air defences via a very low-level terrain following flight. Day or night and in any weather, it neutralises its targets through its highly effective 481 kg dual-stage warhead system, MEPHISTO. TAURUS KEPD 350 combines outstanding penetration of hard and deeply buried targets, and blast and fragmentation of high-value point and area targets with exceptional bridge-and-runway-target kill capacity. The system remains the only stand-off missile programmable for effect at a specific pre-selected floor. This extraordinary feature is achieved by applying layer counting and void sensing technology. (Saab. Com Prospect). MBDA describes the missile as having a range in excess of 500km, unmatched penetration capabilities, precise and jamming resistant navigation, including terrain-following capability below 50 meters, GPS independence, with 4 separate guiding systems, and a layer counting fuse. The last characteristic means that the missile after diving vertical in the last phase, will be able penetrate layers of hardened bunkers, counting the number of layers and voids penetrated. See illustration of the concept at https://taurus-systems.de/#penetration The missile physical specs: Length 5m, width about 1m, weight 1400kg, with a warhead weighing 481 kg. Ukraine’s clamouring for Taurus Ukraine has long demanded deliveries of long-range air launched precision missiles from the West. Until now they have got Storm Shadow missiles from the UK and SCALP missiles from France, in essence the same missile with a range of around 250 Kms. They have been used for some time to strike high values targets in Crimea, including bridges. For almost a year Ukraine had also been clamouring for deliveries of the longer ranging and more advanced Taurus missile. Presumably with the intention to use such missiles in their attempt to destroy the Kerch Bridge connecting the Taman Peninsula of Krasnodar Krai in Russia and the Crimean Kerch Peninsula. Germany’s rejection of Taurus deliveries Until now the German government under Chancellor Scholz has declined to send Taurus missiles to Ukraine. On February 22, the opposition consisting of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) bloc brought forward a motion in the Bundestag calling on the Bundesregierung to provide Ukraine with Taurus missiles. “Die Ukraine durch unverzügliche Lieferung von erbetenen und in Deutschland verfügbaren Waffensystemen (u.a. TAURUS) sowie Munitionssorten im Kampf gegen Russland zu unterstützen und dabei europäische Führung und Koordinierung zu übernehmen” (Bundestag). The motion was defeated in the German Bundestag with 182 voting in favour, 480 against and 5 abstaining. Instead, the Bundesregierung brought a motion calling for providing Ukraine with additional, necessary long-range weapons systems and ammunition. In German: " erforderliche weitreichende Waffensysteme." What long-range weapon systems were not specified, but Taurus missiles were certainly not meant, instead it might mean further deliveries of the MARS II systems. 382 voted in favour of the government motion, 284 against and 2 abstained. Reactions to the wiretapping revelations German Defence minister Pistorius: “"The incident is much more than just the interception and publication of a conversation ... It is part of an information war that Putin is waging," (DW). During visit to the Vatican Scholz told reporters the security breach would be “investigated very meticulously, very intensively and very quickly” Other are demanding a thorough investigation and possible consequences. There is fear that Russia might have much more wiretapping material, to be released when it might have a negative effect on the West’s unity in their support for Ukraine. At a recent visit to Prague President Macron indirectly chastised the Germans, saying "Europe clearly faces a moment when it will be necessary not to be cowards." He later added that it was necessary to shake up France’s allies. Sometimes Macron is taking very loud but providing Ukraine a very small stick. Germany is in fact the second largest contributor to Ukraine after the US. While France apparently contributes less than Finland, according the support tracker at Kiel Institute for World Economy. It is also speculated why the Russia has revealed the wiretapping now, as it will presumably result in Germany taken more stringent measures to guard against wiretapping. Perhaps the Russian rationale is somewhat like this. If we release the conversation of this meeting it might have these important consequences. First it might convince Bundeskanzler Scholz that he must to stick to his “njet” to Taurus deliveries, as it seems to be difficult to avoid direct German or perhaps British participation in Taurus mission planning, if one wants to make sure of hits on the Kerch Bridge. It must be remembered that Scholz is afraid that Ukraine could attack goals inside Russia, which might be a red line for Russia, with the risk of war with Germany and NATO. Perhaps to reinforce this impression Russian officials attacked Germany for discussing detailed attacks on Russian targets and threatened with retaliation should Germany become part of the war effort” (WSJ March 4. 2024). Secondly, the revelation that British and U.S. specialists are directly involved in helping Ukraine to use the sophisticated western weapons is sure to annoy German allies. About the wiretapped meeting A transcript of the conversation between high-ranking Bundeswehr officers dated 02/19/2024 was published by Margarita Simonyan, editor at The Russian TV-Network RT, on vk.com. (https://vk-com.translate.goog/@m_s_simonyan-rasshifrovka-razgovora-vysokopostavlennyh-oficerov-bundesver?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp). The transcript used here is from a Substack article at https://karlof1.substack.com/p/german-military-going-against-its The date The meeting of the German Luftwaffe officers is said to have taken place on February 19, which means that practicalities in relation to a possible delivery of Taurus Missiles to Ukraine toke place a few days before the discussion and the votes in the Bundestag. The use of Webex Normally one would not expect Russia to be able eavesdrop on a meeting of high-ranking German officers. Perhaps the wiretapping was made possible because they were using Webex “a multi-functional desktop Video/Audio Conference call application,” with one of the participants staying at the Marina Bay Sands in Singapore. With one of the others impressed and asking “the one with three towers and swimming pool at the top.” The officer might have been in Singapore for the Airshow. The participants Generalleutnant Ingo Gerhartz - Inspekteur der Luftwaffe General Frank Gräfe - Brigadegeneral der Luftwaffe der Bundeswehr, Abteilungsleiter für Einsätze und Übungen im Kommando Luftwaffe in Berlin. (General Gräfe apparently participating from Singapore). Oberstleutnant Florstedt Oberstleutnant Udo Fenske Excerpts from the wiretapped meeting Purpose of the meeting Listening to General Gerhartz is becomes clear that the officers are meeting to prepare a presentation for defence minister Pistorius, looking at problems and possibilities in relation to a possible delivery of Taurus missiles to Ukraine. Gerhartz: “Okay. We need to verify the information. As you have already heard, Defense Minister Pistorius intends to carefully consider the issue of supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine. We have a meeting planned with him. Everything needs to be discussed so that we can start working on this issue. So far I do not see that the start date of these deliveries has been indicated. It was not like the chancellor told him: “I want to get information now, and tomorrow morning we will make a decision.” I haven't heard anything like this. On the contrary, Pistorius evaluates this entire ongoing discussion. Nobody knows why the Chancellor is blocking these supplies.”… ”It is necessary to show what the missile can do, how it can be used. It is necessary to take into account, if we make a political decision on the transfer of missiles as assistance to Ukraine, what consequences this may lead to. I would be grateful if you could tell me not only what problems we have, but how we can solve them. For example, when it comes to delivery methods.” Revealing that allied partners have people on the ground in Ukraine Gerhartz: “I know what the English do. They always transport them in Ridgeback armored vehicles. They have a few people on the ground. The French don't do that. He later also mentioned that “it is known that there are many people in civilian clothes who speak with an American accent. ” Thus, he confirmed what many had already expected, that Ukrainian forces get assistance on the ground in order to use the sophisticated weapons they have got from the West. Delivery times and delivery systems to be used Gräfe: “If the Chancellor now decides that we should supply missiles, they will be transferred from the Bundeswehr. Good, but they won't be ready for use until eight months later. Secondly, we cannot shorten the time. Because if we do that, there could be a misuse, a missile could fall on a kindergarten, there would be civilian casualties again. These aspects must be taken into account. It should be noted during the negotiations that we will not be able to do anything without the manufacturer. They can equip, re-equip and deliver the first missiles. We can catch up a little bit, but we shouldn't wait until we have 20 pieces, we can transfer five at a time” Gräfe then touched upon the question delivery system: “What weapons systems will these missiles be attached to?” Gerhartz thought this was a problem that could be solved by the Taurus manufacturer: “TSG [Taurus Systems Gmbh] has said that they can solve this problem within six months, it doesn't matter if it's a Sukhoi or an F-16.” Questions related to training With the British already in Ukraine they might also be able to help Ukraine to use Taurus missiles. Thus, avoiding having their own German specialists on the ground in Ukraine. Gräfe: “I have already said that we are cooperating with a missile manufacturer. They teach the maintenance of these systems, and we teach the tactical application. It takes three to four months. This part of the training can take place in Germany. When the first missiles arrive, we need to make a quick decision on mounts and training. Perhaps we will have to turn to the British on these issues and take advantage of their know-how. We can provide them with databases, satellite images, and planning stations.” (Emphasis added). Gerhartz: “We need to imagine that they can use aircraft with mounts for Taurus missiles and for Storm Shadow. The British were there and equipped the planes. The systems are not so different, they can be used for the Taurus as well.” How to conceal technical and mission planning support? Fenske: “If we are talking about combat use, then in this case, de facto, we will be advised to support at least the first group. It's difficult to plan, it took about a year to train our staff and we are now trying to reduce that time to ten weeks and hope that they will be able to race off-road in a car designed for Formula 1. A possible option is to provide scheduled technical support, theoretically this can be done from Büchel [German airbase in Rheinland-Pfalz, where the US has placed nuclear weapons], provided that a secure connection with Ukraine is created.” Gerhartz interrupted: “Wait a minute. I know what you're saying. Politicians may be concerned about the direct closed connection between Büchel and Ukraine, which could become a direct involvement in the Ukrainian conflict.” This led to a discussion of how assistance for mission planning might be concealed. Fenske: “The question will arise as to where the information is coming from. If we are talking about information about targets, which ideally includes satellite images that provide a maximum accuracy of three meters, then we must first process them in Büchel. I think that, regardless of this, it is possible to somehow organize the exchange of information between Büchel and Schrobenhausen [Where TSG is located], or it is possible to work out the possibility of transferring information to Poland, to do it where it is possible to reach by car.” How many Taurus could be delivered? Fenske: “If you give 50 pieces, they will be used up very quickly” Gerhartz: “Exactly, it won't change the course of the war. So we don't want to hand them all over. And not all at the same time. Maybe 50 in the first tranche, then maybe there will be another tranche of 50 missiles. This is perfectly understandable, but all this is big politics. I guess what's really behind it.” (Emphasis added). What goals to hit with Taurus? Frostedte: “I came to the conclusion that there are two interesting targets - the bridge to the east [The Kerch Bridge] and the ammunition depots, which are located above. The bridge in the east is hard to reach, it's a fairly small target, but the Taurus can do it, ammunition depots can also hit. If you take all of this into account and compare it to how many Storm Shadows and HIMARS were used, then I had a question: "Is our goal a bridge or military depots?" Fenske: “I would like to say one more thing about the destruction of the bridge. We have been working intensively on this issue and, unfortunately, have come to the conclusion that the bridge is similar to a runway due to its size. Therefore, it may not require 10 or even 20 missiles.” … “All they can do is make a hole and damage the bridge.” Gerhartz: “We all know that they want to destroy the bridge, that it ultimately means how it is guarded, not only because it has an important military-strategic significance, but also because it has a political significance. Although they now have a land corridor as well. There are certain concerns if we have a direct connection with the Ukrainian armed forces. Therefore, the question will arise - is it possible to use such a trick and send our people to the MBDA? Thus, there will be a direct connection with Ukraine only through the MBDA, which is much better than if such a connection exists with our Air Force.” Gräfe: “Gerhartz, it doesn't matter. We need to make sure that there are no formulations from the very beginning that make us a party to the conflict.” …” At the very beginning, we identified this as the main element of the "red line", so we will participate in the training. Let's say that we will prepare a "road map". It is necessary to divide the learning process into parts. The long track will be designed for four months, we will train them thoroughly, including working out the option with a bridge. The short one will be designed for two weeks so that they can use the missiles as soon as possible. If they are already trained, we will ask if the British are ready to take them up at this stage. I believe that such an action would be correct.”… “And if, at the first stage, the task is to hit ammunition depots, and not such complex objects as bridges, then in this case you can proceed to an abbreviated program and get a quick result.” Waiting for a decision (quoted from the VK transcript) Gräfe: “I want to say, the longer they take to make a decision, the longer it will take us to implement all this. We need to divide everything into stages. First, start with the simple ones, and then move on to the complex ones. Or can we turn to the British, can they provide us with support at the initial stage and take on planning issues? We can force what lies within our area of responsibility. The development of mounts for missiles is not one of our tasks; Ukraine must resolve this issue independently with manufacturers.” Gerhartz: “We wouldn't want to get into trouble right now because of the budget commission. This may make it impossible to start construction work at the Büchel airbase in 2024. Every day now counts in the program.” Hvad bliver det næste? I et kort essay d. 2. marts 2023 skrev jeg ”Hvad er det næste, hvis Leoparder og endda kampfly ikke er nok? I det skjulte indsætte vestlige "boots on the ground " for at forstærke ukrainsk modstand?” (It is time for some hard questions! March 2, 2023). Knapt et år senere kan man så opleve Præsident Macron hævde, ”at udsendelse af vestlige tropper til Ukraine ikke burde udelukkes i fremtiden,” ved et pressemøde efter støttekonferencen for Ukraine. Han tilføjede ganske vist: "Der er ingen konsensus i dag om at sende landtropper ... Men i dynamisk situation bør intet udelukkes. Vi vil gøre alt, hvad der er nødvendigt for at sikre, at Rusland ikke kan vinde denne krig.” (Le Figaro 26. februar, 2024) Muligheden for vestlige ”boots on the ground” i Ukraine skal åbenbart bidrage til at skabe en slags strategisk tvetydighed i proxy-krigen mod Rusland. ”Jeg vil ikke fjerne tvetydigheden i aftenens debatter ved at oplyse navne. Jeg siger, at det blev nævnt blandt mulighederne… Mange mennesker, der siger aldrig, aldrig i dag, var de samme mennesker, der sagde 'Aldrig tanks, aldrig fly, aldrig langdistancemissiler for to år siden'." (Macron i Le Figaro 26. februar, 2024). Her skal man dog lige huske, at Frankrig ikke er har været blandt de fremmeste til at støtte Ukraine med meget mere end svulstige vendinger. Macron’s udtalelser vakte naturligvis den tilsigtede opsigt, for vestlige ”boots on the ground” i Ukraine ville i sandhed være en afgørende rød linje. Forbavsende nok har en første reaktion fra Rusland været relativ stilfærdig. Måske fordi man er vant til urealistiske ideer fra Macron, der afvises af alle andre. Kreml’s Dmitry Peskov understregede dog som svar på et spørgsmål: ”I så tilfælde taler vi ikke om sandsynligheden, men om uundgåeligheden af direkte konflikt.” Næste dag kom så reaktionen fra Bundeskanzler Scholz. Den var afvisende, for også i fremtiden er der enighed om, at der hverken fra europæiske stater eller fra NATO vil blive sendt landtropper til Ukraine. ”Auf der Pariser Ukraine-Konferenz habe Einigkeit geherrscht, ”dass es keine Bodentruppen, keine Soldaten auf ukrainischem Boden geben wird, die von europäischen Staaten oder von Nato-Staaten dorthin geschickt werden.“ (Die Welt, 27.februar 2024). Andre er også i fuld gang med at afvise Macon’s prøveballon. Lige fra USA til Finland. ”Totalt vanvid” lød det også fra Jean-Luc Mélenchon fra det franske venstrefløjsparti ”La France Insoumise:” "At sende tropper til Ukraine ville gøre os til krigsførende … Den krigeriske verbale eskalering af en atommagt mod en anden stor atommagt er allerede en uansvarlig handling" (Le Figaro, 26. februar, 2024). Marine le Pen fra Rassemblement National var lige så kritisk. For hende udgjorde forslaget "en eksistentiel risiko for 70 millioner franskmænd, og vores væbnede styrker, der allerede er udstationeret i Østeuropa." (Le Monde 28. februar 2024). En hastig test (ikke repræsentativ) viste den franske befolknings holdning til spørgsmålet: ”Er du for at sende franske landtropper til Ukraine?” Ikke overraskende var flertallet imod. 76,02 % der var imod, mens 23,98 %, var for. ( https://video.lefigaro.fr/figaro/video/etes-vous-favorable-a-lenvoi-de-troupes-francaises-au-sol-en-ukraine/). Selvom Macron således ikke finder støtte i befolkningen, er det alligevel ganske overraskende at se, at næsten en fjerdedel er for at sende franske landtropper til Ukraine. Har mainstream mediers ustandselige råben ”ulven kommer” (eller i dette tilfælde den russiske bjørn), virkelig gjort næsten en fjerdedel af den franske befolkning ivrige efter at føre krig? Og hvis det er tilfældet, hvad så med resten af Europa? Er det virkelig ved at være tænkeligt, at der kan opstå en begyndende accept af at man kan gå mere direkte i krig med Rusland? I realiteten er det vel ikke helt forkert at antage, at de første skjulte støvleskridt kan være taget for længst. At mandskab fra vestlige militære enheder og efterretningstjenester allerede på forskellig vis er mere eller mindre direkte involveret i proxy-krigen mod Rusland i Ukraine. Ved flere af de mere spektakulære ukrainske aktioner må man antage at vestlige enheder har været dybt involveret, f.eks. ved indsættelse af AWACS-fly og droner. New York Times skrev for nylig, at CIA er involveret i et netværk af 12 hemmelige C.I.A. baser langs med den russiske grænse. Det vel heller ikke utænkeligt, at Ukraine i praksis får direkte hjælp fra vestligt mandskab i form af vejledning og instruktion i betjening af myriaden af avancerede vestlige våben. Jamie Shea med en fortid i NATO hævder ”Der har uden tvivl været vestlige specialstyrker i Ukraine siden krigens begyndelse, de kan give træning til ukrainske specialstyrker og hjælpe med at planlægge sabotage- og kommandooperationer, " (euobserver, 27. februar 2024). Hvis ikke det hele skal ende i en storkrig er der således snarere brug for mere ”Kriegsmüdigkeit” end ”Kriegstüchtigkeit” i Vesten. Måske er det også erkendelsen hos nogle republikanske senatorer i USA. Hør blot senator Marco Rubio (R-Fla), der er viceformand i The Senate Intelligence Committee: "The reality at this point that we have to confront is that that war ends with a negotiated settlement … And the question is — when they finally figured that out — when we finally get to that point, who has more leverage —Putin or Ukraine?” (Politico, 27. februar, 2024). Have we gone mad, are we seriously preparing for war against not only Russia, but China North Korea, Iran and … while the West itself may be falling apart from within.
It is becoming clear abundantly clear that there is a rising wave of dire warnings to prepare for war with Russia, and China, North Korea, Iran and what not. Voices arguing that the West must get ready for war and be able to fight a war. Striving to become “Kriegstüchtig.” To understand what is happening, take a look at these topics: NATO – preparing society for war Making Germany “Kriegstüchtig” UK – a 1930’s moment today Scandinavian countries caught in war scare Lithuania and Finland anxiously keeping their cool? The Trump scare in Europe U.S. – facing war on too many fronts Red lines slipping in Ukraine? A hopeless whack-a-mole strategy? NATO – preparing society for war Take a speech by the Chair of the NATO Military Committee, The Dutch admiral Rob Bauer, in a security conference in Berlin: “For NATO, Russia’s pattern of aggressive and ruthlessly destructive behaviour has ushered in a new era of collective defence … We have developed several military strategies and plans that outline how we will protect ourselves - now and in the future - against the two main threats listed in the new Strategic Concept: Russia and Terrorist Groups.” This means that NATO now is putting more troops at higher readiness and that NATO its readiness and capabilities in other areas too. What is new, and certainly scary, is that in order to strengthen collective defence and support Ukraine in its existential fight “we need a whole of society approach … We need public and private actors to change their mind-set, from an era in which everything was plannable… foreseeable… controllable… to an era where anything can happen at any time … Ready for war. Fit to fight.” Involving all of society in the preparations for war to deter war means “we need all Allied societies to change their mind-set and become more resilient. Not only our armed forces, but our whole societies need to become Kriegstüchtig.” The admiral also argued that “preparing for war is not aggressive. It is the only way to maintain peace.” Well, he did not go as far as saying “war is peace like the Oceania motto in Orwell’s “1984.” But perhaps we are getting there, with recent clamouring for involving all of society in preparations for war to avoid war. We saw how this worked in years before 1914 and in the late 1930s. Making Germany “Kriegstüchtig” “The Bundeswehr has five to eight years to be prepared against the Russian threat” the German “Verteidigungsminister” Boris Pistorius warned in December 2023 in the newspaper “Welt am Sonntag.” The armed forces must become “Kriegstüchtig.” Pistorius also argued that not only the armed forces must undergo a change of mentality or mindset. The whole of society must realise that there is threat of war, if this does not happen, one will not be prepared. The German “Bundeswehr” may already be planning for war with Russia. Although for the moment it must mostly be in the form of scenario writing, due the present rather desolate condition of Germany’s armed forces. According to the “Bild” newspaper the Bundeswehr has a secret “Übungsszenario” that assumes that Russia may be preparing an attack in the Suwalki gap. The area between the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus located along the Polish – Lithuanian border. If Russia were to attack here and were to be successful it would cut off the Baltic states from Poland and Western Europe. According to the “Bild” story the scenario would assume “that NATO would station 300,000 soldiers on its eastern borders to deter Russian aggression.” Not that they would be ready before sometime in or presumably after 2025. If this scenario were to be realised it would of cause mean war between Russia and NATO. A really scary outlook for Europe. When asked about this scenario, a spokesperson for the German Ministry of Defence just said: “considering different scenarios, even if they are extremely unlikely, is part of everyday military life, especially in training" (Euronews, January 17, 2024). Nothing scary there, just business as usual, playing with scenarios then. On the other hand, the new German Defence Policy Guidelines from 2023, have also undergone a major shift in emphasis. “War has returned to Europe. Germany and its allies must once again confront a military threat. The international order is being attacked in Europe and around the world. We are experiencing a turning point, or Zeitenwende, as it is called in Germany … We must be the backbone of deterrence and collective defence in Europe … as a nation and as a society, we have neglected the Bundeswehr for decades. For too long, we were unable to imagine the scenario of a war on European soil and a direct threat to our country.” (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2023). Shortly after the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the recently deceased grand old man of German politics, Wolfgang Schäuble, saw a need for even stronger deterrence, arguing: "Now that Putin's accomplices are threatening a nuclear strike every day, one thing is clear to me: we need nuclear deterrence at the European level as well, … In our own interest, we Germans must make a financial contribution to the French nuclear force in return for a joint nuclear deterrent." (Welt am Sonntag, July 23, 2022). UK – a 1930’s moment today “This is our 1937 moment. We are not at war - but we must act rapidly so that we aren’t drawn into one through a failure to contain territorial expansion. So surely it is beholden on each of us to ensure that we never find ourselves asking that futile question – should we have done more? I will do everything in my power to ensure that the British Army plays its part in averting war; I will have an answer to my grandchildren should they ever ask what I did in 2022.” Warned the new British Chief of the General Staff, Sir Patrick Sanders, in a speech on June 28, 2023. (army.mod.uk). He argued “In all my years in uniform, I haven’t known such a clear threat to the principles of sovereignty and democracy, and the freedom to live without fear of violence, as the brutal aggression of President Putin and his expansionist ambitions. I believe we are living through a period in history as profound as the one that our forebears did over 80 years ago. Now, as then, our choices will have a disproportionate effect on our future.” (army.mod.uk). The General warned that it would be dangerous to assume that Putin and thus Russia would only have Ukraine in its sight. Meaning that war in Ukraine must not be seen as a limited conflict. Although Russia’ capabilities may have declined as a result of the war in Ukraine, Russia has previously proved it resilience, and Putin may still have greater plans: “Putin’s declared intent recently to restore the lands of ‘historic Russia’ makes any respite temporary and the threat will become even more acute. We don’t yet know how the war in Ukraine will end, but in most scenarios, Russia will be an even greater threat to European security after Ukraine than it was before. The Russian invasion has reminded us of the time-honoured maxim that if you want to avert conflict, you better be prepared to fight.” (army.mod.uk). To the General this means that the British army will now have a singular focus “to mobilise to meet today’s threat and thereby prevent war in Europe.” The proxy war in Ukraine has shown that the attempt to punish Russia after it has invaded Ukraine has shown the limitations of that approach. It does not work. To the General this mean the West “must reinforce the importance of deterrence through denial – we must stop Russia seizing territory – rather than expecting to respond to a land grab with a delayed counteroffensive.” On January 15, 2024, the UK Defence Secretary, Grant Shapps, followed up on the General’s warnings in a long speech at the historical Lancaster House. Belligerent states are making a comeback and new ones are making their presence felt. “The era of the peace dividend is over. In five years’ time we could be looking at multiple theatres involving Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. Ask yourselves – looking at today’s conflicts across the world - is it more likely that the number grows, or reduces? I suspect we all know the answer – it’s likely to grow. So, 2024 must mark an inflexion point.” (Grant Shapps, January 15, 2024). His talk of an inflexion point is likely meant to mean the same as the German Zeitenwende. For the moment at least Shapps was not talking about the UK taking on all of these belligerent states, but concentrated on Russia. In his grandstanding speech, which sometimes may have reminded one of the grander times for the British Empire, he also said: “We stand at this crossroads – whether to surrender to a sea of troubles, or do everything we can to deter the danger. I believe that, in reality, it’s no choice at all. To guarantee our freedoms, we must be prepared. Prepared to deter – the enemies who are gathering all around us. Lead our allies in whatever conflicts are to come. Defend our nation whatever threat should arise. This is what Britain has always done.” Shapps saw a huge opportunity here for British industry, which its history of brilliant military and technological innovations, “just imagine what we could do if we managed to better harness that latent inspiration, ingenuity and invention for the Defence of our nation?” Recently The Daily Telegraph (January 24, 2024) carried an article referring to General Sanders call to “mobilise the nation”, as not meaning conscription, but a call for a mindshift in the British people. Later the general even talked of the need for a “citizen army.” Like NATO’s admiral Bauer, the general apparently wants the whole society to become “Kriegstüchtig.” Scandinavian countries caught in war scare “There could be war in Sweden. It isn’t my primary intention to appeal to your fear, but rather to your situational awareness. I’m looking to open a door: a door that is frequently blocked and cluttered up with the demands and challenges of everyday life. A door that many Swedes may have kept closed their whole lives. A door to a space where we are confronted with an important question: who are you if war comes?” (Minister for Civil Defence Carl-Oskar Bohlin). He is not alone. “An armed attack against Sweden cannot be ruled out. War can also come to us,” the Swedish Minister of Defence warned. The Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, Michael Bydén, also warned “Alla svenskar måste vara redo för krig” (Alle Swedes must be ready for war). Of cause talking about the threat from Russia. Eirik Kristoffersen, Norwegian Chief of Defence has a similar warning. We are short on time he argued, referring of cause to the aggressiveness of Russia. “It is important for us to face an uncertain and unpredictable world with a strong national defence, … There is a window now that will perhaps last for one, two, maybe three years, where we have to invest even more in a secure defence. (Dagbladet; January 21, 2024). Lithuania and Finland anxiously keeping their cool? “This year, next year, the possibility or the probability of a war between Russia and NATO is very low, extremely low,” Lithuanian General Valdemars Rupšys told Lithuanian Radio a few days ago. Arguing that at least for now that Russia had enough on its plate in Ukraine. His cool is not shared by foreign minister Landsbergis, who is convinced that war is a possibility. Provoking the general to reply: “cobbler, stick to your last.” In Finland at least some politicians give the impression that there is nothing to fear from Russia. Alexander Stubb, former prime minister, told the Financial Times “Finland is in one of the safest positions that it has been in throughout its history.” Finland is safe because of the triple lock of a strong military, the new membership of NATO and defence cooperation with the U.S. The Trump scare in Europe The possibility that Trump might become U.S. president in 2025 make European allies, fearing the Russian bear, even more anxious in their effort to prepare for war in order to avoid war. A Trump presidency would be expected to focus on the U.S. and its MAGA-policy and would strive to avoid waring confrontations abroad. This might mean that Russia, China, Iran and North Korea could become more belligerent. In the European Parliament Manfred Weber, leader of the centre-right Europeans People’s Party has recently argued that Europe must engage an immediate and dramatic effort to strengthen Europe’s defence, to avoid being left defenceless should a President Trump decide to scale down U.S. engagement in NATO.“The EU’s ability to protect itself without U.S. support is the fundamental question that will be on our minds in 2024,” Weber has argued (Politico, January 25, 2024). Weber calls for a kind of European defence union, and lists some of the pillars necessary to support an independent European defence. Like air defence, to “fend off drones and missiles.” A cyber shield to be able to defend Europe against cyberattacks from Russia and China and presumably everyone else. Not really much new in these demands. They are in line with what we have seen before. A real break with the past is his insistence on an independent nuclear umbrella. “We all know that when push comes to shove, the nuclear option is the really decisive one.” (Politico, January 25, 2024). Weber wants to cooperate closely with Britain, seeing perhaps that a European nuclear deterrence must rest on both France’s Force de Frappe, and Britain’s nuclear forces. No wonder that people in Europe are starting to get advice about how they should prepare for war in Europe. Professional preppers, or should one call them weirdos, are showing the way. Amazon is already offering prepper kits, and it is not alone, China’s TEMU is also eyeing a possibility, offering cheap survival kits and family prepper kits over the internet. It is beginning to look like an oncoming war hysteria accompanied by irrational emotions and behaviours, sure to make war more likely. U.S. – facing war on too many fronts “The United States is a heartbeat away from a world war that it could lose. There are serious conflicts requiring U.S. attention in two of the world’s three most strategically important regions. Should China decide to launch an attack on Taiwan, the situation could quickly escalate into a global war on three fronts, directly or indirectly involving the United States. The hour is late, and while there are options for improving the U.S. position, they all require serious effort and inevitable trade-offs. It’s time to move with real urgency to mobilize the United States, its defenses, and its allies for what could become the world crisis of our time.” (Foreign Policy, November 16, 2023). In the “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” dated February 2023, there is detailed threat assessment and warning in relation to China, seen as the most serious threat, followed by Russia, Iran and a North Korea, which is making itself heard with its firework of missile tests. The recent report “America’s Strategic Posture” argues that U.S. strategy “must include effective deterrence and defeat of simultaneous Russian and Chinese aggression in Europe and Asia using conventional forces. If the United States and its Allies and partners do not field sufficient conventional forces to achieve this objective, U.S. strategy would need to be altered to increase reliance on nuclear weapons to deter or counter opportunistic or collaborative aggression in the other theater.” Today there is also the clear and present danger for a war looming in Middle East. For the moment mostly involving pinpricks attacks initiated by Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Iraq and the Yemen. While the U.S. may be trying to keep a lid on conflict, with their often misguided attempts at diplomacy and by limiting their military response to the pinpricks, it is evident that there is the risk of a much bigger war in the Middle East, indirectly perhaps even involving Russia. And what will happen when Iran gets nuclear warheads for their ballistic missiles? Red lines slipping in Ukraine? Like the European voices President Biden is trying to warn about Putin’s intentions: “If Putin takes Ukraine, he won’t stop there. It’s important to see the long run here. He’s going to keep going. He’s made that pretty clear. If Putin attacks a NATO Ally — if he keeps going and then he attacks a NATO Ally — well, we’ve committed as a NATO member that we’d defend every inch of NATO territory. Then we’ll have something that we don’t seek and that we don’t have today: American troops fighting Russian troops — American troops fighting Russian troops if he moves into other parts of NATO.” (The White House, December 6, 2023). “The bear is coming” warning has also been used by U.S. defence Secretary Lloyd Austin in a secret briefing in Congress. Lloyd Austin is said to have argued that if Ukraine did not get the $61 billion in support that Biden is seeking from Congress, it would be very likely that U.S. GIs in Europe would be fighting Russia. (Stephen Bryen in Asia times). It evident that the U.S. does not dare to fight Russia directly in Ukraine, with President Biden seeing such a scenario as leading to a World war. “We will not fight a war against Russia in Ukraine. Direct conflict between NATO and Russia is World War III, something we must strive to prevent.” (The Hill, March 11, 2022). But then, what about the dangers of the seemingly reluctant, but continuing escalation of the U.S. and Europe’s support for Ukraine. Since the war began the U.S. and Europe have time after time transgressed their own red lines in what has become a continuous escalation of military support for Ukraine. A constant anxious probing of Russia’s red lines. An apparently unending sequence of western leaders first rejecting Ukraine demands, then realising that Ukraine might be in dire straits, and therefore persuading themselves to dare escalate after all. Fearing evidently that the U.S. led proxy war might be lost, and that all previous help would have been in vain. This escalating vortex of material support for Ukraine leads to a risk of a more direct confrontation between Russia and the West, as result of mistake, accident or aggressive hubris on part of Ukraine. We have to fear the reciprocal escalations on both sides. With the West playing a major role in this escalation, stationing more and more troops and equipment closer to Russia’s borders. In Poland, in the Baltic region, in Romania, In Italy, In Spain and in the United Kingdom. For 2024 NATO is preparing to engage in large exercises like NATO’s “Steadfast Defender” with upwards of 90,000 soldiers involved and running for months. Or take the announcement that the U.S. is planning to place nuclear warheads at the RAF Lakenheath Airbase in the UK, in addition modernizing the nuclear arsenal placed in Belgium, Germany and elsewhere. A hopeless whack-a-mole strategy? How does the U.S. manage to face clear and present dangers on so many fronts? Remember President Biden actually wanted to end the never-ending war in Afghanistan, the only major military involvement apart from the fight against Daesh. The withdrawal from Afghanistan did not go well, became more like a flight, like the flight from Hanoi ending the Vietnam War. Apparently, the Afghanistan disaster did not cool the Biden administration’s conviction that the U.S.’s almighty power was destined to uphold and spread “Rules-based order.” Not realising that the U.S. might no longer be the hegemonic power able to intervene decisively in affairs all over the World. Perhaps that may explain their support for a strong NATO, in contrast to former President Trump. Their hubris may also explain why they could not see, that their support for Ukraine’s wish to join NATO, was a step too far for Russia. When the U.S. Senate in 1998 overwhelmingly approved the eastward expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech, Republican Senator Joseph Biden Jr. said: “…this, in fact, is the beginning of another 50 years of peace, … "In a larger sense." Extremely naive as we can see now. The Biden administration’s supreme self-confidence led it to dismiss Putin’s demands, that Ukraine should not become a member of NATO, with an arrogant and delayed rejection. This lead to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Biden administration and its allies met the invasion with unprecedented sanctions and constantly escalating military support for Ukraine’s proxy war against Russia. Ending in the quagmire of a stalemate. In a quiet volte-face the U.S. now just tries to prop up Ukraine’s ability to defend the stalemate, meaning there is no end in sight. With a hapless Biden administration caught in the quagmire of a proxy war, and Ukraine is stuck in a stalemate with no hope of achieving Zelensky’s utopian goals. As late as July 2022, National Security advisor, Jake Sullivan, was convinced that the U.S. proxy war in Ukraine would demonstrate the strength of the U.S. hegemony. In a lengthy interview in “The Atlantic” he saw the war in Ukraine as testing U.S. credibility, adding “…do I think it would have an impact? Yes. And I do think that part of our objective in Ukraine has to be to show strength, resilience, staying power, canniness, capability, because this will have some impact on our ability to effectively deter others elsewhere.” Precisely the imagined show of “strength, resilience, staying power, canniness, capability” may also have lead President Biden and his advisors to become more belligerent in their attitude towards China over the Taiwan question. But “Times they are a-changin” to paraphrase Bob Dylan. Now it would seem that the Biden administration is slowly coming to the realization that U.S. hegemony may be in danger. This may explain a subtle change in the U.S. support for Ukraine, just trying to allow Ukraine to stay in the fight, with no hope of getting back the areas occupied by Russia. It may explain their hurried attempts to keep the lid on Israel’s war in Gaza. Exerting pressure on Israel to scale down their aspirations. Explain the U.S. attempt to almost ignore Iran’s evident involvement in supporting the semi-circle of Israel’s enemies and their attacks. Not really to wanting confront Iran directly, and risk an expanding Middle East war. Not really daring to dare, just to staying on the doorstep, ambivalent about their next step The present ambivalence is a result of scary realisation that the U.S. will not be able to fight on all fronts simultaneously. Instead promoting an approach, where the U.S. just attempts to contain some of the potential threats, in order to be ready to confront others. Playing what might become an impossible whack-a-mole game. Striving to involve the rest of the West in the game. Demanding greater “commitments from European allies [to] give U.S. decision makers the flexibility they need to meet their global security obligations.” (defensenews.com). In the East by attempts to warn against Chinese designs, and to get allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia to strengthen their offensive military capabilities. Also trying to persuade the Philippines and India to get involved in containing China. In the Middle East attempting to strike a kind compromise solution, by attempting to pressure Israel to accept an imaginary and impossible two state proposal, that no one seems to believe in. Bleak outlook for Ukraine The Ukraine is losing manpower faster than it can afford in relation to Russia, meaning that it will have to resort less enthusiastic fighters, from older age groups, or have to introduce draft. Even so it will never be able to compete with Russian manpower resources. Ukraine had put their faith into the supply of advanced weapons like HIMARS, drones German and U.S. tanks and armoured fighting vehicles, long range airborne missiles like Storm Shadows/SCALPs and an inexhaustible supply of 155 mm artillery shells from Western armouries, a supply that turned out to exhaustible. Nothing has been able to break the stalemate. And so today Ukraine is attempting to find up to 500,000 men to fill the ranks of its army, while clamouring for even more advanced weapons like Germany’s Taurus missiles and U.S. A-10 ground-attack aircraft. The almost enthusiastic initial Western support seems to be waning here and there. Most importantly in the U.S. where public support is declining, as evidenced by recent polls. President Biden have asked Congress for $61 billion in military to top up Kyiv’s arms and ammunition lifeline — along with another $14 billion for Israel, but has not got anything yet. Republicans in the U.S. Congress seem to focus more on the internal border problems in the U.S. than the proxy war in Ukraine. Senator John Cormyn arguing that the U.S. own security cannot come second to the security of countries like Ukraine and Israel. The disagreement in Congress is the holding up critical support for Ukraine. Resulting in another kind of stalemate for Ukraine. In the horizon there is the looming presidential election in the U.S. where there is a fear that the aging Biden might lose to a Donald Trump, who certainly does not seem eager to continue a U.S. proxy against Russia in Ukraine. The Israeli war against Hamas and the risk of a much larger Middle East conflagration is also turning the focus away from Ukraine. In Europe the promise of a 50 billion Euro EU-aid package for the next years is being held up by a Hungary’s Orban, although ideas for circumventing the Hungarian resistance by the rest of the EU countries are circulated. In some European countries the attraction of parties with a sceptical view of the support for Ukraine is growing and their success at coming elections would be certain to put support for Ukraine in jeopardy. After Slovakia’s September election, the new Prime Minister Robert Fico, in November rejected the previous governments plan to donate weapons to Ukraine. “Fico ran a campaign criticising Western military support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia, and backs pushing for peace talks, a line similar to Hungary's leader Viktor Orban but rejected by Kyiv.” (Reuters November 8 2023). And the rest of the world? Would seem to be mostly annoyed with the West’s focus on Ukraine, eyeing other World problems more important to them. Irate Zelensky venting his frustration On January 1st 2024 the Economist published an interview with an angry Zelensky, “exasperated by the wobbles of some of his allies, as well as a sense of detachment among some of his compatriots. And he wants you to know it.” In the interview he comes out fighting, arguing that the Russians are not winning the war, as Russia is losing thousands of soldiers and having no success in breaking the existing stalemate in Ukraine, while the Ukraine has succeeded in pushing back the Russians fleet in the Black Sea, making it possible for Ukraine to continue exporting millions of tons of grain. But Zelensky must surely know that killing and maiming thousands of Russia soldiers, while losing many of their own, keeping open a land hugging shipping route, and hitting Crimea with long range missile can only be seen as needlesticks, not winning the war. In his attempt to keep up the waning support of the West he is trying to scare the West with a dire warning in the Economist interview: “Giving us money or giving us weapons, you support yourself. You save your children, not ours,” he warns bleakly. If Russia is allowed to take Ukrainian children, “they will take other children”. If Russia violates the rights of Ukrainians, “it will violate the rights in the world”. If Ukraine loses, warns Mr Zelensky, Mr Putin will bring his wars closer to the West. “Putin feels weakness like an animal, because he is an animal. He senses blood, he senses his strength. And he will eat you for dinner with all your EU, NATO, freedom, and democracy.” (The Economist January 1, 2024). Zelensky again tried to scare the West into supporting Ukraine in his speech at the World Economic Forum on January 16, 2024. “We all in the free world – exist as long as we can defend ourselves. If anyone thinks this is only about Ukraine, they’re fundamentally mistaken. Possible directions and even timeline of a new Russian aggression beyond Ukraine become more and more obvious. Let me ask very honestly: which European nation today can provide a combat ready army on par with ours, holding back Russia? And how many men and women are your nations ready to send to defend another state, another nation?” NATO crying wolf – but says Russia is failing At meeting with Slovakia’s recalcitrant Prime Minister Fico, NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg, voiced a dire warning similar to Zelensky’s: “If Putin wins in Ukraine, there is real risk that his aggression will not end there, … Our support is not charity. It is an investment in our security” (Politico, December 14, 2023) Latvia’s foreign minister, Krišjānis Kariņš, also cried wolf, when telling the Financial Times that Russia is driven by an imperialistic-fuelled ideology … Russia will not stop, Russia can only be stopped. Stopping Russia in Ukraine does not mean that it is over. It simply means we will have to continue. (FT, January 5 2024). In a letter to the new House Speaker, Michael Johnson, he was been warned that “cutting off the flow of U.S. weapons and equipment will kneecap Ukraine on the battlefield, not only putting at risk the gains Ukraine has made, but increasing the likelihood of Russian military victories.” (CNN December 5, 2023). It would seem that “The wolf is coming” argument has become the rallying cry for standing with Ukraine. Ukraine is fighting our fight, if they lose, we lose, in the sense that Putin’s Russia will continue his waring aggression towards other countries in Europe. In an article in Foreign Affairs Fogh Rasmussen and Yermak argues “If military support for Ukraine falters, the consequences will be dire for Europe and the rest of the world. If Putin is allowed to achieve any of his goals in Ukraine, he will not stop there. Russia will threaten more of its neighbors, from Moldova to the Baltic states, and destabilize the globe. Other regional and global powers will take note of his success and use similar tactics to achieve their aims. A Ukrainian defeat would mark the start of the unravelling of the international system.” (Foreign Affairs, January 1 ,2024). The wolf warning has even been used by U.S. defence Secretary Lloyd Austin in a secret briefing in Congress. Lloyd Austin is said to have argued that if Ukraine did not get the $61 billion in support that Biden is seeking from Congress, it would be very likely that U.S. GIs in Europe would be fighting Russia. (Stephen Bryen in Asia times). Recently even the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, Michael Bydén warned “Alla svenskar måste vara redo för krig” (Alle Swedes must be ready for war), of cause talking about the threat from Russia. Many are crying wolf, but apparently not really believing own dire warnings. At NATO’s November meeting of ministers of foreign affairs, Stoltenberg argued, almost like Zelensky, that Ukraine had had a big win: “This year, they continue to inflict heavy losses on Russia. Ukraine has recaptured 50 percent of the territory that Russia originally seized. In the Black Sea, the Ukrainians have pushed back the Russian fleet, and established routes for grain exports – bolstering global food security. Most importantly, Ukraine has prevailed as a sovereign, independent, democratic nation. This is a major achievement – a big win.” (nato.int). Stoltenberg also saw a dire outlook for Russia: “Ukraine has moved forward, Russia has fallen backward. It is now weaker politically, militarily, and economically. Politically, Russia is losing influence in its near abroad. Not only in Ukraine, but in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia is also becoming much more dependent on China. … Economically, Russia is also under pressure. Oil and gas revenues are dropping. Russian banking assets are under sanctions.” It certainly looks as if neither NATO nor Zelensky believe in their own wolf warnings, when at the same time they assert that Russia is getting weaker politically, militarily, and economically. If Russia is getting so much weaker it cannot to be a “wolf” threatening the rest of Europe. Meaning that “the wolf is coming “warnings are really not believable. But why cry wolf then? Is this just cynical ruse to convince the doubters in Europe and the U.S. that upholding and even escalating military support of Ukraine is necessary to prevent the apparently weakened Russian wolf to attack us, meaning Western Europe? If this is what those crying wolf want the rest of us to believe, their ruse is not very convincing. Apparently not even to themselves. Just listen to Stoltenberg when he was asked about F16 deliveries to Ukraine. “I think we need to now realize that there is not a silver bullet, not a single system that by itself will change fundamentally the situation on the battlefield… I welcome of course the delivery of modern battle tanks, HIMARS, cruise missiles, and advanced air defence systems and also the delivery of F-16’s. But again, there is no silver bullet. There's no single system that fundamentally would change the situational battlefield by itself.” But apparently neither is the combined effect of all these weapon systems. All those crying wolf seem to have an almost schizophrenic view of the proxy war in Ukraine involving delusions (false beliefs), hallucinations (seeing or hearing things that don’t exist), and disorganized thinking and speech. Ukraine has achieved big wins, while getting mired in a stalemate. Russia is down at its heels but would aggressively attack us in Western Europe, if it is not losing the war in Ukraine. Supporting Ukraine with more and more advanced weapons has not provided Ukraine with a decisive advantage in the war, but more weapons might, or perhaps not. The doubt of generals On November 9, 2022 the General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, was speaking at the Economic Club of New York. Here are some of his comments based upon Twitter notes from a Washington Post journalist (@DanLamothe). Milley asked: Is the time right to consider diplomacy in Ukraine? Milley says "there has to be mutual recognition" that a true military win is not achievable. Draws comparison to World War I, where victory was not achievable after 1914. Millions more killed in next few years. Milley, asked if the time is right for negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, said that will require both sides to believe that a full military victory is not achievable. The winter months, when fighting will slow a bit, create an opportunity to do so. When later asked about these comments at a meeting of “The Ukrainian Defense Contact Group”, he was somewhat more hesitant, perhaps realising that his words might not fit the prevailing more belligerent attitude of his political chiefs. He said: “In terms of probability, the probability of a Ukrainian military victory defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine to include what they define or what the claim is Crimea, the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily. Politically, there may be a political solution where, politically, the Russians withdraw, that's possible. You want to negotiate from a position of strength. Russia right now is on its back. … So, you want to negotiate at a time when you're at your strength and your opponent is at weakness. And it's possible, maybe that there'll be a political solution. All I'm -- all I'm saying is there's a possibility for it. That's all I'm saying.” In April 2023 Polish armed forces Chief of General Staff, Rajmund Andrzejczak said: “When I look at the conflict in Ukraine, I mainly see it through these political lenses, and unfortunately it does not look good,” he stated. This was primarily on the basis that there was “nothing” to indicate Russia would be unable to sustain its war effort, and that Western economic warfare efforts had failed to prevent this” (Military Watch Magazine). In November 2023 an interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, showed that he has reached conclusion reflecting General Miley’s. In the Economist interview he, like Milley, was reminded of the stalemate in the First World War, saying: “Just like in the first world war we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate … There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough” (Economist November 4, 2023).He said that the West has been reluctant to provide Ukraine with its most advanced weapons, making it possible for the Russians build the defences that led to the unsuccessful Ukrainian summer offensive. Deliveries of F16 fighter jets will not help, as the Russians have enhanced their air defences in the meantime. Experiencing the recent stalemate, the general does not think that a technical breakthrough that would provide Ukraine with the decisive capability to achieve victory will be around the corner. Ukraine may thus be stuck in a long and indecisive war, although he also insists that at the moment there is no alternative. “The biggest risk of an attritional trench war is that it can drag on for years and wear down the Ukrainian state.” Adding “sooner or later we are going to find that we simply don’t have enough people to fight” (Economist November 4, 2023). The scepticism of the few Among U.S. politicians arguing against continuing the support for Ukraine is the Republican senator Vance, who also noticed General Zaluczhny’s bleak view of the situation in Ukraine, leading him to argue: “Zelenkyy’s war aims are not consistent with reality, and you have some of his inner circle pushing back,” he told reporters at the Capitol on Thursday. “This was always going to end with Russia controlling some Ukrainian territory and a negotiated settlement. I’ve been saying it for a year. It was obvious to anybody who paid attention to realities on the ground.” Then of course there is Hungary’s Orban, who has been a sceptic since the start of the war, deciding not to support Ukraine with weapons. Now he is saying: “Today everybody knows but they do not dare to say it out loud, that this strategy has failed. It’s obvious that this will not work... the Ukrainians will not win on the front line …adding that a plan B was needed.” (rferl.org, October 27, 2023). Orban has been decried as a “Putin Versteher” (one who follows Putin’s view) by his fellow EU partners, but he may actually have a wider and longer ranging strategic view of the situation than his European colleagues. Orban may have the not unreasonable view that it would be a dangerous mistake for a Europe with a declining population and declining influence in the World to make Russia an enemy. Russia would orientate itself towards an Asia, that will have a dominant position in the World. Thus, he is implicitly arguing for some sort of accommodation with Russia, even to the detriment of Ukraine. In Germany the AFD party, which has reached 20 per cent in polls, are also decried as “Putin Verstehers,” as they are arguing against the proxy war in Ukraine. They have even put forward a peace plan for Ukraine in the German Bundestag, but is has been denigrated by the other parties. With Green party politician Trittin, saying “You are not for peace, you prefer to act as propaganda dwarfs for Putin’s war propaganda … Your so-called peace plan is a completely transparent domestic political theatre.” (faz.net), The U.S. in a bind – Forcing a stalemate peace on Ukraine or hoping for some supernatural occurrence? “For as long as it takes” has often been the view expressed when talking about support for Ukraine. Now it may begin to sound hollow, but what are the alternatives? The U.S. and president Biden is in a real bind. To many the prevailing opinion is that Biden’s hasty and tumultuous pull out of Afghanistan was preventable disaster. If the Biden administration was to give up their “so long as it takes” position and accept that Ukrainian goals will not be achievable, it would be seen as a much bigger disaster, and presumable lead to distrust in U.S. might and U.S. security promises. Encourage both Russia and China to take an even more belligerent attitude.The Biden bind may be especially felt in a year with an U.S. presidential election. So, what is the undiplomatic Biden administration, with its advocacy for U.S. based “Rules based order,” going to do? What does “it” mean? On the surface the Biden administration and their loyal European allies would seem to uphold their present “for as long as it takes position.” Continuing to escalate the support to Ukraine, crying wolf to force the allies to stand fast behind Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” Although what is meant by “it”? Some kind of victory over the Russia, meaning the re-conquering of the one-fifth of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces, or meaning until Ukraine realizes themselves that they are in hopeless stalemate and agree to trade land for peace, with some kind of guaranties for what is remaining of Ukraine. Escalation with no end in sight To the decisionmakers crying wolf it seems, at least in public, that there is no other alternative for the West than continuing to escalate the support for Ukraine. Just listen to national Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, who in December warned “We’re running out of money, and we are nearly out of time, … A vote against supporting Ukraine is a vote to improve (Vladimir) Putin’s strategic position. Even former peace advocating parties like the German Green Party is suddenly enthusiastically supporting war in Ukraine, At the moment demanding that Germany is sending advanced Taurus long-range stand-off missiles to Ukraine. Taurus would allow Ukraine to strike goals in Crimea like the Kerch Bridge and goals in Russia itself. This may also explain Chancellor Scholtz’s hesitant attitude, as this would mean that German weapons would once more be striking Russian soldiers. In a strange twist of the arguments for more weapons for Ukraine, the Biden administration is subtly changing the message on support for Ukraine. Instead of just having a message supporting “The rule based (western) order” and democracy in Ukraine, the message now used to persuade doubters in Congress, is that Ukraine support is to the material advantage for the U.S. Biden: “Let me be clear about something. We send Ukraine equipment sitting in our stockpiles. And when we use the money allocated by Congress, we use it to replenish our own stores, our own stockpiles with new equipment… Equipment that defends America and is made in America. Patriot missiles for air defense batteries, made in Arizona. Artillery shells manufactured in 12 states across the country, in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Texas. And so much more, … You know, just as in World War II, today patriotic American workers are building the arsenal of democracy and serving the cause of freedom.” Yes, and supporting the U.S. armament industry and a growing workforce in those industries. So, in fact support for Ukraine means production of more weapons and presumably more weapons development in the U.S., preparing the U.S. for the ultimate reckoning. What is lost in the message is that there is absolutely no guarantee that this would mean that Ukraine could win the proxy war on U.S.’s behalf. Instead, it would mean spiralling escalation, and the risk of even more confrontation with Russia, with the ultimate danger of some mishap/accident/provocation that would involve NATO directly in a war with Russia. Hoping for a miracle or perhaps supernatural occurrence? If those crying wolf really believed that own cries, one would expect the West to continue to supporting and escalating to military support for Ukraine- Sooner or later giving in to Zelensky’s constant clamouring for more advanced weapons. Perhaps hoping for some kind of miracle or a supernatural occurrence that would lead to a Russian defeat. Like the demise of president Putin and some of his closest supporters, a miraculous uprising amongst Russian troops leading them to lay down their weapons, or some kind supernatural disaster striking Russia itself.Hoping for something like this to happen would represent magical thinking by Western decisionmakers, and certainly be the stupidest approach to end the War in Ukraine. Instead of a miracle, this approach would sooner lead to disaster or an immense catastrophe. Say a break-down of Ukrainian defences, which of course would be a disaster. In order to prevent this the present undiplomatic U.S. administration, and the naïve but belligerent lesser allies, might feel tempted to put boots on the ground from NATO, which would result in all-out war between Russia and NATO, with little hope that NATO would be winning without risking nuclear exchanges which of cause would result in a catastrop he and immense suffering. Shift strategy to prepare for negotiations Perhaps even most simple-minded politicians eager to show their support for the spotless clean “democratic” Ukraine and their belligerence towards Russia, are beginning to realize that Ukraine cannot win the war in the sense that Zelensky is demanding. But it is one thing to realize the futility and danger of a continued escalation. It is something else to find a way out of the present quagmire. Although if different US. Media sources are to be believed the Biden administration may quietly be shifting its strategy on Ukraine. According to Politico the U.S. may be promoting a strategy where the focus would shift from supporting the idea a of renewed Ukrainian offensive to force the Russians back, to a defensive strategy conserving men and material. This would involve building strong defensive lines against the Russian attacks. “Bolstering air defence systems and building fortifications, razor wire obstructions and anti-tank obstacles and ditches along Ukraine’s northern border with Belarus” according to official sources (Politico December 27, 2023). They may finally be realizing that “As long as it takes…” and “Any decisions about negotiations are up to Ukraine” are not realistic positions. It would mean that the Biden administration is more or less confining their strategy to boosting Ukraine’s ability to hold on in the present stalemate, in order give Ukraine – and the U.S. the strongest possible hand for the truce or peace negotiations that must take place sooner or later. One may guess that the U.S. already has begun secret talks with Ukraine about what might be acceptable terms in peace negotiations with Russia. Forcing Ukraine to accept some kind of truce While realism may be creeping in in parts of the West, it stills looks as if Zelensky is striving for the ultimate goal of pushing Russia back from all Ukrainian land. Constantly trying to scare the West, in order to support his clamouring for more advanced weapons, and even more unrealistic demands like “membership now” of NATO and rapid membership of the EU. In a recent book by Franklin Foer, it is asserted that Zelensky “bombed” the first meeting with President Biden in the White House. Bombing presumable meaning that Zelensky was interrupting and irritating President Biden with his demands. In fact, Zelensky is almost constantly “bombing” the West, with blue sky demands that no one in the West would be able to fulfil, except perhaps those clamouring for direct war with Russia to bring it down once and for all. In absolute contrast there are now voices, arguing that the only way forward is that a more and more desperate and unreasonable Zelensky must go. In order to have a chance for some kind of truce or peace in Ukraine. Shouldn’t we at least demand some sort idea of what the West aims to achieve, instead of leaving it to Zelensky to decide what the West wants? In all seriousness, will Europe really leave it to Zelensky and a vengeful Biden to decide to escalate the proxy war against Russia and decide the conditions for making peace with Russia? Is Ukraine worth it? A question that really would irk moralistic proponents of giving Ukraine everything they demand. One might even ask, is it worth it for Ukraine itself? Losing more than 100.000 dead or wounded? And be subject to enormous destruction everywhere? Will Western decision makers (not the least the Europeans) come to their senses and realise that they have to demand something from Ukraine? Readiness for truce negotiations after re-enforcing their stalemate line against Russian attacks like mentioned before, in order to start negotiations with Russia supported by U.S. and the EU. Negotiations for at the very least a truce, in order to continue diplomatic efforts to achieve some kind of peace. Or perhaps accept something one might call a “Korean solution”? Not peace, but not War either. A divided country with a DMZ (demilitarised zone). Not the best of all worlds, but some alternatives certainly sound worse and the risk is certainly there. Only civilians killed in Gaza? Listening to journalists reporting on the war in Gaza, one might easily get the impression that Israeli forces have killed 15,900 civilians, mostly women and children. Why do reporters not mention that Hamas fighters are included in the Hamas-run health ministry’s numbers? In the 2008-09 war Hamas fighters made up nearly half of those killed, according to a U.S. congressional service. In the ongoing war Israel estimates that at least 5,000 Hamas fighters have been killed (The Times of Israel, December 5), thus making up one third of those killed. Genocide – A question of numbers and proportions? Public outcry and pro-Palestine demonstrations seem to think that the large numbers of people killed in Gaza and the proportionally smaller number killed by Hamas on October 7 and by their rocket barrages is sufficient to accuse Israel of committing genocide and carrying out war crimes on the people in Gaza. But are genocide and war crimes really a question of numbers and proportions? Let us if the accusations will hold up under a closer scrutiny. Accusations of genocide in Gaza At a press conference held on November 20, UN Secretary-General Guterres said: “…without entering into discussing the accuracy of the numbers that were published by the de facto authorities in Gaza, what is clear is that we have had in a few weeks thousands of children killed. So, this is what matters. We are witnessing a killing of civilians that is unparalleled and unprecedented in any conflict since I am Secretary-General.” Guterres apparently did not want to classify the killings war crimes or genocide, but denounced the violations of international humanitarian law and violations of protections of civilians. Thus, in fact making a very serious accusation against Israel in the war against Hamas in Gaza. On November 16 so-called experts at the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) warned about the risk of genocide in Gaza and “the failure of the international system to mobilise to prevent genocide.” Others have been more forthright. At a BRICS meeting on November 21 discussing the situation in the Middle East, South African President Ramaphosa called an immediate ceasefire saying “The collective punishment of Palestinian civilians through the unlawful use of force by Israel is a war crime. The deliberate denial of medicine, fuel, food and water to the residents of Gaza is tantamount to genocide.” “The reality in Gaza, with its unbearable pain and trauma on the survivors, is a catastrophe of enormous proportions,” (OHCHR, press release, November 16). In the U.S. a Civil liberties group is trying to sue President Biden for failing to prevent Israel from committing genocide in Gaza. And then there are the unarticulated outcries of “Genocide.” Thousands of protestors in western countries with large Muslim populations have been screaming genocide, carrying bloodied baby puppets, and played dead civilians in Gaza, demanding a ceasefire and yelling “Free Palestine.” At the same time Gaza has been almost completely blockaded by Israel, making it almost impossible to provide help, except for strictly limited truck deliveries and water provisions. Certainly, a catastrophe for those confined to Gaza, but does this automatically mean that Israel is committing war crimes and genocide? Genocide, what does it mean? The term Genocide was coined by the Polish-Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin in his book “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe” in 1944. Before the war, while still living in Poland his studies had led to him to see a necessity for some kind of international law, that would guard against the eradication of whole human groups or nations. In his book Lemkin called for a new term and a new conception for destruction of ethnic groups and nations, writing: “New conceptions require new terms. By ‘‘genocide” we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. This new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice in its modern development, is made from the ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing), thus corresponding in its formation to such words as tyrannicide, homocide, infanticide, etc. Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. (Emphasis added.) The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group.” (Lemkin, 1944). According to Lemkin genocide has two phases, First the destruction of the national pattern of an oppressed group. Secondly, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. Apparently meaning either that an oppressed group may remain in their territory after imposition of the national of the oppressor. Or the oppressed group may be eradicated and the territory colonized by the oppressor. UN definition of genocide “The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” was approved by the General Assembly on December 9 1948. In Article II it states: “In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” It is important to note that Article II talks of “the intent” to destroy. Meaning “must having the mind, attention, or will concentrated on something or some end or purpose.” “To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.” (UN office on Genocide protection). https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml No evidence of Israel committing genocide On November 16 the OHCHR reported that Israel’s war against Hamas, had led to the killing of over 11,000 people (the number has now risen to more than 14,000), injured 27,000 and displaced around 1.6 million in Gaza. 41 per cent of those killed are said to be children and 25 cent women. According to the OHCHR statement almost 200 medics, 102 UN staff and 41 journalists have also been killed. Infrastructure have been destroyed, as have thousands of houses, together with hospitals schools, mosques, bakeries, water pipes, sewage and electricity networks. One might get the impression that the 14,000 dead are all civilians, but presumable an unknown proportion of the dead must be Hamas fighters killed in action. Trying to make a guesstimate of the number of Hamas and Jihad fighters that may be included in this total number of killed, one might perhaps use the proportions of 2008-09 war. U.S. congressional service state that 1.440 were killed and of these up to 700-750 may have been fighters or around half of those killed. Even if this proportion is too large it might indicate that a large proportion of the 14,000 killed may have been Hamas or Islamic Jihad fighters. Fighters who often use civilian clothes. To some the number of dead, injured and the amount of destruction is seen as clear evidence of genocide. Some also look at the disproportionality between the numbers killed and injured in Israel and in Gaza. With Israel counting “only” a little more than 1.200 killed and around 230 abducted. But neither the number of killed, the amount of destruction in Gaza nor the disproportion is clear evidence of genocide. Lemkin in his definition said that genocide included “the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.” Now, is there any clear indication that Israel is intending annihilate the population living in Gaza? Certainly not. Their aim is solely the annihilation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad as a force threatening Israel. UN convention also states that genocide must include the “proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” The definition also mentions killing members of the group and or causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group. And Israel is killing members of the group by killing civilians. members of Hamas and of Islamic Jihad, but this does not signify that they intend to kill the group of people living in Gaza. Nor would it seem to be Israel’s intention to impose their “national pattern” on the people of Gaza. Perhaps Israel is trying impose their “national pattern” on the Arab population living within its borders, but although this may signify intent, it may not be relevant here. Revelations have brought to light the idea that Israel might want a solution where the people in Gaza would be persuaded or forced to leave Gaza, and moved to Arab states, for instance Egypt, to live in Mediterranean part of the upper Sinai. Even this may not represent genocide for two reasons. The UN convention mentions that dispersion of a group may not represent genocide, and even if that were the case a possible intent found in certain circles in Israel, may be irrelevant as they do not have the means to follow up on their intent. Also, ideas and intentions like this seem to have been buried effectively though, not the least because Arab countries do not seem to want to have unruly more Palestinians move to their countries. Actually, we have the very strange situation that a large part of Gaza is a kind of large refugee camp, supported since 1949 by UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East). And Arab countries certainly haven’t been eager to alleviate the situation for people living in Gaza by offering them a better life in their own countries. Where doubt about genocide may arise is in relation to “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life…” Israel is certainly making life difficult for everyone living in Gaza. The problem is that that it may impossible to help civilians in Gaza, without helping Hamas and other groups fighting Israel. But surely Israel is committing war crimes… In November the Human Rights Watch NGO, argued that Israel was committing war crimes in Gaza, arguing: “The Israeli military’s repeated, apparently unlawful attacks on medical facilities, personnel, and transport are further destroying Gaza’s healthcare system and should be investigated as war crimes. Concerns about disproportionate attacks are magnified for hospitals. Even the threat of an attack or minor damage can have massive life-or-death implications for patients and caregivers. Israeli government should end attacks on hospitals. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the ICC should investigate.” On November 12 the WHO (World Health Organization) reported that Israeli forces had killed a number of people in 137 “attacks on health care” in Gaza. Volker Türk, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has argued that some of the Israeli attacks might constitute war crimes: “The killing of so many people at schools turned shelters, hundreds fleeing for their lives from al-Shifa Hospital amid continuing displacement of hundreds of thousands in southern Gaza are actions which fly in the face of the basic protections civilians must be afforded under international law." Seeing the videos and pictures of the result of Israel’s war in Gaza and listening to the journalists retelling their most gruesome tales from the war in Gaza, one might easily get the impression that Israel is waging an unrestricted and ruthless campaign not only against a mostly invisible Hamas, but against an undefended civilian population. Serious allegations indeed, but are they drawn too hastily, so to speak in the heat of the ongoing battle? International humanitarian law How are Israel’s action actions to be judged in relation to “International humanitarian Law” or IHL? IHL consists of a set of rules that based upon 4th Fourth Geneva Convention from 1949 supplemented with additional rules and protocols added at later stages. The set of rules are meant to limit the effects of armed conflict for humanitarian reasons and to protect civilians in a conflict. The principle of distinction Take the principle of distinction, which only allows attacks on groups of people and objects that constitute the armed forces of a party. “The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects.” (Ihl-databases. Icrc.org). The distinction also applies to how the attacks are carried out. Indiscriminate attacks, like aerial bombardment is banned. Some weapons, like chemical and biological weapons, anti-personal landmines or cluster ammunition, are banned. The principle of proportionality Next, we have the principle of proportionality. “Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.” (ihl-databases. Icrc.org). https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule14 Other principles ban attacks on hospitals, “including the personnel engaged in the search for, removal and transporting of and caring for wounded and sick civilians.” Prohibit the use of human shields and demand that civilians must be removed from the vicinity of military objectives. Demand target verification to make sure that targets are military objectives. Demand advance warning whereby each party must give advance warning of attacks which affect civilians. Not evident that Israel has committed war crimes On the face of it, it may seem evident that Israeli forces have broken some of these rules and principles, civilians have been hit, lots of houses and infrastructure have been destroyed, hospitals and ambulances attacked, help for civilians been prevented from reaching them etc. But let us take a closer look and what seems to observers to be evident war crimes, may turn out to be more than doubtful. It must remembered that these rules and principles are to be used in war, and war is not banned per se. They are also to a certain extent pragmatic, meaning that there are exceptions to the general set of rules. “IHL is suitably ambiguous to permit a broad interpretation, on a case-by-case-basis, while affording protections to those not part of the hostilities. This balancing act allows militaries enough scope to carry out their strategies, while at the same time alleviating suffering and ensuring accountability for acts that could amount to war crimes.” (e-ir.info). https://www.e-ir.info/2022/05/27/the-lawful-killing-of-civilians-under-international-humanitarian-law/ Civilians killed It is evident that many civilians have been killed, although the numbers may actually include a significant number of combatants. What has Israel done to prevent the killing of civilians? First, we notice the large number aerial bombardments and the destruction thus caused may indicate a kind of indiscriminate carpet bombing. But in a strange way the numbers may indicate that this cannot be the case. Given how tightly Gaza is populated indiscriminate bombing would certainly have resulted a much larger number of civilians killed. In fact, Israel seems to taken utmost care to avoid civilian casualties in the thousands of bombing missions. In a modern version of the Lieberman Code (from1863) and in accordance with the IHL-rules, Israeli forces seem have done their outmost to warn civilians before objects were to be bombed. We have seen the mass drops of leaflets to warn people in the areas to be bombed. More specifically Israel apparently often attempts to warn occupants of objects like appartement buildings said to be housing Hamas, by a so-called roof-knocking action, firing smaller projectiles at a building in order to warn the occupants to leave the building. In the ongoing war they are even using phone calls to warn individuals more precisely where they are going bomb or otherwise attack. During the 2008-09 conflict Israel is said to have made 165,000 phone calls to warn civilians in Gaza. IDF’s bombing of objects in Gaza also consists of precision attacks. Indicating high degree of distinction, and certainly not indiscriminate carpet bombing. Thus, adhering the principles and rules of IHL. It also appears that Israel’s forces use extensive intelligence at least for above ground objects to allow them to pinpoint targets deemed military relevant. This even goes for the on the ground missions, where they centrally observe and approve attacks of objects for attack even for small units of the army, in order to take care to only attack what is deemed military objects or else to be ordered to abstain, when intelligence indicate that for instance civilians might be in danger. Again, this would signify an army taken utmost care to avoid civilian casualties. Human shields made up civilians, either voluntarily or forced, are used by Hamas to avoid being attacked, apparently expecting Israeli forces to avoid attacking civilians. But “Military objectives protected by human shields do not cease to be legitimate targets for attack simply because of the presence of those shields … [Altough] attack will be possible if and only if the potential damage to civilians is not ‘excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” (icrc.org) https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc-872-bouchie-de-belle.pdf It is not known whether Israel have used this as an excuse for attacking military objects shielded by civilians. But if they have it may at least be doubtful if it must be seen as a war crime. What about hospitals then? Israeli forces have also tried to warn people to leave hospitals, but hospitals are not to be attacked, even giving warnings. So, have they committed a war crime in these instances? Perhaps not. The immediate vicinity of hospitals or even hospital grounds have apparently been used by Hamas for attacks against Israeli forces. But does this mean that Israel is in their right to attack hospitals? As far it can be gleaned from the rules of proportionality and military necessity, there may be situations when hospitals may be attacked. “Specific protection to which hospitals are entitled shall not cease unless they are used by a party to the conflict to commit, outside their humanitarian functions, an "act harmful to the enemy". (Emphasis added). (icrc.org). Although if there is doubt one must refrain from attacking. Israel apparently was not in doubt, and Hamas at the very least have fired rockets or attacked Israeli forces very close to hospitals, presumable expecting to be immune from attack. After IDF forces have entered the al-Shifa hospital they found holes and tunnels in the grounds and a (limited) collection of weapons to prove that Hamas was operating from the al-Shifa hospital, and more revelations may be forthcoming. So, according to this interpretation Israel might have acted in accordance with the IHL rules and principles. Hamas’s use of lawfare against Israel A NATO Stratcom report on “Hamas use of Human shields in Gaza” illustrates how Hamas’s in earlier military conflicts with Israel has adroitly turned the rules and principles of IHL against the IDF, in what has been termed lawfare, defined as “the use of legal action to cause problems for an opponent” (Cambridge Dictionary). The report lists some situation where Hamas has used of human shields. Firing rockets, artillery, and mortars from or in proximity to heavily populated civilian areas, often from or near facilities which should be protected according to the Geneva Convention (e.g. schools, hospitals, or mosques). Locating military or security-related infrastructures such as HQs, bases, armouries, access routes, lathes, or defensive positions within or in proximity to civilian areas. Protecting terrorists’ houses and military facilities, or rescuing terrorists who were besieged or warned by the IDF. Combating the IDF from or in proximity to residential and commercial areas, including using civilians for intelligence gathering mission. The report sees Hamas’s tactic as a am attempt to create a kind of win-win scenario. If the IDF attacks Hamas in such situations, they will likely cause civilian casualties, and with rising civilian casualties they will expect reactions like the ones we see the ongoing war: Accusations that Israel is committing war crimes. The accusations may turn opinion against Israel exactly as we have seen, and lead to political pressure on Israel to limit their warfare. The result would be a win, albeit a strange one, for Hamas. If Israel then felt compelled to limit their military actions and to take utmost care to avoid civilian casualties, not attacking in situations where civilians may be killed, even though it might be possible under the IHL rules as we have seen, it would enable Hamas to preserve and protect their own forces. That they are committing war crimes is apparently a lesser problem for world opinion. Albeit making Israel’s fight inherently more inefficient and dangerous for its troops. Thus, the IDF would be caught in a kind of Catch 22 situation: Dammed if they attack when civilians are at risk and dammed if they don’t. Israel may be dammed because they are strong, efficient and more or less obey the rules, while Hamas, being the weak part, may win public opinion, although breaking every rule in the book. Only the October 7 attack caused an outcry of damnation, that just lasted until Israel attacked Gaza. While the taking of mostly civilian hostages, the firing of a barrage of rockets which is meant to cause civilian casualties, and their use of human shields, does not provoke an outcry and condemnation. “The most moral army“? After the 2008-2009 war Gaza the so-called Goldstone Report, a UN fact finding mission on the Gaza conflict reached a very critical conclusion with regard to Israel’s conduct of the war against Hamas, not the least in relation to protection of civilians and for example hospitals. “The Mission finds that in a number of cases Israel failed to take feasible precautions required by customary law reflected in article 57 (2) (a) (ii) of Additional Protocol I to avoid or minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.” “The Mission found numerous instances of deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects (individuals, whole families, houses, mosques) in violation of the fundamental international humanitarian law principle of distinction, resulting in deaths and serious injuries. In these cases the mission found that the protected status of civilians was not respected and the attacks were intentional,” “The intentional strike at al-Quds hospital using high-explosive artillery shells and white phosphorous in and around the hospital also violated articles 18 and 19 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. With regard to the attack against al-Wafa hospital, the Mission found a violation of the same provisions, as well as a violation of the customary law prohibition against attacks which may be expected to cause excessive damage to civilians and civilian objects. “ The Goldstone Report thus concluded that Israeli forces were in several cases in conflict with humanitarian rules and principles, indicating that Israel had committed war crimes in the 2008-09 conflict Hamas Conduct With regard to Hamas’ conduct in the 2008-09 conflict that commission was very vague in its comments. In fact, the report seems rather shy, when looking at possible war crimes committed by Hamas, as evidenced for instance by this conclusion: “The Mission examined whether and to what extent the Palestinian armed groups violated their obligation to exercise care and take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population in Gaza from the inherent dangers of the military operations (chap. VIII). The Mission was faced with a certain reluctance by the persons it interviewed in Gaza to discuss the activities of the armed groups. On the basis of the information gathered, the Mission found that Palestinian armed groups were present in urban areas during the military operations and launched rockets from urban areas. It may be that the Palestinian combatants did not at all times adequately distinguish themselves from the civilian population. The Mission found no evidence, however, to suggest that Palestinian armed groups either directed civilians to areas where attacks were being launched or that they forced civilians to remain within the vicinity of the attacks.” The Commission mentions that Hamas’ rocket attacks on Israel have been indiscriminate, as Hamas was not able make sure their rockets only hit military targets. With the result that the Hamas bombardment of Israel “have succeeded in causing terror within Israel’s civilian population, as evidenced by the high rates of psychological trauma within the affected communities. The attacks have also led to an erosion of the social, cultural and economic lives of the communities in southern Israel, and have affected the rights to education of the tens of thousands of children and young adults who attend classes in the affected areas.” Critique of the Goldstone report The focus of the Report was very much on Israel’s conduct of the war. One just has to see the majority of the report is focussing on Israel. The Goldstone Report “predictably saw a line-up of the world’s worst abusers condemn democratic Israel for human rights violations. In a heated lynch mob atmosphere, Kuwait slammed Israel for “intentional killing, intentional destruction of civilian objects, intentional scorched-earth policy,” saying Israel “embodied the Agatha Christie novel, ‘Escaped with Murder’.” Pakistan said the “horrors of Israeli occupation continue to haunt the international community’s conscience.”” (UN Watch) Colonel Richard Kemp, a British officer with experience as commander of British forces in Afghanistan, in a debate on the Goldstone report, reached the opposite conclusion: “… based on my knowledge and experience, I can say this: During Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli Defense Forces did more to safeguard the rights of civilians in a combat zone than any other army in the history of warfare. Israel did so while facing an enemy that deliberately positioned its military capability behind the human shield of the civilian population.” (unwatch.org, 2009). https://unwatch.org/issue-208-british-hero-military-expert-tells-u-n-idf-moral-army-history-warfare/ Later in 2011 judge Goldstone himself also retracted some of the conclusions in the Goldstone report. In Washington Post he wrote: “If I had known then what I know now, the Goldstone Report would have been a different document… Although the Israeli evidence that has emerged since publication of our report doesn’t negate the tragic loss of civilian life, I regret that our fact-finding mission did not have such evidence explaining the circumstances in which we said civilians in Gaza were targeted, because it probably would have influenced our findings about intentionality and war crimes.” Genocide and war crimes —depending on viewpoint? We have seen that number of casualties and proportionality in numbers do not really permit the judgement of genocide. Instead, we have to conclude that there is a lack of evidence to say that Israel is committing genocide or war crimes on the people of Gaza. On the contrary there are indications that Israel is striving to act in accordance with rules and principles of IHL under very difficult circumstances, against a Hamas not abiding with any rules. The IDF has surely used overwhelming force in their attempts to reach and eradicate Hamas fighters, and there are certainly indications that they have hit Hamas even at hospitals and mosques. But what is abundantly clear is that Israel is not trying to eradicate civilian population in Gaza. They are trying hard to hit Hamas, with Hamas using hit and run guerrilla tactics. But IDF’s use of overwhelming force and the unfortunate collateral killing of civilians cannot be seen as evidence that IDF and Israel is committing genocide. The problem is that in Israel’s war against Hamas it may be very difficult to make clear distinction between people and objects that are fighting Israeli forces and those who are not. We are not seeing a battle between two easily identifiable armies, but a battle between an army and what might be seen as guerrilla fighters popping in and out of the fight. Who is actually in danger of being eradicated? It is Israel, not the people in the West Bank or Gaza, but an Israel surrounded by a collection of Arabian and Persian enemies having openly expressed their intent to destroy Israel, in the sense that Lemkin, meant when defining genocide. Hamas have expressed their ultimate goal or intent is to eliminate the state of Israel, using whatever means available. In interview in 2010 co-founder and leader of Hamas Mahmoud Al-Zahhar said that "Our plan for this stage is to liberate any inch of Palestinian land, and to establish a state on it. Our ultimate plan is [to have] Palestine in its entirety. I say this loud and clear so that nobody will accuse me of employing political tactics. We will not recognize the Israeli enemy. " (gatestoneinstitute.org). The atrocities committed against people in Israel on October 7 indicates that Hamas is willing to commit genocide, but not quite having the means to carry out their intent, they transgress every rule and principle in order inflict casualties on Israel. In a repugnant way Gaza civilians being killed are used by Hamas as a “weapon” in the war against Israel. Being the military weak part in the ongoing war has helped Hamas and its allies amongst Muslim countries and leftish movements in the West to turn realities upside down. Leading media, politicians and the UN General Secretary to accuse Israel of Genocide and not Hamas. Thus, succeeding in their attempt at lawfare (the use of legal action to cause problems for an opponent). With a large art of the world conveniently forgetting the fact Israel is the beleaguered state, with enemies lurking in Hezbollah Lebanon, in Houthi Yemen and of cause, for some bizarre antisemitic reason and most of all, Mullah Iran. HAMAS, the acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (the Islamic Resistance Movement). IDF, the acronym for the Israeli Defence Forces, also known as in Israel by its Hebrew acronym Tzahal. Waning support for Ukraine When President Zelensky visited the U.S. in December 2022, President Biden announced that he did not see an expiration date for U.S. support for Ukraine. “The American people are with you every step of the way” adding “And we will stay as long as it takes.” Biden’s words have been echoed by NATO’s Stoltenberg and other European leaders. But in October 2023 “as long as it takes” may be starting to sound kind of hollow, as a sort of enchanted prayer. Constantly repeated it has started to sound less and less convincing, when seeing that no end is in sight. At the UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) session in September President Biden still stuck to his position, saying “… if nations can pursue their imperial ambitions without consequences, then we put at risk everything this very institution stands for. Everything. Every victory won on the battlefield belongs to the courageous Ukrainian soldiers. But this past year, the world was tested as well, and we did not hesitate. We chose liberty. We chose sovereignty. We chose principles to which every party to the United Nations Charter is beholding. We stood with Ukraine. Like you, the United States wants this war to end on just terms, on terms we all signed up for: that you cannot seize a nation’s territory by force. The only country standing in the way of that is Russia. So, we — each of us in this body who is determined to uphold the principles and beliefs we pledge to defend as members of the United Nations — must be clear, firm, and unwavering in our resolve. Ukraine has the same rights that belong to every sovereign nation. We will stand in solidarity with Ukraine. We will stand in solidarity against Russia’s aggression. Period.” (whitehouse.gov) Period! Perhaps the aging president is sticking to his guns, or is to President Zelensky’s guns, but the crags in the solidarity Biden refers to are widening. On September 21 a group of Republican members of Congress handed a letter to the White House, vowing to go against further spending request for Ukraine, unless they get satisfactory answers to their questions. “The American people deserve to know what their money has gone to. How is the counteroffensive going? Are the Ukrainians any closer to victory than they were 6 months ago? What is our strategy, and what is the president’s exit plan? What does the administration define as victory in Ukraine? What assistance has the United States provided Ukraine under Title 10? II would be an absurd abdication of congressional responsibility to grant this request without knowing the answers to these questions. For these reasons … we oppose additional expenditure for war in Ukraine included in your request. ( https://twitter.com/JDVance1/status/1704836926212022346/photo/2). Biden’s request for $24 billion in continued support for Ukraine for the rest of 2023 has now been caught in the wrangling to pass a new spending bill in Congress. Support for Ukraine also seems to be waning outside Congress. A recent ABCNews/ Washington Post poll shows that 41% now think that the U.S. is doing too much to support Ukraine. In April 2022 is was only 14%. Only half of the people asked now think that the U.S. support is the right amount or is too little. Source. ABC News, September 24 2023. What we see is stubborn President Biden and his administration sticking to “whatever it takes” line in relation to the proxy war in Ukraine, fearing the alternative. While the U.S. populace is beginning to doubt express doubt. In Europe support for Ukraine sems to be holding in the population, albeit with large difference between hawkish countries like Poland, Estonia, the UK and Denmark. A more hesitant western group comprises France, Germany, Spain and Portugal. While the sceptic group may include Hungary, Austria and perhaps Italy. Surveys from May 22 and January 23 show answers to the question “The most important thing is to stop the war as soon as possible, even it means Ukraine giving control of areas to Russia” Source: Bruegel based on Krastev & Leonard (2023).
The Bruegel think tank is careful to point out that due to the lack of progress for the Ukraine on the battlefield “voices calling for a peace settlement, even on unfavourable terms to Ukraine, might gain traction in the public debate. In upcoming elections, this could benefit political parties less favourable to supporting Ukraine for ‘as long as it takes’.” Leading European politicians still seem to follow the U.S. lead enthusiastically. Just listen to Josep Borrell, Commission Vice-President in charge of coordinating the external action of the European Union: “Our unity and support to Ukraine is more solid than ever, and it will continue until Ukraine prevails” (X/Twitter May 13,2023). Or to von der Leyen in her State of the Union speech: We will be at Ukraine's side every step of the way – For as long as it takes.” Actually, just about the only serious opposition from a European leader comes from Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. Recently though there been signs of discord between Poland and Ukraine as result of the spat about Ukrainian grain exports destabilizing the polish market. On September 20 a visibly annoyed Polish Prime Minister Mateuz Morawiecki told Polsat News: “We are no longer transferring weaponry to Ukraine, we are now arming ourselves with most modern weapons … If you want to defend yourself, you have to have something to defend with.” While the Morawiecki’s outburst may be related the upcoming parliamentary elections on October 15, they show that not all is well with Poland’s support for Ukraine. Then we have the usual elephant in the room, former president Donald Trump, and the looming 2024 presidential election. There is a fear — or hope, that Trump, if he should win, would not support Ukraine but seek an agreement with Russia. In an interview he has revealed what he intended to do: To Mr Zelensky he would say "No more, you gotta make a deal," and to Mr Putin: "If you don't make a deal, we're gonna give them a lot. We're gonna give more than they ever got. And that is it, the war will be over.” (ndtv.com). No wonder that President Zelensky on his latest visit to the Washington was anxious to speak to both the President and to Congress to try to persuade them to support a continuation of the aid for Ukraine. Senator Schumer, Democrat told that in a private meeting president Zelensky had said: “if we don’t get the aid, we will lose the war.” Zelensky was not given the hero’s welcome he received last time. House Speaker McCarthy even denied Zelensky’s request to address a joint session. Instead, he had to meet privately with leading members. Critical voices Admiral Tony Radkin, the UK Chief of Staff, argues: Ukraine is winning and Russia is losing. "That is because the aim of Russia was to subjugate Ukraine and to put it under Russia's control. That has not happened and it never will happen, and that's why Ukraine is winning." (BBC News September 10). The question is how long can Ukraine continue winning in this really weird fashion? Others seem instead to regard this strange “winning” position of Ukraine as kind of quagmire, that one must get out of. Here some views form three different groups of sceptics. Sceptical military commanders All during the proxy war against the Russian invasion and occupation, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, has never really sounded optimistic in relation to the Ukraine and its chances of forcing the Russians back. In November 2022 he said “In terms of probability, the probability of a Ukrainian military victory defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine to include what they define or what they claim is Crimea, the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily. Politically, there may be a political solution where, politically, the Russians withdraw, that's possible. You want to negotiate from a position of strength. Russia right now is on its back. … So, you want to negotiate at a time when you're at your strength and your opponent is at weakness. And it's possible, maybe that there'll be a political solution. All I'm -- all I'm saying is there's a possibility for it. That's all I'm saying.” In a recent interview with the BBC, he reckoned that it was too early to say whether the counter offensive had failed. “There's still a reasonable amount of time, probably about 30 to 45 days' worth of fighting weather left, so the Ukrainians aren't done … there's battles not done... they haven't finished the fighting part of what they're trying to accomplish.” He is of cause referring to the time left before the muddy fall and winter will hamper the counter offensive While Milley still sees a weak possibility for a wider Ukrainian push, although certainly not sounding optimistic, others are decidedly pessimistic. In April 2023 Polish armed forces Chief of General Staff, Rajmund Andrzejczak, is quoted in the Military Watch Magazine with a warning that the outlook is not good: “War always was, is, and there is nothing to indicate otherwise – a matter of politics, and in its determinants has a substantial number of economic factors: finance, infrastructure issues, social issues, technology, food production and a whole set of problems that must be put into this box to understand this conflict… When I look at the conflict in Ukraine, I mainly see it through these political lenses, and unfortunately it does not look good,” he stated. This was primarily on the basis that there was “nothing” to indicate Russia would be unable to sustain its war effort, and that Western economic warfare efforts had failed to prevent this” (Military Watch Magazine). According to a Washington Post report in August U.S. intelligence does believe that the Ukraine’s counteroffensive will fail in its goal of cutting through Russian forces and reach the city of Melitopol this year. “Ukraine’s forces, which are pushing toward Melitopol from the town of Robotyne more than 50 miles away, will remain several miles outside of the city, U.S. officials said. (washingtonpost.com). Finally, we have the curious suggestion for a Ukrainian solution from the Director of the Private Office of the NATO Secretary, the Norwegian Stian Jenssen. In a public panel debate in Norway in August 2023 he argued: “I think that a solution could be for Ukraine to give up territory, and get NATO membership in return, ... It is important that we discuss our way through this.” Is he airing an idea that NATO is discussing, a sending up a trial balloon to see how the idea would be received? Perhaps not. When Jens Stoltenberg met Zelensky in Kyiv on September 28, he said “all Allies have agreed that Ukraine will join NATO” and “Ukraine is now closer to NATO than ever before.” One has wonder what is going on in NATO, but it certainly looks as if the General Secretary has a more naively optimistic view than his military colleagues. But perhaps Jens Stoltenberg’s role is to act as a Biden/Blinken/Sullivan stooge. Sceptical analysts and commentators Analysts from the Rand Corporation, the well-known non-profit and non-partisan research organization, have become more and more convinced that Ukraine and West will have to prepare for a long war with the non-existing willingness on both side of the war to enter negotiations. Already in February 2023 they foresaw the present signs for a stalemate: “Based on how the Russians are digging in at this point in eastern Ukraine, through a network of defensive positions and trenches, multiple lines, deep mineTelds, I think it’s going to be really costly for the Ukrainians to [oust] them from all areas of occupation. (Dara Massicot at a RAND briefing). A RAND colleague believes that there is no signs that Putin will retreat: … he’s not going to budge, or is going to only budge at the very last minute if he’s under intense political pressure at home … given the military realities on the ground and Putin’s determination — and the Ukrainian’s determination — to keep fighting on, this doesn’t augur well.” (John Tefft, a RAND briefing). Other analysts have focused on the increasing cost of a drawn-out war for Ukraine and not the least for the U.S. “The costs for the United States and the European Union of keeping the Ukrainian state economically solvent will multiply over time as conflict inhibits investment and production; Ukrainian refugees remain unable to return; and, as a result, tax revenue and economic activity drop dramatically lower than before the war. Russia's campaign of destruction of Ukrainian critical infrastructure will create major long-term challenges for sustaining the war effort and for economic recovery and has also substantially increased Kyiv's projections for the economic support it will need from the United States and its allies.” (S. Charap and M. Priebe, The RAND Corporation). A drawn-out war will have consequences for U.S. foreign policy and military capabilities in other parts of the world. “The U.S. ability to focus on its other global priorities—particularly, competition with China—will remain constrained as long as the war is absorbing senior policymakers' time and U.S. military resources. Bilateral or multilateral interaction—let alone cooperation—with Russia on key U.S. interests is unlikely.” (S. Charap and M. Priebe, The RAND Corporation). Then there is the risk that the spiraling escalation on both sides, might lead to a Russia-NATO war, and/or the use of tactical nuclear weapons, which in itself carries the ultimate risk of an all-out nuclear war. Anatol Lieven form The Quincy Institute shows another perspective on the war in Ukraine, the opinions of Russia’s present elites: “The general elite aversion to pursuing total victory in Ukraine is however not the same thing as a willingness to accept Russian defeat – which is all that the Ukrainian and US governments are presently offering. Nobody with whom I have spoken within the Moscow elite, and very few indeed in the wider population, has said that Russia should surrender Crimea and the eastern Donbas. Unless Russian sovereignty over these territories is formally recognised by Ukraine – something that Kyiv has categorically excluded – the Russians who take this view believe that Russia must hold the additional territory it has taken since last year’s invasion, to head off any future Ukrainian attack on Crimea and the Donbas. “(The Guardian, August 30). John Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, and belonging to the realist school on foreign policy, is certainly not popular today for his views on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He believes that opportunities for peace may have been lost. That escalation is likely and that the risk of nuclear weapons being used is not trivial. Another academic heretic is the economist, Jeffrey Sachs. He has recently argued that Ukraine is being destroyed by U.S. arrogance. “The Ukraine War will end when the U.S. acknowledges a simple truth: NATO enlargement to Ukraine means perpetual war and Ukraine’s destruction. Ukraine’s neutrality could have avoided the war, and remains the key to peace.” From what we have seen here, it certainly looks like the analysts have come to a rather pessimistic outlook for the U.S. proxy war in Ukraine. Still, most of western leaders are still bowing, albeit often reluctantly to Ukrainian demands for further support. Unlike political voices in background who are beginning to reach a pessimistic conclusion Sceptical western politicians Former French president Nicolas Sarkozy is one of them. In an article in Le Figaro on August 16, he laid out a pessimistic view on war in Ukraine. “Without compromise, nothing will be possible and we run the risk that the situation will degenerate at any moment. This powder keg could have frightful consequences…The Ukrainians... will want to reconquer what has been unjustly taken from them. But if they can't manage it completely, the choice will be between a frozen conflict... or taking the high road out with referenda [in territories occupied by Russia since 2014] strictly overseen by the international community… any return to the way things were before is an illusion. An incontestable referendum... will be needed to solidify the current state of affairs. (Nicolas Sarkozy). In relation to ongoing pressure from Zelensky for Ukraine to join NATO, and the vague promises from the West in relation to his wish, Sarkozy argues that the Ukrainian wish must be rejected. NATO must instead affirm a willingness “to respect and take into account Russia’s historic fear of being encircled by unfriendly neighbors.” He also described as unrealistic and hypothetical suggestions that Ukraine can join the European Union in the foreseeable future, comparing this to Turkey’s hopeless decades-long efforts: “We are selling fallacious promises that will not be kept.” The EU’s black sheep in the eyes of the majority of EU leaders, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, has been steadfast in his critique of the war in Ukraine. Early on he blamed failed Western diplomacy for the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Later he has criticized EU leaders for being “too intellectual” and not looking for ways to end the fighting. “It is obvious that the military solution does not work … If you look at the reality, the numbers, the context, and the fact that NATO is not ready to send troops, it is obvious that there is no victory for the poor Ukrainians on the battlefield. This is my position. (Euronews , May 24, 2023). Orbán has also constantly refused to send weapons to Ukraine and stuck to humanitarian support. Later provoking a new outcry by saying that Donald Trump winning in 2024 is the only hope for West, arguing that a Ukrainian victory “is not just a misunderstanding. It is a lie. It’s impossible.” After the Slovakian elections with Robert Fico’s SMER party winning the election with an unexpected 22.9%, there is good chance that he will become the new leader in Slovakia, and his view of the war in Ukraine are very similar to Viktor Orbán’s: No support for any further military aid to Ukraine. There have only been weak voices talking about initiatives for Peace elsewhere. Weak voices from both the left and right end of the political spectrum. An example is the German rightwing AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) party, that has argued that a first step would be to link further support for Ukraine with a demand for Ukraine’s willingness to engage in peace initiatives. “Eine privilegierte EU-Partnerschaft für die Ukraine bei gleichzeitiger Garantie, kein Mitglied des NATO- Militärbündnisses und der EU zu werden, könnte eine Bedingung für ein Friedensabkommen sein” (afdbundestag.de) https://afdbundestag.de/friedensinitiative-ukraine/ Alas, European politicians arguing for ending the war are still in the fall of 2023 lonely voices in a political desert. Rejected by most of their colleagues in power, that still cling to President Biden’s verbal promise of standing with Ukraine as long as it takes. Although one may think their real interest is different for Biden’s, and that in end they will have been had. Either being drawn in a wider war, or that the U.S. unknown to them are secretly trying to negotiate an end to the war. In UN speech in February, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned: “The chances of further escalation and bloodshed keep growing. I fear the world is not sleepwalking into a wider war. I fear it is doing so with its eyes wide open. But the world needs peace and peace in line with the United Nations Charter and international law.” Spain’s Prime Minister Pro Sanchez earlier this year said that he would ask President Biden to listen to China’s and Brazil’s views on the war in Ukraine. Views like President Lula da Silva’s, who does not want to take sides and has said: “"I am absolutely certain that we will find a far better outcome for the world if we manage to find a way to make peace, … This war shouldn't have started, Russia shouldn't have invaded but it did. The fact is that it happened. So instead of choosing sides I want to choose a third way, the construction of peace," (AP, AFP April 2023). Lula also said “No one in the world is talking about peace except for me, it is like being alone screaming in the desert.” (France 24). He has been against encouraging Ukraine by sending weapons, and suggested that Ukraine should accept to give hope of getting back Crimea. China’s President Xi is also promoting peace talks, arguing “the more difficulties there are, the greater the need to keep space for peace. The more acute the problem is, the more important it is not to give up efforts for dialogue. China will continue to play a constructive role in promoting the political settlement of the Ukraine issue.” (Global Times, March 2023). China has even proposed a 12-point plan for peace talks, that hasn’t been received very well by Zelensky and the U.S. With China arguing that “Unfortunately, pushing for peace runs counter to the agenda of the US, which created the conditions for war by pushing for NATO expansion, despite the fact it knew this crossed red lines of Russia's security interests. Following this the US has escalated its proxy war in Ukraine over the past year with the goal of "weakening Russia." That is why, despite the interest expressed by other countries, China's peace plan has been rejected by the US.” (Global Times, March. 2023). Hard questions Fiery conviction with no substance? Do the present Western leaders know what they doing, or have they just become delirious on a cocktail of self-righteous moralism and power, stumbling along into an unforeseeable but dangerous future. Their shrill voices filled with passion for Ukraine and their hate of Russia drowning out warning voices. Have they ever taken the time to sit down and reflect upon what they are doing, or are they too busy flitting to and from summits meant to demonstrate their unison conviction? Caught in vortex of a proxy crusade? Will the West do what it takes for as long as it takes, albeit hesitantly and with delays, to help Ukraine defeat the Russian forces and get back all of what they regard as Ukrainian land, even Crimea? Have Western leaders, at first dipping very cautiously into their arsenals, lost all sense of caution, lured by their own superficial moralistic idealism and the terrible plight of Ukraine? Will the West continue to pour tanks, jets and long-range missiles into Ukraine, accepting the Ukrainian argument that more weapons will help save lives? Ignoring that nothing the West has done until now has helped to save lives, au contraire. Is Russia and the West caught in a spiralling vortex of continuous escalation? What is next, if Leopards and even fighter jets are not enough? Surreptitiously inserting Western “boots on the ground” to stiffen Ukrainian resistance? Might the lid be blown off Pandora’s box and release its curses on the whole of human kind, by simple incidents like Russian missiles landing in a NATO country, Russia shooting down a U.S. surveillance plane or something else reminding one of “Princip’s shots in Sarajevo.”? Simplistic views of the endgame What is the West hoping to achieve, a defeated Russia, perhaps even warlike dissolution? Or a Russia getting even more allied to China? Is that something Europe could want? Would that not be a real nightmare on its doorstep? Shouldn’t we at least demand some sort idea of what the West want to achieve, instead of leaving it to Zelensky to decide what the West wants? In all seriousness, will Europe really leave it to Zelensky and a vengeful Biden to decide to escalate the proxy war against Russia and decide the conditions for making peace with Russia? Or will Western decision makers (not the least the Europeans) come to their senses and realise that they have to demand something from Ukraine? Perhaps even accept something one might call a “Korean solution”? Not peace, but not War either. A divided country with a DMZ (demilitarised zone). Not the best of all worlds, but some alternatives certainly sound worse and the risk is certainly there. Is Ukraine worth it? A question that really would irk moralistic proponents of giving Ukraine everything they demand. One might even ask, is it worth it for Ukraine itself? Losing more than 100.000 dead or wounded? And be subject to enormous destruction everywhere? Is Biden promising more than he can deliver? In Kyiv he recently said: “You [President Zelensky] remind us that freedom is priceless; it’s worth fighting for as long as it takes. And that’s how long we’re going to be with you, Mr. President: for as long as it takes. “ Big words, but the U.S. might get tired in its proxy war against Russia and lose popular support? Leaving Ukraine to the fight its own hopeless fight? If U.S. support petered out, it would leave Europe with destroyed Ukraine and a belligerent Russian neighbour. Is Europe prepared for that? Losing sight of other problems? One might also ask if Western leaders are too concentrated on Ukraine, ignoring other massive problems and crises in the world at their own peril? Crises that may pop up “with a vengeance.” In the Middle East Iran seems close to having weapons grade nuclear material. Will they be allowed to get the bomb? And if they do, how will Israel and the West react to Iranian threats? Will China just continue to harass Taiwan, squeeze it with a blockade or invade, while US is occupied elsewhere? Will we see a hegemonic struggle with West against the Rest in large parts of the World? With Western ideas and values coming under threat in parts of the World observing the West concentrating on the Ukraine conflict, while ignoring deadly conflicts elsewhere. How will the West handle its own set of problems? Their internal political divisions and conflicts. In relation to an influx of migrants from other parts of the World, leading over time to a “browning” of the White West. In relation to identity politics and woke ideology, accompanied by vocal attacks on the West’s own history. The history that founded Western success and hegemony. Selected essays on the war in Ukraine: 08/02/23 “Korean solution” to the war in Ukraine? To understand the need for negotiation now it might be worthwhile to read the recent RAND Corporation Perspective “Avoiding a Long War.” https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/korean-solution-to-the-war-in-ukraine? 03/02/23 Realism disappearing down the Ukrainian maelstrom Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin on support for Ukraine: We're going to continue to dig deep. https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/realism-disappearing-down-the-ukrainian-maelstrom 27/09/22 A grim spectre rears its ugly head President Putin and President Biden are playing a passionate and dangerous game of chicken. https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/a-grim-spectre-rears-its-ugly-head 11/07/22 WHY is passion drowning out realism in Ukraine war? https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/why-is-passion-drowning-out-realism-in-ukraine-war? 25/04/22 Spellbound by The Pied Piper of Kyiv’s magic Newspeak https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/april-17th-2022 11/03/22 Proxy war in Ukraine because Biden and Blinken bear a grudge? https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/proxy-war-in-ukraine-because-biden-and-blinken-bear-a-grudge? https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-out-ukrainian-quagmire-part-two-verner-c-petersen Enormous exertion for small gains ”Klishchiivka. I thank our warriors for liberating our land. The 80th Air Assault, 5th Assault, and the renowned 95th Air Assault brigades, as well as the National Police's "Fury" Assault Brigade. I thank everyone who is standing strong from Kupiansk to the left bank of Kherson! (Zelensky September 17 on X, formerly Twitter). Klishchiivka, called a key village in western media, is small village with a pre-war population of around 400. Deputy defence Minister Hanna Maliar later reported that Ukraine had retaken 51 square km near Bakhmut and more 260 square km in south since the offensive began in the beginning of June. Liberating several villages and the town of Robotyne in the south. Previously it had been reported that Ukrainian forces had finally breached the first and most formidable Russian defence line near Zaporizhzhia after a strenuous effort to get through vast minefields. This is what the counteroffensive has achieved until Mid-September, not much to show for their enormous exertion, as the map published by the Institute for the Study of War shows. Bleeding out Ukrainian forces While majority of Western leaders are still enthusiastically sending outdated and new equipment to support Ukraine in its U.S. led proxy fight against the Russian invasion. Ukraine is losing thousands of men killed or maimed in the fight, and civilians as well. And the Russians losing even more. In November 2022 U.S. General Mark Milley reckoned that Russia had 100,000 killed or injured, while the Ukraine might have lost a similar number. According to U.S. officials quoted in August 2023 by the New York Times Russia casualties may have reached 300,000, with as many as 120,000 dead, and 180,000 wounded. While Ukrainian casualties may have reached nearly 200,000, with around 70,000 killed, and around 100,000 to 120,000 wounded. And the numbers are steadily growing in the slugging match between Ukrainian and Russian troops. While equipment of the army may be replenished, Ukraine is be bleeding out army personnel. “Ukraine has no manpower to replace its strategic reserves. Most of the pool of educated youths who might be drafted either bribed their way out of recruitment or left the country.” Argues Stephen Bryen in Asia Times. Russia may lose more, but take a look at their demography. Russian numbers seem overwhelming compared to Ukraine’s: Based upon materiel from Index Mundi. The difference in size is also reflected in the size of their armies, in personnel and equipment although Ukraine is of cause relying on NATO’s arsenal. (Statista, 2023). Material losses “In the first two weeks of Ukraine’s gruelling counteroffensive, as much as 20 percent of the weaponry it sent to the battlefield was damaged or destroyed, according to American and European officials. The toll includes some of the formidable Western fighting machines — tanks and armored personnel carriers — the Ukrainians were counting on to beat back the Russians.” (New York Times). Since then, a necessary change in tactics is said to have a led to a reduction of losses, but also a reduction of momentum. A big reminder that western tanks and infantry fighting vehicles aren’t immune to Russian weapons was the photo of a destroyed Leopard tank, a mine-clearing vehicle and 4 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, in a chaotic group. ORYX, an open-source intelligence (OSINT) defence analysis website and warfare research group in the Netherlands, have been documenting Russian and Ukrainian equipment losses. According one of their later lists 7 Leopard 2A4 have been destroyed or damaged, while 9 Leopard 2A6 have been destroyed or damaged in the fighting. Of the sparse Challenger tanks provided by Britain at least one has been destroyed. It may not look catastrophic compared to the number of Soviet areas tanks Ukraine has already lost, but it may show that deliveries of Western tanks may not represent the “Wunderwaffe” hoped for. The equipment losses and expenditures are massive and there is a constant need for repairs and replenishment. Although Ukraine recently rejected old Leopard 1 tanks gratuitously provided by Denmark and Germany unless they were repaired and upgraded. And then there are the civilian losses and the enormous material loses in Ukraine, infrastructure energy, buildings etc. An assessment for the first year of war, by the Government of Ukraine, the World Bank Group, the European Commission, and the United Nations, estimate that the cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine has grown to U.S. $411 billion (equivalent of €383 billion). Stalemate – but still eyeing success Map showing situation around Robotyne and Verbove on September 24 (The Institute for the Study of War). Almost simultaneously with President Zelensky’s visit to the U.S., enthusiastic media reported that Ukrainian forces had broken through Russia’s main defence line in the southeast with infantry fighting vehicles and other armoured vehicles. “Ukrainian troops overcame antitank obstacles including ditches and concrete blocks known as dragon’s teeth near the village of Verbove in the Zaporizhzhia region.” A Ukrainian officer is quoted saying “We are pushing through. We are destroying them. But the price…” (Wall Street Journal). This was seen as major milestone in the more than three months long Ukrainian counter offensive. Even the cool and imperturbable Sean Bell former Air Vice-Marshall of the RAF, now miliary expert at Sky News UK was clearly exited, when reporting on the Ukraine’s alleged breakthrough Russian defences. Other saw the breakthrough as a sign that the sluggish Ukrainian counter offensive might finally having have got an opening that could led to more. A German newspaper wrote “Dann ist die Südfront verloren” (Meaning the Russian southern front would be lost), and saw it as “eines von mehreren Indizien, dass die Gegenoffensive jetzt ihre volle Dynamik entfalten könnte.” Then came Ukraine’s success in the attack on the Russian Black Fleet headquarter in Sevastopol, using apparently both drones and Storm Shadow missiles, which was also greeted as success that would diminish the Russian naval dominance of the Black Sea. Alas, the enthusiasm in the West may be overstate what this actually means for the Ukrainian counter offensive. On September 24 the Institute for the Study of War reported that elements of three Russian divisions were actively defending against the Ukrainian assault, so we must wait and see what the breakthrough will actually achieve in relation to the Ukrainian goal of reaching the coast to cut the Russian force in two. No wonder that Ukraine is desperately demanding more support from the West. And time after time the West is reluctantly going to give up on their own previous reservations, and give in to Ukrainian demands. Crossing red lines in continuing escalation Since the war began the West has time after time transgressed their own red lines in what has become a continuous escalation of military support for Ukraine, and an anxious probing of Russia’s red lines. Like the deliveries of British Challenger MBT (main battle tanks), variants of German Leopard MBT’s, and around 30 previously promised U.S. made M1 Abrams MBT’s that are now said to be arriving in Ukraine. Here a look at some of the latest examples of ongoing and what might be coming contributions to Ukraine. In the apparently unending sequence of western leaders first rejecting Ukraine demands, then realising that Ukraine might be in dire straits, and therefore persuading themselves to dare escalate after all. Fearing evidently that the U.S. led proxy war might be lost, and that all previous help would have been in vain. Western fighter aircraft In January 2023, when Ukraine was pleading for F16 fighter aircraft, President Biden still held to the his own red line and said, “NO.” When asked in March if Zelensky did not need F16’s, President Biden answer: “"No, he doesn't need F-16s now.” Colin Kahl, undersecretary of defence for policy, at a House hearing in February 2023 said that Ukraine had requested as many as 128 fourth generation aircraft, but that U.S. did not see F16s as a top priority right now. Then in May 2023 President Biden apparently decided to cross his own red line, just as he had done before, and agreed to a plan that would allow European countries with aging F16’s, already destined to be phased out for new aircraft, to train Ukrainian pilots on F 16s in their countries and to send F16s to Ukraine. The formal approval that the Netherlands and Denmark could send F16’s to Ukraine came in a letter from Secretary of State Blinken in August 2023. Later Norway announce that they would also deliver F 16’s to Ukraine. Training has now begun and even U.S. is taking part in training Ukrainian pilots. F16s will not be help Ukraine in the ongoing Ukrainian offensive, as the deliveries of F16s cannot begin before the end of the year, meaning that they could first make their presence felt sometime in 2024 and later. General Miley: “There are no magic weapons. An F-16 is not, and neither is anything else.” “But Kyiv isn’t done asking. Ukraine would need more than 50 or 60 F-16s fully to reequip its air force with its 125 or so aging Soviet-made jets. To help to make up the balance, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky went to Sweden last week and made the case for Stockholm to give away some of its Saab JAS 39 Gripen fighters.” (Forbes, August 25). https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/08/25/theres-a-good-reason-ukraine-also-wants-swedish-gripen-fighters-they-can-fly-from-roads/ Controversial munition Giving in to new Ukrainian demands for help in the stalling counter offensive, the U.S. has approved deliveries of cluster munition to Ukraine. President admits that it took some time to decide to provide these controversial weapons. Also, a kind of redline transgression, made possible as the U.S. has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) that prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions. Defending the transfer of cluster munition to Ukraine, Admiral John Kirby, Coordinator for Strategic Communications at the National Security Council, has been argued: “While Russia is using them in Ukraine in an aggressive war on another country and indiscriminately killing civilians, the Ukrainians will be using these cluster munitions – obviously, which have a very low dud rate, but they’ll be using to defend their own territory hitting Russian positions.” So, there we have hit, Ukrainian will surely use cluster munition in more humane way. A spokesman for the Southern military district in Ukraine also argued that cluster munition "… will further demotivate Russian occupying forces and fundamentally change things in favour of the Ukrainian armed forces." The munitions, he said, would be used strictly within the legal framework, "only for the de-occupation of our territories … They will not be used on Russian territory...They will be used only in areas where Russian military forces are concentrated in order to break through enemy defences." What is cluster munition and why is its use abhorred? What Ukraine is getting is presumably 155mm DPICM cluster munitions to be used in the many 155mm howitzers they have already got from the West, or it might be 227 mm artillery rockets that can be used in the HIMARS and MLRS launchers. Illustration DOD. Taking the artillery rockets as an example, they may contain 644 submunitions, that will be spread over a circular area roughly 200 meters in diameter. A much larger area affected than when using of the usual artillery shells. Thus, able to saturate a much larger area indiscriminately. The indiscriminate saturation of large areas risks collateral damage, which is one of the reasons for the convention forbidding their use. The other reason is that the submunition may have a large dud rate, meaning that they may not explode immediately, but lay around and represent a long-term risk, not the least for children picking them up. Giving in to Ukrainian pleading for this kind of munition would seem to indicate a certain desperation on both the Ukrainian and the U.S. side, a realisation that the counter offensive is not going to plan. Depleted uranium munition The Department of Defense announced on September 6 that in addition to a new package of weapons and military equipment Ukraine would also get 120mm depleted uranium tank ammunition for Abrams tanks. Earlier the U.K. had provided 120mm depleted uranium tank ammunition for Challenger tanks delivered to Ukraine. Why use depleted uranium rounds or DU’s? Because the depleted uranium’s high density provides the penetrator of a tank round with a greater momentum and a straighter trajectory, making it possible to penetrate even heavily protected tanks. That is why it was called “silver bullet” in the Gulf War. Tungsten might be an alternative but is less efficient than DU’s. “Whereas tungsten projectiles become rounded at the tip upon impact, uranium shells burn away at the edges. This "self-sharpening" helps them bore into armor” (Scientific American). This is how one of the newer versions of a 120mm depleted uranium tank round looks: M829A4 120mm Armor Piercing, Fin Stabilized, Discarding Sabot (APFSDS). Photo shows the DU penetrator separating. Source: Army Recognition "On impact with targets, DU penetrators ignite, breaking up in fragments, and forming an aerosol of particles. These fine dust particles can catch fire spontaneously in air. Small pieces may ignite in a fire and burn, but tests have shown that large pieces, like the penetrators used in anti-tank weapons, or in aircraft balance weights, will not normally ignite in a fire,” (The International Atomic Energy Agency). Again, a controversial decision as the experience from their use in operation “Desert Storm had shown. Dust from the depleted uranium had resulted in dangerous health problems for the troops. While depleted uranium is not radioactive enough for the radiation to penetrate human skin, it may cause serious health problems if particles are inhaled or ingested. Normal functioning of the kidney, brain, liver, heart, and numerous other systems can be affected by exposure to uranium.. The biological half-life (the average time it takes for the human body to eliminate half the amount in the body) for uranium is about 15 days. That is why an International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons (ICBUW) wants to ban and eliminate uranium weapons worldwide. Their “use is ethically unreasonable, militarily disproportionate and questionable under international law.” Long-range missiles Ukraine has long pleaded for long-range missiles, not the least to be able to strike Russia in Crimea. The UK were the first to cave in to their pleading and provide an unknown number of the so-called Storm Shadow missile, followed by France with their variant of the same missile, called SCALP (Système de Croisière Autonome à Longue Portée – Emploi Général). The missile is made by MBDA, a European consortium made up of Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo. The Storm Shadow/ SCALP missile is a fairly long range, deep strike precision weapon, conventional armed. Used against fixed or stationary targets such as hardened bunkers and key infrastructure. Usually operated from aircrafts it is said to possess exceptional accuracy due to its advanced navigation system that combines INS (Inertial), GPS and terrain following systems. Although looking like a submarine, this is picture of Storm Shadow/SCALP missile mounted on an aircraft pylon (MBDA). Basis specs: Weight 1300 kg, 5 meters long, with a conventional warhead of 450kg, and a range said to be around 250 km’s. Source: MBDA Ukrainian Airforce’s Soviet-era SU-24M Fencer combat aircraft have been adapted to carry this heavy missile. It has been used by the Ukrainians to strike deep behind Russia’s frontlines, and is assumed to have been used in recent deep strikes on infrastructure in Crimea and on the Russian navy in Sevastopol. Eurasian Times reports that 11 Storm Shadow missiles were used in the September 13 strike on the naval port of Sevastopol, although apparently only 3 missiles slipped through Russian defences hitting a submarine and a landing ship in drydock. On September 20 Ukraine made a new attempt to strike an airbase in Crimea with 8 Storm Shadow missiles, with no missiles striking the target according to Eurasian Times. Later Ukraine struck again: “at around noon on Friday, September 22, Ukraine's Defense Forces successfully struck the Russian Black Sea Fleet Command HQ in temporarily occupied Sevastopol.” (Ukrinform). Taurus Storm Shadow /SCALP missiles have not been enough for Ukraine. For some time, they have had their eyes on the German made longer ranging missile “Lenkflugkörper Taurus KEPD-350.” About the same size as Storm Shadow/ SCALP, it may be used for long range precision strikes on hardened structures like bunkers etc. The German Bundeswehr writes: “Durch vier voneinander unabhängige Navigationssysteme findet der Luft-Boden-Lenkflugkörper sein Ziel sehr zuverlässig, auch bei gegnerischen Störmaßnahmen. Der MEPHISTO-Gefechtskopf des Taurus KEPD-350 durchschlägt im Zusammenwirken mit der Vor-Hohlladung selbst stark gehärtete Zielstrukturen.” (Bundeswehr). Now why would Ukraine want Taurus missiles. It might be because the Taurus has a longer range of around 500km, and it might also be more efficient against certain structures. Realizing that Ukraine has been eager to attack the Kerch bridge and made several attempts to put it out of action, one might guess that Taurus missiles would be used to attack the bridge due their longer range. Of course, it would also be possible to strike into Russia itself supplementing the more primitive drone strikes carried out by Ukraine. For this reason, the possible delivery of Taurus missiles is a very sensitive topic in Germany. While some politicians are eager to provide Ukraine with the Taurus, Chancellor Scholz and others are having serious misgivings. Just the thought of German missiles hitting somewhere in Russia make them shudder, and for now hold back. In order to somehow satisfy the Ukrainian demands it has been the suggested that technical alterations of the Taurus might limit their range to something like the Storms Shadows, in order to make sure that Russia would be out of range, but this has been met with the counter argument that it would demonstrate that Germany did not trust Ukraine. ATACMS Among Ukraine’s demands is the long time clamouring for another kind of a long-range missile that can be fired from the HIMARS and MLRS they already have. The ATACMS missile has almost the same size (4meter long) and weight (1300-1700 kilograms) as the Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles, but it is ground-based and can be fired from form a modified launch pod mounted on a HIMARS or MLRS. Several different versions have been produced over time. From MGM-140A, MGM-140B to MGM-168A with different warheads, a range of 70 to 300 km’s, and warhead of 160 to 591kg. The MGM-140A version may carry 950 M74 APAM (Anti-Personnel Anti-Material submunitions), cluster munition that scatter in mid-air and able to cause destruction of personnel and light material over an area of 33,000 m2. MGM-140B carries the same submunition but only around 300, while other versions may carry Brilliant Anti-Tank (BAT) guided submunitions to destroy moving armoured units or stationary missile/rocket vehicles. Finally, there is a unitary warhead with higher precision, presumably resulting in less collateral damage. “While the ATACMS does assume a ballistic arc to its target, it also performs a series of rapid and sudden turns and course corrections on the way to its aimpoint. This is a deliberate function of the ATACMS, as this seemingly erratic flight behavior makes it exceptionally difficult to track or intercept.” (militarytoday.com). Illustration showing ATACMS being fired from a HIMARS vehicle, diagram of the weapon and a photo of single M74 submunition. M74 is a ball-like aerial dispersed, centrifugally armed, high-explosive, anti-personnel (AP) submunition. Sources: Army Recognition and cat-uxo.com
On his recent visit to the U.S. to argue the case for continued support for Ukraine, President Zelensky met with President Biden and argued his case to sceptical Republican politicians. What he got was a promise of a weapons package worth $325 million. Still no ATACMS’s, and after President Zelensky’s talks with President Biden, National Security Advisor Sullivan told reporters that President Biden had “determined that he would not provide ATACMS, … but he is also not taking it off the table in the future.” The U.S. at present has another excuse for denying Ukraine ATACMS, the limited stockpile they have until they get the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) with a range of 1,000 km. And then, while writing this, certain news media reports that President Biden again has had had a change of heart during President Zelensky’s visit and is now promising a small number of ATACMS for Ukraine, perhaps reflecting the seriousness of the situation in the field. It is not known what version Ukraine is going to get or perhaps have already got, but a guess might be versions with submunition to attack areas far behind the front. Sounds familiar doesn’t it First “No chance”, then “No, but we will keep it under consideration” and finally “Yes.” Reluctantly escalating again, daring to challenge Russia even more, in order avoid a defeat in Ukraine. What More? Looking back at the previous rounds of first no, then maybe, and finally yes, of escalatory deliveries of different kinds of weapons supposed to provide a decisive advantage for Ukraine, it is evident that they have not brought any decisive advantage. What they may have done is keep Ukraine in the game, not winning their fight, but also not losing. Resulting in a costly continuation of the ongoing slogging match, with Russian counter escalations. So, what might be the next round of escalations? Already in 2022 there were talks that Ukraine should be allowed to get U.S. armed drones like the General Atomics MQ-1 Gray Eagle. “The MO-1C Gray Eagle provides reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, command and control, communications relay, signals intelligence, electronic warfare, attack, battle damage assessment, and manned-unmanned teaming capabilities. It is also able to carry 4 hellfire missiles, and fly at 25,000 feet (around 7,5 km) for 30 hours. This time the usual NO, Maybe and Yes chain seems to have been stopped at NO, or perhaps a meek Maybe. Early in 2023 the U.S. maker of advanced military surveillance drones announced that it was willing to sell two drones to Ukraine for just $1, and called on the U.S. government to approve the deal (according to France 24). Perhaps because it would be seen as too escalatory, or perhaps because the U.S. itself is already using such drones to provide Ukraine with reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, command and control, communications relay, signals intelligence, and electronic warfare. In March 2023 a Global Hawk drone flying over the Black Sea, presumably on such a mission, was hit in a dangerous close encounter with Russian jets, which damaged the propeller and caused the drone to plunge into the Black Sea. The U.S. also provide Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircrafts to assist Ukraine. They have the ability to look far beyond the Russian border. Essentially, the Western intelligence data provides Ukrainian planners with a near real-time picture of Russian forces, which in turn enables Ukrainian planners to organize efficient combat operations. One may therefore speculate that the U.S. is deeply involved in providing Ukraine with reconnaissance and surveillance and perhaps ultimately responsible for making it possible for Ukrainian air and sea missiles and drones to hit targets with precision in the Russian occupied areas, the Crimea, the Black Sea – and inside Russia? With deliveries of advanced weapons and fighter aircraft one may also speculate that this necessitates expert assistance for use and maintenance, in the guise of private western contractors active in Ukraine, perhaps even army personal. For instance, Taurus missiles would require German personnel on the ground. Interestingly after the meeting with President Zelensky on September 22 it has been announced that Ukraine will launch a joint weapons production with the US. This would allow Kyiv to start producing air defence systems as part of a long-term agreement, and create new jobs in Ukraine. What’s Next? What might be expected if the promised support is not enough. What more could or would the West be able to do? More modern airplanes, more personnel assistance? No idea, but perhaps the West is beginning to realise the dangers related to a continued escalation, and an ongoing war. Perhaps until Ukraine is bled out, to put it bluntly, or something else make the Russia give up, or some unintended mishap or provocation leads to open war between NATO and Russia – or the West finally demands Ukraine to accept some kind fait accompli like a DMZ. The last possibility would of cause be the least dangerous way out of the present stalemate. … Continuation in Part Two What is the rules-based order that has become so popular with western leaders, when they defend belligerent western attitudes and aggression against foremost Russia and China? In an attempt to understand rules-based order and its consequences, we take up the following topics: The incessant talk of rules-based order Order, but what order? Order, a U.S. based order? Russia and China rejecting a rule-based U.S. order International Law versus rule-based order and U.S. hegemony The hypocrisy of U.S. and the West U.S. dominated order bringing peace and stability – or war and instability? Ukraine proxy war – a fight to uphold U.S. world order Europe’s renewed submission to U.S. hegemony? Next it is all about China The incessant talk of rules-based order When Secretary Blinken first met with Chinese counterparts March 2021 in Alaska he had barely greeted Director Yang and State Councilor Wang before he talked about rules-based international order: “Our administration is committed to leading with diplomacy to advance the interests of the United States and to strengthen the rules-based international order. That system is not an abstraction. It helps countries resolve differences peacefully, coordinate multilateral efforts effectively, and participate in global commerce with the assurance that everyone is following the same rules. The alternative to a rules-based order is a world in which might makes right and winners take all, and that would be a far more violent and unstable world for all of us. Today, we’ll have an opportunity to discuss key priorities, both domestic and global, so that China can better understand our administration’s intentions and approach. ” (Emphasis added). (state.gov) https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-chinese-director-of-the-office-of-the-central-commission-for-foreign-affairs-yang-jiechi-and-chinese-state-councilor-wang-yi-at-th/ The riposte from Director Yang made it very clear that China regarded a rules-based international order as mainly an order serving the U.S.: “What China and the international community follow or uphold is the United Nations-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law, not what is advocated by a small number of countries of the so-called “rules-based” international order. And the United States has its style – United States-style democracy – and China has the Chinese-style democracy. It is not just up to the American people, but also the people of the world to evaluate how the United States has done in advancing its own democracy.” In a guest essay in the New York Times President Biden wrote: “If Russia does not pay a heavy price for its actions, it will send a message to other would-be aggressors that they too can seize territory and subjugate other countries. It will put the survival of other peaceful democracies at risk. And it could mark the end of the rules-based international order and open the door to aggression elsewhere, with catastrophic consequences the world over.” (New York Times May 31, 2022). President Biden on the same topic in a speech in Poland: … “we emerged anew in the great battle for freedom: a battle between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression, between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force.” There we have it, the U.S. led intervention in, sorry, support for Ukraine is justified by seeing it as a battle to uphold rules-based order against the aggression and brute force of Russia. Similar attitudes are voiced in relation to China. Just listen to NATO’s General Secretary Stoltenberg at a press conference in July 2023: “China is increasingly challenging the rules-based international order. Refusing to condemn Russia’s war against Ukraine. Threatening Taiwan. And carrying out a substantial military build-up.” Echoing the views of Secretary Blinken: “I want to be very clear about something …Our purpose is not to contain China, to hold it back, to keep it down. It is to uphold this rules-based order that China is posing a challenge to.” While President Biden promises “We will partner with any nation that shares our basic belief that the rules-based order must remain the foundation for global peace and prosperity. Upholding a rules-based international order (often shortened to RBIO or RBO) has thus become recurring and increasingly popular justification for western views, actions and interventions in relation to the rest of the World. Google Books Ngram Viewer may help to show how the expression became popular in English language books and journals, although having data only up to 2019.: The diagram shows that the use of the term rules-based order became rapidly more popular from around 2000-2004. But we still have no idea what precisely is meant by the rule-based order.
Order, but what order? Annoyingly it does not seem possible to find anything like clear definition or understanding of rules-based order. What we can find are various uses of the term rules-based order or rules-based international order. Interestingly one of foremost users and proponents of the term seems to be Australia, where we can find the following interpretation. “A rules-based global order means a shared commitment by all countries to conduct their activities in accordance with agreed rules which evolve over time, such as international law and regional security arrangements This shared commitment has become even more important with growing interconnectivity, which means that events across the world have the potential to affect Australia’s security and prosperity … Underpinning the rules-based global order is a broad architecture of United Nations, international laws and conventions and regional security architectures which has developed since the end of the Second World War. This governance framework, including the United Nations, international laws and conventions and regional security architectures, has helped support Australia’s security and economic interests for 70 years.” https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-08/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdft According to “The Parley Policy Initiative” the core of international laws, rules and norms that are underpinning the rules-based international order are: UN Charter Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN Security Council Resolutions UN General Assembly Resolutions International conventions (e.g., the Geneva conventions) Treaties (e.g., the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) International agreements (non-treaty level ceasefire agreements, framework agreements, joint declarations, etc.) International court or tribunal rulings (e.g., the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal ruling) https://www.parleypolicy.com/post/the-rules-based-international-order-explained The talk of underpinnings to would seem to indicate that rules-based order encompasses something more than international law, rules and norms. Meaning that the whole concept still remains vague and nebulous. What this “more” includes remains shrouded in mystery. A 2022 National Strategy for the U.S. places the concept of rules-based order under the strange heading “An inclusive World” and writes “The vast majority of countries want a stable and open rules-based order that respects their sovereignty and territorial integrity, provides a fair means of economic exchange with others and promotes shared prosperity, and enables cooperation on shared challenges. They strongly disapprove of aggression, coercion, and external interference. They have no interest in overturning longstanding rules and norms to make the world safe for aggression and repression.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf Another indication that rules-based order in the U.S. version includes more than the list found in the Parley listing. Next comes the inclusive part in which the U.S. “… will help construct and preserve coalitions that engage all of these countries and leverage their collective strengths. We recognize that some may harbor reservations about American power and our foreign policy. Others may not be democratic but nevertheless depend upon a rules-based international system.” Apparently meaning that the U.S. sees itself as the sole guarantor of the rules-based order. Order, a U.S. based order? Remember what Blinken said to the Chinese “Our administration is committed to leading with diplomacy to advance the interests of the United States and to strengthen the rules-based international order.” Perhaps the whole concept of rules-based order is shrouded in a western or more precisely a U.S. ideology of liberal international order. In a comprehensive analysis of conflicting views of rules-based order Lieberherr writes that while country like Germany has a narrow understanding of rules-based order closely based upon the UN charter, the U.S. has a wider understanding. In their view, “the RBO order is not only a system that includes institutions such as the UN and international law, but also US primacy and rules that evolve over time, such as US security alliances in the Asia-Pacific.” https://css.ethz.ch/en/center/CSS-news/2023/02/the-rules-based-order-conflicting-understandings.html The timid beginnings of a U.S. based idea of order in the World are found, when a U.S. hegemony began to gain influence in the World after World War One. In President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points program for world peace presented at the peace conference in Versailles in January 1918. In his speech Woodrow Wilson said: “What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.” Wilson’s very idealistic 14 points for a new world peace may have been rejected by the UK and France, but they can certainly be seen as a sign that the U.S. had entered the world scene, marking beginning decline of the old-world hegemony of Great Britain. In 1941, at a time when Britain was at war and the U.S. not yet at war, President Roosevelt and Prime minister Churchill met to discuss an outline for a postwar international system. The outcome of their meeting was “The Atlantic Charter.” The Charter contained 8 principles that the U.S. and Britain were committed to see realized after the war. “Both countries agreed not to seek territorial expansion; to seek the liberalization of international trade; to establish freedom of the seas, and international labor, economic, and welfare standards. Most importantly, both the United States and Great Britain were committed to supporting the restoration of self-governments for all countries that had been occupied during the war and allowing all peoples to choose their own form of government.” (https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf). The Charter must have been heavily influenced by U.S. views, as there would have be an inherent conflict between the right to self-determination and still existing British colonialism. But the Atlantic Charter set the stage for what has been called the Liberal International Order (often shortened to LIO), after the Second World War. “After the Second World War, the US was already a full-scale stakeholder of the future world order, having proceeded with institutionalizing and affirmation of its vision of the world order. Politically, the U.S. established the UN in 1945 and the NATO in 1949, forming a network of alliances bent on permanent expansion. Economically, the creation in the 1940s of the IMF, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) were important steps towards the structuring of global space based on the vision of western nations, which was presented as an attempt to overcome the brute force factor in global affairs through intensive economic cooperation and embracing the common goals of peace, freedom and prosperity.” (Levchenko 2023). Thus, the whole structure striving to uphold a liberal international order, was heavily dominated by what can only be seen as a U.S. hegemony and countries closely aligned with the U.S., that is to say liberal democratic western states. A western group of countries having some of the features that Headly Bull saw as characteristic for international societies, being “all founded upon a common culture or civilisation, or at least on some of the elements of such a civilisation: a common language, a common epistemology and understanding of the universe, a common religion, a common ethical code, a common aesthetic or artistic tradition.” (Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society- A Study of Order in World Politics, 1977) It has often been said that democracies don’t fight each other, but perhaps that depends upon what one reckons as being democratic. Since the Second World War western democracies were closely aligned with a dominating U.S. hegemony, and engaged in rather limited independent initiatives. After the fall of the Soviet Union, when the U.S. became the sole hegemonic power, the “the liberal norms and ideals of the Cold War victors suffused and animated the institutions of global governance as never before, giving them a coherence and vitality that they had lacked during the era of Soviet-American rivalry.” (The Hill, 2022). https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3736389-the-rules-based-international-order-is-ending-what-will-replace-it/ Thus, U.S. came to dominate the western liberal ideological basis upon which the so-called rules-based international order rested. But what about the rest of the World? Russia and China rejecting a rule-based U.S. order Some time ago the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov wrote a long piece, arguing that “the West wants it to be clear to everyone that it is united as never before and will do only what it considers right in the international arena, and force others - primarily Russia and China - follow their course. The documents of Cornwall and Brussels enshrined the promotion of the concept of "world order based on rules" as opposed to the universal principles of international law, enshrined primarily in the UN Charter” (Lavrov 2021, www.kommersant.ru/ad). In Lavrov’s view the western concept of rules-based order is neither very specific or based upon international law, instead it works like this: “… as soon as someone acts contrary to the will of the West, it instantly alleges a “violation of the rules” (it will not present facts) and announces its “right to “punish” the violator.” … Hence the demands on Moscow and Beijing (and everyone else) to follow Western recipes on issues of human rights, civil society, the opposition, the media, the functioning of state structures, and interaction between the branches of power. Proclaiming its “right” to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries in the interests of promoting democracy in its understanding, the West immediately loses interest in the conversation as soon as we propose to discuss the tasks of democratizing international relations.” In the western view Russia and China are seen as “carriers of authoritarianism.” Russia is charged with aggressive policies against in a number of regions, when it acts against ultra-radical and neo-Nazi tendencies in neighbouring countries, that suppresses the rights of Russians. While China is charged with being too assertive in its economics interest, especially its One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR later morphed into BRI for Bridge and Road Initiative) initiatives, along with its with military build-up. To Lavrov the West must realize its domination of the rest of the World is irretrievably passing. “Attempts to ignore it, asserting itself as the "only legitimate decision-making center" will not bring closer the settlement of not fictitious, but real problems, overcoming which requires a mutually respectful dialogue with the participation of leading countries and taking into account the interests of all other members of the world community. This implies an unconditional reliance on generally recognized norms and principles of international law: respect for the sovereign equality of states, non-interference in their internal affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, recognition of the right of peoples to determine their own destiny.” Foreign Minister Lavrov, is not alone in his rejection of the western interpretation of rules-based order. When Wang Wenbin , the stern spokesperson for The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked about the rumour that the coming G7 meeting in Japan 2023 would ask China to abide by international Rules, he said: “Before discussing international rules, we need to first of all make clear what exactly the international rules are. For the overwhelming majority of countries in the world, international rules consist of the basic norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and all countries must abide by them. The G7 hardly ever mentions the UN Charter, but keeps talking about “democracies” and the so-called “rules-based international order”. However, when the G7 countries talk about international rules, they mean the Western rules that draw lines according to ideologies and values and the US-first and G7-dominated rules of a small circle. Those rules serve the vested interest of a very few countries, including the G7, rather than the common interests of the international community.” (Wang Wenbin, May 2023). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202305/t20230511_11075401.html In 2016 Russia and China signed a Declaration on the “Promotion of International Law” in which they stated “The People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation reiterate their full commitment to the principles of international law as they are reflected in the United Nations Charter, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. They are also guided by the principles enshrined in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The principles of international law are the cornerstone for just and equitable international relations featuring win-win cooperation, creating a community of shared future for mankind, and establishing common space of equal and indivisible security and economic cooperation.” In a curious aside it deserves to be mentioned that Russia and China in this declaration emphasized “the important role of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] in maintaining the rule of law relating to activities in the Oceans.” While the U.S. refused to sign the same convention in 1982 because it would also govern deep seabed mining in areas beyond the continental shelf. Although the U.S. later appeared to accept UNCLOS, it has not ratified it. Something that is important to remember when the U.S. is criticizing Chinese activities in the South China Sea. There are other areas where the U.S. has taken a similar ambivalent stance in relation international conventions and statutes, like for instance The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court that established the International Criminal Court (ICC). One might therefore argue that the U.S. attempts to preserve its hegemonic power by being the sole adjudicator of right and wrong in a rules-based order. International law versus rule-based order and U.S. hegemony To some western observers Russia and China have a point in relation to the West’s interpretation of rules-based-order. In an article on German practice in international law, the author argues that “The term “rules-based order” blurs the distinction between binding and non-binding rules, giving the impression that all States and international actors are subject to this order, irrespective of whether or not they have consented to these rules. While international law is general and universal, the “rules-based order” seems to allow for special rules in special – sui generis – cases. However, the will of a few (Western) States, or even the majority of States, cannot be equated to international or regional rules, or be the basis for a “rules-based order”. While international law is based on the principle of sovereign equality of States, a “rules-based order” detached from the requirement of consent may become an order of the strong, or an order by dictate of the majority. (gpil.jura. bonn.de). https://gpil.jura.uni-bonn.de/2019/01/rules-based-order-v-international-law/ Others have also argued like Russia and China that there is an important difference between international law and the increasingly popular concept of rules-based order. What is this creature ‘Rules-Based International Order” Professor Dugard asks. Is it a harmless synonym for international law or is something novel, “a system meant to replace international law which has governed the behaviour of states for over 500 years? (Referring presumably to the Westphalian peace treaties that ended the thirty years war in 1648). Lavrov mentioned that “charm” of Western “rules” is precisely in the absence of specifics” which allows them to manipulated at will. Dugard tends to agree: “… the rules-based international order may be seen as the United States’ alternative to international law, an order that encapsulates international law as interpreted by the United States to accord with its national interests, ‘a chimera, meaning whatever the US and its followers want it to mean at any given time’. Premised on ‘the United States’ own willingness to ignore, evade or rewrite the rules whenever they seem inconvenient’, the RBO is seen to be broad, open to political manipulation and double standards.” (Dugard 2023, Leyden Journal of International Law). https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/choice-before-us-international-law-or-a-rulesbased-international-order/7BEDE2312FDF9D6225E16988FD18BAF0 The hypocrisy of U.S. and the West While western states in general does not fight each other, western democracies have apparently less qualms fighting others. This goes especially for the U.S. hegemon that seems to have an almost messianic drive to foster democracy upon others. Believing in the morally valid right to intervene in other states, to spread democracy, based apparently upon an “unprecedented understanding of the world population’s aspirations for human rights-based rule of law and [market] based prosperity.” Regarding itself as a benevolent world hegemon the U.S. again and again intervened in other states, disregarding international law for what it must have seen as a higher purpose, a striving to guarantee and spread the western version of rules-based order. A few examples of U.S. intervention will suffice. The bombing of Serbia In 1999 NATO under the leadership of the U.S. conducted a bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In President Clinton’s words: “My fellow Americans, today our armed forces joined our NATO allies in airstrikes against Serbian forces responsible for the brutality in Kosovo. We have acted with resolve for several reasons.” (President Clinton) https://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/25/clinton.transcript/ Among the reasons given: “The protection of innocent people in Kosovo from a Serbian military offensive; the prevention of a wider war; upholding our values protecting our interests and advancing peace.” The bombing campaign did not have any explicit authorization from the U.N. Security Council. Instead, the bombing campaign came about as result of agreement among 10 NATO states deciding to bomb Serbia for reasons similar to the reasons voiced by President Clinton. The Security Council rejected a draft resolution presented by Belarus, The Russian Federation and India demanding “the immediate cessation of the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the urgent resumption of negotiations.” “The decision by ten NATO members to intervene without an explicit authorization from the United Nations Security Council brings to the fore several legal issues relating to the right of states to impede upon the territorial sovereignty of other states, the balance between state rights and individual rights, and the role of the Security Council in controlling the international use of force.” (ILSA Journal of International Law, 2003). It has therefore been argued that the bombing campaign was illegal without the prior authorization by the Security Council, according to a strict interpretation of Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the Charter of the UN. “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The invasion of Iraq In 2003 a coalition of countries led by the U.S. invaded Iraq. Various reasons have been given for the invasion, but it did certainly not have the authorization of the Security Council. An article given an assessment of the legality of the invasion present some of the arguments used by the U.S. instead: Upholding U.S. national security related to threat of terrorism, the need to protect Iraq’s neighbours and the international community and various other reasons, including the imagined threat that Iraq would use WMD’s (Weapons of Mass Destruction. Which may all somehow be related what has been discussed in relation to upholding rules-based order dominated by the U.S. In a speech by President Bush at Westpoint in 2002 he presented a kind of doctrine related to the need for pre-emptive action saying: “Our security will require transforming the military you will lead -- a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.” (Transcript of speech June 1 2002). Later a U.S. report to Congress asserted a right under international law to use military action pre-emptively against threats from “rogue states.” While these various reasons for the invasion have been presented from time to time, the real interesting question is whether the invasion was authorized by the Security Council and was in accordance with international law. The answer is that there was no explicit authorization for the invasion by the Security Council. Instead, the U.S. decided to act on its own, together with a coalition of willing countries Later there was an attempt to find a kind legal basis or perhaps a just reference for the invasion. “The United States did not assert that the invasion of Iraq was permissible under international law due to an evolving right of preemptive self-defense (nor that international law was irrelevant). Rather, the United States asserted that the invasion was lawful because it was authorized by the Security Council.” The problem is that it was referring to a council resolution adopted in 1990, in relation to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Thus, it can in no way be seen as a prior authorization for the invasion in 2003. What we see is the U.S. interpretation of rules-based order, that somehow allows the sole hegemon to act in accordance what it sees as being in the interest of the U.S. and the world, as we saw in Blinken’s interpretation “advance the interests of the United States and to strengthen the rules-based international order.” Threats, isolation , sanctions and intervention– the tools of U.S. diplomacy In the eyes of the aggressive former U.S. Secretary of State Albright, there is a good reason for the U.S. actions on the world stage: “If we have to use force, it is because we are America: we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.” (Secretary of State Albright, 1998) A distinguishing feature of modern American diplomacy is that US admiistrations as a whole tend to privilege hard power policies over soft power policies. A further distinguishing characteristic of American diplomacy is that “the United States has chosen to isolate diplomatically for long periods states that it deemed adversarial, and has required those states to meet preconditions before it will formally engage them.” (Wiseman, “American Diplomacy”). In the eyes of the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign affairs the U.S. is acting hypocritical on the world stage: “…the US walked away from 17 international organizations and treaties, including UNESCO and the Paris Agreement. The US has spied indiscriminately on countries globally, not least its G7 allies, strong-armed countries diplomatically, and applied economic coercion and military interference. The US has blatantly invaded Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria and other countries that are smaller and weaker than the US, killing and displacing tens of millions of innocent civilians. When it comes to international rules, the US’s place is in the dock. It is in no position to point fingers at other countries.” U.S. dominated order bringing peace and stability – or war and instability? Is the present war in Ukraine a result of the U.S. messianic striving to bring peace and democracy and imprint its idea of rules-based order upon the rest of the World? A few weeks after the new Secretary of State, Blinken, had been sworn in, he outlined his idea of “A Foreign Policy for the American People.” Saying: ““We will renew democracy, because it’s under threat…But we will not promote democracy through costly military interventions or by attempting to overthrow authoritarian regimes by force. We have tried these tactics in the past. However well intentioned, they haven’t worked. They’ve given democracy promotion a bad name.” (Secretary of State Blinken, March 3,2021). A year later the U.S. fighting a proxy war in Ukraine, to save what U.S. sees as a Ukrainian democracy, but perhaps foremost to humiliate or overthrow a Russian authoritarian regime by military means. How did that happen? When the U.S. Senate in 1998 overwhelmingly approved the eastward expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech, Republican Senator Joseph Biden Jr. said: “…this, in fact, is the beginning of another 50 years of peace, … "In a larger sense," he added, "we'll be righting an historical injustice forced upon the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians by Joseph Stalin." (Washingtonpost.com) While Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright exclaimed “Hallelujah” and said “To them I say that President Clinton's pledge is now fulfilled. Never again will your states be tossed around like poker chips on a bargaining table. Whether you are helping to revise the Alliance's strategic concept or engaging in NATO's partnership with Russia, the promise of "nothing about you without you," is now formalized. You are truly allies; you are truly home … For NATO's purpose is not to build new walls, but rather to tear old walls down.” With the same hallelujah enthusiasm U.S. wanted to bring more of the states formerly dominated by Russia to their truly home in the West. No one listened to warnings of someone like George F. Kennan, the American diplomat and historian, who saw the expansion as a fateful error. “The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.” (NYT 1996). https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/05/opinion/a-fateful-error.html Wise words, but no match for the U.S. eagerness to bring democracy peace and prosperity to the eastern European states. In 2008, the United States tried to push through a decision to the effect that Ukraine and, by the way Georgia too, would become NATO members. At the time European partners were wary and and after vocal opposition from France and Germany, a decision was made to offer neither Ukraine nor Georgia a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the time. The question of Ukrainian NATO membership propped up again in 2021. A few days after President Biden had spoken to President Putin in an attempt to defuse the situation at Ukraine’s border, he is said to have assured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy that Kyiv's bid to join the NATO military alliance was in its own hands. To Russia Ukrainian NATO membership was unacceptable. Russian grievances and the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO may explain why Russia handed the U.S. and NATO a draft proposal for a new treaty on security guarantees (Dated December 17, 2021). Among proposals is article 6: “All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States.” The leaked written answers to the Russian proposals from NATO and the U.S. gave no indication that Russia’s demands would be taken seriously. Here is part NATO’s reply to article 6 of the Russian Proposal: “All states respecting the right of other states to choose and change security arrangements, and to decide their own future and foreign policy free from outside interference. In this light, we reaffirm our commitment to NATO’s Open Door Policy under Article of the Washington Treaty.” (El País). The U.S. own reply likewise continued to firmly support NATO’s Open Door Policy In his reaction before the invasion of Ukraine a visibly angry President Putin stated: “I would like to be clear and straightforward: in the current circumstances, when our proposals for an equal dialogue on fundamental issues have actually remained unanswered by the United States and NATO, when the level of threats to our country has increased significantly, Russia has every right to respond in order to ensure its security. That is exactly what we will do.” (en.kremlin.ru). Next, we had the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the strong reaction from U.S., followed a little more timidly by Europe. Ukraine proxy war – a fight to uphold U.S. world order To non-western countries like the Global South, the U.S. reaction may have been seen to be less as an attempt to uphold international law and the UN charter, and more as a result of a geopolitical struggle between the Russia and the U.S. “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a dreadful violation of fundamental moral and legal principles. Many in developing countries also recognise this. But they remember, too, the long history of western countries as imperialists and invaders. Nor do they fail to realise that we care far more about fellow Europeans than about others. Too often, we have viewed grave violations of human rights and international law in developing countries as no concern of ours. Ukraine, many in these countries feel, is no concern of theirs.” (Financial Times, July 2023) https://www.ft.com/content/7a2ea643-4adb-465a-9188-20363622b379 There are certainly signs that U.S. engagement in a proxy war in Ukraine is more a struggle to strengthen U.S. hegemony and rule-based order, than a fight to uphold international law and Ukraine’s freedom and right to follow its own cause. Listen to what President Biden said in his great speech in Poland on the one-year anniversary of the war: “Europe was being tested. America was being tested. NATO was being tested. All democracies were being tested. And the questions we faced were as simple as they were profound. Would we respond or would we look the other way? Would we be strong or would we be weak? Would be — we would — would we be — all of our allies — would be united or divided? One year later, we know the answer. We did respond. We would be strong. We would be united. And the world would not look the other way. (Applause.) We also faced fundamental questions about the commitment to the most basic of principles. Would we stand up for the sovereignty of nations? Would we stand up for the right of people to live free from naked aggression? Would we stand up for democracy? One year later, we know the answers. Yes, we would stand up for sovereignty. And we did. Yes, we would stand up for the right of people to live free from aggression. And we did. And we would stand up for democracy. And we did.” Invoking the world, the U.S. became caught in a still escalating proxy war with the Soviet Union in the Ukraine. Secretary of Defence, Lloyd Austin uttered what the war is all about. “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” (Washington Post). https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/26/us-has-big-new-goal-ukraine-weaken-russia/ The New York Times saw Lloyd Austin’s assertion as transformation of the conflict in Ukraine “pitting the United States more directly against Russia.” National Security advisor, Jake Sullivan, also seems to confirm that the U.S. proxy war in Ukraine is a war between the U.S. and Russia to demonstrate the strength of a U.S. hegemony that may have been weakening. In a lengthy interview in “The Atlantic” he sees the war in Ukraine as testing U.S. credibility, adding “…do I think it would have an impact? Yes. And I do think that part of our objective in Ukraine has to be to show strength, resilience, staying power, canniness, capability, because this will have some impact on our ability to effectively deter others elsewhere.” https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/07/jake-sullivan-interview-china-russia-biden-foreign-policy/670930/ “Others elsewhere” include China, and the hope that it might be deterred from invading Taiwan by the Ukrainian show of U.S. strength and resilience. Earlier Sullivan had argued the case for an enlightened sort of “American exceptionalism … as the basis for American leadership in the twenty-first century” with the foremost purpose “of American foreign policy is to defend and protect the American way of life.” One may perhaps argue that the American way of life, seems rather precarious in the U.S. itself. One might even be mischievous enough to suspect that Sullivan thinks that war elsewhere would unite waring fractions in the U.S. To Sullivan and the Biden administration the proxy war in the Ukraine against Russia may be seen as the means to rejuvenate that strength of U.S. hegemony in the World. After years when it looked to be in decline, not least after the calamitous retreat from Afghanistan and President Trump’s MAGA focus on America. The Ukraine war is therefore not about Ukraine or the upholding international law. It is about upholding U.S. hegemony under the guise of fighting for rules-based international order. “One of the things that Russia-Ukraine has done for the U.S. and U.S. foreign policy is that it has not just positioned us to lead the Western alliance in the Euro-Atlantic region, but it’s had global reverberations” (Sullivan quoted in The Atlantic). Europe’s renewed submission to U.S. hegemony Jubilant Europeans greeting President Biden’s “America is back” also jumped with alacrity into what is essentially an American proxy war against Russia fought out in Ukraine. European Commission President von der Leyen on the Russian war in Ukraine: “This is a clash between the rule of law and the rule of the gun; between democracies and autocracies; between a rules-based order and a world of naked aggression. How we respond today to what Russia is doing will determine the future of the international system.” (https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/items/738621/en). Why does Europe accept to be caught in the U.S. slipstream with no apparent independent strategy and ideas of its own? What are they going to do in relation to a Russia that won’t just disappear as a result of the war, but might get even more belligerent? Most European countries are eagerly competing in their attempts to fulfil Ukrainian and U.S. wishes. Delivering weapons and assistance to Ukraine (Now even daring to provoke Russia directly by sending F16 fighter planes, after the U.S. prodding and permission). Smelling the growing weakness of the Russian military aggression in Ukraine there is no end to the spiralling self-confidence and self-righteousness of western leaders out to humiliate president Putin and Russia. For the moment the Ukraine proxy war would seem to fulfil Sullivan’s prediction and strengthen U.S. hegemony in Europe, and the World. What the most ardent supporters of the U.S. proxy war tend to forget, is the grave risks it involves. At the moment we are seeing a spiralling escalation in the amount of assistance given to Ukraine and signs that the proxy war may not be going according to western aspirations. With the Ukrainian offensive bogged in a slow and costly slogging match with Russian troops. As it stands the outcome of the proxy war seems very unsure. Presumably resulting in further assistance to Ukraine and reciprocal Russian escalation. With the risk of a longer war. With the prospect of constantly having to escalate assistance and involvement in Ukraine in the hope of overcoming the Russians, but risking the grim spectre of nuclear war. Or risking a humiliating Ukrainian and Western defeat. Or might Europe or the U.S. after all get tired of fulfilling the more and more outrageous Ukrainian demands and force Ukraine to accept a kind of Korean DMZ armistice solution or even peace talks. Perhaps Stian Jenssen in his capacity as Director of the Private Office of Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg put up a trial balloon in a discussion in Norway when he said ”I think that a solution could be for Ukraine to give up territory, and get NATO membership in return” (VG, August 15, 2023). What is evident is that realisation of some these outcomes would humiliate the U.S. hegemon, contrary to the President Biden and his administration’s reasons for waging this proxy war. A war that certainly not seems to be about Ukraine and the preservation of International Law and the UN charter, but about a weakening U.S. hegemony asserting itself and its version of rule-based order. Next it is all about China In a way it is already more about China than about a Russia, which actually does not represent a real threat to U.S. hegemony. It about an aggressive U.S. hegemon demonstrating its will to uphold its hegemony in the face of growing Chinese competition. In essence a raw geopolitical power struggle, with a Global South and a growing number of BRICS countries watching and placing their bets. See the previous attempt to show the beginning struggle for hegemony between the U.S. dominated world and the Chinese challenger: “The West against the Rest, part 4 – the looming struggle with Chinese hegemony.” (https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/west-against-rest-part-four-looming-struggle-chinese-hegemon) Reactions to Supreme Court’s decision to end affirmative action On Thursday June 29, 2023 the Supreme Court of the United States effectively ended the race conscious admissions programs, known as affirmative action, in a 6 to 3 decision. The division in court is reflected in the media. With a liberal majority in the principal media disagreeing with the decision and a small vocal group (representing perhaps the views of most of the population) expressing joy over the decision. The New York Times Tweeted “Breaking News: The Supreme Court rejected affirmative action at Harvard and UNC. The major ruling curtails race-conscious college admissions in the U.S., all but ensuring that elite institutions become whiter and more Asian and less Black and Latino.” (Emphasis added). “Nature” magazine called the decision “a bitter blow to educational inclusion.” “This is not a normal court” President Biden said when asked if he thought that the Supreme Court had gone “rogue.” Presumably meaning that court was acting erratically, but is this case meaning disregarding what Biden would have liked. In a speech reacting to the court’s decision, he argued: “The Court has effectively ended affirmative action in college admissions. And I strongly — strongly disagree with the Court’s decision… Today, the Court once again walked away from decades of precedent and make — as the dissent has made clear. The dissent states that today’s decision, quote, “rolls back decades of precedent and momentous progress.” End of quote.” Biden also argued that it was his belief that “our colleges are stronger when they are racially diverse. Our nation is stronger because we use what we — because we are tapping into the full range of talent in this nation.” He emphasized that the nation’s colleges “should not abandon – let me say this again: They should not abandon their commitment to ensure student bodies of diverse backgrounds and experience that reflect all of America.” Later in his speech Biden more or less promised to find a way for colleges to circumvent the decisions of the Supreme Court by saying: “Today, I’m directing the Department of Education to analyze what practices help build a more inclusive and diverse student bodies and what practices hold that back, practices like legacy admissions and other systems that expand privilege instead of opportunity.” In contrast to the views of the liberal media and President Biden, a small but vocal group welcomed the court’s decision: In a press release the Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) who for a long time had argued against affirmative action at colleges and initiated the case against the affirmative action found at Harvard University and University of North Carolina Chapel Hill wrote: “The opinion issued today by the United States Supreme Court marks the beginning of the restoration of the colorblind legal covenant that binds together our multi-racial, multi-ethnic nation... The polarizing, stigmatizing and unfair jurisprudence that allowed colleges and universities to use a student’s race and ethnicity as a factor to admit or reject them has been overruled. These discriminatory admission practices undermined the integrity of our country’s civil rights laws … “Beginning today, America’s colleges and universities have a legal and moral obligation to strictly abide by the Supreme Court’s opinion. These obligations compel the removal of all racial and ethnic classification boxes from undergraduate and postgraduate application forms” (SFFA). Supreme Court arguments In the wordy opinion published by the court we find the arguments of court’s majority and of the minority. Majority opinion arguments Ethnicity and the goal of equality Chief Justice Roberts delivered the majority opinion of the court: He began by quoting earlier opinion: “Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” Failure to show that program advances goals Roberts refers to Harvard University’s argument for the educational benefits of its practice: “(1) “training future leaders in the public and private sectors”; (2) preparing graduates to “adapt to an increasingly pluralistic so- ciety”; (3) “better educating its students through diversity”; and (4) “producing new knowledge stemming from diverse outlooks.” He finds that “Although these are commendable goals, they are not sufficiently coherent for purposes of strict scrutiny. At the outset, it is unclear how courts are supposed to measure any of these goals. … How many fewer leaders Harvard would create without racial preferences, or how much poorer the education at Harvard would be, are inquiries no court could resolve. In addition, Robert’ finds that “respondents’ admissions programs fail to articulate a meaningful connection between the means they employ and the goals they pursue.” Opaque racial categories undermine goals In order to accomplish the goal of affirmative action universities must have some kind of numerical measure of the racial or ethnic composition of their classes. To do that they use these categories: 1) Asian; (2) Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; (3) Hispanic; (4) White; (5) African- American; and (6) Native American. In Roberts opinion “the categories are themselves imprecise in many ways. Some of them are plainly overbroad: by grouping together all Asian students, for instance, respondents are apparently uninterested in whether South Asian or East Asian students are adequately represented.” Other categories, Roberts mention Hispanic, are arbitrary or undefined. “It is far from evident, … how assigning students to these racial categories and making admissions decisions based on them furthers the educational benefits that the universities claim to pursue … the use of these opaque racial categories undermines, instead of promotes, respondents’ goals.” Racial stereotyping “The race-based admissions systems that respondents employ also fail to comply with the twin commands of the Equal Protection Clause that race may never be used as a “negative” and that it may not operate as a stereotype. It is far from evident, though, how assigning students to these racial categories and making admissions decisions based on them furthers the educational benefits that the universities claim to pursue.”Harvard’s admissions process rests on the pernicious stereotype that “a black student can usually bring something that a white person cannot offer.” Dissenting arguments of the minority opinion Affirmative action promotes equality Justice Sotomayor argues that “This limited use of race has helped equalize educational opportunities for all students of every race and background and has improved racial diversity on college campuses …Today, this Court stands in the way and rolls back decades of precedent and momentous progress. It holds that race can no longer be used in a limited way in college ad-missions to achieve such critical benefits. In so holding, the Court cements a superficial rule of colorblindness as a constitutional principle in an endemically segregated society where race has always mattered and continues to matter.” Sotomayor acknowledges that even with affirmative action has been progress has been slow, and mentions that “far too many black students at Harvard experience feelings of isolation and marginalization” Colorblindness keep Black Americans in the bunker In Judge Jackson ’s almost emotional opinion she writes: Today, this Court stands in the way and rolls back decades of precedent and momentous progress. It holds that race can no longer be used in a limited way in college admissions to achieve such critical benefits. In so holding, the Court cements a superficial rule of colorblindness as a constitutional principle in an endemically segregated society where race has always mattered and continues to matter… The Court has come to rest on the bottomline conclusion that racial diversity in higher education is only worth potentially preserving insofar as it might be needed to prepare Black Americans and other underrepresented minorities for success in the bunker, not the boardroom (a particularly awkward place to land, in light of the history the majority opts to ignore).” Under- and overrepresentation of ethnicities The affirmative action programs have been aimed mainly at Black Americans and Hispanic Latino Americans, although women and gender also crop up in the material, other ethnic groups do not. What is the reason for that? Perhaps at look at demographics might help understand this rather one-sided focus. Statistics for the overall ethnic composition of Harvard undergraduates provide this picture (Harvard University, Office of Institutional Research & Analytics: Common Data Set 2021-2022): Note the high proportion of Asian and the relatively modest proportion of Whites. Using an admittedly rough comparison these percentages may be compared with the ethnic composition of the U.S. population according to U.S. Census Bureau’s population estimates from July 2022 (www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045222). A first look at the minority group in focus in the programs indicates that Black or African Americans indeed may be underrepresented, as they make up 9.3% of undergraduates, but 13.6% of the U.S. population. A comparison of the percentages demonstrates that the goals of inclusion and equality for Black’s due affirmative active has not been achieved. Leaving only the argument that without affirmative action the situation would have been worse for Blacks. Somewhat surprisingly, the White population is also underrepresented at Harvard. Making up 35.4 % of undergraduates, with Whites in the population still making up at least 58.9%. Standing out is the apparent overrepresentation of Asians, making up 21.7% of undergraduates, but only 6.3% of the U.S. Population. One may wonder why so many Asians are so well represented, compared to Blacks. But perhaps answers to that question may be so embarrassing that we do not want to look? At least according to this simple comparison Harvard University would seem to be rather diverse already. Admission statistics for the class of 2025 even indicate that the proportion of African Americans accepted now stands at 15.9%, with Asians at 25.9% and Whites at around 44 %. Now this seems rather inclusive in relation to especially the Asian minority, and somewhat less inclusive in relation to Whites, don’t you think? SFFA’s long struggle against discrimination Strange as it may sound looking at the numbers Asian student have for quite some time felt that they were being discriminated against by Harvard University. “In 2014, a nonprofit group called Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) sued Harvard University, alleging that its race-conscious admissions program discriminated against Asian American applicants.” SFFA arguing that the Harvard admissions process used impermissible racial balancing favouring Blacks, and not race neutral alternatives, resulting in discrimination against the well qualified Asian students. In fact, saying that the better qualified Asians were not admitted as result of Harvard’s preferential treatment of Black students with lower qualifications. Harvard argues that its consideration of race in the overall admissions process is in accordance with affirmative action and furthermore that abandonment of racial considerations would mean that African American and Hispanic enrollment would decline. As if this in itself is an argument for preferential treatment of Black and Hispanic students. At the time SFFA lost their case in districts courts with the rather spurious argument “that a heterogeneous student body promotes a more robust academic environment with a greater depth and breadth of learning, encourages learning outside the classroom, and creates a richer sense of community.” This is hardly a proven scientific fact, and one might reasonably argue that this certainly depends on the qualities of what is included in this heterogeneity. This case raises the whole question of whether the affirmative action programs favouring Blacks in fact represents a kind of reverse racism and discrimination against other ethnic groups. Here especially of course against the better qualified Asian students. It could be argued that this would in effect lead to a lowering of standards and of excellence in universities. Contrary to argument that diversity in itself would promote excellence. With the Supreme Court’s decision decision SFFA would finally seem to have won their case, although President Biden’s promise to look for way to circumvent the decision of the court may indicate that the SFFA’s struggle might have to continue. Affirmative action — a Potemkin facade hiding a deeper inequality According to 2017 study by a former Harvard professor Raj Chetty “Harvard has had as many students come from the top 1 percent of the income distribution as the bottom 60 percent.” Indicating perhaps that taking into account general socioeconomic factors in admissions would be fairer to all other ethnic groups, than focusing on a certain racial preference to raise the admissions of Black students. See also the work of Chetty and others in “Race and Economic Opportunity in the United States: an Intergenerational Perspective” (The quarterly Journal of Economics) Then there is the problem of legacy students, students where family members have been previous alumni at Harvard. According to the Harvard Crimson 36% of the students in the class of 2022 are legacy students. According to Students for Fair Admissions “legacy applicants were accepted at a rate of nearly 34 percent from 2009 to 2015 … more than five times higher than the rate for non-legacies over the same six-year period: just 5.9 percent” (NPR 2021). In very contorted way Harvard actually uses the arguments for diversity and inclusion to defend the preferential admission of legacy students. In a court testimony Dean Khurana argues “it was important for Harvard to favor the children of alumni in order to bring students who have more experience with Harvard together with others who are less familiar with Harvard.” Well, it certainly guarantees a special kind of diversity and inclusion, but perhaps the inclusion of such a high proportion of legacy students is not necessary to assure this special kind of diversity, and it certainly is not what a sane person might regard as fair and equal treatment. Addendum, added July 10 A few days after the Supreme Court’s decision a complaint “Three Black and Latinx groups filed a civil rights complaint against Harvard … alleging that the University’s consideration of legacy and donor preferences in the admissions process violates the Civil Rights Act of 1964 … “In other words, Harvard admits predominantly white students using Donor and Legacy Preferences, and, as a direct result, excludes non-white applicants.” … In the complaint, the groups call for the department to ensure that applicants cannot indicate a relationship to a family member or donor at any point in the admissions process.” The Harvard Crimson, July 5, 2023 (https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2023/7/4/legacy-admissions-complaint/) “But they cannot unless they get a penis attached” A recent TikTok recording of a compassionate confrontation on sex and gender between a female teacher and a thirteen-year girl in a class on “life education” at Rye College in East Sussex on Friday June 13 has certainly caught attention of mainstream media in the UK. Not the least because the exchange seems to shows a young girl arguing eloquently with an ill-tempered and rather irate teacher who seems to be fully into identity politics. But judge for yourselves, when reading part of the confrontation. Irate teacher: “How dare you, you’ve just really upset someone. Saying things like you should be in an asylum. Girl or girls replaying: I didn’t say that … if they genuinely identify as a cat* or something, then they are genuinely unwell. Yeah, they are crazy. Teacher: You’ questioning their identity. Girl: It wasn’t [the] question. I was just saying about their gender. If I said anything about them. Teacher: Where did you get this idea that there is only two genders? Girl: I just said my opinion. If I respect their opinion can’t they respect mine? Teacher: It’s just an opinion. Girl: This is not an opinion [noise with girl and teacher speaking at the same time] Girl: There’s only a boy and a girl, there’s no other private part. Teacher: Gender is nor linked with that. It is not linked to the parts that you were born with. Gender is how you identify. Which is what I said right from the beginning. Girl: I don’t agree with that so why should I have to listen to that? Teacher: Biological Sex … There’s actually three biological sexes. You can be borne with male and female body parts or hormones. Did you know that? There’s three in terms of biological sex. In terms of gender there are lots of genders. There’s transgender, there’s agender. People who don’t believe they have gender at all. Girl: Yeah, but you cannot have that. Girl: It’s not a law: it’s our opinion. We just don’t agree with it. If you have a vagina, you’re a girl. If you have a penis, you are a boy. Teacher: Cisgender is not necessarily the way to be. You are talking about … that Cisgender is the norm, that you identify with the gender, that is the sexual organ that you are born with. That’s basically what you are saying. Girl: almost inaudible, yeah … Teacher: Which is really despicable. Girl: How? If I called my mum right now, she’d say … Teacher: So that’s very sad as well. Girl: How is it loads of people agree with that then. There’s only a small minority of people who actually think that… Teacher: And why do you think we have so many problems in the world with homophobia? Girl: Yeah but that’s not homophobia, that’s transgender. I’m fine with lesbians and gay people. I’ve got nothing against them. Teacher: But there’s a link between it. [Inaudible] Girl: But they can’t unless they get a penis attached Teacher: You’re confusing sex and gender. Girl: No, I’am not, though. Because, if you have a vagina you’re a girl… [Inaudible] Teacher: Gender is about your identity. How you identify. It’s not an opinion. Girl loud arguing: Yes, it is! [confused talking] Teacher irate again: If you don’t like it, you need to go to a different school… I’m reporting you to [name left out]. You need to have a proper educational conversation. About equality, diversity and inclusion, because I’m not having that expressed in lesson when I’m teaching you about you can be who you want to be, how you identify is up to somebody [Eager interruptions]. Girl: They just don’t say it because all this happens. Teacher: Maybe because they are polite. They’ are sensitive. Girl [according to the Daily Mail interpretation, the girl then defends herself by saying she was respectful, but admits she felt compelled to ask her classmate]: I haven’t said anything at all, but it is because they turn around and say things. So, I said how can you identify as a cat when you are a girl? Teacher talks about the writing of a statement … and the girls as well? Girl: We will. Yeah, we will. A question of penis in politics too The confusing confrontation in the class at Rye College seems to be mirrored in grown up politics. Asked by the Times in March 2022 to define a woman, Keir Starmer, Leader of the opposition in Parliament, said: “A woman is a female adult, and in addition to that trans women are women, and that is not just my view — that is actually the law. It has been the law through the combined effects of the 2004 Act and the 2010 [Equality] Act. So that’s my view. It also happens to be the law in the United Kingdom.” The 2004 Act referred to is the Gender Recognition Act and the 2010 Act is The Equality Act. The author J. K. Rowling of Potter fame, replied to Starmer in a Tweet arguing: “I don’t think our politicians have the slightest idea how much anger is building among women from all walks of life at the attempts to threaten and intimidate them out of speaking publicly about their own rights, their own bodies and their own lives.” Some have: Rosie Duffield, a labour MP, argues that Keir Starmer’s view has made women frightened and furious about losing their rights. For quite some time women have protested against a pervasive trend toward accepting that anyone can "identify themselves as the gender [they] want." That your gender can be determined by what you feel in your own head and not by what you have between your legs. Increasingly, politicians have given in to the demand that gender be defined by how one feels. Once Labour's former leader Corbyn even argued: "The party's position is that where you have identified yourself as a woman, you are treated as a woman." This also applies to Labour's National Executive Committee, which stated in May 2018: "Labour has a proud record of fighting for equality for women from all backgrounds, including BAME women, LGBT+ women, disabled women and working-class women. ... The Labour Party's All Women Shortlists are open to all women, including self-identifying trans women. Similarly, female officers and minimum quotas for women in the Labour Party are open to all women, including self-identifying trans women. (NEC). A statement that was followed by sharp protests. More than 300 women left the party in protest. In a letter to "The Times," some of them explain why: "We are appalled by the Labour Party's support for sex as a self-identified hallmark of all female candidate lists. We are now faced with a situation where any man can just claim to be a woman and be included in all women's shortlists. Sex is not a self-defined character trait and it is disingenuous of Labour to pretend it is. Self-identity – 'I am what I say I am' – oozes male authority and male supremacy. Not that it seems to have caused the party's leadership to hold back. In response to a question about a recently proposed, but controversial Gender Bill in Scotland, Keir Starmer seems to have realized that his view that trans women are women, may have angered the majority of women, and diminished Labour’s chances of winning the next election. Now he is saying “The lesson from Scotland is that if you can’t take the public with you on a journey of reform, then you’re probably not on the right journey.” He also promised there would be “no rolling back” of women’s rights if he was elected prime minister and stressed that “99.9 per cent of women… haven’t got a penis.” Not quite hundred percent, so perhaps he will still not be sure to take women with him on his journey. The leader of the Liberal Party, Ed Davey, also waded right into it, when taking questions in a talk radio program at LBC. Being asked by a listener what woman is he said: "The truth is, Mary, the vast majority of people whose biological sex is a woman when they were birthed - they feel they're women.” And if not? No wonder he was then asked if women can have a penis. Ed Davey’s answer: “Quite clearly.” Like in the class confrontation leaked recordings help to keep the subject alive in the media. In a leaked recording from a meeting of the Conservative 1922 Committee, prime minister Rishi Sunak is overheard saying “Sir Ed has been 'very busy... trying to convince everybody that women clearly had penises.” (PinkNews). In an interview with Rishi Sunak at Conservative Home in 2023, he is asked whether it is true that 100 per cent of women do not have a penis, Rishi Sunak says: “Yes, of course.” There you have it. Leading politicians arguing on level that certainly does not rise above the level thirteen-year girls. Somewhat more sincerely Rishi Sunak later argues “when it comes to these issues of protecting women’s rights, women’s spaces, I think the issue of biological sex is fundamentally important when we think about those questions.” So important that he intends a reform of the legal definitions of sex in order to protect women. Surely hoping that this will take women with him on his political journey up to the next general election. Sex and gender – what are we talking about An article from Yale School of Medicine refers to scientific attempts to disentangle these terms, leading a recommendation to use these definitions (medicine.yale.edu): SEX “In the study of human subjects, the term sex should be used as a classification, generally as male or female, according to the reproductive organs and functions that derive from the chromosomal complement [generally XX for female and XY for male].” We may call this the biological definition. The article also mentions that in studies of nonhuman animals only the term sex should be used. GENDER “In the study of human subjects, the term gender should be used to refer to a person's self-representation as male or female, or how that person is responded to by social institutions on the basis of the individual's gender presentation.” These definitions see sex as strictly binary, while gender of cause covers a whole spectrum of possible variations. More on SEX An article in MedicalNewsToday also tries to untangle sex and gender. In addition to the binary sex definition: male and female, they add intersex, meaning people who have sex organs or chromosomes that does fit the male or female category. This has led to the assertation that biological sex is bimodal with two humps. So to speak a male hump and a female hump, with all sort sorts of less frequent variations in sex distributed around the humps. This would presumably mean that one could talk of a male being more or less male and a female as being more or less female., and thus indirectly give a kind of (scientific?) support to identity politics. The bimodal assertation put lie to the male /female category, but a bimodal definition has mostly been vehemently rejected by science. Male/Female are categories and categories cannot be bimodal. Disentanglement in politics? When Keir Starmer argued: “A woman is a female adult, and in addition to that trans women are women, … that is actually the law,” he was referring to the Equality Act from 2010. According to the act “sex is a reference to a man or to a woman.” Right, this would seem to refer to the biological definition of sex, meaning that Starmer would be mistaken in his belief that transwomen are women according to the law. Now this has led to questions about what is actually meant by the term sex in the Equality Act: Biological sex? or Sex as modified by after receiving a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC)? What this means is that it is unclear if sex is to be defined binary by biology or legally, where gender assignment would be important. This apparent entanglement of sex and gender definitions has led to confusion and criticism, not the least in relation to single sex areas like male or female toilets, in sports where the main problem has been transwoman participating in women’s sports, (the other way round would apparently have been less of a problem), and in allowing transwomen convicted of sexual offences to be imprisoned in a women’s prisons. A challenge to this praxis has at least in one case been rejected by the UK’s High Court, with Lord Justice Holroyde arguing: “it is not possible to argue that the defendant should have excluded from women’s prisons all transgender women. To do so would be to ignore, impermissibly, the rights of transgender women to live in their chosen gender.” Thus, the High Court also seems to be caught in the sex and gender entanglement Reacting to the confusion and the angry critics, prime minister Rishi Sunak has said that he will change the law to protect single-sex spaces for women, arguing that biological sex is “fundamentally important” (The Telegraph). To disentangle the confusing entanglement of sex and gender the Minister for Women and Equalities Kim Badenoch, has asked the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) for advice on clarifying the definition of sex. After reflection on the definition and meaning of sex by the EHRC, they have to come to the preliminary view “that if ‘sex’ is defined as biological sex for the purposes of EqA, this would bring greater legal clarity in eight areas.” (Letter from EHRC, April 3, 2023). Among these areas are: Pregnancy and maternity “As things stand, protections in the EqA [Equality Act] for pregnant women and new mothers fail to cover trans men who are pregnant and whose legal sex is male. Defining ‘sex’ as biological sex would resolve this issue.” (EHRC). Positive action “Currently, trans women with a GRC could benefit from ‘women-only’ shortlists and other measures aimed at increasing female participation. Trans men with a GRC could not. A biological definition of sex would correct this perceived anomaly.” Sports “At present, to exclude trans women with a GRC from women’s sports, the organiser must show that it was necessary to do so in the interests of fairness or safety. A biological definition of sex would mean that organisers could exclude trans women from women’s sport without this additional burden.” Single sex and separate sex services “Service providers are sometimes permitted to offer services to the sexes separately or to one sex only. For instance, a hospital might run several women -only wards. At present, the starting point is that a trans woman with a GRC can access a ‘women-only’ service. The service provider would have to conduct a careful balancing exercise to justify excluding all trans women. A biological definition of sex would make it simpler to make a women’s-only ward a space for biological women.” It is interesting that the EHRC also touch upon the issue of data collection: “When data are broken down by legal not biological sex, the result may seriously distort or impoverish our understanding of social and medical phenomena.” In some sort of conclusion, the EHRC writes: “On balance, we believe that redefining ‘sex’ in EqA to mean biological sex would create rationalisations, simplifications, clarity and/or reductions in risk for maternity services, providers and users of other services, gay and lesbian associations, sports organisers and employers. It therefore merits further consideration.” Not totally convincing one might say. “On balance” they “believe” that the question “merits” further consideration. Now it is up to the present Conservative government to act on the prime minister’s promise. For now, the confusing entanglement of biological sex and legal sex based on the idea of gender assignment remains a problem that not is not only reflected in confrontations like the one in Rye College, in teaching on sex and gender in general, but even more importantly in the question of human rights of woman in society. Gender rights run amok? In the Canadian Government’s efforts to promote the human rights it writes: “Canada stands up for the protection and promotion of the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, 2-spirit and intersex (LGBTQ2I) people globally. The human rights of all persons are universal and indivisible. Everyone should enjoy the same fundamental human rights, regardless of their sexual orientation and their gender identity and expression.” (Emphasis added). But what may that mean: According to WHO “Gender refers to the characteristics of women, men, girls and boys that are socially constructed. This includes norms, behaviours and roles associated with being a woman, man, girl or boy, as well as relationships with each other. As a social construct, gender varies from society to society and can change over time” (WHO). But it would seem that this definition doesn’t cover the whole meaning of gender as used in identity politics today. On the one hand we may have the socially constructed characteristics assigned by a community of people, or a more formally by a society. On the other hand, we have the oh so popular “I am what I feel I am” gender. Recognizing that these two perceptions, the socially recognized and the individual felt, may be interconnected in as much as the socially assigned characteristics today seemingly allows and even help amplify the idea that “You are what you feel you are.” Wonder if this cannot help us understand what happens in societies today, especially Western societies. With an apparent ever-expanding lists of strange letter combinations, like for instance LGBTTQQIP2SAA+ and perhaps the superficial acceptance of people identifying as cats, cows or whatever …? Social construction trying to beat reality Is it really possible in a community (understood as a Gemeinschaft) to have unlimited “I am what I feel” identities independent of the existing social norms in the community. Or will living in a community necessarily will mean that there are limits to what the community will “tolerate” of “I am what feel or say” identities? Today it seems a slight minority of people with “I am what I feel” identities demand that the rest of the community must accept, embrace, support and further the individual whims of this minority, “regardless of their sexual orientation and their gender identity and expression.”This would mean that an individual or group defined identity, trumps whatever community norms and identities that have evolved or been constructed over time. This contributed to the fluffy slogans connected to IDE or DEI, which stands for Inclusion, Diversity and Equality/Equity. Not realising that IDE in reality may have a shadowy side. In which inclusion may evolve to cover a reality of exclusion, where everyone who does not have the right attitude is excluded. This happened recently to the British anti-trans activist Kellie-Jay Keen-Minshull (aka Posie Parker) at a rally in Wellington, New Zealand. She had to abort the rally, drowned out and threatened by “protesters galvanised by the LGBTQIA+ community.” (NZHerald). The protest found support by the Mayor of Wellington, Tory Whanau. She said she would support a counter-protest against her [Posie Parker]: “Wellington is known as a diverse community that celebrates its rainbow and trans whānau,” (NZHerald). Kellie-Jay Keen-Minshull certainly isn’t the only one that entanglement activists have tried to exclude by attempting to shout them down and silence them. Diversity which today may seem an uncontroversial slogan finding its way into institutions, companies and politics, but when it includes attempts to create diversity by decree, quotas etc, it risks endangering equality and equity, and of cause criticism. Related to this, there is the shadowy consequences of striving for an equality, that may hide a self-contradictory bias. There is even an evident danger that biological sex, and lesbian women and gay men will disappear under in colourful rainbow of more superficial feelings and in vogue “I am what I feel” identities. Perhaps this is exactly what the thirteen old meant when she said “ it is not homophobia, that’s transgender. I’m fine with lesbians and gay people. I’ve got nothing against them.” It about all the rest. It may all have gone too far, the bizarre social constructs stemming from a minority of eager minds bringing forth views that collide head on with biological realities. Social constructions are not reality although it seems to have become popular and in vogue to believe that social constructions beat reality on its own turf. When schoolgirls and politicians have started to argue whether women can a penis or not, whether men can birther (to use unusual expression) babies or not. Whether mothers become birthing and breastfeeding persons, instead of mothers. No wonder that this may prove unacceptable to a society that considers itself a community of biological men and women. Take the uproar after the transgender influencer/celebrity Dylan Mulvaney promoted Bud’s Light beer in a short movie clip on Instagram. Or the backlash after newly self-identified transwoman wins a women’s cycling race. Teaching according to beliefs or --- For some time there has been a serious debate in the UK on what children are taught about sex and gender. According to the Telegraph there has been a concern that teaching materials for schools for instance based upon UNESCO advice as published in “International technical guidance on sexuality education – An evidence informed approach.” Here just an example from the publication under the heading “The social construction of gender and gender norms.” Where learning objectives for 5-8 years olds are to include “define gender and biological sex and describe how they are different (knowledge)” and “reflect on how they feel about their biological sex and gender (skill).” Examples like these have been questioned as being inappropriate for young children and led to demands for a review of sex education in the England. A recent report “Asleep at the wheel” from the “Policy Exchange” think tank attempts to show “why … urgent attention needs to be paid to the ways children are being impacted by gender identity beliefs” in English schools. The report finds that “at least 25 per cent of schools teach the idea that some people or children ‘may be born in the wrong body.’” While “at least 30 per cent of schools teach pupils that a person who self-identifies as a man or a woman should be treated as a man or woman in all circumstances, even if this does not match their biological sex.” The reports find strange recommendations, including this strange example: “Biological male/female these terms over-simplify a complex subject of what makes up someone’s sex. ‘Assigned male/female at birth’ (AMAB/AFAB) is preferred.” One wonders what is meant by the term assignment. Might this not be interpreted as meaning according to whim of an assigner. Prime minister Rishi Sunak has listened to the criticism. Perhaps in this he also wants to take parents with him in preparation for the next election. According to the Telegraph he has pledged a review of sex education in English schools in order to protect children from inappropriate sexual content and extreme views on gender. Arguing: “First and foremost as a parent... it's really important that what our kids are exposed to, not just at school but online, is sensitive and age appropriate,” adding "Our children are precious, they deserve to be protected." His concern is shared by the Chief inspector of Ofsted (Office for Standards in Education), Amanda Spielman. She has warned that children are being taught lessons on sex, that have “no basis in any reputable scientific biological explanation” and argued that any guidance for schools would have contain “a much greater definition about what is properly taught and at which age.” Realising that the entanglement of sex and gender have gone too far some kind of principled disentanglement at the very least anchored in science must take place, not the least in sex education or “life education” classes in schools. The confrontation at Rye College certainly seems to underline the need for some kind of guidance. Although this may prove to be a hopeless undertaking with children being subject to all kinds of strange and entertaining fads on TikTok and similar. But least it possible to end with a sign of hope. When a thirteen-year girl at Rye College calls out that the emperor’s new clothes are not there at all: “If you have a vagina, you’re a girl. If you have a penis, you are a boy.” This is how one girl disentangled the web of identity politics. * Although it seems dubious, identifying as cat, cow or some other flurry thing may be some kind of fad. “The first decade of the 21st century witnessed a huge diversification in terms of assumed sexual and gender preferences and identities – especially once otherkin groups migrated to the blog-hosting site, Tumbr.” (https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/features/why-be-human-when-you-can-be-otherkin) See also earlier essay on related questions: Closing our minds and erasing our past 12/11/17 https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/closing-our-minds-and-erasing-our-past Gender madness in the US Congress and elsewhere 01/15/21 https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/gender-madness-in-the-us-congress-and-elsewhere Limits of tolerance in a society 11/04/21 https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/limits-of-tolerance-in-a-society Is Harvard University building a Potemkin facade of diversity and inclusion? 07/09/21 https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/is-harvard-university-building-a-potemkin-facade-of-diversity-and-inclusion The internal decay of the West, part one 8/19/21 https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/archives/08-2021 Freedom of expression becoming thought crime? 12/22/2021 https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/freedom-of-expression-becoming-thought-crime The circle of stars in EU flag is meant to symbolize unity Macron’s much maligned ideas on European strategic autonomy deserve a serious discussion, realising that Europe today is getting caught like pawn between a hegemonic U.S. and a China striving for hegemony. In order to discuss the question of European autonomy or perhaps the lack of it, this second part of an essay will to take a much closer look at the following topics: In part two: No European energy independence European trade dependencies No European defence autonomy “The elephant in the room” key problem for European autonomy No European energy independence Europe’s energy dependency measured as the extent to which it relies on imports to meet its energy needs came to 55.5 percent in 2021. Before the War in Ukraine “Russia’s natural gas accounted for roughly 45% of all EU gas imports in 2021. Combined with 25% of oil and 45% of coal imports, Europe paid around €400 billion to Russia last year for its energy supply. That’s a number comparable to the annual GDP of Germany.” (investigate-europe.eu). Numbers that really demonstrated EU’s dependence on Russia for its energy needs, absolutely no signs of European autonomy here. In the almost panicky attempts to get rid of the dependence on Russia the EU went far and wide to find alternative sources for its energy need. For instance, starting the import of LNG from the US and the Near East and like Germany hastily borrowing mobile LNG terminals. At the same time trying to reduce the energy consumption with all sorts of initiatives. Not really a durable way to reduce dependence on others for energy needs. In May 2022 the EU presented the so-called REPowerEU Plan. A plan for a more durable long-term solution to its energy needs. “The measures in the REPowerEU Plan can respond to this ambition, through energy savings, diversification of energy supplies, and accelerated roll-out of renewable energy to replace fossil fuels in homes, industry and power generation. (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3131). European trade dependencies A look at the EU’s most important trading partners may also tell us something about the relative weight of the of the U.S. vs China: Trade in goods with China (Statista): The figure indicates that the EU is heavily dependent on relations with China for trade in goods, and trade with China has grown rapidly in the last few years, indicating a growing dependence on trade with China. While trade in services has much less weight. In December 2020 the EU and China in principle agreed on the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, the so-called CAI, opening up the markets and contributing to establishing a level playing field. The agreement has not been ratified as the EU has since become more critical in its China policies. Now how does trade with U.S. compare to trade with China? Trade in goods with the U.S. EU exports in goods to the U.S. reached 509.3 billion euros in 2022, while imports stood at 358.4 billion euros. EU exports to China in the same year reached 230.3 billion euro, while imports reached 626 billion euro. Comparing the EU’s trade relations with China and U.S. show that imports from China are far larger than imports from the U.S. For exports the relation is reversed, EU exports to the U.S. are far larger than to China. The total picture, of import and export, especially when one includes trade in services, where the U.S. is much more important than China, show that the U.S. is still the most important trading partner in 2022 by a small margin. The continuing rise in trade and the numbers would seem to indicate a kind of reciprocal interdependence in EU trade relations both with China and the U.S. But there are signs that relations may be souring in the future both in relation to China and to the U.S. In relation to China because a European attempt to have your cake and eat it too, meaning a de-risking policy with no de-coupling from China. “We know there are some areas where trade and investment poses risks to our economic and national security, particularly in the context of China’s explicit fusion of its military and commercial sectors,” von der Leyen said i her speech on China on March 30, 2023. The proposed CAI has more or less been laid to rest. The recently proposed EU Industrial Act is intended to make it slightly more difficult for Chinese firms to participate in EU public procurements. The EU Critical Materials Act the EU is an attempt to free the EU from the very heavy reliance on China. Although that may prove difficult. The EU is also looking more carefully on Chinese investment in critical infrastructure in Europe. However, as we have seen trade with China is still growing, the “inconvenient truth is that with its still growing importance for European companies, the Chinese Market as such has become strategic.” Just take Germany, where export to China for the 30 largest companies in the German DAX account for 15% of their exports. According to Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft: „Deutschland ist auf der Exportseite anteilsmäßig deutlich stärker von China abhängig als umgekehrt: 2,7 Prozent der deutschen gesamtwirtschaftlichen Wertschöpfung und 2,4 Prozent der Gesamtbeschäftigung sind vom Export nach China abhängig. Bei China sind es dagegen nur 0,5 und 0,6 Prozent.“ Any risk of decoupling would therefore seem to weigh more heavily than the still timid efforts in relation to de-risking. In relation to the U.S. trade relations with the EU risk souring for other reasons. The recent U.S. Inflation Reduction ACT (IRA) represents an attempt to boost manufacturing in the US and diversify supply chains away from reliance on China. An example: “The bill mandates that, to qualify for IRA subsidies, EV [Electric Vehicles] products must be assembled in north America – 50 per cent of the final product calculated according to its value at first, subsequently increasing by 10 per cent every year after the bill is implemented.” Some parts of IRA may lead to collateral damage in trade relations with Europa. According to the Council on Foreign Relations “The EU’s immediate response to the IRA has focused on seeking exemptions from the discriminatory clauses. It has attempted to do so by using the threat of a counter-subsidy package as leverage, while accusing America of betrayal and even war-profiteering.” This might of cause be problematic as it may lead to counter reactions from the U.S. But given the size of the European exports the IRA certainly represents a problem for Europe. It remains to be seen how the problem may be solved. What is important in relation to the discussion here is that the U.S. enacted the IRA without regard for European interests. This has also happened in the U.S. attempts to make sure the China cannot get access to certain products deemed critical for China’s efforts to reach and perhaps surpass the U.S. in important areas. Since 2019 the U.S. has put pressure on The Netherland’s government in order make sure that the ASML company (Advanced Semiconductor Materials Lithography?) cannot export its more advanced systems to China. In July 2022, it was reported that Washington has pressured the Netherlands government to take the campaign against China to a new level, with attempts to further limit ASML’s engagement in China. ASML has near monopoly on the design and manufacture of EUV (extreme ultra violet) lithography machines that are used to print the ultrasmall, complex designs on microchip wafers, part of the process to produce leading edge sub 10 nanometre chips. Today’s striving is for 3 and 2 nm. In 2022 ASML CEO Peter Wennink said that the company had “already surrendered” to the U.S. in 2019 when it stopped selling its most advanced lithography machines to Chinese firms. Now it seems that there is U.S. pressure on other European companies to curb the export of products to China that are essential for chips production. The German companies Merck KGaA and BASF producing chemicals important for chips production would be affected by such export curbs. What we see is a Europe so dependent on the U.S. strategically, that it will just have to accept and follow the U.S. attempts to decouple from China, even though it may hurt trade and certainly not be in Europe’s best interest. No European defence autonomy In an interview with The Economist in November 2019 Emmanuel Macron declared: “What we are currently experiencing is the brain death of NATO. Europe is standing on the edge of a precipice.” Macron’s harsh comment may be seen as a wake-up call to the rest of Europe. Europe must begin to think of itself as a geopolitical power, or it will “no longer be in control of its own destiny” Macron argued that Europe should gain “military sovereignty” and open a dialogue with Russia. Failing to do so would be a great mistake. Wise words but no one listening. That was 2019, now the time for dialogue with Russia has passed, and NATO has been brought back form the dead, but the issues raised by Macron have not disappeared. In fact, they have become even more important. Today, Europe, understood as the EU and the European members of NATO, do not seem to be able to think and act on their own. They tumble headlessly along in the U.S. and Zelensky slipstream, prodded frequently by Zelensky’s and Kuleba’s sharp demands for more action, and more weapons to serve the purpose of peace. The previously highly praised efforts of Chancellor Merkel searching for peaceful solutions in the Ukraine conflict, her friendly relations with Putin and the German “Wandel durch Handel” approach to relations with Russia, are now seen as having failed miserably. Jubilant Europeans greeting President Biden’s “America is back” apparently also jumped with alacrity into what is essentially an American proxy war against Russia, fought out in Ukraine. Why does Europe accept to be caught in the U.S. slipstream with no apparent independent strategy and ideas of its own? What are they going to do in relation to a Russia that won’t just disappear as a result of the war, but might get even more belligerent? “The EU and member states have thrown several longstanding policies overboard and taken steps that under normal circumstances would have met with strong opposition from various corners. These include decisions for the EU to finance for the first time the delivery of lethal weapons to a third country; to boost its defence cooperation in the face of new threat perceptions; to send (somewhat mixed) signals of openness to EU membership for the bloc’s eastern neighbours after years of enlargement fatigue; and to trigger, also for the first time, its 2001 Temporary Protection Directive, granting temporary residency to Ukrainian refugees. (reliefweb.int). https://reliefweb.int/report/world/war-ukraine-raises-new-questions-eu-foreign-policy European countries suddenly find it important to fulfil their promises to NATO, something Trump could not get them to do. Now, new expansive defence plans and budgets are seen as more important than almost anything else. Still, one wonders if Europe really wants to contribute to an escalation in a U.S. proxy war to defeat the Russians, given the dangers of a Russian escalation. Fanning the flames of the proxy war in Ukraine with more and more weapons and engaging in sanctions that in the end may hurt the Europeans more than Russia? In the near future Europe may have to decide whether to follow and contribute to a U.S. involvement in a continuing proxy war with Russia or even a far-off war with China over Taiwan. Suddenly Macron’s question to Europe seems very important: “Is it in our interest to accelerate on the Taiwan issue? No. The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction.” Macron instead talks of the possibility of Europe becoming super power with its own stance in world affairs within a few years, if the world is not in turmoil before that would be possible. This raises two serious questions. First does Europe have choice now or in the near future to take an independent position in relation to U.S.? Would it be wise and possible not to follow the U.S. in a war with China over Taiwan in a near future? Secondly would it be possible in a more distant future to achieve a position as a kind of third and independent power in between the present U.S hegemon and the rising Chinese hegemon? In relation to first question the discussion in the first part of this essay clearly indicates that Macron is right. It would certainly be wise first of all to try to prevent an escalation in the Taiwan strait. But how could an independent European stance lessen the risk a military conflict over Taiwan, when there are growing signs that the U.S. may be preparing for a war with China over Taiwan. Europe might attempt to seek support from far eastern allies like Japan, South Korea and even Australia in a diplomatic effort to prevent war over Taiwan. In fact, they may find some kind of support in Japan and South Korea. Japan being recently worried about the sharply rising mercury in the U.S. these days. In an Economist interview with Prime Minister Kishida Fumio he said: “What must be prioritised is proactive diplomacy.” And proactive diplomacy is certainly needed now. Japan may be wary of China’s hegenomic ambitions, but Kishida Fumio’s words indicate that Japan thinks the American-Chinese rivalry may have got too hot. Japanese leaders have recently called for better communication with China, with Sino-Japanese diplomacy quietly resuming. An article in the “The Diplomat” on South Korea’s view on the prospect of war over Taiwan, also points to a certain reluctance to get militarily involved “There is good reason to think South Korea would limit its support to actions near the low end of the spectrum – strong diplomatic statements, symbolic economic sanctions, and behind-the-lines re-supply of U.S. forces returning from battle – in the hopes of avoiding a direct confrontation with China.” Perhaps a combined diplomatic effort on by Europe (if it could agree with itself), Japan and South Korea might dampen U.S. enthusiasm, lower the mercury and prevent war in the near future. It may be just a vague hope though. For these reasons. The U.S. being almost the sole guarantor for European security and in a similar way for the security of South Korea and Japan, given the U.S. military dominance and ultimately of cause its absolute nuclear deterrence. The U.S. may thus decide to present the allies with a fait accompli, by more or es directly threatening to leave the allies without the protective U.S. umbrella. Meaning that the allies would be under enormous pressure to follow the U.S. into a war over Taiwan. Current European leaders may not even have to be persuaded to follow the U.S. into war over Taiwan. Remember the enthusiastic, almost delirious support based upon on a cocktail of self-righteous moralism and power, that let them stumble along with the U.S. into an unforeseeable but dangerous support for the proxy war in Ukraine. Their shrill voices filled with passion for a what they see as a democratic, albeit very corrupt Ukraine invaded by authoritarian Russia. Taiwan might seem to threatened in a similar way to Ukraine, and being a Western oriented democracy, it would certainly also appeal to European self-righteous moralism. In relation the second question on the possibility for Europe to achieve position as a kind of third and independent power between the U.S. and China in a more distant future like Macron envisaged, the outlook is not good. Europe is not united and does not have a singular overriding view of Europe’s role in the world and is certainly not united in the belief that it might become an autonomous superpower standing between the U.S. and China. It might only see itself as a kind of moralistic “arbiter” that has a certain precarious economic clout as a consequence of its trade relations, but not enough agreement to wield this power. It also lacks self-sufficiency in vital areas like we have seen, and it will be difficult to achieve anything like self-sufficiency even in the long run. Europe would seem to be destined to be dependent on the rest of the World for a whole range of resources. Although dependencies may shift as a result of for instance a U.S. power game, as we are seeing in relation to energy. One dependence, on say gas from Russia, is just being substituted for another dependence the U.S., the Near East and even Africa. Not even with regard to conventional defence is Europe a major power. Having for a long time relied timidly and cheaply on U.S. conventional forces. With the present risk of U.S. involvement in a war with China over Taiwan, the U.S. may have realised that it has far too much on its plate to be able to allocate forces both for Europe and in the Pacific. US may turn attention and weapons towards the Pacific, or get tangled in internal political conflict which might result in less support for Europe’s defence. With the war in Ukraine and the realisation that the U.S. might prioritise the Pacific, European decisions makers have laid up costly defence procurement programs. But an overall European plan for defence investment is lacking and thus procurement seem rather haphazard, every country just trying to get what is available, which would often be U.S. equipment. Thus, demonstrating once again that Europe is not even able to supply material for its own defence, but have to rely U.S. defence companies, with the minor aberration that Poland is buying South Korean equipment like tanks, while others want missiles from Israel. Ultimately Europe is still dependent on the U.S. for security, especially the deterrence provided by the nuclear umbrella. France may a nuclear force, but it seems reserved for the protection of France, and the UK has a nuclear force, but it’s use may be dependent on the U.S. The German politician Manfred Weber, leader of the Christian Democrats in the European Parliament has recently argued in favour of a Europe having its own nuclear deterrence: „Putins Angriffskrieg zwingt Europa, endlich die eigene Verteidigung in die Hand zu nehmen, zumal die USA sich künftig stärker Richtung Pazifik orientieren dürften. Dazu gehört auch die Frage nach atomarer Abschreckung: Deutschland und Frankreich sollten jetzt darüber reden.“ (Focus). He is still a lonely voice in relation to most of Europe. Germany for instance being more occupied with getting rid of the last vestiges of peaceful version of nuclear power, having just closed its last nuclear power stations. The sorry state of European defence independence The sorry state relates to low overall European expenditure on defence compared to the superpowers. The dependence on the U.S. defence industry for material, and the patchwork of common European defence initiatives. Using data from SIPRI we can compare overall defence spending for the year 2022 measured in billion US $ at 2021 prices. Note that U.S. Depertment of Defence estimates that China’s real military spending may now be around 1.1 to 2 times higher than stated in its official budget. While European expenditure may look high compared to China, it interesting to see to what degree it actually contributes to military defence autonomy for Europe. For years there has been talk of a European Army, although the discussions never got very far, presumable because most European members of NATO would have seen that European defence capabilities would in the end have to rely on NATO and especially of cause its most important member, the U.S. After the Afghanistan withdrawal debacle, where Europe mostly were left out of the Biden administration’s decision making, the discussion of an independent European defence initiative popped up again. In von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech on September 15 in 2021 she mentioned that the EU had begun to develop a European defence ecosystem. She then said “But what we need is the European Defence Union.” Arguing that “that Europe can – and clearly should – be able and willing to do more on its own.” For three reasons: “The need to provide stability in our neighbourhood and across different regions; the nature of the threats we face is evolving rapidly; the European Union is a unique security provider. There will be missions where NATO or the UN will not be present, but where the EU should be.” Explaining why similar ideas had not been realised in the past she touched, perhaps inadvertently, upon the ultimate reason why the European autonomy Macron envisaged cannot be achieved. What is holding a European Defence Union back in her view is “not just a shortfall of capacity – it is the lack of political will.” A lack of will, caused by the lack of unity of purpose and shared strategic outlook among European states.“What should amount to a largely practical and pragmatic effort often descends into an ideological squabble over “strategic autonomy” or national sovereignty. Bureaucratic turf wars erupt between ministries of defense, NATO, and the European Union over roles and responsibilities.” Although Europe spends a substantial amount on defence, it is still less than had been agreed upon, but the war in Ukraine have certainly brought forth a radical change. Former unwillingness to engage in large defence spending programs, has now been substituted for extraordinary programs in many European countries. An EDA (The European Defence Agency) report finds a marked increase in spending on defence equipment procurement and defence R&D in Europe. This has brought to light another European problem related to defence procurement. It has mostly been and still is a chaotic everyone for themselves. Every state initiating big military procurement programs on their own, with almost no real cooperation. Leading just as before to an assortment of different equipment, and by the way presumable to competition between the states in their procurement programs, thus leading to the lack of both efficiency and effectiveness.
“As EU countries tend to extensively implement their defense plans at the national level, only 18 percent of all investment in security programs were conducted in cooperation, a decrease of 1 percent from 2020. In addition, no improved coherence of the EU defense landscape has been visible. The key factors identified as impacting nations’ decision making were primarily nationally defined requirements, followed by achieving NATO targets, and finally EU priorities. Many were said to consider European cooperation approaches as more difficult and time consuming, which ultimately results in them opting for national solutions or non-EU solutions.” (Report from the European Defence Agency). Cooperation is hampered by what has been fittingly called the cacophony problem. Which is a result of “profound, continent-wide divergences across all the domains of national defense policies, most notably threat perceptions.” All states speaking with different voices on at the same time. The problem is so deeply rooted in independent national thinking and decision making that there is certainly no near-term solution. The result is strategic divergence, fragmentation in European procurement, leading to problems with European defence planning and multinational operation. In short Europe defence procurement represent a patchwork quilt of many separate and divergent decisions with regard to procurement. This represents a challenge to multinational operations given the growing complexity of modern warfare. The natural conservatism of military organizations poses a serious challenge for European military cooperation in particular, given the disparities in technology and capability among them and with key allies. A report from CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) describes how a lack of joint procurement led to fragmentation and duplication: “European armed forces suffer major redundancies, with 29 different types of destroyers, 17 types of main battle tanks, and compared to four, one, and six, respectively, for the United States. Some European countries have managed to develop joint platforms in the past, such as the A400M military transport aircraft, the Eurofighter combat aircraft, and the Tiger attack helicopter.” Years of underinvesting in European defence during the long period when Europe slumbered under the U.S. military protection umbrella, led to less focus on upholding a European defence industry able provide at least some kind of Europe autonomy. Programs like the European Defence Fund’s €1.2 billion program for 2023 and the recent EDIRPA (European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act) accompanied by €500 million earmarked to encourage member states to procure defence products jointly, seem timid in relations to the scale of the problems just discussed. We have to conclude that Macron’s idea of having a European defence, independent of the U.S. looks rather farfetched in the light of what we have seen. For a foreseeable future Europe will be damned to be dependent on U.S. military capabilities and as said before on U.S. nuclear deterrence. A strategic compass with no magnetism Maybe the EU had finally realised that there is need for some kind of strategic goal for Europe when they adopted a so-called “Strategic Compass for Security and Defence” in March 2022, finally awakening to the dangerous strategic challenges facing Europe. According to Borell “The Strategic Compass is setting out concrete actions in the following four work strands so that we: Act more quickly and decisively when facing crises; Secure our citizens against fast-changing threats; Invest in the capabilities and technologies we need; and Partner with others to achieve common goal” Borell expresses his “hope that this Strategic Compass will help us, finally, face our security responsibilities, in front of our citizens and the rest of the world. If not now, then when?” In the face of all the obstacles we have listed, this compass may just have too little magnetic force to assure unity. “The elephant in the room” key problem for European autonomy Macron may be wise in wishing for greater European independence, but like we have seen in other areas there is no real European agreement and certainly no unity of purpose that would be an absolute precondition for realising European defence autonomy. Explaining why similar ideas had not been realised in the past Ursula von der Leyen perhaps inadvertently touched upon the ultimate reason why the European autonomy Macron envisaged cannot be achieved. In relation to the failed attempt to create European Defence Union von der Leyen argued that reason is “not just a shortfall of capacity – it is the lack of political will.” Here we actually find the “the elephant in the room” key problem to any attempt to create a solid European autonomy, whatever aspect of autonomy one may think of. Europe is not able to act as one for this reason: European countries are still not able to achieve the necessary overall agreement on Europe’s role in the World, or on an overall strategic vision. This may also explain why Europe as such does not have any authority able to make decisions on behalf of what would have to include the majority of European states. Instead, Europe must rely on achieving a kind unity in action on single issues often belatedly and full of compromises. For these reasons, it is impossible to envisage comprehensive autonomy in any of the areas discussed in this essay. Macron’s talk of a third superpower between in between the U.S. and China is thus no more than a pipe dream. Compared to the U.S. and China, the EU has glaring lack of decisive leadership able to act with authority, and Europe overall even more so. The EU member states represent a patchwork of different views, with absolute no overall guiding strategic view. No wonder therefore that EU political decision-making on vital issues for Europe and the World is so indecisive, messy and always late. The whole decision-making construction of the EU reflects the lack of unity of purpose. The many presidents in the EU, and especially of cause the president of the EU Commission, by design lacks authority and is filled with comprise and second rate candidates that lack decisive leadership qualities. Not their fault of cause. The whole EU construction is at fault, and for this reason any hope of playing on the same level as the U.S. and China with regard to strategic autonomy is misplaced. This of cause goes also for Europe as a whole. A more strategic autonomous for Europe would thus only be possible with less autonomy for member states along with the necessity of having a much more authoritative political structure and leadership. Unless that were to happen European strategic autonomy is only vague swirling bluish wisps of utopian smoke. Unless that is, deadly external threats threaten all of Europe in a similar way. If this happens, decision making may become united and effective, albeit probably always too late. Furthermore, the present moralism and genuflection to an ideology of values also makes Europe impotent to influence what happens in the World. With more realism and a view to what is in Europe’s best interest Europe might be able to find a way to balance between the U.S. and China. Not really as an autonomous superpower, but as someone good at highlining, or perhaps less dangerous “slacklining,” constantly trying to keep the balance. Perhaps James Cleverly, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, in a recent speech gave cause for some optimism. In relation to China, he said "It would be clear and easy - and perhaps even satisfying - for me to declare some kind of new Cold War and say that our goal is to isolate China." But he then argued that it would “be a betrayal of our national interest and a wilful misunderstanding of the modern world.” Isolating China would be wrong as “No significant global problem - from climate change to pandemic prevention, from economic stability to nuclear proliferation - can be solved without China." If Europa as such began to emphasise similar attitudes it might represent the first very small step towards avoiding falling into the trap Macron feared, “The trap for Europe would be that, at a time when it is achieving a clarification of its strategic position, … it would be tangled up in world destabilization, or crises that aren’t Europe’s” Curio addendum: As an aside one may wonder how ChatGPT answers a question relating to alignment of countries with the U.S. Question: Was alignment with say the US really based on the countries´ own volition? The full ChatGPT answer: The decision of a country to align itself with the United States, or any other country, is not always based purely on its own volition. In many cases, the alignment of a country with a particular power is influenced by a range of factors, including historical ties, economic interests, and strategic considerations. During the Cold War, for example, many countries aligned themselves with the United States or the Soviet Union based on a range of factors, including ideological considerations, military alliances, and strategic interests. In some cases, countries may have been pressured or coerced into aligning with a particular power through the use of military force, economic sanctions, or other forms of coercion. However, it is also important to note that countries may also choose to align themselves with a particular power based on their own perceived interests and strategic goals. In some cases, the alignment of a country with the United States may have been driven by a desire to counterbalance the influence of a regional rival or to gain access to economic and military resources. Ultimately, the decision of a country to align itself with a particular power is a complex one that is influenced by a range of factors, both internal and external. Not really answer. Just a presentation of possible considerations related to the question. Macron’s much maligned ideas on European strategic autonomy deserve a serious discussion, realising that Europe today is getting caught like pawn between a hegemonic U.S. and a China striving for hegemony. In order to discuss the question of European autonomy or perhaps the lack of it, this essay will to take a much closer look at the following topics: In part one: Macron’s idealistic views on autonomy The furious reaction to Macron’s views Independent European stance on Taiwan? Dependence on China in critical areas In part two: No European energy independence European trade dependencies No European defence autonomy “The elephant in the room” key problem for European autonomy Macron’s idealistic views on autonomy No, it’s not about Macron’s pension reform trouble in France. The flare up of critical comments on Macron came as result of an interview gave to three journalists on his flight home from the splashy and colourful visit to China. The commotion that resulted has even been compared to the gasps of incredulity at the time Macron said we were experiencing is the brain death of NATO. With political commentators and media ballooning with critical comments on Macrons interview it might be worthwhile to take a closer look at what he actually said and why this caused such an uproar. Relying on a transcript in English we see that the interview started out with questions related to Macron’s view on China’s position on Ukraine, but it soon turned to even more inflammatory subjects and views. On Europe as a pawn between two blocs “The question Europeans need to answer is the following: is it in our interest to accelerate on the Taiwan issue? No. The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction. Why should we go at a pace chosen by others? At some point, we have to ask ourselves what is in our interest … The risk is that of a self-fulfilling strategy by the U.S. and China. We Europeans must wake up. Our priority is not to adapt to the agenda of others in all regions of the world.” On the risk of Europe becoming a vassal The trap for Europe would be that, at a time when it is achieving a clarification of its strategic position, … it would be tangled up in world destabilization, or crises that aren’t Europe’s. If the tensions between the two superpowers heat up, we will not have the time or the means to finance our strategic autonomy and will become vassals, whereas we could become a third superpower if we have a few years to build it. On European sovereignty given the dependence on U.S. for security “We have … introduced the idea of European defence, of a more united Europe that issues debt together during the COVID pandemic. Five years ago, strategic autonomy was a pipe dream. Today, everyone is talking about it. This is a major change. We have equipped ourselves with instruments on defence and industrial policy… There have been many advances: the Chips Act, the Net Zero Industry Act and the Critical Raw Material Act. These European texts are the building blocks of our strategic autonomy. We have begun to set up factories for batteries, hydrogen components and electronics… “We do not want to depend on others for critical issues. The day you no longer have a choice on energy, self-defence, social networks, or artificial intelligence because you lack the infrastructure on these issues, you will be out of history for a moment … Today, we need to accelerate implementation on the military, technological, energy and financial levels to speed up our effective autonomy.” On Europe’s new dependence on U.S. for Energy It is true that we have increased our dependence on the United States in the field of energy, but in a logic of diversification because we were far too dependent on Russian gas. Today, it is a fact that we are more dependent on the United States, Qatar and others. But this diversification was necessary. For the rest, we must take into account the after-effects. For too long Europe has not built this strategic autonomy for which I am fighting. Today, the ideological battle has been won and the groundwork has been laid. This has a cost, which is normal. On the attempt to achieve European autonomy The key to being less dependent on the Americans is to strengthen our defence industry and agree on common standards. We are all putting in a lot of money but we cannot have ten times as many standards as the Americans! Secondly, we need to speed up the battle for nuclear and renewable energy in Europe. Our continent does not produce fossil fuels. There is a coherence between reindustrialisation, climate and sovereignty. It is the same battle. It is the battle of nuclear power, of renewable energy and of European energy sobriety. It will be the battle of the next 10 to 15 years. On a European strategic independence Strategic autonomy means having convergent views with the United States, but whether it is on Ukraine, the relationship with China or the sanctions, we have a European strategy. We do not want to enter into a logic of block to block. On the contrary, we must "deristify" [deriskify?] our model, not depend on the other, while maintaining a strong integration of our value chains wherever possible. The paradox would be that at the very moment when we are putting in place the elements of a true European strategic autonomy, we start to follow American policy, by a sort of panic reflex. On the contrary, the battles to be fought today consist on the one hand in accelerating our strategic autonomy and on the other hand in ensuring the financing of our economies. I would like to take this opportunity to stress one point: we must not depend on the extraterritoriality of the dollar. On Chinese power filling the vacuum left by Europe and the U.S. disengagement We have been going backwards for twenty years. I decided three years ago to increase our official development assistance, but after 15 years of retreat. When Europe disengages, we should not be surprised that others move forward. When the United States turns more towards itself, as it has done since the 2010s, or towards the Pacific, and Europe suffers a financial crisis, China naturally steps forward. In addition to the interview parts of the “Joint declaration between the French Republic and the People's Republic of China” relating to Macron’s visit may also have caused consternation in Europe and the U.S. The first part of the declaration states that “France and China reaffirm their desire to pursue the continuous development of their close and solid global strategic partnership, on the basis of mutual respect for their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their major interests. … in particular to deepen dialogue between the Southern Theatre of the People's Liberation Army of China and the Command of French forces in the Asia-Pacific Zone. (ALPACI), in order to strengthen mutual understanding of regional and international security issues. Once more France also reaffirms its attachment to the one-China policy, and state that differences should be settled through dialogue and consultation and want to strengthen the multilateral system in a multipolar world. The furious reaction to Macron’s views U.S. politicians and media reacted strongly to the views Macron aired in his interview and what was seen as his attempt to align himself with Chinese views in the declaration following his visit to China. Marco Rubio, outspoken republican senator, aired his wrath in a video: “Does Macron speak for all of Europe? Is Macron now the head of Europe? Because if he is, there are some things we are going to have to change.” Threatening: “You guys handle Ukraine.” Lindsey Graham, another republican senator, tweeted: “His latest visit to China only emboldens the Communists and President Xi, who seems to be hellbent on rewriting world order and taking Taiwan by force.” The Biden Administration seem to have their opinion more or less to themselves. While Trump was his usual self, with this comment: “Macron, who’s a friend of mine, is over with China kissing [Xi’s] ass in China, okay. I said France is now going to China? Eastern European politicians also reacted angrily. Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki blasted both Macron and Chancellor Scholtz for their views on China: “"Short-sightedly they look to China to be able sell more EU products there at huge geopolitical costs, … Hence, I don't understand the concept of European strategic autonomy if it means the fact of shooting ourselves in our own knee." (France 24). In contrast to Macron’s ideas about a Europe not just following in the footsteps of the U.S. Morawiecki argued for an even tighter relationship with U.S. “I see no alternative, and we are absolutely on the same wavelength here, to building an even closer alliance with the Americans. If countries to the west of Poland understand this less, it is probably because of historical circumstances,” (Politico). Gabrielius Landsbergis, foreign minister of Lithuania, said “Unfortunately, our geopolitical blindness has not yet been cured. We chose not to see the threat of Russian aggression, and now we are choosing not to see the threat of Chinese aggression,” (quoted in Financial Times). “Macron scheint von allen guten Geistern verlassen“ was the reaction from the German CDU politician Norbert Röttgen: “While it is America and not France or Germany that is providing significant support to Ukraine and thereby defending Europe, Macron calls for a departure from America. While China is practicing the attack on Taiwan, Macron demands a rapprochement with China." Members of the European parliament also chimed in “We will work to ensure that your remarks serve as a wake-up call to democratic governments to do everything possible to ensure that Beijing’s aggressive stance towards Taiwan receives the hostile reception it deserves from the international community,” the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China wrote in a statement. Others regarded Macron’s idea of a European strategic autonomy as a dangerous illusion. “Die transatlantische Allianz, gestärkt durch das gemeinsame Vorgehen gegen Putin, darf keine Risse bekommen. Genau darauf warten nämlich die Diktatoren in Moskau und Peking. Und dann riskiert Europa, irgendwann wirklich zum „Vasallen“ zu werden – jedoch nicht der USA, sondern Chinas.” (Die Welt). “Macron’s comments risked undercutting EU’s unity on the war in Ukraine,” another official said, adding that China had been “impressed” by how the usually fractious bloc had “been able to reach unity” and keep it. “We have the capacity to act with unity under the most massive aggressive pressure … This is huge capital that one should not squander,” (EU-official quoted in Financial Times. It is worth emphasizing that the angry reactions were voiced most vehemently by Eastern European leaders, by Western politicians not in power and by mainstream media. While governments in the U.S. and Europe mostly kept their silence, or at least did not go public with their anger at a Macron once more stealing the limelight with his vision for Europe as an independent third power between U.S. and China. Apparently refraining from criticizing Macron openly to avoid that the carefully orchestrated impression of European unity is falling apart at a time when Europe is acting as a dependable ally in the U.S. proxy war in Ukraine. Independent European stance on Taiwan? EU strategy papers in 2016 and later on relations with China confirms that the EU still solemnly genuflects to the “One China Policy.” Under the guise of the EU thus maintaining “One China” policy and acknowledging People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, the EU still tries to enhance relations with Taiwan. The High Representative Josep Borrell in 2022 argued that the EU seeks “to broaden our cooperation with Taiwan, [and] to modernise our dialogue with Taiwan. But all of it in the framework of the One China Policy, which recognises the People’s Republic as the sole government of China. Let me be clear on this: the One China Policy does not prevent us –the European Union– from persisting and intensifying our cooperation with Taiwan, not from expressing our concerns at the recent rising tensions.” The EU argues that relations with Taiwan are important for two reasons. The EU likes to emphasise that they “share and promote the same democratic values, the respect for international law and human rights, making political cooperation another important item on their shared agenda.”This is one reason why relations with Taiwan are seen as important. While this may not be vital to Europe it is certainly important to Taiwan in the present situation. The other reason is decidedly more essential to Europe as it concerns Taiwan’s vital role in chips production. Taiwan is in fact the centre of fabs (factories or foundries for fabricating chips) for advanced chips production, with the leading company TSMC earning a 56 percent market share of chips production worldwide. Especially notable is Taiwan’s leading position in the fabrication of the most advanced leading edge semiconductor chips. In the fabrication the of sub 10 nm (nanometre) semiconductor chips Taiwan has a share of 92 percent while South Korea is sitting on the rest. Just an example, the new iPhone 14 pro is built with chips using a 4 nm process made in Taiwan. How come that the rest of the World has become so dependent on advanced semiconductor chips fabricated in Taiwanese fabs and assembled into finished products in China? In a way the explanation is quite simple, labour costs are lower compared to the rest of the World and Asia has a skilled workforce. That is why labour-intensive semiconductor production over the years became located in Taiwan, South Korea and China. Like so much else in manufacturing. It is not only labour cost that explains the movement to North East Asia. It is also government support and the characteristics of the labour force. “With decades of industrial policy support, robust infrastructures, and highly skilled workforces, Taiwan and South Korea are particularly strong in advanced manufacturing and possess a combined 100 percent of the global fabrication capacity in 7- and 5- nanometres processing nodes.” There we have it, Europe is at the moment almost totally dependent on Taiwan, South Korea and China for those semiconductors that has become so vital for Western economies. Will Europe follow the U.S. lead? How will the EU handle the growing tensions and the prospect of a war over Taiwan? “One of those challenges for Europe is whether to support Taiwan, an island which Beijing seeks to bring under its political control, through the use of military force if necessary. Even before Russia’s war of aggression, some European leaders were alert to the increasing likelihood of war over Taiwan.” (Lee and Schreer 2022). Europe is of cause aware of the growing tension and mostly trying to tread carefully at the moment, certainly not interested in contributing to the tension in the Taiwan straits for obvious reasons. The question now is, will Europe support a U.S. war over Taiwan like it supported the U.S. proxy war in Ukraine? Perhaps it worthwhile to look for possible alternatives to U.S. and European positions in general viz a viz China and Taiwan. From what we have seen the U.S. does not really care about possible and alternative views from its allies, neither in the relation to Indo-China nor in Europe. It is almost as if it takes it for granted that they all will follow and support the U.S. position willingly and without any real discussion of the U.S. position and the U.S. Strategies. In a way the allies are also in a very weak position relying themselves absolutely on U.S. military power, so they may not even be able to disagree with the U.S. without losing the U.S. deterrence that has been vital for the security of them. Not the least for Europe in relation to Russia. At the moment it looks as if the European allies with their limited means are following with timid steps in the large American footsteps. Accepting restrictions for exporting to China, preventing Chinese takeover of key industrial companies, keeping Chinese firms and communications equipment out of critical infrastructure, to a degree at least. Although some southern and eastern European countries are grateful for Chinese investment. (for instance in the 17+1 alliance). Some allies try to support U.S forces in the Indo-Pacific area. France perhaps more than others because it has important interests in the Pacific. The U.K. perhaps still clinging to the view that it are the most trusted military partner of the U.S., and demonstrating it by sending a new (and apparently faulty) carrier and other warships to the Far East. Even Germany makes a small contribution by having a frigate showing the flag in the East. The German newspaper Tagesspiegel even arguing that the German Frigate Bayern supports Japan and others threatened by Chinese activities. Big mission for a single small warship. If push came to shove over Taiwan, countries like the UK and perhaps even France and some eager U.S. supporters in Eastern Europe might be willing to follow the U.S. without really having the means to influence the outcome, thus doing something that would not mean much, although it may contribute to the U.S determination. War over Taiwan not in the best interest of Europe Take Germany. In 2021 the trade turnover with China (export plus imports) statistics measured in euros, was larger than it was with the U.S. For this and other reasons Germany or any other country in Europe does not have any real interest in a conflict with China over Taiwan, the Chinese dominance of the South China Sea, or the Uyghurs. It evident that a conflict over Taiwan would be major blow not only to the Europe but to the whole Western World. Even if the Chinese just blockaded Taiwan it would mean serious problems for Europe and the U.S. If the large fabs in Taiwan were to bombed and damaged it would lead to a very serious shortage of advanced semiconductor chips for a long time, as it would extremely difficult to establish similar fabs elsewhere. “It takes two-to-three years to build a semiconductor plant from scratch. Replacing lost manufacturing capacity would be extremely expensive — a new semiconductor factory costs tens of billions of dollars and it is extremely knowledge intensive; indeed, TSMC dominates at the cutting edge because of its technological lead” (Japan Times). A full-blown war over Taiwan would not only cut off exports from Taiwan but presumably lead to reciprocal sanctions on Chinese and European goods, and the closing of the South China Sea shipping routes. Therefore, it would certainly not be in Europe’s interest to get involved in a conflict with China over Taiwan. The problem is that a conflict between China and the U.S. would have detrimental consequences, even if Europe opted to stay out of the conflict. At moment it looks as if the U.S. is doing what it can to get other allies involved in creating a kind of united front against China in order to deter China from going to war over Taiwan, With the so-called Quad (The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) involving strategic dialogue between U.S., Australia, India and Japan. With reinforcing its presence in the Philippines. With the AUKUS alliance, the trilateral security act between Australia, the U.S. and UK. With encouraging greater defence expenditure and involvement in Japan and South Korea. But is a war over Taiwan really in the interest of countries like South Korea, Japan, the Philippines or Australia, as they would presumable suffer more than the U.S. in a war with China? Perhaps a war over Taiwan would only come about as a result of the U.S. belief that it still is the ultimate arbitrator in the World based on its previous hegemonic might. Perhaps the time has come the think the unthinkable, even for hawks like Biden, Blinken and Sullivan, that the weakening of U.S. hegemony is irrevocable, while China’s hegemony is on the rise. Dependence on China in critical areas While Ursula von der Leyen accompanied Macron, we did not hear much about her views. But in a speech on EU-China relations just before her visit to China she laid out the EU’s changing view on China, a view that has recently become far more critical of China. “This is why it is vitally important that we ensure diplomatic stability and open communication with China. I believe it is neither viable – nor in Europe's interest – to decouple from China. Our relations are not black or white – and our response cannot be either. This is why we need to focus on de-risk – not de-couple. And this is part of the reason why I will soon be visiting Beijing together with President Macron. Managing this relationship and having an open and frank exchange with our Chinese counterparts is a key part of what I would call the de-risking through diplomacy of our relations with China.” Von der Leyen also emphasized the existing European dependence on China in certain critical areas. “… it also means taking a critical look at our own resilience and dependencies, in particular within our industrial and defence base. This can only be based on stress-testing our relationship to see where the greatest threats lie concerning our resilience, long-term prosperity and security… we will also need more independence and diversity when it comes to the key inputs needed for our competitiveness. We know this is an area where we rely on one single supplier – China – for 98% of our rare earth supply, 93% of our magnesium and 97% of our lithium – just to name a few. (Emphasis added). A paper taking an in depth look on the EU’s strategic dependencies contain a list of some the most glaring dependencies in key areas. List of technological strategic dependencies for the EU(https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/48878 ): In relation to Rare Earth, Chemicals, and PV (Photovoltaic) Panels the EU is to very large degree dependent on China. For Cybersecurity and IT software the dependence is mostly on the U.S. Here just an example of the dependence on China for rare Earth: Chinese dominance over the rare earth permanent magnets value chain (https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/48878 ): It is quite interesting to see what the co-called Conservative Seeheimer Kreis of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has been up to recently. In their new strategy paper, they also see a need for more European autonomy in certain areas, just like von der Leyen. “Germany and the EU must pursue a multidimensional trade policy. Supply chains must be diversified and new partnerships formed. At the same time, the open and honest exchange with China is all the more important. The EU must make its strengths clear here and speak with one voice in the future… An abrupt end to trade relations with China would be an economic disaster.” (Seeheimer Kreis). Like von der Leyen, they “call for a new European investment agenda and industrial offensive: starting with stronger incentives for the settlement of solar, wind turbine and hydrogen producers as well as with important key technologies such as semiconductors, chips and batteries.” (Seeheimer Kreis). We take these views to mean that although Europe should not join more drastic attempt to decouple from China, it should at the very least become less dependent on China in certain key areas, by investing heavily in those areas. In short, keep up trade and economic relations with China on what has often been called a level playing field, while reducing dependence on China in certain critical areas. More or less like Macron envisioned. Now on to the question of whether the EU would be able to somehow achieve strategic autonomy in the key areas mentioned here. It is evident that that it would be difficult and perhaps impossible, given the Chinese dominance, the size of necessary investments and the technical difficulties of substituting the dependence on China with the EU’s own efforts. This means that Macron’s view, that the Europe should not depend on others for critical issues, and von der Leyen’s stress on the need more independence and diversity, when it comes to the key inputs needed for EU competitiveness, may in reality turn out to be mere pipe dreams for a foreseeable future. The EU will continue to rely on China for the key supplies listed and the U.S. for the more intangible supplies related to cybersecurity and key areas of IT, including the rapidly the growing field of artificial intelligence. Chips dependency Statistics related to all important semiconductor production chain, show that Europe, here defined by the EU, is heavily dependent on foreign suppliers, and to a large degree also on foreign customers. The manufacture of electronic components and loaded electronic boards, linkages with foreign customers/suppliers(https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/publications/position-eu-semiconductor-value-chain-evidence-trade-foreign-acquisitions-and-ownership_en): With a European Chips Act the EU is making an attempt to become less dependent on foreign suppliers and strengthen Europe’s position. With the provisional political agreement to strengthen the European semiconductor ecosystem reached in April 2023, it is argued that a “swift implementation of today’s agreement will transform; our dependency into market leadership; our vulnerability into sovereignty; our expenditure into investment.” (europe.eu).
“With the European Chips Act, the EU will address semiconductor shortages and strengthen Europe’s technological leadership. It will mobilise more than €43 billions of public and private investments and set measures to prepare, anticipate and swiftly respond to any future supply chain disruptions, together with Member States and our international partners.” (europe.eu). What the Commission aims to do sounds like little more than a wish list at the moment, as can be seen from these vague aims. It certainly does not look as if this initiative will help Europe to achieve the autonomy in relation to semiconductors that Macron seems to believe. The EU’s share of global semiconductor production at moment is below 10 percent. With the chips initiative it is hoped to increase this share to 20%. Compared to the recent U.S. “Chips and Science Act” with its 52.7 billion dollars for the CHIPS for America Fund the European initiative may seem underwhelming. Compared to China, where $150 billion has been spent since 2015 to upgrade its semiconductor industry, even more so. A fiery end to escalation? vcp Fiery conviction with no substance? Do Western leaders know what they doing, or have they just become delirious on a cocktail of self-righteous moralism and power, stumbling along into an unforeseeable but dangerous future. Their shrill voices filled with passion for Ukraine and hate of Russia drowning out warning voices. Have they ever taken the time to sit down and reflect upon what they are doing, or are they too busy flitting to and from summits meant to demonstrate their unison conviction? Caught in vortex of a proxy crusade? Will the West do what it takes for as long as it takes, albeit hesitantly and with delays, to help Ukraine defeat the Russian forces and get back all of what they regard as Ukrainian land, even Crimea? Have Western leaders, at first dipping very cautiously into their arsenals, lost all sense of caution, lured by their own superficial moralistic idealism and the terrible plight of Ukraine? Will the West continue to pour tanks, jets and long-range missiles into Ukraine, accepting the Ukrainian argument that more weapons will help save lives? Ignoring that nothing the West has done until now has helped to save lives, au contraire. Is Russia and the West caught in a spiralling vortex of continuous escalation? What is next, if Leopards and even fighter jets are not enough? Surreptitiously inserting Western “boots on the ground” to stiffen Ukrainian resistance? How would/could the West react if China decided to help a Russia in dire straits? Supplying weapons or material for making weapons to enable Russia to continue the War? Would the West get in a reciprocal sanctioning regime with China, or try to threaten China in other ways. Risking the creation of an almighty Eurasian Russian-Chinese power. Might the lid be blown off Pandora’s box and release its curses on the whole of human kind, by simple incidents like Russian missiles landing in a NATO country, Russia shooting down a U.S. surveillance plane or something else reminding one of “Princip’s shots in Sarajevo.”? Simplistic views of the endgame What is the West hoping to achieve, a defeated Russia, perhaps even warlike dissolution? Or a Russia getting even more allied to China? Is that something Europe could want? Would that not be a real nightmare on its doorstep? Shouldn’t we at least demand some sort idea of what the West want to achieve, instead of leaving it to Zelensky to decide what the West wants? In all seriousness, will Europe really leave it to Zelensky and a vengeful Biden to decide to escalate the proxy war against Russia and decide the conditions for making peace with Russia? Or will Western decision makers (not the least the Europeans) come to their senses and realise that they have to demand something from Ukraine? Perhaps even accept something one might call a “Korean solution”? Not peace, but not War either. A divided country with a DMZ (demilitarised zone). Not the best of all worlds, but some alternatives certainly sound worse and the risk is certainly there. Is Ukraine worth it? A question that really would irk moralistic proponents of giving Ukraine everything they demand. One might even ask, is it worth it for Ukraine itself? Losing more than 100.000 dead or wounded? And be subject to enormous destruction everywhere? Is Biden promising more than he can deliver? In Kyiv he recently said: “You [President Zelensky] remind us that freedom is priceless; it’s worth fighting for as long as it takes. And that’s how long we’re going to be with you, Mr. President: for as long as it takes. “ Big words, but the U.S. might get tired in its proxy war against Russia and lose popular support? Leaving Ukraine to the fight its own hopeless fight? If U.S. support petered out, it would leave Europe with destroyed Ukraine and a belligerent Russian neighbour. Is Europe prepared for that? A cocky West risking nuclear war? Smelling the growing weakness of the Russian military aggression in Ukraine there is no end to the spiralling self-confidence and self-righteousness of Western leaders out to humiliate Putin and Russia. What would happen if Russia faced defeat of all Russians troops in Ukraine, and a Ukrainian re-conquering of Russian held areas, Would an imminent risk of this happening provoke Russia to nuclear escalation in order to force the West to de-escalate? Russian certainly has the enough tactical nuclear weapons to make that a possibility. How would/could the West respond? In kind, with just updated nuclear bombs in European storage? Or an all-out conventional attack on the Russian bases. Risking in both scenarios a Third World War. Do we really believe in Stoltenberg’s constantly reiterated conviction: “a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought? Do we trust that secret U.S. counterthreats will make Russian use of nuclear weapons unlikely? Do we trust that the Chinese warnings against a nuclear war will hold back the Russians? Maybe the sanguine attitude of today’s leaders is a consequence of having no experience of the risks involved in nuclear brinkmanship? Losing sight of other problems? One might also ask if Western leaders are too concentrated on Ukraine, ignoring other massive problems and crises in the world at their own peril? Crises that may pop up “with a vengeance.” In the Middle East Iran seems close to having weapons grade nuclear material. Will they be allowed to get the bomb? And if they do, how will Israel and the West react to Iranian threats? Will China just continue to harass Taiwan, squeeze it with a blockade or invade, while US is occupied elsewhere? Will we see a hegemonic struggle with West against the Rest in large parts of the World? With Western ideas and values coming under threat in parts of the World observing the West concentrating on the Ukraine conflict, while ignoring deadly conflicts elsewhere. How will the West handle its own set of problems? Their internal political divisions and conflicts. In relation to an influx of migrants from other parts of the World, leading over time to a “browning” of the White West. In relation to identity politics and woke ideology, accompanied by vocal attacks on the West’s own history. The history that founded Western success and hegemony. Deceived by simple minded media agitation? Have biased and simpleminded western media, breathless with breaking news and latest reports from reporters stumbling through rubble in their attempt to show the terrible plight of Ukrainians, lit a dangerous simple minded furious and self-righteous fire in the minds of Western leaders, and the majority of the public? Where do we find the media holding power to account by asking difficult questions? What are the risks, what is the endgame, do we really want to defeat Russia, and live with the fear of their reaction? Are we far too willingly to participate in a what has become essentially a U.S. proxy war against Russia? Is there not something vaguely irresponsible about the shrill support of the war in Ukraine, with Ukraine is carrying out the fight and ruining their country? Western media in their one-sided enthusiasm for Ukraine seems caught in a self-reinforcing vortex. Where does wary public, subject to a both one-sighted and short-sighted media bombardment, find a discussion of the really difficult questions? Almost unthinkable Suppose the war in Ukraine ends with some with a victory over Russians troops, a Korean like DMZ-solution, or the West tiring of Ukrainian demands, forcing Ukraine to seek humiliating peace. What will the West do in relation to Russia? Continue attempts to isolate Russia, arming the West and live with a hostile Russia on its Borders? Or, strange thought in today’s climate, scale down sanctions, promise investments and trade in exchange for weapons limitations. With the Europeans trying to get Russia somehow into the fold of Europe, ... and sacrilege, promising to dissolve NATO and create a new European security architecture in exchange for disarmament guarantees. Selected essays on the war in Ukraine: 08/02/23 “Korean solution” to the war in Ukraine? To understand the need for negotiation now it might be worthwhile to read the recent RAND Corporation Perspective “Avoiding a Long War.” https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/korean-solution-to-the-war-in-ukraine? 03/02/23 Realism disappearing down the Ukrainian maelstrom Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin on support for Ukraine: We're going to continue to dig deep. https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/realism-disappearing-down-the-ukrainian-maelstrom 27/09/22 A grim spectre rears its ugly head President Putin and President Biden are playing a passionate and dangerous game of chicken. https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/a-grim-spectre-rears-its-ugly-head 11/07/22 WHY is passion drowning out realism in Ukraine war? https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/why-is-passion-drowning-out-realism-in-ukraine-war? 25/04/22 Spellbound by The Pied Piper of Kyiv’s magic Newspeak Yes! We are all (most) ready to follow you with the weapons for peace, even though the piper may harm and disappoint us. https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/april-17th-2022Paragraph. To understand the need for negotiation now it might be worthwhile to read the recent RAND Corporation perspective “Avoiding a Long War – U.S. policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict” (rand.org January 2023). The authors write: “We conclude that, in addition to averting possible escalation to a Russia-NATO war or Russian nuclear use, avoiding a long war is also a higher priority for the United States than facilitating significantly more Ukrainian territorial control.” In other words, give up supporting the Ukrainian goal of getting all the Ukrainian territory back. The authors discuss two possible negotiated ends to the war: The “Korean” solution “An armistice in Ukraine would freeze the front lines and bring a long-term end to active combat. Russia would stop attempts to occupy additional Ukrainian territory and cease missile strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Ukrainian forces would stop their counteroffensives— strikes on Russian-held areas of Ukraine and on Russia itself. There would still be ongoing, unresolved territorial disputes (that is, divergent positions on the location of Ukraine’s borders) between Kyiv and Moscow; these would be contested politically and economically, not militarily.” Political settlement “A political settlement or peace treaty would involve both a durable cease-fire and a resolution of at least some of the disputes that sparked the war or emerged during it. Since 1946, peace treaties have been less common than armistice agreements, but they tend to produce a durable end to fighting and reduction in tensions. In the case of the Russia-Ukraine war, a settlement would entail negotiated compromises on some of the core political issues at stake for the two sides.” Issues like territory, NATO membership or non- alignment, security guaranties, relief from sanctions, reconstruction, mutual relations etc. Another warning voice worth listening to is a former German “Chairman of the NATO Military Committee,” General A. d. Harald Kujat: “Now would be the time to resume negotiations. Both warring factions are currently back in a stalemate, exacerbated by seasonal restrictions. So now would be the right time to resume the broken-off negotiations. The arms shipments mean the opposite, meaning that the war will be pointlessly prolonged, with even more casualties on both sides and the continued destruction of the country. But also with the result that we are drawn even deeper into this war. (infosperber.ch January 26, translated from German). Russian Avangard nuclear missile showing up in the maelstrom vortex When in trouble continue digging? Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin at the Ramstein meeting on January 20: “As President Biden has said, this is a decisive decade for the world and this is a decisive moment for Ukraine's struggle to defend itself. So this Contact Group will not slow down. We're going to continue to dig deep, and based upon the progress that we've made today, I'm confident that Ukraine's partners from around the globe are determined to meet this moment.” (Emphasis added). Kampfpanzer for Ukraine With pressure from all sides. From Ukraine, from NATO allies from the U.S. and from Bundestag opposition and from his own partners in government Kanzler Scholz finally seems to have caved in to the demands for German Leopard “Kampfpanzer” for Ukraine. From rumours emerging from discussions between Scholz and President Biden it said that Kanzler Scholz held out against the pressure, until he could be sure that the U.S. would at least agree to send some U.S M1 Abrams main battle tanks. Evidently the Biden administration this time tried to stand back in the race to provide Ukraine with offensive weapons. Instead trying to pressure Germany into providing Ukraine with modern Western tanks. The reason for Scholz’s holding out against all the those criticizing the German reluctance to send tanks, or even allowing others to send some of their Leopards to Ukraine will have been related to memories of WW2 and the fear of being singled out for some kind of revenge by Russia. Evoking memories of WW2 Giving the memories of German’s war in and against the Soviet Union, Scholz and large part of his own SPD party may have found it impossible to stomach that German panzers should eighty years be involved later in a fight against Russia. Involving the famed German Leopard “Kampfpanzer” against Russia in Ukraine might recall the pictures of the famed German Tiger “Kampfpanzer” against Russian tanks in Ukraine during WW2. In the third battle around Charkov (Kharkiv) in 1943 and later Kursk fought in the vain hope of stopping yhe Russian advance. Photo showing German Tiger 1943 in Ukraine. Perhaps one of nine that may have been used by “13.(schwere) Kompanie, SS-Panzer-Regiment 1, 1. SS-Panzer-Division Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler," In the Februar-Marts offensive against Charkov in 1943. No wonder therefore that Kanzler Scholz would have insisted that sending German Leopard “Kampfpanzer” would at the very least have to be as part of coalition involving first and foremost the U.S. Avoiding the impression that it was just German Panzers sucked into the U.S. proxy war against Russia. Scholz would have been concerned that if Germany was alone in delivering of panzers, with U.S. refusion to deliver Abrams tanks, Russia might have singled out Germany for some sort of retaliation, sabotage, limited attacks or even worse, while U.S. would be standing back. German insistence vs U.S. reluctance According to information from unnamed insiders “Scholz last week told Biden on a phone call and U.S. lawmakers in Davos that no Leopards would make their way east unless Abrams accompanied them. In Scholz’s mind, the two were inextricably tethered.” (Politico). The U.S. had known for some time that this was important for Scholz, leading to renewed pressure upon him, while publicly arguing that U.S. M1 Abrams were not at all suitable for the proxy war in Ukraine. The U.S. even began denigrating and criticizing their own Abrams tanks, apparently intending to show how ill-considered the German demands were. A U.S. defence Official, Colin Kahl, even argued “The Abrams tank is very complicated; it’s expensive; it’s hard to train on.” Needs jet fuel because it has a modified helicopter gas turbine, and is very thirsty. ““I think it’s about three gallons to the mile with jet fuel. It is not the easiest system to maintain. It may or may not be the right system. But we’ll continue to look at what makes sense … we should not be providing the Ukrainian systems they can’t repair, they can’t sustain, and that, over the long term, they can’t afford because it’s not helpful.” Denigrating the Abrams tank may seem a little strange as the U.S. has no qualms selling 250 of these tanks to Poland. Well, Colin Kahl, may just have been sent as a messenger to indicate that Pentagon’s generals did not want to send Abrams tanks to Ukraine. Biden and Austin caving in Given Biden’s extreme belligerence in relation to Putin and Russia, he certainly wanted to provide Ukraine with main battle tanks, and given Scholz’s stubborn refusal to go alone, he must have changed his mind. “The president knew Ukraine needed Leopards — which are abundant across Europe and easier for the Ukrainians to use and maintain than the Abrams — on the battlefield as soon as possible. He started to lean toward sending the M1s after seeing bipartisan support for the transfer, and realizing the Germans would not budge. Ultimately, Biden decided to send American tanks after Lloyd Austin recommended providing 31 M1s, the size of a full Ukrainian army battalion.” (Politico). Surprise after month - the synchronized announcement of Kampfpanzer for Ukraine On January 25 the German government formally announced that they would deliver Leopard 2 Kampfpanzer to Ukraine. “Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz announced on Wednesday in the Cabinet that Germany would further strengthen its military support for Ukraine. The Bundesregierung has decided to provide Ukrainian forces with type "Leopard 2” Kampfpanzer. " This is the result of intensive consultations that took place with Germany's closest European and international partners. “This decision follows our well-known line of supporting Ukraine to the best of our ability. We are acting in a closely coordinated manner internationally,” said the Chancellor in Berlin. The goal is to quickly assemble two tank battalions with Leopard 2 tanks for Ukraine. As a first step, Germany will make a company of 14 Leopard 2 A6 tanks available from stocks of the Bundeswehr plus 2 “Bergepanzer” for tank recovery. Other European partners will also hand over Leopard-2 tanks. The training of the Ukrainian crews is to begin quickly in Germany. In addition to training, the package will also include logistics, ammunition and system maintenance. It is expected that delivery of 14 Leopard 2 A6 tanks will take around 3 months. “Germany will issue the appropriate transfer permits to partner countries that want to quickly deliver Leopard 2 tanks from their stocks to Ukraine.” (BPA Berlin, translation). Politico seen information that “Ukrainian tank crews will undergo a six-week-training on the Leopards, in Germany which is supposed to start in early February. “This procedure should enable the Leopard 2 A6 to be taken over by Ukraine by the end of the first quarter of 2023.” “After weeks of discussions, a larger alliance to support Ukraine with Western-style main battle tanks is emerging. In the medium and long term, more battle tanks from industrial stocks could be added, but they would first have to be refurbished.” (ARD, English translation). Rheinmetall, one of the companies involved in renovating the Leopard, had previously announced that it would be able to deliver 29 Leopard 2A4 that are been prepared for delivery to other countries as part of the German “Ringtausch” program. Those 29 Leopards could be sent to Ukraine as early as April/May, meaning that they would be ready for a spring offensive when the ground is dry. Later deliveries could include 22 older Leopard A4 from a Rheinmetall depot. They would have to refurbished and would not be ready before the end of 2023. Rheinmetall have also said that they have 88 old mothballed Leopards 1 available. U.S. Announcement After the German announcement the U.S. followed. In the Roosevelt Room President Biden announced the decision to send 31 M1 Abrams main battle tanks to Ukraine, representing a whole battalion of Abrams tanks. President Biden in his own words: “With spring approaching, the Ukrainian forces are working to defend the territory they hold and preparing for additional counter-offensives. To liberate their land, they need to be able to counter Russia’s evolving tactics and strategy on the battlefield in the very near term. They need to improve their ability to manoeuvre in open terrain. And they need an enduring capability to deter and defend against Russian aggression over the long term. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the — of the military are behind me. Are — they — they’ve been deeply, deeply involved in this — this whole effort. Armored capability, as General Austin will tell you, spe- — is — has been — has been critical. And that’s why the United States has committed hundreds of armored fighting vehicles to date, including more than 500 as part of the assistance package we announced last Friday. And today — today, I’m announcing that the United States will be sending 31 Abram tanks to Ukraine, the equivalent of one Ukrainian battalion. Secretary Austin has recommended this step because it will enhance the Ukraine’s capacity to defend its territory and achieve its strategic objectives. The Abrams tanks are the most capable tanks in the world. They’re also extremely complex to operate and maintain, so we’re also giving Ukraine the parts and equipment necessary to effectively sustain these tanks on the battlefield. And we begi- — we’ll begin to train the Ukrainian troops on these issues of sustainment, logistics, and maintenance as soon as possible. Delivering these tanks to the field is going to take time, time that we’ll see — we’ll use to make sure the Ukrainians are fully prepared to integrate the Abram tanks into their defenses.” (whitehouse.gov). It is assumed that US has stock of around 4,800 M1 Abrams MBT. The Army having around 4,400, and the Marines around 400. Thousands older versions are laid up in depots. Elsewhere we seen that NATO’s Jens Stoltenberg seem to take a leaf out Orwell’s Newspeak. Now President sems inclined to do the same, when he argued that delivery of Abrams tanks “is not an offensive threat to Russia. We are — there is no offensive threat to Russia.” Others may see it differently and we have certainly come a long way since the commitments to only provide Ukraine with light defensive weapons. Now it seems the allies are ready to go on the offensive in the U.S. proxy war in Ukraine. Joining the fight After the synchronized German – U.S. decision to deliver main battle tanks to Ukraine others are eager to contribute as junior partners in the coalition. In effect hiding behind the German/U.S. decision to deliver. Like Germany hiding behind U.S. announcement of deliveries of M1 Abrams MBT’s. Here the incomplete list of different versions of Leopards in different countries: It must be emphasized that the numbers might be misleading as many of the panzers may be in need of repair or otherwise unavailable. Now, who else has shown willingness to deliver tanks out of their stocks of Leopards to Ukraine. According to ABC News “Twelve countries have agreed to supply Ukraine with around 100 Leopard 2 tanks if the German government gives its consent, according to a senior Ukrainian official who spoke exclusively to ABC News.” While this might be wish-full thinking on the Ukrainian side, it seems likely that a handful of countries might be willing to follow in the footsteps of Germany. Poland had already threatened to deliver a company of 14 Leopard 2 tanks (A4/A5 versions?) without Germany giving the green light. One may wonder if that in fact forced the German/U.S. announcement. It is to be assumed that Poland would be willing to deliver many more, not the least as the country expecting deliveries of up to 250 Abram M1 tanks. Finland seems to be pondering sending Leopards tanks. Suggesting that they could be send as part of a larger unit. “Taking one tank here and another there is not enough. There should be a powerful unit in Europe. We [Finland] are discussing the possibility of creating such a unit..., we are considering options," (President Sauli Niinistö, Ukrinform). Understandable that Finland would like to be part of a common effort. Going alone may not seem a god idea, not yet being a member of NATO. “The Norwegian government supports the donation of tanks to Ukraine and Norway will contribute to the donation. We are in close dialogue with allies and Ukraine on how Norway can contribute in the best possible way. We are working as fast as we can to provide Ukraine with the support they need … addition to the tanks, there will also be a need for logistical-support, spare parts and training of Ukrainian personnel.” (regjeringen.no January 26). Is that 4 lepoapards or more? "Sveriges försvarsminister Pål Jonson (M) stänger inte dörren för export av svenska stridsvagnar." (Svenska Dagbladet). The Danish Defense Minister Jakob Ellemann-Jensen is adamant that Denmark has no "current plans" to send any of the 44 Danish Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine. (dr.dk) But members of parliament are in favour: There is no doubt that Denmark should donate its Leopard 2 tanks, Denmark’s defence spokesperson, Rasmus Jarlov of the Conservative party that is currently in the ruling coalition, said: “Denmark should definitely contribute Leopard tanks. It is crucial that Ukrainians get this capability to beat back the Russians,” he said, echoing nationalist Danish People’s Party MP Alex Ahrendtsen. (Euroactiv). A no now could easily mean a yes before the end of February, giving the earlier sing-song of no means yes. The Netherlands is also considering delivering Leopard 2 tanks although the Cabinet has not made any decision yet. Spain's defence minister has said: "Spain is willing, within this coordination, to work with our allies to do whatever is necessary including the sending of Leopards, training in the use of these Leopards and also to help in their maintenance and upkeep.” (Reuters). The Czechs do not want to send Leopards to Ukraine, but that may perhaps change after the recent election. Canada will supply Ukraine with four Leopard 2 A4 main battle tanks and Canadian Armed Forces trainers to teach Ukrainian soldiers how to operate the vehicles, … "These tanks will allow Ukraine to liberate even more of its territory and defend its people from Russia's brutal invasion. These four tanks are combat-ready and will be deployed over the coming weeks." (Defence Minister Anita Anand announced Thursday). Greece are keeping their many Leopards at home, at least for now. Not to be forgotten, Britain had previously promised to send 12 Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine together with a host of other weapons and ammunition. On January 16 the Minister of Defence, Ben Wallace, announced the most significant package of combat power to date to accelerate Ukrainian success, including a squadron of Challenger 2 tanks with armoured recovery and repair vehicles. He also said: “Even as we gift Challenger 2 Tanks, I shall, at the same time, be reviewing the number of Challenger 3 conversions to consider whether the lessons of Ukraine suggest that we need a larger tank fleet.” (gov.uk). Challenger 2 tanks are armed with a rifled gun, not able to use the same variety of ammunition that the German designed smoothbore guns of the Leopards and Abrams can use. Apparently, the overall aim is to make sure that Ukraine will get enough modern Western tanks to arm three battalions. That is to say around a hundred tanks to be ready in the spring and summer. Ukraine itself has a wish list or rather demand for around 300 tanks. In June 2022, Mikhail Podolyak, adviser to President Zelensky, even published an outrageous Ukrainian wish list for heavy weapons on Twitter, wanting 500 tanks. Next fighter jets A continuing stream of Twitter demands is likewise emanating from Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to Germany Andrej Melnyk. After the German/U.S. decision to deliver tanks, he immediately repeated demands for modern fighter jets: A day later President Zelensky expressed his gratitude for the German and U.S. decision to send modern battle tanks to Ukraine, but he also said: “It is very important that there is progress in other aspects of our defence cooperation as well. Today I spoke with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. We have to unlock the supply of long- range missiles to Ukraine, it is important for us to expand our cooperation in artillery, we have to achieve the supply of aircraft to Ukraine. And this is a dream. And this is a task. An important task for all of us.” (Ukrinform). The wish sounding more like a demand was repeated by an advisor to the Ukrainian minister of defence. He told “The Hill” that “he was optimistic about receiving Western fighter jets such as the American F-16s, which Ukrainians have sought since early last year when Russia first invaded … Every type of weapon we request, we needed yesterday … We will do everything possible to ensure Ukraine gets fourth-generation fighter jets as soon as possible.” And the response from the West…? National Security Advisor John Kirby off the cuff answer when asked about the Ukrainian demands for modern fighter jets: “Can’t blame the Ukrainians for wanting more and more systems,” Kirby said. “It’s not the @irst time they’ve talked about @ighter jets, but I don’t have any announcements to make on that front.” (The Hill, January 26). An anonymous European diplomat was recently quoted in Politico saying: “Washington has told Kyiv that supplying aircraft is a “no-go, for the moment,” … “There’s a red line there — but last summer we had a red line on the HIMARS [multiple rocket launchers], and that moved. Then it was battle tanks, and that’s moving.” Another European envoy apparently also saying the way the wind is blowing this way. No for the moment but let’s see “the discussion in two, three weeks” (Politico, January 26). Dutch foreign minister Wopke Hoekstra said last week that the Netherlands would consider any requests to send F-16s with “an open mind” and that there were “no taboos” on military support. The Netherlands has about 40 F-16s and is in the process of phasing them out after the purchase of more advanced F-35s.(Financial Times). Now, what about Germany with its concerns about being singled by Russia? Although having no F 16s, but a number of Eurofighter Typhoons. Kanzler Scholz‘s immediate reaction: “Scholz zieht rote Linie: Keine Kampfjets und Bodentruppen … Dass es nicht um Kampfflugzeuge geht, habe ich ja sehr früh klargestellt und mache das auch hier" … Als kurz nach Kriegsbeginn über Flugverbotszonen diskutiert worden sei, hätten er und US-Präsident Joe Biden gesagt: "Das werden wir nicht tun. Und an dieser Haltung hat sich gar nichts geändert und wird sich auch nichts ändern." (Handelsblatt, January 25). Scholz is here referring to Biden’s earlier decision not to send Western fighter jets to Ukraine. But that was early in the war, and evidently Western decisionmakers are getting more audacious, having seen Russia reacting with no more than verbal threats of a wider war and use of tactical nuclear weapons. Scholz now has to quell voices in his own party like Saskia Eskens, who has said “das es daraul ankomme,” according to Die Welt. Earlier there had been voices arguing for sending modern fighter aircraft to Ukraine, on January 20 Dutch Foreign Minister Wopke Hoekstra said the Cabinet would look at such a request by Kyiv on F-16 jets with an "open mind … "no taboos" for the delivery of regular equipment, adding that the Netherlands only sends items that Ukraine asks for.” (aa.com). “Poland's government says NATO should be bolder and if the western defence alliance decided to send fighter jets to Ukraine, Warsaw would vote in favour of that, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki told French broadcaster LCI on January 26.” (anews.com). And thus Ukraine may get modern Western fighter jets after all, also from the U.S. Politico is referring to talks about “a contingent of military officials is quietly pushing the Pentagon to approve sending F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine to help the country defend itself from Russian missile and drone attacks (Politico February 1). ATACMS and GLSDB? While Zelensky was grateful for the tanks we saw he wanted not only aircraft but long-range missiles. What he wants is ATACMS missiles. And they are? “Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) are 24/7, all-weather, surface-to-surface, inertially guided missiles used to engage targets in the corps/Army area of influence.” Later versions with a range up to 300 km. At moment it still sems that the U.S. is reluctant to deliver these heavy long-range missiles. Instead, Ukraine may soon get the GLSDB (Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb) missiles. According to SAAB the GLSDB missile “it has range of 150 km, the ability to hit targets from different angles, and a precision so high it can hit the target within a radius of one meter.” Almost about doubling the range of missiles presently used by Ukraine for their HIMARS and MLRS systems. Both these missiles can be fired from the M270 MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket system) and the M142 HIMARS using a special canister. Systems that Ukraine already has, but the ATACMS is a much heavier missile than the ones used for now, with longer range and a much heavier and more destructive payload. The long range would make it possible for Ukraine to strike far into the hinterland of Russian, for instance striking in Crimea and in Russia. In May 2022 Biden had declared: “We are not going to send to Ukraine rocket systems that can strike into Russia.” Pentagon is now saying: “Our view is that we think the Ukrainians can change the dynamic on the battlefield and achieve the type of effects they want to push the Russians back without ATACMS,” (Colin Kahl, the undersecretary of defense for policy, quoted in defensenews.com, January 19). Red lines are changing rapidly, so Ukraine may again get what it wants? What about heavy armed drones? In November 22 “Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov in a Nov. 2 letter requested four MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones made by San Diego-based General Atomics” (timesofsandiego.com). And there are U.S. politicians are supporting the request. But until now the Biden Administration is holding out. Gray Eagle drones have “an endurance of 25 hours, speeds up to167 KTAS, can operate up to 29,000 feet, and carries 1,075 lb (488 kg) of internal and external payload. The aircraft can carry multiple payloads aloft, including Electro-optical/Infrared (EO/IR) with laser designation, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), communications relay, and four Hellfire missiles.” Just what Ukraine would like to have, and they may get it after all. According to The Defense Post the U.S. Army is rumoured to consider modifying MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones to allow operations in Ukraine. Meaning removing sensitive equipment that must not fall in Russian hands. Outright war with Russia? One wonders if the decisionmakers, seemingly lacking a sense of history, ever take the time to contemplate what they are doing. At the moment it seems as if they spend all their time in hastily convened meetings, making even hastier decisions without really contemplating long term consequences and whose interest they are actually catering to. Are Biden and consorts really fighting for western values? Is fighting for a corrupt Ukraine, as evidenced not least by recent examples of corruption involving apparently involving even the minister of defence, really a fight for Western values? Or is the fighting a U.S. proxy war to degrade Russia’s military potential, letting Ukraine bleed to achieve this goal. Or is Biden’s frustration that he could not persuade President Obama to support the Ukraine with weapons 2014 clouding his view today? “When Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2014, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. pressed President Barack Obama to take decisive action, and fast, to make Moscow “pay in blood and money” for its aggression. The president, a Biden aide recalled, was having none of it.” (NYT). It is as if Western decisionmakers out to degrade Russia’s military potential, are acting in a kind of power delirium, convinced of their righteousness and giddy with power they are able to project. Willing apparently to risk a “guerre à outrance” between Russia and the West? Arguing that they will do whatever it takes for as long as it takes. In Stoltenberg like Newspeak “Weapons are – in fact – the way to peace.” Recently the German Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, at meeting of Council of Europe actually said "We are fighting a war against Russia and not against each other." Consternation everywhere as the official view is that we are not war with Russia. Germany immediately disavowed Baerbock, with a government speaker declaring that Germany is not at war with Russia: "Die NATO und Deutschland sind in diesem Angriffskrieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine nicht Kriegspartei", sagte die stellvertretende Regierungssprecherin Christiane Hoffmann. "Wir unterstützen die Ukraine, aber wir sind nicht Kriegspartei." (anews.com). Denials or not, Baerbock may unintentionally have revealed that the West is actually fighting a proxy war with Russia in Ukraine. A war that is seeing a constant mission creep, forgetting earlier red lines against further involvement. “And it seems as of last week, the Biden administration is poised to cross yet another major line, with the New York Times reporting that U.S. officials are strongly considering giving Ukraine the green light to attack Crimea, even while acknowledging the risk of nuclear retaliation that such a move would carry. Fears of such an escalation “have dimmed,” U.S. officials told the paper.” (responsiblestatecraft.org article January 23). It certainly looks that Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin was right when he argued “this is a decisive decade for the world and this is a decisive moment for Ukraine's struggle to defend itself” and said “We're going to continue to dig deep.” The West is certainly digging deeper at the moment. Warning voices are ignored or ostracized. The risk that Russia may be digging even deeper is ignored. Risk of a nuclear war is ignored. While Western leaders seems united in their “intense passion” to punish the Russians with the help of Ukraine, there are isolated voices calling for a cooling of the passion. In the media we don’t hear these voices, they are drowned out by Western medias own enthusiastic support and encouragement for Ukraine and for the leaders who want to punish and humiliate Russia and Putin. The picture painted is black and white with no thought for long term consequences for the West or indeed for the World. Realism is out and passionate enthusiasm is in, at least for the time being. Listening to Western decisionmakers cocksure attitude and the continued “digging” Lloyd Austin talked about, it certainly looks as if they are dismissing the risk of a nuclear war. In an interview with published in Financial Times on December 7, 2023 (which incidentally is a National Pearl Harbor Remembrance Day) NATO’s Jens Stoltenberg argued: “this nuclear rhetoric from Russia, from the Russian side, especially earlier this fall, is reckless, is dangerous. And Russia must know that any use of nuclear weapons would totally change the character, the nature, of the conflict and a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought … And we send the very clear… and Allies have sent a very clear message to Russia that it will have severe consequences for Russia, and also of course that a nuclear war must never be fought.” (FT, December 7). The risk Russia may be digging even deeper is ignored. Nuclear war is ignored with Stoltenberg arguing Putin would not dare due the terrible consequences, and others thinking that Russia’s dependence on China would mean that Putin would not dare. By dismissing the threat of nuclear war Western leaders may in fact be raising the stakes in the war. If they deescalate, back down in order to negotiate they would be seen to give to Russia’s nuclear blackmail threats. By ignoring the risk and continuing to dig deeper by pouring more weapons into Ukraine and getting more and more directly involved, by helping Ukrainian forces to pinpoint Russian targets, and otherwise assisting Ukraine directly to push Russia forces back, they raise the probability that Russia will decide use drastic measures to avoid a defeat. Warning voices Among the European leaders a few have been unwilling to be part of the black and white coaltion. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine and peace talks launched, even if negotiations may take months or even years to conclude. Orbán warned of the danger of an escalation of the war. (abouthungary.hu January 27). While the Croatian president, Zoran Milanovic, does not believe that Russia can be defeated in a conventional war … “I am against sending any lethal arms there …It prolongs the war. What is the goal? Disintegration of Russia, change of the government? There is also talk of tearing Russia apart. This is mad.” (Washington Post). An article in Foreign Policy has points out that “Realists of various stripes repeatedly warned that Western policy toward Russia and Ukraine would lead to serious trouble, warnings that were blithely ignored by those who claimed that NATO’s open-door policy would lead to lasting peace in Europe. Now that war has broken out, lives are being lost, and Ukraine is being destroyed, you would think proponents of open-ended NATO enlargement would have set aside their idealistic illusions and think about these issues in a hard-nosed, realist fashion. Yet the opposite has occurred: The people who got it right are singled out for attack, while those who believed that enlarging NATO would create a vast zone of peace in Europe are insisting that the war continue until Russia is totally defeated and greatly weakened.” (Stephen M. Walt in Foreign Policy). Among the warning voices we also find General Mark Milly, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation’s highest-ranking military officer, and the principal military advisor to the President. In November 2022 he said: “In terms of probability, the probability of a Ukrainian military victory defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine to include what they define or what the claim is Crimea, the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily. Politically, there may be a political solution where, politically, the Russians withdraw, that's possible. You want to negotiate from a position of strength. Russia right now is on its back. … So, you want to negotiate at a time when you're at your strength and your opponent is at weakness. And it's possible, maybe that there'll be a political solution. All I'm -- all I'm saying is there's a possibility for it. That's all I'm saying.” Later, when taking questions after a January 20 Ramstein meeting, he said: Ukraine has also suffered tremendously. You know that there's a significant amount of innocent civilians that have been killed in a result of the Russian actions. The Russians are hitting civilian infrastructure. There's a significant amount of economic damage, a significant amount of damage to the energy infrastructure, and the Russian -- or the Ukrainian military has suffered a significant amount of casualties themselves. So this is a very, very bloody war and there's significant casualties on both sides. And this is why I say that I think that -- at -- sooner or later, this is going to have to get to a negotiating table at some point in order to bring this to a conclusion, and that will have to happen when the end state, which is a free, sovereign, independent Ukraine with its territory intact, is met. When that day comes, then people will sit down and negotiate an end to this.” Perhaps Russia insists on digging even deeper “Putin will argue that the United States and NATO are “in” Ukraine for one reason and one reason only: to weaken Russia, which is the greatest obstacle to Western hegemony worldwide. The West will regard this assertion as the purest nonsense, of course, but the problem is that, from the Russian perspective, it seems eminently plausible.” (Article in americangreatness.com on January 28). For now, it may seem that the outcome of the war hangs in balance, which explains why the West hurrying to dig deeper into their weapon arsenals. But what might Putin do in this escalating Western proxy war against Russia? Might he not try to outdo the western digging, by digging even deeper? As early as May 2022 Avril Haines, Director of National Intelligence gave her assessment of what Putin might do. President Putin may turn to more drastic means …including imposing martial law, reorienting industrial production, or potentially escalatory military actions to free up the resources needed to achieve his objectives as the conflict drags on, or if he perceives Russia is losing in Ukraine. “We believe that Moscow continues to use nuclear rhetoric to deter the United States and the West from increasing lethal aid to Ukraine and to respond to public comments from the U.S. and NATO Allies that suggest expanded western goals in the conflict. If Putin perceives that the United States is ignoring his threats, he may try to signal to Washington the heightened danger of its support to Ukraine by authorizing another large nuclear exercise involving a major dispersal of mobile intercontinental missiles, heavy bombers, strategic submarines. We otherwise continue to believe that President Putin would probably only authorize the use of nuclear weapons if he perceived an existential threat to the Russian state or regime, but we will remain vigilant in monitoring every aspect of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. With tensions this high, there is always an enhanced potential for miscalculation, unintended escalation, which we hope our intelligence can help to mitigate.” (Emphasis added). (Avril Haines Director of National Intelligence at Congressional Testimony, May10). Remember that was in May 2022, and the proxy war has been escalated step by step since then, with Western leaders becoming more and more cocksure in their belief that nothing will come of Russian threats. At a panel discussion at Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in October 2022, one of the participants argued: “You don’t have to be fixated on the peculiarities of Vladimir Putin to conclude that nuclear use is possible because it’s a much more mainstream nuclear doctrine among nuclear-armed powers when they’re facing the prospect of conventional defeat and where the stakes are high, to be tempted to use them. This was NATO’s doctrine in the European theater from 1965, to offset and forestall conventional defeat with a threat of nuclear use. Similar story you can tell about Pakistan, India, even North Korea. I agree that there may not be a meaningful military target, but I think the purpose would be to make Ukraine back off and at least divide the West—an attempt at psychological terror. So whatever strategy we are going to form, if we’re going to have a strategy of least regret, it can’t be one that bets the farm on this being a bluff. This is very real.” (Professor Patrick Porter). A time of unprecedented danger, it is 90 seconds to midnight, writes the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “And worst of all, Russia’s thinly veiled threats to use nuclear weapons remind the world that escalation of the conflict—by accident, intention, or miscalculation—is a terrible risk. The possibility that the conflict could spin out of anyone’s control remains high.” In In 2020 Russia published the latest version of the doctrine entitled ““On Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” The document outlines the circumstances that might lead Russia to use nuclear weapons. It states that Russia could respond with nuclear weapons following an “attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions,” but also in an “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” (Emphasis added). Thus, Russia might respond to a conventional attack with nuclear weapons if it judges the very existence of the state to be in jeopardy. While this might seem to exclude the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Ukrainian war, the document also opens the possibility of nuclear first use as it states:“… in the event of a military conflict, this Policy provides for the prevention of an escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation and/or its allies.” Analysts have assessed that this means Russia might threaten to escalate to use nuclear weapons as a way to deter a conflict that would threaten the existence of the state, with Russia pursuing an “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear doctrine under certain circumstances. If a conventional conflict might threaten Russia, it might decide to use nuclear weapons to create such a catastrophic threat to a continuation of the conflict that its adversary would be forced to de-escalate. The Congressional report in fact mentions that this might happen if Russia looks to be defeated in a conventional conflict with NATO. At least that is how some analysts interpret the Russian doctrine. But it is worth noting that Russia itself does not use the term “escalate to de-escalate.” Now what does this mean in relation to Ukraine? We are seeing a more and more cocksure attitude in the West, manifesting itself in almost no holds barred support of Ukraine. The reality being that the West is using its potent military arsenal to fight the Russians using their Ukraine proxies. Could an eminent defeat of all Russians troops in Ukraine, the re-conquering the Russian held areas, and the weakening of Russia military might to a level, where it would unable to wage war be seen as a defeat of Russia itself? Would an eminent risk of this happening provoke Russia to nuclear escalation in order to force the West to de-escalate? Russian certainly has the enough tactical nuclear weapons to make that a possibility. (See also “A cocksure West risking catastrophe,” Blog at openthoughts.eu.) It is time for to ask some hard questions! Will the West do what it takes for as long as it takes, albeit hesitantly and with delays, to help Ukraine defeat the Russian forces and get back all of what they regard as Ukrainian land, even Crimea? Have Western leaders, at first dipping very cautiously in their arsenals, lost all sense of caution, lured by their by their own superficial moralistic idealism and the plight of little ”big brother” in Ukraine? Will the West continue to pour tanks, jets and long-range missiles into Ukraine, accepting the Ukrainian argument that more weapons will help save lives? Ignoring that nothing the West has done until now has helped to save lives, au contraire. Do Western leaders know what they doing, or have they just become delirious on a cocktail of self-righteous moralism and power, stumbling along into an unforeseeable future. Has any of them taken the time to sit down and reflect, read background information or history, are even aware of warning voices What is the endgame? What is the West hoping to achieve, a defeated Russia, perhaps even warlike dissolution? Or a Russia getting even more allied to China? Is that something Europe could want? Would that not be a real nightmare on its doorstep? Shouldn’t we at least demand some sort idea of what the West want to achieve, instead of leaving it to Zelensky to decide what the West wants? Will Western decision makers come to their senses and realise that they have to demand something from Ukraine. Perhaps even accept something one might call a “Korean solution”? Not peace, but not War either. A divided country with a demilitarised zone. Not the best of all worlds, but some alternatives certainly sound worse and the risk iscertainly there. Is Ukraine worth it? A question that really would irk moralistic proponents of giving everything they demand. One might even ask, is it worth it for Ukraine itself losing according Miley and others more than 100.000 dead or wounded? And enormous destruction everywhere? One might also ask if Western leaders are too concentrated on Ukraine, ignoring other massive problems and crises in the world at their own peril? Crises that are getting bigger and may present themselves with a vengeance. What about Africa, what about the Middle East, what about the looming fight between the U.S. and China over Taiwan? A U.S. general even foresees a war between China and the U.S. as soon as 2025. Maybe it is all too late giving the cocky posture of Western leaders, with a few exceptions? Their sudden belligerence and the promises of allocating big resources to buy weapons, as if they really think they could go to war with Russia, without the risk of provoking a nuclear war they cannot win. With possible U.S. counter strikes just making it worse for Europe, risking of clouds of radioactivity poisoning the air over Europe. Has biased and simpleminded western media, breathless with breaking news and latest reports from reporters stumbling through rubble, in their attempt to show the terrible plight of old and lonely Ukrainians, cooking their food over small outdoor fires, lit a dangerous simple minded furious, self-righteous fire in the minds of Western leaders, and parts of the public? Where do we find the media holding power to account by asking difficult questions? What are the risks, what is the endgame, do we really want to defeat Russia, and live with the fear of their reaction? Are we far too willingly to participate in a what is essentially a U.S. war against Russia? Where does wary public subject to a both one-sighted and short-sighted media bombardment find a discussion of the difficult questions we are asking here? Western media in their one-sided enthusiasm for Ukraine caught in a self-reinforcing vortex of breaking news. Why does Europe not look to its own interests? Restating the argument from an earlier blog post. We wonder why Europe is not making a much more independent diplomatic effort, instead of giving in to moral outrage and Zelensky’s and Biden’s totally overstated warnings about the threat to all of Europe Europe is supporting the Ukraine with financial assistance, weapons, welcoming Ukrainian refugees, and seems inclined to engage in self-harming sanctions to reduce Russia’s ability for fighting a war. In all seriousness, will Europe really leave to Zelensky and a vengeful Biden to decide to escalate the proxy war against Russia and decide the conditions for making peace with Russia? Why do decisionmakers not leave moralistic outbursts aside and take a more realistic position that actually turn out to be more in line with their own self-proclaimed European values. This would mean efforts to promote a peace that might spare lives and avoid further destruction in Ukraine and perhaps help solve or at least alleviate some of the problems brought up by Russia as reasons for the invasion. Why does European leaders not demand something in return from Zelensky’s Ukraine, instead of just playing whipping boy to Zelensky’s critique? Realistically this would mean that Europe would have to put pressure on Zelensky to accept the Russian annexation of Crimea, and insist that the future of the Luhansk and Donetsk would have to be settled by mechanism involving for instance staged referendums from Russian border to the borders of Luhansk and Donetsk. Either accept this or accept that help would be reduced to humanitarian help. Likewise, Europe would have to initiate sincere and realistic diplomatic efforts in relation Russia, taking demands from the Russian speaking parts of Ukraine seriously, accepting the Russian possession of Crimea and proposing realistic solutions for Luhansk and Donetsk that would comply with what Europe ought to demand of Ukraine. This essay can also be found at: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/realism-disappearing-down-ukrainian-maelstrom-verner-c-petersen More weapons a way to peace? In a recent somewhat rambling speech Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, sounded a little like the “War is Peace” motto of Oceania in Orwell’s 1984. In Stoltenberg’s version it sounded like this (nato.int): “So if we want a negotiated peace solution, where Ukraine survives as an independent democratic country in Europe, the fastest way to get there is to support Ukraine. Weapons are – in fact – the way to peace.” (Emphasis added). Perhaps he may have had some doubts as to the wisdom of this, as he also said: “Wars are unpredictable. It is impossible to say when, or how, the war in Ukraine will end. But what we do know is that most wars end at the negotiating table. Most likely this one too. What Ukrainians can achieve at the table depends on their strength on the battlefield.” One may perhaps wonder what they believe and say on the other side of this proxy war against Russia. Does President Putin and his compatriots (whom we might perhaps see as the 1984 Eurasians) have a similar belief in war as the way to peace? And if they do what would that mean for the proxy war in Ukraine? A continuous escalation until at least one side realizes that war isn’t in fact the way to peace? Or “guerre à outrance” between Russia and NATO? A self-imposed taboo is being broken In the first week of 2023 France announced that they would deliver a number of AMX RC-10 (véhicule militaire blindé de reconnaissance-feu) to Ukraine. A kind of light wheeled tank, highly mobile and provided with a quite potent 105mm gun. Not a real main battle tank, but even so it marks a new escalatory step in the proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. The French announcement seems to have paved the way for similar announcements from Bundeskanzler Scholz and President Biden. Germany says it will deliver 40 Marder Schützenpanzer. At least a Panzer in name, but really just an infantry fighting vehicle with a 20 mm automatic cannon, possibly provided with MELLS antitank guided missile system. The U.S. will deliver 50 Bradley armoured infantry fighting vehicles armed with a 25 mm Bushmaster M242 chain gun and provided with TOW anti-tank missiles in order to be able to defend themselves against Russian tanks. Although the Bradley has to be stationary while the TOW missile finds its way to an enemy tank. Apparently, the U.S. is also weighing sending versions of the Stryker eight wheeled armoured personnel carrier to Ukraine. Another version of this armoured personnel carrier is already found in Ukraine, in the shape of the Canadian LAV ACSV Armoured Personnel Carrier. Canada last year decided to send 39 of these to Ukraine. Germany has furthermore promised a Patriot system in addition to the system to be supplied by the U.S. Before the Ukraine can use the diverse fighting vehicles and Patriot batteries, they have to send personal to Germany and the U.S. to train on the systems. For each Patriot systems it means that around 75-90 men have to spend around two months to learn to use complicated the system. Patriot batteries may indirectly involve NATO even more in the war in Ukraine, as its Link 16 communication system “means US airborne radars and NATO combat air patrols can pass radar tracks of Russian sorties in real time to Ukrainian Patriot systems, which can fire upon the linked tracks. The Ukrainians can also pass back data on Russian drones, cruise missile attacks, and other activities back through Link 16.” Paving the way for Main Battle Tanks? Now, do these promised deliveries pave the way for deliveries of main battle tanks like German Leopard 2s to Ukraine. The German newspaper “Handelsblatt” article “Deutschland und seine Panzer für die Ukraine – Erst der Marder, dann der Leopard” may indicate what is expected to happen. The pressure on Kanzler Scholz is certainly growing. “Deutschlands Verbündete erhöhen plötzlich zeitgleich den Druck auf Olaf Scholz, grünes Licht für die Lieferung von Leopard-Panzern zu geben.“ (welt.de). In a TV interview von der Leyen, the German President of the European Commission, is arguing giving in to Ukraine’s demands: “If they say they need main battle tanks, then we should take it seriously and deliver them to them.” (Bild TV). Meanwhile Poland is apparently considering providing Ukraine with some of the German Leopard 2 tanks they got from Germany, when they delivered some of their old Russian T-72 tanks to Ukraine. A characteristic of the Leopard 2: „Hauptwaffe ist eine 120-Millimeter-Glattrohrkanone. Damit kann der Leopard Ziele in einer Entfernung von mehreren tausend Metern stehend und fahrend bekämpfen. Seine maximale Kampfentfernung beträgt 5.000 Meter. Der Leopard 2 vereint Feuerkraft, Panzerschutz und Beweglichkeit.“ (bundeswehr.de) https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ausruestung-technik-bundeswehr/landsysteme-bundeswehr/leopard-2 There are also rumours that the UK is considering sending a limited number of the British main battle tank, the Challenger 2, to Ukraine according to The Times (Monday January 9): “Britain is considering sending tanks to help Ukraine stage a major counteroffensive in the spring. The UK could supply about a dozen Challenger 2s and become the first country in western Europe to send Ukraine tanks. The Challenger has a 1,200 horsepower engine and is equipped with a 120mm gun. Only one has ever been destroyed in combat, when it was hit by friendly fire in Basra during the Iraq war. Although no decision has been made, Ukrainian officials expect an announcement at the end of next week when defence ministers meet at the Ramstein airbase in Germany.” If this happens the floodgates have really been opened up for the delivery of the kind of heavy offensive weapons the Ukraine has been clamouring for. Next one might perhaps expect even the U.S. M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank to show up in Ukraine. If that happens it would really represent a major escalation by the Western side.Paragraph. Challenger 2 MBT with the old L30, 120mm rifled gun from BAE Systems
Overview of recent security assistance for Ukraine United States: More than $3 billion additional U.S. security assistance for Ukraine announced January 6
Germany: Militärische Unterstützungsleistungen für die Ukraine: Eine Patriot-Feuereinheit und bis zu 40 Schützenpanzer Marder liefert Deutschland an die Ukraine, um sie im Verteidigungskampf gegen den Aggressor zu unterstützen. (Emphasis added). Furthermore:
An even longer list of weapons and equipment had already been decided earlier. The complete January list can be found at https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/krieg-in-der-ukraine/lieferungen-ukraine-2054514 Forgive me, but when Zelensky appears every evening on TV news channels, one is reminded of the "Big Brother" big screen moment from the film adaptation of Orwell's "1984," with a listening crowd in front. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KNyqyFNoHKw) This time though we have real demanding little Big Brother. With an aggressive but hesitant, slightly nervous and confusing Big Brother of our “Oceania” in the background providing material support. President Zelensky and his compatriots are constantly clamouring for more support. Their Christmas wish list contained Patriot air defense systems, ATACMS (the MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System Missiles) with a range of 300 km for HIMARS and MLRS, armed MQ-1C Gray Eagle and MQ-9 Reaper drones, main battle tanks and Western fighter jets – and a constant supply of advanced munition. For Christmas President Zelensky apparently only got a Patriot System, which may become operational in Ukraine at some time next year, and more ammunition. But U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has hinted that U.S. would not have anything against Germany supplying Ukraine with German Leopard main battle tanks. Christmas gifts to step up escalation One Patriot air defense battery. “a missile defense system consisting of radars, command-and-control technology and multiple types of interceptors, all working together to detect, identify and defeat tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, advanced aircraft and other threats” For an explanation of different versions of the Patriot system see CSIS Missile threat: https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/patriot/ 500 precision-guided155mm artillery rounds. Presumable the M982/Excalibur. A GPS guided 155mm round for the 155mm howitzers Ukraine has got from Western countries. It is supposed to have a CEP (Circular Error Probable) of around 5 meters. Meaning that is has a high probability of hitting withing a 5 meter radius of target. Ukraine had already got 4,200 of these rounds. See Raytheon Missiles & Defense: https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/what-we-do/land-warfare/precision-weapons/excalibur-projectile Precision aerial munitions. Is this the JDAM kits (Joint Direct Attack Munition)? It consists of a guidance tail kit to convert existing unguided free-fall bombs into accurate, "smart" munitions. See U.S. Air Force: https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104572/joint-direct-attack-munition-gbu-313238/ Complete list of December 2022 assistance ”On December 21, as part of President Zelenskyy's visit to the White House, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced $1.85 billion in additional security assistance for Ukraine. This includes the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance valued at up to $1 billion, as well as $850 million in assistance via the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). The Presidential Drawdown is the twenty-eighth such drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine that the Biden Administration has authorized since August 2021. Capabilities in this package include:” (Emphasis added). (https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3252782/). • One Patriot air defense battery and munitions; • Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); • 500 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds; • 10 120mm mortar systems and 10,000 120mm mortar rounds; • 10 82mm mortar systems; • 10 60mm mortar systems; • 37 Cougar Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles; • 120 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs); • Six armored utility trucks; • High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs); • Precision aerial munitions; • Over 2,700 grenade launchers and small arms; • Claymore anti-personnel munitions; • Demolition munitions and equipment; • Night vision devices and optics; • Tactical secure communications systems; • Body armor and other field equipment. Under USAI, the DoD will also provide Ukraine with: • 45,000 152mm artillery rounds; • 20,000 122mm artillery rounds; • 50,000 122mm GRAD rockets; • 100,000 rounds of 125mm tank ammunition; • SATCOM terminals and services; • Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment. ”Unlike Presidential Drawdown, USAI is an authority under which the United States procures capabilities from industry rather than delivering equipment that is drawn down from DoD stocks. This announcement represents the beginning of a contracting process to provide additional capabilities to Ukraine's Armed Forces. Russia's unrelenting and brutal air attacks against critical infrastructure have only reinforced the need to provide Ukraine with sophisticated air defense capabilities. At President Biden's direction, the United States has prioritized the provision of air defense systems to help Ukraine defend its people from Russian aggression. The Patriot air defense system in this security assistance package is one of the world's most advanced air defense capabilities. Once operational, it will add to a layered defense to counter the full range of threats currently menacing Ukraine's cities and civilians. The Patriot system will augment previous air defense capabilities the United States has provided Ukraine, which include NASAMs, missiles for HAWK air defense systems, Stingers, and equipment to counter the Russian use of unmanned aerial vehicles. In total, the United States has now committed more than $21.9 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration. Since 2014, the United States has committed approximately $24 billion in security assistance to Ukraine and approximately $21.2 billion since the beginning of Russia's unprovoked, full-scale invasion on February 24. Through PDA and USAI, DoD continues to work with Ukraine to meet both its immediate as well as its longer-term security assistance needs. To meet Ukraine's evolving battlefield requirements, the United States will continue to work with its allies and partners to provide Ukraine with key capabilities.”(https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3252782/). A wary general’s warnings General Mark A. Milley is the 20th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation’s highest-ranking military officer, and the principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council (Dept. of Defense). On November 9, 2022 the General was speaking at the Economic Club of New York. Here are some of his comments based upon Twitter notes from a Washington Post journalist (@DanLamothe). Milley asked: Is the time right to consider diplomacy in Ukraine? Milley says "there has to be mutual recognition" that a true military win is not achievable. Draws comparison to World War I, where victory was not achievable after 1914. Millions more killed in next few years. Milley, asked if the time is right for negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, said that will require both sides to believe that a full military victory is not achievable. The winter months, when fighting will slow a bit, create an opportunity to do so. According to a later article in The Washington Post Gen. Milley also reconned that over 100,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded the Ukraine War, and that a similar number of Ukrainian soldiers had “probably” also been killed or wounded. While 40,000 civilians may have died or been wounded, and up to 30 million had been forced to flee their homes. Later, a meeting of “The Ukrainian Defense Contact Group” on November 16, the general at first sounded somewhat more belligerent: “So, across the entire front line trace of some 900 or so kilometers, the Ukrainians have achieved success after success after success and the Russians have failed every single time. They've lost strategically, they've lost operationally, and I repeat, they lost tactically. What they've tried to do, they failed at. They started this war and Russia can end this war. Russia can make another choice, and they could make a choice today, to end this war. However, Russia is choosing to use their time to attempt to regroup their forces and they are imposing a campaign of terror, a campaign of maximum suffering on the Ukrainian civilian population in order to defeat Ukrainian morale.” (Transcript from the press conference). While this may sound as if the general is expecting the Ukrainian to win the war, and not seek an end to war through negotiations, the general also emphasised the heavy cost to the Ukrainians. “The Russians are striking throughout the depth and breadth of all of Ukraine with air-launched cruise missiles, with Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles, and with other types of munitions. They are striking the Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, and it has little or no military purpose. … Basic human survival and subsistence is going to be severely impacted and human suffering for the Ukrainian population is going to increase. These strikes will undoubtedly hinder Ukraine's ability to care for the sick and the elderly. Their hospitals will be partially operational. The elderly are going to be exposed to the elements. In the wake of unrelenting Russian aggression and incalculable human suffering.” Even so the general thought that “at the end of the day, Ukraine will retain -- will remain a free and independent country with its territory intact.” Thus, upholding the official U.S. view. Then he was asked this question: “A follow-up, sir, to your comments about -- earlier from last week about the possibility of discussions put on by -- a slowdown in the fighting, let's say, during the winter -- it sounds like the comments that you're making today about the winter are that the Ukrainians are going to continue very strongly. Is -- are you pulling back from your comments from last week, that you see an opportunity for negotiations with the Russians?” General Milley gave a somewhat hesitant answer, treading carefully: I think -- I think the Ukrainians should keep the pressure on the Russians, you know, to the extent that they militarily can, but winter gets very, very cold. And the natural tendency is for tactical operations are going to naturally, probably slow down. … And I think that, you know, President Biden and President Zelenskyy himself has said that there'll be a -- at the end of the day, there'll be a political solution. So, if there's a slow down in the actual tactical fighting, if that happens, then that may become a window possibly -- it may not -- for a political solution or a -- at least the beginnings of talks to initiate a political solution. So that's all I was saying.” Prodding the general with more questions relating to his comments at Economic Club of New York, the general first praised the amazing resilience of the Ukrainians (one might add, helped by tremendous amounts of weapons from the U.S. and others), before he returned to the question arguing: “In terms of probability, the probability of a Ukrainian military victory defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine to include what they define or what the claim is Crimea, the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily. Politically, there may be a political solution where, politically, the Russians withdraw, that's possible. You want to negotiate from a position of strength. Russia right now is on its back. … So, you want to negotiate at a time when you're at your strength and your opponent is at weakness. And it's possible, maybe that there'll be a political solution. All I'm -- all I'm saying is there's a possibility for it. That's all I'm saying.” Evidently General Milley is in some sort of quandary, supporting a the official “standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes,” while evidently having some misgivings about this view. Realizing the enormous cost it may have, the possible escalations, and perhaps even thinking that this is not where the U.S. ought to have its military focus, surely having his eye on the mighty challenges posed by China. And General Milley may not be alone with this view in the U.S. Military. A Defense Department official is quoted as saying “Why not start talking about [peace talks] before you throw another 100,000 lives into the abyss?” (politico.com). This is neither the official stance of the U.S. government nor of the U.S. Allies for that matter. The official stance of the U.S. and NATO is “to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes” (Jens Stoltenberg). Ukraine will not be pushed to negotiate At a press conference on November 9 the very same day Milley was thinking aloud in New York, President Biden was asked what he meant when he had said “it remains to be seen whether or not, … Ukraine is prepared to compromise with Russia.” Biden, in his usual confusing way answered by saying: “No, I’m not say- — that’s up to the Ukrainians. Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. didn’t have any in mind. You have asked the question whether or not, if I recall — whether or not — what would happen if, in fact, after the — this — I think the context is that whether or not they’re pulling back from Fallujah [sic]. And the — I mean, from the — [Kherson was the city his thinking of]. Realising that Gen. Milley’s comments had caused consternation not the least in Ukraine, “The Biden administration is working to reassure the Ukrainian government, outside experts, and former US officials that it will not push Ukraine to imminently seek a diplomatic outcome to the war with Russia.” (CNN report). “One official explained that the State Department is on the opposite side of the pole from Milley. That dynamic has led to a unique situation where military brass are more fervently pushing for diplomacy than US diplomats.” (CNN). On the flight to the G-20 Summit in Bali National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan reiterated the U.S. position after General Milley’s remarks in New York. Sullivan argued that the U.S. would do everything possible to put Ukraine in “best possible position on the battlefield so that when they make their determination to proceed, they’re in the best possible position at the negotiating table.” (Politico). When Secretary Blinken was interviewed by the editor in chief of the Wall Street Journal on December 5. He was asked “Is there still any off-ramp for the Russians? Is there any even whisper of negotiations or any kind of discussion that could lead to negotiations right now that could somehow resolve the situation for the moment? Is there anything that you see out there?” (U.S. Department of State, December 5). When Blinken said “Well, in a sense there’s always an off-ramp and it’s very simple: President Putin started this war; he could end it tomorrow. That’s the —” he was interrupted by the interviewer interjecting “Yeah but realistically, though.” Blinken continued “… one of the things that you can imagine is the Russians trying to find an off-ramp that would be a phony off-ramp, by which I mean, oh, let’s have a ceasefire, let’s just freeze things in place, get a frozen conflict, never negotiate about the territory that they have seized and continue to hold; rest, refit, regroup, reattack. I think it’s important —” Interrupted again he continued: “Again, fundamentally, fundamentally, this is up to the Ukrainians. But I think – and you’ve heard President Zelenskyy put forward a 10-point proposal for how this can move forward, and Zelenskyy himself has said diplomacy and negotiations will be at the end of this. What’s happened as he was saying that? He put this before the G20 just a few weeks ago. As he was saying that, Putin doubled and tripled down on what he was doing in Ukraine. So the point is this: Unless and until Russia demonstrates that it’s interested in meaningful diplomacy, it can’t go anywhere. If and when it does, we’ll be the first to be ready to help out.” (U.S. Department of State, December 5). This is voice of the hawkish diplomat Secretary of State, Blinken, who apparently does not believe in diplomacy and negotiation. Strange that the U.S. and its allies thinks that it is up to Ukraine, read President Zelensky, alone to decide when to enter into negotiations, when the whole Ukrainian position relies on the military support of the U.S. and its allies, and the whole war essentially may be a U.S. proxy war against Russia carried on the back of Ukraine. Further steps up the ladder of escalation Russian attacks on the Ukrainian infrastructure with drones and missiles have had dire consequences for the civilian population and led to Ukrainian demands for more advanced air defence systems to protect their infrastructure. Foreign Minister Kuleba in late November again asked for deliveries of the U.S. made Patriot Missile system. At the Group of Seven’s (G7) virtual meeting on December 12 President Zelensky urged the leaders to supply Ukraine with modern tanks, long-range weapons and shells. If Ukraine were to get advanced Patriot systems and modern tanks, either German Leopards or U.S. made Abrams main battle tanks, it would represent major steps up the rungs of the escalation ladder. The reaction to the Ukraine’s demands. The G7 meeting first of all reiterated to the almost religious sounding vow: “Today, we reaffirm our unwavering support for and solidarity with Ukraine in the face of ongoing Russian war of aggression for as long as it takes.” But they in their statement they also dared to become slightly more concrete: “We will continue to coordinate efforts to meet Ukraine’s urgent requirements for military and defense equipment with an immediate focus on providing Ukraine with air defense systems and capabilities.” No words about Patriots or modern tanks though. The Biden administration is more active. On December 6 the FAZ, A German newspaper, could report that National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan had told an advisor to the German Bundeskanzler that the U.S. would welcome German deliveries of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, also saying that it had to be seen as a German initiative: “Sullivan habe Plötner am Telefon gesagt, Amerika würde es begrüßen, wenn Deutschland den Leopard 2 liefere, doch solle das auf deutsche Initiative geschehen. Amerika fordere Deutschland zu solchen Lieferungen nicht auf.” (FAZ). Bundeskanzler Scholz is holding back, arguing that no other country had been willing to deliver modern tanks to Ukraine. Scholz evidently not wanting that Germany should be going alone and risk further escalation by providing the Ukrainians with the means to initiate new counter attacks. The opposition is more aggressive and argues for German deliveries. There has been talk of making deliveries in coordination with other countries, but no final decision has been reached. Meanwhile CNN and other media are reporting that Pentagon is preparing plans for sending Patriot systems to Ukraine. If the plans are approved by the administration, Patriot batteries could be shipped quickly, with Ukrainian personnel being trained to use the complicated system at the US. Base and training ground at Grafenwöhr in Germany. The Patriot plans have immediately led to warnings from Russia, with former president Medvedev warning the Patriot batteries would become legitimate targets. Judging from the aggressiveness shown by the Biden administration’s hawks the Russian warning are not likely to prevent the delivery of Patriot Batteries to Ukraine. Apparently, the administration believes that Russia is not able do much about it. Others want to contribute with a less dangerous step up the escalation ladder. Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Rastislav Káčer, recently announced that Slovakia was ready to provide Ukraine with Russian made MIG-29s: "We have not yet provided you with MiG-29s. But we are ready to do it. We are talking with our NATO partners about how to do it. And today [December 8], we had a very meaningful conversation with your President. My [Slovak] Minister of Defense explained to your President how we can do this. And I think that a Ukrainian delegation will come to Slovakia in the coming weeks and we will work together with our American friends to make this a reality." (Interfax-Ukraine). When Ukraine surprised the Russia with long range drone attacks on airfields hundreds of kilometres from the Ukrainian border, they apparently used left over Russian Tu-141 drones of 1970s vintage. Leaving observes astounded over the Ukrainian prowess and ability to convert and use Russian built drones to attack airfields deep into Russia. While others have speculated that to hit Russian bases with precision using old drones Ukraine must have been helped. Contrary to to Blinken’s statement: “We have neither encouraged nor enabled the Ukrainians to strike inside of Russia.” Asia Times reports that “Multiple military sources in NATO countries as well as Russia contradict him, reporting that the reconditioned Russian Tu-141 drones that Ukraine launched at Russian air bases downlinked US satellite GPS data to hit their targets.” If correct the U.S. is providing the Ukraine with a long-range strike capability. Something the U.S. have hitherto said they wanted to avoid. Thus, marking another step up the rungs of the escalation ladder. Russia’s answer has been more drones and missile attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, and verbal rattling of the nuclear sword. Administration hawks overruling wary generals The Biden administration with the hawkish and undiplomatic pair of Sullivan and Blinken seem determined to defeat the Russians in the U.S. proxy war, by continuing to escalate their military support whenever it may look as if the Ukraine might be in dire straits. While the military, not the least personified in General Milley seem to be growing warier, aware that a continued escalation might lead to the risk of a direct war between Russia and NATO, while weakening the U.S. military stance in the Pacific, making the U.S. unable to represent a credible deterrence against China. At the moment though the hawkish views of Biden and his trusty compatriots Blinken and Sullivan are certainly prevailing, resulting in continuous support for the proxy war in Ukraine. They are also prodding U.S. allies in Europe in order to have them to follow the U.S. up the escalation ladder. Especially the reluctant Germans are under pressure from both the U.S. and the Ukrainians. Snap shot of U.S. military assistance The most recent U.S. fact sheet showing the assistance to Ukraine was published on December 12, and contains this list (defense.gov): Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine December 9, 2022 In total, the United States has committed more $20 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration, including more than $19.3 billion since the beginning of Russia’s unprovoked and brutal invasion on February 24. United States security assistance committed to Ukraine includes: · Over 1,600 Stinger anti-aircraft systems; · Over 8,500 Javelin anti-armor systems; · Over 46,000 other anti-armor systems and munitions; · Over 700 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems; · 142 155mm Howitzers and up to 1,004,000 155mm artillery rounds; · 4,200 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds; · 9,000 155mm rounds of Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems; · 36 105mm Howitzers and 180,000 105mm artillery rounds; · 276 Tactical Vehicles to tow weapons; · 22 Tactical Vehicles to recover equipment; · 38 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and ammunition; · 20 120mm mortar systems and 135,000 120mm mortar rounds; · 1,500 Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; · Four Command Post vehicles; · Eight National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and munitions; · Missiles for HAWK air defense systems; · Four Avenger air defense systems; · High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs); · 20 Mi-17 helicopters; · 45 T-72B tanks; · Over 1,000 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs); · Over 100 light tactical vehicles; · 44 trucks and 88 trailers to transport heavy equipment; · 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers; · 250 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles · 440 MaxxPro Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles; · Mine clearing equipment and systems; · Over 11,000 grenade launchers and small arms; · Over 104,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition; · Over 75,000 sets of body armor and helmets; · Approximately 1,800 Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems; · Laser-guided rocket systems; · Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems; · 15 Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Systems; · Two radars for Unmanned Aerial Systems; · Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels; |
Author
Verner C. Petersen Archives
June 2024
|