 Hegemony comes from the Greek word hēgemonía, which means leadership and rule. In international relations, hegemony refers to the ability of an actor with overwhelming capability to shape the international system through both coercive and non-coercive means. (oxfordbibliographies.com) DIVERGENT WESTERN VIEWS OF CHINA On a visit to Europe in 2019 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned that "China wants to be the dominant economic and military power of the world, spreading its authoritarian vision for society and its corrupt practices worldwide." (NYT). While the comment may be seen as relating to the on-going attempts by the US to persuade others countries not to include Huawei in their 5 G plans, it would also seem to represent a view found widely in the present US administration. A former director of policy planning at the State Department even talked about "a fight with a really different civilization" contrasting it with a previous competition with Soviet Union, that she regarded as a fight within the Western family. With China "It’s the first time that we will have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian." A view has seems to have caused some consternation. (washingtonexaminer.com). While views like these may be seen as representing the views of the present administration and the Republicans, the views of leading Democrats seem to be leaning in the same direction. While Biden seems to ridicule such a view "China is going to eat our lunch? Come on, man," (cnbc.com), others seem to agree with the Republicans. Elizabeth Warren accusing China of "using its economic might to bludgeon its way onto the world stage and offering a model in which economic gains legitimize oppression." The view of China as global competitor to the US hegemonic position is underlined in the National Security Strategy, as presented to congress in 2017. "China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence." (NSS). China especially in the Indo-pacific region where it seeks to expand its state driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favour. European views of China are clearly very different from the US view, although there is no shared European view, the only shared view might actually be that they all disagree with the harsh US views on China. This certainly goes for the views found in Germany. At the recent World Economic Forum in Davos Chancellor Merkel said: "From a social point of view, from a political point of view, we have this very close partnership with the United States; but sometimes, for economic reasons, we may well pursue our policies in a different way." The emphasis is on "economic reasons." Merkel might make some noise here and there about the lack of human rights in China, the importance of preserving the economic relations with China seem to be all dominating in her view of China. According to Merkel: "We Europeans must be wisely reflecting how we can deal in this digital age with Chinese products and offerings, and weigh very carefully whether we wish to decouple ourselves from the Chinese value chain," (afr.com). Meaning of course that for economic reasons Germany wouldn't dare to decouple itself from China trade and investment. Clearly Merkel wants Europe to take a very different approach from the US to China. Slightly bizarre perhaps, but an opinion poll in 2019 by Civey shows that 42,3% of Germans see China as a better partner than the US. Only 23,1% are of the opposite opinion. President Macron apparently sees a role for Europe as a power broker that could act as a mediator between the US and China. For now that would seem to have the character of a pipe dream, given the miserable relations between the EU and the US. More than Merkel Macron sees the need for Europe to assert its sovereignty in relation to China, "Since the beginning of my mandate, I have been calling for a real awareness and defence of European sovereignty," (business-standard.com). He bids welcome that the EU has finally woken up to need to assert itself against China as seen the recent EU strategic outlook on China. Though for the time being this awakening is mostly on paper. In reality the EU is still split on China, with member countries in the South and East having a more positive view of China, welcoming Chinese investment deals. Much bigger though is the split in views and strategies towards China between the EU and the US. The US view in general is a bipolar view: The US vs. China. It is a view that sees an upcoming hegemonic struggle between the existing US hegemony and a Chinese striving for hegemony. The European view is more muddled, but in general characterised by a more pragmatic view of relations with China, accompanied by a perhaps naive hope of preserving a rule based multipolar world. In the EU's 2016 strategy on China "The EU expects its relationship with China to be one of reciprocal benefit in both political and economic terms. There should be genuine implementation of the Chinese slogan "win-win co-operation." The EU expects China to assume responsibilities in line with the benefits it draws from a rules-based international order." In the recent Strategic outlook from 2019, a new sense of realism seems to be creeping in "...there is a growing appreciation in Europe that the balance of challenges and opportunities presented by China has shifted. In the last decade, China's economic power and political influence have grown with unprecedented scale and speed, reflecting its ambitions to become a leading global power." Still the EU strives to uphold the idea that China can become an integrated into a multilateral and rule based world order to the benefit of all. Somehow Europe believes it is possible to align itself with the fundamental Western values and ideas of governance shared with the US , while coupling itself to "the Chinese value chain" when it comes to trade and investment. An impossible balancing act to avoid choosing side in a looming hegemonic struggle. One thing is for sure though, the divergence in views especially between the US and the European views on upcoming China dominance weakens the whole Western position vis-à-vis China. What we have seen here and are views and opinions, but in order to the see the real hegemonic positions of the US, China and Europe (leaving Russia out of the picture for the moment ) it is important to get a closer look the major subject areas that together will determine the degree of dominance on the world scene. The following topics will be relevant: The struggle for economic dominance The struggle for technological and scientific dominance The struggle for geopolitical influence The raw power struggle – Challenge to US military hegemony A crumbling West vs. re-juvenated authoritarian China 1. ECONOMIC DOMINANCE What are the relative economic positions of the US, China and Europe? As a general indicator we may use World Bank GDP data for period 1960 to 2018. We get this picture. GDP (current US$) - China, United States, European Union  World Bank, International Comparison Program database. A GDP comparison based upon current US$ would seem to indicate that China is lacking well behind both the US and the EU. Even with high growth rates in China it is likely that this will be the situation for years to come. But using instead a measurement of Purchasing Power Parity (similar to the so-called Big Mac index or Burgernomics) leave us with a different picture. Measured in PPP China has overtaken both the US and the EU since 2015. But China is of course lacking far behind the US and EU when looking at GDP per capita. GDP, PPP (current international $) - China, United States, European Union  World Bank, International Comparison Program database. The data seen here points to a three polar world, China , US and the EU, as Russia really isn't in the same league. Trade in Goods, the split in the West A look at trade relations between the US, the EU and China. Trade has been a major bone of contention for President Trump both in relation to China and Europe, and it is easy to see why. US-China Trade Deficit (wallstreet.window.com)  For some time President Trump has waged a trade war with China with the objective of reducing this deficit. The tit for tat in the war did result in the reduction of total trade, but for some time it didn't seem to reduce the US deficit in trade. Now The Census Bureau statistics for trade with China in 2019 show that the deficit was reduced to -345,616.7 million USD compared to the 2018 deficit of -419,527 million USD. Trump also succeeded in getting at least the first part of trade deal with China, which ought to contribute to further deficit reductions in the coming years While economists disagree about the effect of Trump's trade policies, the policies seem to demonstrate that the US still possess hegemonic power to wrench concessions from China. For a renewed demonstration of this power the EU is next in line, as the EU also has trade surplus with the US, but we will have to wait and see how a trade war with the EU may play out. For now this is the situation: EU-US Trade surplus  It is to be expected that if Trump succeeds in ending the trade war with China to the advantage of the US, Europe will be next in line for a possible trade war with the US. Probably again demonstrating that the EU is no match for the existing US economic hegemony. EU vs. China Trade deficit China has become the EU's largest treading partner, and the EU is likewise China's largest trading partner, but the partnership is unequal Europe also has a trade deficit with China, as can be seen from this graph(Eurostat):  In general the EU has been fairly complacent about this imbalance, perhaps because Germany doesn't want anything to disturb the important German export to China? A relatively meek criticism of China is found in the "EU-China Strategic Outlook 2019." The EU strategy aims to fulfil the following three objectives: Based on clearly defined interests and principles, the EU should deepen its engagement with China to promote common interests at global level. The EU should robustly seek more balanced and reciprocal conditions governing the economic relationship. Finally, in order to maintain its prosperity, values and social model over the long term, there are areas where the EU itself needs to adapt to changing economic realities and strengthen its own domestic policies and industrial base." (EU-China – A strategic outlook 2019). The EU also wants China to adhere to a multilateralism with the UN at its core, to a rule-based international order, and to human rights, although perhaps realising that in reality China may only pay lip service to these ideals. The EU also hopes for China's commitment to global sustainable development. Wishful thinking, but perhaps the EU just wants a kind of self-confirmation of its own ideals and its righteous moral attitude when expressing these views. The EU strategy towards China certainly demonstrates that the EU lacks any sort hegemonic power. The EU may appeal to ideals, but doesn't have a shared will and the necessary clout to impress China., as it is evident that the EU doesn't want to endanger trade relations with China. The internal divisions in the EU weakens its stance towards China even more. Countries like Greece and Hungary doesn't want the EU to discourage Chinese investment in their countries. Others like President Macron warns against China's investment in high tech industries in Europe that would gives China access to key technologies. The trade power struggle While the US uses its economic power to get concessions on trade from China, and probably later from the EU, China attempts to use its economic power to drive wedge between the US and the EU, helped by the implicit disagreement on trade between the US and the EU, and the divergent views within the EU The result being that the Western pressure on China is weakened, with Europe is being caught in the crossfire of the US-China struggle without really being able to assert itself, squeezed as it is in the hegemonic power struggle between the US and China. The trade deal that President Trump has just struck with China may even have negative repercussions on EU trade with China, by committing China to buy more from the US. 2. TECHNOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC DOMINANCE The on-going trade war has re-awakened the interest in China's " Made in China" (MIC25) plan dating back to 2015. A plan to make China a self-reliant manufacturer of advanced, smart technology. “We will implement the 'Made in China 2025' strategy, seek innovation-driven development, apply smart technologies, strengthen foundations, pursue green development and redouble our efforts to upgrade China from a manufacturer of quantity to one of quality.” (Premier Li Keqiang). By the way the plan was inspired by a previous German plan for Industry 4.0. MIC25 intends to decrease China's reliance on import of advanced technology through massive investments in its own advanced technologies, and likewise boost its ability to compete globally. The plan focuses on ten technology areas  The success of MIC25 would have consequences for Western efforts in these area as it would lead to less export of high tech solutions to China and heightened competition in the world market. The furore in relation to Huawei and its advanced 5G technology and to lesser degree China's competition in railway equipment may indicate what is in store for the West if China is successful. The Chinese activities fit well with the intentions found in President Xi Ping's address to 19th National Congress in 2017, where he talked about Chinese development plans. For the period up to 2035 he envisions that "China's economic and technological strength has increased significantly. China has become a global leader in innovation." Investment in R&D A worrying picture of the haste with which China moves can be had by comparing investments in R&D in China with some major competitors. Here shown in a graph from the National Science Board("Science and Engineering Indicators 2018").  Note the extremely rapid growth in investment in China compared to its competitors. According to a science report from UNESCO "China will outpace the USA as the world’s leading R&D spender by around 2019, reaching another important milestone in its endeavour to become an innovation-oriented nation by 2020." (UNESCO science report: towards 2030). Further cause for worry in the West may be found in an evaluation of USA's "National Security Strategy," which asserts that "Part of China’s military modernization and economic expansion is due to its access to the U.S. innovation economy, including America’s world-class universities." In addition there is the worry, voiced not the least by President Trump, that China is acquiring knowledge by illegitimate means: "The White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy also noted China’s prevalent use of cyber-enabled theft (as well as physical theft) in acquiring technologies and intellectual property in strategic sectors." Trump is no longer alone in warning against this phenomenon. President Macron has voiced similar reservations on behalf of the EU, and warned that China through investments in high tech industries in Europe may gain access to key technologies. AI Applications of AI are found in many areas today: Autonomous cars, robotics virtual assistants recognising speech, like Siri, Alexa, Assistant and Cortana. It is found in medicine, education, public safety, entertainment, banking, legal professions, and of course in manufacturing. Given the overwhelming importance of AI, especially in relation to expected future potentials, it is important to see how the West fares in relation to the China. In a paper to Congress, "Rise of the Machines," it is asserted that the US has been leading the world in the development of AI: "The United States has traditionally led the world in the development and application of AI-driven technologies. This is due in part to the government’s prior commitment to investing heavily in research and development (R&D) that has, in turn, helped support AI’s growth and development. "(U.S. House of Representatives).But the report warns that the US risks falling behind in its investments in AI, especially in relation to China, that is investing heavily in AI. In 2018 China published its own"Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan." "In 2025 "new-generation AI will be widely used in intelligent manufacturing, intelligent medicine, intelligent city, intelligent agriculture, national defence construction, and other fields, while the scale of AI’s core industry will be more than 400 billion RMB, and the scale of related industries will exceed 5 trillion RMB. (Around 700 billion USD)." By 2030 "The country will achieve major breakthroughs in brain-inspired intelligence, autonomous intelligence, hybrid intelligence, swarm intelligence, and other areas, having important impact in the domain of international AI research and occupying the commanding heights of AI technology. AI industry competitiveness will reach the world-leading level." President Trump has mainly put his faith into private sector initiatives. Meaning there that there appears to be no corresponding plan in the US. It is thus difficult to compare the Chinese efforts with US and EU efforts as comparable statistics doesn't seem to exist, but there is no lack of reports containing piecemeal assessments of AI efforts . On the basis of such assessments it might be possible to compare the relative efforts of the US, EU and China. First a comparison of the growth in numbers of peer reviewed AI papers (hai.standford.edu).  (Blue line represents China) It is significant that until 2018 most papers on AI were from Europe, followed by China with US coming third. In 2018 the number of Chinese papers passed the number of European papers. The picture seen here is surely not what one would have expected. Looking at venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) investments in AI results in a very different picture (datainnovation.org):  (NB weight belongs to an overall ranking system). For 2017-18 the US in leading investment VC and PE in AI, but China is catching up, while Europe is lacking far behind. There is perhaps reason for caution when looking at the Chinese investment, as others have pointed to the difficulty of measuring the size of Chinese investment in AI. The picture changes once more when looking at adoption of AI by firms (datainnovation.org).  China is here seen as leading the adoption and piloting of AI in firms, even before the US, with European in third place. This may sound puzzling, but the Chinese efforts may be a result of the Chinese “Three-Year Action Plan for Promoting the Development of a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry (2018–2020).” According to the picture presented here the US and China are the big players in the AI game, with important implications for the future. Europe meanwhile is lacking behind. "The European Union has the talent to compete with the United States and China. Indeed, it has more AI researchers than its peers, and typically produces the most research as well.[9] However, there is a disconnect between the amount of AI talent in the EU and its commercial AI adoption and funding. ... The European Union’s laggard position reduces its ability to not only enjoy the economic and social benefits of AI, but also influence global AI governance" (datainnovation.org) In a EU commination about a "Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence," this is at least realised, but what does the EU plan for the future? "Investment levels for AI in the Union are low and fragmented, relative to other parts of the world such as the US and China. To remedy this shortcoming, the April Communication sets an ambitious objective, aiming to increase investment and reach a total (public and private sectors combined) of at least EUR 20 billion in the period 2018-2020, and to increase investments progressively to EUR 20 billion per year in the course of the next decade." Based upon these admittedly simple comparisons we see a bipolar situation in which the US and China are the only real significant competitors with China apparently accelerating its efforts. Europe is a distant third, not really utilising its resources as effcient as US and China. The race for Quantum computing supremacy The July 2018 edition of "Scientific American" wrote that Chinese researchers had achieved a new record by packing 18 qubits, the basic units of quantum computing, into just six weirdly connected photons.(scientificamarican.com) A qubit being “the basic unit of information for a quantum computer, analogous to a bit in ordinary machines. But unlike a bit, which can have the value 0 or 1, a qubit can take on an infinite number of values at once. Somewhat like Schrödinger's cat. The race is on. In late 2019 IBM announced a 53 qubit quantum computer. On October 23 2019 Google announced that its Sycamore 54 qubit quantum computer (though with only 53 qubits working) had completed a very specific calculation in 3 minutes and 20 seconds, a calculation that according to Google would have taken 10.000 years on a traditional supercomputer, thus boasting that they had achieved the holy grail of quantum supremacy, which means that a quantum computer solves problems that for all practical purposes would be impossible for a traditional computer. There is some doubt about Google's claim though, as IBM claims the specific problem could be solved within 2.5 days on its own supercomputer. While perhaps not having achieved quantum supremacy for the time being it would seem that the US has achieved supremacy over China. In the area of quantum communication China may have a lead. So-called quantum key distribution (QKD), take advantage of quantum entanglement to allow secure communications, that cannot hacked. In June 2017 "Science" reported that China had carried out a World first in a quantum computing experiment using China's Micious quantum satellite: "a team of physicists reports that it sent eerily intertwined quantum particles from a satellite to ground stations separated by 1200 kilometres, smashing the previous world record." China also appears to have the longest quantum communication ground links, a 2,032-kilometer (1,263-mile) link between Beijing and Shanghai. While a private company in the US QantumXChange have a similar 1000 km long link along the East Coast of USA. A Washington Post article from 18 August, 2019, shows that China has leapt past the West (US and Europe) in the number of patent filings for quantum technology in the past few years. In 2018 China had 492 patents filing, the US 248 and the EU a miserly 31, overtaken even by South Korea with 45. Chinese research priorities From what we have seen it is becoming evident that "The West against the China" in science and technology is mainly a question of the US (with contributions from Europe) against China, but is has to remembered that China is prioritising and advancing research in other areas too. One example, in January China's Chang'e 4 lunar explorer was making a soft landing on the dark side of the moon.The first time this has been accomplished. According to China's recently published lunar exploration plans a future Chang'e 8 mission "will test key technologies to lay the groundwork for the construction of a science and research base on the moon." China's 13th five year plan 2016-202O, mentions priority science projects in all these areas: 1. Quantum communications and computation 2. Brain research 3. National cyberspace security 4. Deep space exploration 5. Clean, efficient use of coal 6. Industrial, medical and military robots 7. Applications of gene science 8. Big data applications 9. Deep-sea experimental platform 10. New Arctic observatory, Antarctic station Meaning that the West is in for furious competition from China in wide ranging areas. Huawei vs. Crypto AG, a curious case With Huawei seemingly to be on the forefront of 5G technology it might be tempting to use their technology, when rolling out 5G technology in the West, But especially the US has warned against using Huawei technology, as it may allow China to spy on communications. While Huawei denies that would ever be the case, (what else could they say), it has prompted the US to reject Huawei 5G technology, and sought to persuade other Western countries to do the same, with various degrees of success. Curiously it has recently come to fore that Liechtenstein company set up by BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst) and CIA had bought a stake in the Swiss Crypto AG company producing encryption equipment. (Today Crypto is the name of Swedish company). Crypto AG encryption equipment was sold all over the World. Through this secret arrangement, using Crypto AG equipment the BND and CIA were, for years "able to spy upon hostile and allied countries alike, with spied-upon allies including NATO members Portugal, Spain and Ireland, among others. " At least according to revelations brought up in today's media. Taking the two stories together one is tempted to see again the hegemonic battle acted out in a strange spying war, with the centre of gravity tending to move from the US towards China, A China that might soon be able protect its own communications with quantum entanglement. 3. CHINA'S EXPANDING GEOPOLITICAL INFLUENCE In August 2018 the foreign ministers of Greece and China, Nikos Kotzias and Wang Yi, signed a memorandum of understanding, whereby Greece officially joined the Chinese Bridge and Road Initiative or BRI. Marking the China's steadily growing influence in parts of Europe. "As a significant intersection along the overland and maritime silk routes, Greece is a natural partner for jointly building the Belt and Road Initiative" (Wang Yi). In 2016 Chinese shipping company Cosco had already bought a majority stake in the Greek port of Piraeus. Prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis could announce that Cosco would invest 600million Euros to develop the port of Piraeus into a major hub for trade with China. "The objective is to transform it into the biggest transit hub between Europe and Asia and, potentially, the biggest port in Europe." (CNBC). Since then Greece has also signed 16 further agreements with China to boost trade, and in may 2019 Greece also joined the exiting 16 plus 1 initiative, turning it into the 17 +1. The initiative being a framework for cooperation between China and countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Greece as a member state of the EU joining forces with China is just one eye-catching example of Chinas growing geopolitical influence in Europe. OBOR mutating into BRI Bach in 2013 Xi Linping gave a speech at the Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan introducing a modern version of the old Silkroad in the shape of the "One Bridge One Road Initiative" (OBOR). Linping: "To forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development space in the Eurasian region, we should take an innovative approach and jointly build an "economic belt along the Silk Road". This will be a great undertaking benefitting the people of all countries along the route. To turn this into a reality, we may start with work in individual areas and link them up over time to cover the whole region." Xi Linping mentioned five objectives for the OBOR: First, to step up policy integration in order for further economic integration; Second, to improve infrastructure in order to further trade; Third to remove barriers to unimpeded trade in parts of the World inhabited by 3 billion people; Fourth to improve monetary circulation through currency convertibility; Fifth, to promote understanding among people. OBOR was later renamed BRI as it was about more than one bridge and one road. It has since become a gigantic infrastructure and economics project consisting of attempts to construct transports corridors on land and sea, ports and diverse gas and oil pipelines, as shown in this map. (Business Insider).  uWhile the BRI might be first and foremost an economic project boosting Chinese growth, it must certainly also be seen in a geo-strategic context, as it will give China immeasurable influence in large regions of Asia, Europe, Africa and later even Latin America. Europe’s response to China's initiatives is weak and uncoordinated: "While almost half of EU member states have already signed bilateral cooperation agreements, and taking into account the fact that major financial institutions, as well as first-tier European companies, are increasingly engaged in BRI, the European Union itself had until recently failed to agree on an EU strategy to manage growing Chinese influence in Eurasia." (cirsd.org). From east expansion to west expansion The new Silkroad represents a reversal of previous eras of colonial expansion from West to East, augmenting Chinese influence in the West and diminishing Western influence in the East. It may also be a first step in potentially allowing Chinese military presence to grow along the new Silkroad. It isn't all plain sailing for China though. India might seek to countervail too much Chinese influence, while critical voices in Europe argue that European countries who join the BRI may undermine European unity, "Undermine Europe’s trade standards, including investment, labor, and environmental standards," and perhaps even European security. One might paint a bleak picture of a weak Europe loosing its ties with the US and turning east towards the new rising hegemon, China, as a consequence of internal bickering amongst European contries. All in the naive belief that China turn out to be a gentle giant essentially interested in the same multilateralism and rule of law, that Europe puts its trust in. Or the EU may finally begin wake up to the realisation that China isn't a gentle giant. In "EU-China – A strategic outlook" from the European Commission, one finds the argument that there is a need for a more balanced trade and investment relationship with China: "China has also increasingly become a strategic competitor for the EU while failing to reciprocate market access and maintain a level playing field. China’s growing economic weight increases the risk for the global economy of negative spill-overs from distortions in China’s economic system and from possible sudden economic downturn. The EU’s approach to China should therefore take account of the evolving nature of the Chinese economy." In January 2020 the present President of the EU Commission, Ursula von Leyen, gave an interview in "Die Zeit," in which she argued that the EU must take a stand and be realistic: "Sagen was ist." China is acting friendly but had its own agenda: "China umgarnt uns freundlich. Und deshalb übersehen wir oft, wie konsequent es seine Ziele verfolgt. Und wie clever." At the same time though we see EU turning on Trump's administration criticizing its attempt to hold China to account in several areas, instead of finally realising that without the support of the US, Europe's own position vis-à-vis China will just become weaker and weaker. The tripartite hegemonic struggle in Africa In October 2019 the second stage of a Kenyan prestige project, a future railroad connection from Mombasa on the Indian Ocean to the Ugandan border, was opened by President Uhuru Kenyatta. The new railroad and its trains are funded and built by China. Together with newly built Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway, they deliver shiny poster pictures of major Chinese activities in Africa. "Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing has financed more than 3,000 strategic infrastructure projects in Africa and provided tens of billions of dollars more in the form of loans." (The Diplomat). According to an assessment by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) China aims to invest more one trillion dollars in Africa by 2025. China has already passed the US in total R&D funding in agriculture in Africa and has also become the largest trading partner for the African continent. Big infrastructure projects in Africa have been funded with Chinese loans accompanied by the condition that projects have to use Chinese contractors. The Chinese approach has been characterised as "debt trap diplomacy," as African countries with large Chinese funded projects run the risk of becoming caught in a debt trap. "Leaving China able to leverage a country’s indebtedness for political, economic, and military purposes." Recently it has also become obvious that some of the large infrastructure projects, like the railroads haven’t been too successful. Due to a lack of funding the recently opened second phase of the Mombasa to Uganda railroad, "ends abruptly by a sleepy village 75 miles West of Nairobi,... after China withheld some $4.9 billion in funding needed to allow the line’s completion." (Bloomberg). The problem is that the remaining phases to be built may not be economically viable. Still "China’s ability to directly finance and construct infrastructure projects with fewer conditions is unique and has raised worries in some quarters about the expropriation of natural resources, environmental hazards, labor displacement, unstable debt burdens, and land grabs." (CCGA). China's approach to investment in Africa is very different from the US and the EU approaches. A CCGA comparison of Chinese and US activities show the difference:  While China's approach focuses on projects funded with Chinese loans and carried out using Chinese construction companies, the US doesn't use such an approach. When comparing contributions involving grants, food aid, and other forms of aid, the US comes out big in relation to China's small contributions. What the comparison doesn’t show is that China, who has lacked behind in Foreign Direct Investment or FDI in Africa, is catching up and surpassing the US and Europe. According to a "Brookings' figure of the week" from 2019, FDI in Africa for the years 2014 to 2018 showed China in front with the US and France trailing. Total EU contribution is bigger than the US contribution. (Note that in the table rankings are based upon the number of projects).  Comparing overall hegemonic influence in Africa it is evident that the EU's relative hegemonic position is much stronger than in the other areas we have covered. According to a Brookings comparison "The EU is shoring up its commercial position in Africa through a web of free trade agreements, or Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which Brussels is negotiating or has concluded with 40 African nations in sub-Saharan Africa. The EPAs provide European companies with preferential access to markets across the region and will liberalize about 80 percent of imports over 20 years." Whether that in fact is to Africa's advantage remains to be seen. China's growing hegemonic influence in Latin America China sees it as “natural” to expand its westward infrastructure drive – the “BRI” initiative – to Latin America, said China's Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, at a meeting between China and the 33 members of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in Chile 2018. “China wants the participation of all the countries of the region to be involved in the construction of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ … so they can share the great opportunities and dividends of this platform of global cooperation" (Wang Yi, Santiago Times). Many Latin American countries seem eager to participate in the Chinese imitative: "As of May 2019, 19 LAC nations have signed cooperation agreements with the BRI in six major markets for infrastructure investments including Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Peru and Chile." (Belt and Road News). Here an overview from Brinknews:  ec.europa"Trade between Latin America and China has surged from 17 billion dollars in 2002 to 306 billion in 2018 with China becoming the top trading partner of Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. Just as in Africa China has been giving Latin American countries loans to fund big infrastructure projects, like railways, dams etc. "Dams and hydroelectric power plants are being built by Chinese companies in the Amazon rainforest and Patagonia. Thousands of kilometres of rail track are being laid in Brazil, Peru and Venezuela. China and Argentina are negotiating over construction of a US$8 billion nuclear facility in the province of Buenos Aires." (Multimedia). This has made China Latin America's largest lender, with countries like Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina the most important recipients of China's loans. In 2018 Chinese lending to Venezuela amounted to 67 billion dollars, with Brazil following with 28,9 billion, Ecuador with 18,4 billion and Argentina 16,9 billion. This has certainly been seen as a challenge to the traditional US hegemony in Latin America. No wonder that Pompeo has warned that China's “predatory” lending practices and other “malign or nefarious” behaviour by Beijing had injected “corrosive capital into the economic bloodstream, giving life to corruption and eroding good governance.” Critics in the US and Latin America also see the Chinese investment as harming economic development in Latin America, by focusing on investment in extraction and transport of raw materials, which may lead to a greater dependency on import of commodities. On the other hand Chinese investments are not accompanied by a string of political demands and conditions."Such loans typically have less stringent terms, do not impose policy conditions, and have less rigorous environmental guidelines compared to the loans of major international financial institutions." (Congress). While this may sound attractive to countries, being recipients of Chinese investments, it certainly doesn't mean that China doesn't expect something in return. Like de-recognition of Taiwan, or willingness to support Chinese views internationally. A PRC (People's republic of China) paper from 2016 talks about cooperation on the basis of "equality and mutual benefit" in areas like agriculture, energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, and technological innovation, even though it may be taken to mean Chinese dominance. According to the US Congressional Research Service the PRC paper also states that China will "actively carry out military exchanges and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries." No wonder that the US regards the Chinese hegemonic advances in Latin America as problematic to US interests. A Posture Statement from United Sates Southern Command, dated February 2019, warns that both "Russia and China are expanding their influence in the Western Hemisphere, often at the expense of U.S. interests. Both enable —and are enabled by—actions in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba that threaten hemispheric security and prosperity, and the actions of those three states in turn damage the stability and democratic progress across the region. ...In the future, China could use its control of deep water ports in the Western Hemisphere to enhance its global operational posture. Particularly concerning is China’s effort to exert control over key infrastructure associated with the Panama Canal." The Posture Statement also warns that Latin American states are gravitating towards China when it comes to investment in new technology. Mentioning the aggressive advances of Chinese firms like ZTE and Huawei. Chinese activities at Argentina's deep space tracking facility are also disconcerting. "Beijing could be in violation of the terms of its agreement with Argentina to only conduct civilian activities, and may have the ability to monitor and potentially target U.S., Allied, and partner space activities. Additionally, Chinese firms like Huawei and ZTE have aggressively penetrated the region, placing intellectual property, private data, and government secrets at risk. If governments in Latin America and the Caribbean continue to gravitate toward using Chinese information systems, our ability and willingness to share information over compromised networks is likely to suffer." (Southcom). From what we have seen here we may conclude that Chinese economic hegemony is having marked and growing influence in Latin America, while US hegemony is waning, but of course still dominant in military terms. Still the writing on the wall is becoming more and more pronounced year by year, China is advancing, the US is retreating, although to be sure the Trump administration looks prepared to counter the Chinese advance, unlike Europe. Europe's focus on Latin America, on paper... "In reality, one has to acknowledge that for European foreign policy, Latin America has not been a priority. Therefore, the growing presence of China in Latin America is also not of major concern for European politicians. " (Nolte) To be sure on paper the EU wants to strengthen its focus on Latin America. A press release from the EU commission states that "The European Union is strengthening its political partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean by focusing it on four priorities - prosperity, democracy, resilience and effective global governance - for common future." (ec.europa.eu). Sounds idealistic, but what is the reality? A joint Communication tries to answer this question. Here are just the main points: Over the last decades, the EU and LAC have reached an unprecedented level of integration. The EU has signed association, free trade or political and cooperation agreements with 27 of the 33 LAC countries. The economies are closely interconnected. EU is the third largest trade partner of LAC; total trade in goods increased from EUR 185.5 billion in 2008 to EUR 225.4 billion in 2018, ... The EU is the first investor in LAC, with a foreign direct investment (FDI) stock of EUR 784.6 billion in 2017 The EU has been the largest provider of development cooperation to LAC, with EUR 3.6 billion in grants for bilateral and regional programmes between 2014 and 20207 and over EUR 1.2 billion in humanitarian assistance to victims of man-made crises and natural disasters the last 20 years After this it all becomes rather vague: This Communication proposes to strengthen the EU’s political partnership with LAC, setting out a vision for a stronger and modernised bi-regional partnership —in light of changing global and regional realities The EU and the Mercosur countries, Argentina, Brazil Paraguay and Uruguay, has reached a political agreement for an ambitious, balanced and comprehensive trade agreement. Ratification has been held up though. In 2019 "The leaders of France and Ireland have threatened to vote against a trade deal between the EU and South American trade bloc Mercosur unless Brazil, where wildfires continue to devastate the Amazon rainforest, takes its environmental obligations more seriously" (EURATIV). Here we see the decisive difference between the EU's holier than you attitude in contrast to China's focus on economic and hegemonic gains. Europe may have some economic clout but doesn't seem to be able to covert that in hegemonic influence. 4. THE RAW POWER STRUGGLE – CHALLENGE TO US MILITARY HEGEMONY "The defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides' Trap. The Greek historian's metaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power — as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago. " Thucydides's Trap refers to the ancient Greek historian and strategist. His explanation that the war was inevitable constitutes Thucydides' Trap: "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta." (Thuc 1.23.). The current thesis and its application to the relationship between the established world power of the United States and China's rapidly growing power have been made by researchers at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and popularized in the bestseller: "Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides' Trap?" China's growing power and the self-awareness that accompanies it are manifested in many ways. We see this clearly in the Chinese expansion in the South China Sea, where other countries' demands and a Hague Tribunal ruling are ignored. Indirectly, in cases where countries are subject to penalties if they take actions contrary to China's official interests, support Tibet, have contact with Taiwan etc. We also see it in China's increased military presence in other parts of the world. A military base in Djibouti, naval exercises with Russia in the Pacific and even naval visits in the Baltic Sea. In the annual report to the Congress on US-China relations, full attention is paid to the military expansion in China. "The year 2016 saw Chinese President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping continue to consolidate and grow the power of China's military and security apparatus. This was highlighted in particular by his ambitious new military reform and reorganization; China's continued assertiveness in the South China Sea, even in the face of an international arbitral ruling; demonstrations of the Chinese military's efforts to improve its force projection capabilities; and the Chinese military's expanding global engagement and footprint. " Notable here are the "buildup of aircraft carriers and other large vessels - which China now appears to be pursuing under a doctrinal shift towards ''far seas '' protection." The ability to project military power to distant parts of the world is reminiscent of the German struggle build a navy to compete with Britain's Royal Navy before World War I. Also notable is China's commitment to cyber, information and electromagnetic warfare under a separate command. Thucydides' Trap and the other views presented here may be seen as the representing general Western idea of China's military hegemonic aspirations. In order to really get a better picture of the US-China hegemonic power struggle we need to see China's own military aspirations and strategies and contrast them with US strategies . China's strategies and military aspirations Xi Jinping: "We have reached a new historical starting point in strengthening national defense and the armed forces. Confronted with profound changes in our national security environment and responding to the demands of the day for a strong country with a strong military, we must fully implement the Party’s thinking on strengthening the military for the new era and the military strategy for new conditions, build a powerful and modernized army, navy, air force, rocket force, and strategic support force, develop strong and efficient joint operations commanding institutions for theater commands, and create a modern combat system with distinctive Chinese characteristics." (19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 2017). A "Make China Great Again" cry, somewhat like Trump's MAGA (Make America Great Again). To get an idea of what this might mean we may have a look at the white paper "China’s National Defense in the New Era" published in July 2019. The white paper presents a view of the World in which international security "is undermined by growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism and constant regional conflicts and wars." The US and the NATO are causing tensions to rise. The US "has provoked and intensified competition among major countries, significantly increased its defense expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defense, and undermined global strategic stability. " While NATO "has stepped up military deployment in Central and Eastern Europe, and conducted frequent military exercises." The US is accused of undermining the security of the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening "its Asia-Pacific military alliances and reinforcing military deployment and intervention." Its deployment of the THAAD system (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) in South Korea to guard against North Korean threats, has in the Chinese view "severely undermined the regional strategic balance and the strategic security interests of regional countries." Read, it may also be seen as threat to China. US allies in region also contribute by becoming "More outward looking in their military endeavours." Closer to home Taiwan is a problem as they have "gone further down the path of separatism by stepping up efforts to sever the connection with the mainland in favor of gradual independence, pushing for de jure independence, intensifying hostility and confrontation, and borrowing the strength of foreign influence." Foreign influence being of course being the US. Then there are the disputes relating to South-China Sea, where China resolutely safeguards its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. "The South China Sea islands and Diaoyu Islands are inalienable parts of the Chinese territory." Now, what is the Chinese strategy for handling what they see as the increased insecurity and threats. The answer on the one hand is an insistence on furthering peaceful co-existence, on the other hand a strengthened and modernised military. This would seem to represent two conflicting strategies. Peaceful co-existence "Never Seeking Hegemony, Expansion or Spheres of Influence." This according to the white paper is the distinctive feature of China's national defence. China is committed to the five principles of peaceful co existence: "Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. (China Daily). An example being the idea in relation to Taiwan of "peaceful reunification,” with “one country, two systems”, and the promotion of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. " The one country, two systems reminds one of the formal status of Hong Kong, where on-going protests and China's reaction to them may indicate the limit to the two systems ideal. In 2019 Xi Jinping also warned that "Taiwan independence goes against the trend of history and will lead to a dead end." He didn't exclude the use of force in relation to Taiwan : "We make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means." So much then for the peaceful reunification. In relation to the South-China Sea, the white paper insists that "The situation of the South China Sea is generally stable and improving as regional countries are properly managing risks and differences. ...A balanced, stable, open and inclusive Asian security architecture continues to develop." This does fit with the views of China's neighbours in the area. China lays claim to a very large part of the South-China Sea, an area generally referred to as being delimited by the nine dash line. The disputed area is seen here (BBC):  Other countries, like for instance Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines have contested the Chinese claim. In 2013 the Philippines raised a case against China at "The Permanent Court of Arbitration" in the Hague. The court ruled in favour of the Philippines, but China accepted neither the court nor the ruling. Instead China has continued in its efforts to establish Chinese sovereignty as a fait accompli by building military installations in the contested area. In the white paper it sounds like this: "China resolutely safeguards its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The South China Sea islands and Diaoyu Islands are inalienable parts of the Chinese territory. China exercises its national sovereignty to build infrastructure and deploy necessary defensive capabilities on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea, and to conduct patrols in the waters of Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea." Preparing for non-peaceful belligerence The overall military guideline being: "We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked." In the US interpretation this means that China "may conduct defensive counterattacks by responding to an attack or striking preemptively to disrupt an adversary’s preparations to attack." The goals of China's national defence as stated in the white paper are:
To fulfil the goals the white paper argues for reform and modernisation of the PLA (People's Liberation Army), military modernisation innovation based upon for S&T (Science and Technology) and strengthening of all areas of defence. In the words of Xi Jinping: "China must step up transforming its armed forces into a world-class military that is ready to fight and win wars as the country will never compromise on defending sovereignty." Organisational reform "The reform in the leadership and command system is a significant measure in response to the call of a modern and specialized military capable of fighting and winning wars in the information age, aiming to improve the operational effectiveness and development efficiency of the military." A more efficiently organised PLA is to be achieved by cutting the force with 300.000 personnel to keep the active force to 2 million, and by cutting leading organs by 25%. It is now assumed the army has shrunk to around 975.000. "New types of combat forces have been enhanced to conduct special operations, all-dimensional offense and defense, amphibious operations, far seas protection and strategic projection, aiming to make the force composition complete, combined, multi-functional and flexible." Modernization and Innovation Strategic goals for the development of China’s national defence and military in the new era are
Promoting innovation in defense S&T and military theory. China’s armed forces are accelerating the implementation of the strategy to develop the military through S&T in a bid to maintain and enhance the strength of the areas where they lead, and intensify innovation in emerging areas." The white paper points to success it has had in developing the Tianhe-2 (Milky Way) supercomputer. At the time the world’s No. 1 supercomputer, though it has since slid into No.4 position. On the military equipment side there has been a rapid development of high-tech weaponry and equipment. "Type 15 tanks, type 052D destroyers, J-20 fighters, and DF-26 intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles have been commissioned." In December 2019" Global Times" reported "China is developing a new type of fighter jet, according to the country's top aircraft design institutes ... Military observers predict, based on publicly available information, that the aircraft will be stealth-capable and feature the significant use of advanced composite materials." In addition the PLAAF (PLA Air Force) plans for a "new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets. Stealth technology continues to play a key role in the development of these new bombers, which probably will reach initial operational capability no sooner than 2025." In December 2019 China also commissioned its new carrier built in China, demonstrating that it aims to be able project military might to the "far seas." According to the while paper "The PLA Navy (PLAN) has extended training to the far seas and deployed the aircraft carrier task group for its first far seas combat exercise in the West Pacific." China is in fact rapidly building a navy that at least based upon the number of ships is challenging the US navy. China's expanding navy (Reuters special repor):  uIn 2019 the PLAN is estimated to have around 400 warships, while the US Navy has shrunk to 288. Though a 2020 plan sees a need for 355 warships in US Navy by the 2030s. China recently acquired a base in Djibouti (August 2019) to support PLA, presumable to strengthen China's "far seas" ambitions. While China publicly at least hasn't plans for a world wide net of bases like the US, there seems to be plans afoot that it may intend to get more bases to support its ambitions. There are rumours that investments in foreign ports may have dual purpose. In 2017 China acquired control over the Sri Lankan port Hambantota it "Though the agreement technically bars military use of the port by foreign countries, it provides an exception should the Sri Lankan government grant permission." According to "Brookings" there are rumours that potential “bases in Haifa, Israel and Ream, Cambodia reflect similar priorities to those exemplified by Djibouti and Hambantota" (Brookings). China also has its eyes on a series of Pacific island states. During the 70th anniversary parade , China also showed off the new DF 17 hypersonic missile which might pose a threat to regional stability and the US fleet in the Western Pacific. Also in the parade was the new intercontinental road and rail mobile ballistic missile, DF 41, with a presumed range up to 15,000 kilometres. Armed with thermonuclear warheads a potential threat to rest of the world. While China says it is committed to a nuclear policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, it "pursues a nuclear strategy of self-defense, the goal of which is to maintain national strategic security by deterring other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China." (White Paper). Clouded in secrecy are China's nuclear capabilities. In 2019 the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) estimated that China had around 290 nuclear warheads, numerically about equal to France, with the majority found in land based ballistic missiles, a smaller amount on nuclear submarines and tens to be used by the air force. China is expanding its triad of nuclear forces, land sea and air. It aims to have 6 ballistic missile submarines (JL class). One estimate by FAS is that by 2029 China may have in the region of 600 warheads. Thus we see China expanding its military capabilities in all areas like cyber warfare, in space, in more traditional areas like ballistic missiles, air force, navy and military base facilities abroad. US view – China a strategic threat to US military hegemony In a statement to the Congress the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, said that "China represents our greatest long-term strategic threat to a free and open Indo-Pacific and to the United States,... Through fear and coercion, Beijing is working to expand its form of ideology in order to bend, break and replace the existing rules-based international order, ... In its place, Beijing seeks to create a new order, one with Chinese characteristics led by China, an outcome that displaces the stability and peace of the Indo-Pacific that has endured for over 70 years.” (Joint Chiefs of Staff). US-China military scorecard All the way back in 2015 the RAND Corporation released a military scorecard comparing US and China. Summing up their analysis in this card:   rThis shows that China may be close to achieve equality with US forces in several areas, at least in the geographical areas close to China (The Taiwan option) and in the South China Sea, while it may still be at a disadvantage in other areas. A 2019 report from USSC (United States Studies Centre) at University of Sydney, warns that "Chinese counter-intervention systems have undermined America’s ability to project power into the Indo-Pacific, raising the risk that China could use limited force to achieve a fait accompli victory before America can respond; and challenging US security guarantees in the process." (USSC). US turning focus towards China US National defence Strategy 2018: "As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global pre-eminence in the future." The focus is certainly on China. No wonder that the US Defense Secretary has summarised the main focus for US defence in three words: "China, China, China." The Trump administration has also been much more active than previous administrations in seeking to reclaim and preserve US hegemony in a variety of ways. "It has conducted freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait; sold arms to Taiwan; confronted Beijing with tariffs; demanded trade negotiations; and criticized China’s major international undertaking, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)." (The Heritage Foundation). US commitment to the region is manifested in the presence of 375,000 US military and civilian personal assigned to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). The US is also attempting to strengthen is presence in the region. One example being a memorandum of understanding with Singapore regarding U.S. use of facilities in Singapore. This agreement allows continued U.S. military access to Singapore’s air and naval bases. Keeping technology supremacy or at least equality with China The focus on China as the primary challenger to US military hegemony is also reflected in the 705.4 billion dollars Pentagon budget proposal for 2021, aimed to counter not the least the modernisation and new weapons development in China, and Russia too. "That means new technology. The request includes $106.6 billion for research, development, testing and evaluation of the modern weapons systems required to fight such a war, including $3.2 billion meant to hasten the development of hypersonic weapons, $1.5 billion for the development of 5G communications technology that officials said is critical to ensuring systems and troops can share information rapidly, $1.7 billion earmarked for automation research, and another $800 million for Pentagon organizations developing artificial intelligence capabilities." (Stars and Stripes) Containing China The US is also engaging in what might be seen as a containment strategy. With the recent report "A Free and Open Indo-pacific – Advancing a shared vision" Pompeo's State Department "outlined a vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific in which all countries prosper side by side as sovereign, independent states" Noting that this vision excludes no one, it is evident that the US main attempt is to strengthen and deepen relationships with a half-moon sphere of countries surrounding China. "Our alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand have helped sustain peace and security for generations." New are strengthened strategic partnership with India, South Asian nations, Pacific island states and Taiwan. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is the top destination for U.S. investment in the Indo-Pacific. In 2018, cumulative U.S. investment in ASEAN was $271 billion, more than U.S. FDI in China and Japan combined. China on the other hand is seeking influence (and perhaps bases) in small pacific island states by promising investment in return for joining the Chinese sphere of influence. As in the case of the Solomon Islands, who in return withdraw their recognition of Taiwan. The small poor island state of Kiribati switched allegiance from Taiwan to China in September 2019. Vanuatu has declared that says no to Chinese military bases, stating “We are a non-aligned country. We are not interested in militarisation, we are just not interested in any sort of military base in our country.” One may accept that as realistic for now, but what if they become dependent on Chinese investment. China's activism in the Pacific island states worries Australia, who is now trying to counter Chinese expansion with a “Pacific step-up” program promising investment and enhanced Australian support to the islands. Doubts about US hegemony in the region The Australian USSC report isn't sanguine about the present and future US ability to counter China. The report finds that the US has "an atrophying force that is not sufficiently ready, equipped or postured to fulfil a strategy of conventional deterrence by denial in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, the combination of two decades of near-continuous combat operations, budget dysfunction, aging equipment, and the rising cost of advanced military hardware has severely impacted the quality and quantity of America’s high-end armed forces." At the moment we are thus forced to conclude that Chinese military efforts are in the ascendency, while the US star is, if not waning, at least not shining as brightly as it has in the decades after WW II, and the US and the West in general may be on the back foot in other areas too. 5. A CRUMBLING WEST VS. RE-JUVENATED AUTHORITARIAN CHINA In "Der Untergang des Abendlandes" or "The Decline of the West," published just after World War I Oswald Spengler predicted the decline of Western civilization. Spengler had the idea that all cultures, just like living organisms, had a kind of life cycle. While many may view history as a kind of progressive progression toward ever-higher stages of civilization, Spengler sees civilization as the end stage of a culture. Civilization represents the petrified final stage of culture. Where the movement has ceased. Where the creative power of becoming is replaced by the stagnation of what has come into being. In a modern interpretation of Spengler, it reads as follows: "Once a Culture's aim is attained — its idea, its entire content of inner possibilities fulfilled and made actual — it suddenly hardens. It mortifies. Its blood congeals. Its creative forces break down. The fire in the soul dies. Life is fatigued. The society experiences no more fullness but instead poverty, coldness, emptiness, an intellectual chill, and void. Values built up and maintained within the Culture begin to fall away. A sweeping transvaluation, a rejection, a persistent nihilism remolds old forms, understands them otherwise, practices them in different ways. The society begets no more, but only reinterprets. " (Burner, Staring Into Chaos) Today one might get an unpleasant feeling that this description might well fit some of the more negative developments of Western societies today, but still reassure oneself by the thought of the immense creative power of modern science and technology. While we may see signs of looming Western sunset, the sun is certainly rising over China, with its phenomenal re-juvenation and rise after the dismal post war Mao period. President Xi Jinping not long ago talking of a "Chinese Dream" (Zhongguo meng) of the future based upon a political model, expressing the superiority of the Chinese Communist Party-led multiparty cooperation system, and rejecting Western ideas of democracy A Chinese Dream in which China by 2050 will have returned to its rightful status after over a century of bowing to the demands of Western powers. Achieving a goal in which "China will continue to grow and China will be so developed in all aspects that it will be truly a superpower." (Xi Linping). Population: Dwindling in West, holding in the East The Western population of predominantly "white" people make up a steadily diminishing part of the World population, and is characterised by low birth rates and aging societies. Take a look at this projection of world population in 2050 from Worldometers  A comparison of The West (seen as Europe plus North America) with China doesn't look quite as bad, as the population of China is also stagnating,. Europe plus North America is projected to have a population of around 1.1 billion in 2050, while China is projected to have around 1.4 billion. But Western decay isn't just about population numbers. A comparison of The West (seen as Europe plus North America) with China doesn't look quite as bad, as the population of China is also stagnating,. Europe plus North America is projected to have a population of around 1.1 billion in 2050, while China is projected to have around 1.4 billion. But Western decay isn't just about population numbers. Losing faith in Democracy in the West, standing by authoritarian institutions in the East People in the West are losing faith in the social model that has been the foundation of the progress of the Western world. Surveys published in 2014 and 2018 show that young people in the West have a rather pessimistic outlook on their own future compared to young people from other parts of the world, where especially young people from China, Brazil, Turkey and India have a positive outlook on their own future. (Ipsos moris). The 2018 survey found that 94.1 % of Chinese youth were optimistic about their future, while for instance only 65.3 % of young Swedes were optimistic about their future. A "World Values Survey" study shows that in the West there is a generational gap when it comes to confidence in liberal democracy. Younger generations no longer consider it important to live in a democracy. Where older generations regard a democratic order of society as vitally important, only 30-40 percent of the youngest generation considers it important to live in a democracy. Perhaps surprising but in China surveys has consistently found a high level of support for the political system. A "World Values Survey" looking at trust in political institutions found that 64 % of the Chinese people trusted the key political institutions, higher than in the US, with a 56 % trust in key instructions, while in Russia trust was only 42%. It must said though that this survey is from 2000. While one might argue that people in China may hide their true convictions for fear of retribution, it is remarkable that the value for trust is so much higher than in Russia where people may have the same fear. Even so there may be signs that trust is declining, seeing that China " has grown increasingly reliant on a new set of instruments, the most prominent among which are pragmatist policies aimed at maintaining high economic growth and improving people’s livelihoods, appeals to Chinese nationalism, and selective repression." (cfr.com). One may also see the lobotimization of the possibilities for expressing public opinion, and attempts to create detailed individual surveillance and social control mechanisms as evidence of a regime reminding one of an Orwellian "1984" state. Cultural relativism in West, cultural supremacy in the East The West is surrendering to an unfortunate cultural relativism. People who think in these terms do not see that invisible, but crucially important and mutually supportive values and norms that uphold our culture, democracy and society are eroded away. Do not see that they themselves are guilty of this erosion. They make silly excuses for not putting our values and our culture above other value systems or religious requirements that are formulated differently from our values. They forget values exist only by virtue of our living them, not by idiotic re-collections in a culture canon. As if this anchors culture in anything. On the contrary, a culture cannon is a sign of the erosion and dissolution, and a cannon cannot save it. We can only save our culture by living it and insisting on its values. And I am increasing doubting that we will and dare do that in the West. What was it we read in an interpretation of Spengler's predictions: "Values built up and maintained within the Culture begin to fall away." Isn't that exactly what's happening right now? No so in China, where we find a deep rooted belief in their own superiority in relation to the everyone else, at least according to the experience of foreigners in China: "[W]hat we would consider racism in the West is simply a deeply ingrained cultural characteristic of mainland Chinese people. White skin (the Chinese like to consider themselves white) and or being a Han (the dominant ethnic group) means a person is good. Dark skin or not being Han means a person is inferior (and more likely to be a bad guy/a thief/incompetent etc.)." (The Atlantic). What one has to remember is that although there are a number of minorities in China, more 92% of population see themselves as belonging to be the homogenous ethnic group of Han Chinese. As Hobsbawm has noted China is one of "the extremely rare examples of historic states composed of a population that is ethnically almost or entirely homogeneous." Well, then there are of course the problems with the minority of the muslim Uighurs in the Western province of Xinjiang. According to The Council on Foreign Relations China has detained more than million Uighurs in re-education camps. While this has lead to Western outburst in the West, it would seem that Han Chinese don't have a problem with that, perhaps again marking a belief in their own cultural superiority. Deepening fault lines in the West, Enforced unity in the East Our assumption is that society in large parts of the western world may be likened to an expanding donut, where an increasingly diverse and loud periphery runs with all the attention, not paying attention to the hollowing out of the centre. The expansion is so powerful that the periphery is split into countless, incoherent bits of identity groups. This picture illustrates a community that is disintegrating. In all sorts of identity - and special interest groups. Noisy, loud-mouthed, wildly gesticulating groups of focused opinions that all seek maximum attention, with the aim of gaining benefits for themselves, regardless of the consequences for the rest of society. This preoccupation with one's own group identity and group self-assertion has lead to a loss of a shared vision, destiny and community itself as a Gemeinschaft. The focus is on what separates the different identities and not on what is shared. It is the I that matters, not the We. "Today, in the wake of decades of group identity politics and the attendant deconstruction of our heritage through academia, the media, and popular culture, this conviction in the uniqueness of the West is only a pale shadow of what it was a mere half century ago. It has been replaced by elite narratives substituting shame for pride and indifference to one's own heritage for patriotism ... Western societies have changed in ways that make social mobilization around the shared idea of a nation increasingly problematic. This ideological hollowing out of the West has been accompanied by a surge in confident revanchist nationalisms in other parts of the world, as well as religiously inspired totalitarianism. (Micha). " In the ever-larger, growing hole in the middle of society we find the forgotten parts of society. A great mass of isolated people without organization, without the ability to gather in powerful movements, without the ability to articulate their desires and demands in well-formed explanations and reasons. Today we have begun to hear them. For now they have become noisy. We hear their unarticulated cries, incantations, protests and actions. They mark themselves in protest parties and they mark themselves with silent voices on a ballot paper. But demands of the hollowed-out centre are incomprehensible and unacceptable to the self-conscious progressive forces expanding in the outermost part of the donut's periphery. The chattering groups of people dominating public discourse with political correctness and a strange kind of one sided tolerance, that doesn't include those left behind. Contrast this with what we see in China. While there may be fault lines in China, the majority of the population belong to the same ethnic group of Han people., " The racial identity and collective memory associated with Han-centrism is a cohesive force that the Chinese political elite can exploit. Here racial beliefs often feed hyper nationalism, and as China continues to expand its sphere of influence regionally and internationally, it needs the unwavering patriotic support of its population at home and abroad. Han-centrism makes this possible by supporting and legitimating an " us versus them" mentality that fuels security competition and mistrust between China and other nations." (Friend and Thayer) There may be fault lines between town and country and between mass and elite in China but is is evident that compared to Western fault lines we haven't seen a similar break up and disintegration in China. In China the emphasis still seems to be on the We and not the I. The exception of course being the democratic protests in Hong Kong. Protests that one may surmise has something to do with Hong Kong's past being influenced by British idea of freedom and democracy. It remains to been seen what the Hong Kong protests may lead too, but at the moment it is difficult to see them inspiring further protest in mainland China. 6. CENTRE OF GRAVITY SHIFTING EAST In January 2019 The Economist in the piece called "Red moon rising – How China could dominate science” posed the question "Should the world worry?" If we look at the rapid pace with which China, at least up until now, has been moving, the answer must be "Yes, the West should worry." China is fast playing catch up with the overall economic power of the US, while China is lacking in overall economic clout when adding up the US and the EU. The problem is that the US and the EU seem to act at cross purposes in relation to China. Where the US see a serious competitor undermining US economic hegemony, The EU for too long have seen China as convenient partner, a major market not the least for German cars, and at least until recently manufacturer of cheap goods. In general seen as a win-win situation. The view is changing now, at least verbally. But as long as the EU does not work alongside the US, this contributes to a weakening of the US position. In the struggle for technologic and scientific dominance China is again mainly seen as competing with the US, while Europe is lacking behind in its efforts. Although it seems that the new EU Commission under von der Leyen has realised that a major effort is necessary to keep up with Chinese advances in artificial intelligence. Macron and others have are also following in Trump's footsteps, realising that something must be done to protect advanced European technology sectors from Chinese ownership. The question is, why isn't the EU supporting the US efforts, to which the answer would seem to be that EU is kowtowing to China, fearing that their exports may be in danger. A really short sighted view, and one which is frustrating to US efforts to preserve Western hegemony in science and technology. Looking the geopolitical influence of China vs. the West we may conclude that in relation to Africa all three the EU, the US and China, have somewhat similar hegemonic influence based upon very different approaches. Even so one may find that the Western position in Africa is waning in relation to Chinese projects. Being coupled more to ideals in relation to democracy, development and human rights than the Chinese approach. An approach that ruthless and impervious to moral considerations follows a strategy, where the main consideration is whether the approach is advantageous to a China In relation to Latin America it is evident that Chinese influence is growing, while the traditional hegemonic influence of the US is waning, and Europe's influence is weak and confused, plagued by various ideological and moralistic views and goals, whose achievement may actually become less secure by insisting on them, as it leaves the field to a more self-serving Chinese influence. The EU paper ideals, is no match for real Chinese influence. Again Europe's position is weakening the Western position in relation to China. In the raw power struggle Europe plays no role. The hegemonic struggle is between a hastily rising Chinese military, apparently focusing its efforts more and more on modern technology, and in the first instance dominant in the South-China Sea. But the signs of a grander strategy are there, in the development of new weapons and a military with more of a global reach. This is also seen in the efforts to gain footholds that has potential as military bases. The may US still be the only real world power, but its military power is increasing being challenged, not only by China but also Russia, forcing the US to enormous defence expenditures to maintain superiority. Europe meanwhile is hiding under the mighty umbrella of US military power, contributing very little to the power struggle with China and Russia. All the while talking grandly about peace based upon multilateralism and the rule of law. As if this isn't in the end based upon the power to uphold these grand ideas. While there is no question of a rejuvenated and self-conscious and growing Chinese hegemony, there are the signs of internal decline of the West that doesn't bode well for upholding existing Western hegemony. To counter rise of an increasingly powerful China believing in its own superiority, and to avoid an "Untergang des Westen" scenario, there must be a re-juvenated Western drive, a will to power, and a conviction in the validity of ideas and values of the West. Instead of giving in to defaitisme and value relativism that cripples the ability to decide and to act. To be really heretical: We need some kind of pendant to Trump's "America First." A Re-vitalization of the belief in the superiority of the ideas and values that shaped the West. |
