 This article takes up the following topics:
Wildly diverging views on how to tackle Iran The JCPOA agreement – US withdrawal with feeble European attempts to uphold Iranian threats and provocations The missile attack on Soleimani – stupid act of war or stroke of genius Western consternation Muted Iranian reaction Trump's decision, not quite as stupid as thought? European change of tone towards Iran? New years surprise January 2, Statement by the Department of Defence: "At the direction of the President, the U.S. military has taken decisive defensive action to protect U.S. personnel abroad by killing Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization." (Department of Defense). In the early hours of Friday, January 3, General Qassem Soleimani arrived at Bagdad International Airport from Lebanon and was met by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (real name was Jamal Jaafar Ibrahimi), a local leader of PMF (The Popular Mobilization Forces), a group of Iranian backed armed militias in Iraq. The two men and their entourage entered two cars, and left the airport. A short time later Hellfire missiles fired from a US Reaper drone hit the two cars in a high precision attack, killing the two men and their entourage, without hurting anyone else. Media sources report that after the attack Soleimani and al-Muhandis were photographed and identified by US special forces, who had been following the two cars at a distance. Trump posted a Tweet of a US flag, later followed with Tweets bragging "General Qassem Soleimani has killed or badly wounded thousands of Americans over an extended period of time, and was plotting to kill many more...but got caught!" New year's drone attack on Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was received with surprise and consternation. What would happen now? Would Trump's decision turn out to be a stupid act of war, provoking reprisals and war in the Middle East? Or was the attack a stroke of genius, a precision strike at the single most important adversary the US had in the Middle East, and a warning that no one would be beyond the reach of the US? Before looking at the reasons for killing Qassem Soleimani and the reactions to the killing in the West and in Iran, it is important to look the history of actions that led up to this attack, starting with the wildly diverging US and European views of how to deal with Iran. The main bone of contention being the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). Wildly diverging views on how to tackle Iran The reaction to the killing of Soleimani reflect diverging views and policies on Iran and its activities, between the Trump administration on the one side and seemingly everyone else on the other side. This divergence already came to fore when Trump became president and later tore up the so-called JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) with a statement from The White House on May 8, 2018: "President Donald J. Trump is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal." JCPOA The JCPOA was agreed in Vienna on July 14, 2015, and represents an agreement between Iran on the one side and E3/EU+3 on the other (Germany, France United Kingdom, EU, Russia, China and the USA) . The JCPOA was meant to "ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons." In return for Iran’s agreement to limit their nuclear ambitions, the sanctions that had been in place were to be lifted successively. The JCPOA promising "the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy." To ensure Iran's compliance the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA would monitor and verify Iran's compliance. According to the JCPOA Iran will limit their nuclear enrichment program by limiting the number and types of centrifuges used for uranium enrichment, and "keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%," a level typical for fuelling nuclear power reactors, for 15 years, and refrain from enrichment R&D. Likewise the Iranian stockpile of enriched material will be capped at 300 kilograms for 15 years.. Furthermore Iran will redesign the so-called Arak reactor to assure compliance with the JCPOA and not produce weapons grade plutonium. There is a mass of detailed provisions in the agreement, which also includes a Dispute Resolution Mechanism. If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution ... similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same. US criticism of the JCPOA While Trump has been known from the beginning for his opposition to the JCPOA deal, it is perhaps less well known that all Republicans and a number of Democrats also criticised the so-called Obama deal for being insufficient to contain Iranian activities. Their critique concern three major problems with the deal: Iran is allowed to continue to do research and development on centrifuges and even on delivery systems and doesn’t have to reveal their past nuclear work. Work that Prime minister Netanyahu revealed in spectacular presentation based upon material obtained secretly from Iran. Second problem. The existing sanctions on Iran were intended to force Iran to limit other of Iran's adversary activities. With the JCPOA Iran would now be free of sanctions without being forced to limit its other problematic activities. Third problem. The lifting of Iranian sanctions would be indefinite, "while the most important nuclear restrictions on Iran only for another six to 13 years." (Foreign Policy). https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/05/heres-where-advocates-and-critics-of-the-iran-nuke-deal-can-agree/ It should be mentioned that very detailed examination of the JCPOA by the Arms Control Association, seem to reach the opposite conclusion of those criticizing the JCPOA. Insisting that the detailed provisions of the JCPOA are in fact fairly comprehensive, and that the "JCPOA is a strong, verifiable barrier against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, but additional attention to nuclear issues in the region will bolster its chances of success in the longer term." Even if that should prove to be the case, the JCPOA deal would still be seen as insufficient by the critics, as it results in the lifting of sanctions, while allowing Iran more freedom to pursue other problematic activities, like a ballistic missile program, support for the Assad regime in Syria, and support for its regional proxies and terrorist groups, like the Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias, the Houthies in Yemen and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. This is an important part of Trump's criticism of the deal and the reasons given for ending the US participation in the JCPOA. US withdraws from the JCPOA It is as late as May 8 2018 that Trump finally declares that US terminates its participation in the JCPOA, arguing that it was "one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into." Among the reasons given for his decision (whitehouse.gov): "The JCPOA enriched the Iranian regime and enabled its malign behavior, while at best delaying its ability to pursue nuclear weapons and allowing it to preserve nuclear research and development." "The JCPOA failed to deal with the threat of Iran’s missile program and did not include a strong enough mechanism for inspections and verification." "Instead of using the money from the JCPOA to support the Iranian people at home, the regime has instead funded a military buildup and continues to fund its terrorist proxies, such as Hizballah and Hamas." To pressure the Iranian regime to alter its course and end its malign activities, Trump announced that he had directed his "Administration to immediately begin the process of re-imposing sanctions related to the JCPOA." The sanctions will target critical sectors such as energy, petrochemical, and financial service sectors. Sanctions that would bring the Iranian economy to its knees again. Trump also announced that he would work to assemble a broad coalition of nations "to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and to counter the totality of the regime’s malign activities." A slap in the face for European appeasement Trump's announcement of the withdrawal may have come as a shock, but it cannot have been unexpected. The US withdrawal was seen as a potentially catastrophic mistake. A French diplomat characterised Trump’s action as unisolationism, being both unilateral and isolationist. A Dutch newspaper De Tijd caught the general mood among many European leaders when writing that Trump's policies are seen as being impulsive, haphazard and chaotic, meaning the Europa can no longer rely on the US to be a stabilising power in the World. "Die Politik Trumps beruht weiter auf Impulsivität und Chaos. Die USA sind nicht länger eine stabilisierende Macht. Im Gegenteil. Trump hat die Büchse der Pandora geöffnet. Die Folgen sind nicht absehbar." Critical of Trumps decision, European leaders also vowed to uphold their part of the JCPOA. The German chancellor, Merkel, argued the day after Trump's decision that Germany, France and the United Kingdom were in agreement that they were committed to fulfil the JCPOA: "dass wir uns weiter diesem Abkommen verpflichtet fühlen" (zdf.de). To understand the European reactions to Trumps announcement it is important to remember that the lifting of Iranian sanctions, meant that European companies were given a golden opportunity for trade and investment in an Iran, that had long been suffering from the existing sanctions. Thus European countries and especially Germany and France didn't only want to uphold the JCPOA for fear of a renewed excalation, but for very real economic reasons. Trumps announcement of reimposed sanctions was bad news for very lucrative investment possibilities and trade with Iran, as all companies also doing trade with US would be hit. Trump warned that those companies who would try to circumvent US sanctions "will NOT be doing business with the United States" (Reuters). At first Europe tried to get the US to exempt their companies. As this didn't work, they tried to create a legal mechanism that would help preserve trade, while avoiding the repercussions from US sanctions. A special purpose vehicle called INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) was created, "to help EU companies do business with Iran and facilitate non-USD transactions to avoid breaking US sanctions against the country." So far the INSTEX mechanism hasn't helped Iranian and European companies to avoid US sanctions. According to EURActiv from January 14 2020, "there had been no transactions through the mechanism so far." Meaning that trade between Europe Iran has suffered a big decline. European exports fell by 53% in 2019 compared to 2018, while Iranian exports to Europe fell by 94%. No wonder that European leaders are frustrated, and that Iran has begun to pressure Europe. Iran's response: Enrichment threats and provocative actions The first response in May 2018 was a verbal warning from president Rouhani that Iran might resume its nuclear program if the JCPOA wasn't saved. The supreme leader Ali Khamenei followed up by saying that he had given order to prepare for greater enrichment capacity if the agreement wasn't saved. The Europeans have since tried to save the agreement, but with little success so far. When the US sanctions began to take effect in the fall of 2018, Iran began to lose patience with the European attempts to save the JCPOA with its more and less futile attempts to circumvent the US sanctions. On 24 November 2018 the Iranian foreign minister Zarif vented his frustrations with Europe: “We negotiated with the U.S. along with other countries, and reached a good conclusion. Now Europe and others should make investments and pay costs for their efforts and global security. You can’t swim without getting wet" (tehrantimes.com). Iran has since warned Europe of the collapse of the JCPOA, if they didn't achieve the economic gains promised by the JCPOA, thus putting renewed pressure on Europe to find a way around the US sanctions. Around the same time European leaders actually began to talk of imposing their own sanctions on Iran, after exposing Iran’s recent provocative covert activities in Europe. For example a plot to assassinate an Iranian opposition leader in Denmark in September. Iran's test of medium range ballistic missiles put new pressure on Europe. Europe’s response to the provocations was feeble, as Europe had always been weary of new sanctions on Iran, fearing that they would undermine the JCPOA and encourage Iran hardliners to create even more problems in retaliation. Thus for time being Europe's response has been characterised by attempts to appease Iran, for fear of further violence or even war in the Middle East. Perhaps they also eyed the number of Iranians in Europe and feared the possibility of new provocations and acts of terror. Seemingly unable to circumvent the US sanction, Europe was caught between a rock and a hard place, Iranian pressure in the shape of threats and provocations on the one hand and Trumps aggressive sanctions on the other hand. In July 2019 Iran threatened to start further enrichment from 3.67% to 4,5% if Europe hadn't found a way to uphold the JCPOA promises within 60 days, with the prospect of later going to 20% enrichment. In September 2019 IAEA would confirm that Iran had begun installing more advanced centrifuges for enrichment of uranium. The IAEA also confirmed that Iran had breached the 300 Kilogram limit on the amount of enriched uranium. On 5 January 2020 Iran officially announced that "The Islamic Republic of Iran, in its fifth step in reducing its commitments, sets aside the last of its key operational constraints on the Brjam, the "limit on the number of centrifuges." As such, the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program no longer faces any operating restrictions (including enrichment capacity, percent enrichment, amount of enriched material, and R&D)." Due to the timing of the announcement this has of course been interpreted as a reaction to the killing of Soleimani on 3 January 2020, but according to "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" this simply isn't the case, the announcement was just the last step in their continuing breach of the restrictions set in the JCPOA. Other Iranian provocations While the breaches of the JCPOA may be seen as provocative, they certainly weren’t' the only provocative Iranian actions since Trump's withdrawal from the agreement. Here are just some of the more conspicuous actions carried out by Iran or its proxies. The US regards it as highly likely that Iran was behind the explosive damage to four tankers off the coast of the United Arab Republic May 2019. More dangerous perhaps was the shooting down in July of a large US Navy Global Hawk drone in what the US says was international airspace by an Iranian missile. The IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) claimed that the downing of the drone was "a clear message to America." Trump's reaction: "Iran had made a huge mistake in shooting down the drone." Having ordered a retaliatory strike on Iranian installations Trump called off the strike at the last moment, surprising not only the Iranians, and leading perhaps to the erroneous belief that the US wouldn't risk a war with Iran. "On 19 July Iranian authorities seized the British-flagged tanker, Stena Impero, in Omani waters in clear contravention of international law" (uk.gov). Iranian forces alleging that British flagged Swedish owned tanker had violated marine regulations. September 14 2019 came the attack on Saudi Arabian oil installations by a multitude of drones. Houthies from Yemen first boasted that they had carried out the attack, but later analysis pointed firmly towards Iran. On 27 December US forces reported that a rocket attack on an Iraqi base near Kirkuk had killed a U.S. civilian contractor and wounded several US troops. US officials believed that Shia militias in Iraq were responsible the attack. Thus the attack could be seen as an attack carried out by Iranian proxies in the shape of Iraqi Shia militias. Some time before Pompeo had warned of a "decisive U.S. response" in case of attacks that would harm Americans or their allies in the region. On the 29 December 2019 the US accordingly responded by bombing five bases three in Iraq and two in Syria belonging to Kataib Hizbollah, a Hashd al-Shaabi Shia militia. Apparently in retaliation to the US attack that killed a number of Shia militias, a mob of Shia militias attacked the US Embassy compound in the Bagdad Green zone on 31 December 2019. Again the mob was seen as Iranian proxies. Then on 3 January we back where we started, with the killing of Soleimani and a leader of the Shia PMF. The missile attack on Soleimani – stupid act of war or stroke of genius? The most probable explanation for the killing is perhaps that the US finally decided that enough was enough, referring the Iranian provocations and proxy attacks on US and allied troops and installations, culminating in the attacks on December 27 and 31. A thought also uttered by the former General and CIA director, Petraeus: "I suspect that the leaders in Washington were seeking to re-establish deterrence, which clearly had eroded to some degree, perhaps by the relatively insignificant actions in response to these strikes on the Abqaiq oil facility in Saudi Arabia, shipping in the Gulf and our $130 million dollar drone that was shot down. And we had seen increased numbers of attacks against US forces in Iraq. So I'm sure that there was a lot of discussion about what could show the Iranians most significantly that we are really serious, that they should not continue to escalate." Petraeus (pri.org). Just a thought though, could the pictures of the US embassy in Bagdad being under heavy attack on December 31 have evoked memories of the 1979 Iranian attack on the US embassy in Tehran, and thus perhaps given the final push to the decision to kill Soleimani? There must have been a whole range possible actions the US could have chosen, like the attacks on Iranian proxies on December 29, attacks on Iranian military installations, radar sites, navy facilities, oil installations etc. Why then choose a precision attack on an individual, admittedly an important adversary? We don't know the actual reasoning behind the decision to kill Soleimani, apart the reasons given in the Depart of Defence announcement and Trump's and Pompeo's talk of an imminent threat. Again we can speculate, and look the divergence between Trump's boasting and verbal threats, and his at least up until now rather muted military actions. Seen in this light the precision attack on Soleimani would fit the idea of limited but smarting military action with largest possible effect. Somewhat like Reagan's bombing of Gaddafi on April 15 1986, after the killing of US soldiers in a discotheque in Berlin., or his attack on Iranian oil installations in 1988. But why Qassem Soleimani ....? Qassem Soleimani was the Head of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC's) Quds Force, essentially the strong foreign arm of the IRGC, operating all over the Middle East. Supporting and arming Houthis in Yemen, smuggling weapons to Hamas in the Gaza strip, providing support to Hezbollah in Lebanon, to armed groups in Afghanistan, and creating armed Shia militias to fight not only Daesh and Syrian opposition forces but also US troops During the civil war in Syria Soleimani brought militias from Iraq and set up additional armed Shia groups to defend the Assad regime. Many the groups receiving Soleimani's support has been designated as terrorist groups by the US. In April 2019 the whole of the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) was designated a terrorist organisation. Thus Soleimani was a leader of a terrorist organisation in the eyes of the US State Department, responsible for attacks on US installations and forces. An idea of how Soleimani saw his own importance may perhaps be gleaned from his message to General Petraeus , when he was commander of all multinational forces in Iraq. "General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qasem Soleimani, control the policy of Iran for Iraq, and also for Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan." Later and seen from a different angle Soleimani's forces, although US adversaries were also active in defeating Daesh (ISIL), often under the umbrella of the US Air Forces. It has even been asserted that Soleimani's Shia militias were instrumental in preventing Daesh from invading Bagdad in 2014. These and other Iranian militias we later united in PMF (The Popular Mobilization Forces) or Hash al Shaabi, now representing a major Iranian backed force in Iraq. Later PMF officially became part of the Iraqi security forces ... yet it is independent from any control or oversight by the Iraqi Defence Ministry" (fpri.org) The other commander killed in the US drone attack, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (real name was Jamal Jaafar Ibrahimi,), was founder of the deadly Kataib Hezbollah group and a leader of the PMF. Kataib Hezbollah had "earned a reputation for planting deadly roadside bombs and using improvised rocket-assisted mortars (IRAMs) to attack U.S. and coalition forces". And Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was apparently the mastermind behind deadly attacks on US and allied forces. Presumably Kataib Hezbollah was also involved in the killing of a US contractor in a rocket attack blamed on Kataeb Hezbollah December 27, and attacks on the US embassy the Green Zone on Bagdad on December 31 , 2019. Did Trump provoke a WW3? – Western reactions to the killing of Soleimani According to "The Hill" "the hashtag "WWIII" quickly started trending on Twitter in the U.S., with more than 1.92 million tweets using the hashtag — many of them invoking memes about the potential for another global conflict." Western media also warned of the risk of war. The left leaning Danish newspaper, Politiken, asked "has Trump begun the third World war? A former Danish foreign minister, Mogens Lykketoft said: "The assassination of Soleimani pure madness." (piopio.dk) The German magazine Focus: "Nach der gezielten Tötung des Chefs der iranischen Revolutionsgarden durch das US-Militär ist die Gefahr einer kriegerischen Auseinandersetzung zwischen den beiden Erzfeinden Iran und USA so hoch wie nie zuvor. Manche sprechen sogar von einem „Sarajevo“-Effekt, der einen neuen Weltkrieg heraufbeschwören könnte." There were warnings of all out war in the Middle East. DW (Deutsche Welle): "Trump riskiert Krieg in Nahost." The New York Times in the same vein: "How Trump pushed US and Iran to brink of war." National Post: "With Soleimani dead, war is coming — that seems certain, the only questions are where, in what form and when?" The general view found in Western media was that Trump had made a stupid and rash decision, without any thought of possible consequences and certainly without any long term strategy. Thus the killing was not only a dangerous act, but a stupid one. The Guardian quotes an ex CIA man for the opinion that Trump goes after celebrity targets with no regard for national security. "It’s this focus on celebrity, headlines, and immediate gratification – versus substance, impact, and consequences – that so often motivates him" (Guardian). A sentiment that seems to echo the picture mainstream media in the West are painting of a puerile Trump lashing out at an enemy that had been provoking him for some time. The dangerous reaction of an unpredictable man, the president of the United States. Lawful killing or illegal assassination Others have questioned the legality of killing of Soleimani. Law professors like Mary Ellen O'Connell discussing the possible legitimate arguments, argued that "The facts of the Soleimani killing do not meet these elements of lawful self-defense." Even though she admits that not all facts are known, which would seem to weaken her argument. The Trump administration has argued that attacks on US personal were imminent, but Pompeo also seems to have referred to the so-called Bethlehem doctrine (by Daniel Bethlehem, legal advisor to UK Government) on a state's right of self-defence against an imminent or actual attack by non state actors. In accordance with the 1973 War Powers Act the Trump administration has informed the House of Representatives within the requested 48 hours of "the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces." The problem is that the information has been classified, thus we do not know the actual arguments used in the decision to kill Soleimani. The partisan reactions in the US Democrats in the US warned of the risk that the killing would escalate tensions in the region. Democrat leader of the House Nancy Pelosi: "Tonight's airstrike risks provoking further dangerous escalation of violence," adding that US and its allies couldn't afford to have tension escalate to a point from which there would be no return. Presidential candidate, Joe Biden, trying to straddle the fence. "No American will mourn Qassem Soleimani's passing" on the other hand " None of that negates the fact that this is a hugely escalatory move in an already dangerous region." Does this means Biden is in favour of the killing or the opposite? Presidential hopeful, Elizabeth Warren, sitting on the same fence: "Soleimani was a murderer, responsible for the deaths of thousands, including hundreds of Americans. But this reckless move escalates the situation with Iran and increases the likelihood of more deaths and new Middle East conflict." Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had seen clips of Iranian "dancing in the street for freedom." after the killing of Soleimani and his companions. Not that the numbers were overwhelming, and their dancing was soon overshadowed by the clips of thousands seemingly supporting the regime. The hawkish Bolton hinted on the ultimate reason for killing the General: "Hope this is the first step to regime change in Tehran." The former outspoken US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, praised Trump's decision to order the drone strike that killed Soleimani, arguing that what Trump did caught the Iranian regime completely flat-footed" and that only ones upset about the decision are Trump's domestic political opponents. (usatoday.com). European voices of restraint and appeasement In Europe the reactions were in general critical of the killing Soleimani, warning like the Democrats of a possible escalation, and arguing for restraint: Macron wanted to avoid a dangerous escalation and called for restraint, fearing that an Iranian counterstroke was to be expected. A similar reaction came from the new President of the European Council, Charles Michel, who urged restraint "at all cost," whatever that would mean. That EU would appease Iran in every way possible? A spokesman for the German government cautiously noted the Iranian activities in the region "Auch wir sehen die regionalen Aktivitäten des Iran mit großer Besorgnis", but then added " Wir sind an einem gefährlichen Eskalationspunkt, und es kommt jetzt darauf an, mit Besonnenheit und Zurückhaltung zu einer Deeskalation beizutragen.“ A few days later, on January 6, we find a joint declaration from Macron ,Merkel and Johnson, stating: "We have condemned the recent attacks on coalitions forces in Iraq and are gravely concerned by the negative role Iran has played in the region, including through the IRGC and the Al-Qods force under the command of General Soleimani. There is now an urgent need for de-escalation. We call on all parties to exercise utmost restraint and responsibility. The current cycle of violence in Iraq must be stopped." They also stated that they wanted to uphold the JCPOA, to limit uranium enrichment in Iran and wanted to continue the fight against Daesh. Voices of dissent Among the dissenters are also the former Italian Foreign minister, Terzi di Sant'Agata, quoted for saying "Was this justified? Yes. A million times yes" Support also came from Israel with Netanyahu arguing that "Just as Israel has the right of self-defense, the United States has exactly the same right. Qassem Soleimani is responsible for the death of American citizens and many other innocent people. He was planning more such attacks. President Trump deserves all the credit for acting swiftly, forcefully and decisively." (npr.org). Furious Iranian calls for revenge The Iranian reactions didn't disappoint. At least their verbal reactions seemed to confirm the words of warning of a dangerous excalation in the Middle east. Just listen to the first reation from the supreme leader, Khamenei: "The flag of General Soleimani in defence of the country's territorial integrity and the fight against terrorism and extremism in the region will be raised, and the path of resistance to US excesses will continue," and "The great nation of Iran will take revenge for this heinous crime." President Rouhani warned "With no doubt, Iran and other freedom-seeking countries in the region will take his revenge." Foreign minister Javad Zarif talked of "The brutality and stupidity of American terrorist forces in assassinating Commander Soleimani... undoubtedly make the tree of resistance in the region and the world more prosperous.” (Reuters) Iranian retaliation in kind – Missile and rocket attacks "At approximately 5:30 p.m. (EST) on January 7, Iran launched more than a dozen ballistic missiles against U.S. military and coalition forces in Iraq. It is clear that these missiles were launched from Iran and targeted at least two Iraqi military bases hosting U.S. military and coalition personnel at Al-Assad and Irbil." (US Department of Defence) In Iran the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Khamenei bragged that U.S. was given a “slap” in the face and that the U.S. “corruptive presence” in the region must come to an end. Foreign minister Javad Zarif even had the temerity to argue that the missile attack on the US Iraqi bases were in accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter, being an appropriate measure of self- defence after the "Cowardly armed attack against our citizens and senior officials." Shortly after the attack Trump tweeted "All is well," and apparently neither US or allied troops had been killed, although physical damage was reported. Having had a warning (from US satellites) of missile launches personal had time to seek security in bunkers. Later is turned out that some US Trumps had suffered concussions, and were to be flown out and treated in hospitals. According to views of Iranian general Hajizadeh, Iran had intentionally avoided hitting and killing US troops "We did not aim to kill (anybody)…we intended to hit the enemy’s military machine,” (tehrantimes.com) The general bragged that had they wanted they could have killed 500 servicemen in the first strike. In addition to the missile attack on the bases there have been small scale attacks with rockets, fired apparently by Shia militias on US installations. Maybe not quite a stroke of genius, but neither as stupid as thought The Iranian "revenge" in kind for the killing of Soleimani, has been rather timid. Contrary to the fears expressed by US democrats, European leaders, and assorted media pundits. Perhaps the US swift and an unexpected response to the provocations in late December 2019 and January 2020, has demonstrated a will and ability to hit even goals that were thought to be immune to attack because of the possible catastrophic consequences. Perhaps leading not to further escalation from the Iranian side, but to the opposite, a realisation that there are limits to the provocations the US wil tolerate. Perhaps leading to a lowering of tensions instead of an increase. Again one might be reminded of President Reagans operation "Praying Mantis" in 1988. After Iranian Iranian actions against tankers in the Persian Gulf and the mining of a US frigate, the US attacked Iranian navy and oil installations. The result of the US actions then was a reduction in Iranian aggressions. An article in the Time expresses a similar view: "When Donald Trump ordered the death of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, he played perhaps his strongest card in a weak strategic hand. He placed a bold bet that his strike would brush back the Iranian regime, place it on its heels, and deter future attacks. It’s a bet that he might lose (with terrible consequences), but it’s far too soon to judge the outcome" (D. French) Trumps actions can perhaps be characterised by being guided by three things. He doesn't seek to create a coalition of wiling before acting. He doesn't follow the rules of what might seen as a rational diplomatic chess game, he seems instead to play several simultaneous games of poker, in the most cases seemingly with good cards, but always trying to rattle his opponents. Finally it is evident that he prefers economic "weapons" in the shape of sanctions to military actions that would risk war. Incidentally Iran's tragic shooting down of the Ukrainian aircraft PS752, at a time when Iran was expecting US retaliation, may inadvertently have contributed to scale down Iranian aggression. The three days of lying from Iranian officials, denying that the plane was shot down by two Iranian missiles, may probably have weakened convictions and support from large parts of the Iranian society, and thus perhaps had a dampening effect on aggressive posture of Iranian leaders. At least for now. No strategic thought and plans for what comes after action It has been a fairly general view that Trump has no long term strategy, that he is acting on a moments impulse, with no overall idea of what he is doing and what the consequences might be. Perhaps this is in itself a really stupid argument, as time after time it as been fairly evident that Trump is having clear and consistent goals, whether in relation to the "wall, " migration, trade, China , NATO etc, and certainly also with regard to Iran and his reason for withdrawing from the JCPOA. In essence he seem to have three essential demands on Iran. Pompeo has longer list of 12 demands, but they might be boiled down to Trumps three demands: - New nuclear deal with no time limits and strict control, which would make sure that Iran wouldn't get the bomb. - No long range ballistic missiles, that would destabilise the whole Middle East, and may one add, threaten Israel and Europe - Less or no interference in other countries in the Middle East, ending Iran's role of being the largest state sponsor of terrorism. Rather reasonable demands one might think, and if fulfilled they would enable him to fulfil another of his promises, that of bringing US troops home. A change in tone from European leaders Probably encouraged by the seeming limited reactions from the Iranians to the killing of Soliemani it may look as if European leaders have finally realised that almost unlimited appeasement may not be the right policy in relation to Iran. With the official Iranian announcement on January 5, that Iran "no longer faces any operating restrictions (including enrichment capacity, percent enrichment, amount of enriched material, and R&D)," the Europeans may have realised that there are limits to what can be achieved by appeasement. This may finally have prompted a still conciliatory, but marked change in the European response to Iranian threats. On January 14 the E3 foreign ministers declared that Iran was no longer adhering to the commitments of nuclear deal. "We have therefore been left with no choice, given Iran’s actions, but to register today our concerns that Iran is not meeting its commitments under the JCPoA and to refer this matter to the Joint Commission under the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, as set out in paragraph 36 of the JCPoA." Once again they reaffirmed their own commitment to the JCPOA and their "determination to work with all participants to preserve it." Or not, as Prime minister Johnson seem to be ready to jettison the JCPOA, if a better deal could be made by replacing the JCPOA with a Trump deal. In an interview quoted in the Daily Mail Johnson argues " look, we have to stop our Iranian friends acquiring a nuclear weapon ... That’s what the JCPOA deal does. If we’re going to get rid of it, we need a new agreement ... If we’re going to get rid of it, let’s replace it with a Trump deal." This led left leaning media pundits to see Johnson as Trump's poodle. The Iranian reaction to the European triggering of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism followed promptly. In a cabinet meeting President Rouhani threatened Europe: "Today, the American soldier is in danger, tomorrow the European soldier could be in danger." On the other hand the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, leading Friday prayers for the first time in eight years, after scorning the Europe for not being trustworthy and calling Trump a clown, he also said that Iran is willing to negotiate with anyone, except the US. Thus perhaps inviting new negotiations. Confront or Appease? Back to the question posed in the beginning. When the JCPOA agreement was struck with Iran, President Obama argued that it would guarantee that Iran wouldn't be able obtain a nuclear weapon, and thereby remove the most serious threat going out from the Iranian regime. He was well aware though that the deal didn't solve all problems with Iran: "We share the concerns expressed by many of our friends in the Middle East, including Israel and the Gulf States, about Iran’s support for terrorism and its use of proxies to destabilize the region. But that is precisely why we are taking this step — because an Iran armed with a nuclear weapon would be far more destabilizing and far more dangerous to our friends and to the world." (Obama transcript). Sounds reasonable doesn't it, but then one has to remember that the deal presumably only came about as a result of the crippling sanctions that were strangling the Iranian economy, with a potential provoke popular unrest. Meaning that Iran had to be confronted in order to accept negotiations. Thus the success of the diplomatic efforts and talks relied on the threat of continued sanctions. While the deal curbed Iranian efforts to obtain nuclear weapons, it did nothing to curb Iranian efforts in other areas, building and enhancing ballistic missiles, and strengthening Iranian power in the whole region by nefarious means. The dilemma relation to all authoritarian regimes, confront or appease? History mayhave taught us that appeasement tend to encourage authoritarian regimes. It might bring peace for the time being, but may result in much larger confrontations later on. Still European leaders, at least for the time being, have chosen a pusillanimous appeasement approach, trying in vain it seams to salvage a deal that was brought about as a result of mainly US sanctions. Trump in his boisterous way has chosen confrontation not only in relation to Iran but also in relation to Europe, by withdrawing from the deal, and enforcing new sanctions on Iran. Thus in way reviving the tactics of a previous administration which got results through sanctions? Will it work? Will the West get a new deal with Iran taking care of the Trump's three demands? No one knows, but on the other hand the European appeasement approach certainly doesn't seem to work. What it does though is weaken Trump's hand and provide unwelcome encouragement to Iran. In the same way one may presume Democratic opposition to Trump in general also weakens Trump's hand, thus perhaps resulting in damaging US strategy, not only in relation to Iran, but in general. Something adversaries will be sure to profit from. Perhaps both Trump and the European leaders would be well to remember President Theodore Roosevelt's old adage "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far." Meaning that Trump's boisterous approach may be interpreted as a sign of weakness, and the European approach as talk without any stick at all. |
