 Macron’s much maligned ideas on European strategic autonomy deserve a serious discussion, realising that Europe today is getting caught like pawn between a hegemonic U.S. and a China striving for hegemony. In order to discuss the question of European autonomy or perhaps the lack of it, this essay will to take a much closer look at the following topics: In part one: Macron’s idealistic views on autonomy The furious reaction to Macron’s views Independent European stance on Taiwan? Dependence on China in critical areas In part two: No European energy independence European trade dependencies No European defence autonomy “The elephant in the room” key problem for European autonomy Macron’s idealistic views on autonomy No, it’s not about Macron’s pension reform trouble in France. The flare up of critical comments on Macron came as result of an interview gave to three journalists on his flight home from the splashy and colourful visit to China. The commotion that resulted has even been compared to the gasps of incredulity at the time Macron said we were experiencing is the brain death of NATO. With political commentators and media ballooning with critical comments on Macrons interview it might be worthwhile to take a closer look at what he actually said and why this caused such an uproar. Relying on a transcript in English we see that the interview started out with questions related to Macron’s view on China’s position on Ukraine, but it soon turned to even more inflammatory subjects and views. On Europe as a pawn between two blocs “The question Europeans need to answer is the following: is it in our interest to accelerate on the Taiwan issue? No. The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction. Why should we go at a pace chosen by others? At some point, we have to ask ourselves what is in our interest … The risk is that of a self-fulfilling strategy by the U.S. and China. We Europeans must wake up. Our priority is not to adapt to the agenda of others in all regions of the world.” On the risk of Europe becoming a vassal The trap for Europe would be that, at a time when it is achieving a clarification of its strategic position, … it would be tangled up in world destabilization, or crises that aren’t Europe’s. If the tensions between the two superpowers heat up, we will not have the time or the means to finance our strategic autonomy and will become vassals, whereas we could become a third superpower if we have a few years to build it. On European sovereignty given the dependence on U.S. for security “We have … introduced the idea of European defence, of a more united Europe that issues debt together during the COVID pandemic. Five years ago, strategic autonomy was a pipe dream. Today, everyone is talking about it. This is a major change. We have equipped ourselves with instruments on defence and industrial policy… There have been many advances: the Chips Act, the Net Zero Industry Act and the Critical Raw Material Act. These European texts are the building blocks of our strategic autonomy. We have begun to set up factories for batteries, hydrogen components and electronics… “We do not want to depend on others for critical issues. The day you no longer have a choice on energy, self-defence, social networks, or artificial intelligence because you lack the infrastructure on these issues, you will be out of history for a moment … Today, we need to accelerate implementation on the military, technological, energy and financial levels to speed up our effective autonomy.” On Europe’s new dependence on U.S. for Energy It is true that we have increased our dependence on the United States in the field of energy, but in a logic of diversification because we were far too dependent on Russian gas. Today, it is a fact that we are more dependent on the United States, Qatar and others. But this diversification was necessary. For the rest, we must take into account the after-effects. For too long Europe has not built this strategic autonomy for which I am fighting. Today, the ideological battle has been won and the groundwork has been laid. This has a cost, which is normal. On the attempt to achieve European autonomy The key to being less dependent on the Americans is to strengthen our defence industry and agree on common standards. We are all putting in a lot of money but we cannot have ten times as many standards as the Americans! Secondly, we need to speed up the battle for nuclear and renewable energy in Europe. Our continent does not produce fossil fuels. There is a coherence between reindustrialisation, climate and sovereignty. It is the same battle. It is the battle of nuclear power, of renewable energy and of European energy sobriety. It will be the battle of the next 10 to 15 years. On a European strategic independence Strategic autonomy means having convergent views with the United States, but whether it is on Ukraine, the relationship with China or the sanctions, we have a European strategy. We do not want to enter into a logic of block to block. On the contrary, we must "deristify" [deriskify?] our model, not depend on the other, while maintaining a strong integration of our value chains wherever possible. The paradox would be that at the very moment when we are putting in place the elements of a true European strategic autonomy, we start to follow American policy, by a sort of panic reflex. On the contrary, the battles to be fought today consist on the one hand in accelerating our strategic autonomy and on the other hand in ensuring the financing of our economies. I would like to take this opportunity to stress one point: we must not depend on the extraterritoriality of the dollar. On Chinese power filling the vacuum left by Europe and the U.S. disengagement We have been going backwards for twenty years. I decided three years ago to increase our official development assistance, but after 15 years of retreat. When Europe disengages, we should not be surprised that others move forward. When the United States turns more towards itself, as it has done since the 2010s, or towards the Pacific, and Europe suffers a financial crisis, China naturally steps forward. In addition to the interview parts of the “Joint declaration between the French Republic and the People's Republic of China” relating to Macron’s visit may also have caused consternation in Europe and the U.S. The first part of the declaration states that “France and China reaffirm their desire to pursue the continuous development of their close and solid global strategic partnership, on the basis of mutual respect for their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their major interests. … in particular to deepen dialogue between the Southern Theatre of the People's Liberation Army of China and the Command of French forces in the Asia-Pacific Zone. (ALPACI), in order to strengthen mutual understanding of regional and international security issues. Once more France also reaffirms its attachment to the one-China policy, and state that differences should be settled through dialogue and consultation and want to strengthen the multilateral system in a multipolar world. The furious reaction to Macron’s views U.S. politicians and media reacted strongly to the views Macron aired in his interview and what was seen as his attempt to align himself with Chinese views in the declaration following his visit to China. Marco Rubio, outspoken republican senator, aired his wrath in a video: “Does Macron speak for all of Europe? Is Macron now the head of Europe? Because if he is, there are some things we are going to have to change.” Threatening: “You guys handle Ukraine.” Lindsey Graham, another republican senator, tweeted: “His latest visit to China only emboldens the Communists and President Xi, who seems to be hellbent on rewriting world order and taking Taiwan by force.” The Biden Administration seem to have their opinion more or less to themselves. While Trump was his usual self, with this comment: “Macron, who’s a friend of mine, is over with China kissing [Xi’s] ass in China, okay. I said France is now going to China? Eastern European politicians also reacted angrily. Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki blasted both Macron and Chancellor Scholtz for their views on China: “"Short-sightedly they look to China to be able sell more EU products there at huge geopolitical costs, … Hence, I don't understand the concept of European strategic autonomy if it means the fact of shooting ourselves in our own knee." (France 24). In contrast to Macron’s ideas about a Europe not just following in the footsteps of the U.S. Morawiecki argued for an even tighter relationship with U.S. “I see no alternative, and we are absolutely on the same wavelength here, to building an even closer alliance with the Americans. If countries to the west of Poland understand this less, it is probably because of historical circumstances,” (Politico). Gabrielius Landsbergis, foreign minister of Lithuania, said “Unfortunately, our geopolitical blindness has not yet been cured. We chose not to see the threat of Russian aggression, and now we are choosing not to see the threat of Chinese aggression,” (quoted in Financial Times). “Macron scheint von allen guten Geistern verlassen“ was the reaction from the German CDU politician Norbert Röttgen: “While it is America and not France or Germany that is providing significant support to Ukraine and thereby defending Europe, Macron calls for a departure from America. While China is practicing the attack on Taiwan, Macron demands a rapprochement with China." Members of the European parliament also chimed in “We will work to ensure that your remarks serve as a wake-up call to democratic governments to do everything possible to ensure that Beijing’s aggressive stance towards Taiwan receives the hostile reception it deserves from the international community,” the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China wrote in a statement. Others regarded Macron’s idea of a European strategic autonomy as a dangerous illusion. “Die transatlantische Allianz, gestärkt durch das gemeinsame Vorgehen gegen Putin, darf keine Risse bekommen. Genau darauf warten nämlich die Diktatoren in Moskau und Peking. Und dann riskiert Europa, irgendwann wirklich zum „Vasallen“ zu werden – jedoch nicht der USA, sondern Chinas.” (Die Welt). “Macron’s comments risked undercutting EU’s unity on the war in Ukraine,” another official said, adding that China had been “impressed” by how the usually fractious bloc had “been able to reach unity” and keep it. “We have the capacity to act with unity under the most massive aggressive pressure … This is huge capital that one should not squander,” (EU-official quoted in Financial Times. It is worth emphasizing that the angry reactions were voiced most vehemently by Eastern European leaders, by Western politicians not in power and by mainstream media. While governments in the U.S. and Europe mostly kept their silence, or at least did not go public with their anger at a Macron once more stealing the limelight with his vision for Europe as an independent third power between U.S. and China. Apparently refraining from criticizing Macron openly to avoid that the carefully orchestrated impression of European unity is falling apart at a time when Europe is acting as a dependable ally in the U.S. proxy war in Ukraine. Independent European stance on Taiwan? EU strategy papers in 2016 and later on relations with China confirms that the EU still solemnly genuflects to the “One China Policy.” Under the guise of the EU thus maintaining “One China” policy and acknowledging People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, the EU still tries to enhance relations with Taiwan. The High Representative Josep Borrell in 2022 argued that the EU seeks “to broaden our cooperation with Taiwan, [and] to modernise our dialogue with Taiwan. But all of it in the framework of the One China Policy, which recognises the People’s Republic as the sole government of China. Let me be clear on this: the One China Policy does not prevent us –the European Union– from persisting and intensifying our cooperation with Taiwan, not from expressing our concerns at the recent rising tensions.” The EU argues that relations with Taiwan are important for two reasons. The EU likes to emphasise that they “share and promote the same democratic values, the respect for international law and human rights, making political cooperation another important item on their shared agenda.”This is one reason why relations with Taiwan are seen as important. While this may not be vital to Europe it is certainly important to Taiwan in the present situation. The other reason is decidedly more essential to Europe as it concerns Taiwan’s vital role in chips production. Taiwan is in fact the centre of fabs (factories or foundries for fabricating chips) for advanced chips production, with the leading company TSMC earning a 56 percent market share of chips production worldwide. Especially notable is Taiwan’s leading position in the fabrication of the most advanced leading edge semiconductor chips. In the fabrication the of sub 10 nm (nanometre) semiconductor chips Taiwan has a share of 92 percent while South Korea is sitting on the rest. Just an example, the new iPhone 14 pro is built with chips using a 4 nm process made in Taiwan. How come that the rest of the World has become so dependent on advanced semiconductor chips fabricated in Taiwanese fabs and assembled into finished products in China? In a way the explanation is quite simple, labour costs are lower compared to the rest of the World and Asia has a skilled workforce. That is why labour-intensive semiconductor production over the years became located in Taiwan, South Korea and China. Like so much else in manufacturing. It is not only labour cost that explains the movement to North East Asia. It is also government support and the characteristics of the labour force. “With decades of industrial policy support, robust infrastructures, and highly skilled workforces, Taiwan and South Korea are particularly strong in advanced manufacturing and possess a combined 100 percent of the global fabrication capacity in 7- and 5- nanometres processing nodes.” There we have it, Europe is at the moment almost totally dependent on Taiwan, South Korea and China for those semiconductors that has become so vital for Western economies. Will Europe follow the U.S. lead? How will the EU handle the growing tensions and the prospect of a war over Taiwan? “One of those challenges for Europe is whether to support Taiwan, an island which Beijing seeks to bring under its political control, through the use of military force if necessary. Even before Russia’s war of aggression, some European leaders were alert to the increasing likelihood of war over Taiwan.” (Lee and Schreer 2022). Europe is of cause aware of the growing tension and mostly trying to tread carefully at the moment, certainly not interested in contributing to the tension in the Taiwan straits for obvious reasons. The question now is, will Europe support a U.S. war over Taiwan like it supported the U.S. proxy war in Ukraine? Perhaps it worthwhile to look for possible alternatives to U.S. and European positions in general viz a viz China and Taiwan. From what we have seen the U.S. does not really care about possible and alternative views from its allies, neither in the relation to Indo-China nor in Europe. It is almost as if it takes it for granted that they all will follow and support the U.S. position willingly and without any real discussion of the U.S. position and the U.S. Strategies. In a way the allies are also in a very weak position relying themselves absolutely on U.S. military power, so they may not even be able to disagree with the U.S. without losing the U.S. deterrence that has been vital for the security of them. Not the least for Europe in relation to Russia. At the moment it looks as if the European allies with their limited means are following with timid steps in the large American footsteps. Accepting restrictions for exporting to China, preventing Chinese takeover of key industrial companies, keeping Chinese firms and communications equipment out of critical infrastructure, to a degree at least. Although some southern and eastern European countries are grateful for Chinese investment. (for instance in the 17+1 alliance). Some allies try to support U.S forces in the Indo-Pacific area. France perhaps more than others because it has important interests in the Pacific. The U.K. perhaps still clinging to the view that it are the most trusted military partner of the U.S., and demonstrating it by sending a new (and apparently faulty) carrier and other warships to the Far East. Even Germany makes a small contribution by having a frigate showing the flag in the East. The German newspaper Tagesspiegel even arguing that the German Frigate Bayern supports Japan and others threatened by Chinese activities. Big mission for a single small warship. If push came to shove over Taiwan, countries like the UK and perhaps even France and some eager U.S. supporters in Eastern Europe might be willing to follow the U.S. without really having the means to influence the outcome, thus doing something that would not mean much, although it may contribute to the U.S determination. War over Taiwan not in the best interest of Europe Take Germany. In 2021 the trade turnover with China (export plus imports) statistics measured in euros, was larger than it was with the U.S. For this and other reasons Germany or any other country in Europe does not have any real interest in a conflict with China over Taiwan, the Chinese dominance of the South China Sea, or the Uyghurs. It evident that a conflict over Taiwan would be major blow not only to the Europe but to the whole Western World. Even if the Chinese just blockaded Taiwan it would mean serious problems for Europe and the U.S. If the large fabs in Taiwan were to bombed and damaged it would lead to a very serious shortage of advanced semiconductor chips for a long time, as it would extremely difficult to establish similar fabs elsewhere. “It takes two-to-three years to build a semiconductor plant from scratch. Replacing lost manufacturing capacity would be extremely expensive — a new semiconductor factory costs tens of billions of dollars and it is extremely knowledge intensive; indeed, TSMC dominates at the cutting edge because of its technological lead” (Japan Times). A full-blown war over Taiwan would not only cut off exports from Taiwan but presumably lead to reciprocal sanctions on Chinese and European goods, and the closing of the South China Sea shipping routes. Therefore, it would certainly not be in Europe’s interest to get involved in a conflict with China over Taiwan. The problem is that a conflict between China and the U.S. would have detrimental consequences, even if Europe opted to stay out of the conflict. At moment it looks as if the U.S. is doing what it can to get other allies involved in creating a kind of united front against China in order to deter China from going to war over Taiwan, With the so-called Quad (The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) involving strategic dialogue between U.S., Australia, India and Japan. With reinforcing its presence in the Philippines. With the AUKUS alliance, the trilateral security act between Australia, the U.S. and UK. With encouraging greater defence expenditure and involvement in Japan and South Korea. But is a war over Taiwan really in the interest of countries like South Korea, Japan, the Philippines or Australia, as they would presumable suffer more than the U.S. in a war with China? Perhaps a war over Taiwan would only come about as a result of the U.S. belief that it still is the ultimate arbitrator in the World based on its previous hegemonic might. Perhaps the time has come the think the unthinkable, even for hawks like Biden, Blinken and Sullivan, that the weakening of U.S. hegemony is irrevocable, while China’s hegemony is on the rise. Dependence on China in critical areas While Ursula von der Leyen accompanied Macron, we did not hear much about her views. But in a speech on EU-China relations just before her visit to China she laid out the EU’s changing view on China, a view that has recently become far more critical of China. “This is why it is vitally important that we ensure diplomatic stability and open communication with China. I believe it is neither viable – nor in Europe's interest – to decouple from China. Our relations are not black or white – and our response cannot be either. This is why we need to focus on de-risk – not de-couple. And this is part of the reason why I will soon be visiting Beijing together with President Macron. Managing this relationship and having an open and frank exchange with our Chinese counterparts is a key part of what I would call the de-risking through diplomacy of our relations with China.” Von der Leyen also emphasized the existing European dependence on China in certain critical areas. “… it also means taking a critical look at our own resilience and dependencies, in particular within our industrial and defence base. This can only be based on stress-testing our relationship to see where the greatest threats lie concerning our resilience, long-term prosperity and security… we will also need more independence and diversity when it comes to the key inputs needed for our competitiveness. We know this is an area where we rely on one single supplier – China – for 98% of our rare earth supply, 93% of our magnesium and 97% of our lithium – just to name a few. (Emphasis added). A paper taking an in depth look on the EU’s strategic dependencies contain a list of some the most glaring dependencies in key areas. List of technological strategic dependencies for the EU(https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/48878 ):  In relation to Rare Earth, Chemicals, and PV (Photovoltaic) Panels the EU is to very large degree dependent on China. For Cybersecurity and IT software the dependence is mostly on the U.S. Here just an example of the dependence on China for rare Earth: Chinese dominance over the rare earth permanent magnets value chain (https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/48878 ):  It is quite interesting to see what the co-called Conservative Seeheimer Kreis of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has been up to recently. In their new strategy paper, they also see a need for more European autonomy in certain areas, just like von der Leyen. “Germany and the EU must pursue a multidimensional trade policy. Supply chains must be diversified and new partnerships formed. At the same time, the open and honest exchange with China is all the more important. The EU must make its strengths clear here and speak with one voice in the future… An abrupt end to trade relations with China would be an economic disaster.” (Seeheimer Kreis). Like von der Leyen, they “call for a new European investment agenda and industrial offensive: starting with stronger incentives for the settlement of solar, wind turbine and hydrogen producers as well as with important key technologies such as semiconductors, chips and batteries.” (Seeheimer Kreis). We take these views to mean that although Europe should not join more drastic attempt to decouple from China, it should at the very least become less dependent on China in certain key areas, by investing heavily in those areas. In short, keep up trade and economic relations with China on what has often been called a level playing field, while reducing dependence on China in certain critical areas. More or less like Macron envisioned. Now on to the question of whether the EU would be able to somehow achieve strategic autonomy in the key areas mentioned here. It is evident that that it would be difficult and perhaps impossible, given the Chinese dominance, the size of necessary investments and the technical difficulties of substituting the dependence on China with the EU’s own efforts. This means that Macron’s view, that the Europe should not depend on others for critical issues, and von der Leyen’s stress on the need more independence and diversity, when it comes to the key inputs needed for EU competitiveness, may in reality turn out to be mere pipe dreams for a foreseeable future. The EU will continue to rely on China for the key supplies listed and the U.S. for the more intangible supplies related to cybersecurity and key areas of IT, including the rapidly the growing field of artificial intelligence. Chips dependency Statistics related to all important semiconductor production chain, show that Europe, here defined by the EU, is heavily dependent on foreign suppliers, and to a large degree also on foreign customers. The manufacture of electronic components and loaded electronic boards, linkages with foreign customers/suppliers(https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/publications/position-eu-semiconductor-value-chain-evidence-trade-foreign-acquisitions-and-ownership_en):  With a European Chips Act the EU is making an attempt to become less dependent on foreign suppliers and strengthen Europe’s position. With the provisional political agreement to strengthen the European semiconductor ecosystem reached in April 2023, it is argued that a “swift implementation of today’s agreement will transform; our dependency into market leadership; our vulnerability into sovereignty; our expenditure into investment.” (europe.eu).
“With the European Chips Act, the EU will address semiconductor shortages and strengthen Europe’s technological leadership. It will mobilise more than €43 billions of public and private investments and set measures to prepare, anticipate and swiftly respond to any future supply chain disruptions, together with Member States and our international partners.” (europe.eu). What the Commission aims to do sounds like little more than a wish list at the moment, as can be seen from these vague aims. It certainly does not look as if this initiative will help Europe to achieve the autonomy in relation to semiconductors that Macron seems to believe. The EU’s share of global semiconductor production at moment is below 10 percent. With the chips initiative it is hoped to increase this share to 20%. Compared to the recent U.S. “Chips and Science Act” with its 52.7 billion dollars for the CHIPS for America Fund the European initiative may seem underwhelming. Compared to China, where $150 billion has been spent since 2015 to upgrade its semiconductor industry, even more so. |
