A cocksure West risking catastrophe

The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
 W.B. Yeats

When the best still lacked conviction and the passionate were reined in
The sad history of NATO and the Ukraine. At the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008 passionate members encouraged Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. “We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO …Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP [Membership Action Plan]. Therefore, we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications.” (NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008). Encouragement came from the Bush administration eager to expand NATO, ignoring warnings from Russia that Ukrainian member ship would force Russia to treat Ukraine as an enemy.
The best still lacked conviction with Germany and France blocking Ukrainian membership of NATO, arguing that Ukraine was not ready and perhaps also heeding the Russian warning, with French Prime Minister Fillon arguing: “We are opposed to the entry of Georgia and Ukraine because we think that it is not a good answer to the balance of power within Europe and between Europe and Russia.”
The issue of NATO membership then lay more or less dormant until the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the continued fighting in the Donbas.
Previous lukewarm and Ukrainian public support for NATO membership slowly changed to public support for membership. Leading to Ukraine’s passionate press for NATO membership.
In 2019 “The Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, … approved in its final reading a constitutional amendment that reflects the country's strategic goal of becoming a member of NATO and the European Union.” (Radio Free Europe).
When President Zelensky visited President Biden in September 2021, he pressed Biden on the issue NATO membership saying “I would like to discuss with President Biden here his vision, his government’s vision of Ukraine’s chances to join NATO and the timeframe for this accession, if it is possible; and the role the United States can play being involved in a peaceful settlement in Donbas that we would like to reach.” (The White House).
Biden at the time seemed to lack conviction and remained noncommittal.
Later becoming more passionate he voiced support for the Ukraine’s wish. In December 2021 Zelensky’s chief of staff told Reuters: "President Biden said very clearly that the decision on Ukraine's accession to NATO is the decision of the Ukrainian people only, this is a sovereign and independent Ukrainian state."
An attitude certain to encourage Ukraine and anger Russia.
 
A passionate Putin rushing into war
In a long speech on Russian on February 21, 2022 Putin explained his grievances with the NATO expansion towards the East and especially the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO:
These grievances and the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO may explain why Russia handed the U.S. and NATO a draft for a treaty on security guarantees, containing three key demands:
 
First, to prevent further NATO expansion.
Second, to have the Alliance refrain from deploying assault weapon systems on Russian borders.
And finally, rolling back the bloc's military capability and infrastructure in Europe to where they were in 1997, when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed. (en.kremlin.ru)
 
The written answers to his demands from the U.S. and NATO gave no indication that Russia’s demands would be taken seriously.
Causing a visibly angry Putin to state:
“I would like to be clear and straightforward: in the current circumstances, when our proposals for an equal dialogue on fundamental issues have actually remained unanswered by the United States and NATO, when the level of threats to our country has increased significantly, Russia has every right to respond in order to ensure its security. That is exactly what we will do.” (en.kremlin.ru).
 
The blood-dimmed tide loosed …
A few days after Putin’s statement Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24,2022.
While especially the U.S. and UK rushed light antitank weapons like Javelins and Nlaw’s to Ukraine, the main efforts to discourage Russia would seem to have been a succession of Western sanctions meant deter and punish Russia’s economy and weaken its ability to wage war.
While Biden promised to support Ukraine, he also ruled out sending U.S. forces into Ukraine, and pulled out U.S. troops serving as military advisers.
Then after days of fighting, the big surprise, Russian capabilities had been severely overrated. Seeing that Ukrainian troops armed with sophisticated Western anti-armour missiles had severely blunted Russian military capabilities. The feared Russian bear with its mighty steel paws was hurt and withdrew. Not to its lair, but to try again in the Donbas.
 
A West full of passionate intensity
Smelling the growing weakness of the Russian military aggression in Ukraine there is no end to the spiralling self-confidence and self-righteousness of Western leaders out to humiliate Putin and Russia.
No holding back now with the US pouring both smart and traditional heavy weapons and equipment into Ukraine.
The U.S. Senate having just voted 86-11 to approve a $40 billion [milliard] aid Ukraine aid package, and President Biden announcing “The resources that I requested will allow is to send even more weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, replenish our own stockpile, and support U.S. troops stationed on NATO territory.”
The rest of the passionate West joining the U.S. bandwagon with diverse offerings of weapons, even Germany is now willing provide Ukraine with the heavy tools, in the shape of seven advanced Panzerhaubitze 2000, to help push back the Russians and in a “Ringtausch” they will supply the Czechs with 15 Leopard 2 tanks, allowing the Czechs to send T-72 tanks to Ukraine.
A recent list of all known weapon deliveries to Ukraine ca be found at the Forum on the Arms Trade (https://www.forumarmstrade.org/ukrainearms.html).
There are again foreign instructors in Ukraine and Ukrainian soldiers are trained in the West to use the weapons provided.
Suspected for some time, it has now been revealed that the U.S. is providing Ukraine with real time intelligence to help them target the Russians. The Washington Post revealed that “Information about the location and movements of Russian forces is flowing to Ukraine in real-time, and it includes satellite imagery and reporting gleaned from sensitive U.S. sources.” According to a Ukrainian official “The intelligence is very good. It tells us where the Russians are so that we can hit them.”
Somewhat surprisingly it is argued that the intelligence sharing is designed to prevent a wider war. The intention being to calibrate the intelligence sharing precisely so that will not lead to a further heightening of tension between the U.S. and Russia.
Wonder if that is prevented, when seeing that U.S. intelligence helped sink the “Moskva” in the Black see and the apparent targeting of individual Russian generals.
A Biden administration seemingly led by a conviction that Russia is losing, may now dare to provide intelligence that would allow the Ukraine forces to attack objects outside Ukrainian borders, say in the Russian Belgorod area.
Cocky Western leaders are even starting to make mockery of the Russian assault, of their preparations, their logistics, the poor showing of their air force, their special forces, their operational planning, and the low quality of their technical equipment. “GPS receivers have been found taped to the dashboards of downed Russian SU-34s so the pilots knew where they were, due to the poor quality of their own systems.” (Defence Secretary Ben Wallace).
Before May 9 there may have been a certain weariness, as many expected that Putin would use the opportunity to announce some drastic escalation, declare all-out war on Ukraine or put Russia on was footing.
Nothing like that was announced. Putin’s talk was strangely subdued.
The outlook for the Russian invasion does indeed look rather bleak at the moment. Pushed/ withdrawn from the Kyiv area and now also pushed/withdrawn from the Kharkiv area, the land battle is now taking place mostly the Eastern Ukraine, as seen in this map published by the Institute for the Study of War on May 18

In for the kill in the proxy war
The U.S. is now so cocksure that Russians forces are on their heels that Ukrainian forces are really let loose with U.S. help. According to Secretary Blinken Ukraine should “do whatever is necessary to defend against Russian aggression,” adding that “the tactics of this are their decisions.” Perhaps, not wholly on their own given the passionate intensity in the West.
U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Ukraine Kristina Kvien recently expressed the view that Ukraine would win the war: “So far it seems to me that Ukraine has been very successful in pushing back Russia. They pushed back Russia in North of Kyiv, they have now pushed back Russia around Kharkiv. And it is not illogical to think that Ukraine might be able to push back Russia in other areas which Russia has been able to occupy. We specifically haven't discussed Crimea and Donbas in terms of our military support.”
Similar views have been expressed at recent NATO meetings. At the joint press conference after the informal Berlin meeting Stoltenberg said:
“Ukraine can win this war. Ukrainians are bravely defending their homeland.
To help them do so, Allies have committed and delivered security assistance to Ukraine worth billions of dollars, and over the years, NATO and Allies have trained tens of thousands of Ukrainian forces.”
In connection with a G7 meeting at Weissenhaus in Germany on May 12 to 14, the French Foreign Minister Le Drian expressed his conviction that the G7  "very strongly united" in their will to "continue in the long term to support Ukraine's fight for its sovereignty until Ukraine's victory". (AFP).
Western Leaders are still maintaining that this a Russian Ukraine war, not a war between the West (NATO) and Russia. But their arguments rather convoluted, perhaps to convince themselves that what we see is not what we see.
In an interview Le Drian is asked: “Is France’s aim, your aim for Ukraine to win the war?
Le Drian: “No, that’s not what I said. We must be very clear about things: there’s a war between Russia and Ukraine; there isn’t a war between Russia and the Atlantic Alliance, between Russia and other partners; there’s a single war between an invading country, Russia, and an invaded country which is Ukraine. Ukraine must regain its borders, its autonomy, its sovereignty. That’s the aim...” (Emphasis added).
Questioned if this means ensuring that Ukraine will win without humiliating Russia, Le Drian argues: “It means that Russia pulls out of the Donbas, pulls out its forces from the Ukrainian territory it is occupying. There’s an invader; the invader must withdraw. If you want to call that a victory, let’s call it a victory, but the invader must withdraw and no longer be present in Ukraine.” (BFM TV).
Spain’s Foreign Minister Albares Bueno argues in a way that even closer to Newspeak:
“Alles, was wir tun, zielt darauf ab, den Frieden in der Ukraine wiederherzustellen und die russischen Soldaten in die Grenzen der Russischen Föderation zurückzudrängen, die sie nie hätten verlassen dürfen. Darauf sind alle Maßnahmen, auch die Lieferung militärischer Ausrüstung ausgerichtet … Nichts von dem, was die Europäische Union oder die Nato tun, zielt auf eine Eskalation ab.” (Die Welt).
Nothing what the European Union or NATO is are doing, including the weapon deliveries is aimed at escalation.
These are the words, the reality in Ukraine looks different, and the outlook may become even bleaker.
 
 A grim spectre re-emerges
In a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, gave her assessment of what Russia might do after the “failure to rapidly seize Kyiv and overwhelm Ukrainian forces has deprived Moscow of the quick military victory that it had originally expected would prevent the United States and NATO from being able to provide meaningful military aid to Ukraine.”
While Russia strategic goals may not have changed it is evident that it will find difficult in the near future reach even the limited goals of capturing Luhansk and Donetsk and establishing a kind of buffer zone protecting them.
Haines “it is increasingly unlikely that they will be able to establish control over both oblasts and the buffer zone they desire in the coming weeks, but Putin most likely also judges that Russia has a greater ability and willingness to endure challenges than his adversaries, and he is probably counting on U.S. and EU resolve to weaken as food shortages, inflation, and energy prices get worse.”
 Given the apparent success of the West’s proxy war in Ukraine and Russia’s evident difficulties the important question is:
What might/will Russia do now that its mighty military has been humiliated and its goals looks increasingly difficult or even impossible to achieve?
Surely Russia must now realise that it is fighting all the might of West in a proxy war, carried out on Ukrainian soil. Russia finds itself in an impossible quandary similar to the Norse God, Thor, when he was trying to lift the Midgard Serpent or Jörmungandr in the shape of a cat. An impossible task even for Thor as the Midgard Serpent stretched around the whole World.
Putin may have thought it was easy to “lift” a puny Ukraine, but must now realise that he is fighting the Midgard Serpent of the whole of Western might.
What will he do?
Here is what the U.S. intelligence believes he might do:
President Putin may turn to more drastic means …including imposing martial law, reorienting industrial production, or potentially escalatory military actions to free up the resources needed to achieve his objectives as the conflict drags on, or if he perceives Russia is losing in Ukraine.
“The most likely flashpoints for escalation in the coming weeks are around increasing Russian attempts to interdict Western security assistance, retaliation for Western economic sanctions, or threats to the regime at home.
We believe that Moscow continues to use nuclear rhetoric to deter the United States and the West from increasing lethal aid to Ukraine and to respond to public comments from the U.S. and NATO Allies that suggest expanded western goals in the conflict. If Putin perceives that the United States is ignoring his threats, he may try to signal to Washington the heightened danger of its support to Ukraine by authorizing another large nuclear exercise involving a major dispersal of mobile intercontinental missiles, heavy bombers, strategic submarines.
We otherwise continue to believe that President Putin would probably only authorize the use of nuclear weapons if he perceived an existential threat to the Russian state or regime, but we will remain vigilant in monitoring every aspect of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. With tensions this high, there is always an enhanced potential for miscalculation, unintended escalation, which we hope our intelligence can help to mitigate.” (Emphasis added). (Avril Haines Director of National Intelligence at Congressional Testimony, May10).
In the speech announcing the invasion of Ukraine Putin warned the West: “No matter who tries to stand in our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.... All the necessary decisions in this regard have been taken. I hope that my words will be heard.”
Three day later he ordered military command to put Russia's nuclear deterrent forces on high alert.
The White House press secretary Jen Psaki, who often seems to act independently in lieu of Biden, dismissed Putin’s threat on Twitter the same day: “that Russian President Vladimir Putin's decision to put his nation's nuclear deterrent forces on a state of heightened alert was part of a "pattern" of manufacturing threats that don't exist.” (Jen Psaki, February 27).
 In April, when it had become evident that Russian troops were in dire straits in Ukraine
“Sergei Lavrov warned the West on Monday not to underestimate the elevated risks of nuclear conflict over Ukraine and said he viewed NATO as being "in essence" engaged in a proxy war with Russia by supplying Kyiv with weaponry.” (Reuters April 26).
The threats were later dismissed by President Biden, when answering a question from journalist. Sounding somewhat hesitantly he said:
“So, it’s — number one, it’s an excuse for their failure. But number two, it’s also, if they really mean it, it’s — it’s — no — no one should be making idle comments about the use of nuclear weapons or the possibility that they’d use that. It’s irresponsible.”
Prime Minister Johnson was even more casually dismissing the threat. When asked he if shared the concern over threat of a nuclear war he simply said: “No. I don’t.”
Analysts asked to judge the likelihood that Putin might use nuclear weapons when facing defeat in Ukraine have argued that there is a non-zero risk. A former undersecretary for defence put the risk a around 1 or 2 percent, while a former US ambassador to Russia judged the risk to be less than 5 percent.
How they arrived at the percentage is not known, but that they judged the risk to be higher than zero is significant, and ought to give cause for concern among those Western leaders who rather arrogantly dismissed the Russian threat as merely empty words.
Perhaps it would be wise to have a look at the Russian nuclear doctrine.
 
Escalate to de-escalate when things fall apart
On April 21, 2022 the U.S. congressional Service Published a report on Russians Nuclear doctrine.
In 2020 Russia published the latest version of the doctrine entitled ““On Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” The document outlines the circumstances that might lead Russia to use nuclear weapons.
“This document specifically notes that Russia “considers nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence.” It states that Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy “is defensive by nature, it is aimed at maintaining the nuclear forces potential at the level sufficient for nuclear deterrence, and guarantees protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, and deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.” It also emphasizes that Russia maintains forces that could “inflict guaranteed unacceptable damage on a potential adversary ... in any circumstances.”
Defensive it says, but it also states that Russia could respond with nuclear weapons following an “attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions,” but also in an “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” (Emphasis added).
Thus, Russia might respond to a conventional attack with nuclear weapons if it judges the very existence of the state to be in jeopardy. While this might seem to exclude the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Ukrainian war, the document also opens the possibility of nuclear first use as it states:
“… in the event of a military conflict, this Policy provides for the prevention of an escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation and/or its allies.”
 Analysts have assessed that this means Russia might threaten to escalate to use nuclear weapons as a way to deter a conflict that would threaten the existence of the state, with Russia pursuing an “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear doctrine under certain circumstances.
If a conventional conflict might threaten Russia, it might decide to use nuclear weapons to create such a catastrophic threat to a continuation of the conflict that its adversary would be forced  to de-escalate. The Congressional report in fact mentions that this might happen if Russia looks to be defeated in a conventional conflict with NATO.
At least that is how some analysts interpret the Russian doctrine. But it is worth noting that Russia itself does not use the term “escalate to de-escalate.”
Now what does this mean in relation to Ukraine? We are seeing a more and more cocksure attitude in the West, manifesting itself in almost no holds barred support of Ukraine. The reality being that the West is using its potent military arsenal to fight the Russians using their Ukraine proxies.
Could an eminent defeat of all Russians troops in Ukraine, the re-conquering the Russian held areas, and the weakening of Russia military might to a stage, where it would unable to wage war be seen as a defeat of Russia itself?
Would an eminent risk of this happening provoke Russia to nuclear escalation in order to force the West to de-escalate?
 Russian certainly has the enough tactical nuclear weapons to make that a possibility.
 
Russia’s nuclear arsenal
IT is estimated that Russia has 1,912 non-strategic nuclear weapons.
“These nuclear warheads include theater- and tactical-range systems that Russia relies on to deter and defeat NATO or China in a conflict. Russia’s stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons [is] already large and diverse and is being modernized with an eye towards greater accuracy, longer ranges, and lower yields to suit their potential warfighting role. We assess Russia to have dozens of these systems already deployed or in development. They include, but are not limited to: short- and close-range ballistic missiles, ground-launched cruise missiles, including the 9M729 missile [The 9M729 SSC-X-8 is a long-range ground-based cruise missile system], which the U.S. Government determined violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty, as well as antiship and antisubmarine missiles, torpedoes, and depth charges.”
Among the advanced missiles that may be armed with a nuclear tactical warhead is the Kh-47M2 “Kinzhal.” A nuclear-capable, air-launched, hypersonic ballistic missile, one of six new “next generation” weapons unveiled by Vladimir Putin in March 2018. It can carry a payload up to 480 kilos, and be armed with a thermonuclear warhead in the 10 to 50Kt range, and it may be air-launched from a Mig-31.
 
Innocence is drowned …
How might Russia use a non-strategic nuclear weapon, if it is pushed into corner facing defeat in the proxy war with the West?
“Russian military-analytical writings envision a series of steps in which nuclear weapons are first deployed and utilized for signalling, and are then potentially employed in a progressive fashion at the regional level of conflict and finally are used in a large-scale war until the conflict reaches the “retaliation” of all-out nuclear war. At that level of war, in addition to the mass use of conventional precision strike, military writings suggest the employment of “single and/or grouped use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons on adversary forces” as well as the “demonstration use of nuclear weapons by strategic nuclear forces or nonstrategic nuclear weapons.”
There are strong indications that not all of Russia’s nuclear employment appears to be under the rubric of SONF [Strategic Operation of Nuclear Forces].” This means that a tactical nuclear strike with aim of forcing the West to de-escalate could be launched as single initial strike by limited means in a selected region (zone) “intended to destroy political, industrial, and military targets.” (cna.org).
A recent article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists argues that Russian use of “non-strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine could take several forms. They could be used for demonstration purposes—not targeting anything and not creating casualties—to coerce Ukraine and/or the West to agree to a settlement acceptable to Putin. Tactical nukes could also be used to target military units to change the operational situation on the ground.” (thebulletin.org).
“Russian thinking here is keen to avert inadvertent escalation, or the strengthening of political resolve that comes from civilian casualties. The possibility of secondary or synergistic effects, which could result in unacceptable levels of damage, weighs heavily as a consideration. Here, target selection and warhead selection are relevant factors.
The operation is premised on inflicting deterrent damage through the application of limited force. The psychological impact is meant to exceed the level of material damage, affecting the political leadership’s will to fight.” (cna.org).
 
A warning shot
Euphemistically calling it a warning shot this could mean a nuclear explosion in a sparsely populated area Ukraine, using an unstoppable Kinzhal hypersonic missile with a 10 kiloton warhead, or a 9M729 missile similarly configured.
Desperate and vindictive and Russians could perhaps even choose the small community “Ukrainske” for its symbolic value. Using Nukemap one may calculate the probable destructive effects giving the explosion of a 10 Kt warhead, with wind coming from an easterly direction. According to a Nukemap calculation this would result in 140 fatalities and 90 heavily injured. Terrible consequences for a small community and its vicinity in Ukraine, but not catastrophic in the wider sense.
A map showing the areas to suffer the consequences of such nuclear demonstration, according to NUKemap calculations.

De-escalate or risk anarchy loosed upon the World
What would be the Western reaction if the Russians dared attempt to escalate to de-escalate with such a nuclear demonstration, calculated to impress and force the West to de-escalate?
“The emotional noise following the use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine would be deafening, both in terms of calls for restraint and of demands for retaliation. In many ways, the policy community is divided between those wanting an aggressive approach to the war that seeks to force a strategic defeat on Russia and those who want a more constrained approach to avoid a possible escalation.” (thebulletin.org).
Here a list of possible reactions to a Russian nuclear demonstration in Ukraine:
 
De-escalate, scaling down the assistance to Ukraine
 
Respond using conventional weapons
 
 React in kind with some kind of nuclear demonstration
 
De-escalate, scaling down the assistance to Ukraine
It would mean giving in to a Russian “escalate to de-escalate” attempt. It would mean Western powers signalling that they would limit their assistance to Ukraine to level that would not threaten the Russia with defeat, and it would also mean forcing Ukraine to cut down its military and political ambitions. In effect force Ukraine, and the West, to accept some kind of settlement with Russia.
“Given the consequences of a nuclear war between the United States, NATO, and Russia and the risk of escalation beyond Ukraine should the conflict continue, this option argues for ending the conflict in some way that gives the Russian leadership an “out” from the conflict. While seemingly reasonable given the level of destruction and costs of escalation.”
Still, giving in to Russia would be humiliating to decision makers in the West hoping to bring Russia to its knees in their surprisingly successful proxy war against the Russia.
It would also mean that nuclear blackmail would be effective, setting dangerous precedence, given the outstanding conflicts with say North Korea and Iran. On the other hand, there might be much less reluctance to respond in kind in the case of North Korea and Iran, meaning that the precedence setting effect of giving in to the Russian escalate to de-escalate may be negligible.
An aspect that most US analysts seem to forget is that the Europeans would regard a giving in to Russia option as the only option. Fearing that alternatives like responding in kind would raise the spectre a nuclear war on the European continent.
 
Respond using conventional weapons
Fearing the consequences of responding in kind to a Russian nuclear demonstration, the U.S. and especially the Europeans might consider a response using conventional weapons.
This would mean direct Western involvement in a war with Russia. Something the West has tried to avoid, although the cocksure attitude resulting from the success of the proxy war has meant that the restraint is disappearing.
 On overwhelming conventional response could be caried out in different ways.
The limited version would consist of an all-out attack on Russian troops or installations in Ukraine.
 A more dangerous version would be an attack on Russian soil, say on the area, units or installations involved in the Russian nuclear demonstration.
 In this case the Russian escalate to de-escalate strategy would not have succeeded, and the result might be either that the Russia would realise that they were now involved in a direct war with West and that it would have to find some kind of settlement with the West… Or they might choose further escalation, including more forceful Russian nuclear demonstrations. Perhaps against to bases from where the conventional response was carried out.
This would force the West to either seek settlement or escalate further carrying the risk of all out nuclear war.
 
React in kind with some kind of tactical nuclear demonstration
“To truly be “in-kind” in this scenario, the US and NATO would need to strike Russian targets in Ukraine—or otherwise significantly change the nature of the conflict by striking a target in Russia. There may be Russian military targets in Ukraine for which a low-yield nuclear strike would produce limited casualties. But to have a significant military impact, NATO would likely have to use multiple strikes.” (thebulletin.org).
No one can say what the result of such scenario might be. But responsible European decision-makers would see this response in kind option as being far too dangerous. Fearing that it might lead to exchange of tactical nuclear weapon strikes on European soil. The problem is that Europeans may very little say in the decision to respond in kind. The U.S. being in charge and perhaps having less qualms.
“Using a nuclear weapon against Russia immediately turns the conflict into a Russia versus the United States and NATO war that has skipped all the conventional options for escalation management. Given the potential global consequences of a nuclear war between Russia and the United States and NATO, striking targets inside Russia with nuclear weapons is unlikely to be viewed by the US president as a viable option.” (thebulletin.org).
Thus, no one their right mind would therefore regard a response in kind as realistic option in the proxy war against Russia, meaning that we are back with the other two response scenarios.
The 2022 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review states “As long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.”
It would certainly be difficult see a Russian tactical nuclear demonstration in Ukraine with limited local consequences as “extreme circumstances” threatening the “vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners”?
 
Cool the passionate intensity
While the West seems united in their “intense passion” to punish the Russians with help of Ukraine, there are voices calling for a cooling of the passion.
Daniel Immerwahr (with a name signallling “Aalwaystrue”) warns that Western politicians have forgotten the trauma left by the nuclear devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Quoting the Russian ambassador to the U.S. complaining that “the current generation of NATO politicians does not take the nuclear threat seriously.”
Immerwahr argues that “we can’t drive nuclear war to extinction by ignoring it. …
And we’re doing it just at the time when those who have most effectively testified to nuclear war’s horrors – the survivors – are entering their 90s. Our nuclear consciousness is badly atrophied. We’re left with a world full of nuclear weapons but emptying of people who understand their consequences.” (The Guardian).
In an essay published by “Responsible Statecraft” Anatol Lieven warns of the horrible dangers of pushing a US proxy war in Ukraine.
 Arguing that former U.S. presidents like Truman and Eisenhower adopted a strategy of containing, but never fighting the Soviet Union in Europe and not trying to “roll back Soviet power through armed support for anti-Soviet insurgencies in eastern Europe.”
He argues that leaders today should remember this and not try to push back Russia in military proxy war in Europe.
The consequences would be disastrous for themselves “and still more disastrous for the wretched people on the ground who became the pawns of these great power agendas. Have we really learned nothing from history?”
New York Times’ influential Thomas L. Friedman is warning that the war in Ukraine is getting more dangerous for America. He even postulates that Biden knows it, although that seems doubtful giving his rhetoric and the amount of resources, he is allocating to fight the proxy war in Ukraine.
Friedman argues “We need to stick as tightly as possible to our original limited and clearly defined aim of helping Ukraine expel Russian forces as much as possible or negotiate for their withdrawal whenever Ukraine’s leaders feel the time is right.”
The last condition seems very dangerous, giving the views expressed by president Zelensky. Who now sems convinced that the might of Western military assistance will allow Ukraine to aim for goals that would never have been in reach before the latest Russian invasion.
Zelensky insists that he must be given everything he needs to defeat the Russians and push them back from every corner of Ukraine, even the areas occupied in 2014.
“The ultimate goal of Ukraine is to restore territorial integrity, including Crimea, President Volodymyr Zelensky said Tuesday, as Russia pursued its offensive to seize territory in eastern Ukraine. (WSJ).
 In order to do this Zelensky wants to make sure that everything is done “to maintain the world's maximum attention to us, to Ukraine. Information about our needs should be in the news of all countries that are important to us constantly and every day.”
 This means of cause means further escalation, more heavy weapons and more direct involvement of the West in order to achieve Zelensky’s goal, and the passionate intensity in the West is encouraging Zelensky to demand more all the time, scolding those who show less passion.
President Macron has tried to cool the passionate conviction, arguing:
“Nous ne sommes pas en guerre contre la Russie. Nous œuvrons en Européens pour la préservation de la souveraineté et de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Ukraine. Pour le retour de la paix sur notre continent.
Nous serons là pour reconstruire l’Ukraine, en Européens, toujours. (Emmanuel Macron May 9, 2022).
Macron insists that Europe must learn from its past mistakes, and make sure no side is humiliated like the Germans were in the Versailles Treaty after the First World War.
Macron has apparently even to tried to convince Zelensky that Ukraine must pay for peace by accepting to give up some Ukrainian territory.
Not something an increasingly cocksure Zelensky would agree too, with the passionate West bolstering his confidence that everything is possible. He scolded Macron in an Italian interview
“To propose to us to give up something as far as our sovereignty is concerned to save (Russian) President (Vladimir) Putin’s face does not seem like a fair thing on the part of some leaders. (aa.com.tr)
Perhaps Europe should cool its passion for Zelensky and for the mainly U.S. driven proxy war, and instead heed Macron’s advice.
 
Europe must look to Europe’s interest
Restating the argument from an earlier blog post. We wonder why Europe is not making a much more independent diplomatic effort, instead of giving in to moral outrage and Zelensky’s and Biden’s totally overstated warnings about the threat to all of Europe.
Europe is supporting the Ukraine with financial assistance, weapons, welcoming Ukrainian refugees, and seems inclined to engage in self-harming sanctions to reduce Russia’s ability for fighting a war.
Why does it not demand something in return from Zelensky’s Ukraine, instead of just playing whipping boy to Zelensky’s critique?
 Why do decisionmakers not leave moralistic outbursts aside and take a more realistic position that actually turn out to be more in line with their own self-proclaimed European values. This would mean efforts to promote a peace that might spare lives and avoid further destruction in Ukraine and perhaps help solve or at least alleviate some of the problems used by Russia as reasons for the invasion.
Realistically this would mean that Europe would have to put pressure on Zelensky to accept the Russian annexation of Crimea, and insist that the future of the Luhansk and Donetsk would have to be settled by mechanism involving staged referendums from Russian border to the borders of Luhansk and Donetsk.
Either accept this or accept that help would be reduced to humanitarian help.
Likewise, Europe would have to initiate sincere and realistic diplomatic efforts in relation Russia, taking demands from the Russian speaking parts of Ukraine seriously, accepting the Russian possession of Crimea and proposing realistic solutions for Luhansk and Donetsk that would comply with what Europe ought to demand of Ukraine.