Blog Posts

Utopian dream of European strategic autonomy? Part two

5/3/2023

The circle of stars in EU flag is meant to symbolize unity

The figure indicates that the EU is heavily dependent on relations with China for trade in goods, and trade with China has grown rapidly in the last few years, indicating a growing dependence on trade with China. While trade in services has much less weight.
In December 2020 the EU and China in principle agreed on the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, the so-called CAI, opening up the markets and contributing to establishing a level playing field. The agreement has not been ratified as the EU has since become more critical in its China policies.
Now how does trade with U.S. compare to trade with China?

Trade in goods with the U.S.

EU exports in goods to the U.S. reached 509.3 billion euros in 2022, while imports stood at 358.4 billion euros. EU exports to China in the same year reached 230.3 billion euro, while imports reached 626 billion euro.
Comparing the EU’s trade relations with China and U.S. show that imports from China are far larger than imports from the U.S. For exports the relation is reversed, EU exports to the U.S. are far larger than to China. The total picture, of import and export, especially when one includes trade in services, where the U.S. is much more important than China, show that the U.S. is still the most important trading partner in 2022 by a small margin.
The continuing rise in trade and the numbers would seem to indicate a kind of reciprocal interdependence in EU trade relations both with China and the U.S.
But there are signs that relations may be souring in the future both in relation to China and to the U.S.
In relation to China because a European attempt to have your cake and eat it too, meaning a de-risking policy with no de-coupling from China.
“We know there are some areas where trade and investment poses risks to our economic and national security, particularly in the context of China’s explicit fusion of its military and commercial sectors,” von der Leyen said i her speech on China on March 30, 2023.
The proposed CAI has more or less been laid to rest. The recently proposed EU Industrial Act is intended to make it slightly more difficult for Chinese firms to participate in EU public procurements. The EU Critical Materials Act the EU is an attempt to free the EU from the very heavy reliance on China. Although that may prove difficult. The EU is also looking more carefully on Chinese investment in critical infrastructure in Europe.
However, as we have seen trade with China is still growing, the “inconvenient truth is that with its still growing importance for European companies, the Chinese Market as such has become strategic.”
Just take Germany, where export to China for the 30 largest companies in the German DAX account for 15% of their exports. According to Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft:
„Deutschland ist auf der Exportseite anteilsmäßig deutlich stärker von China abhängig als umgekehrt: 2,7 Prozent der deutschen gesamtwirtschaftlichen Wertschöpfung und 2,4 Prozent der Gesamtbeschäftigung sind vom Export nach China abhängig. Bei China sind es dagegen nur 0,5 und 0,6 Prozent.“
Any risk of decoupling would therefore seem to weigh more heavily than the still timid efforts in relation to de-risking.
In relation to the U.S. trade relations with the EU risk souring for other reasons. The recent U.S. Inflation Reduction ACT (IRA) represents an attempt to boost manufacturing in the US and diversify supply chains away from reliance on China.
An example: “The bill mandates that, to qualify for IRA subsidies, EV [Electric Vehicles] products must be assembled in north America – 50 per cent of the final product calculated according to its value at first, subsequently increasing by 10 per cent every year after the bill is implemented.”
Some parts of IRA may lead to collateral damage in trade relations with Europa. According to the Council on Foreign Relations “The EU’s immediate response to the IRA has focused on seeking exemptions from the discriminatory clauses. It has attempted to do so by using the threat of a counter-subsidy package as leverage, while accusing America of betrayal and even war-profiteering.” This might of cause be problematic as it may lead to counter reactions from the U.S. But given the size of the European exports the IRA certainly represents a problem for Europe. It remains to be seen how the problem may be solved. What is important in relation to the discussion here is that the U.S. enacted the IRA without regard for European interests.
This has also happened in the U.S. attempts to make sure the China cannot get access to certain products deemed critical for China’s efforts to reach and perhaps surpass the U.S. in important areas.
Since 2019 the U.S. has put pressure on The Netherland’s government in order make sure that the ASML company (Advanced Semiconductor Materials Lithography?) cannot export its more advanced systems to China. In July 2022, it was reported that Washington has pressured the Netherlands government to take the campaign against China to a new level, with attempts to further limit ASML’s engagement in China. ASML has near monopoly on the design and manufacture of EUV (extreme ultra violet) lithography machines that are used to print the ultrasmall, complex designs on microchip wafers, part of the process to produce leading edge sub 10 nanometre chips. Today’s striving is for 3 and 2 nm.
In 2022 ASML CEO Peter Wennink said that the company had “already surrendered” to the U.S. in 2019 when it stopped selling its most advanced lithography machines to Chinese firms.
Now it seems that there is U.S. pressure on other European companies to curb the export of products to China that are essential for chips production. The German companies Merck KGaA and BASF producing chemicals important for chips production would be affected by such export curbs.
What we see is a Europe so dependent on the U.S. strategically, that it will just have to accept and follow the U.S. attempts to decouple from China, even though it may hurt trade and certainly not be in Europe’s best interest.

No European defence autonomy
In an interview with The Economist in November 2019 Emmanuel Macron declared: “What we are currently experiencing is the brain death of NATO. Europe is standing on the edge of a precipice.” Macron’s harsh comment may be seen as a wake-up call to the rest of Europe. Europe must begin to think of itself as a geopolitical power, or it will “no longer be in control of its own destiny”
Macron argued that Europe should gain “military sovereignty” and open a dialogue with Russia. Failing to do so would be a great mistake. Wise words but no one listening.
That was 2019, now the time for dialogue with Russia has passed, and NATO has been brought back form the dead, but the issues raised by Macron have not disappeared. In fact, they have become even more important.
Today, Europe, understood as the EU and the European members of NATO, do not seem to be able to think and act on their own. They tumble headlessly along in the U.S. and Zelensky slipstream, prodded frequently by Zelensky’s and Kuleba’s sharp demands for more action, and more weapons to serve the purpose of peace.
The previously highly praised efforts of Chancellor Merkel searching for peaceful solutions in the Ukraine conflict, her friendly relations with Putin and the German “Wandel durch Handel” approach to relations with Russia, are now seen as having failed miserably.
Jubilant Europeans greeting President Biden’s “America is back” apparently also jumped with alacrity into what is essentially an American proxy war against Russia, fought out in Ukraine.
Why does Europe accept to be caught in the U.S. slipstream with no apparent independent strategy and ideas of its own? What are they going to do in relation to a Russia that won’t just disappear as a result of the war, but might get even more belligerent?
“The EU and member states have thrown several longstanding policies overboard and taken steps that under normal circumstances would have met with strong opposition from various corners. These include decisions for the EU to finance for the first time the delivery of lethal weapons to a third country; to boost its defence cooperation in the face of new threat perceptions; to send (somewhat mixed) signals of openness to EU membership for the bloc’s eastern neighbours after years of enlargement fatigue; and to trigger, also for the first time, its 2001 Temporary Protection Directive, granting temporary residency to Ukrainian refugees. (reliefweb.int).
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/war-ukraine-raises-new-questions-eu-foreign-policy
European countries suddenly find it important to fulfil their promises to NATO, something Trump could not get them to do. Now, new expansive defence plans and budgets are seen as more important than almost anything else. Still, one wonders if Europe really wants to contribute to an escalation in a U.S. proxy war to defeat the Russians, given the dangers of a Russian escalation. Fanning the flames of the proxy war in Ukraine with more and more weapons and engaging in sanctions that in the end may hurt the Europeans more than Russia?
In the near future Europe may have to decide whether to follow and contribute to a U.S. involvement in a continuing proxy war with Russia or even a far-off war with China over Taiwan. Suddenly Macron’s question to Europe seems very important: “Is it in our interest to accelerate on the Taiwan issue? No. The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction.” Macron instead talks of the possibility of Europe becoming super power with its own stance in world affairs within a few years, if the world is not in turmoil before that would be possible.
This raises two serious questions.
First does Europe have choice now or in the near future to take an independent position in relation to U.S.? Would it be wise and possible not to follow the U.S. in a war with China over Taiwan in a near future?
Secondly would it be possible in a more distant future to achieve a position as a kind of third and independent power in between the present U.S hegemon and the rising Chinese hegemon?
In relation to first question the discussion in the first part of this essay clearly indicates that Macron is right. It would certainly be wise first of all to try to prevent an escalation in the Taiwan strait. But how could an independent European stance lessen the risk a military conflict over Taiwan, when there are growing signs that the U.S. may be preparing for a war with China over Taiwan.
Europe might attempt to seek support from far eastern allies like Japan, South Korea and even Australia in a diplomatic effort to prevent war over Taiwan. In fact, they may find some kind of support in Japan and South Korea. Japan being recently worried about the sharply rising mercury in the U.S. these days. In an Economist interview with Prime Minister Kishida Fumio he said: “What must be prioritised is proactive diplomacy.” And proactive diplomacy is certainly needed now.
Japan may be wary of China’s hegenomic ambitions, but Kishida Fumio’s words indicate that Japan thinks the American-Chinese rivalry may have got too hot. Japanese leaders have recently called for better communication with China, with Sino-Japanese diplomacy quietly resuming.
An article in the “The Diplomat” on South Korea’s view on the prospect of war over Taiwan, also points to a certain reluctance to get militarily involved “There is good reason to think South Korea would limit its support to actions near the low end of the spectrum – strong diplomatic statements, symbolic economic sanctions, and behind-the-lines re-supply of U.S. forces returning from battle – in the hopes of avoiding a direct confrontation with China.”
Perhaps a combined diplomatic effort on by Europe (if it could agree with itself), Japan and South Korea might dampen U.S. enthusiasm, lower the mercury and prevent war in the near future.
It may be just a vague hope though. For these reasons.
The U.S. being almost the sole guarantor for European security and in a similar way for the security of South Korea and Japan, given the U.S. military dominance and ultimately of cause its absolute nuclear deterrence. The U.S. may thus decide to present the allies with a fait accompli, by more or es directly threatening to leave the allies without the protective U.S. umbrella. Meaning that the allies would be under enormous pressure to follow the U.S. into a war over Taiwan.
Current European leaders may not even have to be persuaded to follow the U.S. into war over Taiwan. Remember the enthusiastic, almost delirious support based upon on a cocktail of self-righteous moralism and power, that let them stumble along with the U.S. into an unforeseeable but dangerous support for the proxy war in Ukraine. Their shrill voices filled with passion for a what they see as a democratic, albeit very corrupt Ukraine invaded by authoritarian Russia. Taiwan might seem to threatened in a similar way to Ukraine, and being a Western oriented democracy, it would certainly also appeal to European self-righteous moralism.
In relation the second question on the possibility for Europe to achieve position as a kind of third and independent power between the U.S. and China in a more distant future like Macron envisaged, the outlook is not good.
Europe is not united and does not have a singular overriding view of Europe’s role in the world and is certainly not united in the belief that it might become an autonomous superpower standing between the U.S. and China.
It might only see itself as a kind of moralistic “arbiter” that has a certain precarious economic clout as a consequence of its trade relations, but not enough agreement to wield this power.
It also lacks self-sufficiency in vital areas like we have seen, and it will be difficult to achieve anything like self-sufficiency even in the long run.
Europe would seem to be destined to be dependent on the rest of the World for a whole range of resources. Although dependencies may shift as a result of for instance a U.S. power game, as we are seeing in relation to energy. One dependence, on say gas from Russia, is just being substituted for another dependence the U.S., the Near East and even Africa.
Not even with regard to conventional defence is Europe a major power. Having for a long time relied timidly and cheaply on U.S. conventional forces.
With the present risk of U.S. involvement in a war with China over Taiwan, the U.S. may have realised that it has far too much on its plate to be able to allocate forces both for Europe and in the Pacific. US may turn attention and weapons towards the Pacific, or get tangled in internal political conflict which might result in less support for Europe’s defence.
With the war in Ukraine and the realisation that the U.S. might prioritise the Pacific, European decisions makers have laid up costly defence procurement programs. But an overall European plan for defence investment is lacking and thus procurement seem rather haphazard, every country just trying to get what is available, which would often be U.S. equipment. Thus, demonstrating once again that Europe is not even able to supply material for its own defence, but have to rely U.S. defence companies, with the minor aberration that Poland is buying South Korean equipment like tanks, while others want missiles from Israel.
Ultimately Europe is still dependent on the U.S. for security, especially the deterrence provided by the nuclear umbrella. France may a nuclear force, but it seems reserved for the protection of France, and the UK has a nuclear force, but it’s use may be dependent on the U.S.
The German politician Manfred Weber, leader of the Christian Democrats in the European Parliament has recently argued in favour of a Europe having its own nuclear deterrence: „Putins Angriffskrieg zwingt Europa, endlich die eigene Verteidigung in die Hand zu nehmen, zumal die USA sich künftig stärker Richtung Pazifik orientieren dürften. Dazu gehört auch die Frage nach atomarer Abschreckung: Deutschland und Frankreich sollten jetzt darüber reden.“ (Focus).
He is still a lonely voice in relation to most of Europe. Germany for instance being more occupied with getting rid of the last vestiges of peaceful version of nuclear power, having just closed its last nuclear power stations.

The sorry state of European defence independence
The sorry state relates to low overall European expenditure on defence compared to the superpowers. The dependence on the U.S. defence industry for material, and the patchwork of common European defence initiatives.
Using data from SIPRI we can compare overall defence spending for the year 2022 measured in billion US $ at 2021 prices.

Note that U.S. Depertment of Defence estimates that China’s real military spending may now be around 1.1 to 2 times higher than stated in its official budget. While European expenditure may look high compared to China, it interesting to see to what degree it actually contributes to military defence autonomy for Europe.
For years there has been talk of a European Army, although the discussions never got very far, presumable because most European members of NATO would have seen that European defence capabilities would in the end have to rely on NATO and especially of cause its most important member, the U.S.
After the Afghanistan withdrawal debacle, where Europe mostly were left out of the Biden administration’s decision making, the discussion of an independent European defence initiative popped up again.
In von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech on September 15 in 2021 she mentioned that the EU had begun to develop a European defence ecosystem. She then said “But what we need is the European Defence Union.” Arguing that “that Europe can – and clearly should – be able and willing to do more on its own.” For three reasons: “The need to provide stability in our neighbourhood and across different regions; the nature of the threats we face is evolving rapidly; the European Union is a unique security provider. There will be missions where NATO or the UN will not be present, but where the EU should be.”
Explaining why similar ideas had not been realised in the past she touched, perhaps inadvertently, upon the ultimate reason why the European autonomy Macron envisaged cannot be achieved. What is holding a European Defence Union back in her view is “not just a shortfall of capacity – it is the lack of political will.”
A lack of will, caused by the lack of unity of purpose and shared strategic outlook among European states.“What should amount to a largely practical and pragmatic effort often descends into an ideological squabble over “strategic autonomy” or national sovereignty. Bureaucratic turf wars erupt between ministries of defense, NATO, and the European Union over roles and responsibilities.”
Although Europe spends a substantial amount on defence, it is still less than had been agreed upon, but the war in Ukraine have certainly brought forth a radical change. Former unwillingness to engage in large defence spending programs, has now been substituted for extraordinary programs in many European countries.
An EDA (The European Defence Agency) report finds a marked increase in spending on defence equipment procurement and defence R&D in Europe.

This has brought to light another European problem related to defence procurement. It has mostly been and still is a chaotic everyone for themselves. Every state initiating big military procurement programs on their own, with almost no real cooperation. Leading just as before to an assortment of different equipment, and by the way presumable to competition between the states in their procurement programs, thus leading to the lack of both efficiency and effectiveness.
“As EU countries tend to extensively implement their defense plans at the national level, only 18 percent of all investment in security programs were conducted in cooperation, a decrease of 1 percent from 2020. In addition, no improved coherence of the EU defense landscape has been visible. The key factors identified as impacting nations’ decision making were primarily nationally defined requirements, followed by achieving NATO targets, and finally EU priorities. Many were said to consider European cooperation approaches as more difficult and time consuming, which ultimately results in them opting for national solutions or non-EU solutions.” (Report from the European Defence Agency).
Cooperation is hampered by what has been fittingly called the cacophony problem.
Which is a result of “profound, continent-wide divergences across all the domains of national defense policies, most notably threat perceptions.” All states speaking with different voices on at the same time. The problem is so deeply rooted in independent national thinking and decision making that there is certainly no near-term solution.
The result is strategic divergence, fragmentation in European procurement, leading to problems with European defence planning and multinational operation.
In short Europe defence procurement represent a patchwork quilt of many separate and divergent decisions with regard to procurement. This represents a challenge to multinational operations given the growing complexity of modern warfare. The natural conservatism of military organizations poses a serious challenge for European military cooperation in particular, given the disparities in technology and capability among them and with key allies.
A report from CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) describes how a lack of joint procurement led to fragmentation and duplication: “European armed forces suffer major redundancies, with 29 different types of destroyers, 17 types of main battle tanks, and
compared to four, one, and six, respectively, for the United States. Some European countries have managed to develop joint platforms in the past, such as the A400M military transport aircraft, the Eurofighter combat aircraft, and the Tiger attack helicopter.”
Years of underinvesting in European defence during the long period when Europe slumbered under the U.S. military protection umbrella, led to less focus on upholding a European defence industry able provide at least some kind of Europe autonomy.
Programs like the European Defence Fund’s €1.2 billion program for 2023 and the recent EDIRPA (European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act) accompanied by €500 million earmarked to encourage member states to procure defence products jointly, seem timid in relations to the scale of the problems just discussed.
We have to conclude that Macron’s idea of having a European defence, independent of the U.S. looks rather farfetched in the light of what we have seen.
For a foreseeable future Europe will be damned to be dependent on U.S. military capabilities and as said before on U.S. nuclear deterrence.

A strategic compass with no magnetism
Maybe the EU had finally realised that there is need for some kind of strategic goal for Europe when they adopted a so-called “Strategic Compass for Security and Defence” in March 2022, finally awakening to the dangerous strategic challenges facing Europe.
According to Borell “The Strategic Compass is setting out concrete actions in the following four work strands so that we:

Act more quickly and decisively when facing crises;
Secure our citizens against fast-changing threats;
Invest in the capabilities and technologies we need; and
Partner with others to achieve common goal”

Borell expresses his “hope that this Strategic Compass will help us, finally, face our security responsibilities, in front of our citizens and the rest of the world. If not now, then when?”
In the face of all the obstacles we have listed, this compass may just have too little magnetic force to assure unity.

“The elephant in the room” key problem for European autonomy
Macron may be wise in wishing for greater European independence, but like we have seen in other areas there is no real European agreement and certainly no unity of purpose that would be an absolute precondition for realising European defence autonomy.
Explaining why similar ideas had not been realised in the past Ursula von der Leyen perhaps inadvertently touched upon the ultimate reason why the European autonomy Macron envisaged cannot be achieved. In relation to the failed attempt to create European Defence Union von der Leyen argued that reason is “not just a shortfall of capacity – it is the lack of political will.”
Here we actually find the “the elephant in the room” key problem to any attempt to create a solid European autonomy, whatever aspect of autonomy one may think of.
Europe is not able to act as one for this reason:
European countries are still not able to achieve the necessary overall agreement on Europe’s role in the World, or on an overall strategic vision.
This may also explain why Europe as such does not have any authority able to make decisions on behalf of what would have to include the majority of European states.
Instead, Europe must rely on achieving a kind unity in action on single issues often belatedly and full of compromises. For these reasons, it is impossible to envisage comprehensive autonomy in any of the areas discussed in this essay. Macron’s talk of a third superpower between in between the U.S. and China is thus no more than a pipe dream.
Compared to the U.S. and China, the EU has glaring lack of decisive leadership able to act with authority, and Europe overall even more so. The EU member states represent a patchwork of different views, with absolute no overall guiding strategic view. No wonder therefore that EU political decision-making on vital issues for Europe and the World is so indecisive, messy and always late.
The whole decision-making construction of the EU reflects the lack of unity of purpose. The many presidents in the EU, and especially of cause the president of the EU Commission, by design lacks authority and is filled with comprise and second rate candidates that lack decisive leadership qualities. Not their fault of cause. The whole EU construction is at fault, and for this reason any hope of playing on the same level as the U.S. and China with regard to strategic autonomy is misplaced. This of cause goes also for Europe as a whole.
A more strategic autonomous for Europe would thus only be possible with less autonomy for member states along with the necessity of having a much more authoritative political structure and leadership. Unless that were to happen European strategic autonomy is only vague swirling bluish wisps of utopian smoke.
Unless that is, deadly external threats threaten all of Europe in a similar way. If this happens, decision making may become united and effective, albeit probably always too late.
Furthermore, the present moralism and genuflection to an ideology of values also makes Europe impotent to influence what happens in the World. With more realism and a view to what is in Europe’s best interest Europe might be able to find a way to balance between the U.S. and China. Not really as an autonomous superpower, but as someone good at highlining, or perhaps less dangerous “slacklining,” constantly trying to keep the balance.
Perhaps James Cleverly, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, in a recent speech gave cause for some optimism. In relation to China, he said "It would be clear and easy - and perhaps even satisfying - for me to declare some kind of new Cold War and say that our goal is to isolate China." But he then argued that it would “be a betrayal of our national interest and a wilful misunderstanding of the modern world.” Isolating China would be wrong as “No significant global problem - from climate change to pandemic prevention, from economic stability to nuclear proliferation - can be solved without China."
If Europa as such began to emphasise similar attitudes it might represent the first very small step towards avoiding falling into the trap Macron feared, “The trap for Europe would be that, at a time when it is achieving a clarification of its strategic position, … it would be tangled up in world destabilization, or crises that aren’t Europe’s”

Curio addendum:
As an aside one may wonder how ChatGPT answers a question relating to alignment of countries with the U.S.

Question: Was alignment with say the US really based on the countries´ own volition?
The full ChatGPT answer:

The decision of a country to align itself with the United States, or any other country, is not always based purely on its own volition. In many cases, the alignment of a country with a particular power is influenced by a range of factors, including historical ties, economic interests, and strategic considerations.
During the Cold War, for example, many countries aligned themselves with the United States or the Soviet Union based on a range of factors, including ideological considerations, military alliances, and strategic interests. In some cases, countries may have been pressured or coerced into aligning with a particular power through the use of military force, economic sanctions, or other forms of coercion.
However, it is also important to note that countries may also choose to align themselves with a particular power based on their own perceived interests and strategic goals. In some cases, the alignment of a country with the United States may have been driven by a desire to counterbalance the influence of a regional rival or to gain access to economic and military resources. Ultimately, the decision of a country to align itself with a particular power is a complex one that is influenced by a range of factors, both internal and external.
Not really answer. Just a presentation of possible considerations related to the question.

Utopian dream of European strategic autonomy? Part one

4/29/2023

Macron’s much maligned ideas on European strategic autonomy deserve a serious discussion, realising that Europe today is getting caught like pawn between a hegemonic U.S. and a China striving for hegemony.
In order to discuss the question of European autonomy or perhaps the lack of it,
this essay will to take a much closer look at the following topics:

In part one:
Macron’s idealistic views on autonomy

The furious reaction to Macron’s views

Independent European stance on Taiwan?

Dependence on China in critical areas

In part two:
No European energy independence

European trade dependencies

No European defence autonomy

“The elephant in the room” key problem for European autonomy

Macron’s idealistic views on autonomy
No, it’s not about Macron’s pension reform trouble in France. The flare up of critical comments on Macron came as result of an interview gave to three journalists on his flight home from the splashy and colourful visit to China. The commotion that resulted has even been compared to the gasps of incredulity at the time Macron said we were experiencing is the brain death of NATO.
With political commentators and media ballooning with critical comments on Macrons interview it might be worthwhile to take a closer look at what he actually said and why this caused such an uproar.
Relying on a transcript in English we see that the interview started out with questions related to Macron’s view on China’s position on Ukraine, but it soon turned to even more inflammatory subjects and views.

On Europe as a pawn between two blocs
“The question Europeans need to answer is the following: is it in our interest to accelerate on the Taiwan issue? No. The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction. Why should we go at a pace chosen by others? At some point, we have to ask ourselves what is in our interest … The risk is that of a self-fulfilling strategy by the U.S. and China. We Europeans must wake up. Our priority is not to adapt to the agenda of others in all regions of the world.”

On the risk of Europe becoming a vassal
The trap for Europe would be that, at a time when it is achieving a clarification of its strategic position, … it would be tangled up in world destabilization, or crises that aren’t Europe’s. If the tensions between the two superpowers heat up, we will not have the time or the means to finance our strategic autonomy and will become vassals, whereas we could become a third superpower if we have a few years to build it.

On European sovereignty given the dependence on U.S. for security
“We have … introduced the idea of European defence, of a more united Europe that issues debt together during the COVID pandemic. Five years ago, strategic autonomy was a pipe dream. Today, everyone is talking about it. This is a major change. We have equipped ourselves with instruments on defence and industrial policy…
There have been many advances: the Chips Act, the Net Zero Industry Act and the Critical Raw Material Act. These European texts are the building blocks of our strategic autonomy. We have begun to set up factories for batteries, hydrogen components and electronics… “We do not want to depend on others for critical issues. The day you no longer have a choice on energy, self-defence, social networks, or artificial intelligence because you lack the infrastructure on these issues, you will be out of history for a moment … Today, we need to accelerate implementation on the military, technological, energy and financial levels to speed up our effective autonomy.”

On Europe’s new dependence on U.S. for Energy
It is true that we have increased our dependence on the United States in the field of energy, but in a logic of diversification because we were far too dependent on Russian gas. Today, it is a fact that we are more dependent on the United States, Qatar and others. But this diversification was necessary.
For the rest, we must take into account the after-effects. For too long Europe has not built this strategic autonomy for which I am fighting. Today, the ideological battle has been won and the groundwork has been laid. This has a cost, which is normal.

On the attempt to achieve European autonomy
The key to being less dependent on the Americans is to strengthen our defence industry and agree on common standards. We are all putting in a lot of money but we cannot have ten times as many standards as the Americans! Secondly, we need to speed up the battle for nuclear and renewable energy in Europe. Our continent does not produce fossil fuels. There is a coherence between reindustrialisation, climate and sovereignty. It is the same battle. It is the battle of nuclear power, of renewable energy and of European energy sobriety. It will be the battle of the next 10 to 15 years.

On a European strategic independence
Strategic autonomy means having convergent views with the United States, but whether it is on Ukraine, the relationship with China or the sanctions, we have a European strategy. We do not want to enter into a logic of block to block. On the contrary, we must "deristify" [deriskify?] our model, not depend on the other, while maintaining a strong integration of our value chains wherever possible.
The paradox would be that at the very moment when we are putting in place the elements of a true European strategic autonomy, we start to follow American policy, by a sort of panic reflex. On the contrary, the battles to be fought today consist on the one hand in accelerating our strategic autonomy and on the other hand in ensuring the financing of our economies. I would like to take this opportunity to stress one point: we must not depend on the extraterritoriality of the dollar.

On Chinese power filling the vacuum left by Europe and the U.S. disengagement
We have been going backwards for twenty years. I decided three years ago to increase our official development assistance, but after 15 years of retreat. When Europe disengages, we should not be surprised that others move forward. When the United States turns more towards itself, as it has done since the 2010s, or towards the Pacific, and Europe suffers a financial crisis, China naturally steps forward.

In addition to the interview parts of the “Joint declaration between the French Republic and the People's Republic of China” relating to Macron’s visit may also have caused consternation in Europe and the U.S.
The first part of the declaration states that “France and China reaffirm their desire to pursue the continuous development of their close and solid global strategic partnership, on the basis of mutual respect for their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their major interests. … in particular to deepen dialogue between the Southern Theatre of the People's Liberation Army of China and the Command of French forces in the Asia-Pacific Zone. (ALPACI), in order to strengthen mutual understanding of regional and international security issues.
Once more France also reaffirms its attachment to the one-China policy, and state that differences should be settled through dialogue and consultation and want to strengthen the multilateral system in a multipolar world.

The furious reaction to Macron’s views
U.S. politicians and media reacted strongly to the views Macron aired in his interview and what was seen as his attempt to align himself with Chinese views in the declaration following his visit to China.
Marco Rubio, outspoken republican senator, aired his wrath in a video: “Does Macron speak for all of Europe? Is Macron now the head of Europe? Because if he is, there are some things we are going to have to change.” Threatening: “You guys handle Ukraine.”
Lindsey Graham, another republican senator, tweeted: “His latest visit to China only emboldens the Communists and President Xi, who seems to be hellbent on rewriting world order and taking Taiwan by force.”
The Biden Administration seem to have their opinion more or less to themselves. While Trump was his usual self, with this comment: “Macron, who’s a friend of mine, is over with China kissing [Xi’s] ass in China, okay. I said France is now going to China?
Eastern European politicians also reacted angrily. Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki blasted both Macron and Chancellor Scholtz for their views on China: “"Short-sightedly they look to China to be able sell more EU products there at huge geopolitical costs, … Hence, I don't understand the concept of European strategic autonomy if it means the fact of shooting ourselves in our own knee." (France 24). In contrast to Macron’s ideas about a Europe not just following in the footsteps of the U.S. Morawiecki argued for an even tighter relationship with U.S. “I see no alternative, and we are absolutely on the same wavelength here, to building an even closer alliance with the Americans. If countries to the west of Poland understand this less, it is probably because of historical circumstances,” (Politico).
Gabrielius Landsbergis, foreign minister of Lithuania, said “Unfortunately, our geopolitical blindness has not yet been cured. We chose not to see the threat of Russian aggression, and now we are choosing not to see the threat of Chinese aggression,” (quoted in Financial Times).
“Macron scheint von allen guten Geistern verlassen“ was the reaction from the German CDU politician Norbert Röttgen: “While it is America and not France or Germany that is providing significant support to Ukraine and thereby defending Europe, Macron calls for a departure from America. While China is practicing the attack on Taiwan, Macron demands a rapprochement with China."
Members of the European parliament also chimed in “We will work to ensure that your remarks serve as a wake-up call to democratic governments to do everything possible to ensure that Beijing’s aggressive stance towards Taiwan receives the hostile reception it deserves from the international community,” the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China wrote in a statement.
Others regarded Macron’s idea of a European strategic autonomy as a dangerous illusion.
“Die transatlantische Allianz, gestärkt durch das gemeinsame Vorgehen gegen Putin, darf keine Risse bekommen. Genau darauf warten nämlich die Diktatoren in Moskau und Peking. Und dann riskiert Europa, irgendwann wirklich zum „Vasallen“ zu werden – jedoch nicht der USA, sondern Chinas.” (Die Welt).
“Macron’s comments risked undercutting EU’s unity on the war in Ukraine,” another official said, adding that China had been “impressed” by how the usually fractious bloc had “been able to reach unity” and keep it. “We have the capacity to act with unity under the most massive aggressive pressure … This is huge capital that one should not squander,” (EU-official quoted in Financial Times.
It is worth emphasizing that the angry reactions were voiced most vehemently by Eastern European leaders, by Western politicians not in power and by mainstream media. While governments in the U.S. and Europe mostly kept their silence, or at least did not go public with their anger at a Macron once more stealing the limelight with his vision for Europe as an independent third power between U.S. and China. Apparently refraining from criticizing Macron openly to avoid that the carefully orchestrated impression of European unity is falling apart at a time when Europe is acting as a dependable ally in the U.S. proxy war in Ukraine.

Independent European stance on Taiwan?
EU strategy papers in 2016 and later on relations with China confirms that the EU still solemnly genuflects to the “One China Policy.” Under the guise of the EU thus maintaining “One China” policy and acknowledging People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, the EU still tries to enhance relations with Taiwan.
The High Representative Josep Borrell in 2022 argued that the EU seeks “to broaden our cooperation with Taiwan, [and] to modernise our dialogue with Taiwan. But all of it in the framework of the One China Policy, which recognises the People’s Republic as the sole government of China. Let me be clear on this: the One China Policy does not prevent us –the European Union– from persisting and intensifying our cooperation with Taiwan, not from expressing our concerns at the recent rising tensions.”
The EU argues that relations with Taiwan are important for two reasons.
The EU likes to emphasise that they “share and promote the same democratic values, the respect for international law and human rights, making political cooperation another important item on their shared agenda.”This is one reason why relations with Taiwan are seen as important. While this may not be vital to Europe it is certainly important to Taiwan in the present situation.
The other reason is decidedly more essential to Europe as it concerns Taiwan’s vital role in chips production. Taiwan is in fact the centre of fabs (factories or foundries for fabricating chips) for advanced chips production, with the leading company TSMC earning a 56 percent market share of chips production worldwide. Especially notable is Taiwan’s leading position in the fabrication of the most advanced leading edge semiconductor chips. In the fabrication the of sub 10 nm (nanometre) semiconductor chips Taiwan has a share of 92 percent while South Korea is sitting on the rest. Just an example, the new iPhone 14 pro is built with chips using a 4 nm process made in Taiwan.
How come that the rest of the World has become so dependent on advanced semiconductor chips fabricated in Taiwanese fabs and assembled into finished products in China?
In a way the explanation is quite simple, labour costs are lower compared to the rest of the World and Asia has a skilled workforce. That is why labour-intensive semiconductor production over the years became located in Taiwan, South Korea and China. Like so much else in manufacturing.
It is not only labour cost that explains the movement to North East Asia. It is also government support and the characteristics of the labour force. “With decades of industrial policy support, robust infrastructures, and highly skilled workforces, Taiwan and South Korea are particularly strong in advanced manufacturing and possess a combined 100 percent of the global fabrication capacity in 7- and 5- nanometres processing nodes.”
There we have it, Europe is at the moment almost totally dependent on Taiwan, South Korea and China for those semiconductors that has become so vital for Western economies.

Will Europe follow the U.S. lead?
How will the EU handle the growing tensions and the prospect of a war over Taiwan?
“One of those challenges for Europe is whether to support Taiwan, an island which Beijing seeks to bring under its political control, through the use of military force if necessary. Even before Russia’s war of aggression, some European leaders were alert to the increasing likelihood of war over Taiwan.” (Lee and Schreer 2022).
Europe is of cause aware of the growing tension and mostly trying to tread carefully at the moment, certainly not interested in contributing to the tension in the Taiwan straits for obvious reasons.
The question now is, will Europe support a U.S. war over Taiwan like it supported the U.S. proxy war in Ukraine?
Perhaps it worthwhile to look for possible alternatives to U.S. and European positions in general viz a viz China and Taiwan. From what we have seen the U.S. does not really care about possible and alternative views from its allies, neither in the relation to Indo-China nor in Europe. It is almost as if it takes it for granted that they all will follow and support the U.S. position willingly and without any real discussion of the U.S. position and the U.S. Strategies.
In a way the allies are also in a very weak position relying themselves absolutely on U.S. military power, so they may not even be able to disagree with the U.S. without losing the U.S. deterrence that has been vital for the security of them. Not the least for Europe in relation to Russia.
At the moment it looks as if the European allies with their limited means are following with timid steps in the large American footsteps. Accepting restrictions for exporting to China, preventing Chinese takeover of key industrial companies, keeping Chinese firms and communications equipment out of critical infrastructure, to a degree at least. Although some southern and eastern European countries are grateful for Chinese investment. (for instance in the 17+1 alliance).
Some allies try to support U.S forces in the Indo-Pacific area. France perhaps more than others because it has important interests in the Pacific. The U.K. perhaps still clinging to the view that it are the most trusted military partner of the U.S., and demonstrating it by sending a new (and apparently faulty) carrier and other warships to the Far East. Even Germany makes a small contribution by having a frigate showing the flag in the East. The German newspaper Tagesspiegel even arguing that the German Frigate Bayern supports Japan and others threatened by Chinese activities. Big mission for a single small warship.
If push came to shove over Taiwan, countries like the UK and perhaps even France and some eager U.S. supporters in Eastern Europe might be willing to follow the U.S. without really having the means to influence the outcome, thus doing something that would not mean much, although it may contribute to the U.S determination.

War over Taiwan not in the best interest of Europe
Take Germany. In 2021 the trade turnover with China (export plus imports) statistics measured in euros, was larger than it was with the U.S.
For this and other reasons Germany or any other country in Europe does not have any real interest in a conflict with China over Taiwan, the Chinese dominance of the South China Sea, or the Uyghurs.
It evident that a conflict over Taiwan would be major blow not only to the Europe but to the whole Western World. Even if the Chinese just blockaded Taiwan it would mean serious problems for Europe and the U.S. If the large fabs in Taiwan were to bombed and damaged it would lead to a very serious shortage of advanced semiconductor chips for a long time, as it would extremely difficult to establish similar fabs elsewhere.
“It takes two-to-three years to build a semiconductor plant from scratch. Replacing lost manufacturing capacity would be extremely expensive — a new semiconductor factory costs tens of billions of dollars and it is extremely knowledge intensive; indeed, TSMC dominates at the cutting edge because of its technological lead” (Japan Times).
A full-blown war over Taiwan would not only cut off exports from Taiwan but presumably lead to reciprocal sanctions on Chinese and European goods, and the closing of the South China Sea shipping routes.
Therefore, it would certainly not be in Europe’s interest to get involved in a conflict with China over Taiwan. The problem is that a conflict between China and the U.S. would have detrimental consequences, even if Europe opted to stay out of the conflict.
At moment it looks as if the U.S. is doing what it can to get other allies involved in creating a kind of united front against China in order to deter China from going to war over Taiwan, With the so-called Quad (The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) involving strategic dialogue between U.S., Australia, India and Japan. With reinforcing its presence in the Philippines. With the AUKUS alliance, the trilateral security act between Australia, the U.S. and UK. With encouraging greater defence expenditure and involvement in Japan and South Korea.
But is a war over Taiwan really in the interest of countries like South Korea, Japan, the Philippines or Australia, as they would presumable suffer more than the U.S. in a war with China?
Perhaps a war over Taiwan would only come about as a result of the U.S. belief that
it still is the ultimate arbitrator in the World based on its previous hegemonic might.
Perhaps the time has come the think the unthinkable, even for hawks like Biden, Blinken and Sullivan, that the weakening of U.S. hegemony is irrevocable, while China’s hegemony is on the rise.

Dependence on China in critical areas
While Ursula von der Leyen accompanied Macron, we did not hear much about her views. But in a speech on EU-China relations just before her visit to China she laid out the EU’s changing view on China, a view that has recently become far more critical of China.
“This is why it is vitally important that we ensure diplomatic stability and open communication with China. I believe it is neither viable – nor in Europe's interest – to decouple from China. Our relations are not black or white – and our response cannot be either. This is why we need to focus on de-risk – not de-couple. And this is part of the reason why I will soon be visiting Beijing together with President Macron. Managing this relationship and having an open and frank exchange with our Chinese counterparts is a key part of what I would call the de-risking through diplomacy of our relations with China.”
Von der Leyen also emphasized the existing European dependence on China in certain critical areas. “… it also means taking a critical look at our own resilience and dependencies, in particular within our industrial and defence base. This can only be based on stress-testing our relationship to see where the greatest threats lie concerning our resilience, long-term prosperity and security… we will also need more independence and diversity when it comes to the key inputs needed for our competitiveness. We know this is an area where we rely on one single supplier – China – for 98% of our rare earth supply, 93% of our magnesium and 97% of our lithium – just to name a few. (Emphasis added).
A paper taking an in depth look on the EU’s strategic dependencies contain a list of some the most glaring dependencies in key areas.

List of technological strategic dependencies for the EU(https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/48878 ):

In relation to Rare Earth, Chemicals, and PV (Photovoltaic) Panels the EU is to very large degree dependent on China. For Cybersecurity and IT software the dependence is mostly on the U.S.
Here just an example of the dependence on China for rare Earth:

Chinese dominance over the rare earth permanent magnets value chain (https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/48878 ):

It is quite interesting to see what the co-called Conservative Seeheimer Kreis of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has been up to recently. In their new strategy paper, they also see a need for more European autonomy in certain areas, just like von der Leyen.
“Germany and the EU must pursue a multidimensional trade policy. Supply chains must be diversified and new partnerships formed. At the same time, the open and honest exchange with China is all the more important. The EU must make its strengths clear here and speak with one voice in the future… An abrupt end to trade relations with China would be an economic disaster.” (Seeheimer Kreis).
Like von der Leyen, they “call for a new European investment agenda and industrial offensive: starting with stronger incentives for the settlement of solar, wind turbine and hydrogen producers as well as with important key technologies such as semiconductors, chips and batteries.” (Seeheimer Kreis).
We take these views to mean that although Europe should not join more drastic attempt to decouple from China, it should at the very least become less dependent on China in certain key areas, by investing heavily in those areas. In short, keep up trade and economic relations with China on what has often been called a level playing field, while reducing dependence on China in certain critical areas. More or less like Macron envisioned.
Now on to the question of whether the EU would be able to somehow achieve strategic autonomy in the key areas mentioned here. It is evident that that it would be difficult and perhaps impossible, given the Chinese dominance, the size of necessary investments and the technical difficulties of substituting the dependence on China with the EU’s own efforts.
This means that Macron’s view, that the Europe should not depend on others for critical issues, and von der Leyen’s stress on the need more independence and diversity, when it comes to the key inputs needed for EU competitiveness, may in reality turn out to be mere pipe dreams for a foreseeable future.
The EU will continue to rely on China for the key supplies listed and the U.S. for the more intangible supplies related to cybersecurity and key areas of IT, including the rapidly the growing field of artificial intelligence.

Chips dependency
Statistics related to all important semiconductor production chain, show that Europe, here defined by the EU, is heavily dependent on foreign suppliers, and to a large degree also on foreign customers.

The manufacture of electronic components and loaded electronic boards, linkages with foreign customers/suppliers(https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/publications/position-eu-semiconductor-value-chain-evidence-trade-foreign-acquisitions-and-ownership_en):

With a European Chips Act the EU is making an attempt to become less dependent on foreign suppliers and strengthen Europe’s position. With the provisional political agreement to strengthen the European semiconductor ecosystem reached in April 2023, it is argued that a “swift implementation of today’s agreement will transform; our dependency into market leadership; our vulnerability into sovereignty; our expenditure into investment.” (europe.eu).
“With the European Chips Act, the EU will address semiconductor shortages and strengthen Europe’s technological leadership. It will mobilise more than €43 billions of public and private investments and set measures to prepare, anticipate and swiftly respond to any future supply chain disruptions, together with Member States and our international partners.” (europe.eu).
What the Commission aims to do sounds like little more than a wish list at the moment, as can be seen from these vague aims. It certainly does not look as if this initiative will help Europe to achieve the autonomy in relation to semiconductors that Macron seems to believe. The EU’s share of global semiconductor production at moment is below 10 percent. With the chips initiative it is hoped to increase this share to 20%.
Compared to the recent U.S. “Chips and Science Act” with its 52.7 billion dollars for the CHIPS for America Fund the European initiative may seem underwhelming.
Compared to China, where $150 billion has been spent since 2015 to upgrade its semiconductor industry, even more so.

It is time for some hard questions!

3/2/2023

A fiery end to escalation? vcp

Fiery conviction with no substance?
Do Western leaders know what they doing, or have they just become delirious on a cocktail of self-righteous moralism and power, stumbling along into an unforeseeable but dangerous future. Their shrill voices filled with passion for Ukraine and hate of Russia drowning out warning voices.

Have they ever taken the time to sit down and reflect upon what they are doing, or are they too busy flitting to and from summits meant to demonstrate their unison conviction?

Caught in vortex of a proxy crusade?
Will the West do what it takes for as long as it takes, albeit hesitantly and with delays, to help Ukraine defeat the Russian forces and get back all of what they regard as Ukrainian land, even Crimea?

Have Western leaders, at first dipping very cautiously into their arsenals, lost all sense of caution, lured by their own superficial moralistic idealism and the terrible plight of Ukraine?

Will the West continue to pour tanks, jets and long-range missiles into Ukraine, accepting the Ukrainian argument that more weapons will help save lives? Ignoring that nothing the West has done until now has helped to save lives, au contraire.

Is Russia and the West caught in a spiralling vortex of continuous escalation? What is next, if Leopards and even fighter jets are not enough? Surreptitiously inserting Western “boots on the ground” to stiffen Ukrainian resistance?

How would/could the West react if China decided to help a Russia in dire straits? Supplying weapons or material for making weapons to enable Russia to continue the War? Would the West get in a reciprocal sanctioning regime with China, or try to threaten China in other ways. Risking the creation of an almighty Eurasian Russian-Chinese power.

Might the lid be blown off Pandora’s box and release its curses on the whole of human kind, by simple incidents like Russian missiles landing in a NATO country, Russia shooting down a U.S. surveillance plane or something else reminding one of “Princip’s shots in Sarajevo.”?

Simplistic views of the endgame
What is the West hoping to achieve, a defeated Russia, perhaps even warlike dissolution? Or a Russia getting even more allied to China? Is that something Europe could want? Would that not be a real nightmare on its doorstep?

Shouldn’t we at least demand some sort idea of what the West want to achieve, instead of leaving it to Zelensky to decide what the West wants? In all seriousness, will Europe really leave it to Zelensky and a vengeful Biden to decide to escalate the proxy war against Russia and decide the conditions for making peace with Russia?

Or will Western decision makers (not the least the Europeans) come to their senses and realise that they have to demand something from Ukraine? Perhaps even accept something one might call a “Korean solution”? Not peace, but not War either. A divided country with a DMZ (demilitarised zone). Not the best of all worlds, but some alternatives certainly sound worse and the risk is certainly there.

Is Ukraine worth it? A question that really would irk moralistic proponents of giving Ukraine everything they demand. One might even ask, is it worth it for Ukraine itself? Losing more than 100.000 dead or wounded? And be subject to enormous destruction everywhere?

Is Biden promising more than he can deliver? In Kyiv he recently said: “You [President Zelensky] remind us that freedom is priceless; it’s worth fighting for as long as it takes. And that’s how long we’re going to be with you, Mr. President: for as long as it takes. “
Big words, but the U.S. might get tired in its proxy war against Russia and lose popular support? Leaving Ukraine to the fight its own hopeless fight?

If U.S. support petered out, it would leave Europe with destroyed Ukraine and a belligerent Russian neighbour. Is Europe prepared for that?

A cocky West risking nuclear war?
Smelling the growing weakness of the Russian military aggression in Ukraine there is no end to the spiralling self-confidence and self-righteousness of Western leaders out to humiliate Putin and Russia. What would happen if Russia faced defeat of all Russians troops in Ukraine, and a Ukrainian re-conquering of Russian held areas,

Would an imminent risk of this happening provoke Russia to nuclear escalation in order to force the West to de-escalate? Russian certainly has the enough tactical nuclear weapons to make that a possibility.

How would/could the West respond? In kind, with just updated nuclear bombs in European storage? Or an all-out conventional attack on the Russian bases. Risking in both scenarios a Third World War.

Do we really believe in Stoltenberg’s constantly reiterated conviction: “a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought? Do we trust that secret U.S. counterthreats will make Russian use of nuclear weapons unlikely? Do we trust that the Chinese warnings against a nuclear war will hold back the Russians? Maybe the sanguine attitude of today’s leaders is a consequence of having no experience of the risks involved in nuclear brinkmanship?

Losing sight of other problems?
One might also ask if Western leaders are too concentrated on Ukraine, ignoring other massive problems and crises in the world at their own peril? Crises that may pop up “with a vengeance.”

In the Middle East Iran seems close to having weapons grade nuclear material. Will they be allowed to get the bomb? And if they do, how will Israel and the West react to Iranian threats?

Will China just continue to harass Taiwan, squeeze it with a blockade or invade, while US is occupied elsewhere?

Will we see a hegemonic struggle with West against the Rest in large parts of the World?
With Western ideas and values coming under threat in parts of the World observing the West concentrating on the Ukraine conflict, while ignoring deadly conflicts elsewhere.

How will the West handle its own set of problems? Their internal political divisions and conflicts. In relation to an influx of migrants from other parts of the World, leading over time to a “browning” of the White West. In relation to identity politics and woke ideology, accompanied by vocal attacks on the West’s own history. The history that founded Western success and hegemony.

Deceived by simple minded media agitation?
Have biased and simpleminded western media, breathless with breaking news and latest reports from reporters stumbling through rubble in their attempt to show the terrible plight of Ukrainians, lit a dangerous simple minded furious and self-righteous fire in the minds of Western leaders, and the majority of the public?

Where do we find the media holding power to account by asking difficult questions? What are the risks, what is the endgame, do we really want to defeat Russia, and live with the fear of their reaction? Are we far too willingly to participate in a what has become essentially a U.S. proxy war against Russia?

Is there not something vaguely irresponsible about the shrill support of the war in Ukraine, with Ukraine is carrying out the fight and ruining their country?

Western media in their one-sided enthusiasm for Ukraine seems caught in a self-reinforcing vortex. Where does wary public, subject to a both one-sighted and short-sighted media bombardment, find a discussion of the really difficult questions?

Almost unthinkable
Suppose the war in Ukraine ends with some with a victory over Russians troops, a Korean like DMZ-solution, or the West tiring of Ukrainian demands, forcing Ukraine to seek humiliating peace.
What will the West do in relation to Russia?
Continue attempts to isolate Russia, arming the West and live with a hostile Russia on its Borders?
Or, strange thought in today’s climate, scale down sanctions, promise investments and trade in exchange for weapons limitations. With the Europeans trying to get Russia somehow into the fold of Europe, ... and sacrilege, promising to dissolve NATO and create a new European security architecture in exchange for disarmament guarantees.

Selected essays on the war in Ukraine:

08/02/23 “Korean solution” to the war in Ukraine?
To understand the need for negotiation now it might be worthwhile to read the recent RAND Corporation Perspective “Avoiding a Long War.”
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/korean-solution-to-the-war-in-ukraine?

03/02/23 Realism disappearing down the Ukrainian maelstrom
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin on support for Ukraine: We're going to continue to dig deep.
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/realism-disappearing-down-the-ukrainian-maelstrom

27/09/22 A grim spectre rears its ugly head
President Putin and President Biden are playing a passionate and dangerous game of chicken.
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/a-grim-spectre-rears-its-ugly-head

11/07/22 WHY is passion drowning out realism in Ukraine war?
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/why-is-passion-drowning-out-realism-in-ukraine-war?

25/04/22 Spellbound by The Pied Piper of Kyiv’s magic Newspeak
Yes! We are all (most) ready to follow you with the weapons for peace, even though the piper may harm and disappoint us.
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/april-17th-2022Paragraph.

“Korean solution” to the war in Ukraine?

2/7/2023

To understand the need for negotiation now it might be worthwhile to read the recent RAND Corporation perspective “Avoiding a Long War – U.S. policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict” (rand.org January 2023). The authors write: “We conclude that, in addition to averting possible escalation to a Russia-NATO war or Russian nuclear use, avoiding a long war is also a higher priority for the United States than facilitating significantly more Ukrainian territorial control.” In other words, give up supporting the Ukrainian goal of getting all the Ukrainian territory back.

The authors discuss two possible negotiated ends to the war:

The “Korean” solution
“An armistice in Ukraine would freeze the front lines and bring a long-term end to active combat. Russia would stop attempts to occupy additional Ukrainian territory and cease missile strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Ukrainian forces would stop their counteroffensives— strikes on Russian-held areas of Ukraine and on Russia itself. There would still be ongoing, unresolved territorial disputes (that is, divergent positions on the location of Ukraine’s borders) between Kyiv and Moscow; these would be contested politically and economically, not militarily.”

Political settlement
“A political settlement or peace treaty would involve both a durable cease-fire and a resolution of at least some of the disputes that sparked the war or emerged during it. Since 1946, peace treaties have been less common than armistice agreements, but they tend to produce a durable end to fighting and reduction in tensions. In the case of the Russia-Ukraine war, a settlement would entail negotiated compromises on some of the core political issues at stake for the two sides.” Issues like territory, NATO membership or non-
alignment, security guaranties, relief from sanctions, reconstruction, mutual relations etc.

Another warning voice worth listening to is a former German “Chairman of the NATO Military Committee,” General A. d. Harald Kujat: “Now would be the time to resume negotiations. Both warring factions are currently back in a stalemate, exacerbated by seasonal restrictions. So now would be the right time to resume the broken-off negotiations. The arms shipments mean the opposite, meaning that the war will be pointlessly prolonged, with even more casualties on both sides and the continued destruction of the country. But also with the result that we are drawn even deeper into this war. (infosperber.ch January 26, translated from German).

Realism disappearing down the Ukrainian maelstrom

2/3/2023

Russian Avangard nuclear missile showing up in the maelstrom vortex

When in trouble continue digging?
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin at the Ramstein meeting on January 20: “As President Biden has said, this is a decisive decade for the world and this is a decisive moment for Ukraine's struggle to defend itself. So this Contact Group will not slow down. We're going to continue to dig deep, and based upon the progress that we've made today, I'm confident that Ukraine's partners from around the globe are determined to meet this moment.” (Emphasis added).

Kampfpanzer for Ukraine
With pressure from all sides. From Ukraine, from NATO allies from the U.S. and from Bundestag opposition and from his own partners in government Kanzler Scholz finally seems to have caved in to the demands for German Leopard “Kampfpanzer” for Ukraine. From rumours emerging from discussions between Scholz and President Biden it said that Kanzler Scholz held out against the pressure, until he could be sure that the U.S. would at least agree to send some U.S M1 Abrams main battle tanks. Evidently the Biden administration this time tried to stand back in the race to provide Ukraine with offensive weapons. Instead trying to pressure Germany into providing Ukraine with modern Western tanks. The reason for Scholz’s holding out against all the those criticizing the German reluctance to send tanks, or even allowing others to send some of their Leopards to Ukraine will have been related to memories of WW2 and the fear of being singled out for some kind of revenge by Russia.

Evoking memories of WW2
Giving the memories of German’s war in and against the Soviet Union, Scholz and large part of his own SPD party may have found it impossible to stomach that German panzers should eighty years be involved later in a fight against Russia. Involving the famed German Leopard “Kampfpanzer” against Russia in Ukraine might recall the pictures of the famed German Tiger “Kampfpanzer” against Russian tanks in Ukraine during WW2. In the third battle around Charkov (Kharkiv) in 1943 and later Kursk fought in the vain hope of stopping yhe Russian advance.

Photo showing German Tiger 1943 in Ukraine. Perhaps one of nine that may have been used by “13.(schwere) Kompanie, SS-Panzer-Regiment 1, 1. SS-Panzer-Division Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler," In the Februar-Marts offensive against Charkov in 1943.

No wonder therefore that Kanzler Scholz would have insisted that sending German Leopard “Kampfpanzer” would at the very least have to be as part of coalition involving first and foremost the U.S. Avoiding the impression that it was just German Panzers sucked into the U.S. proxy war against Russia. Scholz would have been concerned that if Germany was alone in delivering of panzers, with U.S. refusion to deliver Abrams tanks, Russia might have singled out Germany for some sort of retaliation, sabotage, limited attacks or even worse, while U.S. would be standing back.

German insistence vs U.S. reluctance
According to information from unnamed insiders “Scholz last week told Biden on a phone call and U.S. lawmakers in Davos that no Leopards would make their way east unless Abrams accompanied them. In Scholz’s mind, the two were inextricably tethered.” (Politico). The U.S. had known for some time that this was important for Scholz, leading to renewed pressure upon him, while publicly arguing that U.S. M1 Abrams were not at all suitable for the proxy war in Ukraine. The U.S. even began denigrating and criticizing their own Abrams tanks, apparently intending to show how ill-considered the German demands were.
A U.S. defence Official, Colin Kahl, even argued “The Abrams tank is very complicated; it’s expensive; it’s hard to train on.” Needs jet fuel because it has a modified helicopter gas turbine, and is very thirsty. ““I think it’s about three gallons to the mile with jet fuel. It is not the easiest system to maintain. It may or may not be the right system. But we’ll continue to look at what makes sense … we should not be providing the Ukrainian systems they can’t repair, they can’t sustain, and that, over the long term, they can’t afford because it’s not helpful.”
Denigrating the Abrams tank may seem a little strange as the U.S. has no qualms selling 250 of these tanks to Poland. Well, Colin Kahl, may just have been sent as a messenger to indicate that Pentagon’s generals did not want to send Abrams tanks to Ukraine.

Biden and Austin caving in
Given Biden’s extreme belligerence in relation to Putin and Russia, he certainly wanted to provide Ukraine with main battle tanks, and given Scholz’s stubborn refusal to go alone, he must have changed his mind. “The president knew Ukraine needed Leopards — which are abundant across Europe and easier for the Ukrainians to use and maintain than the Abrams — on the battlefield as soon as possible. He started to lean toward sending the M1s after seeing bipartisan support for the transfer, and realizing the Germans would not budge. Ultimately, Biden decided to send American tanks after Lloyd Austin recommended providing 31 M1s, the size of a full Ukrainian army battalion.” (Politico).

Surprise after month - the synchronized announcement of Kampfpanzer for Ukraine
On January 25 the German government formally announced that they would deliver Leopard 2 Kampfpanzer to Ukraine. “Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz announced on Wednesday in the Cabinet that Germany would further strengthen its military support for Ukraine. The Bundesregierung has decided to provide Ukrainian forces with type "Leopard 2” Kampfpanzer. " This is the result of intensive consultations that took place with Germany's closest European and international partners. “This decision follows our well-known line of supporting Ukraine to the best of our ability. We are acting in a closely coordinated manner internationally,” said the Chancellor in Berlin. The goal is to quickly assemble two tank battalions with Leopard 2 tanks for Ukraine. As a first step, Germany will make a company of 14 Leopard 2 A6 tanks available from stocks of the Bundeswehr plus 2 “Bergepanzer” for tank recovery. Other European partners will also hand over Leopard-2 tanks. The training of the Ukrainian crews is to begin quickly in Germany. In addition to training, the package will also include logistics, ammunition and system maintenance. It is expected that delivery of 14 Leopard 2 A6 tanks will take around 3 months.
“Germany will issue the appropriate transfer permits to partner countries that want to quickly deliver Leopard 2 tanks from their stocks to Ukraine.” (BPA Berlin, translation).
Politico seen information that “Ukrainian tank crews will undergo a six-week-training on the Leopards, in Germany which is supposed to start in early February. “This procedure should enable the Leopard 2 A6 to be taken over by Ukraine by the end of the first quarter of 2023.”

“After weeks of discussions, a larger alliance to support Ukraine with Western-style main battle tanks is emerging. In the medium and long term, more battle tanks from industrial stocks could be added, but they would first have to be refurbished.” (ARD, English translation). Rheinmetall, one of the companies involved in renovating the Leopard, had previously announced that it would be able to deliver 29 Leopard 2A4 that are been prepared for delivery to other countries as part of the German “Ringtausch” program. Those 29 Leopards could be sent to Ukraine as early as April/May, meaning that they would be ready for a spring offensive when the ground is dry. Later deliveries could include 22 older Leopard A4 from a Rheinmetall depot. They would have to refurbished and would not be ready before the end of 2023. Rheinmetall have also said that they have 88 old mothballed Leopards 1 available.

U.S. Announcement
After the German announcement the U.S. followed. In the Roosevelt Room President Biden announced the decision to send 31 M1 Abrams main battle tanks to Ukraine, representing a whole battalion of Abrams tanks.
President Biden in his own words: “With spring approaching, the Ukrainian forces are working to defend the territory they hold and preparing for additional counter-offensives. To liberate their land, they need to be able to counter Russia’s evolving tactics and strategy on the battlefield in the very near term. They need to improve their ability to manoeuvre in open terrain. And they need an enduring capability to deter and defend against Russian aggression over the long term.
The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the — of the military are behind me. Are — they — they’ve been deeply, deeply involved in this — this whole effort. Armored capability, as General Austin will tell you, spe- — is — has been — has been critical. And that’s why the United States has committed hundreds of armored fighting vehicles to date, including more than 500 as part of the assistance package we announced last Friday.
And today — today, I’m announcing that the United States will be sending 31 Abram tanks to Ukraine, the equivalent of one Ukrainian battalion. Secretary Austin has recommended this step because it will enhance the Ukraine’s capacity to defend its territory and achieve its strategic objectives.
The Abrams tanks are the most capable tanks in the world. They’re also extremely complex to operate and maintain, so we’re also giving Ukraine the parts and equipment necessary to effectively sustain these tanks on the battlefield. And we begi- — we’ll begin to train the Ukrainian troops on these issues of sustainment, logistics, and maintenance as soon as possible. Delivering these tanks to the field is going to take time, time that we’ll see — we’ll use to make sure the Ukrainians are fully prepared to integrate the Abram tanks into their defenses.” (whitehouse.gov).

It is assumed that US has stock of around 4,800 M1 Abrams MBT. The Army having around 4,400, and the Marines around 400. Thousands older versions are laid up in depots.
Elsewhere we seen that NATO’s Jens Stoltenberg seem to take a leaf out Orwell’s Newspeak. Now President sems inclined to do the same, when he argued that delivery of Abrams tanks “is not an offensive threat to Russia. We are — there is no offensive threat to Russia.” Others may see it differently and we have certainly come a long way since the commitments to only provide Ukraine with light defensive weapons. Now it seems the allies are ready to go on the offensive in the U.S. proxy war in Ukraine.

Joining the fight
After the synchronized German – U.S. decision to deliver main battle tanks to Ukraine others are eager to contribute as junior partners in the coalition. In effect hiding behind the German/U.S. decision to deliver. Like Germany hiding behind U.S. announcement of deliveries of M1 Abrams MBT’s.
Here the incomplete list of different versions of Leopards in different countries:

It must be emphasized that the numbers might be misleading as many of the panzers may be in need of repair or otherwise unavailable.

Now, who else has shown willingness to deliver tanks out of their stocks of Leopards to Ukraine. According to ABC News “Twelve countries have agreed to supply Ukraine with around 100 Leopard 2 tanks if the German government gives its consent, according to a senior Ukrainian official who spoke exclusively to ABC News.” While this might be wish-full thinking on the Ukrainian side, it seems likely that a handful of countries might be willing to follow in the footsteps of Germany.
Poland had already threatened to deliver a company of 14 Leopard 2 tanks (A4/A5 versions?) without Germany giving the green light. One may wonder if that in fact forced the German/U.S. announcement. It is to be assumed that Poland would be willing to deliver many more, not the least as the country expecting deliveries of up to 250 Abram M1 tanks.
Finland seems to be pondering sending Leopards tanks. Suggesting that they could be send as part of a larger unit. “Taking one tank here and another there is not enough. There should be a powerful unit in Europe. We [Finland] are discussing the possibility of creating such a unit..., we are considering options," (President Sauli Niinistö, Ukrinform). Understandable that Finland would like to be part of a common effort. Going alone may not seem a god idea, not yet being a member of NATO.
“The Norwegian government supports the donation of tanks to Ukraine and Norway will contribute to the donation. We are in close dialogue with allies and Ukraine on how Norway can contribute in the best possible way. We are working as fast as we can to provide Ukraine with the support they need … addition to the tanks, there will also be a need for logistical-support, spare parts and training of Ukrainian personnel.” (regjeringen.no January 26). Is that 4 lepoapards or more?
"Sveriges försvarsminister Pål Jonson (M) stänger inte dörren för export av svenska stridsvagnar." (Svenska Dagbladet).
The Danish Defense Minister Jakob Ellemann-Jensen is adamant that Denmark has no "current plans" to send any of the 44 Danish Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine. (dr.dk)
But members of parliament are in favour: There is no doubt that Denmark should donate its Leopard 2 tanks, Denmark’s defence spokesperson, Rasmus Jarlov of the Conservative party that is currently in the ruling coalition, said: “Denmark should definitely contribute Leopard tanks. It is crucial that Ukrainians get this capability to beat back the Russians,” he said, echoing nationalist Danish People’s Party MP Alex Ahrendtsen. (Euroactiv). A no now could easily mean a yes before the end of February, giving the earlier sing-song of no means yes.
The Netherlands is also considering delivering Leopard 2 tanks although the Cabinet has not made any decision yet.
Spain's defence minister has said: "Spain is willing, within this coordination, to work with our allies to do whatever is necessary including the sending of Leopards, training in the use of these Leopards and also to help in their maintenance and upkeep.” (Reuters).
The Czechs do not want to send Leopards to Ukraine, but that may perhaps change after the recent election.
Canada will supply Ukraine with four Leopard 2 A4 main battle tanks and Canadian Armed Forces trainers to teach Ukrainian soldiers how to operate the vehicles, … "These tanks will allow Ukraine to liberate even more of its territory and defend its people from Russia's brutal invasion. These four tanks are combat-ready and will be deployed over the coming weeks." (Defence Minister Anita Anand announced Thursday).
Greece are keeping their many Leopards at home, at least for now.
Not to be forgotten, Britain had previously promised to send 12 Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine together with a host of other weapons and ammunition. On January 16 the Minister of Defence, Ben Wallace, announced the most significant package of combat power to date to accelerate Ukrainian success, including a squadron of Challenger 2 tanks with armoured recovery and repair vehicles. He also said: “Even as we gift Challenger 2 Tanks, I shall, at the same time, be reviewing the number of Challenger 3 conversions to consider whether the lessons of Ukraine suggest that we need a larger tank fleet.” (gov.uk).
Challenger 2 tanks are armed with a rifled gun, not able to use the same variety of ammunition that the German designed smoothbore guns of the Leopards and Abrams can use.
Apparently, the overall aim is to make sure that Ukraine will get enough modern Western tanks to arm three battalions. That is to say around a hundred tanks to be ready in the spring and summer. Ukraine itself has a wish list or rather demand for around 300 tanks. In June 2022, Mikhail Podolyak, adviser to President Zelensky, even published an outrageous Ukrainian wish list for heavy weapons on Twitter, wanting 500 tanks.

Next fighter jets
A continuing stream of Twitter demands is likewise emanating from Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to Germany Andrej Melnyk. After the German/U.S. decision to deliver tanks, he immediately repeated demands for modern fighter jets:
A day later President Zelensky expressed his gratitude for the German and U.S. decision to send modern battle tanks to Ukraine, but he also said: “It is very important that there is progress in other aspects of our defence cooperation as well. Today I spoke with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. We have to unlock the supply of long- range missiles to Ukraine, it is important for us to expand our cooperation in artillery, we have to achieve the supply of aircraft to Ukraine. And this is a dream. And this is a task. An important task for all of us.” (Ukrinform).
The wish sounding more like a demand was repeated by an advisor to the Ukrainian minister of defence. He told “The Hill” that “he was optimistic about receiving Western fighter jets such as the American F-16s, which Ukrainians have sought since early last year when Russia first invaded … Every type of weapon we request, we needed yesterday … We will do everything possible to ensure Ukraine gets fourth-generation fighter jets as soon as possible.”

And the response from the West…?
National Security Advisor John Kirby off the cuff answer when asked about the Ukrainian demands for modern fighter jets: “Can’t blame the Ukrainians for wanting more and more systems,” Kirby said. “It’s not the @irst time they’ve talked about @ighter jets, but I don’t have any announcements to make on that front.” (The Hill, January 26).
An anonymous European diplomat was recently quoted in Politico saying: “Washington has told Kyiv that supplying aircraft is a “no-go, for the moment,” … “There’s a red line there — but last summer we had a red line on the HIMARS [multiple rocket launchers], and that moved. Then it was battle tanks, and that’s moving.” Another European envoy apparently also saying the way the wind is blowing this way. No for the moment but let’s see “the discussion in two, three weeks” (Politico, January 26).
Dutch foreign minister Wopke Hoekstra said last week that the Netherlands would consider any requests to send F-16s with “an open mind” and that there were “no taboos” on military support. The Netherlands has about 40 F-16s and is in the process of phasing them out after the purchase of more advanced F-35s.(Financial Times).
Now, what about Germany with its concerns about being singled by Russia? Although having no F 16s, but a number of Eurofighter Typhoons. Kanzler Scholz‘s immediate reaction: “Scholz zieht rote Linie: Keine Kampfjets und Bodentruppen … Dass es nicht um Kampfflugzeuge geht, habe ich ja sehr früh klargestellt und mache das auch hier" … Als kurz nach Kriegsbeginn über Flugverbotszonen diskutiert worden sei, hätten er und US-Präsident Joe Biden gesagt: "Das werden wir nicht tun. Und an dieser Haltung hat sich gar nichts geändert und wird sich auch nichts ändern." (Handelsblatt, January 25).
Scholz is here referring to Biden’s earlier decision not to send Western fighter jets to Ukraine. But that was early in the war, and evidently Western decisionmakers are getting more audacious, having seen Russia reacting with no more than verbal threats of a wider war and use of tactical nuclear weapons. Scholz now has to quell voices in his own party like Saskia Eskens, who has said “das es daraul ankomme,” according to Die Welt.
Earlier there had been voices arguing for sending modern fighter aircraft to Ukraine, on January 20 Dutch Foreign Minister Wopke Hoekstra said the Cabinet would look at such a request by Kyiv on F-16 jets with an "open mind … "no taboos" for the delivery of regular equipment, adding that the Netherlands only sends items that Ukraine asks for.” (aa.com).
“Poland's government says NATO should be bolder and if the western defence alliance decided to send fighter jets to Ukraine, Warsaw would vote in favour of that, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki told French broadcaster LCI on January 26.” (anews.com).
And thus Ukraine may get modern Western fighter jets after all, also from the U.S. Politico is referring to talks about “a contingent of military officials is quietly pushing the Pentagon to approve sending F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine to help the country defend itself from Russian missile and drone attacks (Politico February 1).

ATACMS and GLSDB?
While Zelensky was grateful for the tanks we saw he wanted not only aircraft but long-range missiles. What he wants is ATACMS missiles. And they are?
“Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) are 24/7, all-weather, surface-to-surface, inertially guided missiles used to engage targets in the corps/Army area of influence.” Later versions with a range up to 300 km. At moment it still sems that the U.S. is reluctant to deliver these heavy long-range missiles.

Instead, Ukraine may soon get the GLSDB (Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb) missiles. According to SAAB the GLSDB missile “it has range of 150 km, the ability to hit targets from different angles, and a precision so high it can hit the target within a radius of one meter.” Almost about doubling the range of missiles presently used by Ukraine for their HIMARS and MLRS systems.
Both these missiles can be fired from the M270 MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket system) and the M142 HIMARS using a special canister. Systems that Ukraine already has, but the ATACMS is a much heavier missile than the ones used for now, with longer range and a much heavier and more destructive payload. The long range would make it possible for Ukraine to strike far into the hinterland of Russian, for instance striking in Crimea and in Russia.
In May 2022 Biden had declared: “We are not going to send to Ukraine rocket systems that can strike into Russia.” Pentagon is now saying: “Our view is that we think the Ukrainians can change the dynamic on the battlefield and achieve the type of effects they want to push the Russians back without ATACMS,” (Colin Kahl, the undersecretary of defense for policy, quoted in defensenews.com, January 19).
Red lines are changing rapidly, so Ukraine may again get what it wants?

What about heavy armed drones?
In November 22 “Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov in a Nov. 2 letter requested four MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones made by San Diego-based General Atomics” (timesofsandiego.com). And there are U.S. politicians are supporting the request. But until now the Biden Administration is holding out. Gray Eagle drones have “an endurance of 25 hours, speeds up to167 KTAS, can operate up to 29,000 feet, and carries 1,075 lb (488 kg) of internal and external payload. The aircraft can carry multiple payloads aloft, including Electro-optical/Infrared (EO/IR) with laser designation, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), communications relay, and four Hellfire missiles.”
Just what Ukraine would like to have, and they may get it after all. According to The Defense Post the U.S. Army is rumoured to consider modifying MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones to allow operations in Ukraine. Meaning removing sensitive equipment that must not fall in Russian hands.

Outright war with Russia?
One wonders if the decisionmakers, seemingly lacking a sense of history, ever take the time to contemplate what they are doing. At the moment it seems as if they spend all their time in hastily convened meetings, making even hastier decisions without really contemplating long term consequences and whose interest they are actually catering to.
Are Biden and consorts really fighting for western values? Is fighting for a corrupt Ukraine, as evidenced not least by recent examples of corruption involving apparently involving even the minister of defence, really a fight for Western values? Or is the fighting a U.S. proxy war to degrade Russia’s military potential, letting Ukraine bleed to achieve this goal. Or is Biden’s frustration that he could not persuade President Obama to support the Ukraine with weapons 2014 clouding his view today? “When Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2014, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. pressed President Barack Obama to take decisive action, and fast, to make Moscow “pay in blood and money” for its aggression. The president, a Biden aide recalled, was having none of it.” (NYT).
It is as if Western decisionmakers out to degrade Russia’s military potential, are acting in a kind of power delirium, convinced of their righteousness and giddy with power they are able to project. Willing apparently to risk a “guerre à outrance” between Russia and the West? Arguing that they will do whatever it takes for as long as it takes. In Stoltenberg like Newspeak “Weapons are – in fact – the way to peace.”
Recently the German Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, at meeting of Council of Europe actually said "We are fighting a war against Russia and not against each other." Consternation everywhere as the official view is that we are not war with Russia. Germany immediately disavowed Baerbock, with a government speaker declaring that Germany is not at war with Russia: "Die NATO und Deutschland sind in diesem Angriffskrieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine nicht Kriegspartei", sagte die stellvertretende Regierungssprecherin Christiane Hoffmann. "Wir unterstützen die Ukraine, aber wir sind nicht Kriegspartei." (anews.com).
Denials or not, Baerbock may unintentionally have revealed that the West is actually fighting a proxy war with Russia in Ukraine. A war that is seeing a constant mission creep, forgetting earlier red lines against further involvement.
“And it seems as of last week, the Biden administration is poised to cross yet another major line, with the New York Times reporting that U.S. officials are strongly considering giving Ukraine the green light to attack Crimea, even while acknowledging the risk of nuclear retaliation that such a move would carry. Fears of such an escalation “have dimmed,” U.S. officials told the paper.” (responsiblestatecraft.org article January 23).
It certainly looks that Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin was right when he argued “this is a decisive decade for the world and this is a decisive moment for Ukraine's struggle to defend itself” and said “We're going to continue to dig deep.” The West is certainly digging deeper at the moment. Warning voices are ignored or ostracized. The risk that Russia may be digging even deeper is ignored. Risk of a nuclear war is ignored.
While Western leaders seems united in their “intense passion” to punish the Russians with the help of Ukraine, there are isolated voices calling for a cooling of the passion. In the media we don’t hear these voices, they are drowned out by Western medias own enthusiastic support and encouragement for Ukraine and for the leaders who want to punish and humiliate Russia and Putin. The picture painted is black and white with no thought for long term consequences for the West or indeed for the World. Realism is out and passionate enthusiasm is in, at least for the time being.
Listening to Western decisionmakers cocksure attitude and the continued “digging” Lloyd Austin talked about, it certainly looks as if they are dismissing the risk of a nuclear war. In an interview with published in Financial Times on December 7, 2023 (which incidentally is a National Pearl Harbor Remembrance Day) NATO’s Jens Stoltenberg argued: “this nuclear rhetoric from Russia, from the Russian side, especially earlier this fall, is reckless, is dangerous. And Russia must know that any use of nuclear weapons would totally change the character, the nature, of the conflict and a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought … And we send the very clear… and Allies have sent a very clear message to Russia that it will have severe consequences for Russia, and also of course that a nuclear war must never be fought.” (FT, December 7).
The risk Russia may be digging even deeper is ignored. Nuclear war is ignored with Stoltenberg arguing Putin would not dare due the terrible consequences, and others thinking that Russia’s dependence on China would mean that Putin would not dare.
By dismissing the threat of nuclear war Western leaders may in fact be raising the stakes in the war. If they deescalate, back down in order to negotiate they would be seen to give to Russia’s nuclear blackmail threats. By ignoring the risk and continuing to dig deeper by pouring more weapons into Ukraine and getting more and more directly involved, by helping Ukrainian forces to pinpoint Russian targets, and otherwise assisting Ukraine directly to push Russia forces back, they raise the probability that Russia will decide use drastic measures to avoid a defeat.

Warning voices
Among the European leaders a few have been unwilling to be part of the black and white coaltion.
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine and peace talks launched, even if negotiations may take months or even years to conclude. Orbán warned of the danger of an escalation of the war. (abouthungary.hu January 27).
While the Croatian president, Zoran Milanovic, does not believe that Russia can be defeated in a conventional war … “I am against sending any lethal arms there …It prolongs the war. What is the goal? Disintegration of Russia, change of the government? There is also talk of tearing Russia apart. This is mad.” (Washington Post).
An article in Foreign Policy has points out that “Realists of various stripes repeatedly warned that Western policy toward Russia and Ukraine would lead to serious trouble, warnings that were blithely ignored by those who claimed that NATO’s open-door policy would lead to lasting peace in Europe. Now that war has broken out, lives are being lost, and Ukraine is being destroyed, you would think proponents of open-ended NATO enlargement would have set aside their idealistic illusions and think about these issues in a hard-nosed, realist fashion. Yet the opposite has occurred: The people who got it right are singled out for attack, while those who believed that enlarging NATO would create a vast zone of peace in Europe are insisting that the war continue until Russia is totally defeated and greatly weakened.” (Stephen M. Walt in Foreign Policy).
Among the warning voices we also find General Mark Milly, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation’s highest-ranking military officer, and the principal military advisor to the President. In November 2022 he said: “In terms of probability, the probability of a Ukrainian military victory defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine to include what they define or what the claim is Crimea, the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily. Politically, there may be a political solution where, politically, the Russians withdraw, that's possible. You want to negotiate from a position of strength. Russia right now is on its back. … So, you want to negotiate at a time when you're at your strength and your opponent is at weakness. And it's possible, maybe that there'll be a political solution. All I'm -- all I'm saying is there's a possibility for it. That's all I'm saying.”
Later, when taking questions after a January 20 Ramstein meeting, he said: Ukraine has also suffered tremendously. You know that there's a significant amount of innocent civilians that have been killed in a result of the Russian actions. The Russians are hitting civilian infrastructure. There's a significant amount of economic damage, a significant amount of damage to the energy infrastructure, and the Russian -- or the Ukrainian military has suffered a significant amount of casualties themselves. So this is a very, very bloody war and there's significant casualties on both sides. And this is why I say that I think that -- at -- sooner or later, this is going to have to get to a negotiating table at some point in order to bring this to a conclusion, and that will have to happen when the end state, which is a free, sovereign, independent Ukraine with its territory intact, is met. When that day comes, then people will sit down and negotiate an end to this.”

Perhaps Russia insists on digging even deeper
“Putin will argue that the United States and NATO are “in” Ukraine for one reason and one reason only: to weaken Russia, which is the greatest obstacle to Western hegemony worldwide. The West will regard this assertion as the purest nonsense, of course, but the problem is that, from the Russian perspective, it seems eminently plausible.” (Article in americangreatness.com on January 28).
For now, it may seem that the outcome of the war hangs in balance, which explains why the West hurrying to dig deeper into their weapon arsenals. But what might Putin do in this escalating Western proxy war against Russia? Might he not try to outdo the western digging, by digging even deeper?
As early as May 2022 Avril Haines, Director of National Intelligence gave her assessment of what Putin might do. President Putin may turn to more drastic means …including imposing martial law, reorienting industrial production, or potentially escalatory military actions to free up the resources needed to achieve his objectives as the conflict drags on, or if he perceives Russia is losing in Ukraine. “We believe that Moscow continues to use nuclear rhetoric to deter the United States and the West from increasing lethal aid to Ukraine and to respond to public comments from the U.S. and NATO Allies that suggest expanded western goals in the conflict. If Putin perceives that the United States is ignoring his threats, he may try to signal to Washington the heightened danger of its support to Ukraine by authorizing another large nuclear exercise involving a major dispersal of mobile intercontinental missiles, heavy bombers, strategic submarines.
We otherwise continue to believe that President Putin would probably only authorize the use of nuclear weapons if he perceived an existential threat to the Russian state or regime, but we will remain vigilant in monitoring every aspect of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. With tensions this high, there is always an enhanced potential for miscalculation, unintended escalation, which we hope our intelligence can help to mitigate.” (Emphasis added). (Avril Haines Director of National Intelligence at Congressional Testimony, May10).
Remember that was in May 2022, and the proxy war has been escalated step by step since then, with Western leaders becoming more and more cocksure in their belief that nothing will come of Russian threats.
At a panel discussion at Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in October 2022, one of the participants argued: “You don’t have to be fixated on the peculiarities of Vladimir Putin to conclude that nuclear use is possible because it’s a much more mainstream nuclear doctrine among nuclear-armed powers when they’re facing the prospect of conventional defeat and where the stakes are high, to be tempted to use them. This was NATO’s doctrine in the European theater from 1965, to offset and forestall conventional defeat with a threat of nuclear use. Similar story you can tell about Pakistan, India, even North Korea. I agree that there may not be a meaningful military target, but I think the purpose would be to make Ukraine back off and at least divide the West—an attempt at psychological terror. So whatever strategy we are going to form, if we’re going to have a strategy of least regret, it can’t be one that bets the farm on this being a bluff. This is very real.” (Professor Patrick Porter).
A time of unprecedented danger, it is 90 seconds to midnight, writes the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “And worst of all, Russia’s thinly veiled threats to use nuclear weapons remind the world that escalation of the conflict—by accident, intention, or miscalculation—is a terrible risk. The possibility that the conflict could spin out of anyone’s control remains high.”
In In 2020 Russia published the latest version of the doctrine entitled ““On Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” The document outlines the circumstances that might lead Russia to use nuclear weapons. It states that Russia could respond with nuclear weapons following an “attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions,” but also in an “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” (Emphasis added).
Thus, Russia might respond to a conventional attack with nuclear weapons if it judges the very existence of the state to be in jeopardy. While this might seem to exclude the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Ukrainian war, the document also opens the possibility of nuclear first use as it states:“… in the event of a military conflict, this Policy provides for the prevention of an escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation and/or its allies.”
Analysts have assessed that this means Russia might threaten to escalate to use nuclear weapons as a way to deter a conflict that would threaten the existence of the state, with Russia pursuing an “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear doctrine under certain circumstances. If a conventional conflict might threaten Russia, it might decide to use nuclear weapons to create such a catastrophic threat to a continuation of the conflict that its adversary would be forced to de-escalate. The Congressional report in fact mentions that this might happen if Russia looks to be defeated in a conventional conflict with NATO. At least that is how some analysts interpret the Russian doctrine. But it is worth noting that Russia itself does not use the term “escalate to de-escalate.”
Now what does this mean in relation to Ukraine? We are seeing a more and more cocksure attitude in the West, manifesting itself in almost no holds barred support of Ukraine. The reality being that the West is using its potent military arsenal to fight the Russians using their Ukraine proxies. Could an eminent defeat of all Russians troops in Ukraine, the re-conquering the Russian held areas, and the weakening of Russia military might to a level, where it would unable to wage war be seen as a defeat of Russia itself? Would an eminent risk of this happening provoke Russia to nuclear escalation in order to force the West to de-escalate?
Russian certainly has the enough tactical nuclear weapons to make that a possibility. (See also “A cocksure West risking catastrophe,” Blog at openthoughts.eu.)

It is time for to ask some hard questions!
Will the West do what it takes for as long as it takes, albeit hesitantly and with delays, to help Ukraine defeat the Russian forces and get back all of what they regard as Ukrainian land, even Crimea?
Have Western leaders, at first dipping very cautiously in their arsenals, lost all sense of caution, lured by their by their own superficial moralistic idealism and the plight of little ”big brother” in Ukraine?
Will the West continue to pour tanks, jets and long-range missiles into Ukraine, accepting the Ukrainian argument that more weapons will help save lives? Ignoring that nothing the West has done until now has helped to save lives, au contraire.
Do Western leaders know what they doing, or have they just become delirious on a cocktail of self-righteous moralism and power, stumbling along into an unforeseeable future. Has any of them taken the time to sit down and reflect, read background information or history, are even aware of warning voices
What is the endgame? What is the West hoping to achieve, a defeated Russia, perhaps even warlike dissolution? Or a Russia getting even more allied to China? Is that something Europe could want? Would that not be a real nightmare on its doorstep? Shouldn’t we at least demand some sort idea of what the West want to achieve, instead of leaving it to Zelensky to decide what the West wants?
Will Western decision makers come to their senses and realise that they have to demand something from Ukraine. Perhaps even accept something one might call a “Korean solution”? Not peace, but not War either. A divided country with a demilitarised zone. Not the best of all worlds, but some alternatives certainly sound worse and the risk iscertainly there.
Is Ukraine worth it? A question that really would irk moralistic proponents of giving everything they demand. One might even ask, is it worth it for Ukraine itself losing according Miley and others more than 100.000 dead or wounded? And enormous destruction everywhere?
One might also ask if Western leaders are too concentrated on Ukraine, ignoring other massive problems and crises in the world at their own peril? Crises that are getting bigger and may present themselves with a vengeance. What about Africa, what about the Middle East, what about the looming fight between the U.S. and China over Taiwan? A U.S. general even foresees a war between China and the U.S. as soon as 2025.
Maybe it is all too late giving the cocky posture of Western leaders, with a few exceptions? Their sudden belligerence and the promises of allocating big resources to buy weapons, as if they really think they could go to war with Russia, without the risk of provoking a nuclear war they cannot win. With possible U.S. counter strikes just making it worse for Europe, risking of clouds of radioactivity poisoning the air over Europe.
Has biased and simpleminded western media, breathless with breaking news and latest reports from reporters stumbling through rubble, in their attempt to show the terrible plight of old and lonely Ukrainians, cooking their food over small outdoor fires, lit a dangerous simple minded furious, self-righteous fire in the minds of Western leaders, and parts of the public?
Where do we find the media holding power to account by asking difficult questions? What are the risks, what is the endgame, do we really want to defeat Russia, and live with the fear of their reaction? Are we far too willingly to participate in a what is essentially a U.S. war against Russia?
Where does wary public subject to a both one-sighted and short-sighted media bombardment find a discussion of the difficult questions we are asking here? Western media in their one-sided enthusiasm for Ukraine caught in a self-reinforcing vortex of breaking news.

Why does Europe not look to its own interests?
Restating the argument from an earlier blog post. We wonder why Europe is not making a much more independent diplomatic effort, instead of giving in to moral outrage and Zelensky’s and Biden’s totally overstated warnings about the threat to all of Europe
Europe is supporting the Ukraine with financial assistance, weapons, welcoming Ukrainian refugees, and seems inclined to engage in self-harming sanctions to reduce Russia’s ability for fighting a war. In all seriousness, will Europe really leave to Zelensky and a vengeful Biden to decide to escalate the proxy war against Russia and decide the conditions for making peace with Russia?
Why do decisionmakers not leave moralistic outbursts aside and take a more realistic position that actually turn out to be more in line with their own self-proclaimed European values. This would mean efforts to promote a peace that might spare lives and avoid further destruction in Ukraine and perhaps help solve or at least alleviate some of the problems brought up by Russia as reasons for the invasion.
Why does European leaders not demand something in return from Zelensky’s Ukraine, instead of just playing whipping boy to Zelensky’s critique? Realistically this would mean that Europe would have to put pressure on Zelensky to accept the Russian annexation of Crimea, and insist that the future of the Luhansk and Donetsk would have to be settled by mechanism involving for instance staged referendums from Russian border to the borders of Luhansk and Donetsk. Either accept this or accept that help would be reduced to humanitarian help.
Likewise, Europe would have to initiate sincere and realistic diplomatic efforts in relation Russia, taking demands from the Russian speaking parts of Ukraine seriously, accepting the Russian possession of Crimea and proposing realistic solutions for Luhansk and Donetsk that would comply with what Europe ought to demand of Ukraine.

This essay can also be found at:
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/realism-disappearing-down-ukrainian-maelstrom-verner-c-petersen

Panzer for Ukraine – the way to peace?

1/11/2023

More weapons a way to peace?
In a recent somewhat rambling speech Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, sounded a little like the “War is Peace” motto of Oceania in Orwell’s 1984. In Stoltenberg’s version it sounded like this (nato.int):

“So if we want a negotiated peace solution, where Ukraine survives as an independent democratic country in Europe, the fastest way to get there is to support Ukraine. Weapons are – in fact – the way to peace.” (Emphasis added).

Perhaps he may have had some doubts as to the wisdom of this, as he also said:

“Wars are unpredictable. It is impossible to say when, or how, the war in Ukraine will end. But what we do know is that most wars end at the negotiating table. Most likely this one too. What Ukrainians can achieve at the table depends on their strength on the battlefield.”

One may perhaps wonder what they believe and say on the other side of this proxy war against Russia. Does President Putin and his compatriots (whom we might perhaps see as the 1984 Eurasians) have a similar belief in war as the way to peace? And if they do what would that mean for the proxy war in Ukraine? A continuous escalation until at least one side realizes that war isn’t in fact the way to peace? Or “guerre à outrance” between Russia and NATO?

A self-imposed taboo is being broken
In the first week of 2023 France announced that they would deliver a number of AMX RC-10 (véhicule militaire blindé de reconnaissance-feu) to Ukraine. A kind of light wheeled tank, highly mobile and provided with a quite potent 105mm gun. Not a real main battle tank, but even so it marks a new escalatory step in the proxy war against Russia in Ukraine.
The French announcement seems to have paved the way for similar announcements from Bundeskanzler Scholz and President Biden.
Germany says it will deliver 40 Marder Schützenpanzer. At least a Panzer in name, but really just an infantry fighting vehicle with a 20 mm automatic cannon, possibly provided with MELLS antitank guided missile system.
The U.S. will deliver 50 Bradley armoured infantry fighting vehicles armed with a 25 mm Bushmaster M242 chain gun and provided with TOW anti-tank missiles in order to be able to defend themselves against Russian tanks. Although the Bradley has to be stationary while the TOW missile finds its way to an enemy tank.
Apparently, the U.S. is also weighing sending versions of the Stryker eight wheeled armoured personnel carrier to Ukraine. Another version of this armoured personnel carrier is already found in Ukraine, in the shape of the Canadian LAV ACSV Armoured Personnel Carrier. Canada last year decided to send 39 of these to Ukraine.
Germany has furthermore promised a Patriot system in addition to the system to be supplied by the U.S.
Before the Ukraine can use the diverse fighting vehicles and Patriot batteries, they have to send personal to Germany and the U.S. to train on the systems. For each Patriot systems it means that around 75-90 men have to spend around two months to learn to use complicated the system.
Patriot batteries may indirectly involve NATO even more in the war in Ukraine, as its Link 16 communication system “means US airborne radars and NATO combat air patrols can pass radar tracks of Russian sorties in real time to Ukrainian Patriot systems, which can fire upon the linked tracks. The Ukrainians can also pass back data on Russian drones, cruise missile attacks, and other activities back through Link 16.”

Paving the way for Main Battle Tanks?
Now, do these promised deliveries pave the way for deliveries of main battle tanks like German Leopard 2s to Ukraine.
The German newspaper “Handelsblatt” article “Deutschland und seine Panzer für die Ukraine – Erst der Marder, dann der Leopard” may indicate what is expected to happen.
The pressure on Kanzler Scholz is certainly growing. “Deutschlands Verbündete erhöhen plötzlich zeitgleich den Druck auf Olaf Scholz, grünes Licht für die Lieferung von Leopard-Panzern zu geben.“ (welt.de). In a TV interview von der Leyen, the German President of the European Commission, is arguing giving in to Ukraine’s demands: “If they say they need main battle tanks, then we should take it seriously and deliver them to them.” (Bild TV).
Meanwhile Poland is apparently considering providing Ukraine with some of the German Leopard 2 tanks they got from Germany, when they delivered some of their old Russian T-72 tanks to Ukraine.
A characteristic of the Leopard 2: „Hauptwaffe ist eine 120-Millimeter-Glattrohrkanone. Damit kann der Leopard Ziele in einer Entfernung von mehreren tausend Metern stehend und fahrend bekämpfen. Seine maximale Kampfentfernung beträgt 5.000 Meter. Der Leopard 2 vereint Feuerkraft, Panzerschutz und Beweglichkeit.“ (bundeswehr.de)
https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ausruestung-technik-bundeswehr/landsysteme-bundeswehr/leopard-2
There are also rumours that the UK is considering sending a limited number of the British main battle tank, the Challenger 2, to Ukraine according to The Times (Monday January 9):
“Britain is considering sending tanks to help Ukraine stage a major counteroffensive in the spring. The UK could supply about a dozen Challenger 2s and become the first country in western Europe to send Ukraine tanks. The Challenger has a 1,200 horsepower engine and is equipped with a 120mm gun. Only one has ever been destroyed in combat, when it was hit by friendly fire in Basra during the Iraq war. Although no decision has been made, Ukrainian officials expect an announcement at the end of next week when defence ministers meet at the Ramstein airbase in Germany.”
If this happens the floodgates have really been opened up for the delivery of the kind of heavy offensive weapons the Ukraine has been clamouring for. Next one might perhaps expect even the U.S. M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank to show up in Ukraine. If that happens it would really represent a major escalation by the Western side.Paragraph.

Challenger 2 MBT with the old L30, 120mm rifled gun from BAE Systems

Overview of recent security assistance for Ukraine

United States:
More than $3 billion additional U.S. security assistance for Ukraine announced January 6

50 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles with 500 TOW anti-tank missiles and 250,000 rounds of 25mm ammunition (Emphasis added);
100 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
55 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs);
138 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs);
18 155mm self-propelled Howitzers and 18 ammunition support vehicles; 70,000 155mm artillery rounds;
500 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds;
1,200 155mm rounds of Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems; 36 105mm towed Howitzers and 95,000 105mm artillery rounds;
10,000 120mm mortar rounds;
Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
RIM-7 missiles for air defense;
4,000 Zuni aircraft rockets;
Approximately 2,000 anti-armor rockets;
Sniper rifles, machine guns, and ammunition for grenade launchers and small arms;
Claymore anti-personnel munitions; Night vision devices and optics; Spare parts and other field equipment.

Germany:
Militärische Unterstützungsleistungen für die Ukraine: Eine Patriot-Feuereinheit und bis zu 40 Schützenpanzer Marder liefert Deutschland an die Ukraine, um sie im Verteidigungskampf gegen den Aggressor zu unterstützen. (Emphasis added).

Furthermore:

20 Raketenwerfer 70mm auf Pick-up trucks mit Raketen*
15 Bergepanzer 2* (zuvor: 13)
13 Schwerlastsattelzüge M1070 Oshkosh* (zuvor: 12)
7 ferngesteuerte Kettenfahrzeuge für Unterstützungsaufgaben*
143 Pick-up* (zuvor: 80)
216 Stromerzeuger (zuvor: 195)
35 LKW 8x8 mit Wechselladesystem (zuvor: 18)
148 Feldheizgeräte* (zuvor: 116)
26 Aufklärungsdrohnen* (zuvor: 18)
36 Krankenkraftwagen* (zuvor: 35)
85 Grenzschutzfahrzeuge* (zuvor 78)
36.400 Wolldecken
12 Schwerlastsattelzüge*
55 Drohnenabwehrsensoren und -jammer* (zuvor: 28)
30 Drohnendetektionssensoren*
114 Aufklärungsdrohnen* (zuvor: 22)

An even longer list of weapons and equipment had already been decided earlier. The complete January list can be found at https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/krieg-in-der-ukraine/lieferungen-ukraine-2054514

A demanding little “Big Brother”

12/28/2022

Forgive me, but when Zelensky appears every evening on TV news channels, one is reminded of the "Big Brother" big screen moment from the film adaptation of Orwell's "1984," with a listening crowd in front. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KNyqyFNoHKw)
This time though we have real demanding little Big Brother. With an aggressive but hesitant, slightly nervous and confusing Big Brother of our “Oceania” in the background providing material support.

President Zelensky and his compatriots are constantly clamouring for more support. Their Christmas wish list contained Patriot air defense systems, ATACMS (the MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System Missiles) with a range of 300 km for HIMARS and MLRS,
armed MQ-1C Gray Eagle and MQ-9 Reaper drones, main battle tanks and Western fighter jets – and a constant supply of advanced munition.

For Christmas President Zelensky apparently only got a Patriot System, which may become operational in Ukraine at some time next year, and more ammunition.
But U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has hinted that U.S. would not have anything against Germany supplying Ukraine with German Leopard main battle tanks.

Christmas gifts to step up escalation

One Patriot air defense battery.
“a missile defense system consisting of radars, command-and-control technology and multiple types of interceptors, all working together to detect, identify and defeat tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, advanced aircraft and other threats”
For an explanation of different versions of the Patriot system see CSIS Missile threat:
https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/patriot/

500 precision-guided155mm artillery rounds.
Presumable the M982/Excalibur. A GPS guided 155mm round for the 155mm howitzers Ukraine has got from Western countries. It is supposed to have a CEP (Circular Error Probable) of around 5 meters. Meaning that is has a high probability of hitting withing a 5 meter radius of target. Ukraine had already got 4,200 of these rounds.
See Raytheon Missiles & Defense:
https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/what-we-do/land-warfare/precision-weapons/excalibur-projectile

Precision aerial munitions.
Is this the JDAM kits (Joint Direct Attack Munition)?
It consists of a guidance tail kit to convert existing unguided free-fall bombs into accurate, "smart" munitions.
See U.S. Air Force:
https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104572/joint-direct-attack-munition-gbu-313238/

Complete list of December 2022 assistance

”On December 21, as part of President Zelenskyy's visit to the White House, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced $1.85 billion in additional security assistance for Ukraine. This includes the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance valued at up to $1 billion, as well as $850 million in assistance via the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).
The Presidential Drawdown is the twenty-eighth such drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine that the Biden Administration has authorized since August 2021. Capabilities in this package include:” (Emphasis added).
(https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3252782/).

   •   One Patriot air defense battery and munitions;
   •   Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
   •   500 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds;
   •   10 120mm mortar systems and 10,000 120mm mortar rounds;
   •   10 82mm mortar systems;
   •   10 60mm mortar systems;
   •   37 Cougar Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles;
   •   120 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs);
   •   Six armored utility trucks;
   •   High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs);
   •   Precision aerial munitions;
   •   Over 2,700 grenade launchers and small arms;
   •   Claymore anti-personnel munitions;
   •   Demolition munitions and equipment;
   •   Night vision devices and optics;
   •   Tactical secure communications systems;
   •   Body armor and other field equipment.

Under USAI, the DoD will also provide Ukraine with:
   •   45,000 152mm artillery rounds;
   •   20,000 122mm artillery rounds;
   •   50,000 122mm GRAD rockets;
   •   100,000 rounds of 125mm tank ammunition;
   •   SATCOM terminals and services;
   •   Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment.

”Unlike Presidential Drawdown, USAI is an authority under which the United States procures capabilities from industry rather than delivering equipment that is drawn down from DoD stocks. This announcement represents the beginning of a contracting process to provide additional capabilities to Ukraine's Armed Forces.
Russia's unrelenting and brutal air attacks against critical infrastructure have only reinforced the need to provide Ukraine with sophisticated air defense capabilities. At President Biden's direction, the United States has prioritized the provision of air defense systems to help Ukraine defend its people from Russian aggression. The Patriot air defense system in this security assistance package is one of the world's most advanced air defense capabilities. Once operational, it will add to a layered defense to counter the full range of threats currently menacing Ukraine's cities and civilians. The Patriot system will augment previous air defense capabilities the United States has provided Ukraine, which include NASAMs, missiles for HAWK air defense systems, Stingers, and equipment to counter the Russian use of unmanned aerial vehicles.
In total, the United States has now committed more than $21.9 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration. Since 2014, the United States has committed approximately $24 billion in security assistance to Ukraine and approximately $21.2 billion since the beginning of Russia's unprovoked, full-scale invasion on February 24. Through PDA and USAI, DoD continues to work with Ukraine to meet both its immediate as well as its longer-term security assistance needs.
To meet Ukraine's evolving battlefield requirements, the United States will continue to work with its allies and partners to provide Ukraine with key capabilities.”(https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3252782/).

Negotiate or escalate in Ukraine?

12/16/2022

A wary general’s warnings
General Mark A. Milley is the 20th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation’s highest-ranking military officer, and the principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council (Dept. of Defense).
On November 9, 2022 the General was speaking at the Economic Club of New York. Here are some of his comments based upon Twitter notes from a Washington Post journalist (@DanLamothe).

Milley asked: Is the time right to consider diplomacy in Ukraine?
Milley says "there has to be mutual recognition" that a true military win is not achievable.
Draws comparison to World War I, where victory was not achievable after 1914. Millions more killed in next few years.
Milley, asked if the time is right for negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, said that will require both sides to believe that a full military victory is not achievable. The winter months, when fighting will slow a bit, create an opportunity to do so.

According to a later article in The Washington Post Gen. Milley also reconned that over 100,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded the Ukraine War, and that a similar number of Ukrainian soldiers had “probably” also been killed or wounded. While 40,000 civilians may have died or been wounded, and up to 30 million had been forced to flee their homes.
Later, a meeting of “The Ukrainian Defense Contact Group” on November 16, the general at first sounded somewhat more belligerent:
“So, across the entire front line trace of some 900 or so kilometers, the Ukrainians have achieved success after success after success and the Russians have failed every single time. They've lost strategically, they've lost operationally, and I repeat, they lost tactically.
What they've tried to do, they failed at. They started this war and Russia can end this war. Russia can make another choice, and they could make a choice today, to end this war. However, Russia is choosing to use their time to attempt to regroup their forces and they are imposing a campaign of terror, a campaign of maximum suffering on the Ukrainian civilian population in order to defeat Ukrainian morale.” (Transcript from the press conference).
While this may sound as if the general is expecting the Ukrainian to win the war, and not seek an end to war through negotiations, the general also emphasised the heavy cost to the Ukrainians. “The Russians are striking throughout the depth and breadth of all of Ukraine with air-launched cruise missiles, with Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles, and with other types of munitions. They are striking the Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, and it has little or no military purpose. … Basic human survival and subsistence is going to be severely impacted and human suffering for the Ukrainian population is going to increase. These strikes will undoubtedly hinder Ukraine's ability to care for the sick and the elderly. Their hospitals will be partially operational. The elderly are going to be exposed to the elements. In the wake of unrelenting Russian aggression and incalculable human suffering.”
Even so the general thought that “at the end of the day, Ukraine will retain -- will remain a free and independent country with its territory intact.” Thus, upholding the official U.S. view.
Then he was asked this question: “A follow-up, sir, to your comments about -- earlier from last week about the possibility of discussions put on by -- a slowdown in the fighting, let's say, during the winter -- it sounds like the comments that you're making today about the winter are that the Ukrainians are going to continue very strongly. Is -- are you pulling back from your comments from last week, that you see an opportunity for negotiations with the Russians?”
General Milley gave a somewhat hesitant answer, treading carefully: I think -- I think the Ukrainians should keep the pressure on the Russians, you know, to the extent that they militarily can, but winter gets very, very cold. And the natural tendency is for tactical operations are going to naturally, probably slow down. … And I think that, you know, President Biden and President Zelenskyy himself has said that there'll be a -- at the end of the day, there'll be a political solution. So, if there's a slow down in the actual tactical fighting, if that happens, then that may become a window possibly -- it may not -- for a political solution or a -- at least the beginnings of talks to initiate a political solution. So that's all I was saying.”
Prodding the general with more questions relating to his comments at Economic Club of New York, the general first praised the amazing resilience of the Ukrainians (one might add, helped by tremendous amounts of weapons from the U.S. and others), before he returned to the question arguing:
“In terms of probability, the probability of a Ukrainian military victory defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine to include what they define or what the claim is Crimea, the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily. Politically, there may be a political solution where, politically, the Russians withdraw, that's possible. You want to negotiate from a position of strength. Russia right now is on its back. … So, you want to negotiate at a time when you're at your strength and your opponent is at weakness. And it's possible, maybe that there'll be a political solution. All I'm -- all I'm saying is there's a possibility for it. That's all I'm saying.”
Evidently General Milley is in some sort of quandary, supporting a the official “standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes,” while evidently having some misgivings about this view. Realizing the enormous cost it may have, the possible escalations, and perhaps even thinking that this is not where the U.S. ought to have its military focus, surely having his eye on the mighty challenges posed by China.
And General Milley may not be alone with this view in the U.S. Military. A Defense Department official is quoted as saying “Why not start talking about [peace talks] before you throw another 100,000 lives into the abyss?” (politico.com).
This is neither the official stance of the U.S. government nor of the U.S. Allies for that matter. The official stance of the U.S. and NATO is “to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes” (Jens Stoltenberg).

Ukraine will not be pushed to negotiate
At a press conference on November 9 the very same day Milley was thinking aloud in New York, President Biden was asked what he meant when he had said “it remains to be seen whether or not, … Ukraine is prepared to compromise with Russia.”
Biden, in his usual confusing way answered by saying: “No, I’m not say- — that’s up to the Ukrainians. Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. didn’t have any in mind. You have asked the question whether or not, if I recall — whether or not — what would happen if, in fact, after the — this — I think the context is that whether or not they’re pulling back from Fallujah [sic]. And the — I mean, from the — [Kherson was the city his thinking of].
Realising that Gen. Milley’s comments had caused consternation not the least in Ukraine, “The Biden administration is working to reassure the Ukrainian government, outside experts, and former US officials that it will not push Ukraine to imminently seek a diplomatic outcome to the war with Russia.” (CNN report).
“One official explained that the State Department is on the opposite side of the pole from Milley. That dynamic has led to a unique situation where military brass are more fervently pushing for diplomacy than US diplomats.” (CNN).
On the flight to the G-20 Summit in Bali National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan reiterated the U.S. position after General Milley’s remarks in New York. Sullivan argued that the U.S. would do everything possible to put Ukraine in “best possible position on the battlefield so that when they make their determination to proceed, they’re in the best possible position at the negotiating table.” (Politico).
When Secretary Blinken was interviewed by the editor in chief of the Wall Street Journal on December 5. He was asked “Is there still any off-ramp for the Russians? Is there any even whisper of negotiations or any kind of discussion that could lead to negotiations right now that could somehow resolve the situation for the moment? Is there anything that you see out there?” (U.S. Department of State, December 5).
When Blinken said “Well, in a sense there’s always an off-ramp and it’s very simple: President Putin started this war; he could end it tomorrow. That’s the —” he was interrupted by the interviewer interjecting “Yeah but realistically, though.”
Blinken continued “… one of the things that you can imagine is the Russians trying to find an off-ramp that would be a phony off-ramp, by which I mean, oh, let’s have a ceasefire, let’s just freeze things in place, get a frozen conflict, never negotiate about the territory that they have seized and continue to hold; rest, refit, regroup, reattack. I think it’s important —”
Interrupted again he continued: “Again, fundamentally, fundamentally, this is up to the Ukrainians. But I think – and you’ve heard President Zelenskyy put forward a 10-point proposal for how this can move forward, and Zelenskyy himself has said diplomacy and negotiations will be at the end of this. What’s happened as he was saying that? He put this before the G20 just a few weeks ago. As he was saying that, Putin doubled and tripled down on what he was doing in Ukraine. So the point is this: Unless and until Russia demonstrates that it’s interested in meaningful diplomacy, it can’t go anywhere. If and when it does, we’ll be the first to be ready to help out.” (U.S. Department of State, December 5).
This is voice of the hawkish diplomat Secretary of State, Blinken, who apparently does not believe in diplomacy and negotiation.
Strange that the U.S. and its allies thinks that it is up to Ukraine, read President Zelensky, alone to decide when to enter into negotiations, when the whole Ukrainian position relies on the military support of the U.S. and its allies, and the whole war essentially may be a U.S. proxy war against Russia carried on the back of Ukraine.

Further steps up the ladder of escalation
Russian attacks on the Ukrainian infrastructure with drones and missiles have had dire consequences for the civilian population and led to Ukrainian demands for more advanced air defence systems to protect their infrastructure. Foreign Minister Kuleba in late November again asked for deliveries of the U.S. made Patriot Missile system.
At the Group of Seven’s (G7) virtual meeting on December 12 President Zelensky urged the leaders to supply Ukraine with modern tanks, long-range weapons and shells.
If Ukraine were to get advanced Patriot systems and modern tanks, either German Leopards or U.S. made Abrams main battle tanks, it would represent major steps up the rungs of the escalation ladder.
The reaction to the Ukraine’s demands. The G7 meeting first of all reiterated to the almost religious sounding vow: “Today, we reaffirm our unwavering support for and solidarity with Ukraine in the face of ongoing Russian war of aggression for as long as it takes.”
But they in their statement they also dared to become slightly more concrete: “We will continue to coordinate efforts to meet Ukraine’s urgent requirements for military and defense equipment with an immediate focus on providing Ukraine with air defense systems and capabilities.”
No words about Patriots or modern tanks though.
The Biden administration is more active. On December 6 the FAZ, A German newspaper, could report that National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan had told an advisor to the German Bundeskanzler that the U.S. would welcome German deliveries of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, also saying that it had to be seen as a German initiative:
“Sullivan habe Plötner am Telefon gesagt, Amerika würde es begrüßen, wenn Deutschland den Leopard 2 liefere, doch solle das auf deutsche Initiative geschehen. Amerika fordere Deutschland zu solchen Lieferungen nicht auf.” (FAZ).
Bundeskanzler Scholz is holding back, arguing that no other country had been willing to deliver modern tanks to Ukraine. Scholz evidently not wanting that Germany should be going alone and risk further escalation by providing the Ukrainians with the means to initiate new counter attacks. The opposition is more aggressive and argues for German deliveries. There has been talk of making deliveries in coordination with other countries, but no final decision has been reached.
Meanwhile CNN and other media are reporting that Pentagon is preparing plans for sending Patriot systems to Ukraine. If the plans are approved by the administration, Patriot batteries could be shipped quickly, with Ukrainian personnel being trained to use the complicated system at the US. Base and training ground at Grafenwöhr in Germany.
The Patriot plans have immediately led to warnings from Russia, with former president Medvedev warning the Patriot batteries would become legitimate targets. Judging from the aggressiveness shown by the Biden administration’s hawks the Russian warning are not likely to prevent the delivery of Patriot Batteries to Ukraine. Apparently, the administration believes that Russia is not able do much about it.
Others want to contribute with a less dangerous step up the escalation ladder. Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Rastislav Káčer, recently announced that Slovakia was ready to provide Ukraine with Russian made MIG-29s:
"We have not yet provided you with MiG-29s. But we are ready to do it. We are talking with our NATO partners about how to do it. And today [December 8], we had a very meaningful conversation with your President. My [Slovak] Minister of Defense explained to your President how we can do this. And I think that a Ukrainian delegation will come to Slovakia in the coming weeks and we will work together with our American friends to make this a reality." (Interfax-Ukraine).
When Ukraine surprised the Russia with long range drone attacks on airfields hundreds of kilometres from the Ukrainian border, they apparently used left over Russian Tu-141 drones of 1970s vintage. Leaving observes astounded over the Ukrainian prowess and ability to convert and use Russian built drones to attack airfields deep into Russia. While others have speculated that to hit Russian bases with precision using old drones Ukraine must have been helped. Contrary to to Blinken’s statement: “We have neither encouraged nor enabled the Ukrainians to strike inside of Russia.”
Asia Times reports that “Multiple military sources in NATO countries as well as Russia contradict him, reporting that the reconditioned Russian Tu-141 drones that Ukraine launched at Russian air bases downlinked US satellite GPS data to hit their targets.”
If correct the U.S. is providing the Ukraine with a long-range strike capability. Something the U.S. have hitherto said they wanted to avoid. Thus, marking another step up the rungs of the escalation ladder.
Russia’s answer has been more drones and missile attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, and verbal rattling of the nuclear sword.

Administration hawks overruling wary generals
The Biden administration with the hawkish and undiplomatic pair of Sullivan and Blinken seem determined to defeat the Russians in the U.S. proxy war, by continuing to escalate their military support whenever it may look as if the Ukraine might be in dire straits.
While the military, not the least personified in General Milley seem to be growing warier, aware that a continued escalation might lead to the risk of a direct war between Russia and NATO, while weakening the U.S. military stance in the Pacific, making the U.S. unable to represent a credible deterrence against China.
At the moment though the hawkish views of Biden and his trusty compatriots Blinken and Sullivan are certainly prevailing, resulting in continuous support for the proxy war in Ukraine.
They are also prodding U.S. allies in Europe in order to have them to follow the U.S. up the escalation ladder. Especially the reluctant Germans are under pressure from both the U.S. and the Ukrainians.

Snap shot of U.S. military assistance
The most recent U.S. fact sheet showing the assistance to Ukraine was published on December 12, and contains this list (defense.gov):

Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine
December 9, 2022
In total, the United States has committed more $20 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since
the beginning of the Biden Administration, including more than $19.3 billion since the beginning
of Russia’s unprovoked and brutal invasion on February 24.
United States security assistance committed to Ukraine includes:

· Over 1,600 Stinger anti-aircraft systems;
· Over 8,500 Javelin anti-armor systems;
· Over 46,000 other anti-armor systems and munitions;
· Over 700 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
· 142 155mm Howitzers and up to 1,004,000 155mm artillery rounds;
· 4,200 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds;
· 9,000 155mm rounds of Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems;
· 36 105mm Howitzers and 180,000 105mm artillery rounds;
· 276 Tactical Vehicles to tow weapons;
· 22 Tactical Vehicles to recover equipment;
· 38 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and ammunition;
· 20 120mm mortar systems and 135,000 120mm mortar rounds;
· 1,500 Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
· Four Command Post vehicles;
· Eight National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and munitions;
· Missiles for HAWK air defense systems;
· Four Avenger air defense systems;
· High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs);
· 20 Mi-17 helicopters;
· 45 T-72B tanks;
· Over 1,000 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs);
· Over 100 light tactical vehicles;
· 44 trucks and 88 trailers to transport heavy equipment;
· 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
· 250 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles
· 440 MaxxPro Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles;
· Mine clearing equipment and systems;
· Over 11,000 grenade launchers and small arms;
· Over 104,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition;
· Over 75,000 sets of body armor and helmets;
· Approximately 1,800 Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
· Laser-guided rocket systems;
· Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems;
· 15 Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Systems;
· Two radars for Unmanned Aerial Systems;
· Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels;

U.S. talking peace but preparing to take on China, Part 3

12/2/2022

At their recent meeting of Xi Jinping and Joe Biden agreed that the United States and China must manage the competition responsibly and keep lines of communication open to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict.
In reality both countries are in involved in complicated but spiralling arms race including U.S. rearmament to deter the Chinese, while China is modernising and enhancing its military capabilities to such an extent that the U.S. fears to be outpaced in the arms race.
In this essay we discuss the U.S. fears and U.S. strategies to alleviate these fears and stay ahead, not the least in relation to a China-U.S. conflict over Taiwan.

Due to the length of the essay, it has been divided into three parts published separately:

Part 1 Declining power of the U.S.
The U.S. not prepared for the big one
Playing war games and losing
A U.S. military in decline

Part 2 Preparing for the big one
Vague “National Strategy” of deterrence
Renewing nuclear armament
Building a stronger missile defence

Part 3 Questioning U.S. Strategy
Peace rhetoric while preparing for war?
War over Taiwan?
Should allies question U.S. strategy?
War over Taiwan neither in the best interest of Europe nor the U.S

Part 3 Questioning U.S. Strategy

Peace rhetoric while preparing for war?
After President Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden met for more than three hours during the G 20 summit in Bali Chinese media wrote that their meeting had injected “a certain degree of positivity into bilateral relations, which have entered a downward spiral due to the US' ever widening containment strategy against China, and especially after the provocative visit by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to the island of Taiwan.”
According to the White House readout from the meeting President Biden had reiterated that the competition between the U.S. and China “should not veer into conflict and underscored that the United States and China must manage the competition responsibly and maintain open lines of communication.”
The two leaders promised to maintain communication and deepen constructive efforts on outstanding issues through joint working groups and key senior officials. Thus, Secretary of State Blinken will visit China to follow up on their discussions.
According to Global Times the two leaders talked nuclear issues relating to Ukraine and North Korea. They agreed that nuclear weapons must not be used, that nuclear wars cannot be fought and that nuclear crises should be prevented in the Eurasian continent.
The rhetoric may signal peace and cooperation and regard for each powers red lines etc. but the talks also revealed their deep disagreement in many areas, not the least the Taiwan question.
In reality both countries are involved in a complicated but spiralling arms race including continuing U.S. rearmament of Taiwan, to deter a Chinese invasion, while China is modernising and enhancing its military capabilities to such an extent that the U.S. fears to be outpaced in the arms race as we have seen the previous discussion.
One may be reminded of the arms race that led up to the First World War in which Germany and Great Britain competed in the race to build battleships. Germany to break a possible British Blockade and Britain to make sure that Germany would never be able compete with the British fleet. We know how it ended.
Perhaps what we are seeing in the U.S.- China competition just now is the realisation that neither is ready for a serious conflict over Taiwan and other issues, and instead are catching their breath and keep up the rhetoric of friendly competition. While actually are doing everything they can to strengthen their respective positions.

War over Taiwan?
A previous commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in 2021 told the Senate Armed Services Committee that there was risk of possible Chinese military actions against Taiwan in the next six years. “Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions. ... And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years” (Admiral Philip Davidson). The admiral also said “I worry that they're [China] accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order.”
His successor, the present commander of the Indo-Pacific forces, Admiral Aquilino have uttered similar stern warnings. “I think the [Chinese] goals are to supplant U.S. security leadership in the region overall, whether they be in the South China Sea or on the northern border of India, and generate a change to the international rules beyond what the nations all agree to, under the 1982 UNCLOS treaty, and ultimately to change those rules to the benefit of the PRC. Ultimately, it would change the view of the region from those who believe in a free and open Indo-Pacific to those that might want a more authoritarian might-equals-right closed Indo-Pacific.” (Admiral John C. Aquilino).
In his view the “Indo-Pacific is the most consequential reason for America’s future and remains the priority theater for the United States. Residing here are four of the five security challenges identified in the Department of Defense —China, Russia, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations.” Adding “I think the main point that comes out is China is a global problem.”
At the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing Senator Cotton wondered about the importance of Taiwan: “Admiral ... I want to hear from you about why Taiwan is so critical from a military and strategic standpoint. Why would Beijing so desire to have Taiwan annexed to the mainland, and how would it complicate your military planning if Beijing did invade and annex Taiwan? ... From a military and strategic standpoint, why is it so important to Beijing that they annex Taiwan? (Senator Tom Cotton).
In the admiral’s answer we may finally find the reason why the U.S. is so preoccupied with the Taiwan question that they seem to be prepared to take on China to defend the present status of Taiwan.
Admiral Aquilino: “They [China] view it as their number one priority. The rejuvenation of the Chinese Communist Party is at stake, very critical as they look at the problem.
From a military standpoint, the strategic location of where it is, as it applies to the potential impact of two-thirds of the world’s trade, certainly a critical concern. Additionally, the status of the United States as a partner with our allies and partners also is at stake, should we have a conflict in Taiwan. So those two reasons are really the strategic main concernsthat I would see.”
But why would a Chinese occupation actually hinder trade in those areas, as it would also be problem for China’s own trade. Or is the real reason for the U.S. position represented by the second part of his argument. That the U.S. would be seen to lose its hegemonic position vis a vis China in the eyes of the World. Seeing this as so important that they would rather take on China in a what might turn out to become at major battle. A battle that according to the games played would risk crippling U.S forces or even lead to their defeat.
To the admiral the greatest danger for the U.S. in the competition with China would be the erosion of conventional deterrence. He therefore argued that “A combat-credible, conventional deterrent posture is necessary to prevent conflict, protect U.S. interests, and to assure our allies and partners.”
A credible of U.S. deterrent in the Indo-Pacific area would be depend on the ability to achieve these four objectives:

Develop an agile and distributed Joint Force designed to deter and deny our adversaries of their objectives in the first and second island chains;
Regain positional advantage by evolving our posture and balancing key capabilities across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania resulting in a more dynamic and distributed presence;
Establish a network of compatible and interoperable allies and partners who are willing and able to protect their sovereignty from coercion; and
Reassure our allies and partners of our commitment by revealing the capacity to conduct complex operations and concealing capabilities that provide a decisive advantage.

First and second island chain (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik):

Should allies question U.S. strategy?
Perhaps it worthwhile to look for possible alternatives to U.S. and Western positions in general viz a viz China and Taiwan. From what we have seen the U.S. does not really care about possible and alternative views from its allies, neither in the relation to Indo-China nor in Europe. It is almost as if it takes it for granted that they all will follow and support the U.S. position willingly and without any real discussion of the U.S. position and the U.S. Strategies we have been discussing.
In a way the allies are also in a very weak position relying themselves absolutely on U.S. military power, so they may not even be able to disagree with the U.S. without losing the deterrence the US provides, not the least in relation to Russia.
At the moment it looks as if the allies with their limited means are following with their timid steps in the large American footsteps. Accepting restrictions for exporting to China, preventing Chinese takeover of key industrial companies, keeping Chinese firms and communications equipment out of critical infrastructure, to a degree at least. Although some southern and eastern European countries are grateful for Chinese investment.
Some allies even try to support U.S forces in the Indo-Pacific area. France perhaps more than others because it has important interests in the Pacific. The U.K. perhaps still clinging to the view that they are the most trusted military partner of the U.S., demonstrating it by sending a carrier and other warship to the far East. Even Germany makes a small contribution by having a frigate showing the flag in the East. The German newspaper Tagesspiegel arguing that the German Frigate Bayern supports Japan and others threatened by Chinese activities no less: „Die Mission der Fregatte "Bayern" ist ein wichtiger Schritt für die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik Begründet wird der Einsatz damit, man wolle die internationale Zusammenarbeit stärken, also Partner wie Japan unterstützen, Länder, die sich durch China bedroht sehen. Die Regeln der internationalen Ordnung müssten durchgesetzt und außerdem die Seewege freigehalten werden.“

War over Taiwan neither in the best interest of Europe nor the U.S
Take Germany. In 2021 the trade turnover with China (export plus imports) statistics measured in euros, was larger than it was with the U.S.
For this and other reasons Germany or any other country in Europe does not have any real interest in a conflict with China over Taiwan, the Chinese dominance of the South China Sea, or the Uyghurs.
Chips produced in large fabs in Taiwan are found in all advanced electronic products. Especially notable is Taiwan’s leading position in the fabrication of the most advanced leading edge semiconductor chips. In the fabrication the of sub 10 nm (nanometre) semiconductor chips Taiwan has a share of 92 percent, while South Korea is sitting on the rest. Just an example, the new iPhone 14 pro is built with chips using a 4 nm process made in Taiwan. (See previous essay “The US-China war on chips”).
For these reasons it evident that a conflict over Taiwan would be major blow not only to the Europe but to the whole Western World. Even if the Chinese just blockaded Taiwan it would mean serious problems for Europe and the U.S. If the large fabs in Taiwan were to bombed and damaged it would to very serious shortage of advanced semiconductor chips for a long time, as it would extremely difficult to establish similar fabs elsewhere.
“It takes two-to-three years to build a semiconductor plant from scratch. Replacing lost manufacturing capacity would be extremely expensive — a new semiconductor factory costs tens of billions of dollars and it is extremely knowledge intensive; indeed, TSMC dominates at the cutting edge because of its technological lead” (Japan Times).
A full-blown war over Taiwan would not only cut off exports from Taiwan but lead to reciprocal sanctions on Chinese and European goods, and probably a closing of the South China Sea shipping routes.
Therefore, it would certainly not be in Europe’s interest to get involved in a conflict with China over Taiwan. The problem is that a conflict between China and the U.S. would have detrimental consequences even if Europe opted to stay out of the conflict.
The question does the U.S. actually have any interest in getting involved in a conflict or war with China over Taiwan?
When asked if the U.S. would defend Taiwan against China, President Biden said: "Yes, if in fact, there was an unprecedented attack." (Reuters). Perhaps Biden’s insistence on defending Taiwan just shows that he still believes it is possible for the U.S. to be the ultimate arbitrator in the World based on its previous hegemonic might.
Remember admiral Aquilino’s part of argument for defending Taiwan: “the status of the United States as a partner with our allies and partners also is at stake, should we have a conflict in Taiwan.” Perhaps showing that the most important reason for going to war over Taiwan would be seen as an attempt to preserve the U.S. hegemony and its standing in rest of the World, and not really a concern for Taiwan and its people.
Is war over Taiwan for this reason really worth it? Risking as we have seen that a stalemate, and maybe even defeat. Or even worse risking a nuclear war that cannot be won.
Perhaps the time has come the think the unthinkable, even for hawks like Biden, Blinken and Sullivan, that the weakening of U.S. hegemony is irrevocable, while China’s hegemony is on the rise.

U.S. talking peace but preparing to take on China, Part 2

11/28/2022

At their recent meeting of Xi Jinping and Joe Biden agreed that the United States and China must manage the competition responsibly and keep lines of communication open to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict.
In reality both countries are in involved in complicated but spiralling arms race including U.S. rearmament to deter the Chinese, while China is modernising and enhancing its military capabilities to such an extent that the U.S. fears to be outpaced in the arms race.
In this essay we discuss the U.S. fears and U.S. strategies to alleviate these fears and stay ahead, not the least in relation to a conflict a China-U.S. over Taiwan.

Due to the length of the essay, it has been divided into three parts published separately:

Part 1 Declining power of the U.S.
The U.S. not prepared for the big one
Playing war games and losing
A U.S. military in decline

Part 2 Preparing for the big one
Vague “National Strategy” of deterrence
Renewing nuclear armament
Building a stronger missile defence

Part 3 Questioning U.S. Strategy
Peace rhetoric while preparing for war?
War over Taiwan?
Should allies question U.S. strategy?
War over Taiwan neither in the best interest of Europe nor the U.S

Part 2 Preparing for the big one

Vague “National Strategy” of deterrence
When The Department of Defense published their most recent National Defense Strategy including Missile Defense and Nuclear Posture Reviews on October 27, 2022, it placed its primary focus on the need to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence against China in collaboration with allies and partners. One wonder if allies and partners have had anything say to the strategy of the U.S, but perhaps collaboration just means they have to accept the U.S. strategic view.
In the words of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin this means "We're seamlessly integrating our deterrence efforts to make a basic truth crystal clear to any potential foe … That truth is that the cost of aggression against the United States or our allies and partners far outweigh any conceivable gains."
The absolute focus of U.S. is China. Here as described in a lengthy excerpt from the National Defense Strategy:
“Strategic Competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the PRC’s coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences.
The PRC seeks to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic influence and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing strength and military footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten their interests.
The PRC’s increasingly provocative rhetoric and coercive activity towards Taiwan are destabilizing, risk miscalculation, and threaten the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.
This is part of a broader pattern of destabilizing and coercive PRC behavior that stretches across the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and along the Line of Actual Control.
The PRC has expanded and modernized nearly every aspect of the PLA, with a focus on offsetting U.S. military advantages. The PRC is therefore the pacing challenge for the Department.
In addition to expanding its conventional forces, the PLA is rapidly advancing and integrating its space, counterspace, cyber, electronic, and informational warfare capabilities to support its holistic approach to joint warfare.
The PLA seeks to target the ability of the Joint Force to project power to defend vital U.S. interests and aid our Allies in a crisis or conflict.
The PRC is also expanding the PLA’s global footprint and working to establish a more robust overseas and basing infrastructure to allow it to project military power at greater distances. In parallel, the PRC is accelerating the modernization and expansion of its nuclear capabilities.
The United States and its Allies and partners will increasingly face the challenge of deterring two major powers with modern and diverse nuclear capabilities – the PRC and Russia – creating new stresses on strategic stability “

How the U.S. aim to deter China
The National Defence Strategy is surprisingly vague on the substance of deterrence, and on precisely how the U.S. might deter China, but there is lots of rhetoric.
The U.S. will reduce a competitor’s perception of the benefits of aggression relative to restraint. Meaning that the U.S. will try to persuade China that aggression against the U.S. and its allies will not pay.
The U.S. will use deterrence by denial. “To deter aggression, especially where potential adversaries could act to rapidly seize territory, the Department will develop asymmetric approaches and optimize our posture for denial… Over the mid- to long-term, we will develop new capabilities, including in long-range strike, undersea, hypersonic, and autonomous systems, and improve information sharing and the integration of non-kinetic tools.”
The strategy also refers to deterrence by resilience. “The ability to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption… Cyber resilience will be enhanced by, for example, modern encryption and a zero-trust architecture. In the space domain, the Department will reduce adversary incentives for early attack by fielding diverse, resilient, and redundant satellite constellations.” This was actually one of the important weaknesses shown in the aforementioned war games.
The strategy also includes escalation management, as if escalation might not mean a self-reinforcing vicious spiral. In the rhetoric presented here they talk of “tailored approaches to assess and manage escalation risk in both crises and conflicts, including conducting analysis of escalation pathways and thresholds, and planning for situations with decreased domain awareness and impaired communications.”
Under the heading “Force Planning” the strategy talks of infrastructure investments in the Indo-Pacific and expansion across the region. Perhaps this is related to the apparent problems related to maintenance and repair facilities for instance in Hawaii, and the planned use of bases in Northern Australia.
“In Europe, our posture will focus on command and control, fires, and key enablers that complement our NATO Allies’ capabilities and strengthen deterrence by increasing combat credibility.”
To strengthen and sustain deterrence, and to prevail in conflict “The Department will prioritize a future force that is:

Lethal: Possesses anti-access/area-denial-insensitive strike capabilities that can penetrate adversary defenses at range.
Sustainable: Securely and effectively provides logistics and sustainment to continue operations in a contested and degraded environment, despite adversary disruption.
Resilient: Maintains information and decision advantage, preserves command, control, and communications systems, and ensures critical detection and targeting operations.
Survivable: Continues generating combat power to support strike capabilities and enablers for logistics and sustainment, despite adversary attacks.
Agile and Responsive: Rapidly mobilizes forces, generates combat power, and provides logistics and sustainment, even given adversary regional advantages and climate change impacts.

Rhetoric and more rhetoric. Llike a vague wish for and hope we will achieve these aims. There is nothing more specific on how this is to be achieved, and what it will demand of the U.S. and its allies.
The Strategy says it: This NDS (National Dense Strategy) has outlined the courses of action the Department of Defense will take to help meet this challenge. We are confident in success. Our country has faced and prevailed in multi-year competitions with major powers threatening or using force to subjugate others on more than one occasion in the past. Working in service of the American people, and in collaboration with our partners around the world, the men and women of our superbly capable Joint Force stand ready to do so again.”
Perhaps in relying on the ultimate deterrence, in the shape of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Renewing nuclear armament
“In 2022 the leaders of the five declared Nuclear Weapon States (France, People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States (P5)) affirmed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and that nuclear weapons should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war.”
Instead of concrete steps to make sure that a nuclear war will not happen by initiating mutual steps to prevent a nuclear armament race and a stronger commitment to nuclear disarmament, there are signs of a renewal of the nuclear armament race in relation to both Russia and China. While not ignoring he formidable Russian nuclear arsenal the main focus in this essay is on China.
“The PRC likely intends to possess at least 1,000 deliverable warheads by the end of the decade. While the end state resulting from the PRC’s specific choices with respect to its nuclear forces and strategy is uncertain, the trajectory of these efforts points to a large, diverse nuclear arsenal with a high degree of survivability, reliability, and effectiveness. This could provide the PRC with new options before and during a crisis or conflict to leverage nuclear weapons for coercive purposes, including military provocations against U.S. Allies and partners in the region.” (Nuclear Posture Review 2022).
In relation to China the Review argues that “it may be necessary to consider nuclear strategy and force adjustments to assure our ability to achieve deterrence and other objectives for the PRC – even as we continue to do so for Russia. Our plans and capabilities must also account for the fact that the PRC increasingly will be able to execute a range of nuclear strategies to advance its goals”
The declarative policy of the U.S. is to maintain a very high bar for nuclear deployment, but as long as nuclear weapons exist “the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our Allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its Allies and partners.”
The Nuclear Posture Review declares: “We will maintain a flexible deterrence strategy and force posture that continues to clearly convey to the PRC that the United States will not be deterred from defending our Allies and partners, or coerced into terminating a conflict on unacceptable terms. Forces that provide this flexibility include the W76-2 low yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead, globally-deployable bombers, dual-capable fighter aircraft, and air-launched cruise missiles. Our intent is to prevent the PRC from mistakenly concluding that it could gain advantage through any employment of nuclear weapons, however limited.”
The W76-2 reportedly has the explosive power of around 6,5 kilotons, and replaces existing W76 warheads with a yield of 100 kilotons. The deployment on U.S. nuclear Trident submarines apparently began in 2002. The idea behind the replacement of a high yield weapon with a low yield weapon is that the U.S. would then be able to have nuclear answer to Russian or Chinese use of tactical nuclear weapons in a regional war.
The problem with this thinking is of course that it potentially gives rise to the spectre of a limited nuclear war, which in itself may be a very dangerous prospect.
The U.S. is also modernizing its nuclear arsenal in other areas. “This includes modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and, with participating NATO Allies, transitioning to a new generation of fighter aircraft, including the U.S. F-35A Joint Strike Fighter. The United States will work with Allies concerned to ensure that the transition to modern DCA [Dual Aircraft Capable] and the B61-12 bomb [An updated air dropped gravity nuclear bomb] is executed efficiently and with minimal disruption to readiness.”
The updated bombs would replace existing bombs bunkered at bases in Germany and Belgium.
In the Indo-Pacific region the Posture Review states “We will work with Allies and partners to identify opportunities to increase the visibility of U.S. strategic assets to the region as a demonstration of U.S. resolve and commitment, including ballistic missile submarine port visits and strategic bomber missions. Greater capability integration is an important goal, as well – to better synchronize the nuclear and non-nuclear elements of deterrence and to leverage Ally and partner non-nuclear capabilities that can support the nuclear deterrence mission.”
Recently it there has been plans for the deployment of strategic bombers to a Northern Australian base. ABC reported that the plans would include deployment up to six of the nuclear capable aging B52 bombers to Tindal Air airbase south of Darwin.
There also plans for uprated the U.S. nuclear command, control and Communications (NC3) architecture.
In contrast to the National Strategy the Nuclear Posture Review reveal very specific plans for modernizing the nuclear forces of the U.S. Including what might seem to some observers a dangerous possibility of fighting a regional nuclear war.
This certainly does not represent concrete steps to make sure that a nuclear war will not happen, on the contrary. While the rhetorically signalling arms control and nuclear disarmament, the reality today points a multifaceted nuclear race involving Russia, China and the U.S. with additional dangers lurking in the wings from North Korea and Iran.

The US program is certainly comprehensive, with the Review listing these findings (National Posture Review 2022):.

S
Building a stronger missile defence
In addition to what might be seen as deterrence based upon superior offensive capabilities U.S. strategy also relies on defensive capabilities to deter China, Russia North Korea and to a certain degree also Iran from launching strikes against the U.S. and its allies.
Until recently the main threat may have been Russia, but Chinese offensive capabilities are increasingly important.
“Over the past two decades, the PRC has dramatically advanced its development of conventional and nuclear-armed ballistic and hypersonic missile technologies and capabilities, through intense and focused investment, development, testing, and deployments. … Increasingly sophisticated and proliferated space-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) networks, and improved Command and Control (C2) systems, have greatly improved the precision and accuracy of missile systems the PRC would employ to deter and counter U.S. forward presence and operations, especially in the Western Pacific region.” (Missile Defense Review 2022).
This means the U.S. will have strengthen its missile defence against China, not the least in the Indo-pacific region, in order for to make sure that its missile defence capabilities, represent a credible defence against missile attacks.

The defence against missile attacks
“Missile defense systems such as the GMD [Gound Based Midcourse Defence System] offer a visible measure of protection for the U.S. population while reassuring Allies and partners that the United States will not be coerced by threats to the homeland from states like North Korea and potentially Iran. In the event of crisis, globally integrated domain awareness capabilities increase warning and allow for flexible decision-making to respond, as necessary and appropriate, with escalatory options such as kinetic strike. Should deterrence fail, missile defenses can help mitigate damage to the homeland and help protect the U.S. population.”
With the present missile defence is no longer sufficient it will be necessary to develop new capabilities. This includes the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), new “active and passive defenses against regional hypersonic missile threats, and … a persistent and resilient sensor network to characterize and track all hypersonic threats, improve attribution, and enable engagement.”
The U.S. will also continue to strengthen defences for U.S. allies and partners against all regional missile threats from any source.
It is important to emphasize that U.S. neither intend nor is capable of, is defending and defeating “large and sophisticated ICBM, air-, or sea- launched ballistic missile threats from Russia and the PRC.”
Against these threats the U.S. relies on solely on its strategic nuclear deterrence. For instance the SSBNs (The Sub-Surface Ballistic Nuclear) submarines like the Ohio class and the new Columbia class submarines carrying up to 16 Trident D-5 SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles).

See also:
U.S. talking peace but preparing to take on China, Part 1 and
U.S. talking peace but preparing to take on China, Part3 (Forthcoming).

U.S. talking peace but preparing to take on China Part 1

11/26/2022

Click here to edit.

Part 1 Declining power of the U.S.

The U.S. not prepared for the big one
"This Ukraine crisis that we're in right now, this is just the warmup … The big one is coming. And it isn't going to be very long before we're going to get tested in ways that we haven't been tested a long time.” Navy Adm. Charles A. Richard, commander of Stratcom (The U.S. Strategic Command) prophesied recently.
Of cause the admiral was taking about the ability to take on China in the future. In his view the outlook was dire, with China was outcompeting the U.S. in a dramatic fashion.
"As I assess our level of deterrence against China, the ship is slowly sinking, … It is sinking slowly, but it is sinking, as fundamentally they are putting capability in the field faster than we are. As those curves keep going, it isn't going to matter how good our [operating plan] is or how good our commanders are, or how good our forces are — we're not going to have enough of them. And that is a very near-term problem."
As Commander of Stratcom he was especially concerned that the U.S. nuclear forces might not be able to demonstrate a convincing strategic deterrence in relation to China. Referring also to the threats from Russia and North Korea “vividly illuminating what nuclear coercion looks like and how you, or how you don’t, stand up to that.
In his view the U.S. has to regain the advantage fast. What he envisioned was the ability to act fast and confident, “That’s how we got to the Moon by 1969 … Otherwise China is simply going to outcompete U.S. and Russia isn’t going anywhere anytime soon.”
A year earlier the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chíefs of Staff, General Hyten, gave a similar warning, after China had tested its secretive hypersonic missile that “went around the world, dropped of a hypersonic glide vehicle that glided all the way back to China and impacted a target in China.” This Chinese demonstration was certainly a wake-up call for the U.S. military. Prompting General Hyten to warn “The pace they’re moving and the trajectory they’re on will surpass Russia and the United States if we don’t do something to change it. It will happen. So, I think we have to do something.”

Playing war games and losing
In a secret wargame in October 2020 simulating a battle between Chinese and U.S. forces over Taiwan the Chinese mauled the U.S. forces. ““Without overstating the issue, it failed miserably. An aggressive red team that had been studying the United States for the last 20 years just ran rings around us. They knew exactly what we're going to do before we did it” (Gen. Hyten).
Apparently, the wargame showed that the U.S. forces lost the battle because of these decisive factors:
U.S. forces were too aggregated and in “today’s world, with hypersonic missiles, with significant long-range fires coming at us from all domains, if you're aggregated and everybody knows where you are, you're vulnerable” (Gen. Hyten).
In earlier wars like in the Gulf war U.S. were used to have information dominance. “We basically attempted an information-dominance structure, where information was ubiquitous to our forces. Just like it was in the first Gulf War, just like it has been for the last 20 years, just like everybody in the world, including China and Russia, have watched us do for the last 30 years.”
In this wargame the U.S. forces lost their information dominance with the Chinese able to take their cloud-based information system. Turning the table on the U.S. forces knowing where American were, while the Americans lost the ability to know the whereabouts of the Chinese.
Apparently even the advanced F-35 joint Strike fighter proved useless in the tabletop wargames having to be based too close to the enemy.
As a consequence of seeing U.S. forces failing miserably in this and earlier wargames “the military is updating its Joint Warfighting Concept with the new “Expanded Maneuver” strategy that seeks to transform how it fights over the next decade.” (Stars and Stripes).
The military is not alone in playing games. The worsening relations between the U.S. and China, especially in relation to Taiwan have renewed the interest in the question of what might happen in a U.S.-China war over Taiwan. Think tanks have designed their own wargames.
In May 2022 the NBC even sponsored a wargame at the gaming lab at the Center for New American Security (CNAS.) Afterwards airing a short version in their “Meet the Press” program.
The wargame was based upon the assumption that China invaded Taiwan in 2027 as a reaction to a new government in Taiwan declaring permanent independence from China.
In the game the red team representing China initially attempted a quick invasion in the Northern part of Taiwan “to force Taipei to capitulate before the Blue forces [The U.S.] could recover from Red’s opening blow. Red aimed to decapitate Taiwan’s leadership, launch punitive strikes to erode Taiwan’s will to resist, and cut off communications to the island to reduce Taipei’s strategic messaging aimed at rallying international support.” (CNAS).
In the game it proved impossible for China to achieve a quick win due to Taiwan resistance and U.S. involvement. “…neither side was able to decisively win in the initial week of fighting. Both Red and Blue had expended large portions of their inventories of precision long-range missiles, lost many fighter aircraft, and needed to resupply and rearm forces under attack.” (CNAS).
Unexpected and really was scary, both red and blue rapidly became involved in mutual escalation, with the red team attempting to break the American ability to bring reinforcements into battle by bombarding American bases in the first island chain, bases in Japan and even bases in northern Australia, while the blue U.S. team retaliated by bombing points in mainland China (amazonaws.com).

Taking a leaf out of the war in Ukraine the red team then threatened to go nuclear. The blue U.S. team dismissed the threat relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrence. The red team then decided to up the ante by detonating a nuclear weapon off Hawaii.
Well, it was game wasn’t it, although perhaps somewhat over the top. Perhaps for showing off and getting a TV audience’s attention.
More serious was the realisation that the U.S. would have a hard time fighting off a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Observers like a former Airforce Lt. General Deptula said the game demonstrated the need to re-arm and supply Taiwan before any confrontation with China, as “The U.S. military lacks enough systems and equipment “to execute and sustain its own contribution to a successful defense of Taiwan, much less adequately supply Taiwan” (Lt. Gen. Deptula).
Similar observations were made by other observers.
The Center for Strategic & and International Studies (CSIS) is carrying out a several iterations of a similar wargame involving a simulated U.S.-China battle over Taiwan in 2026. The game is ongoing but planned to finish in December 2022.
Insights from most of previous iterations apparently demonstrate that U.S. and Taiwanese forces could prevent the Chinese from taking over Taiwan or at least reach a stalemate, but ultimately the cost would be terrible.
It has been reported that the U.S. in 18 of the existing 22 iterations lost 500 aircraft, 20 surface ships including two aircraft carriers in every round. But at least this game hasn’t involved the use of nuclear weapons.
The existing iterations have shown that if the U.S. decides to get involved in battle to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan it must enhance the deterrence provided by conventional means.
According to CSIS this include supplying Taiwan with weapons now, as it would be almost impossible to provide Taiwan with arms and supplies when a battle has begun.
The games have shown that U.S. bombers armed with long range anti-ship missiles was the most important weapon. Meaning that U.S. should enhance its capabilities in this field.
Another lesson from that game was that the U.S. would lose most aircraft on the ground as they would have to be stationed on forward bases vulnerable to Chines attacks. Meaning that bases had to be hardened.
The amounts of missiles used early in the battle would be prodigious and leading to rapid depletion of the available stockpiles. Thus, there is a need for much larger stockpiles.
Like General Hyten previously mentioned, it is also important to avoid large concentrations of U.S. forces as it might represent an easy target for the multitude of Chinese missiles.
But it is just games is it not? Or is there is more to it? Perhaps such games can set in motion actions by the U.S. that would strengthen U.S. military capabilities and enhance deterrence against a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. Which in itself might actually strengthen the conviction that a battle over Taiwan could be won, and indirectly also strengthen Taiwanese rejection of Chinese unification approaches. Actually, making war over Taiwan more probable.
A similar view is found in an article published by U.S. China Perception Monitor. The article argues that war games “can dangerously mislead American policymakers and public to misunderstand the risk and current state across the Taiwan Strait. Both the CNAS and the CSIS wargame projects relied on assumptions about strategy and military doctrine that are unwarranted, impractical, or outdated. Meanwhile, the methods used to conduct these wargames were likely more entertaining than they were accurate and constructive.” (Zhang Yilun, uscnpm.org).

A U.S. military in decline
War games and military commanders are not alone in warning against a waning U.S. ability to take on China, and the existing and potential challenges it has to take into account, like Russia, North Korea, Iran terrorist groups and the complex consequences of climate change, and dare one mention internal strife in the U.S. itself.
In October 2022 the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, published a “2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength.”
In this it argued that
“As currently postured, the U.S. military is at growing risk of not being able to meet the demands of defending America’s vital national interests. It is rated as weak relative to the force needed to defend national interests on a global stage against actual challenges in the world as it is rather than as we wish it were. This is the logical consequence of years of sustained use, underfunding, poorly defined priorities, wildly shifting security policies, exceedingly poor discipline in program execution, and a profound lack of seriousness across the national security establishment even as threats to U.S. interests have surged.” With the index the think tank attempts to assess “the ease or difficulty of operating in key regions based on existing alliances, regional political stability, the presence of U.S. military forces, and the condition of key infrastructure.”
All this in order to view the ability to defend the vital interests of the U.S.

Defense of the homeland;
Successful conclusion of a major war that has the potential to destabilize a region of critical interest to the U.S.; and
"Preservation of freedom of movement within the global commons (the sea, air, outer space, and cyberspace domains) through which the world conducts its business.

Here first a visual summary of the threats to the vital interest as judged by the think tank.
(Heritage Foundation):

No surprises in this summary. But at least it shows that U.S. military hegemony is being challenged from several directions at the same time. The question then is, is the U.S. military might ready to take on all these threats almost simultaneously? Or in other words is the U.S. ready to go to war with a large part of the World? Or are there alternatives to war, realizing that taking on all these threats might be too much even for the U.S.
Another question to what degree would the rest of the Western World, especially of cause Europe, be ready to support U.S. might and hegemony?
The index being discussed here concentrates mostly on the status of U.S. military might.
In the think tank’s summary of the military capabilities of the U.S. they reach the following aggregate conclusion ((Heritage Foundation):

The conclusion points to an overall weakness in conventional forces, apart for the Marine Corps, but they certainly will not be able to fight major conflicts on their own.
Nuclear capabilities are seen as strong, but it might not matter much given the enormous Russian arsenal and the hasty growth of Chinese nuclear capability, as a nuclear war might result in mutual destruction.
Detailed comparisons with the capabilities of major competitors in a more detailed exposé demonstrate the growing U.S. weakness in conventional forces.
Here a couple of examples.

An army comparison shows the U.S. lagging its competitors in land-based missile capabilities. Some of missiles are capable of delivering non-strategic nuclear weapons. (Heritage Foundation):

An example from a navy comparison, detailing fleet expansion trends (Heritage Foundation):

This shows that at least in the number of ships the U.S navy is really getting behind. In addition, it seems certain that the U.S. is lagging behind China in shipbuilding capacity, which would be important in a drawn-out conflict. China may not have the enormous U.S. nuclear powered carriers, but these carriers on the other hand represent inviting goals for China’s missile capabilities. Where the U.S. has real advantage for a foreseeable time is in the number of nuclear submarines.
With regard to Air Force the index points to a growing U.S. weakness related to number and age of combat-coded fighters (Heritage Foundation):

Not exactly the impressive view that one might have expected. Although they apparently do not include navy and marine corps fighters. It is worth remembering that the wargames related to a war with China over Taiwan showed that the U.S. might lose around 500 aircraft.
A simple comparison of total numbers still shows U.S. superiority (armed forces.eu):

Recently General Mark Kelly U.S. Air Combat Commander warned China’s PLAA (People’s Liberation Army Airforce) might become the first to field sixth generation aircraft, and thus overtake the U.S. in the latest generation fighters. While the general may be right, it is important to keep in mind, that he is using the possible threat to argue for a speedy introduction of such 6th generation fighters in the U.S.

The U.S. must do more to stay ahead. Overall, the Heritage Foundation Index concludes “that the current U.S. military force is at significant risk of not being able to meet the demands of a single major regional conflict while also attending to various presence and engagement activities. The force would probably not be able to do more and is certainly ill-equipped to handle two nearly simultaneous MRCs [Major regional Conflicts]—a situation that is made more difficult by the generally weak condition of key military allies.”
While this leads the military sources and Heritage Foundation to recommend hasty rejuvenation and expansion of U.S. military capabilities to stay ahead of its competitors, one might perhaps draw another preliminary conclusion. That the U.S. perhaps should not get into a war with China over Taiwan as it might be too costly, and likewise that the U.S. perhaps should look to alternatives. Instead of believing that it ought to be capable of talking on militarily all the threats it sees in the next decade. In this light it might look outright stupid to drive Russia into a kind of forced rapprochement with China, as the ongoing U.S. proxy war with Russia in the Ukraine is sure to do.

Essay to be continued in Part 2 "Preparing for the big one"

New US attempt to throttle Chinese chips development

10/19/2022

Making sure that the U.S. stays ahead

In September National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan emphasised that the U.S. had to protect the U.S.’s technology advantage. Apparently not only by outcompeting anyone else, but also by attempts to throttle key technological development in China.
Sullivan argued that maintaining “relative” advantages over competitors in certain key technologies was no longer enough … Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.” In order to maintain the lead over competitors (read China) the U.S. must restrict outbound investments in sensitive technologies, “particularly investments that would not be captured by export controls and could enhance the technological capabilities of our competitors in the most sensitive areas.” (Sullivan).
The two goals then for U.S.: Stay ahead in technology and prevent China from ever getting too close to overtaking the U.S.
With the CHIPS ACT from august 2022 Congress and the Biden administration were trying primarily to support the first goal. The $52.7 billion CHIPS Act seeks to alleviate chips shortage and re-establish the production of advanced microchips in the U.S. In effect an attempt to bring home at least part of the fabrication of advanced semiconductor chips, presently mostly located in Taiwan.
In a previous essay “The US-China war on chips” we also looked at the U.S. attempt to support the second gaol with U.S. attempts to throw a spanner into the works for China by introducing new export controls. On August 12 the U.S. established export controls on technologies that enable semiconductors, engines and power systems “to operate faster, more efficiently, longer, and in more severe conditions in both the commercial and military context” (BIS, Bureau of Industry and Security).
Now the U.S. is following up with further attempts to make sure that China stays behind in the war on chips.

Preventing China from ever catching up
A key priority is to establish an export control system capable of throttling the Chinese military’s access to advanced AI chips. On October 7 the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced a new set of export controls on advanced computing and semiconductor items to China.
The new BIS export controls contain two rules.

The first one is meant to make sure that China cannot get access to the most advanced U.S. chips and tools used to develop and construct supercomputers, artificial intelligence applications, and manufacture advanced semiconductors.
Taking the example of supercomputers the race is already on today China is competing at eyelevel with U.S. in the super computer race. Both having built supercomputers with peak performances in the ExaFLOP range. While the U.S. Frontier supercomputer at Oak Ridge National Laboratory is said to be capable of 1.5 ExaFLOPS, the Chinese Sunway Oceanlite computer is reported to have a peak performance of 1.3 exaFLOPS in 2022. (ExaFLOPS, a measure of performance for a supercomputer that can calculate at least one quintillion floating point operations per second).
The Oceanlite supercomputer “is already in use and plays a starring role in a recent project designed to approach brain-scale AI where the number of parameters is similar to the number of synapses in the human brain. In fact, the project is the first to target training brain-scale models on an entire exascale supercomputer, revealing the full potential of the machine.” (asianscientist.com).
There is fear such capabilities might be used by China “to produce advanced military systems including weapons of mass destruction; improve the speed and accuracy of its military decision making, planning, and logistics, as well as of its autonomous military systems; and commit human rights abuses.”
Here we see a new argument creeping in, that preventing China from getting access to advanced chips and tools is also meant to prevent human rights abuses. Like surveillance capabilities to monitor own citizens.
In other words: “Our actions will protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests while also sending a clear message that U.S. technological leadership is about values as well as innovation.” (Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration).
An argument to somehow elevate the U.S. attempt to keep China behind in the supercomputer race from just being concerned with technology to the noble goal of preserving and strengthening Western values.
The new restrictions announced in the BIS statement adds new license requirements for items destined to be used in semiconductor fabrication. “The new rules are comprehensive, and cover a range of advanced semiconductor technology, from chips produced by the likes of AMD and Nvidia to the expensive, complex equipment needed to make those chips. Much of highest-quality chip manufacturing equipment is made by three U.S. companies: KLA, Applied Materials, and Lam Research, and cutting off China’s access to their tools has the potential to damage the country’s ambitions to become a chipmaking powerhouse.” (protocol.com).

The stringent new restrictions
The new restrictions for export to China announced by BIS October 7 include:

Logic chips with non-planar transistor architectures (I.e., FinFET or GAAFET) of
16nm or 14nm, or below;
DRAM memory chips of 18nm half-pitch or less;
NAND flash memory chips with 128 layers or more.
(These restrictions are meant to make sure that China will not have access to the most advanced chips, forcing China to use older designs and technologies, but it may prove impossible as SMIC, the largest chipmaker in China, is already able to produce chips with a 7nm process).

Restricts the ability of U.S. persons to support the development, or production, of
ICs at certain China-located semiconductor fabrication “facilities” without a license (Meaning that U.S. citizens supporting or servicing development and production of ICs in China will have to cease their work);

Adds new license requirements to export items to develop or produce semiconductor
manufacturing equipment and related items (restricting the export of tools that would allow China to make advanced semiconductors); and

Establishes a Temporary General License (TGL) to minimize the short-term impact
on the semiconductor supply chain by allowing specific, limited manufacturing activities
related to items destined for use outside the PRC. (Presumable in order make sure that the new rules will not harm the U.S. itself).

The second rule in in the BIS announcement is meant to make sure that Chinese and other foreign countries and companies will be added to an export black list, known as the “Entity List,” if they do not comply with the U.S. export controls.
“The rule provides an example that stipulates that sustained lack of cooperation by a foreign
government that prevents BIS from verifying the bona fides of companies on the Unverified List (UVL) can result in those parties being moved to the Entity List, if an end-use check is not timely scheduled and completed.” (BIS).
On October 7 a total of 31 new entities were added to the list. Among those were China's top memory chipmaker YMTC (Yangtze Memory Technologies) and 30 other Chinese entities. Hurting Apple’s plans to use YMTC’s NAND flash memory chips, with Nikkei reporting that Apple has now put plans on hold.
According to a BIS document 600 Chinese companies had already been added to the list. More than 110 of these since the start of the Biden presidency.

Chinese reactions to US’s export ban
“Full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” The quote from Shakespeare’s Macbeth may characterize the public reactions from China. And what else can they do publicly?
When the CHIPS act was signed Wang Wenbin, Chinese Foreign ministry spokesperson, slammed the Act: “How the US grow its industry is its own business, but it should not set obstacles for normal economic, trade, scientific and technological exchanges and cooperation between China and the US, let alone undermine China's legitimate development rights and interests.” (Global Times).
The new October restrictions were met with renewed fury. The U.S. restrictions on exports to China were seen as attempt to create a U.S. technological hegemony: “Mao Ning, a spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry, said on Saturday that the US' new restrictions will hinder international tech exchanges and economic cooperation, and undermine the stability of global industrial and supply chains and the recovery of the world economy. The US' politicization and weaponization of technology, economic and trade issues will not stop China's development, and will only hurt the US itself, Mao added.” (People’s Daily).
Global Times warns that the U.S. chips export ban “could risk as much as 30% of some global chips giants’ revenue” and harm the U.S. itself. “As it costs vast financial and human resources investment in the R&D of cutting-edge chips, US companies will unlikely see much returns without chip exports to China and could barely re-invest in future R&D,” (Gao Lingyun quoted in Global Times).
Erecting barriers to trade shift production away from the countries with most efficient production, and lead to a decrease in economic growth.
A recent WTO working paper that tries to model the impact of ongoing geopolitical conflicts on trade growth and innovation indicate that “welfare losses for the global economy of a decoupling scenario can be drastic, as large as 12% in some regions and larges in the lower income regions” (wto-library.org).
What the U.S. may also have forgotten in their eagerness to prevent China from ever getting too close to overtaking the U.S. is that export controls may not nearly be enough.
In an earlier essay “The US-China war on chips” we refer to the historical example of America colonies (later the U.S.) overtaking Britain in industrial textile manufacturing as an example showing that it might be impossible to throttle a competitor with enough human and material resources, and China certainly has the manpower and the financial resources to achieve something similar..
Mathieu Duchatel at the Institute Montaigne argues in a similar vein, when saying: The most difficult challenge for an effective chokepoint policy is intangible technology transfers through education and research cooperation, and talent recruitment. Frontal breakthroughs that would suddenly remove chokepoints seem unlikely in the medium term, but Chinese breakthroughs may happen in other innovative segments of the semiconductor industry, such as new materials and heterogeneous integration.”

The fallout hitting South Korea and Taiwan
October 10 South Korea published an assessment of possible consequences of the U.S. chip export ban. While it concluded that the effects should be limited it also acknowledged that the South Korean giants in the production of memory chips Samsung and Hynix and important activities in China would certainly have to take account of the new U.S. export controls. Restricting their ability to introduce more advanced technology in their memory chip fabrication in China.
Earlier in the year the Taiwan chip giant TSMC stopped supplying the Chinese company Tianjin Phytium Information Technology Company with advanced chips after Phytium had been placed on the U.S. entity list, presumably as a consequence of Phytium having designed a supercomputer, which according to Datacenter Dynamics is used to simulate the performance of the new Chinese hypersonic DF-17 missile. A missile that certainly poses a new big challenge to the U.S.

The possible self-harm for U.S. companies
In the Chinese reaction to the U.S. export ban they warned that it would harm U.S. companies in the semiconductor sector as their involvement in China and their large export to China would be harmed. This certainly seem to be the case when noting what has happened to the share price of the companies in this sector.
Asia Times on October 17 showed the decline from 52 weeks highs to 52 weeks lows:

Intel (INTC) was down 56%;
Micron (MU) was down 50%;
Nvidia (NVDA) was down 69% (its products having been directly targeted by
the Biden administration); and
AMD (AMD) (also directly targeted) was down 67%.

Among the companies making equipment critical for chips design and fabrication:

"Applied Materials (AMAT) was down 57%;
"Lam Research (LRCX) was down 59%; and
"KLA (KLAC) was down 45%.

Yes, there might be other factors involved in the decline, but on October 10 Applied Materials has said that the U.S. ban would reduce fourth quarter net sales by about $400 million, thus lowering profit expectations.
Retaliatory measures from China might further reduce sales from these and other companies having a substantial export to China. This would mean that the Biden administration’s ban would harm not only Chinese but also American companies.

The warning from history
Here it may be relevant to refer back the conclusion in the earlier essay “The US-China war on chips”
China may not yet a champion in the production of advanced semiconductors, but then we have to remember that Taiwan is, and China insists that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it. And if that also became the reality, China would jump to the front in the production of advanced semiconductors. Production that is, not yet design. But China might be on the verge of overtaking the U.S. in areas related to Artificial Intelligence or AI.
A final report on AI from the U.S. National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) published in 2021 concludes:
“The leading indexes that measure progress in AI development generally place the United
States ahead of China. However, the gap is closing quickly. China stands a reasonable chance of overtaking the United States as the leading center of AI innovation in the coming decade. In recent years, technology firms in China have produced pathfinding advances in natural language processing, facial recognition technology, and other AI-enabled domains.”
Does history repeat itself? Not one to one of course. We are no longer talking textile machinery, but advanced semiconductors and AI. Looking at the data we have shown that it certainly seems probable that in the war on chips China might overtake the U.S. and thus the West. The present U.S. sanctions restrictions may hamper Chinese development in these areas, but also encourage Chinese to search for ways to leapfrog the U.S. based on their own efforts.
Like the British attempts to prevent the growth of textile manufacturing in the colonial US and later in India, it may prove impossible to stop the colossal Chinese momentum, in research, investment and production. The U.S. realization that China might soon overtake the U.S. in AI may represent the writing on the great wall. A kind of mene mene tekel upharsin for the West.

A grim spectre rears its ugly head

9/24/2022

The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
W.B. Yeats

Eying defeat in a proxy war
Given the apparent success of the West’s proxy war in Ukraine and Russia’s evident difficulties the important question is:
What might/will Russia do now that its mighty military has been humiliated and its goals looks increasingly difficult or even impossible to achieve?
Surely Russia must now realise that it is fighting all the might of West in a proxy war, carried out on Ukrainian soil. Russia finds itself in an impossible quandary similar to the Norse God, Thor, when he was trying to lift the Midgard Serpent or Jörmungandr in the shape of a cat. An impossible task even for Thor as the Midgard Serpent stretched around the whole World.
Putin may have thought it was easy to “lift” a puny Ukraine, but must now realise that he is fighting the Midgard Serpent of the whole of Western might.

What will Putin do?
The Kremlin, September 21, 2022, 09:00. In an address that Wednesday morning President Putin had three important announcements:

Referendums in Donbass, Kherson and Zaporozhye
“The parliaments of the Donbass people’s republics and the military-civilian administrations of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions have adopted decisions to hold referendums on the future of their territories and have appealed to Russia to support this.”

Partial mobilisation
“I find it necessary to support the proposal of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff on partial mobilisation in the Russian Federation to defend our Motherland and its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to ensure the safety of our people and people in the liberated territories.”

Nuclear threat
“Washington, London and Brussels are openly encouraging Kiev to move the hostilities to our territory. They openly say that Russia must be defeated on the battlefield by any means, and subsequently deprived of political, economic, cultural and any other sovereignty and ransacked…
I would like to remind those who make such statements regarding Russia that our country has different types of weapons as well, and some of them are more modern than the weapons NATO countries have. In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.
The citizens of Russia can rest assured that the territorial integrity of our Motherland, our independence and freedom will be defended – I repeat – by all the systems available to us. Those who are using nuclear blackmail against us should know that the wind rose can turn around.”

Biden’s hasty riposte
United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 21, 2022 at10:35 a.m. EDT. In his speech at the 77th session of the United Nations President Biden had these replies to President Putin’s announcements:

On nuclear threats
“Again, just today, President Putin has made overt nuclear threats against Europe and a reckless disregard for the responsibilities of the non- proliferation regime.
Let me also urge every nation to recommit to strengthening the nuclear non- proliferation regime through diplomacy. No matter what else is happening in the world, the United States is ready to pursue critical arms control measures. A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought …
Let me also urge every nation to recommit to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime through diplomacy. No matter what else is happening in the world, the United States is ready to pursue critical arms control measures. A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought …
And again, today, as I said, they’re making irresponsible nuclear threats to use nuclear weapons. China is conducting an unprecedented, concerning nuclear buildup without any transparency.”

On Putin’s mobilization
“Now Russia is calling — calling up more soldiers to join the fight. And the Kremlin is organizing a sham referenda to try to annex parts of Ukraine, an extremely significant violation of the U.N. Charter.
This world should see these outrageous acts for what they are. Putin claims he had to act because Russia was threatened. But no one threatened Russia, and no one other than Russia sought conflict. In fact, we warned it was coming. And with many of you, we worked to try to avert it.”

A passionate and dangerous game of chicken*
What the U.S. intelligence believes Putin might do: President Putin may turn to more drastic means …including imposing martial law, reorienting industrial production, or potentially escalatory military actions to free up the resources needed to achieve his objectives as the conflict drags on, or if he perceives Russia is losing in Ukraine.
“The most likely flashpoints for escalation in the coming weeks are around increasing Russian attempts to interdict Western security assistance, retaliation for Western economic sanctions, or threats to the regime at home.
We believe that Moscow continues to use nuclear rhetoric to deter the United States and the West from increasing lethal aid to Ukraine and to respond to public comments from the U.S. and NATO Allies that suggest expanded western goals in the conflict. If Putin perceives that the United States is ignoring his threats, he may try to signal to Washington the heightened danger of its support to Ukraine by authorizing another large nuclear exercise involving a major dispersal of mobile intercontinental missiles, heavy bombers, strategic submarines.
We otherwise continue to believe that President Putin would probably only authorize the use of nuclear weapons if he perceived an existential threat to the Russian state or regime, but we will remain vigilant in monitoring every aspect of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. With tensions this high, there is always an enhanced potential for miscalculation, unintended escalation, which we hope our intelligence can help to mitigate.” (Emphasis added). (Avril Haines Director of National Intelligence at Congressional Testimony, May10).
In the speech announcing the invasion of Ukraine Putin warned the West: “No matter who tries to stand in our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.... All the necessary decisions in this regard have been taken. I hope that my words will be heard.”
Three day later he ordered military command to put Russia's nuclear deterrent forces on high alert.
The White House press secretary Jen Psaki, who often seems to act independently in lieu of Biden, dismissed Putin’s threat on Twitter the same day: “that Russian President Vladimir Putin's decision to put his nation's nuclear deterrent forces on a state of heightened alert was part of a "pattern" of manufacturing threats that don't exist.” (Jen Psaki, February 27).
In April, when it had become evident that Russian troops were in dire straits in Ukraine
“Sergei Lavrov warned the West on Monday not to underestimate the elevated risks of nuclear conflict over Ukraine and said he viewed NATO as being "in essence" engaged in a proxy war with Russia by supplying Kyiv with weaponry.” (Reuters April 26).
The threats were later dismissed by President Biden, when answering a question from journalist. Sounding somewhat hesitantly he said:
“So, it’s — number one, it’s an excuse for their failure. But number two, it’s also, if they really mean it, it’s — it’s — no — no one should be making idle comments about the use of nuclear weapons or the possibility that they’d use that. It’s irresponsible.”
Prime Minister Johnson was even more casually dismissing the threat. When asked he if shared the concern over threat of a nuclear war he simply said: “No. I don’t.”
Analysts asked to judge the likelihood that Putin might use nuclear weapons when facing defeat in Ukraine have argued that there is a non-zero risk. A former undersecretary for defence put the risk a around 1 or 2 percent, while a former US ambassador to Russia judged the risk to be less than 5 percent.
How they arrived at the percentage is not known, but that they judged the risk to be higher than zero is significant, and ought to give cause for concern among those Western leaders who rather arrogantly dismissed the Russian threat as merely empty words.
Perhaps it would be wise to have a look at the Russian nuclear doctrine.

Escalate to de-escalate when things fall apart
On April 21, 2022 the U.S. congressional Service Published a report on Russians Nuclear doctrine.
In 2020 Russia published the latest version of the doctrine entitled ““On Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” The document outlines the circumstances that might lead Russia to use nuclear weapons.
“This document specifically notes that Russia “considers nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence.” It states that Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy “is defensive by nature, it is aimed at maintaining the nuclear forces potential at the level sufficient for nuclear deterrence, and guarantees protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, and deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.” It also emphasizes that Russia maintains forces that could “inflict guaranteed unacceptable damage on a potential adversary ... in any circumstances.”
Defensive it says, but it also states that Russia could respond with nuclear weapons following an “attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions,” but also in an “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” (Emphasis added).
Thus, Russia might respond to a conventional attack with nuclear weapons if it judges the very existence of the state to be in jeopardy. While this might seem to exclude the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Ukrainian war, the document also opens the possibility of nuclear first use as it states:
“… in the event of a military conflict, this Policy provides for the prevention of an escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation and/or its allies.”
Analysts have assessed that this means Russia might threaten to escalate to use nuclear weapons as a way to deter a conflict that would threaten the existence of the state, with Russia pursuing an “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear doctrine under certain circumstances.
If a conventional conflict might threaten Russia, it might decide to use nuclear weapons to create such a catastrophic threat to a continuation of the conflict that its adversary would be forced to de-escalate. The Congressional report in fact mentions that this might happen if Russia looks to be defeated in a conventional conflict with NATO.
At least that is how some analysts interpret the Russian doctrine. But it is worth noting that Russia itself does not use the term “escalate to de-escalate.”
Now what does this mean in relation to Ukraine? We are seeing a more and more cocksure attitude in the West, manifesting itself in almost no holds barred support of Ukraine. The reality being that the West is using its potent military arsenal to fight the Russians using their Ukraine proxies.
Could an eminent defeat of all Russians troops in Ukraine, the re-conquering the Russian held areas, and the weakening of Russia military might to a stage, where it would unable to wage war be seen as a defeat of Russia itself?
Would an eminent risk of this happening provoke Russia to nuclear escalation in order to force the West to de-escalate?
Russian certainly has the enough tactical nuclear weapons to make that a possibility.

Russia’s nuclear arsenal.
IT is estimated that Russia has 1,912 non-strategic nuclear weapons.
“These nuclear warheads include theater- and tactical-range systems that Russia relies on to deter and defeat NATO or China in a conflict. Russia’s stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons [is] already large and diverse and is being modernized with an eye towards greater accuracy, longer ranges, and lower yields to suit their potential warfighting role. We assess Russia to have dozens of these systems already deployed or in development. They include, but are not limited to: short- and close-range ballistic missiles, ground-launched cruise missiles, including the 9M729 missile [The 9M729 SSC-X-8 is a long-range ground-based cruise missile system], which the U.S. Government determined violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty, as well as antiship and antisubmarine missiles, torpedoes, and depth charges.”
Among the advanced missiles that may be armed with a nuclear tactical warhead is the Kh-47M2 “Kinzhal.” A nuclear-capable, air-launched, hypersonic ballistic missile, one of six new “next generation” weapons unveiled by Vladimir Putin in March 2018. It can carry a payload up to 480 kilos, and be armed with a thermonuclear warhead in the 10 to 50Kt range, and it may be air-launched from a Mig-31.

Innocence is drowned …
How might Russia use a non-strategic nuclear weapon, if it is pushed into corner facing defeat in the proxy war with the West?
“Russian military-analytical writings envision a series of steps in which nuclear weapons are first deployed and utilized for signalling, and are then potentially employed in a progressive fashion at the regional level of conflict and finally are used in a large-scale war until the conflict reaches the “retaliation” of all-out nuclear war. At that level of war, in addition to the mass use of conventional precision strike, military writings suggest the employment of “single and/or grouped use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons on adversary forces” as well as the “demonstration use of nuclear weapons by strategic nuclear forces or nonstrategic nuclear weapons.”
There are strong indications that not all of Russia’s nuclear employment appears to be under the rubric of SONF [Strategic Operation of Nuclear Forces].” This means that a tactical nuclear strike with aim of forcing the West to de-escalate could be launched as single initial strike by limited means in a selected region (zone) “intended to destroy political, industrial, and military targets.” (cna.org).
A recent article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists argues that Russian use of “non-strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine could take several forms. They could be used for demonstration purposes—not targeting anything and not creating casualties—to coerce Ukraine and/or the West to agree to a settlement acceptable to Putin. Tactical nukes could also be used to target military units to change the operational situation on the ground.” (thebulletin.org).
“Russian thinking here is keen to avert inadvertent escalation, or the strengthening of political resolve that comes from civilian casualties. The possibility of secondary or synergistic effects, which could result in unacceptable levels of damage, weighs heavily as a consideration. Here, target selection and warhead selection are relevant factors.
The operation is premised on inflicting deterrent damage through the application of limited force. The psychological impact is meant to exceed the level of material damage, affecting the political leadership’s will to fight.” (cna.org).

A warning shot
Euphemistically calling it a warning shot this could mean a nuclear explosion in a sparsely populated area Ukraine, using an unstoppable Kinzhal hypersonic missile with a 10 kiloton warhead, or a 9M729 missile similarly configured.
Desperate and vindictive and Russians could perhaps even choose the small community “Ukrainske” for its symbolic value. Using Nukemap one may calculate the probable destructive effects giving the explosion of a 10 Kt warhead, with wind coming from an easterly direction. According to a Nukemap calculation this would result in 140 fatalities and 90 heavily injured. Terrible consequences for a small community and its vicinity in Ukraine, but not catastrophic in the wider sense.
A map showing the areas to suffer the consequences of such nuclear demonstration, according to NUKemap calculations.

De-escalate or risk anarchy loosed upon the World
What would be the Western reaction if the Russians dared attempt to escalate to de-escalate with such a nuclear demonstration, calculated to impress and force the West to de-escalate?
“The emotional noise following the use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine would be deafening, both in terms of calls for restraint and of demands for retaliation. In many ways, the policy community is divided between those wanting an aggressive approach to the war that seeks to force a strategic defeat on Russia and those who want a more constrained approach to avoid a possible escalation.” (thebulletin.org).
Here a list of possible reactions to a Russian nuclear demonstration in Ukraine:

De-escalate, scaling down the assistance to Ukraine

Respond using conventional weapons

React in kind with some kind of nuclear demonstration

De-escalate, scaling down the assistance to Ukraine
It would mean giving in to a Russian “escalate to de-escalate” attempt. It would mean Western powers signalling that they would limit their assistance to Ukraine to level that would not threaten the Russia with defeat, and it would also mean forcing Ukraine to cut down its military and political ambitions. In effect force Ukraine, and the West, to accept some kind of settlement with Russia.
“Given the consequences of a nuclear war between the United States, NATO, and Russia and the risk of escalation beyond Ukraine should the conflict continue, this option argues for ending the conflict in some way that gives the Russian leadership an “out” from the conflict. While seemingly reasonable given the level of destruction and costs of escalation.”
Still, giving in to Russia would be humiliating to decision makers in the West hoping to bring Russia to its knees in their surprisingly successful proxy war against the Russia.
It would also mean that nuclear blackmail would be effective, setting dangerous precedence, given the outstanding conflicts with say North Korea and Iran. On the other hand, there might be much less reluctance to respond in kind in the case of North Korea and Iran, meaning that the precedence setting effect of giving in to the Russian escalate to de-escalate may be negligible.
An aspect that most US analysts seem to forget is that the Europeans would regard a giving in to Russia option as the only option. Fearing that alternatives like responding in kind would raise the spectre a nuclear war on the European continent.

Respond using conventional weapons
Fearing the consequences of responding in kind to a Russian nuclear demonstration, the U.S. and especially the Europeans might consider a response using conventional weapons.
This would mean direct Western involvement in a war with Russia. Something the West has tried to avoid, although the cocksure attitude resulting from the success of the proxy war has meant that the restraint is disappearing.
On overwhelming conventional response could be caried out in different ways.
The limited version would consist of an all-out attack on Russian troops or installations in Ukraine.
A more dangerous version would be an attack on Russian soil, say on the area, units or installations involved in the Russian nuclear demonstration.
In this case the Russian escalate to de-escalate strategy would not have succeeded, and the result might be either that the Russia would realise that they were now involved in a direct war with West and that it would have to find some kind of settlement with the West… Or they might choose further escalation, including more forceful Russian nuclear demonstrations. Perhaps against to bases from where the conventional response was carried out.
This would force the West to either seek settlement or escalate further carrying the risk of all out nuclear war.

React in kind with some kind of tactical nuclear demonstration
“To truly be “in-kind” in this scenario, the US and NATO would need to strike Russian targets in Ukraine—or otherwise significantly change the nature of the conflict by striking a target in Russia. There may be Russian military targets in Ukraine for which a low-yield nuclear strike would produce limited casualties. But to have a significant military impact, NATO would likely have to use multiple strikes.” (thebulletin.org).
No one can say what the result of such scenario might be. But responsible European decision-makers would see this response in kind option as being far too dangerous. Fearing that it might lead to exchange of tactical nuclear weapon strikes on European soil. The problem is that Europeans may very little say in the decision to respond in kind. The U.S. being in charge and perhaps having less qualms.
“Using a nuclear weapon against Russia immediately turns the conflict into a Russia versus the United States and NATO war that has skipped all the conventional options for escalation management. Given the potential global consequences of a nuclear war between Russia and the United States and NATO, striking targets inside Russia with nuclear weapons is unlikely to be viewed by the US president as a viable option.” (thebulletin.org).
Thus, no one their right mind would therefore regard a response in kind as realistic option in the proxy war against Russia, meaning that we are back with the other two response scenarios.
The 2022 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review states “As long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.”
It would certainly be difficult see a Russian tactical nuclear demonstration in Ukraine with limited local consequences as “extreme circumstances” threatening the “vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners”?

Cool the passionate intensity
While the West seems united in their “intense passion” to punish the Russians with help of Ukraine, there are voices calling for a cooling of the passion.
Daniel Immerwahr (with a name signallling “Allwaystrue”) warns that Western politicians have forgotten the trauma left by the nuclear devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Quoting the Russian ambassador to the U.S. complaining that “the current generation of NATO politicians does not take the nuclear threat seriously.”
Immerwahr argues that “we can’t drive nuclear war to extinction by ignoring it. …
And we’re doing it just at the time when those who have most effectively testified to nuclear war’s horrors – the survivors – are entering their 90s. Our nuclear consciousness is badly atrophied. We’re left with a world full of nuclear weapons but emptying of people who understand their consequences.” (The Guardian).
In an essay published by “Responsible Statecraft” Anatol Lieven warns of the horrible dangers of pushing a US proxy war in Ukraine.
Arguing that former U.S. presidents like Truman and Eisenhower adopted a strategy of containing, but never fighting the Soviet Union in Europe and not trying to “roll back Soviet power through armed support for anti-Soviet insurgencies in eastern Europe.”
He argues that leaders today should remember this and not try to push back Russia in military proxy war in Europe.
The consequences would be disastrous for themselves “and still more disastrous for the wretched people on the ground who became the pawns of these great power agendas. Have we really learned nothing from history?”
New York Times’ influential Thomas L. Friedman is warning that the war in Ukraine is getting more dangerous for America. He even postulates that Biden knows it, although that seems doubtful giving his rhetoric and the amount of resources, he is allocating to fight the proxy war in Ukraine.
Friedman argues “We need to stick as tightly as possible to our original limited and clearly defined aim of helping Ukraine expel Russian forces as much as possible or negotiate for their withdrawal whenever Ukraine’s leaders feel the time is right.”
The last condition seems very dangerous, giving the views expressed by president Zelensky. Who now sems convinced that the might of Western military assistance will allow Ukraine to aim for goals that would never have been in reach before the latest Russian invasion.
Zelensky insists that he must be given everything he needs to defeat the Russians and push them back from every corner of Ukraine, even the areas occupied in 2014.
“The ultimate goal of Ukraine is to restore territorial integrity, including Crimea, President Volodymyr Zelensky said Tuesday, as Russia pursued its offensive to seize territory in eastern Ukraine. (WSJ).
In order to do this Zelensky wants to make sure that everything is done “to maintain the world's maximum attention to us, to Ukraine. Information about our needs should be in the news of all countries that are important to us constantly and every day.”
This means of cause means further escalation, more heavy weapons and more direct involvement of the West in order to achieve Zelensky’s goal, and the passionate intensity in the West is encouraging Zelensky to demand more all the time, scolding those who show less passion.
President Macron has tried to cool the passionate conviction, arguing:
“Nous ne sommes pas en guerre contre la Russie. Nous œuvrons en Européens pour la préservation de la souveraineté et de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Ukraine. Pour le retour de la paix sur notre continent.
Nous serons là pour reconstruire l’Ukraine, en Européens, toujours. (Emmanuel Macron May 9, 2022).
Macron insists that Europe must learn from its past mistakes, and make sure no side is humiliated like the Germans were in the Versailles Treaty after the First World War.
Macron has apparently even to tried to convince Zelensky that Ukraine must pay for peace by accepting to give up some Ukrainian territory.
Not something an increasingly cocksure Zelensky would agree too, with the passionate West bolstering his confidence that everything is possible. He scolded Macron in an Italian interview
“To propose to us to give up something as far as our sovereignty is concerned to save (Russian) President (Vladimir) Putin’s face does not seem like a fair thing on the part of some leaders. (aa.com.tr)
Perhaps Europe should cool its passion for Zelensky and for the mainly U.S. driven proxy war, and instead heed Macron’s advice.

Europe must look to Europe’s interest
Restating the argument from an earlier blog post. We wonder why Europe is not making a much more independent diplomatic effort, instead of giving in to moral outrage and Zelensky’s and Biden’s totally overstated warnings about the threat to all of Europe.
Europe is supporting the Ukraine with financial assistance, weapons, welcoming Ukrainian refugees, and seems inclined to engage in self-harming sanctions to reduce Russia’s ability for fighting a war.
Why does it not demand something in return from Zelensky’s Ukraine, instead of just playing whipping boy to Zelensky’s critique?
Why do decisionmakers not leave moralistic outbursts aside and take a more realistic position that actually turn out to be more in line with their own self-proclaimed European values. This would mean efforts to promote a peace that might spare lives and avoid further destruction in Ukraine and perhaps help solve or at least alleviate some of the problems used by Russia as reasons for the invasion.
Realistically this would mean that Europe would have to put pressure on Zelensky to accept the Russian annexation of Crimea, and insist that the future of the Luhansk and Donetsk would have to be settled by mechanism involving staged referendums from Russian border to the borders of Luhansk and Donetsk.
Either accept this or accept that help would be reduced to humanitarian help.
Likewise, Europe would have to initiate sincere and realistic diplomatic efforts in relation Russia, taking demands from the Russian speaking parts of Ukraine seriously, accepting the Russian possession of Crimea and proposing realistic solutions for Luhansk and Donetsk that would comply with what Europe ought to demand of Ukraine.

* From the the previous essay “A cocksure West risking catastrophe” on the blog openthoughts.eu, discussing what might happen in the dangerous game of chicken between Russia and the US, represented by two intensely passionate and elderly presidents.

The US-China war on chips

9/21/2022

Zero production of advanced chips in America
At a ground breaking ceremony for Intel’s new mega plant for leading edge chips fabrication in New Albany, Ohio, President Biden talked of the need to restart microchips production in the U.S.
“… over 30 years ago, America had more than 30 percent of the global chip production. Then something happened. America ba- — America production, the backbone — the backbone of our economy — got hollowed out. Companies moved jobs overseas, especially from the industrial Midwest. And as a result, today we’re down to producing barely 10 percent of the world’s chips, despite leading in chip research and design.”
The situation is even worse in relation to the production of the most advanced leading-edge microchips. President Biden: “Unfortunately, we produce zero — zero — of these advanced chips in America. Zero. And China is trying to move way ahead of us in producing them.”

The U.S. versus the Rest
A Kearney report from 2021 show the sorry state of microchips or semiconductor production in the U.S.

According to CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) 75 percent of the world’s chips production is concentrated in North East Asia.
Taiwan is in fact the centre of fabs (factories or foundries for fabricating chips) for advanced chips production, with the leading company TSMC earning a 56 percent market share of chips production worldwide.
A table from Counterpoint show the market shares of the main foundries:

UMC’s (United microelectronics Corporation) is also located in Taiwan, while GlobalFoundries could be said to represent the West with fabs in US, Singapore and Europe. Chinese SMIC is a state-owned Chinese company.
While advanced chips production in so-called called fabs or foundries is indeed in a sorry state in the U.S., at least for now, the situation is very different with regard to a different segment of the semiconductor value chain related to:

Knowledge intensive semiconductor R&D,
EDA (Electronic Design Automation,
DAO (Discrete, Analog, and Other),
Memory,
SME (Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment).

In these areas the US is still leading with no close competitor. A CSIS table demonstrate geographical split in the main segments of the chips value chain (making up about 78 percent of whole value chain):

A bar chart from SIA (The Semiconductor Industry Association) show a more detailed picture for the three main segments: Knowledge intensive R&D, Capital intensive production, and Capital-intensive and Labour-intensive production.

While it is evident that the U.S. and to lesser degree Europe is leading in the knowledge intensive R&D segment, it is also clear that that fabs for fabricating semiconductor chips is concentrated in North East Asia, with Taiwan in the dominating position. The more labour-intensive assembly into finished products is shared between China and Taiwan.
Especially notable is Taiwan’s leading position in the fabrication of the most advanced leading edge semiconductor chips. In the fabrication the of sub 10 nm (nanometre) semiconductor chips Taiwan has a share of 92 percent while South Korea is sitting on the rest. Just an example, the new iPhone 14 pro is built with chips using a 4 nm process made in Taiwan.
Biden was certainly right when stating that there is no fabrication of leading-edge semiconductors in the U.S. at the moment. “There is currently no cutting-edge logic capacity below 10 nanometre being done in the United States.” (SIA).

Why did this happen?
How come that the U.S. and the rest of the World has become so dependent on advanced semiconductor chips fabricated in Taiwanese fabs and assembled into finished products in China?
In a way the explanation is quite simple, labour costs are lower compared to the U.S. and Asia has a skilled workforce. That is why labour-intensive semiconductor production over the years became located in Taiwan, South Korea and China. Like so much else in manufacturing.
It is not only labour cost that explains the movement to North East Asia. It is also government support and the characteristics of the labour force. “With decades of industrial policy support, robust infrastructures, and highly skilled workforces, Taiwan and South Korea are particularly strong in advanced manufacturing and possess a combined 100 percent of the global fabrication capacity in 7- and 5- nanometres processing nodes.”

Chips for America
That the present global regional division in the different segments is posing a growing problem for the U.S. and the West in general has become evident due to the simmering U.S. trade war with China. The situation is exacerbated by U.S.-China tensions related to Taiwan.
No wonder the U.S. is eager to bolster U.S. competitiveness in relation to China. With Taiwan in a precarious position in relation to China, and with the dependence on both Taiwan and China for capital- and labour-intensive production and assembly of advanced semiconductor chips the U.S. and the West in general has a growing problem.
Just think of the consequences of a possible Chinese blockade of Taiwan by air and sea. Or even worse China’s annexation of Taiwan. Cutting off the rest of a World and causing turmoil in the West with its insatiable appetite for chips from Taiwanese fabrication and Chinese assembly. “If China were to invade Taiwan, the most-advanced chip factory in the world would be rendered “not operable,” TSMC’s executive chairman Mark Liu has warned.
No wonder then that the U.S. is very eager to re-nationalise the most import parts of those segments of the semiconductor chips production that is concentrated in Taiwan and China, or at the very least moving production to other countries, like Vietnam and India.
We see the consequences of the outsourcing of production and supply of something that is absolutely vital for Western economies and their security. It has created a dependence on what is more or less a single source located far from home in a region where the potential for conflicts is growing steadily.
No wonder that the U.S. and the West in general suddenly realised the precarious situation they are in with present shortage of semiconductor chips. In addition to a growing realisation that the extreme dependence on an Asian source of semiconductor chips might endanger Western economies and Western security.
The energy shortage in Europe today shows the consequences of becoming on a single source of supply. Relaying on cheap natural gas the supply from Russia has suddenly become a major problem for Europe due its active engagement in a proxy war against Russia.

The need for Action
A letter to congressional leaders sent on December 1, 2021, by a broad coalition of 59 U.S. CEOs and senior executives, calls for action to ensure the supply of semiconductors vital to virtually all sectors of the economy – including aerospace, automobiles, communications, clean energy, information technology, and medical devices. They refer to the present global chip shortage resulting in lost growth and jobs in the economy. “The shortage has exposed vulnerabilities in the semiconductor supply chain and highlighted the need for increased domestic manufacturing capacity.”
To alleviate the shortage, they urge “Congress to take prompt action to fund the “Creating Helpful Incentives for the Production of Semiconductors” (CHIPS) for America Act and enact a strengthened version of the “Facilitating American Built Semiconductors” (FABS) Act to include an investment tax credit for both design and manufacturing.” (semiconductors.org).
And Congress listened and acted.

The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022
In an effort to alleviate the chips shortage and re-establish the production of advanced microchips in the U.S. Congress recently introduced “The CHIPS and Science Act.”
Also known as “Chips Act of 2022” it was signed on by Biden on August 9, 2022. It will allocate $52.7 billion for a “CHIPS for America Fund.” This includes:

$39 billion to be used for manufacturing incentives, including $2 billion to focus solely on legacy chip production to advance economic and national security interests. For instance legacy chips used in cars and defense systems.

$ 13.2 billion to be used for R&D and workforce development, including for Department of Defense-unique applications—and for semiconductor workforce training.

$500 million for a “CHIPS for America International Technology Security and Innovation Fund” … for the purposes of coordinating with foreign government partners to support international information and communications technology security and semiconductor supply chain activities.
.
In a speech Biden emphasised that the “CHIPS and Science Act” was not just handling out blanks checks to companies: “I’ve directed my administration to be laser-focused on the guardrails that will protect taxpayers’ dollars. And we’ll make sure that companies partner with unions, community colleges, technical schools to offer training and apprenticeships and to work with small and minority- owned businesses as well.”
Guardrails are also meant to ensure that recipients do not use the funds to build facilities in China and other countries of concern, and to prevent companies from using the funds for stock buybacks or shareholder dividends.
To get support from the fund the recipients must also demonstrate significant worker- and community investment, in order to ensure that semiconductor incentives support equitable economic growth and development. Amongst others the act requires companies building new chip facilities to offer the prevailing wage. “The funds will also support good-paying, union construction jobs by requiring Davis-Bacon prevailing wage rates for facilities built with CHIPS funding.” (Fact sheet, CHIPS Act).
SIA (The Semiconductor Industry Association) of course applauded the “CHIPS Act”: “The bill’s investments in chip production and innovation will strengthen America’s economy and national security – both of which rely heavily on chips – and reinforce our country’s semiconductor supply chains … The CHIPS Act will help usher in a better, brighter American future built on semiconductors.”
https://www.semiconductors.org/sia-applauds-house-passage-of-chips-act-urges-president-to-sign-bill-into-law/

A European CHIPS Act
On February 8, 2022, The European Commission proposed a “European Chips Act” to confront semiconductor shortages and strengthen Europe’s technological leadership.mEurope being in a worse bind than the U.S. with regard to chips shortage and lack of a European production of advanced semiconductor chips. (See the previous SIA bar chart).
What does the Commission propose:
“With the European Chips Act, the EU will address semiconductor shortages and strengthen Europe’s technological leadership. It will mobilise more than €43 bn of public and private investments and set measures to prepare, anticipate and swiftly respond to any future supply chain disruptions, together with Member States and our international partners.”
What the Commission aims to do sounds like little more than a wish list at the moment, as can be seen from these vague aims.

https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/european-chips-act_en

The race is on. Other countries are planning to invest more in semiconductor manufacturing. Japan has approved a 774 bn yen (around 5.4 bn dollars), for semiconductor investments, and South Korea likewise is planning large semiconductor investments.

Signs of change
The early signs of government support for building new fabs for manufacturing semiconductor chips in U.S. has already led to a small wave of big announcements for new fabs.
Here just a selection:
As early as May 2020 TSMC (The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) announced it was going to build a $12.2 bn chip fab in Arizona. The first of its kind to mass produce 5nm chips in the U.S.

In July 2022 TSMC placed the last beam in their Fab21 building in Phoenix Arizona. Expecting mass production of leading edge chips to begin in 2024.

In November 2021 Samsung announced its commitment to build a $17 bn fab in Texas, also to begin production in 2024.

With the promise of receiving funding from the “CHIPS Act” Intel in January 2022 announced plan for a $20 bn fab in Columbus Ohio.

In may 2022 Texas Instruments “broke ground” for a 30 bn 300mm wafer fab in Texas (A semiconductor wafer is a thin slice of semiconductor substance, like crystalline silicon, used for the making of integrated circuits.).

Meanwhile Samsung in 2022 apparently announced plans for investing up to 192 bn over the next decades in 11 fabs in Texas.

While these plans for fabs may lead to rejuvenation of advanced semiconductor fabrication in the US, spurred along by the CHIPS Act’s $52 bn and the realisation that further investments in North East Asia may carry a growing risk, all is not well for the U.S.
The U.S. may not yet possess a sufficiently skilled workforce for the fabrication of advanced semiconductors, because the focus hitherto has been on creating expertise in chip design.
The amounts to be invested in fabs and the creation of a skilled workforce may turn out to be insufficient in relation to the investments in Taiwan, South Korea and most of all China.
And what if China came in possession of Taiwan’s fabulous fabs.

CHIP 4
Realising perhaps that even for the US it will next to impossible to achieve chips self-sufficiency, the US has proposed a semiconductor alliance to include the U.S. and the three Non-Chinese Asian partners including Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. Such an alliance would, as we can see from previous discussion, include all segments of semiconductor production from design, fabrication of chips, to assembly and packing. Of course, it could also be seen as a way to limit and contain Chinese influence.
For the time being a rather diffuse attempt, with built in contradictions.
“The Diplomat” reports that South Korea might be wary of such an alliance due to the its relations with China. With China accounting for 60 Percent of South Korea’s semiconductor export, and South Korean chip giants Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix having invested billions of dollars in key manufacturing facilities in China.
South Korea must of course fear Chinese retaliation if South Korea became active member of Chip 4. It must be assumed that Taiwan would be just as wary, looking to its own already strained relations with mainland China. Even Japan would have look to its own relations with China, its exports and investment, and may not won’t to get too close to an alliance with Taiwan for these reasons.
While Chip 4 may represent a further step in the Biden administration’s efforts to contain China in the global competition for hegemony, it will have wary and reluctant partners, and may escalate the war on chips. Leading to unknown retaliation from China and thus further escalation.

A spanner in the works for China
The U.S. is not only investing in leading edge chips production at home, it is also trying to trying to throw a spanner into Chinese plans for winning the future semiconductor race, by attempts to make sure that China cannot have access to leading edge semiconductor design and technology.
A start had already been made by the Trump administration. In May 2019 it issued an executive order banning the Huawei Technologies Co. from buying vital U.S. technology without special approval and effectively barring its equipment from U.S. telecom networks on national security grounds. Later even Huawei’s non-America suppliers of products had to stop the exporting to Huawei if their products contained U.S. technology.
The ban has been upheld by the Biden administration and has been a big blow to Huawei and its technologies, its products and of course its share price. In effect hampering Huawei’s technological development and worldwide sales.
Today U.S. is going much further in its efforts to hamper Chinese semiconductor fabrication and development. Since 2019 the U.S. has put pressure on The Netherland’s government in order make sure that the ASML company (Advanced Semiconductor Materials Lithography?) cannot export its more advanced systems to China. In July 2022, it was reported that Washington has pressured the Netherlands government to take the campaign against China to a new level, with attempts to further limit ASML’s engagement in China.
What is means?
ASML has near monopoly on the design and manufacture of the EUV (extreme ultra violet) lithography machines that are used to print the ultrasmall, complex designs on microchip wafers, part of the process to produce leading edge sub 10 nanometre chips. (Todays striving is for 3 and 2 nm).
“ASML has sold a total of about 140 EUV systems in the past decade, each one now costing up to $200 million, ... The price tag for its next machine, called High NA will be more than $300 million.”
Of course, the U.S. wants to make sure that China’s chip fabs cannot get access to this technology, instead having to do with less advanced UV machines that make it impossible to produce leading edge sub 10 mm chips. “Any additional restrictions would deal a bigger blow to China’s efforts to become more self-sufficient in chips. An embargo could also cripple its ambitions to make chips that are close to today’s state-of-the-art.” (electronicdesign.com).
On August 12 the U.S. established new export controls on technologies that enable semiconductors, engines and power systems “to operate faster, more efficiently, longer, and in more severe conditions in both the commercial and military context” (BIS, Bureau of Industry and Security)

“The four technologies covered by today’s rule include two substrates of ultra-wide bandgap semiconductors: Gallium Oxide (Ga2O3), and diamond; Electronic Computer-Aided Design (ECAD) software specially designed for the development of integrated circuits with Gate-All- Around Field-Effect Transistor (GAAFET) structure; and Pressure Gain Combustion (PGC) technology (BIS).

Cryptic to most of us, but BIS has provided some explanation. Gallium Oxide allow semiconductors to work under severe conditions, important for miliary and space use.
ECAD is used in designing, analysing, optimizing, and validating the performance of integrated circuits or printed circuit boards.
GAAFET is the key to enable 3 nm and below technologies, allowing for faster and more energy efficient semiconductors.
While PGC represents “a novel approach for significantly increasing the efficiency of aerospace propulsion systems and ground-based power systems.” (Paxton).

These restrictions “will potentially have the greatest impact on the trade between China and the US compared to all other actions taken to date,” (IBS consulting).
Not enough for the U.S. in their war on chips with China. Now they are trying to hinder Chinese development in the areas of artificial intelligence (AI). An area in which China is trying to push ahead of the U.S.
On August 26 Nvidia, a multinational company making chips used for deep learning and AI, announced: “the U.S. government, or USG, informed NVIDIA Corporation, or the Company, that the USG has imposed a new license requirement, effective immediately, for any future export to China (including Hong Kong) and Russia of the Company’s A100 and forthcoming H100 integrated circuits.
Later the Company has been allowed to continue development of one of its less advanced AI chips in China.
Another company, AMD, has likewise had its export of MI250 artificial intelligence chips to China restricted.
It certainly looks as if the U.S. is doing all it can to hamper Chinese semiconductor development and their use, not the least in AI applications. Really throwing a spanner in the China’s chips and AI development. Perhaps hoping to delay China ambitious plans to overtake the U.S. in AI.
Alas, the U.S. war on China’s ambitious plans may have a negative impact on the U.S. itself.
A recent study has found that a full decoupling or even a modest decoupling from China may have serious implications for the U.S. semiconductor industry and its workforce, as can be seen from this table (Understanding U.S.-China Decoupling, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2021)

China’s riposte in the war on chips
While China really cannot do much to avoid the U.S. attempts to hamper China’s semiconductor ambitions. It has reacted with angry words, and lobbying attempts in the U.S.
Somewhat amazingly, given China’s own actions, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce is arguing that the CHIPS Act “comes with discriminatory clauses and seriously violates market laws and international economic and trade rules” (Global Times).
The Chinese equivalent to SIA, the Chinese Semiconductor Industry Association, complained that “these provisions clearly deviate from the shared principle of being fair, open and non-discriminatory that the global semiconductor industry forged through practice over the past decades.” (Global Times). Wordy protests not really achieving anything.
The real question is. What can and will China do fulfil its own ambitious plan to leapfrog the U.S? In the immediate future probably not much. Looking a bit further there seems to be two possibilities. A dangerous one and long term one. The dangerous one: China blockading or invading Taiwan might force the U.S. and the West into a quid pro quo with China. Opening export to China in return for access to Taiwanese fabs. Or it might result in a tit for tat escalation and war.
Less dangerous in the short term is the Chinese goal to become the leader in selected aspects of AI in 2025 and the World leader in AI by 2030.
China may outspend the U.S. in R&D, in STEM education (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics), in creating an enormous and highly skilled workforce, and in investing in leapfrogging startup companies.
According the “Made in China Plan” China aims to achieve 70 percent self-sufficiency by 2025. To achieve that goal a national fund for investment in integrated circuits (The Big Fund) and 15 local government funds for IC development has been established with a combined amount of $73 bn according to a report from SIA: “This does not account for government grants, equity investments, and low-interest loans which exceeds $50 billion alone” (Taking stock of China semiconductor industry, SIA).
According to the SIA Report China is also rapidly closing the gap in AI chip design, “due partly to fast growing demand from China’s hyperscale cloud and consumer smart device market and lower barriers to entry in chip design. Chinese fabless firms are now taping out 7/5nm chip designs for everything from AI to 5G communications.”
China certainly has the ambition, and we are seeing their advances in the number of patents, for instance in relation 5G communication and quantum computing.
On September 8, 2022 Asia Times reported that China’s government says it will use the advantages of its “new-type whole-nation system” to catapult technological progress. Apparently meaning in translation: “That in order to improve the new nationwide system for tackling key and core technologies, it is necessary to organically combine the government, the market, and society, to scientifically plan, concentrate, optimize the mechanism, and coordinate tackling problems.” (From meeting of the Chinese Communist Party September 6, 2022). Whatever that means.

The warning from history
The South Korean giant Samsung’s remarkable example of leapfrogging the Japanese in the technological development and production of Memory chips (DRAMs), demonstrates that leapfrogging is possible. But it is certainly a very specific example of leapfrogging under rather favourable circumstances, where there is no serious attempt to contain the Korean leapfrogging.
Perhaps a historical example of leapfrogging under more difficult circumstances may show that it is impossible to contain and restrict new technologies to a single geographical region by export restrictions and other means when there is growing demands for these products. (like in China today).
Take the historical example of America colonies (later the U.S.) overtaking Britain in industrial textile manufacturing as an example.
The rapid industrialisation of Britain the eighteenth and nineteenth century was fuelled by British advances in textile manufacturing, steam power and iron-making.Up to mid nineteenth century it was also a period where ideas of mercantilism were prevalent. A system of political economy that sought to enrich the country by restraining imports and encouraging exports of finished goods.
Taking the example of the all-important textile industry it meant that Britain wanted to export all it could of the finished products, while trying its best to make sure that production knowledge, machines and artisans used to manufacture the products stayed in Britain.
“Once British entrepreneurs had demonstrated the superiority of machinery in the manufacture of textiles, in the decades following the inventions of Hargreaves, Arkwright, Crompton and Cartwright, traditional efforts to contain British technology withing the kingdom was intensified. Checks against the outflow of Britain’s early industry were applied both by private businessmen and the government.” (Damming the Flood. David I. Jeremy). For a time, it became illegal to export industrial textile, metalworking, clock making, paper making and glass manufacturing equipment.
Not only the export of machinery for textile production was banned. No skilled artisans and manufacturers in the textile industry were legally free to leave Britain or Ireland to carry out their trade in other countries. “Textile printing workers were even forbidden to leave the British Isles.”
While some of these restrictions may remind one of the U.S. efforts to prevent the export of advanced semiconductors to China, at least similar restrictions do not (yet?) apply to people in the industry.
Did Britain succeed in its attempts to make sure that the American colonies, from where the raw cotton for the textile production came, could not establish their own textile industry?
No of course it didn’t. “During the revolution, American envoys in Europe accelerated efforts to steal technology and attract artisans. These initiatives continued during the Confederation period when both voluntary and official bodies attempted to speed technology transfer. The Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts, for example, underwrote the establishment of a textile factory near Philadelphia and its leading official Tench Coxe helped smuggle over the technology. Coxe urged the Continental Congress to provide long-term monopolies to persons who introduced foreign technology, and he favored land grants as a lure to potential immigrants.” (Doron Ben Natar).
And the lures seemed to work. In 1789 one Samuel Slater, working as a supervisor at one of the advanced English water-powered cotton mills, embarked on a ship bound for America, lured by the bounties offered for workers who knew how to manufacture cotton textile. Slater carried no written plans for cotton mills with him, as he risked being searched when leaving Britain, but he had apparently memorized everything he knew about Arkwright’s inventions in water-powered cotton mills and the first industrial examples of the division of labour to make cotton textiles.
Slater built the first American cotton mill, paving the way for an American cotton textile industry. There were others like him and with that Ben Natar concludes “the United States emerged as the world's industrial leader by illicitly appropriating mechanical and scientific innovations from Europe"
Sound familiar doesn’t it. Remember the Trump administrations accusation that China was illegally appropriating knowledge and technologies from the U.S. “The theft of intellectual property by international actors represents a massive threat to the American economy. In 2017, the Commission on the Theft of Intellectual Property estimated that intellectual property theft inflicted a cost of somewhere between $225 billion and $600 billion annually on the American economy, with China the primary culprit. The scale of some individual instances of theft can be downright staggering—in one notable case, a Chinese company stole as much as $8.75 billion in microchip technology from Idaho-based Micron.”
Britain could neither keep Industrial knowledge, machinery or people at home, and it even became an important investor in the industrialisation in America, not the last in the rapid growth of railroads. And soon investments and inventions in the U.S. leapfrogged British industry. “A golden torrent of British capital flowed abroad from 1870 to 1914, annually averaging about a third of the nation’s investment. In 1913, 32 percent of Britain’s wealth (a total of £4 billion at the time) was vested in overseas assets, primarily the bonds of railroads and utilities in the United States, Argentina, and other settler regions.” (The decline and fall of the British economy, D. Kedrosky).
Somewhere around the 1870’s the U.S. overtook Britain in manufacturing.
To compare with the present. Something similar seems to be happening in relation to China and the U.S. today. Similar to the flow of investments from Britain to the U.S. manufacturing in China is accompanied by an influx of foreign investments. According to the “Peterson Institute for International Economics” foreign direct investment in China grew to $334 in 2021, an all-time high.
In recent years China has thus become the manufacturing hub of the World. China accounts for around 29 percent of global manufacturing output, while the U.S. has slipped to 17 per cent and followed by Japan and Germany.(Statista).

“China ranks first in terms of share of global output in 16 categories of 22 manufacturing categories tracked by the U.N., while second in six others. The data is from 2019, the most recent year available. China continues to dominate in light industries such as apparel and textiles, general sectors like basic metals and electrical equipment, and higher-end activities like computers and transport equipment. There’s hardly a sector in which China does not have at least a 20% global market share, while commanding 40%+ shares in electrical equipment, basic metals and computers. In textiles, apparel and leather, China’s share is more than half.”(Barrons).
As we seen China is not yet a champion in the production of advanced semiconductors, but then we have to remember that Taiwan is, and China insists that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it. And if that also became the reality, China would jump to the front in the production of advanced semiconductors. Production that is, not yet design. But China might be on the verge of overtaking the U.S. in areas related to Artificial Intelligence or AI.
A final report on AI from the U.S. National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) published in 2021 concludes: “The leading indexes that measure progress in AI development generally place the United States ahead of China. However, the gap is closing quickly. China stands a reasonable chance of overtaking the United States as the leading center of AI innovation in the coming decade. In recent years, technology firms in China have produced pathfinding advances in natural language processing, facial recognition technology, and other AI-enabled domains.”
Does history repeat itself? Not one to one of course. We are no longer talking textile machinery, but advanced semiconductors and AI. Looking at the data we have shown that it certainly seems probable that in the war on chips China might overtake the U.S. and thus the West. The present U.S. sanctions restrictions may hamper Chinese development in these areas, but also encourage Chinese to search for ways to leapfrog the U.S. based on their own efforts.
Like the British attempts to prevent the growth of textile manufacturing in the colonial US and later in India, it may prove impossible to stop the colossal Chinese momentum, in research, investment and production. The U.S. realization that China might soon overtake the U.S. in AI may represent the writing on the great wall. A kind of mene mene tekel upharsin for the West.

Moving up the escalator in Ukraine

8/4/2022

Deliberate ratcheting up
On July 20th Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Army General Mark A. Milley held a press conference providing a Ukraine battlefield update, and informing about the military assistance being rushed to Ukraine.
In the update Lloyd Austin mentioned that “Ukrainian forces are now using long-range rocket systems to great effect, including HIMARS provided by the United States, and other systems from our allies and partners. Ukraine's defenders are pushing hard to halt Russia's advances in the Donbas.”
With Russians relentless shelling Ukraine, Austin argued that “Ukraine needs the firepower and the ammunition to withstand its barrage and to strike back at the Russia -- Russian weapons launching these attacks from inside Ukraine's own territory … And so we understand the urgency and we're pushing hard to maintain and intensify the momentum of donations.”
He mentioned that the deliveries of the advanced NASAMS air defence systems in cooperation with Norway, and the commitment of four more HIMARS in addition to the 12 systems that had already been provided.
Milley mentioned that in its current phase the war continues to be a battle of attrition, executed through sustainment and really long-range fires. The limited gains of the Russians come at an incredible cost in terms of Russian casualties and equipment.
Austin and Milley only talked about the ongoing deliveries of military assistance, but neither touched upon the serious issue of what to expect in the future. Further drip drip escalation? A continued battle of attrition? Russian answers to the use of long ranging HIMARS and MLRS? Continued escalation until what…?”
It is almost as if they just expect the West, led by the U.S. to have an implicit strategy of reacting to Russian advances with a deliberate drip drip escalation. Just enabling Ukraine to keep up the fight without being strong enough to somehow overwhelm the Russians. Continuing a proxy war of attrition, albeit with a constant but deliberate escalation of the military aid to Ukraine, calculated not to provoke the Russians to retaliate in way that would result in out-of-control escalation.
This must also have struck the journalists present at the press conference, with one journalist asking “Can you give us a picture of how much, if any, gains Ukraine may be making or not making? Is the Donbas lost at this point to Russia?
Milley’s response: “…to answer your question about is the Donbas lost, no, it's not lost yet. The Ukrainians are making the Russians pay for every inch of territory that they gain.” Essentially, he just said that a war of attrition would continue.
No wonder another journalist asked “Do you see that continuing just forever or do you still have fundamental concerns that Russia could stage some kind of break-out or a sudden escalation and just throw everything at Ukraine even back towards Kyiv at some point, back towards the rest of the country?”
Austin only had a vague answer arguing “there's a lot more to be done. The HIMARS alone will not change or win or lose a fight, but it's the integration of a number of capabilities that we have provided and are looking at providing down the road. But most importantly, our allies are providing as well. So, we're looking at a lot of things, everything.”
Milley in his answer at least touched upon the risk of a dangerous escalation in the war: “…in terms of what you asked about could it go in directions of, I think, escalation. Those kinds of terms that you were referring to, we look at it as most likely most dangerous courses of action that an opponent may -- an enemy may take … think of those.
In terms of the most dangerous, of course, there's -- you can -- it doesn't take me at a podium to talk about what they might be, you can figure that out on your own.”
Apparently eyeing the possibility of a dangerous escalation that he really did not want to talk about. Instead, he seemed to prefer to return to the vague idea that the war of attrition might somehow lead of some kind of solution.
“In terms of most likely, though, at this point -- and -- and this is always subject to -- to debate -- but at this point, we have a very serious ground -- grind -- grinding war of attrition going on in the Donbas, and -- and unless there's a breakthrough on either side, which right now the analysts don't think is particularly likely in the near term, but unless there's a breakthrough, it'll probably continue as a grinding war of attrition for a period of time until both sides see an alternative way out of this, perhaps through negotiation or something like that.” (Emphasis added).
Austin and Miley are evidently aware of the dangers of escalation, but do not want to talk about the inherent dangers of further escalation, as we can infer from Milley’s hesitant and stumbling answer.
The press conference shows that there are no explicit ideas for how to end the war, except for an extremely vague hope of negotiation or something like that in the future.
To avoid the unmentionable dangers Milley alluded to, the overall strategy just seems to consist of a deliberate escalation to keep the Russians at bay, by letting them pay dearly for every attempt to advance.
Almost like the war in Vietnam, but in this case relying fully on the Ukrainian proxies to bear the brunt of the war. The U.S. just giving them sufficient support to stand up to the Russian forces. A war of attrition indeed!

The dangers of escalatory reaction?
While two generals aim to give the impression of deliberate escalation, prodding the Russian bear with bigger and bigger sticks, without actually provoking Russia to retaliate with a drastic escalation, that would involve NATO forces or even some form of non-strategic nuclear demonstration in Ukraine designed to force the U.S. to de-escalate.
The generals seem to prefer to react to Russian advances by giving the Ukrainians just enough military support to keep a war of attrition going.
That is certainly not enough for President Zelensky, who argues: “The ultimate goal of Ukraine is to restore territorial integrity, including Crimea.” (WSJ). This of cause means further escalation, more heavy weapons and more direct involvement of the West in order to achieve Zelensky’s goal, and the passionate intensity of some politicians in the West is encouraging Zelensky to demand more all the time, and scolding those who show less passion.
Just listen to NATO’s Declaration of support for Ukraine: “We stand in full solidarity with the government and the people of Ukraine in the heroic defence of their country. We reiterate our unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders extending to its territorial waters. We fully support Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence and to choose its own security arrangements. “
Restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity must mean defeating the Russian assault. How will the Russia react if it was eyeing such a defeat. Somehow accept the defeat or react with drastic attempt to escalate meant to force the West to de-escalate if they do not want all-out war…? If a conventional conflict might threaten Russia, it might decide to use nuclear weapons to create such a catastrophic threat to a continuation of the conflict that its adversary would be forced to de-escalate.
A Congressional report in fact mentions that this might happen if Russia looks to be defeated in a conventional conflict with NATO.
Now what does this mean in relation to Ukraine? Could an eminent defeat of all Russians troops in Ukraine, the re-conquering the Russian held areas, and the weakening of Russia military might to a stage, where it would unable to wage war be seen as a defeat threatening Russia itself? Would an eminent risk of this happening provoke Russia to nuclear escalation in order to force the West to de-escalate?
Russian certainly has the enough tactical nuclear weapons to make that a possibility.
See also these previous blog entries:

A cocksure West risking catastrophe
Russia might pursue an “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear doctrine, when facing defeat, the possibility of losing everything in Ukraine, and ability to wage war.
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/a-cocksure-west-risking-catastrophe
#berlingske #borsen #jyllandsposten #dkpol

WHY is passion drowning out realism in Ukraine war?
This essay contrasts two views of the proxy war in Ukraine.
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/why-is-passion-drowning-out-realism-in-ukraine-war?

A Ukrainian weapons wish list
The U.S. generals may follow a strategy of deliberate ratcheting up weapon deliveries when absolutely necessary to counter Russian advances, keeping the proxy war simmering so to speak, until an alternative way out of this war is found through negotiation or something like that.
Ukrainians want much more than that. In order to be able to force back the Russians, they want an enormous escalation of weapon deliveries that would out-escalate Russian non-nuclear capabilities.
Just before the meeting of NATO i the middle of June, Mikhail Podolyak, adviser to President Zelensky, published an outrageous Ukrainian wish list for heavy weapons on twitter:

Weapons delivered or promised
A comparison of the wish list with what has been delivered or promised show that Ukraine in July has actually got quite a lot of the heavy weapons, armoured vehicles, and drones they wished for.

Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLS) delivered or promised
At least 60+ of 300 on the wish list, although only 20+ are modern MLRS from the West, the rest being older Russian material with less capabilities:

Western types:
16 227mm HIMARS from U.S. [Delivered from June 2022 onwards]
3 227mm M270B1 MLRS from UK [July 2022] Plus 3 refurbished M270MLRS from Norway?
3 227mm M270 ''MARS'' MLRS from Germany [To be delivered in late 2022]

Russian types:
20+ 122mm RM-70 [April 2022]
122mm BM-21 Grad [May or June 2022] (Purchased by Czechia from Bulgaria and delivered to Ukraine)
122mm RM-70 Vampir [July 2022]
20+ 122mm BM-21 Grad from Poland [April 2022]

155 mm Howitzers towed and self-propelled delivered or promised
At the very least more than 250+ promised or delivered. In addition, Ukraine has got or been promised a substantial number of 122mm and 105mm howitzers.

Towed Artillery
126 155mm M777 [Delivered from April 2022 onwards] from the U.S. (Towed by 126 FMTV armoured trucks. Including 1000 M982 Excalibur GPS-guided shells)
6 155mm M777 from Australia [April 2022]
4 155mm M777 from Canada [April 2022] (Including an undisclosed amount of M982 Excalibur GPS-guided shells)
155mm FH-70 from Estonia [May 2022]
155mm FH-70 from Italy [May 2022]

Self-Propelled Artillery
18 155mm Caesar from France [Delivered from May 2022 onwards]
22 155mm M109A3GN from Norway [May 2022]
8 155mm PzH 2000 from the Netherlands [April 2022. Training completed in May 2022. Arrived to Ukraine from June 2022 onwards]. In coordination with German deliberies ?
10 155mm PzH 2000 from Germany [April 2022. Training completed in May 2022. Arrived to Ukraine from June 2022 onwards]
72 155mm AHS Krab from Poland (18 donated, 54 purchased) [June 2022] (Delivered along with LPG command vehicles)
8 155mm ShKH Zuzana 2 from Slovakia (Purchased) [To be delivered]
20 155 mm M109 US made, acquired from Belgium and refurbished from the UK [to be delivered].

Tanks delivered or promised
At the very least 270+ tanks mostly of the old Russian T-72 type, with an unknown number of newer Polish PT-91 tanks, a development of the T-72.

Russian materiel
40~ T-72M1 [April 2022]
T-72M1 [May or June 2022] (Purchased by Czechia from Bulgaria and delivered to Ukraine)
230+ T-72M(R) and T-72M1(R) from Poland [Delivered from April 2022 onwards]

Polish material
PT-91 from Poland [July 2022]. A Polish development of the T-72M1

Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs).
A compilation made by ORYX (Oryxspioenkop, a Dutch defence analysis website) shows that Ukraine must have got or been promised around 400 APC’s of various types.
Not known if this includes the 120 APCs from the UK.

Drones or Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles (UCAVs)
Apart from a number of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, Ukraine has got or been promised at the very least 1000 + USA Switchblades (type 300 and 600) and a large number U.S. made Phoenix Ghost drones.

More detailed lists of equipment delivered and promised have been compiled and published by some countries and by ORYX and Wikipedia.

U.S. Department of Defence published “Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine” on July 8.

The UK Forces.net have published a list of UK military equipment support for Ukraine (delivered and promised) on July 21.

The German “Bundesregierung” has published a list showing the military equipment support for Ukraine (“Militärische Unterstützungsleistungen für die Ukraine”) on July 27.

A further very comprehensive “List of equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” may be found in Wikipedia

Our compilation and the various lists only show what is known at the moment. While it shows that Ukraine has got quite a lot of heavy weapons, there is still some way to go if the West were to fulfil the Ukrainian wish list and all the other demands that they have.

What’s next?
It would seem that there is a steady drip drip drip of HIMARS rocket launchers and precision ammunition from the U.S. Originally Ukraine got 4 HIMARS, later it got 8 more and on July 20 the Secretary of Defense announced that the U.S. would deliver 4 more, thus Ukraine would have 16 HIMARS as noted in our listing.
More to come? Especially given the apparent success the Ukrainians have had. HIMARS precision guided missiles “have helped diminish the Russian Army's firepower by blowing up munition depots, command centres, and other key targets. Ukrainian soldiers in eastern Ukraine say this has made a palpable difference on the battlefield” (Radio Free Europe).
Recently HIMARS missiles have apparently been used to seriously damage the Antonivsky bridge in Kherson, hampering Russian logistics.
And the U.S. Department of Defense has just announced additional ammunition for the HIMARS.

Ukraine also needs ammunition for all the 155 mm howitzers they have got, and on August 1 the U.S. Department of Defense announced the delivery of 75.000 extra rounds of 155 mm ammunition., while the UK defence minister promised 50.000 rounds.

Tanks and especially modern Western tanks have been a constant Ukrainian demand, while Western countries until now have tried to avoid giving in to the demand. Worried how the Russians would react.
Instead, Ukraine have been provided with Russian type tanks, mostly T-72s. Sometimes involving what the Germans have called “Ringtausch.” Meaning that for instance Poland would deliver T-72s from its own stockpile and be provided with German Leopard tanks instead. Although there have been Polish complaints that the Germans are not living up to their promise by delivering tanks that have not been upgraded.
Previously Spain had wanted to deliver 40 German made Leopard tanks to Ukraine, but they did not get the necessary permission from Germany. With Germany fearing Russia could see this deliberate escalation of the conflict and accuse NATO of being a co-belligerent to Kyiv.

Thus, Germany and the West in general are still reluctant to deliver modern tanks to Ukraine.

Ukraine has called for much more
Deliveries of heavier missiles to be used in the HIMARS and MRLS. For instance, the longer ranging and more destructive ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System). The MGM-140 ATACMS has a range of 165 km (block1) or 300km (block 1A) and a 500kg+ warhead.

More self-propelled Howitzers, and in a surprise move late in July Germany has allowed Ukraine to buy 100 Panzerhaubitze 2000, the modern self-propelled howitzer from the German armament firms Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) and Rheinmetal: “Die Bundesregierung hat offenbar den Verkauf von 100 Panzerhaubitzen an die Ukraine genehmigt und somit den Weg für einen 1,7 Milliarden Euro schweren Deal zwischen der Ukraine und den deutschen Rüstungsfirmen Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) und Rheinmetall freigemacht.”
But they cannot be delivered before 2024.

Air defence systems. Ukraine has now been promised delivery of two National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS). Also known as Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, as they are developed by Kongsberg defence in Norway and Raytheon in the US. They represent very advanced Surface-to-Air missile systems, able to protect large cities thus upping the ante in the fight against Russian missiles and aerial bombardments.
In an interview in late July the German Foreign Minister announced: "…we also are delivering the IRIS-T air defense system. Well, I hope that by the end of summer, or in early September… And it is in the final stage of production, it was to go to another country. So, we had to agree with this country, that they would give in, and the system would go to Ukraine, and I really hope that we would be able to do the same with more of these systems" (defense-ua.com). Iris-T SL is an advanced anti-aircraft missile system able to intercept all types of air targets, aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise and ballistic missiles, at a distance up to 40 km and a height of 20 km.
Lately there also been talk of allowing Ukraine to buy more of these systems.

Ukraine would like to have heavier strike drones like the MQ-1C Gray Eagle. An advanced strike drone with a range up to 400 km, and able to carry 4 × AGM-114 Hellfire or 8 × AIM-92 Stinger missiles or × GBU-44/B Viper Strike bombs.
In June the Biden administration apparently had planned to deliver 4 MQ-1C Gray Eagles to Ukraine but this was blocked by congress. Present status unknown.

Modern combat aircraft like U.S. F16s. A U.S. general talked of the possibility of using non-US fighter jets like the Swedish built JAS 39 Gripen or the French Rafale), and US Air Force Secretary, Frank Kendal, mentioned the possibility of giving Ukraine A-10 Thunderbolts (also called Warthogs) specially designed for close air support of ground forces.

A pie in the sky list of demands you might say. Giving in to the Ukrainian wishes and demands would certainly represent a large escalatory move, which in turn might lead to an unknown but presumably drastic Russian retaliation. And suddenly the proxy war may reach the dangerous uncontrollable escalation the generals did not want to talk about.
In an interview on July 20 Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said that the delivery of Western long-range weapons like HIMARS would pose a direct threat to the territory of the republics that-have declared their independence. Lavrov “… cannot allow the part of Ukraine that Zelensky will control or whoever replaces him to have weapons that will pose a direct threat to our territory and the territory of those republics that have declared their independence, those who want their future decide for yourself.” (RIA Novosti).
Russia would therefore have to move further into Ukraine to secure its own and the Donbas Republics borders.

Western support for Ukraine quantified in monetary terms
What is the cost of the material support in form of weapons and other equipment, of humanitarian and financial assistance?
The Kiel Institute for the World Economy is running a database quantifying the military, humanitarian and financial support that Ukraine is receiving.

Government support to Ukraine from major contributors in billions (in some countries called milliards) of Euros.
Commitments made from January 24 to July 1 2022. (Data from The Kiel Institute for the World Economy.)

This may seem a lot, but should perhaps be seen in relation to the other important cost related to war in Ukraine.

The costs of war
Ukrainian Prime Minister, Denys Shmyhal, gave a recent estimate of the size of damages resulting from the war and the cost of recovery: “Direct infrastructural losses are worth over $100 billion, and full-fledged Ukraine recovery plan is estimated at $750 billion.” (Denys Shmyhal at Twitter).
According to KSE (Kyiv School of Economics) compilation “the volume of direct losses to the Ukrainian economy from damage and destruction of residential and non-residential buildings and infrastructure (in monetary terms) increased to $108.3 billion” as of August 1, 2022.
For instance KSE has calculated that at least 129,900 residential buildings have been destroyed or damaged up until now.
Taking account total amount of reconstruction, recovery and modernization according to “Build Back Principles” KSE reach Denys Shmyhal’s estimate of $750 billion.
The Ukrainian government intends to finance their costly recovery plan with international grants, loans, and donations. In other words, with money from the West, with Zelensky arguing): “This is Russia’s attack on everything that is of value to you and me,” he added. “Therefore, the reconstruction of Ukraine is not a local project, not a project of one nation, but a joint task of the entire democratic world.” (NYT)
The EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, has suggested that the frozen Russian foreign exchange reserves should be used to fund at least part of the reconstruction effort in Ukraine. The frozen Russian reserves amounts to around 300 billion dollars. But Russia has already reacted to the freezing of a major part of its reserves by announcing: “… this is an unprecedented freeze, so we will be preparing lawsuits, and we are preparing to apply them, as this is unprecedented on a global scale. (Elvira Nabiullina, head of Russia’s central bank, as quoted in FT).
One may also wonder how China with enormous foreign exchange reserves would react to such a move by the West.
Then there are the costs borne by Russia as a result of Western sanctions, although in certain areas like energy Russia is actually earning more from exports than in previous years. This at least goes for exports to Germany in the first half-year of 2022:
“Im gesamten ersten Halbjahr betrugen Russlands Erlöse aus dem Deutschland-Geschäft in Summe 22,6 Milliarden Euro. Mehr als im bisherigen Rekordjahr 2012. Und nicht weniger als 52 Prozent mehr als 2021.” (Die Welt).
Meaning that West is actually financing a part of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Perhaps one might even argue that the West is financing part of the war for both the Russians and the Ukrainians.
For the West there is the cost borne as a result of rising energy and food prices. With the attempts to combat the resulting inflation perhaps resulting in a recession, and political instability.
On the other hand, the Western military support for Ukraine and the sudden rush by NATO countries to arm themselves against Russia has “precipitated the current explosive boom for U.S.-and-allied armaments firms and their investors. Those investors are being well served by their governments.” (Zuesse in Modern Diplomacy).
The rush to buy armament will presumable mostly benefit the U.S. armament firms, as for instance Germany now looks to buy U.S. made Lockheed Martin F-35 combat aircraft and Boeing Chinook heavy lift helicopters, not wanting to have to wait for the previous planned European developments.
One may even wonder if the gains to U.S. armaments firms and their investors surpasses the outlay for government assistance to Ukraine.
Perhaps it is worth remembering World War 2 military leader and later President, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s, farewell address in which he warned:
“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.” (Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 17, 1961).

WHY is passion drowning out realism in Ukraine war?

7/11/2022

Loud cries of outrage and passionate support for war

At the recent G7 Summit at Schloss Elmau in Germany seven Western leaders expressed their moral outrage over the Russian war of aggression and promised their unwavering support for Ukraine.
There seems to be no end to the spiralling self-confidence and self-righteousness of Western leaders out to humiliate Putin and Russia. Just take a look at these belligerent statements from the G7 Summit and NATO’s Madrid Summit.

The loud and passionate intensity of the G7 group of countries

G7 Condemnation of Russia
“We remain appalled by and continue to condemn the brutal, unprovoked, unjustifiable and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine by Russia and aided by Belarus. We condemn and will not recognise Russia’s continued attempts to re-draw borders by force. This devastating war has produced dramatic consequences far beyond Europe. It constitutes a blatant violation of international law, in particular a grave breach of the United Nations Charter.” (G7 Statement on Support for Ukraine).
An annex to the G7 Statement promises a united effort to hold Russia to account:
“The G7 has been united in holding Russia to account for its unprovoked war against Ukraine. Our coordinated sanctions impose severe and enduring costs on Russia to help bring an end to this war. Russia cannot remain a member in good standing of the global economic and political system as long as it flagrantly violates the international norms at the cost of others.” (Annex to G7 Summit Statement).

Russia must lose
“We reiterate our demand that Russia put an end to this war of choice, and immediately,
unconditionally cease all hostilities and withdraw its troops and military equipment from
the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.”
In an interview the French Foreign Minister, Le Drian, argues that it means “that Russia pulls out of the Donbas, pull out its forces from the Ukrainian territory it is occupying. There’s an invader; the invader must withdraw. If you want to call that a victory, let’s call it a victory, but the invader must withdraw and no longer be present in Ukraine.” (BFM TV).
To have any hope of achieving this goal the West appears to willing to continuously escalate their passionate proxy war against Russia, by providing Ukraine with a growing stream of more and more potent and advanced weapons.

As long as it takes
“We are committed to helping Ukraine to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to defend itself, and to choose its own future. It is up to Ukraine to decide on a future peace settlement, free from external pressure or influence … We will continue to provide financial, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support and stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.” (Emphasis added).
The G7 is acting without thoughts about the future relations with a humiliated Russia. A Russia armed to the teeth with extremely powerful nuclear weapons. A Russia that won’t just go away. What is the chance that it will give up in Ukraine? What the risk that it will escalate? Does Europe really want that to happen, or will they realise that Russia may be so important for Europe, that some form of accommodation must reached even at the cost that Ukraine will have to limit its ambitions in the war.

Sanctions
“We remain steadfast in our commitment to our unprecedented coordinated
sanctions measures in response to Russia’s war of aggression, the impacts of which will
compound over time. We are committed to sustaining and intensifying international
economic and political pressure on President Putin’s regime and its enablers in Belarus,
depriving Russia of the economic means to persist in its war of aggression against Ukraine.”
Steadfast G7 leaders may sound in their passionate war of words, but what happens when the cost of sanctions hit back on the West with a vengeance as we are beginning to see, with worldwide repercussions.

NATO’s passionate follow up on G7 promises

Condemnation of Russia
“We condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms. It “gravely undermines international security and stability. It is a blatant violation of international law. Russia’s appalling cruelty has caused immense human suffering and massive displacements, disproportionately affecting women and children. Russia bears full responsibility for this humanitarian catastrophe.” (NATO’s Madrid Summit Declaration).
No thought for the suffering that is caused in Ukraine as a result of the West’s escalating proxy war.

Solidarity with Ukraine
“We stand in full solidarity with the government and the people of Ukraine in the heroic defence of their country. We reiterate our unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders extending to its territorial waters. We fully support Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence and to choose its own security arrangements. We welcome efforts of all Allies engaged in providing support to Ukraine. We will assist them adequately, recognising their specific situation.” (Emphasis added).
Full solidarity with Zelensky and those calling the shots in Ukraine that is, but is this really in the interests of suffering people of Ukraine and its Russian speaking minorities?
Perhaps we get an indirect indication of a split in the Ukrainian population from poll carried out by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in May 2022. Asked whether it would be acceptable not to join NATO if Ukraine instead got security guarantees from NATO countries, 35 per cent in Western Ukraine found this acceptable in, while 50 percent found it acceptable in Eastern Ukraine, which is directly affected by the war.

President Biden’s expressions of moral outrage
On March 26 2022 President Biden tweeted: “We are engaged anew in a great battle for freedom. A battle between democracy and autocracy. Between liberty and repression. This battle will not be won in days or months either.”
In essence he is talking about a battle between good and evil, between light and darkness, an almost hyper ideologic argument for the proxy war in Ukraine.
Biden even expressed his moral outrage at President Putin’s invasion of Ukraine by blurting out: “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.” Later arguing: “I was expressing the moral outrage that I feel, and I make no apologies for it.”
In an unusual guest essay in the New York Times he later wrote
“Standing by Ukraine in its hour of need is not just the right thing to do. It is in our vital national interests to ensure a peaceful and stable Europe and to make it clear that might does not make right.”
One is reminded of President Clinton’s argument for the bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999.
“My fellow Americans, today our armed forces joined our NATO allies in airstrikes against Serbian forces responsible for the brutality in Kosovo. We have acted with resolve for several reasons…
We act to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the cause of peace…
Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative. It is also important to America's national interests.” (President Clinton addressing the nation on March 24, 1999).
To understand President Biden’s moral outrage and belligerence towards Putin and Russia it may also be worthwhile to cast a glance at Biden’s attitude back in 2014 when Russia made what Obama called an incursion into Crimea, and Russia supported pro-Russian separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk.
“When Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2014, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. pressed President Barack Obama to take decisive action, and fast, to make Moscow “pay in blood and money” for its aggression. The president, a Biden aide recalled, was having none of it.” (NYT).
With Biden now being president, he may finally be able to act on a grudge he may have carried with him since 2014.

Drowned out voices of dissent
While Western leaders seems united in their “intense passion” to punish the Russians with the help of Ukraine, there are isolated voices calling for a cooling of the passion. In the media we don’t hear these voices, they are drowned out by Western medias own enthusiastic support and encouragement for Ukraine and for the leaders who want to punish and humiliate Russia and Putin.
The picture painted is black and white with no thought for long term consequences for the West or indeed for the World. Realism is out and passionate enthusiasm is in, at least for the time being.

The warning voices of realism
“Realists of various stripes repeatedly warned that Western policy toward Russia and Ukraine would lead to serious trouble, warnings that were blithely ignored by those who claimed that NATO’s open-door policy would lead to lasting peace in Europe. Now that war has broken out, lives are being lost, and Ukraine is being destroyed, you would think proponents of open-ended NATO enlargement would have set aside their idealistic illusions and think about these issues in a hard-nosed, realist fashion. Yet the opposite has occurred: The people who got it right are singled out for attack, while those who believed that enlarging NATO would create a vast zone of peace in Europe are insisting that the war continue until Russia is totally defeated and greatly weakened.” (Stephen M. Walt in Foreign Policy).

Among the realists we find John Mearsheimer, professor of Political science at the University of Chicago. In a recent speech on the cause and consequences of the Ukraine Crisis he argued:
“The war in Ukraine is a multi-dimensional disaster, which is likely to get much worse in the foreseeable future. When a war is successful, little attention is paid to its causes, but when the outcome is disastrous, understanding how it happened becomes paramount. People want to know: how did we get into this terrible situation?” (John J. Mearsheimer)
Mearsheimer has two main arguments.
“First, the United States is principally responsible for causing the Ukraine crisis. This is not to deny that Putin started the war and that he is responsible for Russia’s conduct of the war. Nor is it to deny that America’s allies bear some responsibility, but they largely follow Washington’s lead on Ukraine. My central claim is that the United States has pushed forward policies toward Ukraine that Putin and other Russian leaders see as an existential threat, a point they have made repeatedly for many years.”
“Second, the Biden administration has reacted to the outbreak of war by doubling down against Russia. Washington and its Western allies are committed to decisively defeating Russia in Ukraine and employing comprehensive sanctions to greatly weaken Russian power. The United States is not seriously interested in finding a diplomatic solution to the war, which means the war is likely to drag on for months if not years … Furthermore, there is a danger that the war will escalate, as NATO might get dragged into the fighting and nuclear weapons might be used. We are living in perilous times.” (emphasis added).
Mearsheimer regards the war as on unmitigated disaster for Ukraine: “Russian forces have conquered 20 percent of Ukrainian territory and destroyed or badly damaged many Ukrainian cities and towns. More than 6.5 million Ukrainians have fled the country, while more than 8 million have been internally displaced. Many thousands of Ukrainians—including innocent civilians—are dead or badly wounded and the Ukrainian economy is in shambles The World Bank estimates that Ukraine’s economy will shrink by almost 50 percent over the course of 2022.”
Ukrainian Prime Minister, Denys Shmyhal, indirectly confirms the disaster for Ukraine in a recent estimate of the size of damages resulting from the war and the cost of recovery: “Direct infrastructural losses are worth over $100 billion, and full-fledged Ukraine recovery plan is estimated at $750 billion.” (Denys Shmyhal at Twitter).
Like others Mearsheimer sees a real risk of a drawn-out war with continued escalation on both sides. “There is a danger that the United States and its NATO allies will get dragged into the fighting, which they have been able to avoid up to this point, even though they are already waging a proxy war against Russia. There is also the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used in Ukraine and that might even lead to a nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States. The underlying reason these outcomes might be realized is that the stakes are so high for both sides, and thus neither can afford to lose.”

Mearsheimer is not alone in warning of the dangers of an escalating war in Ukraine: In an essay published by “Responsible Statecraft” Anatol Lieven warns of the horrible dangers of pushing a U.S. proxy war in Ukraine.
Arguing that former U.S. presidents like Truman and Eisenhower adopted a strategy of containing, but never fighting the Soviet Union in Europe and never tryed to “roll back Soviet power through armed support for anti-Soviet insurgencies in eastern Europe,”
he argues that leaders today should remember this and not try to push back Russia in military proxy war in Europe.
The consequences would be disastrous for themselves “and still more disastrous for the wretched people on the ground who became the pawns of these great power agendas. Have we really learned nothing from history?”

At this year’s Davos meeting, 99 years old former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, argued: "Parties should be brought to peace talks within the next two months. Ukraine should've been a bridge between Europe and Russia, but now, as the relationships are reshaped, we may enter a space where the dividing line is redrawn and Russia is entirely isolated. We are facing a situation now where Russia could alienate itself completely from Europe and seek a permanent alliance elsewhere. This may lead to Cold War-like diplomatic distances, which will set us back decades. We should strive for long- term peace."

Even the New York Times’ influential Thomas L. Friedman is warning that the war in Ukraine is getting more dangerous for America. He even postulates that Biden knows it, although that seems doubtful giving his rhetoric and the amount of resources, he is allocating to fight the proxy war in Ukraine.
Friedman argues “We need to stick as tightly as possible to our original limited and clearly defined aim of helping Ukraine expel Russian forces as much as possible or negotiate for their withdrawal whenever Ukraine’s leaders feel the time is right.”
The last condition seems very dangerous, giving the views expressed by president Zelensky. Who now sems convinced that the might of Western military assistance will allow Ukraine to aim for goals that would never have been possible before the Russian invasion.
Zelensky insists that he must be given everything he needs to defeat the Russians and push them back from every corner of Ukraine, even the areas occupied in 2014.
“The ultimate goal of Ukraine is to restore territorial integrity, including Crimea, President Volodymyr Zelensky said Tuesday, as Russia pursued its offensive to seize territory in eastern Ukraine. (WSJ). This of cause means further escalation, more heavy weapons and more direct involvement of the West in order to achieve Zelensky’s goal, and the passionate intensity in the West is encouraging Zelensky to demand more all the time, and scolding those who show less passion.

Even President Macron have tried to cool the passionate conviction, arguing that the West is not at war with Russia:
“Nous ne sommes pas en guerre contre la Russie. Nous œuvrons en Européens pour la préservation de la souveraineté et de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Ukraine. Pour le retour de la paix sur notre continent. Nous serons là pour reconstruire l’Ukraine, en Européens, toujours. (Emmanuel Macron May 9, 2022).
Macron insists that Europe must learn from its past mistakes, and make sure no side is humiliated like the Germans were in the Versailles Treaty after the First World War.
Macron has apparently even to tried to convince Zelensky that Ukraine must pay for peace by accepting to give up some Ukrainian territory.
Not something an increasingly cocksure Zelensky would agree too, with the passionate West bolstering his confidence that everything is possible. He scolded Macron in an Italian interview: “To propose to us to give up something as far as our sovereignty is concerned to save President Putin’s face does not seem like a fair thing on the part of some leaders. (aa.com.tr)
Perhaps Europe should cool its passion for Zelensky and for the mainly U.S. driven proxy war, and instead heed Macron’s advice.

Less passion for war in the population
A public opinion poll for The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in 10 European Countries carried out in April/May indicate that the passionate support for the Ukraine war is not shared by the European population. Instead, we find marked split between those support the proxy war in Ukraine to punish Russia even if it means more “human suffering,” and those who looks for ways to end the war as soon as possible “even if it means Ukraine must make concessions.”

The Peace camp consists of the 35 per cent of the respondents who agreed with statement: “The most important thing is to stop the war as soon as possible, even if it means Ukraine giving control of areas to Russia.”

The Justice camp consists of the 22 per cent who agreed with statement: “The most important thing is to punish Russia for its aggression, even if it means that more Ukrainians are killed and displaced.”

Swing Voters made up 20 per cent. “Members of this Swing group share the anti-Russian feelings of the Justice camp, but also worry about escalation – like the Peace camp.”

The Rest 23 per cent are those who answered “Neither of these” and “Don’t know” to the statements.

There are large differences between the respondents in the 10 countries as seen here:

Perhaps indicating at the very least that European leaders are out of tune with their population in the majority of the 10 countries. Only in Poland is the support for the Justice Camp larger than the support for the Peace Camp.

Europe must look to Europe’s interest
Restating the argument from an earlier blog post. We wonder why Europe is not making a much more independent diplomatic effort, instead of giving in to moral outrage and Zelensky’s and Biden’s totally overstated warnings about the threat to all of Europe.
Europe is supporting the Ukraine with financial assistance, weapons, welcoming Ukrainian refugees, and seems inclined to engage in self-harming sanctions to reduce Russia’s ability for fighting a war.
In all seriousness, will Europe really leave to Zelensky and a vengeful Biden to decide to escalate the proxy war against Russia and decide the conditions for making peace with Russia?
Why do decisionmakers not leave moralistic outbursts aside and take a more realistic position that actually turn out to be more in line with their own self-proclaimed European values. This would mean efforts to promote a peace that might spare lives and avoid further destruction in Ukraine and perhaps help solve or at least alleviate some of the problems brought up by Russia as reasons for the invasion.
Why does European leaders not demand something in return from Zelensky’s Ukraine, instead of just playing whipping boy to Zelensky’s critique?
Realistically this would mean that Europe would have to put pressure on Zelensky to accept the Russian annexation of Crimea, and insist that the future of the Luhansk and Donetsk would have to be settled by mechanism involving for instance staged referendums from Russian border to the borders of Luhansk and Donetsk.
Either accept this or accept that help would be reduced to humanitarian help.
Likewise, Europe would have to initiate sincere and realistic diplomatic efforts in relation Russia, taking demands from the Russian speaking parts of Ukraine seriously, accepting the Russian possession of Crimea and proposing realistic solutions for Luhansk and Donetsk that would comply with what Europe ought to demand of Ukraine.

Biden, the most dangerous man for peace in Europe

6/1/2022

The impatient desire to simplify too soon, to find explanations at an insufficient depth,
leads to enormous errors … In their eagerness to find a simple explanation for what occurs, men are tempted to select only one of these forces and say: “this is the only force at work” (Aldous Huxley “Causes of War”)

Biden’s unusual defence for further escalation in New York Times
On May 31 President Biden had an unusual Guest Essay in the New York Times. One wonders if the essay is meant to explain why he dared promise to give the Ukrainians what they craved for. In this instance Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) to outrange the Russians.
Here some excerpts followed by critical comments attempting to show why this latest escalatory move by the Biden administration may lead Russia to a reciprocal escalation, that may endanger not just peace in Ukraine, but in Europe and the rest of World.

Biden’s arguments for daring to escalate
President Biden: “America’s goal is straightforward: We want to see a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine with the means to deter and defend itself against further aggression.”

Comment: How will this ever be possible without some sort of accommodation with Russia? And how is this going to happen when escalating the proxy war?
Biden argues like Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who once said the United States wanted “to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” This certainly does not bode well for future peaceful relations with Russia?
What has the Biden actually done to promote an accommodation with Russia?
Apparently, nothing. Instead, Biden recklessly acts without thoughts about the future relation with a humiliated Russia. A Russia armed to the teeth with extremely powerful nuclear weapons, that won’t go away. What is the chance that it will give up in Ukraine? What the risk that it will escalate? One thing is for sure, the U.S. is at moment driving Russia into the arms of a China striving after World hegemony. Does Europe really want that to happen, or do they realise that Russia may be so important for Europe, that some form of accommodation must reached even at the cost that Ukraine will have to limit its ambitions in the war.

President Biden: “My principle throughout this crisis has been “Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.” I will not pressure the Ukrainian government — in private or public — to make any territorial concessions. It would be wrong and contrary to well-settled principles to do so …
Standing by Ukraine in its hour of need is not just the right thing to do. It is in our vital national interests to ensure a peaceful and stable Europe and to make it clear that might does not make right.”

Comment: To support Ukraine in making “No territorial concession” seems certain to crush any hope of an accommodation with Russia. Together with the ongoing escalation of U.S. deliveries of weapons to Ukraine it will instead support President Zelensky and FM Kuleba in making new outrageous demands. Looking at Zelensky’s many outpourings it sems that he becomes more willing to negotiate, when Russia has the overhand, but uncompromising when Ukraine looks be winning the proxy on behalf of the U.S.
To be sure, it is in our all interest to ensure a peaceful Europe, but what Biden is doing is instead sure to escalate the present war. In fact Biden seems prefer to follow a bizarre ”1984” logic: “War is Peace.”

President Biden: “We have moved quickly to send Ukraine a significant amount of weaponry and ammunition so it can fight on the battlefield and be in the strongest possible position at the negotiating table. That’s why I’ve decided that we will provide the Ukrainians with more advanced rocket systems and munitions that will enable them to more precisely strike key targets on the battlefield in Ukraine.”
He then bizarrely argues. “We do not seek a war between NATO and Russia … We are not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders. We do not want to prolong the war just to inflict pain on Russia.”

Comment: What Biden is talking about is his decision, after some hesitation, to dare to provide Ukraine with HIMARS M142 (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System), a lighter and more mobile version of MLRS M270 (Multiple Launch Rocket System).
These systems carry launch pods for precision guided long range rockets. It seems that the decision means that Ukraine will only get rockets with a limited range (perhaps up to70 kilometres. Not extended range rockets that could reach 300-499+ kilometres and thus reach Russian territory).
In any case Ukraine would get rockets able to outrange Russian howitzers, that is the whole point, given the present Russia artillery onslaught in Eastern Ukraine.
This means a further escalation of the war in Ukraine, perhaps enabling the Ukraine to once more force the Russians backwards, this time in Eastern Ukraine.
How will the Russians react, be more inclined to seek peace or be more inclined to escalate?
If Biden’s escalation of the proxy war means that Russia will be eyeing a new setback or even outright defeat, there is certainly a risk of reciprocal attempts to escalate.
A grim spectre may even emerge. Russia may choose to “escalate to de-escalate,” meaning use a tactical nuclear demonstration in the kiloton range in some part of Ukraine to tell the West: If you don’t to de-escalate after this, you will risk the prospect of a nuclear war.
(See my essay “A cocksure West risking catastrophe” at https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/a-cocksure-west-risking-catastrophe ).
Biden apparently brushes the possibility aside.

President Biden: “I know many people around the world are concerned about the use of nuclear weapons. We currently see no indication that Russia has intent to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine …
Let me be clear: Any use of nuclear weapons in this conflict on any scale would be completely unacceptable to us as well as the rest of the world and would entail severe consequences.”

Comment: “severe consequences.” Yes, certainly, but before that happens one would hope that the hitherto docile Europeans still clinging with some enthusiasm to the Biden proxy war bandwagon, would finally realise the catastrophic outlook and choose de-escalation. Distancing themselves from both Ukraine and Biden to avoid a nuclear war in Europe.
Like Macron and to some degree Scholz, they should cool the European enthusiasm for war, and distance themselves from a Biden escalation that would threaten to humiliate Russia.
It pays to remember what the former, well-respected German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt once said about Russia: “Russland ist eine Weltmacht und wird es bleiben.” Arguing with Russia’s enormous geographical size and its enormous natural resource potential.

Well, this essay may also be impatient in its desire to simplify too soon, but at least it does not risk a catastrophic outcome.

Addendum June2
New German weapon deliveries in the wake of Biden’s promises
Just after Biden announced that Ukraine would get HIMARS It was annouced that Ukraine would get four Bundeswehr MARS-II (Mittleres Artillerieraketensystem), similar to the U.S. MLRS’s, and armed with two launch pods each containing 6 rockets.
In the Bundestag Chancellor also Scholz also announced that Ukraine is getting IRIS-T Germany’s most up to date SLS/SLM short to medium-range surface-to-air defence systems. A single system he said would be able to defend a whole city.
Germany is also supposed to deliver Counter Battery Radar systems, which will allow Ukrainian forces to pinpoint the location of say Russian Howitzers (perhaps in order to hit them with guided rockets launched from the MARS-II and HIMARS).

A cocksure West risking catastrophe

5/20/2022

The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
W.B. Yeats

When the best still lacked conviction and the passionate were reined in
The sad history of NATO and the Ukraine. At the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008 passionate members encouraged Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. “We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO …Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP [Membership Action Plan]. Therefore, we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications.” (NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008). Encouragement came from the Bush administration eager to expand NATO, ignoring warnings from Russia that Ukrainian member ship would force Russia to treat Ukraine as an enemy.
The best still lacked conviction with Germany and France blocking Ukrainian membership of NATO, arguing that Ukraine was not ready and perhaps also heeding the Russian warning, with French Prime Minister Fillon arguing: “We are opposed to the entry of Georgia and Ukraine because we think that it is not a good answer to the balance of power within Europe and between Europe and Russia.”
The issue of NATO membership then lay more or less dormant until the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the continued fighting in the Donbas.
Previous lukewarm and Ukrainian public support for NATO membership slowly changed to public support for membership. Leading to Ukraine’s passionate press for NATO membership.
In 2019 “The Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, … approved in its final reading a constitutional amendment that reflects the country's strategic goal of becoming a member of NATO and the European Union.” (Radio Free Europe).
When President Zelensky visited President Biden in September 2021, he pressed Biden on the issue NATO membership saying “I would like to discuss with President Biden here his vision, his government’s vision of Ukraine’s chances to join NATO and the timeframe for this accession, if it is possible; and the role the United States can play being involved in a peaceful settlement in Donbas that we would like to reach.” (The White House).
Biden at the time seemed to lack conviction and remained noncommittal.
Later becoming more passionate he voiced support for the Ukraine’s wish. In December 2021 Zelensky’s chief of staff told Reuters: "President Biden said very clearly that the decision on Ukraine's accession to NATO is the decision of the Ukrainian people only, this is a sovereign and independent Ukrainian state."
An attitude certain to encourage Ukraine and anger Russia.

A passionate Putin rushing into war
In a long speech on Russian on February 21, 2022 Putin explained his grievances with the NATO expansion towards the East and especially the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO:
These grievances and the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO may explain why Russia handed the U.S. and NATO a draft for a treaty on security guarantees, containing three key demands:

First, to prevent further NATO expansion.
Second, to have the Alliance refrain from deploying assault weapon systems on Russian borders.
And finally, rolling back the bloc's military capability and infrastructure in Europe to where they were in 1997, when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed. (en.kremlin.ru)

The written answers to his demands from the U.S. and NATO gave no indication that Russia’s demands would be taken seriously.
Causing a visibly angry Putin to state:
“I would like to be clear and straightforward: in the current circumstances, when our proposals for an equal dialogue on fundamental issues have actually remained unanswered by the United States and NATO, when the level of threats to our country has increased significantly, Russia has every right to respond in order to ensure its security. That is exactly what we will do.” (en.kremlin.ru).

The blood-dimmed tide loosed …
A few days after Putin’s statement Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24,2022.
While especially the U.S. and UK rushed light antitank weapons like Javelins and Nlaw’s to Ukraine, the main efforts to discourage Russia would seem to have been a succession of Western sanctions meant deter and punish Russia’s economy and weaken its ability to wage war.
While Biden promised to support Ukraine, he also ruled out sending U.S. forces into Ukraine, and pulled out U.S. troops serving as military advisers.
Then after days of fighting, the big surprise, Russian capabilities had been severely overrated. Seeing that Ukrainian troops armed with sophisticated Western anti-armour missiles had severely blunted Russian military capabilities. The feared Russian bear with its mighty steel paws was hurt and withdrew. Not to its lair, but to try again in the Donbas.

A West full of passionate intensity
Smelling the growing weakness of the Russian military aggression in Ukraine there is no end to the spiralling self-confidence and self-righteousness of Western leaders out to humiliate Putin and Russia.
No holding back now with the US pouring both smart and traditional heavy weapons and equipment into Ukraine.
The U.S. Senate having just voted 86-11 to approve a $40 billion [milliard] aid Ukraine aid package, and President Biden announcing “The resources that I requested will allow is to send even more weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, replenish our own stockpile, and support U.S. troops stationed on NATO territory.”
The rest of the passionate West joining the U.S. bandwagon with diverse offerings of weapons, even Germany is now willing provide Ukraine with the heavy tools, in the shape of seven advanced Panzerhaubitze 2000, to help push back the Russians and in a “Ringtausch” they will supply the Czechs with 15 Leopard 2 tanks, allowing the Czechs to send T-72 tanks to Ukraine.
A recent list of all known weapon deliveries to Ukraine ca be found at the Forum on the Arms Trade (https://www.forumarmstrade.org/ukrainearms.html).
There are again foreign instructors in Ukraine and Ukrainian soldiers are trained in the West to use the weapons provided.
Suspected for some time, it has now been revealed that the U.S. is providing Ukraine with real time intelligence to help them target the Russians. The Washington Post revealed that “Information about the location and movements of Russian forces is flowing to Ukraine in real-time, and it includes satellite imagery and reporting gleaned from sensitive U.S. sources.” According to a Ukrainian official “The intelligence is very good. It tells us where the Russians are so that we can hit them.”
Somewhat surprisingly it is argued that the intelligence sharing is designed to prevent a wider war. The intention being to calibrate the intelligence sharing precisely so that will not lead to a further heightening of tension between the U.S. and Russia.
Wonder if that is prevented, when seeing that U.S. intelligence helped sink the “Moskva” in the Black see and the apparent targeting of individual Russian generals.
A Biden administration seemingly led by a conviction that Russia is losing, may now dare to provide intelligence that would allow the Ukraine forces to attack objects outside Ukrainian borders, say in the Russian Belgorod area.
Cocky Western leaders are even starting to make mockery of the Russian assault, of their preparations, their logistics, the poor showing of their air force, their special forces, their operational planning, and the low quality of their technical equipment. “GPS receivers have been found taped to the dashboards of downed Russian SU-34s so the pilots knew where they were, due to the poor quality of their own systems.” (Defence Secretary Ben Wallace).
Before May 9 there may have been a certain weariness, as many expected that Putin would use the opportunity to announce some drastic escalation, declare all-out war on Ukraine or put Russia on was footing.
Nothing like that was announced. Putin’s talk was strangely subdued.
The outlook for the Russian invasion does indeed look rather bleak at the moment. Pushed/ withdrawn from the Kyiv area and now also pushed/withdrawn from the Kharkiv area, the land battle is now taking place mostly the Eastern Ukraine, as seen in this map published by the Institute for the Study of War on May 18

In for the kill in the proxy war
The U.S. is now so cocksure that Russians forces are on their heels that Ukrainian forces are really let loose with U.S. help. According to Secretary Blinken Ukraine should “do whatever is necessary to defend against Russian aggression,” adding that “the tactics of this are their decisions.” Perhaps, not wholly on their own given the passionate intensity in the West.
U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Ukraine Kristina Kvien recently expressed the view that Ukraine would win the war: “So far it seems to me that Ukraine has been very successful in pushing back Russia. They pushed back Russia in North of Kyiv, they have now pushed back Russia around Kharkiv. And it is not illogical to think that Ukraine might be able to push back Russia in other areas which Russia has been able to occupy. We specifically haven't discussed Crimea and Donbas in terms of our military support.”
Similar views have been expressed at recent NATO meetings. At the joint press conference after the informal Berlin meeting Stoltenberg said:
“Ukraine can win this war. Ukrainians are bravely defending their homeland.
To help them do so, Allies have committed and delivered security assistance to Ukraine worth billions of dollars, and over the years, NATO and Allies have trained tens of thousands of Ukrainian forces.”
In connection with a G7 meeting at Weissenhaus in Germany on May 12 to 14, the French Foreign Minister Le Drian expressed his conviction that the G7 "very strongly united" in their will to "continue in the long term to support Ukraine's fight for its sovereignty until Ukraine's victory". (AFP).
Western Leaders are still maintaining that this a Russian Ukraine war, not a war between the West (NATO) and Russia. But their arguments rather convoluted, perhaps to convince themselves that what we see is not what we see.
In an interview Le Drian is asked: “Is France’s aim, your aim for Ukraine to win the war?
Le Drian: “No, that’s not what I said. We must be very clear about things: there’s a war between Russia and Ukraine; there isn’t a war between Russia and the Atlantic Alliance, between Russia and other partners; there’s a single war between an invading country, Russia, and an invaded country which is Ukraine. Ukraine must regain its borders, its autonomy, its sovereignty. That’s the aim...” (Emphasis added).
Questioned if this means ensuring that Ukraine will win without humiliating Russia, Le Drian argues: “It means that Russia pulls out of the Donbas, pulls out its forces from the Ukrainian territory it is occupying. There’s an invader; the invader must withdraw. If you want to call that a victory, let’s call it a victory, but the invader must withdraw and no longer be present in Ukraine.” (BFM TV).
Spain’s Foreign Minister Albares Bueno argues in a way that even closer to Newspeak:
“Alles, was wir tun, zielt darauf ab, den Frieden in der Ukraine wiederherzustellen und die russischen Soldaten in die Grenzen der Russischen Föderation zurückzudrängen, die sie nie hätten verlassen dürfen. Darauf sind alle Maßnahmen, auch die Lieferung militärischer Ausrüstung ausgerichtet … Nichts von dem, was die Europäische Union oder die Nato tun, zielt auf eine Eskalation ab.” (Die Welt).
Nothing what the European Union or NATO is are doing, including the weapon deliveries is aimed at escalation.
These are the words, the reality in Ukraine looks different, and the outlook may become even bleaker.

A grim spectre re-emerges
In a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, gave her assessment of what Russia might do after the “failure to rapidly seize Kyiv and overwhelm Ukrainian forces has deprived Moscow of the quick military victory that it had originally expected would prevent the United States and NATO from being able to provide meaningful military aid to Ukraine.”
While Russia strategic goals may not have changed it is evident that it will find difficult in the near future reach even the limited goals of capturing Luhansk and Donetsk and establishing a kind of buffer zone protecting them.
Haines “it is increasingly unlikely that they will be able to establish control over both oblasts and the buffer zone they desire in the coming weeks, but Putin most likely also judges that Russia has a greater ability and willingness to endure challenges than his adversaries, and he is probably counting on U.S. and EU resolve to weaken as food shortages, inflation, and energy prices get worse.”
Given the apparent success of the West’s proxy war in Ukraine and Russia’s evident difficulties the important question is:
What might/will Russia do now that its mighty military has been humiliated and its goals looks increasingly difficult or even impossible to achieve?
Surely Russia must now realise that it is fighting all the might of West in a proxy war, carried out on Ukrainian soil. Russia finds itself in an impossible quandary similar to the Norse God, Thor, when he was trying to lift the Midgard Serpent or Jörmungandr in the shape of a cat. An impossible task even for Thor as the Midgard Serpent stretched around the whole World.
Putin may have thought it was easy to “lift” a puny Ukraine, but must now realise that he is fighting the Midgard Serpent of the whole of Western might.
What will he do?
Here is what the U.S. intelligence believes he might do:
President Putin may turn to more drastic means …including imposing martial law, reorienting industrial production, or potentially escalatory military actions to free up the resources needed to achieve his objectives as the conflict drags on, or if he perceives Russia is losing in Ukraine.
“The most likely flashpoints for escalation in the coming weeks are around increasing Russian attempts to interdict Western security assistance, retaliation for Western economic sanctions, or threats to the regime at home.
We believe that Moscow continues to use nuclear rhetoric to deter the United States and the West from increasing lethal aid to Ukraine and to respond to public comments from the U.S. and NATO Allies that suggest expanded western goals in the conflict. If Putin perceives that the United States is ignoring his threats, he may try to signal to Washington the heightened danger of its support to Ukraine by authorizing another large nuclear exercise involving a major dispersal of mobile intercontinental missiles, heavy bombers, strategic submarines.
We otherwise continue to believe that President Putin would probably only authorize the use of nuclear weapons if he perceived an existential threat to the Russian state or regime, but we will remain vigilant in monitoring every aspect of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. With tensions this high, there is always an enhanced potential for miscalculation, unintended escalation, which we hope our intelligence can help to mitigate.” (Emphasis added). (Avril Haines Director of National Intelligence at Congressional Testimony, May10).
In the speech announcing the invasion of Ukraine Putin warned the West: “No matter who tries to stand in our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.... All the necessary decisions in this regard have been taken. I hope that my words will be heard.”
Three day later he ordered military command to put Russia's nuclear deterrent forces on high alert.
The White House press secretary Jen Psaki, who often seems to act independently in lieu of Biden, dismissed Putin’s threat on Twitter the same day: “that Russian President Vladimir Putin's decision to put his nation's nuclear deterrent forces on a state of heightened alert was part of a "pattern" of manufacturing threats that don't exist.” (Jen Psaki, February 27).
In April, when it had become evident that Russian troops were in dire straits in Ukraine
“Sergei Lavrov warned the West on Monday not to underestimate the elevated risks of nuclear conflict over Ukraine and said he viewed NATO as being "in essence" engaged in a proxy war with Russia by supplying Kyiv with weaponry.” (Reuters April 26).
The threats were later dismissed by President Biden, when answering a question from journalist. Sounding somewhat hesitantly he said:
“So, it’s — number one, it’s an excuse for their failure. But number two, it’s also, if they really mean it, it’s — it’s — no — no one should be making idle comments about the use of nuclear weapons or the possibility that they’d use that. It’s irresponsible.”
Prime Minister Johnson was even more casually dismissing the threat. When asked he if shared the concern over threat of a nuclear war he simply said: “No. I don’t.”
Analysts asked to judge the likelihood that Putin might use nuclear weapons when facing defeat in Ukraine have argued that there is a non-zero risk. A former undersecretary for defence put the risk a around 1 or 2 percent, while a former US ambassador to Russia judged the risk to be less than 5 percent.
How they arrived at the percentage is not known, but that they judged the risk to be higher than zero is significant, and ought to give cause for concern among those Western leaders who rather arrogantly dismissed the Russian threat as merely empty words.
Perhaps it would be wise to have a look at the Russian nuclear doctrine.

Escalate to de-escalate when things fall apart
On April 21, 2022 the U.S. congressional Service Published a report on Russians Nuclear doctrine.
In 2020 Russia published the latest version of the doctrine entitled ““On Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” The document outlines the circumstances that might lead Russia to use nuclear weapons.
“This document specifically notes that Russia “considers nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence.” It states that Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy “is defensive by nature, it is aimed at maintaining the nuclear forces potential at the level sufficient for nuclear deterrence, and guarantees protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, and deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.” It also emphasizes that Russia maintains forces that could “inflict guaranteed unacceptable damage on a potential adversary ... in any circumstances.”
Defensive it says, but it also states that Russia could respond with nuclear weapons following an “attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions,” but also in an “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” (Emphasis added).
Thus, Russia might respond to a conventional attack with nuclear weapons if it judges the very existence of the state to be in jeopardy. While this might seem to exclude the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Ukrainian war, the document also opens the possibility of nuclear first use as it states:
“… in the event of a military conflict, this Policy provides for the prevention of an escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation and/or its allies.”
Analysts have assessed that this means Russia might threaten to escalate to use nuclear weapons as a way to deter a conflict that would threaten the existence of the state, with Russia pursuing an “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear doctrine under certain circumstances.
If a conventional conflict might threaten Russia, it might decide to use nuclear weapons to create such a catastrophic threat to a continuation of the conflict that its adversary would be forced to de-escalate. The Congressional report in fact mentions that this might happen if Russia looks to be defeated in a conventional conflict with NATO.
At least that is how some analysts interpret the Russian doctrine. But it is worth noting that Russia itself does not use the term “escalate to de-escalate.”
Now what does this mean in relation to Ukraine? We are seeing a more and more cocksure attitude in the West, manifesting itself in almost no holds barred support of Ukraine. The reality being that the West is using its potent military arsenal to fight the Russians using their Ukraine proxies.
Could an eminent defeat of all Russians troops in Ukraine, the re-conquering the Russian held areas, and the weakening of Russia military might to a stage, where it would unable to wage war be seen as a defeat of Russia itself?
Would an eminent risk of this happening provoke Russia to nuclear escalation in order to force the West to de-escalate?
Russian certainly has the enough tactical nuclear weapons to make that a possibility.

Russia’s nuclear arsenal
IT is estimated that Russia has 1,912 non-strategic nuclear weapons.
“These nuclear warheads include theater- and tactical-range systems that Russia relies on to deter and defeat NATO or China in a conflict. Russia’s stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons [is] already large and diverse and is being modernized with an eye towards greater accuracy, longer ranges, and lower yields to suit their potential warfighting role. We assess Russia to have dozens of these systems already deployed or in development. They include, but are not limited to: short- and close-range ballistic missiles, ground-launched cruise missiles, including the 9M729 missile [The 9M729 SSC-X-8 is a long-range ground-based cruise missile system], which the U.S. Government determined violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty, as well as antiship and antisubmarine missiles, torpedoes, and depth charges.”
Among the advanced missiles that may be armed with a nuclear tactical warhead is the Kh-47M2 “Kinzhal.” A nuclear-capable, air-launched, hypersonic ballistic missile, one of six new “next generation” weapons unveiled by Vladimir Putin in March 2018. It can carry a payload up to 480 kilos, and be armed with a thermonuclear warhead in the 10 to 50Kt range, and it may be air-launched from a Mig-31.

Innocence is drowned …
How might Russia use a non-strategic nuclear weapon, if it is pushed into corner facing defeat in the proxy war with the West?
“Russian military-analytical writings envision a series of steps in which nuclear weapons are first deployed and utilized for signalling, and are then potentially employed in a progressive fashion at the regional level of conflict and finally are used in a large-scale war until the conflict reaches the “retaliation” of all-out nuclear war. At that level of war, in addition to the mass use of conventional precision strike, military writings suggest the employment of “single and/or grouped use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons on adversary forces” as well as the “demonstration use of nuclear weapons by strategic nuclear forces or nonstrategic nuclear weapons.”
There are strong indications that not all of Russia’s nuclear employment appears to be under the rubric of SONF [Strategic Operation of Nuclear Forces].” This means that a tactical nuclear strike with aim of forcing the West to de-escalate could be launched as single initial strike by limited means in a selected region (zone) “intended to destroy political, industrial, and military targets.” (cna.org).
A recent article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists argues that Russian use of “non-strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine could take several forms. They could be used for demonstration purposes—not targeting anything and not creating casualties—to coerce Ukraine and/or the West to agree to a settlement acceptable to Putin. Tactical nukes could also be used to target military units to change the operational situation on the ground.” (thebulletin.org).
“Russian thinking here is keen to avert inadvertent escalation, or the strengthening of political resolve that comes from civilian casualties. The possibility of secondary or synergistic effects, which could result in unacceptable levels of damage, weighs heavily as a consideration. Here, target selection and warhead selection are relevant factors.
The operation is premised on inflicting deterrent damage through the application of limited force. The psychological impact is meant to exceed the level of material damage, affecting the political leadership’s will to fight.” (cna.org).

A warning shot
Euphemistically calling it a warning shot this could mean a nuclear explosion in a sparsely populated area Ukraine, using an unstoppable Kinzhal hypersonic missile with a 10 kiloton warhead, or a 9M729 missile similarly configured.
Desperate and vindictive and Russians could perhaps even choose the small community “Ukrainske” for its symbolic value. Using Nukemap one may calculate the probable destructive effects giving the explosion of a 10 Kt warhead, with wind coming from an easterly direction. According to a Nukemap calculation this would result in 140 fatalities and 90 heavily injured. Terrible consequences for a small community and its vicinity in Ukraine, but not catastrophic in the wider sense.
A map showing the areas to suffer the consequences of such nuclear demonstration, according to NUKemap calculations.

De-escalate or risk anarchy loosed upon the World
What would be the Western reaction if the Russians dared attempt to escalate to de-escalate with such a nuclear demonstration, calculated to impress and force the West to de-escalate?
“The emotional noise following the use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine would be deafening, both in terms of calls for restraint and of demands for retaliation. In many ways, the policy community is divided between those wanting an aggressive approach to the war that seeks to force a strategic defeat on Russia and those who want a more constrained approach to avoid a possible escalation.” (thebulletin.org).
Here a list of possible reactions to a Russian nuclear demonstration in Ukraine:

De-escalate, scaling down the assistance to Ukraine

Respond using conventional weapons

React in kind with some kind of nuclear demonstration

De-escalate, scaling down the assistance to Ukraine
It would mean giving in to a Russian “escalate to de-escalate” attempt. It would mean Western powers signalling that they would limit their assistance to Ukraine to level that would not threaten the Russia with defeat, and it would also mean forcing Ukraine to cut down its military and political ambitions. In effect force Ukraine, and the West, to accept some kind of settlement with Russia.
“Given the consequences of a nuclear war between the United States, NATO, and Russia and the risk of escalation beyond Ukraine should the conflict continue, this option argues for ending the conflict in some way that gives the Russian leadership an “out” from the conflict. While seemingly reasonable given the level of destruction and costs of escalation.”
Still, giving in to Russia would be humiliating to decision makers in the West hoping to bring Russia to its knees in their surprisingly successful proxy war against the Russia.
It would also mean that nuclear blackmail would be effective, setting dangerous precedence, given the outstanding conflicts with say North Korea and Iran. On the other hand, there might be much less reluctance to respond in kind in the case of North Korea and Iran, meaning that the precedence setting effect of giving in to the Russian escalate to de-escalate may be negligible.
An aspect that most US analysts seem to forget is that the Europeans would regard a giving in to Russia option as the only option. Fearing that alternatives like responding in kind would raise the spectre a nuclear war on the European continent.

Respond using conventional weapons
Fearing the consequences of responding in kind to a Russian nuclear demonstration, the U.S. and especially the Europeans might consider a response using conventional weapons.
This would mean direct Western involvement in a war with Russia. Something the West has tried to avoid, although the cocksure attitude resulting from the success of the proxy war has meant that the restraint is disappearing.
On overwhelming conventional response could be caried out in different ways.
The limited version would consist of an all-out attack on Russian troops or installations in Ukraine.
A more dangerous version would be an attack on Russian soil, say on the area, units or installations involved in the Russian nuclear demonstration.
In this case the Russian escalate to de-escalate strategy would not have succeeded, and the result might be either that the Russia would realise that they were now involved in a direct war with West and that it would have to find some kind of settlement with the West… Or they might choose further escalation, including more forceful Russian nuclear demonstrations. Perhaps against to bases from where the conventional response was carried out.
This would force the West to either seek settlement or escalate further carrying the risk of all out nuclear war.

React in kind with some kind of tactical nuclear demonstration
“To truly be “in-kind” in this scenario, the US and NATO would need to strike Russian targets in Ukraine—or otherwise significantly change the nature of the conflict by striking a target in Russia. There may be Russian military targets in Ukraine for which a low-yield nuclear strike would produce limited casualties. But to have a significant military impact, NATO would likely have to use multiple strikes.” (thebulletin.org).
No one can say what the result of such scenario might be. But responsible European decision-makers would see this response in kind option as being far too dangerous. Fearing that it might lead to exchange of tactical nuclear weapon strikes on European soil. The problem is that Europeans may very little say in the decision to respond in kind. The U.S. being in charge and perhaps having less qualms.
“Using a nuclear weapon against Russia immediately turns the conflict into a Russia versus the United States and NATO war that has skipped all the conventional options for escalation management. Given the potential global consequences of a nuclear war between Russia and the United States and NATO, striking targets inside Russia with nuclear weapons is unlikely to be viewed by the US president as a viable option.” (thebulletin.org).
Thus, no one their right mind would therefore regard a response in kind as realistic option in the proxy war against Russia, meaning that we are back with the other two response scenarios.
The 2022 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review states “As long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.”
It would certainly be difficult see a Russian tactical nuclear demonstration in Ukraine with limited local consequences as “extreme circumstances” threatening the “vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners”?

Cool the passionate intensity
While the West seems united in their “intense passion” to punish the Russians with help of Ukraine, there are voices calling for a cooling of the passion.
Daniel Immerwahr (with a name signallling “Aalwaystrue”) warns that Western politicians have forgotten the trauma left by the nuclear devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Quoting the Russian ambassador to the U.S. complaining that “the current generation of NATO politicians does not take the nuclear threat seriously.”
Immerwahr argues that “we can’t drive nuclear war to extinction by ignoring it. …
And we’re doing it just at the time when those who have most effectively testified to nuclear war’s horrors – the survivors – are entering their 90s. Our nuclear consciousness is badly atrophied. We’re left with a world full of nuclear weapons but emptying of people who understand their consequences.” (The Guardian).
In an essay published by “Responsible Statecraft” Anatol Lieven warns of the horrible dangers of pushing a US proxy war in Ukraine.
Arguing that former U.S. presidents like Truman and Eisenhower adopted a strategy of containing, but never fighting the Soviet Union in Europe and not trying to “roll back Soviet power through armed support for anti-Soviet insurgencies in eastern Europe.”
He argues that leaders today should remember this and not try to push back Russia in military proxy war in Europe.
The consequences would be disastrous for themselves “and still more disastrous for the wretched people on the ground who became the pawns of these great power agendas. Have we really learned nothing from history?”
New York Times’ influential Thomas L. Friedman is warning that the war in Ukraine is getting more dangerous for America. He even postulates that Biden knows it, although that seems doubtful giving his rhetoric and the amount of resources, he is allocating to fight the proxy war in Ukraine.
Friedman argues “We need to stick as tightly as possible to our original limited and clearly defined aim of helping Ukraine expel Russian forces as much as possible or negotiate for their withdrawal whenever Ukraine’s leaders feel the time is right.”
The last condition seems very dangerous, giving the views expressed by president Zelensky. Who now sems convinced that the might of Western military assistance will allow Ukraine to aim for goals that would never have been in reach before the latest Russian invasion.
Zelensky insists that he must be given everything he needs to defeat the Russians and push them back from every corner of Ukraine, even the areas occupied in 2014.
“The ultimate goal of Ukraine is to restore territorial integrity, including Crimea, President Volodymyr Zelensky said Tuesday, as Russia pursued its offensive to seize territory in eastern Ukraine. (WSJ).
In order to do this Zelensky wants to make sure that everything is done “to maintain the world's maximum attention to us, to Ukraine. Information about our needs should be in the news of all countries that are important to us constantly and every day.”
This means of cause means further escalation, more heavy weapons and more direct involvement of the West in order to achieve Zelensky’s goal, and the passionate intensity in the West is encouraging Zelensky to demand more all the time, scolding those who show less passion.
President Macron has tried to cool the passionate conviction, arguing:
“Nous ne sommes pas en guerre contre la Russie. Nous œuvrons en Européens pour la préservation de la souveraineté et de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Ukraine. Pour le retour de la paix sur notre continent.
Nous serons là pour reconstruire l’Ukraine, en Européens, toujours. (Emmanuel Macron May 9, 2022).
Macron insists that Europe must learn from its past mistakes, and make sure no side is humiliated like the Germans were in the Versailles Treaty after the First World War.
Macron has apparently even to tried to convince Zelensky that Ukraine must pay for peace by accepting to give up some Ukrainian territory.
Not something an increasingly cocksure Zelensky would agree too, with the passionate West bolstering his confidence that everything is possible. He scolded Macron in an Italian interview
“To propose to us to give up something as far as our sovereignty is concerned to save (Russian) President (Vladimir) Putin’s face does not seem like a fair thing on the part of some leaders. (aa.com.tr)
Perhaps Europe should cool its passion for Zelensky and for the mainly U.S. driven proxy war, and instead heed Macron’s advice.

Europe must look to Europe’s interest
Restating the argument from an earlier blog post. We wonder why Europe is not making a much more independent diplomatic effort, instead of giving in to moral outrage and Zelensky’s and Biden’s totally overstated warnings about the threat to all of Europe.
Europe is supporting the Ukraine with financial assistance, weapons, welcoming Ukrainian refugees, and seems inclined to engage in self-harming sanctions to reduce Russia’s ability for fighting a war.
Why does it not demand something in return from Zelensky’s Ukraine, instead of just playing whipping boy to Zelensky’s critique?
Why do decisionmakers not leave moralistic outbursts aside and take a more realistic position that actually turn out to be more in line with their own self-proclaimed European values. This would mean efforts to promote a peace that might spare lives and avoid further destruction in Ukraine and perhaps help solve or at least alleviate some of the problems used by Russia as reasons for the invasion.
Realistically this would mean that Europe would have to put pressure on Zelensky to accept the Russian annexation of Crimea, and insist that the future of the Luhansk and Donetsk would have to be settled by mechanism involving staged referendums from Russian border to the borders of Luhansk and Donetsk.
Either accept this or accept that help would be reduced to humanitarian help.
Likewise, Europe would have to initiate sincere and realistic diplomatic efforts in relation Russia, taking demands from the Russian speaking parts of Ukraine seriously, accepting the Russian possession of Crimea and proposing realistic solutions for Luhansk and Donetsk that would comply with what Europe ought to demand of Ukraine.

US and UK goals in proxy war risk nuclear confrontation

4/29/2022

Here a first few quotes and references pointing a Biden administrations’ goal of defeating Russia in the Ukrainian proxy war, and some quotes pointing the heightened risk for direct confrontation with Russia that may involve non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Perhaps this may dampen the enthusiastic support for the Pied Piper of Kyiv and his cry of “more weapons for peace”

Remarks by President Biden on the Request to Congress for Additional Funding to Support Ukraine.
April 28, 2022
Biden: “Bottom line: All these actions we’ve been taking are about the truth — this truth: Investing in Ukraine’s freedom and security is a small price to pay to punish Russian aggression, to lessen the risk of future conflicts … Our unity at home, our unity with our Allies and partners, and our unity with the Ukrainian people is sending an unmistakable message to Putin: You will never succeed in dominating Ukraine.”
Question from reporter: ”Mr. President, thank you. How worried are you by a growing number of Russian comments in the media and amongst some of their officials painting this conflict as actually already a conflict between NATO, the U.S., and Russia? And they’re painting in very alarmist terms, talking of nuclear weapons, saying it’s a life-or-death struggle, et cetera.”
Part of Biden’s answer: ”So, it’s — number one, it’s an excuse for their failure. But number two, it’s also, if they really mean it, it’s — it’s — no — no one should be making idle comments about the use of nuclear weapons or the possibility that they’d use that. It’s irresponsible.”

On Monday, April 25, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on the Biden administrations goal.
Lloyd Austin said it was “to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine”
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-return-embassy-to-ukraine-boost-military-aid-blinken-and-austin-tell-zelensky-in-visit-to-kyiv-11650859391

UK Defence Secretary. Statement to the House of Commons on Ukraine: 25 April 2022
Mr Speaker, some of us in this House knew that, behind the mask, the Kremlin was not the international statesman it pretended to be. With this invasion of Ukraine, all of Europe can now see the true face of President Putin and his inner circle. His intention is only to destroy, to crush, to rub out the free peoples of Ukraine. He does not want to preserve. He must not be allowed to prevail. Ukrainians are fighting for their very lives and they are fighting for our freedoms.
The President of Ukraine himself said as much: if Russia stops fighting, there will be peace. If Ukraine stops fighting, there will be no more Ukraine. (Ben Wallace MP, Ministry of Defence).
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defence-secretary-statement-to-the-house-of-commons-on-ukraine-25-april-2022

The horrible dangers of pushing a US proxy war in Ukraine
Article by Anatoly Lieven on the” Responsible Statecraft” site.
To judge by its latest statements, the Biden administration is increasingly committed to using the conflict in Ukraine to wage a proxy war against Russia, with as its goal the weakening or even destruction of the Russian state.
During the Cold War, no U.S. president ever forgot that Washington and Moscow between them have the ability to destroy human civilization and even put an end to the human race. For this reason, first the Truman and then the Eisenhower administration adopted the strategy of “containing” the Soviet Union in Europe, and not trying to “roll back” Soviet power through armed support for anti-Soviet insurgencies in eastern Europe. (Anatoly Lieven).
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/04/27/the-horrible-dangers-in-pushing-a-us-proxy-war-in-ukraine/

Bundeskanzler Scholz on dangers of nuclear war, April 22
“I said very early on that we must do everything possible to avoid a direct military confrontation between NATO and a highly armed superpower like Russia, a nuclear power, … “to prevent an escalation that would lead to a third world war… “There must be no nuclear war,” (Scholz quoted in Politico).
https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-chancellor-olaf-scholz-nuclear-war-tanks-heavy-weapons-ukraine-russia-invasion/

Finally: Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization
Congressional Research Service, April 21,2022

“Russia has a number of nuclear weapons available for use by its “naval, tactical air, air- and missile defense forces, as well as on short-range ballistic missiles.” It is reportedly engaged in a modernization effort focused on “phasing out Soviet-era weapons and replacing them with newer versions.” Unclassified estimates place the number of warheads assigned to nonstrategic nuclear weapons at 1,912.
Recent analyses indicate that Russia is both modernizing existing types of short-range delivery systems that can carry nuclear warheads and introducing new versions of weapons that have not been a part of the Soviet/Russian arsenal since the latter years of the Cold War. In May 2019, Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) raised this point in a public speech. He stated that Russia has 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads and that its stockpile “is likely to grow significantly over the next decade.”
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf

See also these blog entries:

Sucked into a war for peace
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/sucked-into-a-war-for-peace

Getting bolder – in for the “kill”
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/april-17th-2022

Getting bolder – in for the kill

4/17/2022

Getting modern heavy offensive weapons to Ukraine
Reuters has reported that Slovakia is discussing the sale of Slovakian made Zuzana advanced self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine.
In television debate the Slovak Defence Minister Jaroslav Nad said: "I can confirm that we are in talks (about the sale)," (Reuters).
Germany also seems to see the idea of selling heavy weapons as a way out of the German predicament. Instead of just giving Ukraine what they are asking for, which might further provoke Russia, giving Ukraine the money to buy heavy weapons might be seen as a kind non-involvement solution.
According to the German public service broadcaster ARD, Chancellor Scholz has announced that Germany will provide a total of two billion euros in further military aid - significantly more than one billion euros of which will go directly to Ukraine.
The Ukrainians can use the money to buy the weapons they want - in consultation with the US and other partners.
The money is to be paid as part of the federal government's empowerment initiative (Ertüchtigungsinitiative der Bundesregierung). An initiative originally intended to help bring about security and peace. Another 400 million euros from the overall package are intended for the European Peace Facility, which would then buy weapons for Ukraine. The remaining 400 million euros are for other countries.
If Ukraine then wants to buy weapons from Germany, it would have to be approved by Bundeswirtschaftsminister (Federal Economics Minister) Robert Habeck, and Germany has a very restrictive policy on sale of weapons to sensitive areas, which might pose a new problem. ”All exports of military equipment are subject to a licence, which is only issued following detailed scrutiny of each case. The German government pays particular attention to ensuring that the goods will not be misused to commit human rights violations or to exacerbate a crisis.” (Emphasis added). (bmwi.de).

How to train Ukrainian troops in their use
According to The Times British Special Forces are now again in Ukraine, training local troops in Obolon on the outskirts of Kyiv in the use of British supplied NLAW anti-tank missiles.
According to CBS News “A small number of Ukrainians who have been in the U.S. since the fall in professional military education programs have received rudimentary training on weapons systems that are new to the Ukrainian military …
The U.S. has taken advantage of having a small number of Ukrainians in the country and pulled them aside for a couple of days to receive training on how to operate switchblade drones… The small number of individuals are expected to go back to Ukraine relatively soon, as was initially planned and can train additional Ukrainian soldiers on the weapons.” (CBS).
More training will certainly be needed for advanced heavy weapons and the use of smart ammunition. More western special forces in Ukraine or letting Ukrainians train in the West?
The UK is not only delivering armoured vehicles to Ukraine. The Armed Forces Minister, James Heappey, has told Forces News Ukrainian troops will be trained in Britain on how to use the armoured vehicles being provided.

Getting bolder – in for the “kill”
One wonders if the West is now seeing Russia as being so weak and beaten, that further involvement does not risk direct war with Russia. The West perhaps even eyeing the possible defeat of Russian troops, if Ukraine is given everything they want in order to conduct the war of behalf of not the least the U.S.
This would mean that present verbal and written threats from Russia are being disregarded. One wonders if the Biden’s administration hawks are now so self-assured that they see no need for some kind of diplomatic solution that would mean that Ukraine would also have to be reined in.
One wonders if that isn’t a very risky policy, as no one in the West knows what Russia might do in order to avoid defeat. Would they amass even more troops in Eastern Ukraine, escalate the severe bombing and missile attacks, attack western weapons supply columns in countries bordering Ukraine, get help with smart weapons and equipment from China, or in fact use tactical nuclear weapons in order to avoid defeat.
If Russia really used tactical nuclear weapons the game would be up, as Europe presumably would not accept to let the U.S. retaliate in kind.
What would Europe do? Don’t someone in Europe see the need for a serious and independent European diplomatic effort to enhance a chance for peace, instead of just finding strange arrangements for providing Ukraine with the heavy weapons that Zelensky and Kuleba assert are necessary for peace?

See also the essay: Sucked into a war for peace
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/sucked-into-a-war-for-peace

Sucked into a war for peace

4/15/2022

“War is peace”
One is reminded of Orwell’s 1984 when listening to Ukraine’s FM Kuleba when he arrived at a NATO meeting recently:
“My agenda is very simple, there is only three items for me It’s weapons, weapons and weapons … As weird as it may sound, but today weapons serve the purpose of peace.”
On March 26 Zelensky reiterated the need for get soviet made fighter aircrafts from the West in order to prevent the Russians from bombing Ukrainian cities from the air, arguing "The price of procrastination with planes is thousands of lives of Ukrainians, which we are losing from missile and air strikes on peaceful Ukrainian cities,"
The message from Ukraine: More weapons serve the peace and save the lives of thousands of Ukrainians.
But Zelensky and Kuleba may be wrong. More weapons may instead lead to escalation, more death and destruction and carry enormous risks, not the least for Europe.
This essay is an attempt to show how the West might get sucked into an escalating “war for peace” with Europe losing sight of its own interests. It takes a look at these topics:

The West is listening

The escalating list of Ukrainian demands

Fanning the flames with more offensive weapons …

It's not only weapons – escalating sanctions

What does the West hope to achieve?

Ukraine’s Orwellian “war for peace”

A clueless Europe caught in jingoistic excitement

Why doesn’t Europe look to Europe’s interest?

The West is listening
In the beginning it sent weapons and materials that would help Ukraine defend itself with evidently strict limitations on offensive weapons that might involve the risk of getting into war with Russia.
Ukraine instead got smart weapons like Javelin missiles and NLAW’s (nicknamed Inlove by Ukrainians?) and other sorts of weapons that would help Ukraine defenders to combat armoured columns of Russian tanks and personal carriers.
On April 6 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley “testified that the U.S. and allies have provided 60,000 anti-tank weapons and 25,000 anti-aircraft weapons.”
Weapons that may have had a devastating effect on Russians columns, judging by the number of pictures and videos of burned-out Russian equipment.

The escalating list of Ukrainian demands
Zelensky and Kuleba are constantly demanding more from the West, and woe to those who do not at least give the impression that they listening. Like Hungary’s Orban or a foot-dragging Germany.
At the April 7 meeting with thirty NATO members, plus the European Union, Finland, Sweden, Japan, New Zealand and Australia, Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba was asking for ”planes, land-based anti-ship missiles, armoured vehicles and air defence systems.”
He said: “I think the deal that Ukraine is offering is fair. You give us weapons, we sacrifice our lives, and the war is contained in Ukraine.”
If effect saying that Ukraine would carry out a proxy war on behalf of the West. Just give us the means to do so.
After NATO meeting with Ukraine’s FM Kuleba, Secretary General Stoltenberg was asked; “You speak about more weapons right? Does it mean in quantity? Or are you talking about a different kind of weapon, more as we call it in a more offensive weapon and how do you think Russia was is going to respond to that?”
In his answer it was evident Stoltenberg did not want to become too specific as to what kind of weapons and assistance would be forthcoming, but said: ”I think it's important to understand that Allies believe it is better often to not be specific exactly about what kinds of systems, but rest assured Allies are providing a wide range of different weapons systems, both Soviet era systems but also modern equipment and I think that this distinction between offensive and defensive is a bit strange, because we speak about providing weapons to a country which is defending itself and self-defence is a right which is enshrined in the UN Charter.”
So, everything Ukraine does with the support from NATO allies is per definition defensive because Ukraine is defending itself. His answer indicates that the dividing line between what might considered might be defensive weapons and what might be seen as heavy offensive weapons has become blurred.
Leading again to questions about whether Ukraine might get fighter aircraft after all.
Stoltenberg furthermore highlighted the urgency of giving assistance to Ukraine, as the Russians seemed to prepare a new offensive in the Donbas: “So that's also the reason why we need to, of course, work for a quick end to this war. And that's the reason why also Allies are imposing heavy costs on President Putin and Russia. But at the same time, be prepared for the long haul. This war may last for weeks, but also months and possibly also for years, and therefore we need to prepare for a lot more.”
Possibly for years, and all the while getting sucked more and more into the proxy war with Russia that might become a real war with Russia.
It is apparent that NATO does not want to be seen to be delivering the weapons to Ukraine, instead it will be done by each country who wants to participate based upon their own decisions.
It seems somewhat risky to assume that this primitive “sleight of hand” will deceive anyone, least of all Russia.
On April 13 Zelensky reiterated the demand for heavy offensive weapons to give battle to the Russian forces assembling in Eastern Ukraine.
"To continue heroically defending the world from Russian aggression, Ukraine needs a specific list of weapons. I appeal to citizens of the whole world to help convey to your governments, presidential administrations, and leaders of your countries the real needs of Ukraine, which will help stop the war."
The list includes:

- Artillery pieces (caliber 155 mm) and ammo; - Artillery shells (152 mm caliber). As much as possible; - Multiple Rocket Launch Systems: "Grad", "Uragan", or American M142 HIMARS; - APCs (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, etc.); - Tanks (T-72, either American or German analogs); - Air defense systems (S-300, BUK, or similar modern western air defense systems); - Combat aircraft.
Fanning the flames with more offensive weapons …
On April 5 “Prague Morning” reported that the Czech’s will send old Soviet-designed T-72 tanks to Ukraine, “providing badly needed heavy weapons to outgunned Ukrainian troops that are battling a much better-equipped Russian invasion force.”
There has also been talk about Poland, who be able would deliver up to 100 old T-72 tanks, and possible be “rewarded” with U.S. made Abrams main battle tanks, but nothing has apparently been decided,

On April 8 “The Slovak Spectator” revealed that Slovakia is donating its S-300 air defence system to Ukraine.” S-300 is a Russian air defence system already used by Ukraine. It is not the newest type of Russian air defence, but still a very formidable weapon to use against fighter planes, drones and missiles.
This was followed by an announcement by U.S. Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, that the U.S. would station a Patriot missile battery in Slovakia: “It my direction, and at the invitation of Slovakia, U.S. European Command will reposition one Patriot missile system, manned by U.S. service members, to Slovakia.” Apparently by moving a battery stationed in Poland to Slovakia instead.

Early April the Ukrainian ambassador to Australia announced an Australian contribution on Facebook: "Australia sends 20 Bushmaster vehicles worth AUD 50 million (USD 38 million). A historic moment.” (Ukrinform).
The Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle is a personal carrier with a V-shaped armoured hull to protect its passengers from landmines and other explosive devices.

Also, in early April the UK government announced that it would send a new package of weapons worth 100 million pounds, including according to gov.uk:

More than 800 more NLAW anti-tank missiles
Additional Javelin anti-tank systems
Additional loitering munitions
Additional Starstreak air defence systems
Additional non-lethal aid including ballistic helmets, body armour and night vision goggles

After Boris Johnson’s surprise visit to Kyiv Downing Street it was confirmed that it would also send 120 armoured Mastiff vehicles and anti-ship missiles to Ukraine. Judging from media reports there is talk of “obsolete US-made Harpoons which were due to leave service in 2018 (although extended until 2023).” (Navy Lookout). Weapons that might be used against Russian warships blockading and threatening Ukrainian ports and cities, from the Black Sea.

In interview with Deutsche Welle on April 6, Secretary Blinken was asked about further arms deliveries to Ukraine.
Blinken’s answer:
“What we’re focused on is making sure that we get to Ukraine the systems that they can use now and use effectively. At the same time, we’re looking at other systems – some of them larger, more sophisticated – that may be useful and important going forward, but where, for example, Ukrainians need to be trained, because some of these systems you can’t just turn them over and have them be used immediately. Training is required; maintenance is required.
So, what we focused on is what can Ukrainians use immediately and use effectively, but we’re also looking at over the longer term what could they use with the right training, with the right support, with the right maintenance. All of that we’re working on right now.” (Emphasis added).
Later National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan announced that he had “spent two hours on the phone with the chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and President [Volodymyr] Zelenskyy's top aide. And we went through every weapon system that Ukraine is seeking, in priority order. … Our policy is unequivocal that we will do whatever we can to help Ukraine succeed.” (Emphasis added).
What that means he did not say, but evidently Ukraine was going to get more sophisticated weapons. Pentagon spokesman John Kirby revealed that Ukrainian soldiers had been trained to used Switchblade drones and that 100 of these had already been sent to Ukraine. What model of the weapon he did not reveal, but media reported that Ukraine would get 10 of the large Switchblade 600 armed with multi-purpose anti-armour ammunition, able to loiter for 40 minutes and having a range of around 40 km. The rest may perhaps be Switchblade 300, a lighter version.
Then on Thursday April 13 the U.S. Department of Defence announced the authorization of a Presidential drawdown of security assistance valued at up to an additional $800 million tailored to meet urgent Ukrainian needs for today’s fight.
Euphemistically called capabilities this includes delivery of:

18 155mm Howitzers and 40,000 artillery rounds;
Ten AN/TPQ-36 counter-artillery radars;
Two AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel air surveillance radars;
300 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
500 Javelin missiles and thousands of other anti-armor systems;
200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
100 Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles;
11 Mi-17 helicopters;
Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels;
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment;
Medical equipment;
30,000 sets of body armor and helmets;
Over 2,000 optics and laser rangefinders;
C-4 explosives and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing; and
M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions [anti-personal mines] configured to be consistent with the Ottawa Convention.

In the armed Services Committee General Mark Miley had previous ly revealed that “We are looking around along with other countries in NATO to help them out in terms of building them up in terms of armor and artillery,” … The fight in the southeast is different from the north, it is much more open and lends itself to armor, mechanized operations, offensive operations on both sides.” In other words, lending itself better to the use of tanks than the terrain around Kyiv.
Still, Ukrainian video clips indicate that their troops are also preparing for old style trench warfare.

Germany still seems to be reluctant to send up to 100 old Bundeswehr Marder infantry fighting vehicles (Schützenpanzer) that Ukraine would like to have (although they might need to refurbished). The Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany has argued receiving such weapons would not prolong the war, but shorten the war and the suffering of people.” "Wenn wir sagen, wir wollen mehr Waffen, heißt das, dass wir diesen Krieg nicht verlängern, sondern den Krieg und das Leid der Menschen verkürzen wollen." (NTV).
The Rheinmetal arms manufacturer has indicated it would also be able to deliver German built Leopard 1 main battle tanks (from storage at FFG in Flensburg?), if the German government so decided. Although the Leopards would also need refurbishment and thus only be available after a few months.

France will not reveal what kind of military support they are providing, with general Thierry Burkhard arguing "The Russians can accept a certain number of things, but they cannot accept that we overplay our support for Ukraine." (Quoted in WSJ).

Ukraine has even asked for anti-aircraft missile systems from South Korea. A South Korean official has said that they will reject the demand: “Minister Suh politely repeated the South Korean government’s principled stance that its aid is confined to non-lethal materials.”

Finally, there is the outstanding question about old soviet fighter planes for the Ukraine, but there still seems to be some reluctance, as this might mean that West would cross a Russian red line and thus lead to a more direct involvement of the West in a war with Russia.

Training,
After President Biden in a speech in Poland had created some confusion about the possible involvement of US troops in Ukraine, he now argues: “We were talking about helping train the troops in — that are — the Ukrainian troops that are in Poland. That’s what the context.”
With this Biden revealed publicly that U.S. forces might still be training Ukrainian troops for battle while the war is going on in Ukraine.
Later Pentagon spokesman John Kirby argued that “It’s not training in the classic sense that many people think of training. I would just say it’s liaising.” Perhaps trying to convince the public that U.S. instructors are just showing Ukrainian troops the instruction manual for the Javelins:

US intelligence
Answering a question from senator Tom Cotton, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin revealed that US was providing Ukraine with real time intelligence: "We are providing them intelligence to conduct operations in the Donbas, that's correct," (CNN).

Seeing that NATO countries now seem to dare to deliver more offensive and sophisticated weapons, U.S. troops “liaising” with Ukrainian troops and Ukraine receiving real time intelligence, it seems evident that the U.S. and NATO countries are getting sucked into what might turn out to be an escalating and possible long drawn-out proxy war in the Ukraine, while betting that their involvement will not lead to direct war with Russia.

It's not only weapons – escalating sanctions
On Thursday April 7 Zelensky demanded that the West intensify the sanctions on Russia.
Arguing for a speedy embargo on Russian oil and a complete exclusion of Russia from the international financial system. “According to Volodymyr Zelensky, Moscow makes so much money from crude exports that it does not consider it necessary to seriously negotiate the restoration of peace. He called on the “democratic world” to immediately impose an embargo.”
On April 7 Foreign Minister Kuleba also “reiterated a demand that the EU impose a full oil and gas embargo on Russia and called for weapons deliveries to be speeded up.”
Friday April 7 the EU announced the fifth package of sanctions. Accompanied by this statement from Josep Borell: “These latest sanctions were adopted following the atrocities committed by Russian armed forces in Bucha and other places under Russian occupation. The aim of our sanctions is to stop the reckless, inhuman and aggressive behaviour of the Russian troops and make clear to the decision makers in the Kremlin that their illegal aggression comes at a heavy cost.”

The new EU package comprises:
a prohibition to purchase, import or transfer coal and other solid fossil fuels into the EU.
a prohibition to provide access to EU ports to vessels registered under the flag of Russia.
a ban on any Russian and Belarusian road transport.
export bans, targeting jet fuel and other goods such as quantum computers and advanced semiconductors, high-end electronics, software, sensitive machinery and transportation equipment.
import bans on products such as: wood, cement, fertilisers, seafood and liquor.
a series of targeted economic measures intended to strengthen existing measures and close loopholes, such as: a general EU ban on participation of Russian companies in public procurement in member states, the exclusion of all financial support to Russian public bodies. an extended prohibition on deposits to crypto-wallets, and on the sale of banknotes and transferrable securities denominated in any official currencies of the EU member states to Russia and Belarus,
sanctions on companies whose products or technology have played a role in the invasion, key oligarchs and businesspeople, high-ranking Kremlin officials, proponents of disinformation and information manipulation,
More over a full transaction ban is imposed on four key Russian banks representing 23% of market share in the Russian banking sector.

The European Council also made the rather unrealistic demand that “Russia immediately stop its military aggression in the territory of Ukraine, immediately and unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine, and fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders.”
This package does not satisfy Ukraine’s Zelensky. He is still scolding those who are reluctant to support Ukraine in every way possible:
“Some politicians still cannot decide to restrict the flow of petrodollars and petro-euros to Russia so as not to jeopardize their economies,” … The only question is how many more Ukrainians, men and women, the Russian army will have to kill in order for you, some politicians – we know who you are – to find some determination within you,” (newsbulletin 247.com)
On April 13 in one of his video pep talks to European parliaments, this time Lithuania, he wanted Europe to initiate a complete abandonment of Russia's energy resources:
“I stressed that the sixth package of EU sanctions against Russia must include oil. Stop multiplying insufficiently strong sanctions packages. In any case, you will have to acknowledge that only Europe's abandonment of Russia's energy resources and the complete restriction of Russia's banking system can be an argument for Russia's leadership to seek peace. Without this, Moscow is looking for a military solution.” (tsn.ua).

What does the West hope to achieve?
On NBC’s “Meet the Press” it has recently been revealed what the U.S. wants to achieve in the proxy war in Ukraine:
“Our policy is unequivocal that we will do whatever we can to help Ukraine succeed. And it will be … President Zelensky and the democratically elected government of Ukraine that determines what that success constitutes,”…
“But at the end of the day, what we want to see is a free and independent Ukraine, a weakened and isolated Russia, and a stronger, more unified, more determined West,” … “We believe that all three of those objectives are in sight, can be accomplished.” (Emphasis added).
And some Republicans seem just as belligerent. Apparently seeing the Russian retreat from the Kyiv area as a sign of weakness that has to be exploited, by dramatically ramping up the delivery of weapons like tanks and fighter planes. The goal being not a negotiated settlement but Russian defeat on the battlefield.
“We want the Ukrainians to win, to win, to defeat the Russians, for the Russians to withdraw from the country. And that ought to be our goal,” Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell has told “Fox News Sunday.
Listening to the words of Jake Sullivan, McConnell and Biden’s outrage one gets the impression that the US is letting Ukraine fight Russia with sophisticated Western weapons to fulfil the American purpose of achieving a weakened and humiliated Russia, and remembering Bidens “For God's sake, this man cannot remain in power,” presumably also Putin’s removal.
To a belligerent Biden and his henchmen this might actually be the ulterior goal, much more important than the ideological loaded “crusade” for a “free and independent Ukraine.”
The U.S. policy might actually lead to a Ukraine ravaged by war with more human misery and destruction.
The U.S. seems to be acting accordance the kind of approach once defended by Madeleine Albright: ““If we have to use force, it is because we are America: we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.” (Secretary of State Albright, 1998)
While the U.S. seems eager to carry out the proxy war in Ukraine with nearly all possible means to weaken Russia, it certainly does not seem to be very eager to engage in diplomatic activities to help bring about a peaceful end to the Ukraine war. Instead, diplomatic efforts to seems directed to further the overall purpose of punishing and weakening Russia by threatening every country that that might help Russia succeed.
Exerting diplomatic pressure on China to make sure that it does not help Russia, which led to an angry riposte from China. In a similar fashion the U.S. is attempting to persuade India’s Nahendra Modi to help by not buying cheap oil from Russia.
This approach has once been characterised by an American scholar as a kind of anti-diplomacy:
“A … distinguishing feature of modern American diplomacy is that US administration as a whole tend to privilege hard power policies over soft power policies.
A further distinguishing characteristic of American diplomacy is that “the United States has chosen to isolate diplomatically for long periods states that it deemed adversarial, and has
required those states to meet preconditions before it will formally engage them.” (Wiseman In the Hague Journal of Diplomacy.)
While the immediate goal of seriously weakening Russia seems clear, one wonders whether the U.S. has any ulterior goal in relation to Russia. It seems evident that the belligerent U.S. policy and lack of diplomatic efforts in relation to Russia in the long run will drive Russia and China closer together, ultimately resulting in the U.S. having to deal with an adversary with a combined strength surpassing the U.S. and confronting it in both Europe and Asia.
Meaning of course that the present very dangerous attempt to really humiliate Russia might turn out to be a rather stupid short-term strategy, coming back to hunt a future U.S. administration.

Ukraine’s Orwellian “war for peace”
In an interview Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky has said:
“No one wants to negotiate with a person or people who tortured this nation. It’s all understandable. And as a man, as a father, I understand this very well, … But “we don’t want to lose opportunities, if we have them, for a diplomatic solution …
We have to fight, but fight for life. You can’t fight for dust when there is nothing and no people. That’s why it is important to stop this war.” (Emphasis added).
In another connection Zelensky has also argued that victory for his country is “being able to save as many lives as possible.”
But what has Zelensky actually done to stop the war from leading to more casualties and destruction? Some will argue that his team is negotiating with the Russians, but that the Russians don’t seem sincere in these negotiations.
But what has Zelensky himself to offer: While he may be looking for peace "without delay" he has also stated that "Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity are beyond doubt. (Axios). But if Ukraine must get back Crimea and the occupied areas of Luhansk and Donetsk, there is little hope for peace.
We are back where we began, with Ukrainian’s almost 1984 “Ministry of Truth” logic, claiming that they are fighting for peace, and to fight for peace they need more weapons.
Arguing as we have seen that they are fighting for the security for all of Europe.
“What is the price of this security? This is very specific. These are planes for Ukraine. These are tanks for our state. This is anti-missile defense. This is anti-ship weaponry. This is what our partners have. This is what is covered with dust at their storage facilities. After all, this is all for freedom not only in Ukraine - this is for freedom in Europe…. Because it cannot be acceptable for everyone on the continent if the Baltic states, Poland, Slovakia and the wholof Eastern Europe are at risk of a clash with the Russian invaders. At risk only because they left only one percent of all NATO aircraft and one percent of all NATO tanks somewhere in their hangars. One percent! We did not ask for more. And we do not ask for more” (Zelensky quoted in Ukrinform).
Zelensky seems to have ideas similar to the those found in the Biden administration and some Republicans. Demanding weapons to serve the purpose of peace.
This is a pie in sky approach to peace, and this approach to peace seems to carry some very big risks not only for Ukraine but for Europe and perhaps even the U.S.
More weapons mean more fighting, more casualties and more destruction. It means escalation which carries new risks of a prolonged war or even a war spreading to other parts of Europe.
In bizarre sense this may make Zelensky’s warning about Russia being a threat to all of Europe come true, but now as a result of seeking peace in Ukraine by escalating the war with growing involvement from Europe and the U.S. Not because Russia had any previous intention to do so.

A clueless Europe caught in jingoistic excitement
Europe understood as the EU and the European members of NATO do not seem to be able to think and act on their own. They tumble along headlessly in the U.S. and Zelensky slipstream, prodded frequently by Zelensky’s and Kuleba’s sharp demands for more action, more weapons to serve the purpose of peace.
It almost as if Zelensky is dictating EU foreign policy together with Biden and his administration of un-diplomats. Where European countries are reluctant, they submitted to the wrath of Zelensky and his representatives.
The previously highly praised efforts of Chancellor Merkel to search for peaceful solutions in the Ukraine conflict, her friendly relations with Putin and the German “Wandel durch Handel” approach to relations with Russia, now are seen as having failed miserably. Thus, President Steinmeier was recently declared unwanted, when he wanted to visit Kyiv in a show of solidarity, because of his previous good relation with Putin.
In a speech to the Danish Parliament Zelensky scolded all those who do not slavishly, or should it be sheepishly, follow the path set by Biden and Zelensky himself:
“There can be no Russian branches in Europe that divide the EU from within, that are trying to help Russia make as much money as possible even now. Everyone knows very well who in the European Union opposes humanity and common sense, and who does nothing at all to help establish peace in Ukraine. This must stop, and Europe must stop listening to the excuses of Budapest.” Zelensky of course talking about Viktor Orban who does not join the rush almost jingoistic enthusiasm for helping Ukraine with weapons and sanction and ostracising Russia.
EU’s Borrell is lamenting that the EU is left out. Asked if Europe is not dissatisfied with being left out in talks between Russia and the U.S. Borrell said:
“I have not expressed this dissatisfaction in respect to these talks. If Russia wants to talk. Certainly, it has to be. Organise a dialogue. But on this dialogue, there are not two actors alone. It is not just the U.S. and Russia. If we want to talk about security in Europe, Europeans have to be part of the table. And the agenda of the meetings is not just the issue that Russia has put on the table. There are other issues on the agenda, many of them affecting Ukraine. So, I am not expressing dissatisfaction about the fact that they have started these bilateral talks. It would not be a good idea to refuse the dialogue that Russia is asking for.” (eeas.europa.eu).
Jubilant Europeans greeting President Biden’s “America is back” apparently also jumped with alacrity into what is essentially an American proxy war against Russia, fought out in Ukraine.
Why does Europe accept to be caught in the U.S. slipstream with no apparent independent strategy and ideas of its own? What are they going to do in relation to a Russia that won’t just disappear as a result of the war, but might get even more belligerent?
Most European countries are eagerly competing in their attempts to fulfil Ukrainian and U.S. wishes).
Delivering weapons and assistance to Ukraine (But still not daring to provoke Russia directly by sending fighter planes).
Giving Ukrainian refugees preferential treatment.
Allowing Ursula von der Leyen to present Zelensky with the paperwork to be used as a first step for his country to join the European Union.
Promising a fast-track procedure for Ukrainian membership of the EU (Although Ukraine is very far from being able to fulfil the criteria for entering the EU).
“The EU and member states have thrown several longstanding policies overboard and taken steps that under normal circumstances would have met with strong opposition from various corners. These include decisions for the EU to finance for the first time the delivery of lethal weapons to a third country; to boost its defence cooperation in the face of new threat perceptions; to send (somewhat mixed) signals of openness to EU membership for the bloc’s eastern neighbors after years of enlargement fatigue; and to trigger, also for the first time, its 2001 Temporary Protection Directive, granting temporary residency to Ukrainian refugees. (reliefweb.int).
Europe politicians and decision makers are acting as if they believe Zelensky’s often repeated warnings to Europe that Russia has much more than Ukraine in its sight.
Volodymyr Zelenskiyi is arguing that Russia is targeting all of Europe and that stopping the invasion of Ukraine is essential for the security of all democracies. “That is why it is not just the moral duty of all democracies, all the forces of Europe, to support Ukraine’s desire for peace, .. This is, in fact, a strategy of defence for every civilised state. … Freedom does not have time to wait.” ... “When tyranny begins its aggression against everything that keeps the peace in Europe, action must be taken immediately.” (The Guardian, April 10).
Evidently enough European politicians seem to believe in this postulated Russian threat to the rest of Europe, or else it is impossible to explain the hurried political decisions made to prepare themselves against Russian aggression.
A NATO almost seeming to have lost its purpose, has sprung in to action with eager prodding from the Biden’s administration.
More American troops are being stationed along the borders of the countries sharing a border with Russia.
European countries suddenly find it important to fulfil their promises to NATO, something Trump could not get them to do. Now, new expansive defence plans and budgets are seen as more important than almost anything else.
One may perhaps wonder whether the hasty expansion of troops, the sudden increases in defence expenditure and Finland’s and Sweden’s possible membership may not in fact seem rather provocative to Russia, and thus contribute to a more belligerent stance.
Be that as it may be.
The war in Ukraine seem to show the opposite, that the Russian capabilities have been severely overrated. Seeing that Ukrainian troops armed with sophisticated anti-armour weapons have severely blunted Russian military capabilities. Therefore, the rash reaction to the postulated threat to rest of Europe is therefore an overreaction. Russia’s conventional military capabilities truly does not pose a threat to the rest of Europe.
The real dangers may lie somewhere else.
The West’s escalating weapons deliveries could presumably lead to an outcome, where “Ukraine” (or rather the U.S. in its proxy war) might actually be seen to actually defeat the Russians. This seems to be the goal of the U.S., if we believe Jake Sullivan.
What would be the consequences if this was happening? Would the prospect of a humiliating Russian defeat lead to the fall of Putin, with unknown consequences, to a Russian escalation of the war, involving the threat of tactical nuclear weapons, or to a dangerous long term belligerent stand-off between Russia and the West? No one really knows.
Still, one wonders if Europe really wants to contribute to an escalation in a U.S. proxy war to defeat the Russians, given the dangers of a Russian escalation. Fanning the flames of the proxy war in Ukraine with more and more weapons and engaging in sanctions that in the end may hurt the Europeans more than Russia?

Why doesn’t Europe look to Europe’s interest?
Making a much more independent diplomatic effort, instead of giving in to moral outrage and Zelensky’s and Biden’s totally overstated warnings about the threat to all of Europe.
Europe is supporting the Ukraine with financial assistance, weapons, welcoming Ukrainian refugees, and seems inclined to engage in self-harming sanctions to reduce Russia’s ability for fighting a war.
Why does it not demand something in return from Zelensky’s Ukraine, instead of just playing whipping boy to Zelensky’s critique?
Why do decisionmakers not leave moralistic outbursts aside and take a more realistic position that actually turn out to be more in line with their own self-proclaimed European values. This would mean efforts to promote a peace that might spare lives and avoid further destruction in Ukraine and perhaps help solve or at least alleviate some of the problems used by Russia as reasons for the invasion.
Realistically this would mean that Europe would have to put pressure on Zelensky to accept the Russian annexation of Crimea, and insist that the future of the Luhansk and Donetsk would have to be settled by mechanism involving staged referendums from Russian border to the borders of Luhansk and Donetsk.
Either accept this or accept that help would be reduced to humanitarian help.
Likewise, Europe would have to initiate sincere and realistic diplomatic efforts in relation Russia, taking demands from the Russian speaking parts of Ukraine seriously, accepting the Russian possession of Crimea and proposing realistic solutions for Luhansk and Donetsk that would comply with what Europe ought to demand of Ukraine.

Do sanctions deter?

3/25/2022

Will they make Putin flounder? Or are they only part of an already ongoing war effort. Biden and his administration do seem rather confused.
One might have thought that announcing the serious sanctions we see now, before the invasion, would have deterred Putin and prevented the ongoing war in Ukraine. A war that now has become a U.S. and Europe proxy war carried out in Ukraine against Russia. Resulting in terrible sufferings in Ukraine.

Sanctions do deter
President Joe Biden warned Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday that the West would impose "strong economic and other measures" on Russia if it invades Ukraine (Reuters, December 7, 2021)
In an interview aired on CNN Secretary Blinken argued that sanctions were to deter:
“The purpose of the sanctions in the first instance is to try to deter Russia from going to war. As soon as you trigger them, that deterrent is gone. And until the last minute, as long as we can try to bring a deterrent effect to this, we're going to try to do that.” (CNN February 20).

Sanctions never meant to deter
During a press briefing on March 22 at NATO headquarters a journalist asked Biden: “Sir, deterrence didn’t work. What makes you think Vladimir Putin will alter course based on the action you’ve taken today?” President Biden visibly irritated: “Let’s get something straight: You remember, if you’ve covered me from the beginning, I did not say that in fact the sanctions would deter him. Sanctions never deter. You keep talking about that. Sanctions never deter. The maintenance of sanctions — the maintenance of sanctions, the increasing the pain, and the demonstration — why I asked for this NATO meeting today — is to be sure that after a month, we will sustain what we’re doing not just next month, the following month, but for the remainder of this entire year. That’s what will stop him. The journalist then asked: Do you believe the actions today will have an impact on making Russia change course in Ukraine? President Biden now visibly irritated: That’s not what I said. You — you — you’re playing a game with me.

Sanctions came too late to prevent war
Evidently Zelensky does have a different view about the deterring effect of sanctions
The weekend before the Russian invasion Zelensky told CNN’s Amanpour
“that the West is not doing enough right now to deter Putin. He called for a list of possible sanctions on Moscow to be made public immediately.” (CNN transcript February 20).
In a video message on March 24 Zelensky thanked the EU for uniting countries around Ukraine, although he seemed to have certain reservations in Hungary’s case. He then said:
"I want to say that it was done, one way or another, in different ways, but again the main thing is that you have united, and we certainly appreciate that. You applied sanctions - these are powerful steps, but it was a little late. Because if it was preventive, Russia would not go to war. No one knows for sure, but at least there was a chance. You blocked Nord Stream 2 - we thank you for that, and that was the right thing, but it was also a little late. Because if it had been done on time, Russia would not have created a gas crisis. At least there was such a chance," Zelensky said. (ukrinform.net) Emphasis added.
No one knows for sure, but neither is it wild speculation. Did the West make a serious miscalculation, even though they apparently knew that Putin would go to war (at least that is Biden seemed convinced), or – sinister thought – President Biden, Secretary Blinken and Security Advisor Sullivan may have thought that they would never get the Europeans aboard, before Russia actually had invaded Ukraine.

Consequences – war or peace?
Biden now argues that severe sanctions will only stop Putin and Russia after the fact, at some point in the future. When perhaps irreparable damage has been done, not only in Ukraine, but to the relations between the West and Russia. Even a successor to Putin might then want to rely on China, and then the West would be confronted with a mighty Eurasian constellation.
It is almost as if the Biden, Blinken and Sullivan constellation have not thought about the endgame and the consequences in the long term. At least not publicly. One may wonder if they have no long term plan or strategy, but are driven just by their moral outrage and old grudges.
It is really strange that Europe is eagerly tagging along with the U.S., without apparently having any idea of their own about what is going to happen. Even though they must realise that they will have to get along with Russia in the future, they seem bent upon making Russia an enemy, while making sure that carnage in Ukraine can go on with the help of sophisticated Western weaponry – and one might fear being persuaded by Zelensky and their own outbursts of jingoism to contribute to a further escalation.
They seem eager to please Zelensky in his often very unrealistic and outright dangerous demands, but perhaps they ought to dampen his ambitions in order to make peace possible.
Where do we see serious European attempt to create peace?

See also (added March 29):

U.S. diplomacy failing in relation to Russia and China
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/us-diplomacy-failing-in-relation-to-russia-and-china

Proxy war in Ukraine because Biden and Blinken bear a grudge?
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/proxy-war-in-ukraine-because-biden-and-blinken-bear-a-grudge?

Letting Ukraine bleed in a proxy war with Russia?
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/letting-ukraine-bleed-in-a-proxy-war-with-russia?

NATO eastward expansion a serious mistake?
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/nato-eastward-expansion-a-serious-mistake?

Foolish reactions to Russian demands and threats?
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/foolish-reactions-to-russian-demands-and-threats

Who defines US policy?
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/biden-giving-in-to-putin

U.S. diplomacy failing in relation to Russia and China

3/17/2022

Views of U.S. diplomacy

“If we have to use force, it is because we are America: we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.” (Secretary of State Albright, 1998).

A … distinguishing feature of modern American diplomacy is that US admin-
istrations as a whole tend to privilege hard power policies over soft power policies.
A further distinguishing characteristic of American diplomacy is that “the United States has chosen to isolate diplomatically for long periods states that it deemed adversarial, and has
required those states to meet preconditions before it will formally engage them. (Wiseman, Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 2011)

Blinken’s and Sullivan's diplomacy or the lack of it?
When NPR interviewed Secretary Antony Blinken on March 16 he was asked “Do you have any channel that is open to Vladimir Putin right now to communicate about any way to end this war?”
Blinken’s vague answer: “Well, various leaders, countries have sought to communicate with him, may even remain in communication with him. Of course, the Ukrainians are talking to the Russians.”
Following up, the interviewer then asked if the United itself had any channel open to Putin.
Blinken’s answer was noncommittal: “there are always ways of communicating. Let me leave it at that.”
One would have thought U.S. diplomacy would be heavily involved in trying to persuade Russia and force Ukraine to find a compromise that would end the war in Ukraine. Instead, it seems that the U.S. is quite willing to fight a proxy with Russia in Ukraine. Letting Ukraine bleed for failed diplomacy.
One wonders if Biden and Blinken think they are carrying out the reverse of the Soviet Union’s and China’s proxy war with the U.S. in Vietnam. Somewhat like the U.S. proxy war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s in Afghanistan. Ukraine now playing the role of Afghanistan in the 1980s.
An observer in the Washington Post wondered how much the “U.S. seem to be collectively stuck in the past. Just as we did during the Cold War, we see ourselves as the good-guy victims of an immoral opponent. This time, the Russian state, personified by Vladimir Putin, is the one-dimensional enemy.” (Weissberg, December Washington Post 2021).

With relation to China’s support of Russia, Secretary Antony Blinken was asked what the U.S. might be able to do: “Are the United States and its European allies capable of isolating China in the way that you’ve isolated Russia if China were to aid Russia beyond some certain point?”
Biden’s answer: “Well, China is already on the wrong side of history when it comes to Ukraine and the aggression being committed by Russia. The fact that it has not stood strongly against it, that it has not pronounced itself against this aggression, flies in the face of China’s commitments as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council responsible for maintaining peace and security… Second, of course, if China actually provides material support in one way or another to Russia in this effort, that would be even worse. (state.gov).

National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan seem to work on diplomatic, or is non-diplomatic, principles similar to Blinken’s.
In a meeting with China's top diplomat Yang Jiechi in Rome March 14, he “raised directly and very clearly” concern over possible Chinese support for Russia.
When a State Department spokesperson was asked about the meeting he said: “Backing Russia in the wake of Moscow's invasion of Ukraine would have implications for China's relationships around the world, including with U.S. allies and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. … We have communicated very clearly to Beijing that we won’t stand by if – we will not allow any country to compensate Russia for its losses.”
Meaning that the U.S. is apparently already threatening China with sanctions too.

China later criticised the U.S. warning as arrogant, and according to Asia Times the Chinese Foreign Office spokesperson “strongly urged the US not to undermine its legitimate rights and interests when handling relations with Russia.”
Meanwhile the Chinese Defense Times talked of strengthened Russia-Chinese cooperation to counter the U.S. hegemony:
“Under the mutual commitment that "China-Russia cooperation has no upper limit", the two countries are creating greater development space for each other based on the principle of mutual benefit and win-win results. The construction of the Eurasian Economic Union-China's new financial settlement system is a larger-scale embodiment of this principle of mutual benefit and win-win results.“ (Translation, Defense Times’ social media).

US diplomacy making threats and creating mighty adversaries
Wondering if this means that Blinken and Sullivan represent the current U.S. administration’s view of how diplomacy works – or perhaps does not work. As if U.S. hegemonic power and ideological belief of being on the right side of history means diplomacy threatening the use of hard power and isolation. Both in relation to Russia and more or less also in relation to China. As if it is forgotten that hard power and isolation diplomacy against China would have to be an order of magnitude larger than in case of Russia. Perhaps plain and simple rather stupid.

One might even get the idea that U.S. is acting even more like Russia, than Russia itself dares.
Think of the Balkan wars in the nineties. An essay from the CATO institute tells this story of how the U.S. acted against Yugoslavia:
“At the 1999 Rambouillet conference Albright made demands of Yugoslavia that no independent, sovereign state could accept: that, for instance, it act like defeated and occupied territory by allowing the free transit of NATO forces. Washington expected the inevitable refusal, which was calculated to provide justification for launching an unprovoked, aggressive war against the Serb‐ dominated remnant of Yugoslavia.”
Sounds uncanny similar to Russia’s argument for invading Ukraine.

Once Nixon and Kissinger cosied up to China in order to contain Russia. Now it seems that Blinken and Sullivan represent a version of American diplomacy doing what it can to make both of them adversaries. A recent article in Foreign Policy carried the ominous title “Washington Must Prepare for War With Both Russia and China.” Not a very smart move might think. Let’s see how this may play out over time.

Proxy war in Ukraine because Biden and Blinken bear a grudge?

3/11/2022

Much has been said in recent days about Putin’s reasons for invading Ukraine and about his state of mind.
Putin is seeing the collapse of the Soviet Union as “a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and co-patriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself.”
Condoleezza Rice is seeing “a different Putin” who “seems erratic” and has “an ever-deepening delusional rendering of history.”
A former U.S. ambassador to Russia about Putin: "He has changed. He sounds completely disconnected from reality. He sounds unhinged."
Boris Johnson on Putin: “He is clearly in an illogical and irrational frame of mind.” Prompting speculation that Putin might be crazy.
Not much has been said about Biden’s and Blinken’s policies and reactions in relation to Putin and the invasion of Ukraine and only Biden’s antagonists have questioned his mental capacities and health.
What is evident though is that Biden and Blinken has shown a very belligerent stance against Putin and Russia. Only a result of Putin’s surprisingly drastic invasion or may there be other explanations?
Here an attempt to explain President Biden’s and Secretary Blinken’s belligerent stance using reasoning similar to the reasoning about Putin’s motives. Alas, with just as little factual evidence of course.
Let us see how this might play out.

Biden’s and Blinken’s frustrated stance in 2014
To understand their belligerence towards Putin and Russia it is worthwhile to cast a glance at Biden’s and Blinken’s views and attitudes back in 2014 when Russia made what Obama called an incursion into Crimea, and Russia supported pro-Russian separatist in Luhansk and Donetsk.
With a “Don’t do stupid s—" approach to foreign policy President Obama recognised that Ukraine was a core interest for Russia, but certainly not in the same way for the U.S. Resulting in a careful and measured approach to Russia. A Russia that Obama apparently saw as a regional power in decline.
Vice-president Biden evidently stood for a more belligerent approach. “When Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2014, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. pressed President Barack Obama to take decisive action, and fast, to make Moscow “pay in blood and money” for its aggression. The president, a Biden aide recalled, was having none of it.” (NYT).
According to the article in the New York Times Biden tried to persuade President Obama to send lethal weapons to Ukraine in the shape of Javelin anti-tank missiles, but apparently Obama would have none of it.
Instead, Biden was made emissary to the region and send off with Obama’s warning “about not overpromising to the Ukrainian government.” (NYT). Something the U.S. and the EU have done for years since 2014, and now causing President Zelensky to plea more and more desperate and incoherent for interventions that would led war in all Europe.

Biden’s frustration in 2014 clouding his view today?
In April 2014 Biden vowed that the U.S. would never recognize Russia’s “illegal occupation” of Crimea and said “no nation has the right to simply grab land from another” and called on Russia to stop supporting masked gunmen who have seized government buildings across the east of the country.” (NYT).
In November 2014 after a meeting with Ukrainian leaders Biden criticised Russia for not lessening its aggressive stand towards Ukraine. “Instead we’ve seen more provocative action, more blatant disregard for the agreement signed not long ago by Russia. As long as that continues Russia will face rising cost, greater isolation.”(Los Angeles Times).
Now with Biden being President he sems finally to be able to act on a grudge he may have carried with him since 2014. Sending the infamous Javelin missiles in large numbers to Ukraine, creating rising costs for Russia and making every attempt to isolate Russia.
Perhaps Biden is not so different in his reactions from Putin in this regard. Perhaps like him acting on personal a grudge, he has had carried with him for a long time.

What about Blinken then?
First it is worth noting that Blinken’s relationship with Biden goes back a long time. His presentation at the U.S. Department of State homepage states:
“Mr. Blinken was national security advisor to then-Vice President Joe Biden. This was the continuation of a long professional relationship that stretched back to 2002, when Mr. Blinken began his six-year stint as Democratic staff director for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Then Senator Biden was the chair of that committee from 2001 to 2003 and 2007 to 2009”
In 2014 “Blinken was nominated and confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State under former Secretary of State John Kerry. Secretary Blinken played a key role in guiding President Obama’s foreign policy, particularly his strategy in the Middle East and response to the Russian annexation of Ukraine.” (InfluenceWatch).
Blinken certainly seems to have had a negative view of Russia and President Putin for quite some time, just like Biden.
In 2014 at an event at the Brookings Institute he argued: “One way President Putin and Russia define power is by the geopolitical influence that Russia is able to obtain. And undermining Russia politically in the international community and isolating it politically diminishes that power." (Newsweek)
At a confirmation in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in November 2014 Blinken argued like Biden for providing Ukraine with lethal weapons. Speaking about Russian aggression he said:
“One element that could hopefully get them to think twice and deter them from further action is strengthening the capacity of the Ukrainian forces, including with defensive lethal equipment. So that’s why I think that’s something that we should be looking at.”
Blinken in 2014 also argued that the sanctions put in place in 2014 would mean that Russia would really be hit. In an interview as deputy national security advisor, he argued (please note this is quote from March 2014, not from 2022 when Blinken is almost repeating himself).
“Actually, the compact that President Putin has with his people is if you remain politically compliant, I’ll deliver growth for you. That growth has stagnated even before this crisis. And everything that’s happened since, as a result of the efforts we’ve made, to isolate Russia for its actions in Ukraine has only made that worse.
And what we’re seeing every single day is Russia getting more and more isolated and its economy taking a bigger and bigger hit.
We had the finance minister of Russia worrying out loud in public about the hit that the economy was taking. We have the leader of the Association of Entrepreneurs, basically the oligarchs’ club, saying I’m really worried about investment drying up. This is having an impact on Russia. This has to get Putin to think twice.” (CNN).
Apparently not enough of hit to prevent Russia from invading Ukraine, after none of Putin’s three essential demands had been seriously considered by Blinken and Biden.

Is Biden and Blinken having their revenge for 2014?
As we have seen one might perhaps argue that both Biden and Blinken have born a deepfelt grudge against Putin and Russia since the Crimea invasion in 2014 and felt regret that what was done in 2014 wasn’t enough to persuade Putin to give up his aggression against Ukraine. He did not leave Crimea and did not stop his support for the rebels in Luhansk and Donetsk.
The difference between 2022 and 2014 is that Biden and Blinken now have it in their power to carry out what they wanted to do in 2014. Apparently in the belief that Russia will act differently this time.
Free to do what they wanted to in 2014 and convinced that this time they both save Ukrainian sovereignty and cause Putin and Russia to fail, they are willing to support and wage a very risky proxy war with Russia in Ukraine. With Ukraine now bearing the disastrous consequences.
This might explain why they had no thought for any seriously meant diplomatic solution that would answer Russia’s concerns.
Just listen Blinken at a recent press briefing with UK’s Liz Truss on March 9:
”So our response continues to be to do everything we possibly can to make sure that the Ukrainians have the means to defend themselves; to make sure we do everything we possibly can to exert pressure on Russia and on Putin to change course; to do everything we possibly can, of course, to support those who are suffering as a result of Russia’s actions.
Ultimately, I am absolutely convinced that Putin will fail and Russia will suffer a strategic defeat no matter what short-term tactical gains it may make in Ukraine. As we’ve said before, you can win a battle but that doesn’t mean you win the war – on the contrary. You can take a city but you can’t take the hearts and minds of its people, and Ukrainians are demonstrating that every single day.”
All the while Ukraine is doomed to bear the terrible consequences of what may after all be less a result of insurmountable differences between Russia and the U.S. over the Ukrainian independence and security, than of long held grudges borne by the decisionmakers in the conflict.”
You may argue that the idea that U.S. is willing to wage a proxy with Russia for reasons related to lack of success in 2014 is highly speculative.
Perhaps so, as the reasoning cannot be substantiated by facts, but big policy decisions in peace and war are certainly not only a result of some facts, but of fateful decisions made by those believing in power, highflying ideals, or low motives, or as we perhaps seen here, long term grudges, hidden behind a modern version of the emperor’s new clothes.

Europe should think twice
If there is any truth in what is surmised here, then Europe should be very hesitant of doing what the two B’s are now persuading and pressuring Europe to do.
What is needed is an independent European stance, even realising how weak it is, in as much as Europe do not carry a Rooseveltian big stick, but is only able to talk very loudly. But then talk might actually help bring about a diplomatic compromise over Ukraine with Russia.
After all Europe will have to live with Russia also in future, whatever the outcome of the present conflict, while the U.S. in reality will be forced to be less concerned with Russia and Ukraine and more with a Chinese hegemon.
Although judging from the belligerence and yellow-blue jingoism shown in Europe at the moment it does not look as if European decisionmakers are realising that.

Letting Ukraine bleed in a proxy war with Russia?

3/7/2022

Now one may seriously ask if Blinken has given up working for peace in Ukraine, and instead is actively working to escalate an U.S. and NATO proxy war with Russia.
Just take a look at the diverging views on “no-fly zone Ukraine” or “fighter planes for Ukraine”.

Secretary General Stoltenberg
Tuesday last week when the question of fighter planes for Ukraine arose, Stoltenberg said that European Union members would not lend fighter jets to the war in Ukraine. Thus, in effect warning Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria not to send their old Russian MiG 29’s to Ukraine.

At a press conference after an “Extraordinary meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs” on Friday 04 March 2022, Stoltenberg also argued against “no flight zones” and other proposals that might involve NATO in a possible war with Russia.

”…we have a responsibility as NATO Allies to prevent this war from escalating beyond Ukraine. Because that will be even more dangerous, more devastating, and will cause even more human suffering. So we have made it clear that we are not going to move into Ukraine, neither on the ground, or in Ukrainian airspace. And of course, the only way to implement a no-fly zone is to send NATO planes, fighter planes into Ukrainian airspace, and then impose that no-fly zone by shooting down Russian planes. And our assessment is that we understand the desperation. But we also believe that if we did that, we'll end up with something that could end in a full-fledged war in Europe, involving many more countries, and causing much more human suffering. So that's the reason why we make this painful decision to impose heavy sanctions, provide significant support, stepping up support. But at the same time not involving NATO forces directly in the conflict in Ukraine, neither on the ground, or in their airspace.” (Stoltenberg, NATO).

President Zelensky
In an angry comment after NATO’s Friday meeting Zelensky called it a "weak summit, a confused summit," and argued:
"All the people who die starting today will also die because of you. Because of your weakness, because of your disconnection."
"Today the leadership of the alliance gave the green light for further bombing of Ukrainian cities and villages, refusing to make a no-fly zone.

A day later Zelensky then made a passionate plea in a zoom call to 300 members of the U.S: Congress. Zelensky again asked for a NATO no-fly zone over Ukraine, or at least provide fighter planes in order to allow Ukraine to defend itself.

One might get the idea that Zelensky is actually working less for some kind of compromise peace than for involving the West in the war.

Secretary of State Blinken
Zelensky’s pleas did not fall on deaf ears. In an interview on CBS News on Sunday, Secretary of State Blinken said that if a NATO member would send their old MiG 29 fighter planes to Ukraine it would get a green light from the U.S. He added:

“In fact, we're talking with our Polish friends right now about what we might be able to backfill their needs if in fact they choose to provide these fighter jets to the Ukrainians. What can we do? How can we help to make sure that they get something to backfill the planes that they're handing over to the Ukrainians?"

The idea being that Poland would get U.S. F16 fighter planes instead of the planes sent to Ukraine, although that would take some time as they might be earmarked for Taiwan.

Poland’s response – for the time being
Poland’s response to ideas of providing Ukraine with MiG 29 fighter planes had already been shot down as it were by President Duda tweeting no to “sending any jets to Ukraine because that would open military interference in the Ukrainian conflict.”
Later the Prime Minister added this tweet:

6:38 AM · Mar 6, 2022·Twitter for Android

A Polish official quoted in Financial Times this Monday also said: “Poland is not in a state of war with Russia, but it is not an impartial country, because it supports Ukraine as the victim of aggression. It considers, however, that all military matters must be a decision of NATO as a whole.”

What in the world do Biden, Blinken and Zelensky hope to achieve?
First, they shot down Russia’s three essential demands, and not even the warning from their own intelligence service that Russia might invade Ukraine made Biden and Blinken reconsider.
Biden and Blinken act as if a Ukraine invasion followed by ex post sanctions were preferred to a compromise with Russia based on a kind of “Finlandisation” of Ukraine?
Perhaps Biden bears some kind of grudge from 2014 when Crimea was invaded. As Vice-President he implored President Obama to let Russia “pay in blood and money.”
Obama rejected Biden’s idea and according to New York Times instead sent him as emissary to Ukraine warning him “about not overpromising to the Ukrainian government.”
Perhaps this is what he has done now, with dreadful consequences.

See also essays written just before the invasion:

Does Putin have a point? And are Western reactions foolish?
An alternative view of the Ukraine crisis at
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/foolish-reactions-to-russian-demands-and-threats

NATO eastward expansion a serious mistake?
Still a relevant question to look at in order to understand Putin’s reason for invading Ukraine. https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/nato-eastward-expansion-a-serious-mistake?

Let the U.S. take the consequences
Addendum March 9, 2022

Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland
In connection with the statement by the US Secretary of State on providing airplanes to Ukraine the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland published this statement on March 8, 2022:

“The authorities of the Republic of Poland, after consultations between the President and the Government, are ready to deploy – immediately and free of charge – all their MIG-29 jets to the Ramstein Air Base and place them at the disposal of the Government of the United States of America.

At the same time, Poland requests the United States to provide us with used aircraft with corresponding operational capabilities. Poland is ready to immediately establish the conditions of purchase of the planes.

The Polish Government also requests other NATO Allies – owners of MIG-29 jets – to act in the same vein.” (2018.08.03, gov.pl)

Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby
On the same day Pentagon rejected to Polish offer. Here the statement from the Pentagon the Pentagon Press Secretary

“We are now in contact with the Polish government following the statement issued today. As we have said, the decision about whether to transfer Polish-owned planes to Ukraine is ultimately one for the Polish government. We will continue consulting with our Allies and partners about our ongoing security assistance to Ukraine, because, in fact, Poland's proposal shows just some of the complexities this issue presents. The prospect of fighter jets "at the disposal of the Government of the United States of America" departing from a U.S./NATO base in Germany to fly into airspace that is contested with Russia over Ukraine raises serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance. It is simply not clear to us that there is a substantive rationale for it. We will continue to consult with Poland and our other NATO allies about this issue and the difficult logistical challenges it presents, but we do not believe Poland's proposal is a tenable one.” (March 8,2022, defense.gov)

Blinken – Pentagon disagreement?
This exchange of statements would seem to indicate that Secretary of State Blinken and the Pentagon have conflicting views on the proposal to provide Ukraine with old MiG 29’s.
The diplomat Blinken seemingly trying to escalate conflict with Russia, while the Pentagon is holding back and showing more sense, at least for now.

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