 What is the rules-based order that has become so popular with western leaders, when they defend belligerent western attitudes and aggression against foremost Russia and China? In an attempt to understand rules-based order and its consequences, we take up the following topics: The incessant talk of rules-based order Order, but what order? Order, a U.S. based order? Russia and China rejecting a rule-based U.S. order International Law versus rule-based order and U.S. hegemony The hypocrisy of U.S. and the West U.S. dominated order bringing peace and stability – or war and instability? Ukraine proxy war – a fight to uphold U.S. world order Europe’s renewed submission to U.S. hegemony? Next it is all about China The incessant talk of rules-based order When Secretary Blinken first met with Chinese counterparts March 2021 in Alaska he had barely greeted Director Yang and State Councilor Wang before he talked about rules-based international order: “Our administration is committed to leading with diplomacy to advance the interests of the United States and to strengthen the rules-based international order. That system is not an abstraction. It helps countries resolve differences peacefully, coordinate multilateral efforts effectively, and participate in global commerce with the assurance that everyone is following the same rules. The alternative to a rules-based order is a world in which might makes right and winners take all, and that would be a far more violent and unstable world for all of us. Today, we’ll have an opportunity to discuss key priorities, both domestic and global, so that China can better understand our administration’s intentions and approach. ” (Emphasis added). (state.gov) https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-chinese-director-of-the-office-of-the-central-commission-for-foreign-affairs-yang-jiechi-and-chinese-state-councilor-wang-yi-at-th/ The riposte from Director Yang made it very clear that China regarded a rules-based international order as mainly an order serving the U.S.: “What China and the international community follow or uphold is the United Nations-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law, not what is advocated by a small number of countries of the so-called “rules-based” international order. And the United States has its style – United States-style democracy – and China has the Chinese-style democracy. It is not just up to the American people, but also the people of the world to evaluate how the United States has done in advancing its own democracy.” In a guest essay in the New York Times President Biden wrote: “If Russia does not pay a heavy price for its actions, it will send a message to other would-be aggressors that they too can seize territory and subjugate other countries. It will put the survival of other peaceful democracies at risk. And it could mark the end of the rules-based international order and open the door to aggression elsewhere, with catastrophic consequences the world over.” (New York Times May 31, 2022). President Biden on the same topic in a speech in Poland: … “we emerged anew in the great battle for freedom: a battle between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression, between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force.” There we have it, the U.S. led intervention in, sorry, support for Ukraine is justified by seeing it as a battle to uphold rules-based order against the aggression and brute force of Russia. Similar attitudes are voiced in relation to China. Just listen to NATO’s General Secretary Stoltenberg at a press conference in July 2023: “China is increasingly challenging the rules-based international order. Refusing to condemn Russia’s war against Ukraine. Threatening Taiwan. And carrying out a substantial military build-up.” Echoing the views of Secretary Blinken: “I want to be very clear about something …Our purpose is not to contain China, to hold it back, to keep it down. It is to uphold this rules-based order that China is posing a challenge to.” While President Biden promises “We will partner with any nation that shares our basic belief that the rules-based order must remain the foundation for global peace and prosperity. Upholding a rules-based international order (often shortened to RBIO or RBO) has thus become recurring and increasingly popular justification for western views, actions and interventions in relation to the rest of the World. Google Books Ngram Viewer may help to show how the expression became popular in English language books and journals, although having data only up to 2019.:  The diagram shows that the use of the term rules-based order became rapidly more popular from around 2000-2004. But we still have no idea what precisely is meant by the rule-based order.
Order, but what order? Annoyingly it does not seem possible to find anything like clear definition or understanding of rules-based order. What we can find are various uses of the term rules-based order or rules-based international order. Interestingly one of foremost users and proponents of the term seems to be Australia, where we can find the following interpretation. “A rules-based global order means a shared commitment by all countries to conduct their activities in accordance with agreed rules which evolve over time, such as international law and regional security arrangements This shared commitment has become even more important with growing interconnectivity, which means that events across the world have the potential to affect Australia’s security and prosperity … Underpinning the rules-based global order is a broad architecture of United Nations, international laws and conventions and regional security architectures which has developed since the end of the Second World War. This governance framework, including the United Nations, international laws and conventions and regional security architectures, has helped support Australia’s security and economic interests for 70 years.” https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-08/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdft According to “The Parley Policy Initiative” the core of international laws, rules and norms that are underpinning the rules-based international order are: UN Charter Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN Security Council Resolutions UN General Assembly Resolutions International conventions (e.g., the Geneva conventions) Treaties (e.g., the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) International agreements (non-treaty level ceasefire agreements, framework agreements, joint declarations, etc.) International court or tribunal rulings (e.g., the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal ruling) https://www.parleypolicy.com/post/the-rules-based-international-order-explained The talk of underpinnings to would seem to indicate that rules-based order encompasses something more than international law, rules and norms. Meaning that the whole concept still remains vague and nebulous. What this “more” includes remains shrouded in mystery. A 2022 National Strategy for the U.S. places the concept of rules-based order under the strange heading “An inclusive World” and writes “The vast majority of countries want a stable and open rules-based order that respects their sovereignty and territorial integrity, provides a fair means of economic exchange with others and promotes shared prosperity, and enables cooperation on shared challenges. They strongly disapprove of aggression, coercion, and external interference. They have no interest in overturning longstanding rules and norms to make the world safe for aggression and repression.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf Another indication that rules-based order in the U.S. version includes more than the list found in the Parley listing. Next comes the inclusive part in which the U.S. “… will help construct and preserve coalitions that engage all of these countries and leverage their collective strengths. We recognize that some may harbor reservations about American power and our foreign policy. Others may not be democratic but nevertheless depend upon a rules-based international system.” Apparently meaning that the U.S. sees itself as the sole guarantor of the rules-based order. Order, a U.S. based order? Remember what Blinken said to the Chinese “Our administration is committed to leading with diplomacy to advance the interests of the United States and to strengthen the rules-based international order.” Perhaps the whole concept of rules-based order is shrouded in a western or more precisely a U.S. ideology of liberal international order. In a comprehensive analysis of conflicting views of rules-based order Lieberherr writes that while country like Germany has a narrow understanding of rules-based order closely based upon the UN charter, the U.S. has a wider understanding. In their view, “the RBO order is not only a system that includes institutions such as the UN and international law, but also US primacy and rules that evolve over time, such as US security alliances in the Asia-Pacific.” https://css.ethz.ch/en/center/CSS-news/2023/02/the-rules-based-order-conflicting-understandings.html The timid beginnings of a U.S. based idea of order in the World are found, when a U.S. hegemony began to gain influence in the World after World War One. In President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points program for world peace presented at the peace conference in Versailles in January 1918. In his speech Woodrow Wilson said: “What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.” Wilson’s very idealistic 14 points for a new world peace may have been rejected by the UK and France, but they can certainly be seen as a sign that the U.S. had entered the world scene, marking beginning decline of the old-world hegemony of Great Britain. In 1941, at a time when Britain was at war and the U.S. not yet at war, President Roosevelt and Prime minister Churchill met to discuss an outline for a postwar international system. The outcome of their meeting was “The Atlantic Charter.” The Charter contained 8 principles that the U.S. and Britain were committed to see realized after the war. “Both countries agreed not to seek territorial expansion; to seek the liberalization of international trade; to establish freedom of the seas, and international labor, economic, and welfare standards. Most importantly, both the United States and Great Britain were committed to supporting the restoration of self-governments for all countries that had been occupied during the war and allowing all peoples to choose their own form of government.” (https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf). The Charter must have been heavily influenced by U.S. views, as there would have be an inherent conflict between the right to self-determination and still existing British colonialism. But the Atlantic Charter set the stage for what has been called the Liberal International Order (often shortened to LIO), after the Second World War. “After the Second World War, the US was already a full-scale stakeholder of the future world order, having proceeded with institutionalizing and affirmation of its vision of the world order. Politically, the U.S. established the UN in 1945 and the NATO in 1949, forming a network of alliances bent on permanent expansion. Economically, the creation in the 1940s of the IMF, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) were important steps towards the structuring of global space based on the vision of western nations, which was presented as an attempt to overcome the brute force factor in global affairs through intensive economic cooperation and embracing the common goals of peace, freedom and prosperity.” (Levchenko 2023). Thus, the whole structure striving to uphold a liberal international order, was heavily dominated by what can only be seen as a U.S. hegemony and countries closely aligned with the U.S., that is to say liberal democratic western states. A western group of countries having some of the features that Headly Bull saw as characteristic for international societies, being “all founded upon a common culture or civilisation, or at least on some of the elements of such a civilisation: a common language, a common epistemology and understanding of the universe, a common religion, a common ethical code, a common aesthetic or artistic tradition.” (Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society- A Study of Order in World Politics, 1977) It has often been said that democracies don’t fight each other, but perhaps that depends upon what one reckons as being democratic. Since the Second World War western democracies were closely aligned with a dominating U.S. hegemony, and engaged in rather limited independent initiatives. After the fall of the Soviet Union, when the U.S. became the sole hegemonic power, the “the liberal norms and ideals of the Cold War victors suffused and animated the institutions of global governance as never before, giving them a coherence and vitality that they had lacked during the era of Soviet-American rivalry.” (The Hill, 2022). https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3736389-the-rules-based-international-order-is-ending-what-will-replace-it/ Thus, U.S. came to dominate the western liberal ideological basis upon which the so-called rules-based international order rested. But what about the rest of the World? Russia and China rejecting a rule-based U.S. order Some time ago the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov wrote a long piece, arguing that “the West wants it to be clear to everyone that it is united as never before and will do only what it considers right in the international arena, and force others - primarily Russia and China - follow their course. The documents of Cornwall and Brussels enshrined the promotion of the concept of "world order based on rules" as opposed to the universal principles of international law, enshrined primarily in the UN Charter” (Lavrov 2021, www.kommersant.ru/ad). In Lavrov’s view the western concept of rules-based order is neither very specific or based upon international law, instead it works like this: “… as soon as someone acts contrary to the will of the West, it instantly alleges a “violation of the rules” (it will not present facts) and announces its “right to “punish” the violator.” … Hence the demands on Moscow and Beijing (and everyone else) to follow Western recipes on issues of human rights, civil society, the opposition, the media, the functioning of state structures, and interaction between the branches of power. Proclaiming its “right” to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries in the interests of promoting democracy in its understanding, the West immediately loses interest in the conversation as soon as we propose to discuss the tasks of democratizing international relations.” In the western view Russia and China are seen as “carriers of authoritarianism.” Russia is charged with aggressive policies against in a number of regions, when it acts against ultra-radical and neo-Nazi tendencies in neighbouring countries, that suppresses the rights of Russians. While China is charged with being too assertive in its economics interest, especially its One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR later morphed into BRI for Bridge and Road Initiative) initiatives, along with its with military build-up. To Lavrov the West must realize its domination of the rest of the World is irretrievably passing. “Attempts to ignore it, asserting itself as the "only legitimate decision-making center" will not bring closer the settlement of not fictitious, but real problems, overcoming which requires a mutually respectful dialogue with the participation of leading countries and taking into account the interests of all other members of the world community. This implies an unconditional reliance on generally recognized norms and principles of international law: respect for the sovereign equality of states, non-interference in their internal affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, recognition of the right of peoples to determine their own destiny.” Foreign Minister Lavrov, is not alone in his rejection of the western interpretation of rules-based order. When Wang Wenbin , the stern spokesperson for The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked about the rumour that the coming G7 meeting in Japan 2023 would ask China to abide by international Rules, he said: “Before discussing international rules, we need to first of all make clear what exactly the international rules are. For the overwhelming majority of countries in the world, international rules consist of the basic norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and all countries must abide by them. The G7 hardly ever mentions the UN Charter, but keeps talking about “democracies” and the so-called “rules-based international order”. However, when the G7 countries talk about international rules, they mean the Western rules that draw lines according to ideologies and values and the US-first and G7-dominated rules of a small circle. Those rules serve the vested interest of a very few countries, including the G7, rather than the common interests of the international community.” (Wang Wenbin, May 2023). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202305/t20230511_11075401.html In 2016 Russia and China signed a Declaration on the “Promotion of International Law” in which they stated “The People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation reiterate their full commitment to the principles of international law as they are reflected in the United Nations Charter, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. They are also guided by the principles enshrined in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The principles of international law are the cornerstone for just and equitable international relations featuring win-win cooperation, creating a community of shared future for mankind, and establishing common space of equal and indivisible security and economic cooperation.” In a curious aside it deserves to be mentioned that Russia and China in this declaration emphasized “the important role of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] in maintaining the rule of law relating to activities in the Oceans.” While the U.S. refused to sign the same convention in 1982 because it would also govern deep seabed mining in areas beyond the continental shelf. Although the U.S. later appeared to accept UNCLOS, it has not ratified it. Something that is important to remember when the U.S. is criticizing Chinese activities in the South China Sea. There are other areas where the U.S. has taken a similar ambivalent stance in relation international conventions and statutes, like for instance The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court that established the International Criminal Court (ICC). One might therefore argue that the U.S. attempts to preserve its hegemonic power by being the sole adjudicator of right and wrong in a rules-based order. International law versus rule-based order and U.S. hegemony To some western observers Russia and China have a point in relation to the West’s interpretation of rules-based-order. In an article on German practice in international law, the author argues that “The term “rules-based order” blurs the distinction between binding and non-binding rules, giving the impression that all States and international actors are subject to this order, irrespective of whether or not they have consented to these rules. While international law is general and universal, the “rules-based order” seems to allow for special rules in special – sui generis – cases. However, the will of a few (Western) States, or even the majority of States, cannot be equated to international or regional rules, or be the basis for a “rules-based order”. While international law is based on the principle of sovereign equality of States, a “rules-based order” detached from the requirement of consent may become an order of the strong, or an order by dictate of the majority. (gpil.jura. bonn.de). https://gpil.jura.uni-bonn.de/2019/01/rules-based-order-v-international-law/ Others have also argued like Russia and China that there is an important difference between international law and the increasingly popular concept of rules-based order. What is this creature ‘Rules-Based International Order” Professor Dugard asks. Is it a harmless synonym for international law or is something novel, “a system meant to replace international law which has governed the behaviour of states for over 500 years? (Referring presumably to the Westphalian peace treaties that ended the thirty years war in 1648). Lavrov mentioned that “charm” of Western “rules” is precisely in the absence of specifics” which allows them to manipulated at will. Dugard tends to agree: “… the rules-based international order may be seen as the United States’ alternative to international law, an order that encapsulates international law as interpreted by the United States to accord with its national interests, ‘a chimera, meaning whatever the US and its followers want it to mean at any given time’. Premised on ‘the United States’ own willingness to ignore, evade or rewrite the rules whenever they seem inconvenient’, the RBO is seen to be broad, open to political manipulation and double standards.” (Dugard 2023, Leyden Journal of International Law). https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/choice-before-us-international-law-or-a-rulesbased-international-order/7BEDE2312FDF9D6225E16988FD18BAF0 The hypocrisy of U.S. and the West While western states in general does not fight each other, western democracies have apparently less qualms fighting others. This goes especially for the U.S. hegemon that seems to have an almost messianic drive to foster democracy upon others. Believing in the morally valid right to intervene in other states, to spread democracy, based apparently upon an “unprecedented understanding of the world population’s aspirations for human rights-based rule of law and [market] based prosperity.” Regarding itself as a benevolent world hegemon the U.S. again and again intervened in other states, disregarding international law for what it must have seen as a higher purpose, a striving to guarantee and spread the western version of rules-based order. A few examples of U.S. intervention will suffice. The bombing of Serbia In 1999 NATO under the leadership of the U.S. conducted a bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In President Clinton’s words: “My fellow Americans, today our armed forces joined our NATO allies in airstrikes against Serbian forces responsible for the brutality in Kosovo. We have acted with resolve for several reasons.” (President Clinton) https://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/25/clinton.transcript/ Among the reasons given: “The protection of innocent people in Kosovo from a Serbian military offensive; the prevention of a wider war; upholding our values protecting our interests and advancing peace.” The bombing campaign did not have any explicit authorization from the U.N. Security Council. Instead, the bombing campaign came about as result of agreement among 10 NATO states deciding to bomb Serbia for reasons similar to the reasons voiced by President Clinton. The Security Council rejected a draft resolution presented by Belarus, The Russian Federation and India demanding “the immediate cessation of the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the urgent resumption of negotiations.” “The decision by ten NATO members to intervene without an explicit authorization from the United Nations Security Council brings to the fore several legal issues relating to the right of states to impede upon the territorial sovereignty of other states, the balance between state rights and individual rights, and the role of the Security Council in controlling the international use of force.” (ILSA Journal of International Law, 2003). It has therefore been argued that the bombing campaign was illegal without the prior authorization by the Security Council, according to a strict interpretation of Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the Charter of the UN. “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The invasion of Iraq In 2003 a coalition of countries led by the U.S. invaded Iraq. Various reasons have been given for the invasion, but it did certainly not have the authorization of the Security Council. An article given an assessment of the legality of the invasion present some of the arguments used by the U.S. instead: Upholding U.S. national security related to threat of terrorism, the need to protect Iraq’s neighbours and the international community and various other reasons, including the imagined threat that Iraq would use WMD’s (Weapons of Mass Destruction. Which may all somehow be related what has been discussed in relation to upholding rules-based order dominated by the U.S. In a speech by President Bush at Westpoint in 2002 he presented a kind of doctrine related to the need for pre-emptive action saying: “Our security will require transforming the military you will lead -- a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.” (Transcript of speech June 1 2002). Later a U.S. report to Congress asserted a right under international law to use military action pre-emptively against threats from “rogue states.” While these various reasons for the invasion have been presented from time to time, the real interesting question is whether the invasion was authorized by the Security Council and was in accordance with international law. The answer is that there was no explicit authorization for the invasion by the Security Council. Instead, the U.S. decided to act on its own, together with a coalition of willing countries Later there was an attempt to find a kind legal basis or perhaps a just reference for the invasion. “The United States did not assert that the invasion of Iraq was permissible under international law due to an evolving right of preemptive self-defense (nor that international law was irrelevant). Rather, the United States asserted that the invasion was lawful because it was authorized by the Security Council.” The problem is that it was referring to a council resolution adopted in 1990, in relation to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Thus, it can in no way be seen as a prior authorization for the invasion in 2003. What we see is the U.S. interpretation of rules-based order, that somehow allows the sole hegemon to act in accordance what it sees as being in the interest of the U.S. and the world, as we saw in Blinken’s interpretation “advance the interests of the United States and to strengthen the rules-based international order.” Threats, isolation , sanctions and intervention– the tools of U.S. diplomacy In the eyes of the aggressive former U.S. Secretary of State Albright, there is a good reason for the U.S. actions on the world stage: “If we have to use force, it is because we are America: we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.” (Secretary of State Albright, 1998) A distinguishing feature of modern American diplomacy is that US admiistrations as a whole tend to privilege hard power policies over soft power policies. A further distinguishing characteristic of American diplomacy is that “the United States has chosen to isolate diplomatically for long periods states that it deemed adversarial, and has required those states to meet preconditions before it will formally engage them.” (Wiseman, “American Diplomacy”). In the eyes of the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign affairs the U.S. is acting hypocritical on the world stage: “…the US walked away from 17 international organizations and treaties, including UNESCO and the Paris Agreement. The US has spied indiscriminately on countries globally, not least its G7 allies, strong-armed countries diplomatically, and applied economic coercion and military interference. The US has blatantly invaded Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria and other countries that are smaller and weaker than the US, killing and displacing tens of millions of innocent civilians. When it comes to international rules, the US’s place is in the dock. It is in no position to point fingers at other countries.” U.S. dominated order bringing peace and stability – or war and instability? Is the present war in Ukraine a result of the U.S. messianic striving to bring peace and democracy and imprint its idea of rules-based order upon the rest of the World? A few weeks after the new Secretary of State, Blinken, had been sworn in, he outlined his idea of “A Foreign Policy for the American People.” Saying: ““We will renew democracy, because it’s under threat…But we will not promote democracy through costly military interventions or by attempting to overthrow authoritarian regimes by force. We have tried these tactics in the past. However well intentioned, they haven’t worked. They’ve given democracy promotion a bad name.” (Secretary of State Blinken, March 3,2021). A year later the U.S. fighting a proxy war in Ukraine, to save what U.S. sees as a Ukrainian democracy, but perhaps foremost to humiliate or overthrow a Russian authoritarian regime by military means. How did that happen? When the U.S. Senate in 1998 overwhelmingly approved the eastward expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech, Republican Senator Joseph Biden Jr. said: “…this, in fact, is the beginning of another 50 years of peace, … "In a larger sense," he added, "we'll be righting an historical injustice forced upon the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians by Joseph Stalin." (Washingtonpost.com) While Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright exclaimed “Hallelujah” and said “To them I say that President Clinton's pledge is now fulfilled. Never again will your states be tossed around like poker chips on a bargaining table. Whether you are helping to revise the Alliance's strategic concept or engaging in NATO's partnership with Russia, the promise of "nothing about you without you," is now formalized. You are truly allies; you are truly home … For NATO's purpose is not to build new walls, but rather to tear old walls down.” With the same hallelujah enthusiasm U.S. wanted to bring more of the states formerly dominated by Russia to their truly home in the West. No one listened to warnings of someone like George F. Kennan, the American diplomat and historian, who saw the expansion as a fateful error. “The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.” (NYT 1996). https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/05/opinion/a-fateful-error.html Wise words, but no match for the U.S. eagerness to bring democracy peace and prosperity to the eastern European states. In 2008, the United States tried to push through a decision to the effect that Ukraine and, by the way Georgia too, would become NATO members. At the time European partners were wary and and after vocal opposition from France and Germany, a decision was made to offer neither Ukraine nor Georgia a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the time. The question of Ukrainian NATO membership propped up again in 2021. A few days after President Biden had spoken to President Putin in an attempt to defuse the situation at Ukraine’s border, he is said to have assured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy that Kyiv's bid to join the NATO military alliance was in its own hands. To Russia Ukrainian NATO membership was unacceptable. Russian grievances and the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO may explain why Russia handed the U.S. and NATO a draft proposal for a new treaty on security guarantees (Dated December 17, 2021). Among proposals is article 6: “All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States.” The leaked written answers to the Russian proposals from NATO and the U.S. gave no indication that Russia’s demands would be taken seriously. Here is part NATO’s reply to article 6 of the Russian Proposal: “All states respecting the right of other states to choose and change security arrangements, and to decide their own future and foreign policy free from outside interference. In this light, we reaffirm our commitment to NATO’s Open Door Policy under Article of the Washington Treaty.” (El País). The U.S. own reply likewise continued to firmly support NATO’s Open Door Policy In his reaction before the invasion of Ukraine a visibly angry President Putin stated: “I would like to be clear and straightforward: in the current circumstances, when our proposals for an equal dialogue on fundamental issues have actually remained unanswered by the United States and NATO, when the level of threats to our country has increased significantly, Russia has every right to respond in order to ensure its security. That is exactly what we will do.” (en.kremlin.ru). Next, we had the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the strong reaction from U.S., followed a little more timidly by Europe. Ukraine proxy war – a fight to uphold U.S. world order To non-western countries like the Global South, the U.S. reaction may have been seen to be less as an attempt to uphold international law and the UN charter, and more as a result of a geopolitical struggle between the Russia and the U.S. “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a dreadful violation of fundamental moral and legal principles. Many in developing countries also recognise this. But they remember, too, the long history of western countries as imperialists and invaders. Nor do they fail to realise that we care far more about fellow Europeans than about others. Too often, we have viewed grave violations of human rights and international law in developing countries as no concern of ours. Ukraine, many in these countries feel, is no concern of theirs.” (Financial Times, July 2023) https://www.ft.com/content/7a2ea643-4adb-465a-9188-20363622b379 There are certainly signs that U.S. engagement in a proxy war in Ukraine is more a struggle to strengthen U.S. hegemony and rule-based order, than a fight to uphold international law and Ukraine’s freedom and right to follow its own cause. Listen to what President Biden said in his great speech in Poland on the one-year anniversary of the war: “Europe was being tested. America was being tested. NATO was being tested. All democracies were being tested. And the questions we faced were as simple as they were profound. Would we respond or would we look the other way? Would we be strong or would we be weak? Would be — we would — would we be — all of our allies — would be united or divided? One year later, we know the answer. We did respond. We would be strong. We would be united. And the world would not look the other way. (Applause.) We also faced fundamental questions about the commitment to the most basic of principles. Would we stand up for the sovereignty of nations? Would we stand up for the right of people to live free from naked aggression? Would we stand up for democracy? One year later, we know the answers. Yes, we would stand up for sovereignty. And we did. Yes, we would stand up for the right of people to live free from aggression. And we did. And we would stand up for democracy. And we did.” Invoking the world, the U.S. became caught in a still escalating proxy war with the Soviet Union in the Ukraine. Secretary of Defence, Lloyd Austin uttered what the war is all about. “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” (Washington Post). https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/26/us-has-big-new-goal-ukraine-weaken-russia/ The New York Times saw Lloyd Austin’s assertion as transformation of the conflict in Ukraine “pitting the United States more directly against Russia.” National Security advisor, Jake Sullivan, also seems to confirm that the U.S. proxy war in Ukraine is a war between the U.S. and Russia to demonstrate the strength of a U.S. hegemony that may have been weakening. In a lengthy interview in “The Atlantic” he sees the war in Ukraine as testing U.S. credibility, adding “…do I think it would have an impact? Yes. And I do think that part of our objective in Ukraine has to be to show strength, resilience, staying power, canniness, capability, because this will have some impact on our ability to effectively deter others elsewhere.” https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/07/jake-sullivan-interview-china-russia-biden-foreign-policy/670930/ “Others elsewhere” include China, and the hope that it might be deterred from invading Taiwan by the Ukrainian show of U.S. strength and resilience. Earlier Sullivan had argued the case for an enlightened sort of “American exceptionalism … as the basis for American leadership in the twenty-first century” with the foremost purpose “of American foreign policy is to defend and protect the American way of life.” One may perhaps argue that the American way of life, seems rather precarious in the U.S. itself. One might even be mischievous enough to suspect that Sullivan thinks that war elsewhere would unite waring fractions in the U.S. To Sullivan and the Biden administration the proxy war in the Ukraine against Russia may be seen as the means to rejuvenate that strength of U.S. hegemony in the World. After years when it looked to be in decline, not least after the calamitous retreat from Afghanistan and President Trump’s MAGA focus on America. The Ukraine war is therefore not about Ukraine or the upholding international law. It is about upholding U.S. hegemony under the guise of fighting for rules-based international order. “One of the things that Russia-Ukraine has done for the U.S. and U.S. foreign policy is that it has not just positioned us to lead the Western alliance in the Euro-Atlantic region, but it’s had global reverberations” (Sullivan quoted in The Atlantic). Europe’s renewed submission to U.S. hegemony Jubilant Europeans greeting President Biden’s “America is back” also jumped with alacrity into what is essentially an American proxy war against Russia fought out in Ukraine. European Commission President von der Leyen on the Russian war in Ukraine: “This is a clash between the rule of law and the rule of the gun; between democracies and autocracies; between a rules-based order and a world of naked aggression. How we respond today to what Russia is doing will determine the future of the international system.” (https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/items/738621/en). Why does Europe accept to be caught in the U.S. slipstream with no apparent independent strategy and ideas of its own? What are they going to do in relation to a Russia that won’t just disappear as a result of the war, but might get even more belligerent? Most European countries are eagerly competing in their attempts to fulfil Ukrainian and U.S. wishes. Delivering weapons and assistance to Ukraine (Now even daring to provoke Russia directly by sending F16 fighter planes, after the U.S. prodding and permission). Smelling the growing weakness of the Russian military aggression in Ukraine there is no end to the spiralling self-confidence and self-righteousness of western leaders out to humiliate president Putin and Russia. For the moment the Ukraine proxy war would seem to fulfil Sullivan’s prediction and strengthen U.S. hegemony in Europe, and the World. What the most ardent supporters of the U.S. proxy war tend to forget, is the grave risks it involves. At the moment we are seeing a spiralling escalation in the amount of assistance given to Ukraine and signs that the proxy war may not be going according to western aspirations. With the Ukrainian offensive bogged in a slow and costly slogging match with Russian troops. As it stands the outcome of the proxy war seems very unsure. Presumably resulting in further assistance to Ukraine and reciprocal Russian escalation. With the risk of a longer war. With the prospect of constantly having to escalate assistance and involvement in Ukraine in the hope of overcoming the Russians, but risking the grim spectre of nuclear war. Or risking a humiliating Ukrainian and Western defeat. Or might Europe or the U.S. after all get tired of fulfilling the more and more outrageous Ukrainian demands and force Ukraine to accept a kind of Korean DMZ armistice solution or even peace talks. Perhaps Stian Jenssen in his capacity as Director of the Private Office of Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg put up a trial balloon in a discussion in Norway when he said ”I think that a solution could be for Ukraine to give up territory, and get NATO membership in return” (VG, August 15, 2023). What is evident is that realisation of some these outcomes would humiliate the U.S. hegemon, contrary to the President Biden and his administration’s reasons for waging this proxy war. A war that certainly not seems to be about Ukraine and the preservation of International Law and the UN charter, but about a weakening U.S. hegemony asserting itself and its version of rule-based order. Next it is all about China In a way it is already more about China than about a Russia, which actually does not represent a real threat to U.S. hegemony. It about an aggressive U.S. hegemon demonstrating its will to uphold its hegemony in the face of growing Chinese competition. In essence a raw geopolitical power struggle, with a Global South and a growing number of BRICS countries watching and placing their bets. See the previous attempt to show the beginning struggle for hegemony between the U.S. dominated world and the Chinese challenger: “The West against the Rest, part 4 – the looming struggle with Chinese hegemony.” (https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/west-against-rest-part-four-looming-struggle-chinese-hegemon) |
