Revealing video clips leading to allegations of corruption
Friday 17 July The German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung and the magazine, Der Spiegel, publishes clips from a video that must have come from a sting operation. The video was apparently recorded with several hidden cameras on 24 July 2017 in a house on Ibiza and show Hans Christian Strache of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), later Vice-Chancellor in the Kurz Government, and Johan Gudenus, also a member the FPÖ, in animated conversation with an unseen women, apparently posing as a niece of a Russian oligarch. She tells the group in the room that she wants to invest 250 millions Euro in Austria, money that may not be entirely legal. What can the FPÖ offer her?
This is where it gets interesting. The seemingly rather intoxicated FPÖ members discuss casino licenses, the sale of an old luxury hotel, contracts for highway construction -- all of it for the Russian investor. They even discuss a takeover of the Kronen Zeitung, one of Austria's most widely circulated newspapers." (Der Spiegel).
Strache really goes out on a limp with his suggestions for what the FPÖ could do when in government and how that could benefit the Russian investor: "Das Erste in einer Regierungsbeteiligung, was ich heute zusagen kann, ist: Der Haselsteiner (Chef der Strabag [large construction company]) kriegt keine Aufträge mehr. (…) Dann soll sie nämlich eine Firma wie die Strabag gründen, weil alle staatlichen Aufträge, die jetzt die Strabag kriegt, kriegt sie dann.“ (news.at).
The Russian investor might also buy the large Austrian paper "Kronen Zeitung" and promote the interests of the FPÖ: "Wenn sie die Kronen Zeitung übernimmt drei Wochen vor der Wahl und uns zum Platz eins bringt, dann können wir über alles reden." (Kronen Zeitung).
There is talk of ways to support the FPÖ with money and how it could be secretly delivered, hidden from prying eyes.
In what is perhaps the most bizarre part of the short clips published from a 7 hour video Strache talks about secretly getting compromising material on political opponents and having it published by someone else, thus hiding its origin. Precisely what is happening to him at that moment.
At some point Strache may have thought that this is too good to be true, and whispers that it must be a trap, but his companion assures him it isn’t: "Falle, Falle, eine eingefädelte Falle", soll er Gudenus zugeflüstert haben. Dieser habe indes gesagt: "Des is ka Falle." (Kleine Zeitung).
When the video clips were published Strache insisted that he had several times insisted that everything must be legal, although some of his suggestions certainly do not sound legal.
Sueddeutsche Zeitung und Der Spiegel admit that the source of the video is known but they will not reveal it. But rumours begin to pop up here and there about a dubious lawyer and some sort of private eye that may have been involved in the operation.
 
Interesting questions thus remain
Who arranged the sting operation with what purpose?
Why was it published now a few days before the election to the European Parliament?
Was is responsible and legally okay for Sueddeutsche and Der Spiegel to publish clips from a video that evidently was made secretly and presumably illegally, of a private meeting showing intoxicated politicians promising all sorts of things?
What might be the reason for giving the material to a German newspaper and magazine and not Austrian newspapers? Neither Sueddeutsche nor Der Spiegel is making a secret out of their continuing efforts to reveal what they see as the problematic nature of right wing populism, in their defence of democracy. Der Spiegel: "Demokratien sterben heute kaum noch durch gewalttätige Systemveränderungen - sie werden von innen ausgehöhlt. Um das zu verhindern, müssen sich alle demokratischen Kräfte zusammentun" (Der Spiegel).
The turquoise-blue coalition government under Chancellor Kurz was eyed with distrust and aversion when it came about in 2017. Der Spiegel: "In Österreich regieren ab heute Rechtspopulisten mit, darunter Politiker mit rechtsextremer Vergangenheit und Verbindungen in die Neonaziszene. Das birgt Gefahren - und erfordert Kritik." (Der Spiegel).
Perhaps it is worth mentioning that Der Spiegel has just concluded an investigation into a scandal in their own backyard. A journalist who published 55 articles in the magazine based upon made up interviews and false statements.
Why wasn't the video published in 2017? It was made a few month before the 15 October 2017 elections in Austria, when Kurz's Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) came first and the FPÖ third, thus leading to the turquoise-blue coalition government of the two parties under chancellor Sebastian Kurz. Presumably its publication then would have ruined FPÖ's chances of getting into government and thus prevented Kurz from becoming Chancellor.
Did the purpose of the sting operation perhaps change during the two years, from a kind of revenge, or blackmail, to political defamation, or....?
Does the seven  hour long video contain more explosive material, as those who organised the sting operation apparently had put cameras and microphones everywhere?
 
The effect on Austrian ands perhaps even European politics
 The day after the publication of the video clips Strache announced that he was laying down all his political offices and party functions. He excused his embarrassing behaviour: "In einem siebenstündigen privaten Gespräch in meinem Urlaub wurde ich – ja, unter Ausnutzung einer zunehmenden Alkoholisierung, ja, es war eine besoffene Geschichte, und ich war in einer intimen Atmosphäre – verleitet, auch unreflektiert und mit lockerer Zunge über alles und jedes zu polemisieren. Und ja, meine Äußerungen waren nüchtern gesehen katastrophal und ausgesprochen peinlich."
He still insisted that he hadn't done anything illegal, and that nothing had come of the meeting.
But he also attacked those behind the video and its publication.
 
"Genug ist genug"
Chancellor Kurz apparently wanted to act just as quickly, but before he did that he wanted to dismiss the interior minister, Herbert Kickl, the outspoken hardliner from the FPÖ, as Kurz didn't want him to be responsible for a thorough investigation into the affaire. Kickl wouldn't leave and the FPÖ wouldn't accept his dismissal, threatening to leave the government if Kickl was dismissed.
On the evening of Saturday 18 May Kurz had made up his mind. "Genug ist Genug." He said he had known that it would not be easy to work with the FPÖ and had swallowed some of the problematic incidences and scandals brought about by members of the FPÖ, but this was way too much and as the FPÖ would not accept his dismissal of Kickl, he saw no other way than to call for re-election as soon as possible and in meantime place experts and technocrats in the offices occupied by FPÖ ministers.
Soon after the FPÖ threatened Kurz with a no-confidence vote together with some of the other parties. The small "Jetzt-Liste Pilz" party with eight sets in the "Nationalrat" jumped at the chance to unseat Kurz: "Die oppositionelle Liste „Jetzt“ kündigte für die nächste Nationalratssitzung – deren Termin noch nicht feststeht - einen Misstrauensantrag gegen den Kanzler an."
When this will take place is unknown and so is the outcome, meaning that at the moment we don't know if Chancellor Kurz will have to step down as a result of the Ibiza video affair. It will presumable depend on the social democratic party's (SPÖ) stance.
Sunday 19 May Bundespräsident Van der Bellen, announced that re-election would take place as soon as possible in September. "Ich plädiere für NewWahlen im September, zu Beginn des Septembers“ (Van der Bellen).
The first opinion poll, already shows a here and now effect of the video and the talk about it: Kurz's party, the ÖVP wins 4 per cent and stands at 38 per cent, while the party of Strache's FPÖ goes from 23 percent to 18 per cent. Not a sensational loss at the moment. Opinion is divided on the need for the re-election. 60 percent are in favour while 40 per cent are against.

Europe-wide consequences?
The Ibiza video may have consequences for right wing protest parties, or so-called populist parties all over Europe. It speculated that it may create distrust against these parties, thus leading to less success in the European Parliament elections and accordingly less representation in European Parliament.
The Ibiza-gate might lead people to believe that such abominable behaviour is characteristic of all these parties. Perhaps this may explain part of the reason for the sting operation.
"Die Videoaffäre hat Auswirkungen weit über Österreich hinaus. Denn nur eine Woche vor der Europawahl macht die Affäre deutlich, wie dierechtspopulistische FPÖ demokratische und rechtsstaatliche Prinzipien ignoriert, wenn sie mitregiert. FPÖ-Chef Strache zeigt sich im Video nicht nur bereit zur Korruption und zur engen Kooperation mit zwielichtigen russischen Partnern. Auch die Pressefreiheit interessiert ihn nicht, für ihn positive Inhalte in der mächtigen „Kronen Zeitung“ will er sich erkaufen. Viele Wähler dürften bei der FPÖ ein rechtspopulistisches Muster erkennen, das sich auf den französischen Front National oder die deutsche AfD übertragen lässt." (RP).

Not a singularity, but a universal characteristic
Can Strache's and Gudenus' behaviour in the video be seen as a singularity, as a one off event, that may show the lengths individuals like Christian Strache and Johan Gudenus would be willing to go to in order to achieve and maintain power, especially if it can be done in what they must surely believe is secrecy?
Or can the behaviour in the video be seen as a universal characteristic of what is often called far right populist parties?
The German foreign minister, Heiko Maas, from the SPD is not in doubt. Right wing populist are enemies of freedom and joining them is irresponsible. "Rechtspopulisten sind die Feinde der Freiheit. Mit Rechtspopulisten gemeinsame Sache zu machen, ist verantwortungslos." (Bild am Sonntag). Although Maas believes that people in Europe are aware of this, one must act against these parties.
Merkel, who seems to spend lot of her slow departure from the chancellorship outside Germany, is of a similar opinion. In Zagreb she said that the populist trends despise European values and wants to destroy them. We must act decisively against that. "Wir haben es mit Strömungen, populistischen Strömungen zu tun, die in viel Bereichen diese Werte verachten, die das Europa unserer Werte zerstören wollen. Dem müssen wir uns entschieden entgegenstellen."
Others talk of the moral rot, corruption and dangerousness of right wing populism in general.
The general opinion especially in Germany seems to that the Ibiza video exposes a universal characteristic of those despicable far right parties.

The righteous against the far right
Does that mean that the righteous people have been right to abhor right wing populist parties and the people who vote for them? That right wing protest parties and followers really are deplorables. Completely unacceptable and thus deserving the strongest possible condemnation.
The term deplorable was used by Hillary Clinton to characterise supporters of Donald Trump. During a LGBT fund raising campaign on September 9 2016, standing behind a lectern with the slogan “Stronger Together," she said: “You know, to just be grossly generalistic, you could put half of Trump's supporters into what I call the basket of deplorables. Right? They're racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic – Islamophobic – you name it." (Time).
Around the same time the then German foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel put the upcoming right wing party, the AfD, into a corner with Nazis saying: "Alles, was die erzählen, habe ich schon gehört – im Zweifel von meinem eigenen Vater, der bis zum letzten Atemzug ein Nazi war." (Die Welt).
Already in 1999 the Danish prime minister at the time, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, compared the Danish People's Party to a pet that would never be house trained: "Derfor siger jeg til Dansk Folkeparti: Uanset, hvor mange anstrengelser, man gør sig - set med mine øjne – stuerene, det bliver I aldrig!" (Folketinget)
To the self-proclaimed righteous parties, media and people, the right wing protest parties and their followers in Europe really seem to be deplorables, that deserve intense critical scrutiny, using all possible means. Whenever something deplorable is discovered, like the Ibiza video, it is seen as evidence of depraved values of these parties and their supporters.
 A few warning voices are heard. For the former chief of the German "Verfassungsschutz" who recently had to go after criticising Chancellor Merkel, the sting operation is breaking a taboo: "Derartige Fallen zu stellen, ist mitunter einfach und kann auch zum Instrumentarium des Dirty-Campaigning gezählt werden, bei dem versucht wird, den politischen Gegner mit teilweise geheimdienstlichen Mitteln zu diskreditieren." (freiewelt.net).
Others have voiced the same concerns, and want to see who has been behind the sting operation.

 When similar cases are seen as singularities
 In 2000 the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl from the conservative CDU party admitted that he had for years received millions in illegal donations and hidden them in so-called "Schwarze Kassen" or black accounts, without declaring them in the party's books. He was accused and then acquitted, even though he refused to name the donors, arguing that he had given them his word.
Wolfgang Schäuble, the former German finance minister from the CDU and now highly respected Bundestagspräsident, was involved in the so-called "Spenden affäre" He admitted in 2000 to have received an envelope containing 100.000 DM in cash from a dubious weapons dealer. "Schäuble [hatte] am 10. Januar 2000 eingeräumt, vom Waffenhändler Karlheinz Schreiber im Jahre 1994 eine Bar-Spende über 100.000 DM für die CDU entgegengenommen zu haben."
Did this lead to condemnation of the whole of the CDU party? Not really, it was mostly seen as embarrassing singular activities of Kohl and Schäuble and they were ostracised for some time.
A sting operation set up by journalists revealed three peers from the House of Lords as being involved in corruption. "A Sunday Times reporter posed as a lobbyist from a solar energy firm; the three politicians allegedly agreed to use their influence to push the firm’s agenda in return for monthly payments of up to $18,000" (OCCRP)
The two peers from the labour party were suspended, while the third peer fro the Ulster Unionists gave up his position.
 Now, did the German cases or the English sting operation that certainly had some similarity with the Ibiza video lead to condemnation of the respective parties of those involved? Was it seen as a universal characteristic of the respective parties and their members?
No, the revelations certainly didn't fall back on people voting for the party.
Mostly it was in fact seen as singularities, although there have been some procedural changes in the involved parties in order to avoid similar embarrassments in the future.
Why this difference in view between established parties and protest parties caught in the act?
In the case of right wing protest parties incidences like the Ibiza video appear to taint the whole movement. If one black case is found it paints the whole, movement black in the eyes of the righteous. It just confirms what they had thought all along.
If similar incidences are found among established parties, that are seen as belonging to the righteous side, the involved may be ostracised, but it doesn’t really taint the rest of the party, and doesn't paint them all black in the eyes of the righteous. In curiously parallel to the view asserting that self confessed Muslims committing atrocities are singularities, not representative of the majority of Muslims.

Shining the light on the deplorables – the role of the media
Why is does incidences among right wing parties taint everything they and their supporters do, while other parties avoid having the whole movement coloured black?
What is role of the media, who may be involved in sting operations and revelations of misconduct, and who are our primary source of information about the incidents and opinions about such incidents?
Could it be that established media in general are especially critical in their treatment of the right wing protest parties and movements?
Even in the way they are talking about them, often using derogatory terms like populist, far right, extremist, bigot, fremdenfeindlich or xenophobic, rechtsradikal, pak, homephobic, islamophobic, nazist etc.
Are the established media in general neutral in their treatment of the subjects they choose to take up, and in their reporting? Or do they have certain ideological and political bias in what is taken up and the way they report?
Not an easy question to answer decisively. But there are indications we may use.
Studies in Germany show that the heart of German journalist beats left. A study from Freie Universität Berlin shows how journalists see themselves. 26,9 per cent felt close to the Green Party, 15,5 close to the social democratic SPD, 4,2 per cent to the left party (Die Linke), while 9 per cent felt close to the conservative Christian Democratic parties CDU/CSU, and 7,4 per close to the liberal FDP.
A majority of journalists were thus leaning left.
Another study asking journalists for their basic belief showed that 48 per cent felt they belonged on the left side, 17 per cent felt they belonged to right side and 15 per cent to the middle.
In a US study of financial journalists, whom one might suppose to have conservative and libertarian views, turned to show that they were mostly leaning left, with 58 per cent seeing them selves as leaning left of centre. (investors.com).
A study from PEW research from 2014 show the ideological placement of readers and views of US media sources. (PEW Research 2014)

Indirectly this might be seen as confirming the left bias of some of the most widely used media sources. Although I suspect that readers and viewers on both sides may insist that they have the most objective sources.
The strange irony is that in many cases the left leaning media are owned by people and organisations that no one would regard as left leaning.
Perhaps what we have is a self-confirming and according to view, vicious or a virtues spiral, whereby the righteous established parties and left leaning media confirm each other's views, especially in their shared disgust and eagerness to demonstrate the deplorability of right wing protest and populism
We suspect that all this means that we cannot really expect an unbiased view of the existing or emerging right wing protest parties. Is this a problem?

Causes for disgust
Perhaps there is good cause for the critical view of right wing protest parties and movements.
Protest parties as per definition represent people standing against the establishment, which may make them attract unsavoury characters. Not yet being established, these parties may be seen as an outlet for these characters' own personal frustrations and problems. This may lead to outcries and outbursts of activity that put the whole movement in disrepute.
It is not only a question of protest actions and problematic incidences though.
It is also about the verbal outbursts. To what we have called the chattering classes, consisting not necessarily of those in power, but of all those whose views are represented in the media, expressions used by the "unwashed deplorables " may seem extraordinarily bigot, racist and generally obnoxious.
We are not talking about people in power, they may exerts their power and influence in private, just the chattering classes, with self-proclaimed progressive and politically correct views
It is a question of the difference between those who may seethe with frustration, but unable to give voice to sophisticated expressions of their frustrations, and the chattering classes, who are characterised by their ability to express themselves in well-formed opinions, terms and phrases.
Thus language and forms of expression are something that lead to divisiveness in society, not something holding it together. Perhaps Bernie Sanders has understood that, when he said: "I come from the white working class, and I am deeply humiliated that the Democratic Party cannot talk to the people where I came from." Strangely, this is what Trump can.
On the one hand we have the unarticulated roar of protest, and on the other hand the sophisticated words of rejection. Except of course for some politicians using terms like racist, bigots, deplorable, Nazi etc. about the deplorables. Almost mirroring the other side, but being on the righteous side, they are of course seen as justified in using characterisations that would seem to preclude all chances of dialogue with their opponents
Perhaps these differences are unavoidable consequences of movements in the making. Looking back at the history of revolutions, this would seem happen when hereto suppressed frustrations and problems from the bottom of society pop up as it were to the surface.  Like foul and evil smelling gases from the bottom of a murky lake.
If this is how it is viewed by established parties, media and all self-confirmed righteous opinions, then it is no wonder that they hold their noses and turn away in disgust.

Trying to silence the "deplorables" is deplorable
Instead of listening and attempting to understand the reasons for protest it would seem that the righteous are mostly occupied with shining a harsh light on the protest parties and their followers, while keeping themselves in the dark, in order to find something confirming their prejudgements, and defaming the protesters. Finding some sort of Russian connection, illegal donations, misuse of donations, members and supporters with dubious backgrounds or behaviour, and politically incorrect and offending language.
Ignoring that there may be real and relevant causes for the protest.
In earlier blog post like the "The yells of protest from the inarticulate middle" and "Ominous signs of seismic activity in the political landscape" we looked the explanations for protest parties growing in importance in several countries.
What might then be the common causes for some of the tremors that are felt all over the Western world?
We see a growing divide between a kind of self-appointed elite and the rest of society.
One side of the divide consisting of a real power elite and a chattering  class proclaiming a progressive and liberal view, and consisting of people with the political correct view, even though they might split into a variety of identity movements.
On the other side of the divide we find both people with a more burkian (from Edmind Burke)  conservative view, and those who are seen as left-behind, "the deplorables."
We may find some support for our view in a curious study published by Chatham House, "The Future of Europe – Comparing Public and Elite Attitudes."
The study seems to find a similar binary split in society.

Protest movements vital to democracy
Those who hold their noses and shut their eyes to the protest today seem to have forgotten Mill's sensible advice in his chapter "on the liberty of thought and discussion: "When there are persons to be found, who form an exception to the apparent unanimity of the world on any subject, even if the world is in the right, it is always probable that dissentients have something worth hearing to say for themselves, and that truth would lose something by their silence."
In a way the right wing protests derided as populism may represent something that is vital to democracies. The ability to change themselves, in fits and starts, through trial and error, when developments have created inequality, division, too great distance between the those in power and those who are not, mismatch between economic and technological development and social conditions. Something that isn't possible in other kinds of regimes, whether authoritarian, so-called socialist regimes, or faith based regimes.
The protests may have both positive effects and negative effects, but the important thing is that they represent something that is important to large sections of the populace, not to be ignored and derided by a snapchattering classes of politicians, media, and the self-proclaimed righteous.
To Kaltwasser (what an appropiate name) populism is both a necessary corrective and threat:
 
Positive effects
Populism can give voice to groups that do not feel represented by the elites, by putting topics relevant to the ‘silent majority’
Populism can mobilise excluded sections of society, improving their political integration
Populism can represent excluded sections of society by implementing policies that they prefer
Populism can provide an ideological bridge that supports the building of important social and political coalitions, often across class lines
Populism can increase democratic accountability, by making issues and policies part of the political realm
Populism can bring back the conflictive dimension of politics (‘democratisation of democracy’)
 
Negative effects
Populism can use the notion and praxis of popular sovereignty to contravene the ‘check and balances’
Populism can use the notion and praxis of majority rule to circumvent minority rights
Populism can promote the establishment of a new political cleavage, which impedes the formation of stable political coalitions
Populism can lead to a moralisation of politics, making consensus extremely difficult (if not impossible)
Populism can foster a plebiscitary transformation of politics, which undermines the legitimacy of political institutions and unelected bodies
Ironically, by advocating an opening up of political life to non-elites, populism can easily promote a shrinkage of ‘the political’

Smooth change or abrupt break in unruly times?
Elsewhere we have speculated on ways in which protest parties and movements might influence democracy and society. We see two very different outcomes depending on the amount of resistance to protest parties and movements.
On the one hand an almost smooth and gliding incorporation of protest views in mainstream ideology, politics and political decision-making. On the other hand an abrupt break that may represent almost revolutionary break. A break that might be saving democracy or destroying it.
The difference can be illustrated with a kind of carpet fold model. At one end the fold is smooth and almost imperceptible, signifying little resistance to move from time a(t) to time a(t+1). At the other end the fold is abrupt and no smooth transition can take place, instead we have an abrupt change from time b(t) to b(t+1) thus representing some kind of revolution.

An example of smooth change may be found in Denmark in the quiet way the views of the right wing Danish Peoples Party became incorporated in mainstream politics. Prompting other parties to more or less perceptible changes in the views, and making them lean into the space created by The Danish Peoples Party, today to such a degree that they may have taken the wind out of the sails of the Peoples Party.
An example of resistance to change may be found in Germany in the crass attempts of mainstream German parties to distance them selves from the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland), assisted in their efforts by the most of established media.
The resistance of established parties and mainstream media is demonstrated in their contempt for the AfD and their followers and in attempts to denounce them in every way possible. In order to keep the AfD from having any kind of influence, and now they will have got a real boost from the Ibiza-video.
NZZ (Neue Zürcher Zeitung): "Strache ist ein unmöglicher Mensch. Alle Rechtspopulisten sind wie Strache. Und weil alle Rechtspopulisten wie Strache sind, müssen sie politisch isoliert werden. Wer geglaubt hatte, nur Populisten hätten das Prinzip der Vereinfachung verstanden, konnte sich in der Sendung eines Besseren belehren lassen."
Party and media attitudes may have to be seen in the light of German history, but a sign of a well functioning democracy it is certainly not.
To a lesser degree the same contempt and revulsion with regard to right wing protest parties may be found in much of the EU. Such attitudes of contempt doesn't bode well for smooth and peaceful change in European democracies..
 

Views on Europe
In previous blog posts we have seen Macron's flight forward from the present European quagmire and yellow west protests, with his rallying cry for a “Renaissance européenne."
We have seen the reserved German reply to Macrons slightly nebulous visions for a kind of "En Marche" movement for Europe. Kramp-Karrenbauer proposing more pragmatic version of Europe, a German version "Nach Unseren Vorstellungen."
Meanwhile the British are involved in chaotic attempt to distance themselves from more Europe, in a renewed bout of British exceptionalism, resulting in the present rather chaotic Brexit negotiations, and uncertain future relations with the rest of Europe.
In this blog post we attempt to understand how the British are viewing themselves in or perhaps rather apart from Europa, and how the present attempt to break lose from the EU may have come about.
In order to this we will have a look at topics and questions relating to:
 
British exceptionalism
 
The rise of euroscepticism
 
Cameron's promise and "mis-calculation?"
 
What went wrong for Cameron?
 
Did they really vote to leave?
 
British scepticism – part of more general problem in Western societies?
 
Standing up for democracy again?
 
We do not think that is possible to find one simple and unequivocal explanation for the present attempt to Brexit as it were, but hope that one may find enough important strands in the tangle of explanations found here and there, to weave a consistent understanding of the British view.
 
Choosing their own way – British exceptionalism
To understand how the British see themselves in Europe we look back to some of Winston Churchill’s famous speeches after the war.
In September 1946 in Zürich Churchill talked about the need to unite a Europe torn by war.
"We must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only will
hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living. The process is simple. All that is needed is the resolve of hundreds of millions of men and women to do right instead of wrong and to gain as their reward blessing instead of cursing."
To make a United States of Europe possible he saw it as absolutely necessary for France and Germany to enter into a partnership. (Zürich Speech 1946).
"I am now going to say something that will astonish you. The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In this way only can France recover the moral and cultural leadership of Europe. There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany."
Churchill apparently also saw the need to make sure that large countries wouldn't dominate this Europe. In an interesting aside he thought that  the individual states [Die Länder?] in Germany "might take their individual places among the United States of Europe" An idea that might have even more relevance today, in an effort to soften the German hegemon's influence in Europe.
But where did he see Britain in relation the idea of the United States of Europe? Today there are conflicting interpretations of Churchill's views on the role of the Britain in or of Europe.
Looking at some of his speeches it is apparent that he sees a double role for Britain, playing a major role in Europe and at the same time keeping apart from Europe.
Whilst arguing that Germany and France must come together to lay the foundation for the future of Europe, he sees a different role for the UK. He ends his Zürich speech with this hope: "Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America - and, I trust, Soviet Russia, for then indeed all would be well - must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live. Therefore I say to you “Let Europe arise!”."
Thus Britain is both promoting the unification of Europe and standing apart.
Churchill saw Britain as part of another family, The Commonwealth of nations, with Britain having not only a place in Europe but also a place in this Commonwealth of self-governing dominions. In an Albert Hall speech in 1947 he made this double bind clear.
"It is necessary that any policy this island may adopt towards Europe and in Europe should enjoy the full sympathy and approval of the peoples of the
Dominions. But why should we suppose that they will not be with us in this cause? They feel with us that Britain is geographically and historically a part of Europe, and that they also have their inheritance in Europe. If Europe united is to be a living force, Britain will have to play her full part as a member of the European family." (Albert Hall Speech 1947).
It would seem that Churchill sees Britain play its full part in the European family of nations if this can be combined with its role in the Commonwealth.
"Britain is an integral part of Europe, and we mean to play our part in the revival of her prosperity and greatness. But Britain cannot thought of as a single State in isolation. She is the founder and centre of a world-wide Empire and Commonwealth ... Britain to enter a European Union from which the Empire and Commonwealth would be excluded would not only be impossible but would, in the eyes of Europe, enormously reduce the value of out participation" (Kingsway Hall Speech 1949).
 
We are with them, but not of them
In 1953 Churchill said in Parliament: "Where do we stand? We are not members of the European Defence Community, nor do we intend to be merged in a Federal European system. We feel we have a special relation to both. This can be expressed by prepositions, by the preposition "with" but not "of"—we are with them, but not of them. We have our own Commonwealth and Empire." (Hansard)
Later Churchill seems to lean more towards a view of Britain in Europe, if the conditions were acceptable. In 1961 when Britain made an attempt to join the EEC (The European Economic Community of the original six).  Churchill argued "I think that the Government are right to apply to join the European Economic Community, not because I am yet convinced that we shall be able to join, but because there appears to be no other way by which we can find out exactly whether the conditions of membership are acceptable." (Richard Langworth).
 
Schuman Declaration – British ambiguity and reservations
The Schuman Declaration of 1950, which is seen a kind of founding text for European integration, was revealed on 9 May 1950.
Revealed is the right term because the declaration came as a surprise to the British, presumable because it was feared that Britain would not receive the declaration with enthusiasm.
The declaration proposed "that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organisation open to the participation of the other countries of Europe." (our emphasis).
British newspapers seem to have had a positive view of the declaration and prime minister Clement Attlee from Labour also seems to have received it initially in a positive spirit. "... the proposal offered a possible solution to the German question and represented a significant contribution to the establishment of Franco-German relations in the future. He saw the Schuman Plan as a way of resolving some of Western Europe’s economic problems."
While Britain on the one hand may have wanted to participate in the Schuman Plan, on the other hand they were opposed to construction of a High Authority "whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries." (Schuman Declaration), they also seem to have been weary of French ideas for further European cooperation.
"The British were primarily opposed to the prospect of a technocratic organisation with restricting powers which would be liable to intervene in the country’s economic policy. They believed that delegating part of the country’s sovereignty represented a dangerous point of no return along the European road." (The Schuman Plan and Franco-British relations).
"On 31 May, the British Government repeated that it was impossible for it to commit to a supranational institution before knowing where this would lead in practice. The British therefore indicated their wish for guarantees and a special position in the negotiations on the Schuman Plan"
The French answer was not long in coming. It was rejection of the British wishes. In June "the Quai d’Orsay asked all the interested governments to give their agreement to a new communiqué which called for the establishment of a treaty that would be submitted for ratification by the parliaments, and which put forward as an immediate objective the pooling of coal and steel output and the establishment of a High Authority." (The Schuman Plan and Franco-British relations)
 A few Months later Britain once more tried its hand by suggesting that the High Authority of the Schumann plan be eliminated and supplanted by an intergovernmental mechanism and an opt out clause. This was also rejected.
Thus we see how the British already in 1950 demanded special treatment.
 
The attempt to join followed by De Gaulle's rejection
When it must have become clear that Britain’s role in world was squeezed and it  was reduced to a middling power in relation to the two world powers, the US and the Soviet Union, with its place at the centre of Commonwealth dissolving, and the EEC becoming a success, the mood in Britain was changing. Now there was a wish to join the Common Market.
"On August 9, 1961, the conservative Macmillan government asked the Six for negotiations for membership in the Common Market (as well as the Ecsc and Euratom). Whitehall had thus drawn its conclusions from the success of the European Community." (pitt.edu).
President De Gaulle made no heel of his opposition to British membership. Britain wasn't really ready to join the EEC in his view, with British interests that contradicted Frances. One major point of contention was the CAP (The Common Agricultural Policy). De Gaulle apparent hoped that by setting stringent conditions for joining the Brits would give up, but they persisted. Thus de Gaulle had to act, in a cabinet meeting 17 December 1962 he announced that he would veto the British application. It is said that he was mocking Macmillan by quoting the Edith Piaf song “Ne pleurez pas Milord (“Do not cry, my Lord”)
 
Finally joining the EEC, but still wanting exceptions
While the Conservatives wanted to join the EEC, Labour had maintained Attlee's negative view of the EEC, but in 1966 there was a shift in Labour's position.
With Harold Wilson as leader of Labour they aimed to join the EEC "provided essential British and Commonwealth interests are safeguarded." We see that even Labour's  wishes contained remnants of the views found in Churchill’s speeches. It wasn't only a question of Britain’s' interest, it was a question of taking into account Britain and the whole set of its Commonwealth relations. Not the least the Commonwealth imports.
Thus the EEC's common agricultural policy was a problem if Britain were to join, meaning that it would have be changed in order to avoid “a most serious and damaging effect on Commonwealth imports and upon our balance of payments" (House of Commons: The 1974-75 UK Renegotiation of EEC Membership and Referendum).
When the Conservatives were back in power after the 1970 elections, it  was prime minister Edward Heath, who applied for Membership of the EEC and in 1973 the UK joined the EEC together with Denmark and Ireland.
Labour wasn’t satisfied with terms under which Britain joined, and wowed to renegotiate the conditions if  they came to power, which they did in 1974.
In what might be seen as antecedent to David Cameron’s attempt to renegotiate the terms with EU and  his promise of a referendum, the Labour Government presented its position:  "We shall negotiate in good faith and if we are successful in achieving the right terms we shall put them to our people for approval. But if we fail, we shall submit to the British people the reason why we find the terms unacceptable and consult them on the advisability of negotiating the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Community. " (House of Commons: The 1974-75 UK Renegotiation of EEC Membership and Referendum).
Labour wanted changes in the CAP, the financing of the Community budget, the plan for an economic and monetary union and other attempts at harmonization.
In the following negotiations Britain seems to have achieved a certain measure of success, for instance in relation to imports from the Commonwealth. In 1975 Parliament approved what had been achieved and the agreement was put to to the vote in a referendum, against the opposition of the Conservatives. Margaret Thatcher saw referendums as "a device of dictators and demagogues,” while others saw it as device for holding the Labour Party  together.
In the referendum held in 1975, 67,2 per cent voted in favour  of what had been achieved by the Wilson government, while 32,8 per cent voted against.
 
Willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states – the view of Margaret Thatcher
 While Thatcher may be remembered for securing Britain a budget rebate, it is important to see her understanding of the role of Britain in relation to the EU and Europe as a whole.
In her famous Bruges Speech in 1988 Margaret Thatcher talked of Britain's relation to Europa, and presented her views on the guiding principles for the future of the European Community.
On Britain's importance for and role in Europe. "... we British have in a very special way contributed to Europe. Over the centuries we have fought to prevent Europe from falling under the dominance of a single power. ... Had it not been for that willingness to fight and to die, Europe would have been united long before now—but not in liberty, not injustice."
Britain had to have wider horizons than Europe, but Thatcher said that Britain doesn't dream of a cosy isolated existence on the fringes of Europa: "Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community. That is not to say that our future lies only in Europe, ... The Community is not an end in itself."
Looking to the future She presented a set of guiding principles for the future of Europe.
 
 1: "willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community." Not the United States of Europe, but a community of nations states that may speak with one voice on many great issues, be it trade or defence. She is against centralising power in Brussels and decisions taken by an appointed bureaucracy.
 
2. "Community policies must tackle present problems in a practical way, however difficult that may be." Wrong or Ineffective policies must be changed, one example being the CAP. "the CAP has become unwieldy, inefficient and grossly expensive. Production of unwanted surpluses safeguards neither the income nor the future of farmers themselves."
 
3. "[T]he need for Community policies which encourage enterprise ... And that means action to free markets, action to widen choice, action to reduce government intervention. Our aim should not be more and more detailed regulation from the centre: it should be to deregulate and to remove the constraints on trade." It is clear that she sees the liberal policies and the deregulation she has followed in Britain as essential for the whole of the EU.
It should be made easier for people and goods to pass through frontiers. But almost prescient she also insists on the importance of borders: "... it is a matter of plain common sense that we cannot totally abolish frontier controls if we are also to protect our citizens from crime and stop the movement of drugs, of terrorists and of illegal immigrants."
 
 4. "Europe should not be protectionist." She asserts it would be wrong to erect greater external protection while breaking down internal trade barriers. Not erecting external barriers to trade will help less developed nations. "They need not only aid; more than anything, they need improved trading opportunities if they are to gain the dignity of growing economic strength and independence."
 
5. "Europe must continue to maintain a sure defence through NATO"
 
Thatcher's focus on a community of nation states, each with their own way of doing things, her ideas of a liberated economy and market, of deregulation, and of lowering barriers to trade with the rest of the world, demonstrate that at least in her view Britain stands apart from the way the EU is developing. Once more marking a British position that is different from the rest of EU on central issues.
What we have seen in our discussion so far is that Britain's views of and relationship with the European Union has always been coloured by British exceptionalism. An exceptionalism that has historical roots and as such is understandable. It has changed over time, but has always been there. And perhaps this is important if we want to understand some of the underlying causes why Britain are in certain way is not only "with" the EU, but also "of" the EU, to paraphrase Churchill.
Even so this is not in itself enough to explain the recent attempt to leave the EU.
To understand why this happened we must look for causes that may harp back to historical differences, but we still need some concrete explanations relating more recent developments, or else one might ask: Why now?
 
The rise of euroscepticism – demands for a referendum
In 2012 a Conservative backbencher John Baron, sent a letter to Prime Minister Cameron signed by 100 MPs, urging Cameron commit to holding a referendum on the nature of our relationship with the European Union.
The letter argued that a referendum was justified because "there is consistent majority in this country who believe the European Union meddles too much in our everyday lives, that the weight of regulation on our businesses is too burdensome, and that the cost of membership is far too high "
It also asserted the EU is very different from the EEC Britain joined in 1973, and that no voter under the age of 55 has had the opportunity to express their views on this important matter.
According to John Baron Cameron’s reply acknowledged "that we need less Europe, not more. However, he did not agree with the letter’s suggestion, only that once the Eurozone crisis has played itself out should a fresh mandate be sought from the electorate." meaning that in practice the demand for a referendum was rejected for now.
But the letter demonstrated that among the Conservative MPs there was widespread misgivings with relation to the EU
They were not alone. For a long time a eurosceptic movement had existed in Britain. Foremost among these since was UKIP, not the least under the leadership of one Nigel Farage. Essentially a party with one issue and one goal: A referendum on Britain’s relationship with the EU in the hope that the result of a referendum would lead to Britain leaving the EU.
In the 2004 European elections UKIP garnered 16,1 per cent of the vote and in 2014 they got 27,5 per cent. They had become a force to be reckoned with.
 Perhaps being seen by eurosceptic voters from the two major parties, especially the Conservatives, as being the only party really committed to a referendum on the EU.
Why the surge in euroscepticism and the increasing support fro UKIP? In a former blog we look the which issues that were seen as important by UKIP supporters in 2014. (YouGov).

It is evident that UKIP supporters find issues relating to immigration and asylum of overriding importance. The same issues also have a high importance  for "All," albeit overshadowed by issues related to the economy. Issues directly related to Europe take the third pace among UKIP supporters, but apparently have far les weight overall. But one may wonder, aren't after all the  two main issues related to Europe.
 
David Cameron’s promise
"This morning I want to talk about the future of Europe." The opening line of David Cameron's first "Europe Speech" held at Bloomberg’s London headquarter on 23 January 2013.
In this speech Cameron laid out his view of the challenges facing the European Union and Europe, and his ideas for addressing these challenges, and the British role in this. In many ways his speech sound like a continuations of the views found Thatcher's Bruges speech.
He tried to calm fears of British exceptionalism, but like Thatcher he expounded the British view. "For us, the European Union is a means to an end – prosperity, stability, the anchor of freedom and democracy both within Europe and beyond her shores – not an end in itself."
Cameron insisted that he didn't want to pull up the drawbridge and let Britain retreat from Europe: "I am not a British isolationist ..., I don’t just want a better deal for Britain. I want a better deal for Europe too."
 It is apparent that he fears that the EU is moving in further in a direction that Britain could not follow. At the time of the speech he already feels that support for the EU is, as he says, "wafer thin."
Cameron talks of three major challenges that must be addressed (gov.uk):
 
"First, the problems in the Eurozone are driving fundamental change in Europe ... those of us outside the Eurozone ... need certain safeguards to ensure, for example, that our access to the Single Market is not in any way compromised."
 
"Second, there is a crisis of European competitiveness, as other nations across the world soar ahead." Cameron fears that the Europe is falling behind in the world due to complicated and excessive regulation.
 
"[T]hird, there is a gap between the EU and its citizens which has grown dramatically in recent years. And which represents a lack of democratic accountability and consent that is – yes – felt particularly acutely in Britain."
 
To address these challenges that are seen as especially problematic by Britain, he proposes fundamental changes in the EU based upon 5 principles.
 
 1 Competitiveness. To Cameron the internal market is the core of the EU, but is hasn't been carried far enough: "when the Single Market remains incomplete in services, energy and digital – the very sectors that are the engines of a modern economy – it is only half the success it could be."
 Just like Thatcher Cameron is also after the inefficiency and bureaucracy in the in the EU and so "we urgently need to address the sclerotic, ineffective decision making that is holding us back"
 
2. Flexibility. " We need a structure that can accommodate the diversity of its members – North, South, East, West, large, small, old and new. Some of whom are contemplating much closer economic and political integration. And many others, including Britain, who would never embrace that goal ... The EU must be able to act with the speed and flexibility of a network, not the cumbersome rigidity of a bloc."
Cameron knows that his suggestion goes against the visions of an ever closer union promoted in the EU, but he knows that an ever closer union wouldn't be acceptable to Britain, with "the character of an island nation – independent, forthright, passionate in defence of our sovereignty." One can hear the echoes of the views of Churchill and Thatcher. To Britain the essential part of the EU that it can embrace is the single market. Not a "2-speed Europe, of fast lanes and slow lanes, of countries missing trains and buses."
 
3. Power must flow back to the member states. "Let us not be misled by the fallacy that a deep and workable single market requires everything to be harmonised, to hanker after some unattainable and infinitely level playing field." This principle actually seems to assert the same thing as principle 2.
 
4. Democratic accountability. "we need to have a bigger and more significant role for national parliaments ... There is not, in my view, a single European demos." Again Cameron is asserting the need for member states to have a say in the own affairs. "[T]here is a growing frustration that the EU is seen as something that is done to people rather than acting on their behalf. And this is being intensified by the very solutions required to resolve the economic problems. ... we are seeing this frustration with the EU very dramatically in Britain."
 
Essentially what Cameron wants to achieve is a "new settlement subject to the democratic legitimacy and accountability of national parliaments where Member States combine in flexible cooperation, respecting national differences not always trying to eliminate them and in which we have proved that some powers can in fact be returned to Member States." This also seems to represent a direct continuation of Thatcher's views.
We again see the continuing strand of British exceptionalism. Britain in a Europe, that mainly builds upon the idea of a single market and openness towards the rest of the world, with flexibility for members states to manage their own affairs to a degree that is as large as possible. But also a Britain distancing itself from the Eurozone, detailed supranational regulation and lack of local democratic self-determination. A different version of Churchill’s "with" and "of" Europe, but from a very different perspective, in which former British position in the world does not directly play a role, although recent views may perhaps build upon similar spirit.
 
The in-out referendum pledge
In the last part of his speech Cameron pledges to hold a referendum on continued membership of the European Union.
"The next Conservative manifesto in 2015 will ask for a mandate from the British people for the Conservative government to negotiate a new settlement with our European partners in the next Parliament." 
Cameron does promise an here and now referendum. "It is wrong to ask people whether to stay or go before we have had a chance to put the relationship right."
First there will have to be attempt to negotiate a new settlement "in which Britain shapes and respects the rules of the single market but is protected by fair safeguards, and free of the spurious regulation which damages Europe’s competitiveness."
[W]hen we have negotiated that new settlement, we will give the British people a referendum with a very simple in-or-out choice: to stay in the European Union on these new terms, or to come out altogether."
"It will be an in-out referendum.... I say to the British people: this will be your decision."
"Because I believe something very deeply. That Britain’s national interest is best served in a flexible, adaptable and open European Union and that such a European Union is best with Britain in it"
 Cameron spares some thought on the consequences of leaving the EU, in which he asserts the Britain cannot leave Europe "If we leave the EU, we cannot of course leave Europe. It will remain for many years our biggest market, and forever our geographical neighbourhood. We are tied by a complex web of legal commitments." What he finds really important though is continued access to the single market "Continued access to the Single Market is vital for British businesses and British jobs... And being part of the Single Market has been key to that success"
 
The conservative manifest 2015
"We believe in letting the people decide: so we will hold an in-out referendum on our membership of the EU before the end of 2017"
The arguments set forth are the one we found in Cameron’s speech: The EU needs to Change. The 2015 Manifesto spells out all the British arguments for the need to change the EU:
"The EU is too bureaucratic and too undemocratic. It interferes too much in our daily lives, and the scale of migration triggered by new members joining in recent years has had a real impact on local communities. We are clear about what we want from Europe. We say: yes to the Single Market. Yes to turbo-charging free trade. Yes to working together where we are stronger together than alone. Yes to a family of nation states, all part of a European Union – but whose interests, crucially, are guaranteed whether inside the Euro or out. No to ‘ever closer union.’ No to a constant flow of power to Brussels. No to unnecessary interference. And no, of course, to the Euro, to participation in Eurozone bail-outs or notions like a European Army."
 
Cameron reiterating his promise after 2015 election
The Conservatives won the May 2015 election with a rather slim majority of 331 seats out of 650. This means that an in-out referendum on membership of the EU was now to be held before the end of 2017.
In a Chatham House speech in on 10 November 2015 Cameron essentially reiterates the argument for a referendum from the 2013 speech., and the promise of a referendum.
 All the main issues are still there, but something important has happened since 2013. Europe has been hit by the 2015 refugee and immigration wave, from Syria and other countries.
In a press conference 31 august 2015 Chancellor Merkel say the words that will follow her ever after: "Wir schaffen das!" This is followed on 4 September by the formal opening of the borders, giving rise to an accelerated influx into the EU. Her decision which was apparently made without consulting other than the Austrian Chancellor mean the borders are open and Schengen rules are no longer followed.
What happened here may have induced Cameron to emphasise a challenge that must be mastered. Mass immigration.
"Right now the pressures are too great. I appreciate that at a time when other European countries are facing huge pressure from migration from outside the EU, this may be hard for some other EU countries to understand."
Britain already felt it had an immigration problem with the amount of immigration from both from the EU and outside the EU.  While accepting that the free movement of labour is a basic treaty right, Britain for some time has felt that something must be done to "to find arrangements to allow a member state like the UK to restore a sense of fairness to our immigration system… …and to reduce the current very high level of migration from within the EU into the UK."
Cameron's suggestion for addressing this issue: More stringent rules for receiving work benefits or social housing, " ... we have proposed that people coming to Britain from the EU must live here and contribute for 4 years before they qualify for in work benefits or social housing."
In his speech Cameron tells the audience that he is writing the President of the European Council on that very day "setting out how I want to address the concerns of the British people."
Cameron lists four objectives for his coming renegotiation with EU:
 
Objective 1: protect the single market for Britain and others outside the Eurozone.
 
Objective 2: Write competitiveness into the DNA of the whole European Union.
 
Objective 3: Exempt Britain from an ‘ever closer union’ and bolster national parliaments.
 
And objective 4: Tackle abuses of the right to free movement, and enable us to control migration from the European Union, in line with our manifesto.
 
Cameron realises that many will say he is embarking on a mission impossible, that the rest of the EU's 27 members won't accept the British demands, but he believes that it will prove possible, because "They are eminently resolvable, with the requisite political will and political imagination."
 
Cameron's apparent miscalculation
 What Cameron is attempting looks like a repetition of what Wilson succeeded in doing in the 1975.
Renegotiating on the parts of agreements that caused dissatisfaction with what was then EEC, followed by a referendum on the result of the negotiation. A referendum which Wilson as we have seen won comfortably.
Cameron must have been convinced that the threat of Britain leaving the EU would be enough to persuade that rest of the EU to give in to enough of his demands for change, that he could proclaim that he had got enough to win the referendum. Success in negotiations a followed by confirmation in a referendum would also silence the eurosceptic parts of his own Conservative Party.
In a copy of "Politico" we find scorecard comparing what Cameron wanted, with the results he achieved in February 2016.
Here some of the main points (Politico):
 
On protecting of the single market for Britain:
Cameron's demands: EU must protect non-eurozone countries against discrimination. Non-eurozone taxpayers never responsible for supporting eurozone.
Final agreement: Non-euro countries can't imped further integration,  but not responsible for bailouts A single non-eurozone country can request Council discussion on euro laws that may affect their financial stability.
 
On competitiveness:
Cameron's demands: Clear long-term commitment to boost competitiveness and productivity calls for target to cut red tape.
Final agreement: All member states to fully implement and strengthen the internal market. Concrete steps towards better regulation
 
On sovereignty:
Cameron's demands: Europe where necessary, national where possible. National Parliaments able to work together to block EU-legislation.
Final agreement: "Ever closer union" does not apply to the UK. Possibility to stop unwanted EU law if enough other states agree.
 
On immigration and abuses of free movement:
Cameron's demands: Migrants must earn for 4 years before claiming in-work benefits or social housing. No child benefit or tax credit if child lives abroad.
Final agreement: "Safeguard mechanism" to restrict benefits in exceptional circumstances. Bans benefits for 4 years and in place for 7 years, no extensions.
Child benefit indexed to conditions in country where child resides for new migrants.
 
From this simplified scorecard comparison, it is evident that Cameron got some concessions from the EU, but Cameron did not really achieve much in his attempt to assure a level playing field for non-members of the eurozone.
On competitiveness all he got were vague promises, nothing more.
On the question of sovereignty the EU acknowledged an ever closer union did not apply to Britain, as if it ever had. What Cameron got was the promise there would be a possibility of blocking unwanted EU law if enough other states would agree. A kind of "red-card" mechanism, if 55% of national parliaments agreed. Something that was regarded as difficult to achieve in practice, meaning that in reality Cameron didn't really get very much.
In relation to migration and benefits he actually got some concrete concessions. A kind of emergency brake that could be applied on immigration, but only for 4 years and only within a time span of 7 years, with no possibility of an extension. Cameron had to accept child benefits for children living abroad. The only concession he got was the indexation. During the following public debate in Britain Cameron sold this meagre result of his attempt to limit immigration to Britain under the slogan "No more something for nothing."
It would seem that Cameron had miscalculated his ability to get the concessions he strived for from the EU. Had he also miscalculated the mood in Britain, feeling sure that that he might achieve what Wilson had achieved?
 
What went wrong for Cameron?
Did Cameron have enough to convince the British voters and his own eurosceptive  members of the Conservative party? With hindsight we can se that he evidently didn't. It has been summed up like this: "Ultimately, Cameron blundered by promising so much and delivering little when it came to the UK’s position within the EU." (Referendum Analysis).
But while this might be a very convenient and popular impression, it might be a little too convenient.
One wonders if the British voters really followed the all intricacies of the EU negotiations. As if their votes were based upon a careful consideration of the detailed results Cameron achieved or failed to achieve as it were. What if something else was on their minds, when they went to ballot boxes?
Where things went wrong for Cameron may have been in these areas: The change in public attitudes towards the EU, the EU's and especially Germany's insistence that nothing must limit the four freedoms, and finally the effect of the unforeseeable refugee and immigrant wave from late 2015.
 
 Public attitude before the referendum
 In late 2012 and the beginning of 2013 when Cameron made his first speech on the European Union, some opinion polls based upon the question "If there was a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU, how would you vote?", showed that a majority would vote leave. November 2012 YouGov found the following: 51% leave, 30% remain.
When Cameron sent his demands to the EU in November 2015 and before the referendum in 2016 the mood had apparently changed in a more positive direction. Yougov November 2015: 38% leave and 40% remain. Just before the referendum a majority for remaining in the first month of 2016 had become a kind of fifty opinion: YouGov May 2016 40% leave and 40% remain.
A diagram from the Guardian show result of all polls up to the referendum, and looking at these one might have believed that remain could win. Not with the overwhelming majority that Wilson achieved in 1975, but at least win. (The Guardian):

Misreading a bumbling Merkel
Then there was the question of Cameron misreading the bumbling and mumbling Chancellor Merkel. Given her apparently positive attitude towards Britain Cameron may have thought that with her help he might deliver on his promise to reduce migration from the EU.
He was wrong and he might have known. In a Sunday Times interview in October 2014 "Merkel categorically denied that there was any possibility of Germany supporting any limitations on the freedom of movement"  Thus indirectly dashing the hopes that Cameron might have had for some kind of limitation.
Typically for her, Merkel seems to have had a different opinion, when 10 new countries from eastern Europe joined the EU in 2004 "the German government sought the right to restrict free movement of laborers for a period of up to seven years. Ms. Merkel, then the opposition leader, thought those restrictions did not go far enough to protect the German labor market against an feared influx of low-wage workers from Poland and the Czech Republic. The government should have installed an even “better protection mechanism."(Jochen Bittner, NYT).
 
The effect of the unforeseeable refugee and immigrant wave
In September 2015 Chancllor Merkel opened the German borders to a human wave of refugees and immigrants, ignoring the Schengen rules. The flow continued unabated in 2016, leading one to wonder whether in fact the massive influx of refugee to continental Europe and Markel’s open border decision may have had a decisive influence on the result of the British referendum 23 June 2016.
A German political editor from "Die Zeit" posed the rhetorical question in an article in the New York Times: "Is Merkel to blame for Brexit?" He points to shifts in her position with regard to free movement, to her inflexibility in dealing the British demands for limiting migration from the rest of the EU to Britain, and suggest this may been enough to sway opinion in Britain towards leave.
When we look back to our table showing the most importing topic for UKIP voters, Immigration and asylum, and see this in combination with the sudden surge in refugees and migrants in late 2015, which continued up to and beyond the British referendum, one surely has grounds for believing that Merkel's no to Cameron in relation to free movement, combined with her own open border decision, may have had decisive influence on the British referendum.
Thus correcting the view that the outcome was a result of Cameron’s miscalculation of the EUs willingness to compromise and the trend in the opinion polls, when he made his promise.
Cameron may have realised this and this may explain his decision to bring the referendum forward to June 2016 in order to reduce the negative impression the refugee wave may have given, instead of waiting to the end of 2017.
Others have had the same thought: "Coming in the wake of a protracted refugee crisis that started in spring 2015, concerns that immigration, already a key campaign issue for many eurosceptics, would dominate debate in the referendum affected the Prime Minister’s calculations on timing the referendum... David Cameron found himself boxed into a corner in part of his own making, in part due to international factors outside his control." (Dr Julie Smith, Cambridge).
 
Gasp – Did they really vote to leave?
The Result of the referendum on 23 June 2016 in the UK.

The reaction to result of the referendum on 23 June 2016 indirectly showed that Cameron wasn't alone in misjudging the mood of the British people.
Some headlines from Britain and foreign newspapers.
The Times: Brexit earthquake. Financial Times: Britain breaks with Europe. The Telegraph: The Birth of a new Britain. The Mail: Take a bow Britain. The Mirror: We're out of the EU. The Independent had a different take on result: Welcome to Boris Island. I news: OUT- Global shock as Britain Quits EU.
The New York Times: British stun the world with vote to E.U. The Washington Post perhaps caught the mood in the rest of the world: Brit's vote to exit E.U. roils globe.
The German Finansminister Schäuble told of his reaction: "Meine erste Reaktion auf den Brexit war: Ich habe geweint." Prime Minister Hollande: ""The European Union has suffered an "explosive shock" and must reinvent itself to prevent its break-up and restore the confidence of voters." It can’t be "business as usual for EU."
While Chancellor Merkel served the world one of her usual "nichtssagende" comments: "Die Europäische Union ist stark genug, um die richtigen Antworten auf den heutigen Tag zu geben ... Der heutige Tag ist ein Einschnitt für Europa, er ist ein Einschnitt für den europäischen Einigungsprozess.“ Whatever that means?
 
Had the Brits gone mad....?
Or did the result point to a much more universal problem. Perhaps the tabloid Daily Mail was really on to something the day after the referendum, when it wrote: " It was the day the quiet people of Britain rose up against an arrogant, out-of-touch political class and contemptuous Brussels elite.
The New York Post apparent had a similar view: "Around the world voices cry out: Power to the People." Although perhaps sounding a little awkward from what is now a tabloid newspaper owned by Rupert Murdoch.
Who voted leave and who remain? A simple overview of who voted what may be had from the a Lord Ashcroft poll looking at the connection between the way people voted, age group, sex,  and social grade (lordashcroftpolls.com).

 Overall male and females shoved the same patterns. The real differences in their voting behaviour is found between age groups. Those in the age group 18-24 voted overwhelmingly remain with 73%. A similar pattern is found in the age group 25-34.
In contrast people older than 45 voted mostly Leave., with the highest percentage of leave votes among the older age groups.
In addition we note others have shown that the turn-out for the referendum also differed among age groups., with smaller turnout in the younger age groups and a higher turnout among the older age groups. A "Demos" blog shows that among the age group 18-24 there was a turnout of 64 %, while for instances the age group 65+ showed a turnout of 90%. In reality the difference may have been even bigger, because the numbers show turnout as percentage of registered voters not all eligible voters and percentage of young people registered seems to have been  lower that the percentage registered of older people. 
This has given rise to assertion that older people decided the outcome referendum, followed by the nasty conclusion that a new referendum would result in a remain result, due to older voters from the 2016 referendum having died.
Apart from demographics the poll looked at the voting behaviour of different social grades.  With the AB grades evidently mostly in favour of remain. AB grades consisting of higher and managerial administrative and professional occupations.
In contrast C2 and DE grades voted mostly in favour of leave. C2 being Skilled manual occupations, while DE contains semi-skilled, unskilled manual occupations and unemployed.
Thus we see a divide between people in top grades voting in favour of remain and the lower social grades that vote in favour of leaving the EU. A clear social divide.
Those having voted Conservative in 2015, mostly voted to leave in the referendum, 61% voting leave. While those having voted Labour in 2015 now show a majority voting to remain in the Union, with 65 % voting remain. (YouGov)
Statistics show that Conservative voters tend to be older that Labour voters, and this of course be part of the explanation.
What is significant though is that there no significant relation between those who had earlier voted for Labour or the Conservatives and the proportion of people voting to leave,  as can bee seen from the following diagrams taken from a House of Commons Briefing paper (CBP 7639, 29 June 2016). This suggest that both Labour and Conservative voters are split on the leave or remain question

How to explain the split found both within the Labour and Conservative voters? Is it based on the similar reasons  for voting either leave or remain? Or does the split have different causes for Labour and Conservative voters?
The Lord Ashcroft poll finds that for both Conservative and Labour voters the most important reason given for voting leave was "the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK. 49 % gave this as the most important reason. The second most important reason for voters from both parties was that leave "offered the best chance for the UK to regain control over immigration and its own borders."
For people  voting to remain the reason given was "the risks of voting to leave the EU looked too great when it came to things like the economy, jobs and prices” 43 % gave this as the main reason.
These result would seem to point to similar explanations for the split within both Conservative and Labour voters. But might there not be another explanation?
Conservatives today may perhaps contain both people with what one might call a more traditional Burkean view (after Edmund Burke) and people with a much more libertarian or neo-liberal view. One the hand one might thus have Conservative voters  believing in traditional values, therfore "being opposition to destructive change" and having "a belief in individual liberty upheld by the rule of law." (Alex Illingworth).
For this group of the  Conservative voters  the arguments for leave might be that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK. Perhaps in this group one may also find imprint of the views propounded by Churchill and Thatcher, that Britain is of Europe but not in Europe?
On the other hand we have Conservative voters  with an urban neo-liberal view, One might perhaps se them as globalists maintaining a more libertarian view, in which government intervention in an economy, or society can never be justified, advocating in instead unbridled freedom, and the right for individuals to define their own lives completely."  Among this group one might find the argument propagated by the remainers. Arguments related to negative consequences for the economy if one were to leave, arguments against isolationism,  arguments in favour of globalism.  
Our explanation might explain the evident split among Conservative voters.
What then about the split in Labours voters? Might this not have other causes?
We already know that young Labour voters with a left wing views are orientated towards Europe and the rest of the World. Labour voters in local constituencies with large European companies employing many Labour voters might also be found on the remain side, for fear of losing their jobs if Britain were to go it alone.
But what about Labour voters with less education and with precarious employment, or fear of precarious employment. Might they not see themselves as being subject to forces beyond their understanding and control, meaning for instance that they are at the mercy of the decision-making of global firms and political decision makers in Brussels,  and therefore  choosing to  vote leave?
 
 British scepticism – part of more general problem?
 In earlier blog post like the "The yells of protest from the inarticulate middle" and "Ominous signs of seismic activity in the political landscape" we have seen protest parties growing in importance in several countries. In Europe often marked a by decidedly anti-EU attitude.
Could this not signify that the British leave movement is part of wider movement in Europe and elsewhere? Not in all its aspects but in the sense that the leave movement is not only based upon a specific British historical and exceptionalist insular attitude, but in its recent manifestations is caused by more general development found also in the rest of Europe and the USA.
What might then be the common causes for some of the tremors that are felt all over the Western world?
We see two probable causes. A growing divide between a kind of self-appointed elite and the rest of society, and a new split opening up. On one side of the divide  consisting of a real in the power elite  and of  a self-styled so-called elite proclaiming  a progressive and liberal view, and consisting of  a chattering class of people with what they themselves see as the political correct view, even though these might split into a variety of identity movements, On the other side of the divide we find both people with a  more conservative view, and those who are seen  as left-behind people, "the deplorables" that Hillary Clinton talked about.
We may find some support for our  view in a curious study published by Chatham House, "The Future of Europe – Comparing Public and Elite Attitudes."
The  study  sees two problematic binary splits in society.
 
First a divide between elite and the public in general.
The elite consists of individuals in positions of influence at local, regional,
national and European levels across four key sectors (elected politicians, the media, business and civil society).
The public in general presumable represents the rest of society
Of interest to our discussion is the survey where they look at the attitude of the elite and the public towards the EU.
To the question " Should the EU get more powers? with three possible choices for an answer,  the study finds clear differences between the elite position and the public position (chathamhouse,org).

The results points to the same kind of divide we found in the British referendum. An elite of people in power or with ability to advocate for their views that is more inclined to give EU more power, and less inclined to want to return power back to the member states than the public in general.
The study found "Those most likely to want powers returned to member states tended to be older (45 and above), to have only a secondary-level education, and to be slightly more likely to come from rural areasor small towns, while there were no major differences related to income."
A split between elite and public positions were also found with  regard to other topics. The elite being more in favour of further enlargement of the EU, although itself split on the question of whether Turkey should be joining, and elite also seing Germany's role significantly more positive than the public.
The study doesn't only find a divide between elite and public. It asserts that there is a second split within the public itself, between on the one hand a liberal view and the other hand what they call an authoritarian view.
The characterisation of one side of the divide as authoritarian seem to us to show that the study in itself rests upon elitist view. It seems to refer to what is often seen as a divide between cosmopolitans and nativists, or winners and losers of the globalization. The epithet authoritarian though smacks of something much more derogatory than losers of globalization.
"In terms of demographics, those who hold a more authoritarian-minded outlook are: More likely to be middle-aged males, to have low levels of education, and to be economically active. Slightly more likely to live in rural areas and away from big cities, to have no or only a few friends from different backgrounds, and to speak only one language ...
those who hold the more liberal outlook are: More likely to be females, older, to have a degree, to come from small towns, to be retired. To have friends from different backgrounds, to align with centrist or left-wing parties and to speak two or more languages." (chathamhouse,org).
The study mentions that there is "no significant differences in terms of income between the two groups."
Based upon a regression analysis the study  finds the key drivers of anti-EU sentiment and support for returning power from the EU to the nation states (Chatham House: The Future of Europe):

eHow should one interpretate these findings from the regresion analysis? Perhaps in a similar way to our interpretation of the split vote on Brexit.
What is here called authoritarian might in fact more  precisly be seen as a kind Burkean conservatism, like we surmised for Britain. This might also mean people in older age groups, with less of a modern liberal urban view. They might be joined, just like in Britain by people with less education and precarious jobs.
Thus united in the view that power ought to be returned to the nation states.
Likewise we may find the ones standing for liberal minded views as seeing no need to return power to the nation states, they are  joined by young people, who might actually be against neo-liberalis in their left wing orientations, but maintaining a global outlook with no veneration for the nation states, strangely enough joining the neo-liberals in the rejection of returning power to the nation states.
Yes, this is at the moment all seems rather speculative, but lacking a more convincing explanation this is what we have got in our attempt to show that the divide shown in the British referendum is  also something that is found in much of the Western World (Europe and North America, and perhaps Australia  and New Zealand).-
 
Standing up for democracy once again?
In a discussion obout Brexit with an curious academic from Tasmania  at a  remote pacific atoll, a strange thought popped  up. The thought that this might be the third time in the last 100 yars or so that Britain is standing up against powers on the European continent.
In 1914 the break was precipitated by something peripheral to the real differences (power struggles and fleet competition), the question of Germans breaching Belgian neutrality (thus activating an old UK-Belgian treaty) and the Germans disregard for Edward Grey's attempt to defuse the situation.
In 1939 it was finally the fairly peripheral question of Danzig and the Polish corridor and the British guaranties to Poland that precipitated the War with Germany, after Chamberlain previously in negotiations in Bad Godesberg and Munich in 1938 had given in to the German demands by agreeing to German occupation of the Czech Sudetenland.
When on May 10 the Germans finally started their invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands and France, panic broke out and many in Britain believed a German victory was inevitable.
That same day Churchill was made Prime Minister, although eyed with distrust and seen as a maverick by other MPs. But with Churchill at the rudder the mood apparently changed to his famous "we shall never surrender" position.
Now, the wish to leave the European Union certainly cannot be seen as a declaration of War. But perhaps it might be seen as Britain standing up to what was might be seen as an undemocratic EU-power construct usurping the power to make decisions from the UK.
The Leave result may perhaps also seen as caused by and directed against Germany, thus having an ever so slight whiff of the old animosity towards too much German influence. Speculation you might say, but remember the view that Merkel’s open border decision may had a decisive influence on the result of the British referendum. Added to this the suggestion that Merkel may have had a decisive influence on the decision not to give Cameron what he had hoped for.  Now, after the surprising Leave vote, there seems to have been a frantic scramble from the EU and remainers to assert that the result was a result of voter manipulation by the Leave side.  Remember Macron's "Who told the British people the truth about their post-Brexit future? Who spoke to them about losing access to the European market? Who mentioned the risks to peace in Ireland of restoring the former border? Nationalist retrenchment offers nothing; it is rejection without an alternative."
More substantial is the strange direction of the EU-British negations after the Leave vote, which soon got stuck on questions relating to the Northern Ireland border, and the so-called Backstop. Drowning out the more relevant question of the future relationship between Britain and the EU.
Again we are speculating, no question about that, but could it be that this Northern Ireland question turned out to be a most effective tool in a more or less overt attempt to make Britain backtrack on the decision to leave? Perhaps even by having a second referendum, or at least something that would diminish the consequences of Britain leaving, for instance by having the British accept a kind of Norwegian solution, in effect being in the EU with no say?
A British MP has even seen German hand in this, by looking at most important bureaucrats presumable preparing the positions of Barnier and Jean-Claude Juncker. Sabine Weygand, a German and former deputy director-general in the trade department, was appointed deputy chief Brexit negotiator i Barnier's team. While Jean-Claude Juncker appointed the German Martin Selmayr to post of Secretary general of the Commission, after dubious procedure. Selmayr is seen as an ardent federalist, in favour of ever more union.  "Critics say his tendency to believe that Brussels can barrel past national political imperatives is not just wildly unrealistic and impractical — but potentially dangerous because it fuels anti-EU backlash" (Politico).
A too conspiratorial view one might say, but perhaps not all together unrealistic.
Something else points in this same direction. When observing the Brexit negotiations one is struck by the difference in transparency and democratic  discussion.
On the one hand we have the EU: The Commission, The European Council and its president Donald Tusk and the Barnier's team. On the other hand the British Parliament, with its what seems to many, endless squabbles  with a  majority  of MPs apparently not really ready  to accept the  result of the referendum, and lacking a decisive leadership.
Still,  in our admittedly subjective view the British  idea of democracy is still showing what democracy is all about.
Like Churchill once said:
"At the bottom of all the tributes paid to democracy is the little man, walking into the little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper—no amount of rhetoric or voluminous discussion can possibly diminish the overwhelming importance of that point." (Martin Gilbert).
Looking  Hansard (transcript  of Parliamentary debates) one  is astounded  by the resolute calmness with  which Parliament decided that war was inevitable in 1914  and again in  1939.
On  3 September  1939 when it became clear that a state  of war  existed between  Britain and Germany  Churchill  expressed  what is was all about:  "This is not a question of fighting for Danzig or fighting for Poland. We are fighting to save the whole world from the pestilence of Nazi tyranny and in defence of all that is most sacred to man. This is no war for domination or imperial aggrandisement or material gain; no war to shut any country out of its sunlight and means of progress. It is a war, viewed in its inherent quality, to establish, on impregnable rocks, the rights of the individual, and it is a war to establish and revive the stature of man. Perhaps it might seem a paradox that a war undertaken in the name of liberty and right should require, as a necessary part of its processes, the surrender for the time being of so many of the dearly valued liberties and rights."  ( Hansard 3 September 1939).
We are not alone in our view of the importance  of British democracy also to the rets of Europe. The great political scientist and philosopher Ralph Dahrendorf who spend much of his time in Britain, once put it this way: "From the perspective of Britain’s continental friends, two contributions were most eagerly awaited. One was democracy. The democratic deficit has long been one of the major shortcomings of European integration. Only the Dutch had systematically tried to remedy it. Now we were hoping that Britain would bring to bear its tradition of democratic accountability on the bureaucratic institutions. of Monnet’s Europe. The other expectation concerned attitudes to the outside world. Britain knew that the boundaries of Europe do not define the limits of Europe’s interest. It could therefore provide a welcome antidote to the inward-looking protectionist instincts of some other member-states." (R. Dahrendorf).
In another connection he wrote "Britain fought the second world war for these values, and it was victorious. It must surely be in the British interest to be part of a venture designed to prevent a repetition of the unhappy past." (R. Dahrendorf).
With this we are in sense back with some the major reservations Britain has had  in relation to the European project. The lack of democracy and the inward look, that would limit Britain’s long time outward look, in the beginning to the dominions and Commonwealth, later more towards a transatlantic and the rest of the world view.
In this sense one might certainly see the British vote to leave the EU as renewed attempt to once more stand up against a powerful Europe power in the shape of  an EU, with a large deficit in democracy, containing a large dose of German influence on decision-making, and having too much of a self-sufficient inward look, that is obviously a problem in the world of today.