NOTE: This article is part of the February 2025 article “Trump aiming for mightier deals than myopic Europe” (https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/trump-aiming-mightier-deals-than-myopic-europe-verner-c-petersen-fficf).
 
Bringing peace to Europe and deals to the U.S.
 
Although it appears the U.S. is prepared to concede to Russian demands for peace in Ukraine—something you, leaders of Europe, find abhorrent and foolish—it may be your analysts and experts who are naïve and perhaps even misguided.
You should lift your gaze and see what immense possibilities may result from peace in Ukraine and wider accommodations between Trump and Putin.
This must certainly be what Trump and present administration have set their eyes upon, and the reason they are ignoring Ukraine demands, as well your constant wailing.
Accepting Russia’s red line demands will surely make it possible to reduce the talked up Russian threat, that is scaring you as leaders of Europe. Try to stretch your minds instead and you might also see the possible benefits that Trump may eying in relation to peace between the U.S. and Russia.
 
Reducing Russia’s military threat
Befriending Russia would enable the U.S. to cut back military obligations in Europe and withdraw U.S. troops. Making U.S. forces able to concentrate on the Pacific or at the very least save resources. Would it also mean closing the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe? Yes, why not`
This of cause would force Europe to be solely responsible for the defence of Europe, forcing it to augment military spending. But peace with Russia might actually make your calls to “buy, buy, buy weapons,” like Danish Prime Minister Frederiksen is yelling, sound rather stupid. Coordination with U.S. would allow a process where U.S. forces and equipment in Europe is slowly being supplanted by European troops and equipment. This would reduce cost, give time to build up competence and presumably allow European defence industries to offer alternatives to hasty contracts with U.S. weapon producers.
Peace with Russia would certainly be advantageous for Europe as they could forget the scary ideas of war with Russia. Investing again in Russia, and getting access again to cheap resources and a fairly large market for their goods. Reviving the idea of “Wandel durch Handel.”
 
New European security architecture supplanting NATO?
At the moment you are desperate in your attempts to find a European answer to the U.S. losing interest in Europe. With Friedrich Merz even wondering “Whether we will still be talking about NATO in its current form or whether we will have to establish an independent European defence capability much more quickly." At the moment even thinking wildly of some sort European nuclear Umbrella. Perhaps by “Posting a few French nuclear jet fighters in Germany should not be difficult and would send a strong message” (The Telegraph, February 24, 2025).
Here it worth remembering that to Putin NATO became an anachronism the 1990’s. “There is only one bloc in the world that is held together by the so-called obligations and strict ideological dogmas and cliches. It is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which continues expansion to Eastern Europe and is now trying to spread its approaches to other parts of the world, contrary to its own statutory documents. It is an open anachronism.” (President Putin at the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi,2024). In fact, it was difficult to see the raison d’etre of NATO after the cold war. As we have argued in the blog “No need for NATO today, if dismantled in the 90s.”
Instead of getting into panic over the possibility that peace with Russia would permit the U.S. to leave NATO and its article 5 responsibilities you should eye the possibility that peace with Russia would allow you to build a new security architecture together with Russia, instead of against Russia. This might move Russia closer to Europe, and create further possibilities for peaceful interdependence
 
Economic deals with Russia
This is surely having a large place in Trump’s mind, given his what’s it in for U.S. stand, and it must certainly also be important for Russia, giving the constantly expanding sanctions regime. As part of peace process and an enduring peace, sanctions on Russia must of cause come to a stop.
 As a result of these sanctions many U.S. and European companies have either been compelled or chosen to leave Russia. The Yale School of Management’s tracking of companies having left Russia, indicate the scale. “Over 1,000 companies have publicly announced they are voluntarily curtailing operations in Russia to some degree beyond the bare minimum legally required by international sanctions — but some companies have continued to operate in Russia undeterred.”
The head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund. Kirill Dmitriev, taking part in the meeting in Saudi Arabia, has referred to U.S losses: “US companies have lost $324 billion by moving out of Russia - which has the world's biggest reserves of natural resources. … Lots of assets were sold at basically, very cheap valuations, a huge discount" (tbsnews.net).
 In an interview on CBS on February 23, Steve Witkoff, President Trump's special envoy to the Middle East and apparently also to Russia, where he had a 3.5 hours long meeting with President Putin, said that if “a peace deal is reached, there would be an expectation that American companies could return to the country to do business.” (CBS interview February 23, 2025). In addition, there would be new possibilities for sorely needed investments in Russia, not only from the U.S. but also from Europe.
Sanctions meant curtailing Russian energy exports to Europe, with the share of Russia’s pipeline gas imports into the EU dropping from over 40% in 2021 to about 8% in 2023. This has led to high energy prices, one of the probable causes for economic decline in Germany.
With peace and the lifting of sanctions both Europe and the U.S. might be able to take advantage of the enormous natural resources that Russia has to offer. Not only by expanding gas imports again, resulting in cheaper energy especially for Europe, relying as they are at the moment on costly U.S. and Arabian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports. Peace and loosening of sanction might mean more pipeline gas from Russia to Europe, and may of cause also lead to investment in those Russian resources.
 
Dealing with global conflicts
Here we get to really global consequences of Trump’s lightning strike, so let’s see what might become possible. The possibilities may be grouped under these topics:
 
Reducing Russian dependence on China
 
Making new disarmament agreements
 
Solving Middle East problems
 
Reducing conflicts with Russia elsewhere
 
Reducing Russian dependence on China
On Trump’s mind something else might also come to fruition. Friendship with Russia might mean that Russia would be less inclined to become totally dependent on China, opening possibilities for both Europe and the U.S. to counterbalance China’s growing hegemonic striving. This would surely suit Trump.
 
Making new disarmament agreements
It seems probable that Trump will also be aiming for new agreements on nuclear disarmament with Russia, the U.S. and China, and new agreements that would reduce missile threats, strategic as well as tactical. In fact, Trump has already talked about reducing military spending in Russia, China and thus also in the U.S. Trump even mentioned the idea of a summit with Putin and China's Xi Jinping. “When we straighten it all out, then I want one of the first meetings I have is with President Xi of China, President Putin of Russia. And I want to say, let's cut our military budget in half.”
 
Solving Middle East problems
On Trump’s mind might something more pressing. Perhaps it is no accident that he talked about meeting Putin in Saudi Arabia, as Putin and Russia might make it possible for Trump to checkmate adversaries in the Middle East, and cut the complicated Gordian knot there too.
With Russia’s help Trump would perhaps be able to make something out of his lofty but cloudy ideas of rearranging things in the Middle East. Keeping Iran in place, balancing Turkey’s influence in Syria, solving the Palestinian problem, and enlarging upon the previous genial Abraham accords.
 
Reducing conflicts with Russia elsewhere
Lately there has been a lot of talk on the Arctic, not least after Trump’s wanting to buy Greenland, a land and a sea area far too big for Denmark to provide with a credible defence. As long as Russia is seen an adversary and with the Chinese also eyeing the Arctic, it is evident that U.S. has a clear interest in establishing a bigger military presence in Greenland, with Trump of cause also eyeing possible mineral resources there. Are we seeing another deal in the making?
Bringing Russia in from the cold, after a peace in Ukraine, might make it a lot easier to agree on spheres of influence in the Artic between the U.S. and Russia, and make it possible to counteract increasing Chinese influence and presence in the Arctic.
This might also bring advantages for Europe as friendly relations with Russia, would allow secure future sea-transport connections with Asia via the Arctic route.
Less important to the U.S but really important to Europe, we might see a less belligerent Russia in Africa, perhaps even getting indirect help from Russia in stemming a future wave of migration from Africa.
 
Creating a new world order
In a speech at Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi in 2024 President Putin made this prophesy: “There comes, in a way, the moment of truth. The former world arrangement is irreversibly passing away, actually it has already passed away, and a serious, irreconcilable struggle is unfolding for the development of a new world order. It is irreconcilable, above all, because this is not even a fight for power or geopolitical influence. It is a clash of the very principles that will underlie the relations of countries and peoples at the next historical stage.”
Putin is not alone with the view that a new world order is emerging.
As early as 2019, a Chinese white paper on defence argued that international security "is undermined by growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism and constant regional conflicts and wars." The US and the NATO are causing tensions to rise. The US "has provoked and intensified competition among major countries, significantly increased its defense expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defense, and undermined global strategic stability. " While NATO "has stepped up military deployment in Central and Eastern Europe, and conducted frequent military exercises."
President Putin is right “The former world arrangement is irreversibly passing away. The U.S. is realising that its once almighty hegemony is threatened in several areas by a Chinese striving for hegemony, and it certainly does not help that Russia has become closer and closer to China, not the least as a result of President Biden’s dumb act of picking a proxy fight with Russia in Ukraine.
Now Trump is in command, and he evidently sees the stupidity of picking fights with Russia, when a mightier conflict might be brewing with China. And with his attempt to cool the conflict with Russia, and lure it into a deal that would be advantageous to both the U.S. and Russia, Russian conditions for peace in Ukraine is a price he is willing to pay to achieve something more important to the U.S.
Peace with Russia, would allow the U.S. to concentrate on China. But remember Trump does not want war. War would destroy the possibility of a good deal. So, what might he be aiming for? A god bargain of cause, the biggest ever.
Let’s guess what this might be. Realising that U.S. and China are about equal for the time being at least, war would be stupid. The alternative is dividing the world between them almost like in the olden days with the Soviet Union and the U.S. dividing the World in separate spheres of interest.
 What would that mean for Taiwan? Acceptance that it is part of China, on the condition unification would be by peaceful means and over time, remembering that Taiwan’s fab factories are still absolute essential for the U.S. Acceptance of a kind of Chinese Monroe-like doctrine in relation to the South China Sea. Acceptance of U.S. non-interference in internal Chinese matters like human rights and the Uyghurs.
From China the U.S. would need acceptance of non-military intervention in Taiwan, for a set time (until some kind of substitute for Taiwan’s fab factories have been found) Removal of all sorts of barriers creating disadvantages for U.S. companies in China, and possibly help in countering North Korean threats.
All with the aim of preserving advantageous good relations between what would be the only superpowers of the world for some time.
Such a balancing act between the U.S. and China, would mean lesser powers becoming semi-independent, but important powers. These important powers would presumably include Russia, Europe, and India.

A Flood of Negative Opinions – Hiding Another Truth?

As of April 2026, the rhetoric surrounding President Trump’s second term remains as polarised as ever. Mainstream media outlets, political commentators, and academic observers have reached, with remarkable consistency, for a well-worn repertoire of derogatory descriptors when addressing his administration’s policies and personal conduct. The range of these labels is instructive, not so much for what they reveal about the President, but for what they reveal about those who deploy them.
His policies are variously characterised as authoritarian, with the United States depicted as an isolationist and malevolent power on the world stage. His rhetoric is condemned as vulgar and laced with racist overtones. His communications are dismissed as fake news. His executive actions are described as harmful and reckless. His personal style is branded cruel, erratic, and unpredictable. The sobriquet “Disruptor in Chief” is offered as a term of opprobrium, though many of his supporters would wear it as a badge of honour. One acronym circulating in certain media circles, TACO, meaning “Trump Always Chickens Out”, was coined to mock the President’s alleged habit of making bold threats on trade and foreign policy only to reverse or delay them. The evidence of the year under review will put that particular characterisation to the test.
His decliningapproval ratings, meanwhile, have attracted considerable attention.

https://www.economist.com/interactive/trump-approval-tracker
 
A recent opinion poll conducted jointly by the Spanish newspaper El País and the Cadena SER radio network produced results that, depending on one’s perspective, either constitute a devastating indictment of American foreign policy or a rather revealing commentary on European attitudes toward American assertiveness. When respondents were asked which world leaders most endangered global peace, 81% pointed to Trump, compared with 79.3% who cited Vladimir Putin and 71.2% who named Benjamin Netanyahu. China’s Xi Jinping, by contrast, was identified by a comparatively modest 49.3% of respondents. That a survey conducted by Spanish media organisations should arrive at the conclusion that the democratically elected President of the United States poses a greater threat to world peace than the autocrat who has been waging an active land war in Europe will astonish precisely no one familiar with the contemporary European press.
What we appear to have, then, is a steadily expanding body of negative characterisation of President Trump, reflected in opinion polls of the kind described above, that has become, for much of the Western commentariat, a substitute for serious engagement with his record.
Trump’s own response to this critical barrage has been characteristically direct. He has described certain journalists in terms that fall some distance short of diplomatic, and he has pursued his grievances through more formal channels as well, filing lawsuits against outlets whose coverage he regards as hostile, threatening to revoke television broadcast licences, and seeking to apply pressure to news organisations and social media companies. His critics interpret all of this as an assault upon a free press. His supporters interpret it as a long-overdue challenge to institutions whose claim to political neutrality has grown increasingly implausible. Both sides, it must be said, argue their positions with a fervour that rather suggests the debate will not be resolved by evidence alone.
What this analysis proposes to do is set the criticism to one side, not to dismiss it, but to assess it against the actual record of the administration’s first year. The record, it turns out, is rather more compelling than the critics have found it convenient to acknowledge.
 
The Radical Shift in American Policy
No two consecutive American presidencies in recent memory have offered so stark a contrast as those of Joe Biden and Donald Trump. Biden’s first term represented a studied effort to restore what he called the “soul of America”,  measured multilateralism, institutional deference, and the reassertion of alliance diplomacy. Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 was, by contrast, a declaration of war on that very restoration, and, in the view of his many supporters, a long-overdue correction of course.
This article takes the totality of both first-year records as its subject. ´First comparing the two presidencies across the key dimensions of their inaugural years. Then turning to an analysis of Trump’s domestic policy agenda and its considerable achievements. Finally, it examines Trump’s foreign polic,  its bold aims, methods, regional expressions, and the extraordinary results it has already delivered.
The comparison is not offered in order to judge between two partisan visions. It is offered as a means of understanding how decisively American statecraft shifted within a single electoral cycle, and why, by any accounting, the second Trump term stands as one of the most consequential openings of an American presidency in the post-Cold War era.
 
Part One: Biden (2021) vs. Trump (2025)

From Sighs of Relief to a New Respect
When Joe Biden was inaugurated in January 2021, the collective exhale from European capitals was almost audible. According to Pew Research, confidence in the American president in Germany leapt from a meagre 10% under Trump to 78% under Biden within months. He rejoined the Paris Climate Agreement on his first day, signalled a return to co-operation with the World Health Organisation, and set the tone for an administration that would be, above all else, agreeable. In his own words: “America is back.”
That sense of relief, however, masked a more uncomfortable truth. Biden’s comfort was the comfort of retreat, the restoration of familiar process at the expense of results. His studied deference to allies was read in Berlin and Paris not as enlightened partnership but as evidence of American decline dressed up as politeness. His “non-demands” of allies were quietly interpreted as confirmation that Washington had lost its nerve. By the end of 2021, the chaotic and unilateral withdrawal from Afghanistan, executed without meaningful consultation with allies who had committed troops to the mission, reminded European governments that a polished manner and a strategic failure are not mutually exclusive.
Trump’s return in January 2025 commanded a very different kind of attention. Favourability ratings in European capitals fell sharply; the scramble for strategic autonomy intensified; and, crucially, defence budgets began to rise with an urgency that decades of careful American diplomatic requests had never managed to produce. Trump had walked back into the room, and the room rearranged itself accordingly. That, his supporters rightly argue, is precisely what strength looks like.

NATO: From Polite Requests to Historic Results
The treatment of NATO offers the sharpest single point of contrast between the two administrations, and the most compelling evidence of which approach actually works. Biden’s strategy was that of the committed institutionalist: invoking solemn obligations, speaking of burden-sharing in the language of enlightened partnership, and achieving, over the course of four years, very little. European defence spending edged upward at glacial pace. The targets set at previous summits were met with polite promises and creative accounting. Washington’s requests were received with warm affirmations and modest cheques.
Trump’s approach in 2025 was of an altogether different character. Speaking virtually at Davos in January 2025, he was unambiguous: all NATO nations should increase defence spending to 5% of GDP, which, he noted with characteristic understatement, was what it should have been years ago. The message was received with the predictable mixture of alarm and indignation from those accustomed to more diplomatic formulations. The results, however, were extraordinary.
By June 2025, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte confirmed there was broad support among allies for the new 5% target, a goal that would have seemed fantastical under any previous administration. Rutte described a structured mechanism under which nations would commit to annual plans demonstrating measurable progress towards the target, split into 3.5% for core military spending and 1.5% for critical infrastructure. The approach was, he acknowledged, fundamentally different from the previous Welsh pledge framework, it had teeth.
At the NATO Summit at The Hague on 24–25 June 2025, alliance members formally committed to reaching the 5% benchmark by 2035. Estonia and Lithuania pledged to meet the target immediately. It was an unprecedented shift in NATO’s 75-year history. The European defence investment surge that followed represented the largest single increase in collective Western military capacity since the Cold War, not because Biden asked nicely, but because Trump demanded results and made clear there would be consequences if they were not forthcoming.

Domestic Politics: Preservation vs. Radical Action
Biden entered office with a mandate to heal and a preference for institutional process. His first-year agenda emphasised pandemic recovery, infrastructure investment, and democratic norms. Internationally, this was received as the behaviour of a functioning democracy. Domestically, however, the mandate fractured rapidly: Republicans blocked or diluted much of his legislative programme, and his administration’s ambition to position the military as a vehicle for social transformation was derided, not unfairly, as prioritising ideological fashion over warfighting capability.
Trump’s second first year inverted every element of that tableau with remarkable speed. Where Biden had institutionalised diversity, equity, and inclusion frameworks across the Pentagon, Trump restored meritocracy and operational focus. Where Biden offered a meandering and ultimately unsuccessful approach to the southern border, Trump launched the most consequential border transformation in American history, a subject that warrants its own detailed treatment.

Economic Posture: Managed Decline vs. Assertive Growth
On the economy, Biden’s approach was almost Keynesian, stimulus, investment, and managed recovery, with inflation as its lasting and politically ruinous legacy. Price levels that rose sharply on his watch eroded real wages and destroyed consumer confidence in ways that no subsequent messaging could repair. The administration spent its later years attempting to persuade Americans that the economy was performing well, whilst Americans spent their earnings persuading themselves they disagreed. The voters, eventually, settled the argument.
Trump’s return brought a dramatically different economic philosophy and, in its early phases, dramatically different results. Third-quarter 2025 GDP growth reached 4.3% at an annualised rate, the strongest performance in two years, according to the BEA (The Bureau of Economic Analysis). Whilst the aggregate annual figure for 2025 reflected a slower first quarter, the product of transition uncertainty, the trajectory was unmistakably upward. The direction of travel mattered, and that direction was decisively set by the second Trump administration.

Looking Back
Assessed together, Biden’s first year was an act of polite restoration, earnest, often stumbling, and ultimately insufficient for a world that had moved on from the comfortable certainties of the post-Cold War order. It assumed that what allies and adversaries wanted was a return to the status quo ante: familiar faces, familiar formulas, and the reassuring hum of multilateral process. The evidence of subsequent years suggests that assumption was, at best, naïve.
Trump’s second first year was an act of muscular disruption, intentional, sometimes uncomfortable, and already producing measurable results that no previous administration had achieved. The European complacency that accompanied Biden’s inauguration has given way, by 2026, to the grudging acknowledgement of adversaries and allies alike that when America asserts itself, the world responds. Whether they like it or not.
 
Part Two: Domestic Policies – Rapid Actions of an Unapologetic Trump Administration

The Governing Philosophy: Change, Not Continuation
From its very first hours, the second Trump administration chose the language of correction over continuity, and backed that language with action of a speed and scale that left observers, supporters and critics alike, unable to keep pace. In official communications marking the close of the first year, the White House declared that Trump’s return had “marked a new era of success and prosperity,” pointing to historic economic momentum, a transformed border, restored military morale, and renewed American strength on the world stage.
What made this administration’s domestic record remarkable was not merely the volume of activity, though that was extraordinary, but its ideological coherence. Every major policy domain, from trade to energy to immigration to institutional reform, was aligned with the same organising principle: that America’s interests come first, that its sovereignty is non-negotiable, and that decades of accumulated drift can and must be reversed. The results, already visible within the first twelve months, are among the most consequential in recent presidential history.

Economic Nationalism: The Return of American Industry
The centrepiece of Trump’s domestic agenda was an unapologetic revival of economic nationalism, the conviction that the United States had for decades written the rules of global trade to its own disadvantage, and that the time had come to rewrite them. The Peterson Institute for International Economics, not an administration ally, documented over 120 discrete trade policy interventions within the first year alone. The sheer ambition of the programme was without modern precedent.
The underlying argument was powerful and historically grounded: that globalisation had produced asymmetric outcomes, benefiting mobile capital and foreign manufacturers whilst hollowing out the communities that depended on domestic industry. By applying targeted tariffs, demanding reciprocity, and treating trade as an instrument of national power rather than an academic exercise in comparative advantage, the administration began to reverse those incentives. Critics who had spent years insisting that tariffs were an unsophisticated tool deployed only by those who had not read enough economics found themselves confronted with the awkward fact that the world was negotiating.
The macro-economic results were compelling. Third-quarter 2025 GDP growth reached 4.3% at an annualised rate, the strongest performance in two years. Crucially, the administration also concluded major trade agreements during the year: a deal with Japan in July, placing a 15% tariff on Japanese goods and securing a commitment to invest $550 billion in the United States; and a landmark agreement with the European Union in late July, establishing a 15% baseline tariff rate alongside rather vague EU commitments to purchase $750 billion in American energy (LNG and oil) and to invest $600 billion in the American economy over three years. These were not abstractions. They were signed agreements with economic consequences.

Energy Policy: Abundance as Strategy
“We will drill, baby, drill.” Trump’s oft-repeated rallying cry was more than a slogan. In his inaugural address, he declared a national energy emergency and connected it directly to the inflation crisis: excessive spending and escalating energy prices, he argued, had combined to erode American living standards, and correcting that required the full exploitation of the nation’s vast domestic energy resources.
On energy, the Trump administration pursued one of the most coherent and consequential policy transformations of the first year. By rolling back the regulatory constraints accumulated across the Obama and Biden years, dramatically expanding domestic fossil fuel extraction, and positioning American liquefied natural gas as a geopolitical instrument, the administration turned energy from a constraint into a source of strategic strength. Those who had spent years insisting that America’s energy future lay exclusively in renewables watched with some discomfort as the administration proceeded to demonstrate that oil and gas remained rather important.
The strategic logic was explicit and compelling. In a world where Russia had demonstrated the coercive power of energy dependency, the ability to supply reliable American LNG to Europe and the Indo-Pacific was not merely a commercial opportunity, it was a national security asset of the first order. Agreements signed during 2025 underscored the point with considerable clarity. The United States, Bulgaria, Greece, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine jointly launched a “Vertical Corridor” to deliver American LNG to central and south-eastern Europe via the Mediterranean. These were not merely trade transactions; they were strategic realignments of the energy map of Europe.
The administration’s domestic energy expansion simultaneously served the goal of consumer relief. By increasing supply and cutting regulatory friction, it applied sustained downward pressure on energy prices, a direct and tangible benefit to every American household. “Affordable energy is the foundation of economic freedom” became not merely a slogan but a governing reality. This was, one might note, rather different from the previous administration’s approach, which had managed to make energy both expensive and a source of moral instruction.

Immigration: The Most Secure Border in American History
In his inaugural address, Trump promised to declare a national emergency at the southern border, to halt all illegal entry immediately, and to begin the process of returning millions of illegal aliens. Troops would be sent to the border to repel what he described as a disastrous invasion of the United States. These promises were followed, on the first day of office, by a series of proclamations, executive orders, and memoranda of a scope and ambition that left his critics spluttering and his supporters exhilarated.
No area of domestic policy produced more dramatic, more measurable, or more consequential results. The second Trump administration did not merely tighten the border — it transformed it. The figures deserve to be stated clearly and in full, because they represent an achievement of genuine historical significance.
By the close of fiscal year 2025, Customs and Border Protection recorded just 444,000 total migrant encounters, down from 2.1 million the previous year, a reduction of nearly 80%. Border Patrol encounters of migrants crossing without authorisation fell to a 55-year low. By November 2025, monthly south-west border encounters stood at 30,375, a figure 92% below the peak of the Biden era. On some days in July 2025, daily Border Patrol interdictions reached as low as 116; under Biden, a single difficult day had seen 11,000.
442,637 deportations were carried out in the first year, many them individuals charged with or convicted of crimes. A further 1.9 million individuals self-deported as enforcement made illegal residence untenable. The United States achieved negative net migration in 2025, the first time in over 50 years. For nine consecutive months, not a single illegal alien was released into the American interior. The catch-and-release era, which had reduced American sovereignty to a polite fiction enthusiastically endorsed by those who did not live near the border, was over.
The human and social costs of uncontrolled migration, suppressed wages for the lowest-paid American workers, strained public services, and the exploitation of vulnerable migrants by criminal networks, were being systematically addressed for the first time in a generation. Secretary Kristi Noem offered a summary that was characteristically direct: “Under President Trump’s leadership, we are making America safe again and putting the American people first. In record time, we have secured the border, taken the fight to cartels, and arrested thousands upon thousands of criminal illegal aliens. Though 2025 was historic, we won’t rest until the job is done.”

Law and Order: Violent Crime Falling to Historic Lows
Recent statistics point to a sharp nationwide decline in violent crime across major American cities in 2025. A report from the Major Cities Chiefs Association, drawing on data from 67 of the nation’s largest police departments, confirmed declines across every major violent-crime category compared to the previous year: homicides fell by 19%, robberies by approximately 20%, and aggravated assaults by nearly 10%.
President Trump attributed the improvement directly to his administration’s policies: the deployment of federal resources to Democrat-run cities that had, in his characterisation, devolved into war zones; the removal of criminal illegal aliens from American streets; the restoration of support for police and prosecutors; and the rejection of what he described as the radical left’s approach to law enforcement. Critics, displaying almost forensic precision, noted that crime had been in steady decline since a spike during the Covid-19 pandemic. The residents of cities that had spent several years being told that declining police budgets and progressive prosecution policies were perfectly safe may perhaps have their own view on this.

Institutional Reform: Restoring Democratic Accountability
Beyond specific policy domains, the second Trump term was characterised by a systematic effort to restore democratic accountability to a federal government that had, in the administration’s view, allowed unelected administrators to accumulate excessive policy-making authority over many years. Personnel changes, regulatory rollbacks, and the dismantling of ideological programmes embedded across federal agencies were pursued with deliberate speed.
Trump had promised to end what he described as the government’s policy of trying to socially engineer race and gender into every aspect of public and private life, and to forge a society that was, in his words, colourblind and merit-based. He also declared, with characteristic directness, that it would henceforth be the official policy of the United States government that there are only two genders: male and female. He signed two executive actions on his first day specifically addressing these matters: one rescinding DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) programmes across the federal sector, and one aimed at protecting women from what the order termed “gender ideology.”
The most visible expression of institutional reform was the reversal of DEI mandates across federal institutions, including the Pentagon. Rather than viewing the military as a social laboratory. an experiment that a number of senior officers had, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, been conducting for several years, the administration returned it to its foundational purpose: warfighting excellence. Generals whose records reflected political prioritisation over operational readiness were replaced by officers whose careers had been defined by capability and effectiveness. The morale implications, widely reported within the military community, were positive and immediate. It turns out that soldiers generally prefer to be evaluated on their ability to do their jobs.
In the private sector, the administration’s deregulatory agenda and permissive approach to mergers and acquisitions unleashed investment activity across multiple sectors. Artificial intelligence, in particular, saw a surge of venture capital and corporate investment directly linked to the removal of regulatory uncertainty. The administration’s willingness to allow American technology companies to compete without artificial constraint was already yielding dividends visible to any serious observer of the innovation econom. In glaring contrast to the EU’s tight regulatory korset approach.
 
Part Three: Trump’s Foreign Policy – American Assertiveness
President Trump’s executive order on the America First policy directive to the Secretary of State was unambiguous in its intent: “From this day forward, the foreign policy of the United States shall champion core American interests and always put America and American citizens first.” (Executive Order 14150 of January 20, 2025). The Secretary of State was instructed to bring the Department’s policies, programmes, personnel, and operations into alignment with this directive as a matter of urgency.

The Strategic Vision: Power Over Order
The foreign policy of Donald Trump’s second term represents the most significant departure from post-Cold War American grand strategy since the Cold War itself ended. Where successive administrations had maintained a broad commitment to multilateralism and the liberal international order, accumulating process, issuing communiqués, and conducting polite consultations whilst rivals grew stronger and allies grew complacent, Trump’s approach replaced institutional deference with direct, unapologetic American power projection.
This was not incoherence, whatever its critics claimed. The European Union Institute for Security Studies, in its February 2026 analysis, acknowledged that Trump’s second term had “defied expectations of isolationism,” documenting activity across every axis of foreign policy simultaneously, military operations, trade agreements, diplomatic engagements, and alliance restructuring, all driven by the same organising objective: maximum American influence at minimum American cost. At his inauguration, Trump had declared that his proudest legacy would be that of a peacemaker and unifier. The first year’s record, for those willing to read it honestly, suggests he was in earnest.

Core Strategic Aims
Restoring American Primacy
A central and explicit aim of the second Trump administration’s foreign policy was the restoration of unambiguous American global primacy. As the Wall Street Journal observed, Trump sought to place the United States at the centre of international affairs — not as a rule-following member of the international community, but as its dominant and direction-setting power. The strategy documents of the administration reinforced this with the language of absolute American superiority in the defining arenas of great-power competition, to be achieved through economic dominance, technological leadership, and credible military deterrence.

 “America First” Logic
The concept of the national interest was radically and deliberately sharpened. Where previous administrations had diluted American strategic focus by attempting to address every global problem, democracy promotion, humanitarian intervention, global governance, and any number of other worthy causes that produced extensive documentation and limited results, Trump’s framework focused relentlessly on core priorities: economic security, territorial sovereignty, and the management of great-power competition. The result was not disengagement but concentration: a presidency that was, as the EUISS (European Union Institute for Security Studies) data confirmed, in fact more internationally active than its critics claimed, but active on American terms rather than everybody else’s.” The US has reshaped the architecture of international trade, recalibrated relations with allies, and carried out military interventions both near home and across the globe, culminating in the Caracas raid that removed Nicolás Maduro from power. To those who were expecting an isolationist foreign policy, even within the MAGA movement, this activism has come as a surprise.” (iss.europa.eu).

Strategic Competition with China and Russia
The management of great-power rivalry occupied the centre of the administration’s strategic thinking, and its approach was both sophisticated and effective. Rather than the direct confrontation that risked escalation, the administration pursued what the Lowy Institute described as a strategy of “deep denial: “The core goal remains to restore absolute American superiority over China and Russia. But Trump wants to avoid confronting these major rivals directly. He is rather working to isolate Beijing and Moscow from their international partners and deprive them of any major means of external support.” (Ross Babage, The Lowy Institute). The aim was attrition rather than confrontation: to weaken China and Russia not by fighting them directly, but by depriving them of the external resources that sustained their ambitions. The combination of sanctions, supply-chain restructuring, and alliance realignment in the Indo-Pacific delivered results that direct military deterrence alone could never have achieved.

Strategic Urgency and the Fear of Lost Time
The 2026 National Defence Strategy is defined by urgency. Its central premise is that the United States must reassert military, industrial, and alliance dominance before structural advantages erode further. The strategy identifies four goals to be achieved without delay: the defence of the homeland; the deterrence of China in the Indo-Pacific; the restructuring of alliances through genuine burden-sharing; and the revitalisation of the American defence industrial base. Taken together, these represent a redefinition of American leadership not as omnipresence or moral crusading, but as disciplined strength applied in defence of clearly defined national interests.
The defence of the homeland is framed as the primary mission of the American military, encompassing border security, counter-narco-terrorism operations throughout the Western Hemisphere, protection of key geographic chokepoints such as the Panama Canal and Greenland, nuclear deterrence modernisation, cyber defence, and counterterrorism. The strategy effectively revives and expands the logic of the Monroe Doctrine, asserting that American security requires denying adversaries influence anywhere in the hemisphere.
The deterrence of China in the Indo-Pacific is identified as the most pressing external challenge to American prosperity and long-term power. The stated objective is the prevention of any single power from dominating the world’s most economically vital region. Alliance restructuring, meanwhile, proceeds from the explicit premise that American alliances remain indispensable, but only if allies transition from dependency to genuine partnership, as evidenced by the 5% GDP defence spending benchmark. The revitalisation of the defence industrial base, finally, is presented as a prerequisite for all else: rebuilding capacity, accelerating innovation, integrating artificial intelligence, and co-ordinating production with allied manufacturers.

Economic Power as Foreign Policy Instrument
The most innovative and consequential aspect of Trump’s foreign policy was the systematic elevation of economic instruments to the status of primary foreign-policy tools. Tariffs, sanctions, trade agreements, and supply-chain leverage were not marginal adjuncts to traditional diplomace,  they were the main weapons. The EUISS noted that whilst Trump’s first-term tariffs had been limited to a narrow set of countries and products, the 2025 programme was of an entirely different order of magnitude. On 2 April 2025, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act was invoked to impose reciprocal tariffs on imports from all relevant countries. The world noticed, and it negotiated, delivering deals, investment commitments, and strategic concessions that more conventional approaches had never produced.
In April 2025, Trump issued a declaration focused explicitly on trade itself. He pointed to what he described as large and persistent American goods trade deficits, exceeding one trillion dollars annually, and argued that these were not benign accounting artefacts but evidence of systemic imbalance and exploitation. Non-reciprocal tariff structures, hidden subsidies, regulatory barriers, and currency practices had, in his account, hollowed out American manufacturing, suppressed wages, and left critical supply chains dangerously vulnerable. Decades of trade liberalisation had eroded national strength rather than enhanced it.
“The absence of sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity in certain critical and advanced industrial sectors -- another outcome of the large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits -- also compromises U.S. economic and national security by rendering the U.S. economy less resilient to supply chain disruption. The large, persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, and the concomitant loss of industrial capacity, have compromised military readiness; this vulnerability can only be redressed through swift corrective action to rebalance the flow of imports into the United States.” (Executive Order 14257, April 2, 2025).
The Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling against certain aspects of Trump’s tariff-setting authority introduced a degree of procedural constraint that the administration had not anticipated. Emergency shortcuts were closed, whilst the underlying economic imbalances that had prompted them remained entirely unresolved. Whether the administration can persuade Congress to legislate more durable and economically coherent trade frameworks will determine whether Trump’s tariff experiment stands as a defining step in the defence of American economic sovereignty or an ambitious initiative that at least for now ran ahead of its legal foundations.

Lightning strikes and Strategic Deterrence
Whilst the Trump administration’s rhetoric was frequently robust, its actual use of military force was calibrated with considerable care toward deterrence and signalling rather than sustained engagement. The administration’s consistent aversion to “forever wars” was not weakness but wisdom, an accurate assessment of what large-scale military commitments had cost the United States in blood, treasure, and strategic attention over the preceding two decades. In their place, the administration deployed targeted operations: the September-to-January Caribbean and Eastern Pacific campaign against drug traffickers, employing the USS Gerald Ford, proved popular, with 62% of Americans approving the use of military force against suspected narco-traffickers, rising to 90% among the administration’s core supporters.
A distinctive and, properly understood, highly effective feature of Trump’s approach was the deliberate cultivation of unpredictability. By keeping adversaries perpetually uncertain about American intentions, through sudden shifts in posture, aggressive rhetoric combined with unexpected conciliation, and a willingness to take actions that conventional strategic calculations suggested he would not, Trump created negotiating leverage that more predictable administrations had never possessed. As the Lowy Institute observed, this approach drew on both the insights of classical strategic thought and the hard-won lessons of high-stakes commercial negotiation. The result was an adversary community that could never fully discount American threats and an ally community that could never fully take American protection for granted, both of which are, precisely, what effective deterrence requires.

Europe vs. NATO: Transformation
Through PressureIn Europe, Trump’s combination of pressure and clear expectation produced historic results. The 5% GDP commitment was the headline achievement, but the administration’s broader European policy also yielded concrete security architecture: the Vertical Corridor LNG agreement linking American energy supplies to Eastern Europe; the strengthening of bilateral defence relationships with Poland, the Baltic states, and other front-line allies; and a trade deal with the EU that secured $600 billion in European investment into the American economy. These were structural realignments of the transatlantic relationship on terms more favourable to American interests than any previous administration had achieved, and they were achieved, it bears repeating, through the application of pressure rather than the distribution of reassurances.
European political still leaders speak of “unity,” “values,” and “security,” but behind the polished statements and moral posturing lies a continent that has lost the ability to think strategically for itself. We cling to NATO as though it were a sacred relic, refusing to admit what has been obvious for years: the alliance no longer provides Europe with security. It provides us with an illusion of security, a dangerous illusion.
After meeting President Trump in The White House Chancellot Merz seems to have realised this, when saying : “For me, it will therefore be an absolute priority to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA” (politico, June 22, 2025).

Ukraine and Russia: Pragmatic Realism Over Principle
On Ukraine, the administration’s approach was more complex than its critics were willing to acknowledge. Trump’s engagement with Putin, including a personal summit in Alaska, and his sustained diplomatic pressure on both sides reflected a genuine effort to bring the conflict to an end. The terms under discussion, including a prolonged moratorium on NATO membership for Ukraine, attracted the predictable chorus of outrage from those who prefer the clarity of firm principles to the messiness of actual diplomacy.
The administration’s position, articulated by Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, was straightforward: returning to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders was an unrealistic objective; NATO membership for Ukraine was equally unrealistic; and any peacekeeping force required to secure an agreement would not include American troops and would not operate under a NATO mandate. This was denounced by some as capitulation. Arguing that this was Munich 1938 again, with many loudly crying never again, seeing themselves as guardians of lofty ideals, while losing sight of the reality on the ground. But this is nothing like Munich again. If you want to compare, it should be with the Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945, where new borders were drawn in Europe
A more considered assessment would suggest that these positions reflect the actual situation on the ground rather than any abandonment of principle, and that a settlement which ends the killing is not without merit on its own terms. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov himself acknowledged as much, noting that Trump was the first and, in his view at the time, the only Western leader to have publicly and clearly stated that one of the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis was the previous administration’s drive to draw Ukraine into NATO. No Western leader had said that before. That it took Trump to say it openly tells us something interesting about the courage of his predecessors.
The talks in Riyadh involved Russian demands that NATO scrap the promise of future membership for Ukraine contained in the Bucharest summit communiqué of April 2008. The details of those early discussions remained closely held, but the strategic logic was clear: peace with Russia would permit the United States to concentrate its attention and resources on the rather more consequential challenge posed by China. Trump, in this reading, was not conceding ground. Trump choosing his battles with a strategic clarity that had eluded several of his predecessors, and certainly also his European allies.

The Middle East: Gaza Cease-fire and Strikes on Iran
The Middle East produced some of the second Trump administration’s most striking and consequential foreign policy results. The administration was involved in brokering a Gaza cease-fire even before Trump’s inauguration, and its sustained personal engagement — described by the Middle East Institute as more intensive than that of any president since Obama yielded the insecure October 2025 Gaza cease-fire agreement, signed by Trump alongside the leaders of Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey at Sharm el-Sheikh. The release of the last living Israeli hostages, secured in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, represented a tangible human achievement that years of communiqués and working groups had conspicuously failed to produce. “Trump invested considerable personal time and energy to secure a cease-fire that produced the release of the last living Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.”(Middle East Institute, 2026 Annual Assessment).
On Iran, the administration’s maximum pressure campaign, backed by the credible threat of military force, produced the most significant damage to Tehran’s nuclear and military infrastructure in decades. In June 2025, co-ordinated Israeli and American strikes inflicted severe damage on Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility — an operation that had been contemplated by multiple previous administrations and never previously executed. American assessments confirmed substantial damage. The combination of military action, comprehensive sanctions, and European snapback measures left the Iranian regime strategically weakened to a degree without modern precedent. Those administrations that had preferred the careful choreography of the JCPOA to the blunter instruments of deterrence, ought to compare the results achived.
Across the wider region, Trump’s May 2025 tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE generated a wave of strategic, economic, energy, technological, and military agreements. The personal relationships cultivated by Trump with Gulf leaders produced investment commitments and security partnerships of a depth and breadth that multilateral diplomacy had never achieved. Saudi Arabia’s designation as a major non-NATO ally in November 2025, whilst controversial in some quarters, represented a durable strategic architecture for regional stability.
The swift and decisive execution of Operation Epic Fury on 27 February 2026 initiated a profound shift in the architecture of Middle Eastern security. The Iranian regime may still have operated under the comfortable assumption that the United States was too weary of endless conflicts to commit to high-intensity kinetic action. Operation Epic Fury shattered that assumption with considerable force.
By launching hundreds of strikes incoordination with Israels IDF, the Trump administration prioritised speed and overwhelming force to achieve specific, goal-oriented ends without the quagmire of ground occupation. The primary objectives were surgically focused on high-value strategic assets: the systematic degradation of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and production capacity; the crippling of Iran’s regional naval capabilities; and the disruption of critical infrastructure linked to nuclear weapons development. From a strategic perspective, this reflected a counter-proliferation doctrine that favoured coercive disarmament over the costly and frequently ineffective paradigm of regime-change and nation-building.
The operation was not without complexity. Framed as a limited intervention, its stated goals were straightforward enough — yet even at the time, the scale and targeting of the initial strikes suggested something broader: an attempt not merely to weaken Iran militarily, but to fundamentally alter its strategic posture. The administration’s simultaneous insistence that this would not become another “forever war” created the central tension of the operation. Applying enough force to achieve strategic objectives whilst avoiding a wider, uncontrollable conflict required the threading of a very fine needle. Officials emphasised restraint and limited aims; rhetoric occasionally drifted toward demands for sweeping concessions. Such contradictions did little to clarify whether the United States was pursuing a narrowly defined military outcome or something closer to regime transformation.
European reactions offered, as has become customary in such situations, a study in diplomatic caution. Governments in France, Germany, and Italy expressed concern, urged de-escalation, and emphasised the importance of international law, ignoring its impotence in the Iranian situation. The practical implication was equally familiar: Europe would contribute statements, whilst the United States and Israel handled the missiles. One might observe that European commitment to multilateralism is most robustly expressed precisely when it does not require the deployment of actual force. To be fair, European scepticism was not without foundation. Questions surrounding the legal justification for the operation were substantial, and European restraint could reasonably be read as adherence to legal norms that Washington was willing to interpret more flexibly.
As for the outcome, assessments remain divided. The operation inflicted significant damage on Iranian military infrastructure and demonstrated the continued reach of American power. At the same time, it fell short of delivering a decisive strategic transformation: Iran’s capabilities were degraded rather than eliminated, and regional tensions were heightened rather than resolved. Epic Fury succeeded tactically whilst leaving the broader strategic landscape considerably more volatile. It encapsulates a broader shift in American military thinking: the pursuit of short, high-intensity interventions designed to achieve outsized effects without long-term commitments. Whether this represents an evolution in warfare or a repackaging of old dilemmas remains genuinely open to debate. What is considerably less open to debate is the enduring asymmetry between American willingness to act and European preference to deliberate — an asymmetry that Epic Fury highlighted rather than resolved. Leaving unsolved the serious problems related to the double blockade of the Hormuz Strait for the time being.

The Indo-Pacific: The Race to Create Deterrence
In the Indo-Pacific — the theatre identified by all serious strategists as the defining arena of 21st-century great-power competition — the Trump administration reinforced the deterrence architecture with notable vigour. Exercise Resolute Dragon in September 2025, involving 19,000 American and Japanese forces, was the largest iteration of the annual drill to date. The first deployment of the Typhon missile system to Japan extended American strike capability across the theatre in a manner that was not lost on Beijing. Joint naval exercises with Japan and the Philippines in the South China Sea reinforced Washington’s treaty commitments and enhanced operational interoperability.
The administration’s October 2025 Indo-Pacific tour produced further momentum on regional economic co-operation. The strategic message — that China’s expansionism in the South China Sea and beyond would be met with a prepared and resolute American presence — was delivered clearly and with credibility.
The most direct and dangerous scenario remains a conflict over Taiwan. This pathway does not require a sudden Chinese decision for conquest, nor an explicit U.S. commitment to war. It emerges instead from mutual preventive logic. The United States, fearing that Chinese military capabilities will soon overwhelm denial strategies, accelerates forward deployments, arms transfers, and operational integration with Taiwan. Central to this effort is the construction of a “denial defense” along the First Island Chain (FIC), mainly consisting of the Kuril Islands, the Japanese Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and Borneo, thus closing off the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.
China, concluding that peaceful reunification is being structurally foreclosed, faces growing incentives to act before U.S. denial becomes insurmountable. Taiwan, sensing shrinking ambiguity, hardens its own political identity, further reducing diplomatic off-ramps. Each side believes delay worsens its position. Crisis stability erodes not because deterrence fails, but because deterrence becomes time-bound.
How to avoid a conflict over Taiwan? Let’s guess what this might be. Realising that the U.S. and China are about equal for the time being at least, war would seem rahther unwise. The alternative is dividing the world between them almost like in the olden days with the Soviet Union and the U.S. dividing the World in separate spheres of interest. What would that mean for Taiwan? That it might become a bargaining chip. Acceptance that it is part of China, on the condition unification would be by peaceful means and over time, remembering that Taiwan’s fab factories are still absolutely essential for the U.S.. With the U.S. resurrecting its own Monroe-Roosevelt doctrine under Trump, it seems reasonable to accept a kind of Chinese Monroe-like doctrine in relation to the South China Sea
 
Challenges and Unknown Road Ahead
No honest account of even the most successful administration should pretend that every challenge has been met. The durability of the Gaza cease-fire remains to be tested by events on the ground. Iran, though strategically weakened, retains its tactical reach and its capacity for regional mischief. The Ukraine settlement, if it comes, will carry costs as well as benefits, and not all of those costs will be borne equally. The long-term effects of the administration’s trade architecture will depend on execution as much as design, and the Supreme Court’s constraint on tariff-setting authority has introduced genuine uncertainty into a central element of the economic programme.
What the first year demonstrated was an administration willing to apply pressure, to accept short-term turbulence in pursuit of long-term structural advantage, and to treat American power as something to be deployed rather than apologised for. Whether that approach produces durable results will depend on a combination of continued political will, allied compliance, and the United States’ ability to rebuild the material foundations of its military and industrial power under conditions of intense global competition. The evidence of the first year suggests the foundation is being laid with rather more energy than anyone expected.
 
The American Disruptor and the World That Changed
The comparison of Biden’s 2021 and Trump’s 2025 first years reveals something important about the nature of effective American leadership. Biden’s first year was an act of polite restoration, sincere, often eloquent, and ultimately insufficient for a world that had moved on from the comfortable certainties of the post-Cold War order. It assumed that what allies and adversaries wanted was a return to familiar process, familiar faces, and the reassuring hum of multilateral diplomacy. The evidence of subsequent years suggests that assumption was, to be charitable, optimistic.
Trump’s second first year made clear that the world responds not to American politeness but to American power. The 5% NATO commitment achieved in a single year. The $750 billion EU energy agreement. The 93% reduction in border crossings. The 55-year low in illegal immigration. The degradation of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The $550 billion Japanese investment commitment. These are not talking points,  they are data points, and they tell a consistent story: that an administration willing to assert American interests directly, without apology, and backed by the credible application of economic and military leverage, can achieve in months what more tentative approaches had failed to achieve in years.
The second Trump administration’s domestic record was defined by coherence and ambition, a clear set of priorities pursued with relentless energy. Its foreign policy record was defined by results, measurable, documented outcomes that reshaped alliances, deterred adversaries, and delivered economic value directly to the American people. History will deliver its ultimate verdict in due course, as it always does. But the first year’s evidence suggests that this was, by the only measure that truly matters, an administration that delivered.
“Today, our border is secure, our spirit is restored, inflation is plummeting, incomes are rising fast, the roaring economy is roaring like never before, and our enemies are scared, our military and police are stacked, and America is respected again, perhaps, like never before.” (State of the Union Address, 2026).

“From the Halls of Montezuma
To the Shores of Tripoli;
We fight our country's battles
In the air, on land and sea;” 
U.S. Marine’s Hymn
 
A Young United States Waged War on Distant Countries Long Before Trump
In its early years, the American republic confronted a challenge that tested the young nation’s resolve: state-sponsored piracy in the Mediterranean. The Barbary States, Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia, and Tripoli, demanded tribute from U.S. merchant ships or seized them outright, holding crews for ransom. Rather than submit, the third U.S. president, Thomas Jefferson, finally chose war.
His First Barbary War (1801–1805), fought on the distant shores of North Africa, became a defining moment of U.S. defiance against extortion. At its heart were some of the most audacious operations in U.S. military history. The young United States, scarcely a generation removed from its own revolution, fought a conflict on the distant shores of North Africa, home to the troublesome Barbary States. This marked a decisive moment in the United States' emergence as a maritime power.
The war tested not only the strength of the American navy but also the principles upon which the republic was founded. At its core lay a question that had long divided policymakers: should the United States purchase peace through tribute, or defend its commerce by force?
More than two centuries later, President Donald Trump faced a modern echo of the same threat. Iran, through its Revolutionary Guard and proxies, menaced commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz—the narrow chokepoint carrying roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil. Tehran repeatedly threatened to close the strait, attacked tankers, and used mines and missiles to disrupt global trade.
Trump’s response—maximum economic pressure in his first term, followed by decisive military and diplomatic action in his second—mirrored Jefferson’s refusal to pay tribute. Both leaders rejected appeasement, deployed American power to protect commerce, and forced adversaries to back down. Thus, we see a curious parallel: a grueling maritime and overland campaign in 1805 and a high-stakes campaign of sanctions, naval presence, strikes, and ultimatums now.
 
Tensions Leading to War
Tensions with the Barbary States, Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia, and Tripoli, had simmered for years. American merchant ships, lacking protection, were vulnerable to capture by corsairs (pirates) operating under state sanction. European powers, such as Sweden, Denmark, and even Great Britain, had long managed this threat through payments, but the arrangement sat uneasily with American sensibilities. Shortly after Thomas Jefferson was inaugurated as the third President of the United States in March 1801, tensions rose anew.
The Bashaw (or Pasha) of Tripoli, Yusuf Qaramanli, had expressed his dissatisfaction with the terms of a previous treaty between the U.S. and Tripoli. Showing a readiness to seize U.S. ships, the Bashaw announced in October 1800 that if he did not have a response from the U.S. within six months, he would declare war. He stated that the price of a new treaty would be $225,000, plus continuing annual payments of $20,000. In January 1801, the U.S. Consul to Tripoli warned that war might be imminent, with a risk that U.S. ships might be seized before April 1801. He had earlier written: “there is no access to permanent friendship of these states without paving the way with gold or cannon balls.”
 
Jefferson Chose “Cannon Balls.”
After fifteen years of ever-rising tribute and ransom prices, alongside endless negotiations for captured ships and crews, President Jefferson decided to use force to ensure American safety in the Mediterranean. As Secretary of State, Jefferson had long taken a hard line against Barbary piracy. In 1801, The  just inaugurated President Jefferson therefore sent a small squadron of three frigates and a schooner, led by Commodore Richard Dale, to blockade Tripoli and to attack any interfering Barbary ship.
Jefferson also wrote a conciliatory letter, dated May 1801, to Bashaw Yusuf Qaramanli, informing him of the squadron but also of his goodwill and his wish for peace:
“We have found it expedient to detach a squadron of observation into the Mediterranean sea, to superintend the safety of our commerce there & to exercise our seamen in nautical duties. we recommend them to your hospitality and good offices should occasion require their resorting to your harbours. we hope that their appearance will give umbrage to no power for, while we mean to rest the safety of our commerce on the resources of our own strength & bravery in every sea, we have yet given them in strict command to conduct themselves towards all friendly powers with the most perfect respect & good order it being the first object of our sollicitude to cherish peace & friendship with all nations with whom it can be held on terms of equality & reciprocity."
The Bashaw of Tripoli had other ideas. On 14 May 1801, he ordered his soldiers to cut down the flagpole in front of the American consulate, declaring war on the United States. Commodore Dale and his squadron first learned about the Bashaw's declaration of war when they arrived in Gibraltar in July 1801.
The initial American response, though swift, proved cautious in execution. Naval commanders were instructed to protect commerce and observe developments, but constitutional concerns limited more aggressive action in the absence of a formal declaration of war. As a result, the early years of the conflict yielded little progress; blockades were attempted but imperfectly enforced. Tripolitan vessels evaded capture, and American merchant ships continued to face danger.
The war’s costs mounted, and doubts began to surface in Washington. Even President Jefferson, long an advocate of resistance, acknowledged the difficulty of the undertaking. The Barbary rulers, he observed, waged “a war of little expence to them which must put the great nations to a greater expence than the presents which would buy it off.”
But one naval engagement made history: On 1 August 1801, the brash Lieutenant Andrew Sterett of the 14-gun schooner Enterprise fought the first engagement of the war, capturing the corsair Tripoli, commanded by Admiral Rais Mahomet Rous. This first naval victory is commemorated in the 1801 poem Sterrett’s Sea Fight, and the name Enterprise became immortalised by a long series of major U.S. warships up to the present day.
 
Disaster Strikes
In 1801, Congress finally passed the “Act for Protection of Commerce and Seamen of the United States Against the Tripolitian Corsairs”, which was seen as a declaration of war. In the meantime, the navy commanders in the Mediterranean over the next two years proved less enterprising than Lieutenant Sterett.
Finally, in 1803, Commodore Preble led a more formidable U.S. squadron consisting of frigates—including the flagship 44-gun USS Constitution—schooners, and brigs to the Mediterranean.
A formidable force indeed, but soon disaster struck. The Philadelphia and Vixen were assigned to blockade Tripoli, but in October 1803 the Vixen left to pursue a corsair, leaving the deep-draught Philadelphia to patrol the treacherous, shallow coastline alone. On 31 October, while chasing a vessel heading for Tripoli, Captain Bainbridge realised the water was shoaling rapidly. Despite attempting to steer into deeper water, the ship struck a reef at eight knots, lifting it several feet onto the rocks.
As Tripolitan gunboats surrounded and fought the stranded frigate, the crew fought back until the ship’s heavy tilt made their remaining guns useless. To protect his crew and prevent the enemy from using the vessel, Bainbridge ordered the ship scuttled and the flag lowered at 5:00 pm. The Bashaw imprisoned the crew of 307 men in Tripoli, where they suffered the further indignity of watching the Tripolitan corsairs successfully refloat, repair, and remount the guns on the Philadelphia within a week.
 
A Strike on Tripoli Harbour
Determined to deny the enemy use of the captured vessel, Commodore Edward Preble authorised a bold operation to destroy the Philadelphia in its own harbour. In February 1804, a small American force led by Lieutenant Stephen Decatur sailed into Tripoli under cover of darkness aboard a captured vessel disguised as a merchant ship. Approaching the frigate, they succeeded in boarding her before the alarm was fully raised.
What followed was swift and decisive. The Tripolitan crew, taken by surprise, fled or were driven overboard. Within minutes, the Americans had secured the ship and set it ablaze. The scene was both terrifying and awe-inspiring: “The flames… ascending her rigging and masts, formed columns of fire… whilst the occasional discharge of her guns gave an idea of some directing spirit within her.”
Under heavy fire from shore batteries, Decatur and his men escaped without significant loss. The destruction of the Philadelphia denied Tripoli a valuable prize and restored confidence in the American effort.
 
To the Shores of Tripoli – A Daring Overland Expedition

When news of the Philadelphia's loss reached America, Jefferson and his colleagues began looking for a way to send at least two more frigates to the Mediterranean. Congress rallied behind the president and the navy, approving a new tax and new expenditures for the war. Newly appointed Commodore Samuel Barron would command eleven vessels, a force intended to coerce the enemy into a peace compatible with American honour and interests.
As the naval campaign continued, American strategy expanded beyond the sea. In 1805, Consul-General William Eaton led an expedition across the North African desert in support of Hamet Qaramanli, an older brother and rival claimant to Tripoli’s throne. Accompanied by a small contingent of U.S. Marines and a small force of mercenaries, Eaton marched 500 miles through the desert to the coastal city of Derna. While the navy maintained a long blockade of Tripoli, the expedition succeeded in capturing Derna with support from offshore naval forces.
The victory marked the first time American forces raised their flag in triumph on foreign soil. Although limited in scale, the operation demonstrated a new willingness to combine naval and land forces in pursuit of strategic objectives. After the capture of Derna, there was still a long way to reach Tripoli, and enthusiasm for the plan to oust the Bashaw was waning. There was increasing doubt about Hamet, the mercenaries were leaving, and at sea, there was doubt regarding the ability to sustain another winter blockade.
 
A Negotiated Peace
Despite successes, neither side achieved a decisive victory. Tripoli proved resilient, while the United States bore the financial and logistical burden of maintaining a distant war. By mid-1805, both parties appeared ready to negotiate.
A treaty was concluded in June. The United States secured the release of its prisoners in exchange for a payment of $60,000, seen not as tribute, but as ransom. Notably, the agreement did not establish ongoing tribute payments, a key objective of American policy. Here two important articles of the “Treaty Of Peace and Amity between the United States of America and the Bashaw, Bey and Subjects of Tripoli in Barbary”:
 
On peace and reciprocal favours
“There shall be, from the conclusion of this Treaty, a firm, inviolable and universal peace, and a sincere friendship between the President and Citizens of the United States of America, on the one part, and the Bashaw, Bey and Subjects of the Regency of Tripoli in Barbary on the other, made by the free consent of both Parties, and on the terms of the most favoured Nation. And if either party shall hereafter grant to any other Nation, any particular favour or priviledge in Navigation or Commerce, it shall immediately become common to the other party, freely, where it is freely granted, to such other Nation, but where the grant is conditional it shall be at the option of the contracting parties to accept, alter or reject, such conditions in such manner, as shall be most conducive to their respective Interests.” (https://avalon.law.yale.edu).
 
On release of The Bashaw’s captured prisoners
 
“The Bashaw of Tripoli shall deliver up to the American Squadron now off Tripoli, all the Americans in his possession; and all the Subjects of the Bashaw of Tripoli now in the power of the United States of America shall be delivered up to him; and as the number of Americans in possession of the Bashaw of Tripoli amounts to Three Hundred Persons, more or less; and the number of Tripolino Subjects in the power of the Amelicans (sic) to about, One Hundred more or less; The Bashaw of Tripoli shall receive from the United States of America, the sum of Sixty Thousand Dollars, as a payment for the difference between the Prisoners herein mentioned.”(https://avalon.law.yale.edu)
 
The outcome was met with mixed reactions at home. Some critics argued that any payment undermined the principle for which the war was fought, while others contended that the conflict had already achieved a more lasting victory. As one observer noted, the war established the precedent that the U.S. would stand up for itself on the world stage rather than pay for safe passage.
 
Growing International Confidence
Thus, the First Barbary War represents a significant chapter in the early history of the United States. It revealed the challenges of projecting power abroad and the complexities of balancing principle with practicality. It also demonstrated a growing confidence—a willingness to defend American interests beyond its shores. For a nation still defining its place in the world, the lessons of Tripoli proved enduring. The young United States was no longer content to remain a passive actor; it had entered the world stage and intended to remain there.
 
Shared Legacy: Will and Strength to Secure Peace
The blockade of Tripoli and the 500-mile march to Derna and Trump’s Hormuz campaign, are separated by centuries, yet united by principle. Jefferson refused to pay pirates; Trump refused to tolerate a nuclear-threshold state’s chokehold on energy lifelines. Both faced domestic critics wary of entanglement, yet both chose decisive action over tribute or timidity.
Eaton’s Marines and mercenaries captured Derna against overwhelming odds. Trump’s combination of sanctions, strikes, and deadlines forced Iran to the table on American terms. In both cases, the result was the same: hostile actors learned that threatening American commerce carries a steep price. Jefferson’s war established that the United States would defend its flag on distant seas; Trump’s actions reaffirmed it in the 21st century. The lesson endures: when commerce is threatened, strength, not submission, preserves the peace.

Indenrigspolitik, strategisk tavshed
Den igangværende danske valgkamp frem mod folketingsvalget den 24. marts udspiller sig på et tidspunkt med en af de mest dramatiske geopolitiske transformationer siden afslutningen på Den Kolde Krig. Ruslands invasion af Ukraine, den hurtige europæiske oprustning, usikkerheden om den transatlantiske alliances fremtid samt Israels og USA’s militære engagementer i Mellemøsten har fundamentalt ændret det strategiske miljø, som Danmark opererer i.
Og alligevel synes selve valgkampen, ganske bemærkelsesværdigt, næsten fuldstændig løsrevet fra disse udviklinger.
Den politiske debat har i høj grad været centreret om indenrigspolitiske emner såsom velfærdsudgifter, beskatning og kvaliteten af offentlige serviceydelser. Samtidig får nogle af de mest betydningsfulde strategiske spørgsmål, som Danmark står overfor—including krigen i Ukraine, langsigtet forsvarspolitik, relationerne til USA, Den Europæiske Unions fremtid og risikoen for bredere konflikter—kun den mest flygtige og forsigtige opmærksomhed.
Dette essay ser på den danske valgkamp fra et kritisk perspektiv. Først ved at undersøge de hovedtemaer, der dominerer kampagnen, og de måder, hvorpå forskellige partier indrammer dem. Dernæst ved at udforske de strukturelle politiske dynamikker, der ligger til grund for disse debatter. Endelig ved at vende sig mod det mest slående træk ved valgkampen: de historisk betydningsfulde geopolitiske spørgsmål, som næsten fuldstændigt er fraværende fra den offentlige politiske diskussion.
 
Nøgletemaer i den aktuelle danske valgkamp
På trods af det brede spektrum af udfordringer, Danmark står overfor, har valgkampen været centreret omkring et relativt snævert sæt af emner. Disse temaer er overvejende indenrigspolitiske og afspejler de velkendte bekymringer i velfærdsstatens politik.
 
Formueskat og økonomisk retfærdighed
En af de centrale debatter drejer sig om forslag om at indføre en ny skat på formue. Tilhængere argumenterer for, at sådanne politikker vil reducere ulighed og skabe finansiering til forbedringer af offentlige ydelser såsom uddannelse og sundhedsvæsen. Venstrefløjspartier indrammer formueskatten primært som et spørgsmål om social retfærdighed og fairness. Efter deres opfattelse kræver den danske velfærdsstat nye finansieringskilder, hvis service af høj kvalitet skal opretholdes. Statsminister Mette Frederiksen, en Socialdemokrat, har argumenteret: “Når den rigeste ene procent af befolkningen ejer omkring en fjerdedel af Danmarks samlede nettoformue, er balancen blevet for skæv. Derfor foreslår vi en formueskat. Danmark blev ikke et stærkt og velstående samfund på grund af ulighed. Tværtimod—vi blev det, vi er, fordi vi er vant til at arbejde sammen, og fordi vi ikke er alt for forskellige fra hinanden.” (avisendanmark.dk).
Partier på den liberale og konservative fløj modsvarer, at sådanne skatter vil afskrække investeringer og skade Danmarks konkurrenceevne. De advarer om, at velhavende iværksættere og virksomheder kan flytte til lande med lavere skattebyrder. Og erhvervsledere har fulgt op med trusler om at forlade Danmark, hvis en formueskat bliver implementeret.
Centrum-højre foretrækker derfor en ganske anderledes vægtning. Alex Vanopslagh fra Liberal Alliance efterlyser for eksempel omfattende afregulering: “Først og fremmest har vi brug for omfattende afregulering. Derfor har Liberal Alliance foreslået en bindende bureaukratilov, så vi politikere binder os selv til masten og garanterer resultater. Det kræver også et opgør med en lang række skatter—herunder selskabsskat, aktieskat og kapitalskat—som bør reduceres betydeligt.” (Dansk Industri, Folketingsvalg 2026).
På trods af debattens tilsyneladende intensitet er den på mange måder i høj grad symbolsk. Danmark har allerede et af de mest omfordelende skattesystemer i verden. Argumentet handler derfor mindre om fundamentale systemiske ændringer end om politisk identitet og prioriteringer.
 
Pres på velfærdsstaten
Et andet centralt tema er det voksende pres på Danmarks velfærdssystem. Den offentlige diskussion fokuserer ofte på:
ventetider i sundhedssystemet
personalemangel på hospitaler og i ældreplejen
pres på de offentlige skoler
kvaliteten af ydelser til en aldrende befolkning
Næsten hvert parti præsenterer sig selv som en forsvarer af velfærdsstaten. De primære uenigheder handler om, hvordan systemet skal finansieres og organiseres. Partier på venstrefløjen foretrækker generelt øgede offentlige udgifter og højere skatter på velhavende individer eller virksomheder. Liberale partier argumenterer derimod for, at effektivitetsreformer og strukturelle justeringer er nødvendige, hvis velfærdsydelser skal opretholdes uden løbende at hæve skatterne.
 
Indvandring og integration
Indvandring har historisk været et af de mest omstridte emner i dansk politik. I den nuværende valgkamp er dets rolle dog noget mere afdæmpet end ved tidligere valg. I løbet af det seneste årti er dansk udlændingepolitik gradvist blevet strammere på tværs af store dele af det politiske spektrum. Selv traditionelle centrum-venstre partier støtter nu relativt restriktive migrationspolitikker.
Som resultat heraf er den politiske kløft på indvandringsområdet blevet mindre. Forskelle består stadig—særligt mellem rød-grønne partier og højrepopulistiske partier—men kløften er ikke længere så stor som tidligere.Dog har et krav fra Morten Messerschmidt fra Dansk Folkeparti genantændt debatten vedrørende muslimske migranter ved at sige: “Vi gør det til et ultimatum for at støtte en borgerlig regering, at regeringsgrundlaget skal sikre, at færre muslimer kommer ind i Danmark, end der forlader landet. Der skal være netto-udvandring af muslimske borgere.
Pensionsalder og “seniorliv”
Socialdemokratiet, Socialistisk Folkeparti og Enhedslisten har foreslået nye initiativer, der vil øge fleksibiliteten eller sænke tempoet i stigningen af pensionsalderen. Centrum-højre partier—særligt Venstre og Liberal Alliance—advarer om, at sådanne forslag kan underminere den langsigtede bæredygtighed i den danske økonomi og true fremtidige velfærdsinvesteringer.
 
Drikkevand og den grønne omstilling
Noget pludseligt er beskyttelsen af rent drikkevand blevet en slagmark for gode intentioner i takt med, at et valg nærmer sig. Mette Frederiksen: “Drikkevand fortjener særlig opmærksomhed i den valgperiode, vi nu går ind i,” sagde Mette Frederiksen. (DR, 3. marts 2026)
Debatten om grundvandsbeskyttelse og den grønne omstilling har udviklet sig til en særpræget politisk disciplin, hvor en alliance af venstrefløjspartier og grønne partier kræver strenge forbud mod sprøjtning med pesticider i sårbare områder, mens Socialdemokratiet og Venstre entusiastisk beskylder hinanden for utilstrækkelig økologisk dyd.
 
National sikkerhed og lederskab
Udenrigspolitik optræder lejlighedsvis i valgkampen gennem diskussioner om lederskab og national sikkerhed. Politiske ledere fremhæver deres evne til at håndtere internationale kriser og beskytte danske interesser. Disse diskussioner udvikler sig sjældent til dybere debatter om den strategiske retning for dansk udenrigspolitik. I stedet indrammes udenrigspolitik som regel i symbolske termer, der understreger stabilitet og ansvarligt lederskab. Et nyligt eksempel på en noget teatralsk uenighed vedrører forsvarsminister Troels Lund Poulsen fra Venstre og Mette Frederiksen, efter et forslag fra Venstre om at fordoble længden af værnepligten—en idé som Frederiksen insisterer på allerede var blevet diskuteret tidligere i regeringen.
 
Atomkraft, atomvåben—og, uventet, kokain
Liberal Alliance har taget føringen med en næsten religiøs overbevisning om, at små modulære atomreaktorer repræsenterer svaret på alt fra klimaforandringer til elpriser. “Hvis fremtiden skal være god, grøn og generøs, har vi brug for atomkraft.” De traditionelle regeringspartier i det politiske centrum har reageret med en bemærkelsesværdigt veludført politisk pantomime af eftertænksomme mumlen og forsigtige “tja, måske.”
En lignende forsigtighed omgiver den franske præsidents forslag om at udvide en atomparaply til Danmark og andre europæiske allierede.
Mærkeligt nok har den politiske debat dog vist langt større iver efter at diskutere Liberal Alliances Alex Vanopslaghs tilståelse af at have taget kokain.
 
Ingen reel dynamik i dansk partipolitik
For at forstå, hvorfor valgkampen fokuserer på relativt snævre indenrigspolitiske emner—og pludseligt på nitrater i drikkevand og narkotika—er det nødvendigt at se på bredere strukturelle tendenser i dansk politik.
 
Udligning af traditionelle politiske blokke
Historisk set var dansk politik organiseret omkring to blokke: en centrum-venstre blok og en centrum-højre blok. I de senere år er denne opdeling blevet mindre tydelig. Koalitionsregeringer krydser i stigende grad traditionelle ideologiske grænser og samler partier, der tidligere stod i klar opposition til hinanden. Som følge heraf handler valg mindre om at vælge mellem radikalt forskellige politiske modeller og mere om at justere prioriteringer inden for et allerede etableret system. Dette kan være med til at forklare den lejlighedsvise fascination af mindre vigtige temaer og partisager, der giver partier mulighed for at bringe hinanden i forlegenhed.
 
Konsensuspolitik
Danmark har længe været kendetegnet ved en politisk kultur baseret på konsensus. Store reformer forhandles ofte på tværs af partilinjer, og brede parlamentariske aftaler er almindelige. Denne kompromiskultur har mange fordele, herunder politisk stabilitet og kontinuitet i politikken.
Den reducerer dog også sandsynligheden for, at valg kommer til at dreje sig om store ideologiske konflikter. I den nuværende valgkamp er konsensuspolitik med til at forklare, hvorfor mange strategiske spørgsmål får så lidt opmærksomhed: der er ganske enkelt begrænset uenighed mellem de store partier. Efterhånden som de ideologiske forskelle er blevet mindre, tilskyndes politiske strateger til at fremhæve små, men meget synlige indenrigspolitiske emner, som antages at appellere til vælgerne, frem for komplekse internationale spørgsmål.
 
Store strategiske spørgsmål fraværende fra valgkampen
Det mest slående træk ved valgkampen er ikke, hvad der diskuteres, men hvad der omhyggeligt undgås. Flere emner af enorm strategisk betydning får bemærkelsesværdigt lidt vedvarende opmærksomhed—på trods af at de kan påvirke næsten alle aspekter af dansk politik.
 
Stedfortræderkrigen i Ukraine
Ruslands invasion af Ukraine udgør den største militære konflikt i Europa siden Anden Verdenskrig. Relativt til sin størrelse har Danmark været blandt Ukraines stærkeste støtter. Dansk støtte har inkluderet:
 
militært udstyr
finansiel bistand
træning af ukrainske styrker
diplomatisk støtte i internationale institutioner
 
På trods af omfanget af disse engagementer diskuteres krigen i Ukraine sjældent under valgkampen. Den primære årsag er en mærkelig, men bred politisk konsensus, hvilket efterlader flere vigtige spørgsmål stort set ubesvarede:
 
Hvor længe bør Danmark opretholde et højt niveau af militær støtte?
Hvilke risici for eskalation eksisterer mellem NATO og Rusland?
Hvordan kunne en forhandlet løsning se ud?
Opretholdelse af langvarig frygt og fjendtlighed over for Rusland?
 
Sådanne spørgsmål indebærer komplekse strategiske afvejninger, som sjældent passer ind i valgkampens retorik. Noget den belgiske premierminister Bart De Wever muligvis har indset, da han for nylig argumenterede: “…vi må normalisere relationerne med Rusland og genvinde adgang til billig energi. Det er sund fornuft. Privat siger europæiske ledere til mig, at jeg har ret, men ingen tør sige det højt.” (The Brussels Times, 15. marts 2026).
 
Hurtig oprustning
En anden væsentlig udvikling, som i vid udstrækning er fraværende i valgkampens debat, er den dramatiske stigning i forsvarsudgifter i hele Europa, herunder i Danmark.
I årtierne efter Den Kolde Krig reducerede europæiske lande deres militære udgifter. Krigen i Ukraine vendte denne tendens næsten fra den ene dag til den anden. Danmark investerer nu massivt i:
 
nye våbensystemer, herunder offensive våben
luftforsvarssystemer
militær infrastruktur
udvidede væbnede styrker
omkostningstungt forsvar af Grønland og Arktis
 
Forsvarsudgifterne stiger til niveauer, der ikke er set i årtier. Alligevel diskuteres konsekvenserne af denne udvikling sjældent under valgkampen. Det centrale spørgsmål—hvordan øgede forsvarsudgifter skal afvejes mod velfærdsstatens opgaver—er politisk følsomt og undgås derfor ofte.
 
NATO, Europa og atomafskrækkelse
Krigen i Ukraine har også fremskyndet diskussioner om en stærkere europæisk rolle i forsvar. Den Europæiske Union har udvidet samarbejdet på områder som:
 
fælles indkøb af våben
finansieringsmekanismer for forsvar
militær koordinering
 
For Danmark rejser dette grundlæggende spørgsmål om den fremtidige balance mellem NATO og europæiske forsvarsstrukturer. EU-integration har dog historisk været kontroversiel i dansk politik. Valgkampstrateger foretrækker derfor ofte at undgå emnet for at forhindre splittende debatter.
Samtidig er diskussioner om atomar afskrækkelse vendt tilbage med overraskende styrke og vækker en uventet genklang af Den Kolde Krig. Muligheden for strategisk samarbejde med Frankrig har åbnet en dør, som mange troede var permanent lukket. Regeringen forsøger at berolige offentligheden med, at intet grundlæggende ændrer sig—selvom Danmark forsigtigt bevæger sig tættere på den franske præsidents løfte om at stille en atomparaply til rådighed, dog altid under fransk kommando.
 
Mindre tillid til USA
Danmark har traditionelt haft et meget tæt forhold til USA gennem NATO og bilateralt sikkerhedssamarbejde. Samtidig har de senere år introduceret nye usikkerheder i det transatlantiske forhold—særligt efter udtalelser fra præsident Donald Trump vedrørende Grønland.
Europæiske ledere, herunder den tyske kansler Friedrich Merz, overvejer i stigende grad risikoen  for, at USA kan reducere sine sikkerhedsforpligtelser i Europa. Dette rejser vigtige spørgsmål:
 
Bør Europa blive mere strategisk uafhængigt?
Hvordan skal Danmark balancere loyalitet over for NATO mod stærkere europæiske forsvarskapaciteter?
På trods af deres betydning bliver disse spørgsmål sjældent centrale temaer i valgkampen.
 
Risikoen for en bredere konflikt i Mellemøsten
Globale spændinger i Mellemøsten—herunder konflikten med Iran—kan få store konsekvenser for europæisk sikkerhed og energiforsyning. For Danmark kan sådanne konflikter påvirke:
 
NATO-operationer
globale handelsruter
energipriser
international diplomati
 
Ikke desto mindre spiller Mellemøstens geopolitiske situation kun en mindre rolle i valgkampens diskussioner. Danske partier har tendens til at følge bredere vestlige diplomatiske linjer frem for at formulere særskilte nationale strategier.
 
En valgkamp, der skjuler et slående paradoks
Danmark gennemgår en af de mest betydningsfulde transformationer af sin sikkerhedspolitik i moderne tid. Landet øger forsvarsudgifterne, styrker militære kapaciteter og spiller en aktiv rolle i støtten til Ukraine. Samtidig holdes dybtgående globale forandringer med potentielt afgørende konsekvenser for Danmark i vid udstrækning uden for valgkampen.
Politiske beslutningstagere synes optaget af at konstruere et defensivt skjold mod en forestillet ekstern trussel, mens de i langt mindre grad retter opmærksomheden mod truede interne stabilitet i det samfund, som skjoldet er tiltænkt at beskytte. De dybere sårbarheder i vestlige samfund—inklusive dem i det tilsyneladende homogene Danmark—får faktisk kun begrænset opmærksomhed:
 
stigende politisk uro og fremvæksten af protestpartier
demokratiske underskud og manglende gennemsigtighed i EU
stigende social ulighed og faldende solidaritet
sociale spændinger forbundet med migration og integration
 
Erfaringer fra lande som Sverige, Storbritannien og Frankrig kan udgøre tidlige tegn på opløsning og sammenbrud i Vesteuropa.
Paradokset er slående: Europa opruster hurtigt mod et Rusland, som hverken synes klar til eller i stand til at angribe Vesteuropa, for at forsvare samfund, som i stigende grad står over for deres stærke interne spændinger. Et tungere, dyrere—og muligvis provokerende—skjold bliver således konstrueret for at bevare de bløde indre dele af et samfund, som gradvist kan være ved at opløses indefra.
Burde dette ikke være et centralt emne i en valgkamp?
 
Vælgerne efterlades med ad hoc-problemer og fængende blikfang
Vælgerne bliver ikke bedt om at tage stilling til disse kolossale transformationer. I stedet fokuserer valgkampens diskussioner primært på trygge indenrigspolitiske emner såsom beskatning og offentlige serviceydelser. Dette mønster afspejler både den konsensusorienterede karakter af dansk politik og den strategiske kompleksitet i moderne geopolitik. Mens vælgerne præsenteres for beskedne valg vedrørende velfærdspolitik, beskatning og offentlige serviceydelser, forbliver de dybere geopolitiske transformationer, der former Danmarks fremtid, næsten fuldstændig uden for den centrale politiske debat.

English  Version: 
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/hyggelig-danish-election-campaign-in-a-time-of-geopolitical-upheaval

Domestic Politics, Strategic Silence
The ongoing Danish election campaign for the Folketingsvalg  on March 24  is unfolding at a moment of one of the most dramatic geopolitical transformations since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, rapid European rearmament, uncertainty about the future of the transatlantic alliance, and the military engagements of Israel and the United States in the Middle East have fundamentally altered the strategic environment in which Denmark operates.
And yet, rather remarkably, the election campaign itself appears almost entirely detached from these developments.
Political debate has largely centred on domestic matters such as welfare spending, taxation, and the quality of public services. Meanwhile, some of the most consequential strategic questions facing Denmark—including the war in Ukraine, long-term defence policy, relations with the United States, the future of the European Union, and the risk of wider conflicts—receive only the most fleeting and delicate attention.
This essay takes a look at the Danish election campaign from a critical perspective.First looking at  the principal themes that dominate the campaign and the ways in which different parties frame them. Then  exploring the structural political dynamics underlying these debates. Finally, turning to the most striking feature of the campaign: the historically significant geopolitical questions that remain almost entirely absent from public political discussion.
 
Key Themes in the Current Danish Election Campaign
Despite the wide array of challenges confronting Denmark, the campaign has centred on a relatively narrow set of issues. These themes are overwhelmingly domestic in nature and reflect the familiar concerns of welfare-state politics.
 
Wealth Tax and Economic Fairness
One of the central debates concerns proposals to introduce a new tax on wealth.
Supporters argue that such policies would reduce inequality and provide funding for improvements to public services such as education and healthcare. Left-wing parties frame the wealth tax primarily as a matter of social justice and fairness. In their view, the Danish welfare state requires new sources of funding if high-quality services are to be maintained. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, a Social Demokrat. has argued: “When the wealthiest one percent of the populatin owns around a quarter of Denmark’s total net wealth, the balance has become too skewed. We therefore propose a wealth tax. Denmark did not become a strong and prosperous society because of inequality. On the contrary—we became what we are because we are used to working together and because we are not excessively different from one another.” (avisendanmark.dk).
Parties on the liberal and conservative side counter that such taxes would discourage investment and damage Denmark’s competitiveness. They warn that wealthy entrepreneurs and businesses might relocate to countries with lighter tax burdens. And  business leader have followed up with threats to leave Denmark, if a wealth tax would be implemented..
The centre-right therefore prefers a rather different emphasis. Alex Vanopslagh of Liberal Alliance, for example, calls for sweeping deregulation: “Above all we need comprehensive deregulation. That is why Liberal Alliance has proposed a binding bureaucracy law, so that we politicians tie ourselves to the mast and guarantee results. It also requires a confrontation with a long list of taxes—corporate tax, share tax and capital tax among them—which should be significantly reduced.” (Dansk Industri, Folketingsvalg 2026).
Despite the apparent intensity of the debate, it is in many ways largely symbolic. Denmark already possesses one of the most redistributive tax systems in the world. The argument is therefore less about fundamental systemic change than about political identity and priorities.
 
Pressure on the Welfare State
Another central theme is the growing pressure on Denmark’s welfare system. Public discussion frequently focuses on:
waiting times in the healthcare system
staff shortages in hospitals and elderly care
pressures on public schools
the quality of services for an ageing population.
Almost every party presents itself as a defender of the welfare state. The primary disagreements concern how the system should be financed and organised.
Parties on the left generally favour increased public spending and higher taxes on wealthy individuals or companies. Liberal parties, meanwhile, tend to argue that efficiency reforms and structural adjustments are required if welfare services are to be sustained without continuously raising taxes.
 
Immigration and Integration
Immigration has historically been one of the most contentious issues in Danish politics. In the current campaign, however, its role is somewhat more subdued than in earlier elections.
Over the past decade, Danish immigration policy has gradually shifted toward stricter regulation across much of the political spectrum. Even traditional centre-left parties now support relatively restrictive migration policies.
As a result, the political divide on immigration has narrowed. Differences remain—particularly between red-green parties and right-wing populist parties—but the gap is no longer as wide as it once was.
Although  a demand from Morten Messerschmidt from Dansk Folkeparti, has  rekindled the debate with regard to Muslim  migrants by saying: “We make it an ultimatum for supporting a centre-right government that the government programme must ensure that fewer Muslims enter Denmark than leave. There must be net emigration of Muslim citizens.”
 
Retirement Age and the “Senior Life”
Social Democrats, the Socialist People’s Party, and the Red-Green Alliance have proposed new initiatives that would increase flexibility or slow the pace at which the retirement age rises.
Centre-right parties—particularly Venstre and Liberal Alliance—warn that such proposals could undermine the long-term sustainability of the Danish economy and threaten future welfare investments.
 
Drinking Water and the Green Transition
Somewhat suddenly, the protection of clean drinking water has become a battlefield of admirable intentions now that an election looms. Mette Fredriksen: “Drinking water deserves special focus in the election period we are now entering, said Mette Frederiksen.” (DR, March 3, 2026)
The debate about groundwater protection and the green transition has evolved into a peculiar political discipline in which an alliance of left-wing parties and  green parties calls for strict bans on pesticide spraying in vulnerable areas, while the Social Democrats and Venstre enthusiastically accuse one another of insufficient ecological virtue.
 
National Security and Leadership
Foreign policy occasionally appears in the campaign through discussions about leadership and national security. Political leaders emphasise their capacity to handle international crises and protect Danish interests.
These discussions rarely develop into deeper debates about the strategic direction of Danish foreign policy. Instead, foreign policy is usually framed in symbolic terms emphasising stability and responsible leadership.
A recent example of somewhat theatrical disagreement concerns Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen  from Venstre and Mette Frederiksen, following a proposal from Venstre to double the length of military conscription—an idea which Frederiksen insists had already been discussed within the government.
 
Nuclear Power, Nuclear Weapons—and, Unexpectedly, Cocaine
Liberal Alliance has taken the lead with an almost religious conviction that small modular nuclear reactors represent the answer to everything from climate change to electricity prices. "If the future is to be good, green and generous, we need nuclear power."
The traditional governing parties in the political centre have responded with a remarkably accomplished political pantomime of thoughtful murmurs and cautious “well perhaps”.
A similar delicacy surrounds the French president’s suggestion of extending a nuclear umbrella to Denmark  and  other European allies.
Curiously though, the political debate has shown far greater eagerness t discussing liberal Alliance’s Alex Vanopslagh’s confession  of having taken cocaine.
 
No real Dynamics in Danish Party Politics
To understand why the campaign focuses on relatively narrow domestic issues—and suddenly on nitrates in drinking  water and narcotics—it is necessary to consider broader structural trends in Danish politics.
 
Blurring of Traditional Political Blocs
Historically, Danish politics was organised around two blocs: a centre-left bloc and a centre-right bloc. In recent years, this division has become less distinct.
Coalition governments increasingly cross traditional ideological boundaries, bringing together parties that once stood firmly in opposition to one another.
As a result, elections are less about choosing between radically different political models and more about adjusting priorities within an already established system. This may help explain the occasional fascination with minor themes and party problems that allow parties to embarrass one another.
 
Consensus Politics
Denmark has long been characterised by a political culture based on consensus. Major reforms are often negotiated across party lines, and broad parliamentary agreements are common.
This culture of compromise has many advantages, including political stability and policy continuity. However, it also reduces the likelihood that elections will revolve around major ideological conflicts.
In the present campaign, consensus politics helps explain why many strategic questions receive little attention: there is simply limited disagreement among the major parties.
As ideological differences have narrowed, political strategists are encouraged to highlight small but highly visible domestic issues that is supposed resonate with voters, rather than complex international questions.
 
Major Strategic Questions Absent from the Campaign
The most striking feature of the election campaign is not what is discussed, but what is carefully avoided.
Several issues of enormous strategic importance receive remarkably little sustained attention—despite the fact that they may influence nearly every aspect of Danish politics.
 
The Proxy War in Ukraine
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents the largest military conflict in Europe since the Second World War. Relative to its size, Denmark has been among Ukraine’s strongest supporters. Danish assistance has included:
military equipment
financial aid
training of Ukrainian forces
diplomatic support in international institutions.
Despite the scale of these commitments, the war in Ukraine is rarely debated during the campaign.The primary reason is strange , yet broad political consensus.Leaving several important questions largely unaddressed:
How long should Denmark maintain high levels of military assistance?
What risks of escalation exist between NATO and Russia?
What might a negotiated settlement look like?
Keeping  up long term fear of and hostility towards  Russia?
Such questions involve complex strategic trade-offs that rarely fit comfortably within campaign rhetoric. Something  the Bergian Prime Minister Bart de Wever  may have  realised when rently arguing  “... we must normalise relations with Russia and regain access to cheap energy. It's common sense. In private, European leaders tell me I'm right, but no one dares to say it out loud.” (the Brussels Times, March 15, 2026).
 
Rapid Rearmament
Another major development largely absent from the campaign debate is the dramatic increase in defence spending across Europe, including Denmark.
For decades after the Cold War, European countries reduced military expenditures. The war in Ukraine reversed this trend almost overnight. Denmark is now investing heavily in:
new weapons systems  including offensive  weapons
air defence systems
military infrastructure
expanded armed forces
costly defence  of Greenland and the Arctic.
Defence spending is rising to levels not seen for decades. Yet the implications of this shift are rarely discussed during the election. The key question—how increased defence spending should be balanced against welfare-state commitments—is politically sensitive and therefore often avoided.
 
NATO,  Europe and Nuclear Deterrence
The war in Ukraine has also accelerated discussions about a stronger European role in defence. The European Union has expanded cooperation in areas such as:
joint procurement of weapons
defence financing mechanisms
military coordination.
For Denmark, this raises fundamental questions about the future balance between NATO and European defence structures. However, EU integration has historically been controversial in Danish politics. Campaign strategists therefore often prefer to avoid it in order to prevent divisive debates.
Meanwhile, discussions about nuclear deterrence have reappeared with surprising enthusiasm, evoking an unexpected Cold War flashback. The possibility  of strategic cooperation with France has opened a door many assumed was permanently sealed.
The government attempts to reassure the public that nothing fundamental is changing—even as Denmark cautiously edges closer to the French president’s promise of providing nuclear umbrella, albeit under  French command.
 
Less Trust in  the United States
Denmark has traditionally maintained extremely close relations with the United States through NATO and bilateral security cooperation. At the same time, recent years have introduced new uncertainties in the transatlantic relationship—especially following remarks by former US President Donald Trump regarding Greenland.
European leaders, including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, increasingly consider the possibility that the United States might reduce its security commitments to Europe.
This raises important questions:
Should Europe become more strategically independent?
How should Denmark balance loyalty to NATO with stronger European defence capabilities?
Despite their significance, these issues rarely become central campaign themes.
 
The Risk of Wider Conflict in the Middle East
Global tensions in the Middle East—including the possibility of conflict involving Iran—could have major implications for European security and energy. For Denmark such conflicts could affect:
NATO operations
global trade routes
energy prices
international diplomacy.
Nevertheless, Middle Eastern geopolitics plays only a minor role in campaign discussions. Danish parties tend to follow broader Western diplomatic positions rather than presenting distinct national strategies.
 
An Election Campaign Avoiding a Striking Paradox
Denmark is undergoing one of the most significant transformations of its security policy in modern history. The country is increasing defence spending, strengthening military capabilities, and playing an active role in supporting Ukraine. At the same time, profound global shifts with potentially decisive consequences for Denmark are largely kept outside the election campaign.
Political decision-makers appear preoccupied with constructing a defensive shield against an imagined external threat, while paying far less attention to the internal stability of the society the shield is meant to protect. Indeed, the deeper vulnerabilities of Western societies—including those of apparently homogeneous Denmark—receive little attention:
growing political unrest and the rise of protest parties
democratic deficits and lack of transparency within the EU
increasing social inequality and declining solidarity
social tensions associated with migration and integration.
Experiences in countries such as Sweden, the United Kingdom, and France may represent early signs disintegration and break down within Western Europe.
The paradox is striking: Europe is rapidly rearming against a Russia that neither appears ready nor capable of attacking Western Europe, in order to defend societies that increasingly face their own  internal pressures. A heavier, more expensive—and arguably provocative—tortoise shield is thus being constructed to preserve a the  soft innards  of a society that may gradually be dissolving from within.
Should this not be a central topic in an election campaign?
 
Voters Are Left  With Ad Hoc Problems And Catchy Eye-openers  
Voters are not asked to take a position on these colossal transformations. Instead, election discussions focus primarily on comfortable domestic concerns such as taxation and public services.This pattern reflects both the consensus-oriented nature of Danish politics and the strategic complexity of modern geopolitics.
While voters are presented with modest choices concerning welfare policy, taxation, and public services, the deeper geopolitical transformations shaping Denmark’s future remain almost entirely outside the central political debate.

"Certainly, whoever has the right to make you absurd has the right to make you unjust" — Voltaire

Threats to Freedom of Expression
Voltaire, often regarded as an apostle of freedom of expression, wrote the play Le Fanatisme ou Mahomet le Prophète, which premiered in 1741 and was fiercely criticised by Catholics. In 2006, the town of Saint-Genis-Pouilly on the border between France and Switzerland planned a public reading of Mahomet. The reaction in the small town was immediate:
“This play… constitutes an insult to the entire Muslim community,” wrote a Muslim café owner to the mayor, demanding that the reading be cancelled.
The event nevertheless went ahead, but the atmosphere was described as “quasi-insurrectional”. Once again, Muslim threats and protests led many to recognise how far matters had already gone.
“Help us Voltaire. They have gone mad,” declared the headline in France Soir.
What is the relationship between religious demands and rights such as freedom of expression, equality, and equality before the law? Can all the religious demands we especially see in connection with a Muslim religion be justified with reference to universal human rights, or is the conflict also built into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? To find the answer to this, we shall see what considerations were made in the work on universal rights.

Human Rights and the Inherent Conflict
In a speech to Congress in 1941, President Roosevelt looked forward to a world based on four freedoms; among the four freedoms were:

• “Freedom of speech and expression - everywhere in the world”
• “Freedom of every person to worship God in his own way - everywhere in the world”
• (The others were “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear”)

After the war, a committee led by the former First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, was given the task of formulating a proposal for a universal declaration of human rights. It is claimed that in this work she often referred to the four freedoms.
Regarding the declaration, Eleanor Roosevelt later said: “Concern for the preservation and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms stands at the heart of the United Nations. Its Charter is distinguished by its preoccupation with the rights and welfare of individual men and women.” The new thing is the strong focus on universal individual rights for both men and women.
On 10 December 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the UN. In this declaration, the declaration of religious freedom is included:

Article 18:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”
It is an article that can give rise to a long series of interpretations. It does not say precisely what we should do. It says nothing about what we should understand by public and private, or teaching, practice, worship, or observance of religious prescriptions. The article does not tell us how the relationship between a secular state and religious freedom should be. Nor does it provide any solution to the implicit contradiction with other human rights. In light of the conflicts we have seen, this applies, for example, in relation to Article 19, the first part of Article 2, and Article 16—just listen:

Article 19:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
The contradiction with the article on religious freedom seems obvious, for does freedom of opinion and expression not include the right to criticise a religion, as well as a culture and its practices?

Article 2:
“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
Does this not mean that a religious parallel justice system with a background in a fundamentalist patriarchal culture would be in contradiction with this article? Or will one, with reference to religious freedom, be forced to accept the use of Muslim sharia? Again, the conflict is obvious.

Article 16:
“Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”
Again, we can see a built-in conflict between Article 18 and a religious practice where women do not have the same rights as men to choose a spouse, where a religious practice oppresses women, and where one does not accept an age of majority set by the society one lives in.
In short, it is evident that there exist a number of built-in contradictions in the declaration of human rights. Contradictions that, as we have seen, are also quite evident in practice, where freedom of expression, equality between the sexes, equality before the law, and equal rights at the conclusion of marriage are under heavy pressure. On the other hand, one can hardly say that religious rights and freedoms are under a corresponding pressure.
Does this mean then that in practice far too much space is given to primarily Muslim religious communities? So that Muslims alone or in community with others, publicly and privately, can manifest their religion or belief through teaching, practice, worship, and observance? Does one in practice interpret Article 18 as an awarding of rights to religious minorities that allows one to continue a religious practice that is actually in contradiction with the other rights in the universal declaration? In that case, one could say that this interpretation would be in conflict with the considerations that lie behind Article 18.

The Individual's Rights, Not the Collective's
In a draft of the declaration from 1947, an Article 46 was included with the following wording:
“In States inhabited by a substantial number of persons of a race, language or religion other than those of the majority of the population, persons belonging to such ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities shall have the rights as far as compatible with public order to establish and maintain their schools and cultural or religious institutions, and to use their own language in the press, in public assembly and before the courts and other authorities of the State.”
Here we are talking about the rights of religious minorities in relation to another majority in a given country. It is thus a case of a religious collective's rights to exercise their religion and to linguistic and cultural rights. The weight is placed on the minority's rights to preserve its distinctiveness. Not on the individual person's right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.
In a way, this draft of an Article 46 seems to correspond quite well to the way we today interpret the rights of religious minorities—namely, as a religious and cultural collective's rights. In an article about the creation of Article 18, Lindquist points out that there was resistance to establishing special rights for minorities. According to him, the resistance was due, among other things, to the Third Reich's (mis)use of alleged oppression of German minorities in other countries to carry out conquests. In our day, something similar could well apply to the fear of a Russian invasion to secure Russian minorities.
More relevant for our discussion, however, is the resistance that arose from a fear that ethnic parallel societies could be built up that would be “cut off” from the rest of society. For is it not precisely a situation that several countries with large immigration of Muslims today have ended up in? Even though there naturally exist various opinion-makers who see the emergence of parallel societies as something positive, as multiculturalism.
Eleanor Roosevelt had other reasons for being against special minority rights.
“She repeatedly insisted that minorities ‘did not exist as such in the United States’ and that her government instead practiced a policy of cultural assimilation” (Lindquist).
To say anything else could involve an inconvenient admission of racial inequality in the USA. The resistance to setting forth special rights for minorities thus did not only have something to do with religion. What one feared were the consequences of inscribing rights for ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic minorities.
The committee finally rejected the article on minorities' rights and thereby emphasised something new in the declaration of human rights. A decisive shift from having focus on minority rights—i.e., on the collective—to primarily having focus on the individual, on the single person, and on “human rights.” This is important to remember in connection with the discussion of religious freedom.
“The value of the ‘human person’ trumped the desires of the group or nation to which he may belong, but also that ‘the human person’s most sacred and inviolable possessions are his mind and his conscience, enabling him to perceive the truth, to choose freely, and to exist.’” (Lindquist)

Inner Freedom Versus Outer Manifestation
Another aspect in connection with the creation of Article 18 is important for the discussion of the built-in conflicts in the universal declaration, but also for the conflicts we experience in practice. It is the basic distinction between inner and outer freedom. The inner freedom consists of the unrestricted freedom to think and believe completely freely. For one of the committee's participants, the Lebanese Malik, it was a freedom that constituted the very foundation for all rights:
“Without the full and unimpaired right to think and believe freely, the value of these other rights pales into relative insignificance. One enjoys these other rights precisely in order to be free, and being free means nothing if it does not mean freedom to think and believe and change in your belief from the good to the better and better as the truth progressively reveals itself to you. The right to be free inwardly is the end and justification of all other rights.”
Inner freedom encompasses the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and the freedom to change religion or belief. The outer aspect of religious freedom, on the other hand, is the freedom to “either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”
It is this outer manifestation of religion that relates most of all to the conflicts we see in practice. If we, like Malik, place the weight on the inner freedom, one can imagine that one can well limit the outer freedom to manifest one's religious conviction without touching the inner core of religious conviction. Or in other words: religion is a private matter, a matter between the individual person and their faith or conviction.
“In this regard, Article 18 marked a subtle but distinct change of tone. This was a politically motivated departure ... liberty of conscience was a far more forceful version of religious liberty than freedom of worship.” (Lindquist).

The Challenge to Universal Human Rights from Islam
Already in 1947, during the work on the universal declaration, representatives from the Muslim world—including the Saudi Arabian delegation—were against parts of the declaration. They were especially against Article 16 and Article 18.
The reason for the rejection:
“The authors of the draft declaration had, for the most part, taken into consideration only the standards recognized by Western civilization and had ignored more ancient civilizations which were past the experimental stage, and the institutions of which, for example, marriage, had proved their wisdom through the centuries. It was not for the Committee to proclaim the superiority of one civilization over all others or to establish uniform standards for all the countries of the world.”
Without taking a position on human rights' demand to be universally valid, we can at least establish that from the Muslim side it has been claimed that the declaration on several points conflicts with basic elements of the Muslim religion—against Islam, that is. This applies to central points:

Article 18 with its demand for the freedom to change religion or belief.
“The freedoms articulated in Articles 18 and 19 of the Universal Declaration make no sense within the theocratic bias of Islamic political thought.”
 
Article 16 with the demand for equal rights with respect to the conclusion of marriage, during marriage, and at its dissolution, and that marriage shall only be able to be entered into with both parties' free and full consent.
 
“The right to marry and found a family, to freely choose one’s partner, is a direct challenge to the forces in Islamic society that enforce the family choice of spouse, polygamy, and the keeping of women in purdah (from Hindu veil, in the sense that women are kept separate from the men)”
 
Article 19 with the right to freedom of opinion and expression, which encompasses freedom to maintain one's view without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and thoughts through any means of communication and regardless of national borders. It would indeed be a right that would be extremely problematic for “the theocratic bias of Islamic political thought,” which is also precisely what we experience when we look at Muslim protests and threats against freedom of expression.
 
Article 7: All are equal before the law and have, without distinction of any kind, equal right to the law's protection. All have the right to equal protection against any distinction in conflict with this declaration and against any incitement to such a distinction.
“Islamic figures have questioned the universal writ of Western human rights norms. They have pointed out that the Western separation of church and state, secular and religious authority, is alien to the jurisprudence and political thought of the Islamic tradition”
 
In 2004, “The Arab Charter on Human Rights” was formulated—a modernised version of a declaration on Arab human rights from 1994. Here too, a human rights declaration has been formulated that on several points is incompatible with the UN's 1948 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. It has also met with criticism from the “International Commission of Jurists,” among others regarding its preamble:
“The Preamble is not based on universal principles, but instead refers to the highly contentious Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam."
In “Arab Charter on Human Rights” from 2008, there seems to have happened a shift in the direction of the understanding we find in the UN's human rights declaration—on paper, at least—for now we find sections like these:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and no restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of such freedoms except as provided for by law. All persons are equal before the law and have the right to enjoy its protection without discrimination.”
But the 2008 declaration certainly also qualifies the rights. It is still about sharia and “divine law”:
“Men and women are equal in respect of human dignity, rights and obligations within the framework of the positive discrimination established in favour of women by the Islamic Shariah, other divine laws and by applicable laws and legal instruments.”
It is, however, clear that a certain adaptation to the values we find in the human rights declaration has occurred. When “Islamic societies have managed to modernize, create a middle-class, and enter the global economy—Egypt and Tunisia being examples—a constituency in favor of basic human rights can emerge.” That is, precisely the places where the attempts at an Arab Spring flared up.

The Dangers of Giving In to Cultural Relativism
We must be careful that we do not surrender to an ominous cultural relativism, where we accept the claim that the universal declaration of human rights merely represents a distillate of Western values that can only have validity in the Western world, but has no universal validity in other parts of the world.
“There is a style of cultural relativism that concedes too much to the Islamic challenge and in the process trades away the universality of human rights standards. ...This postmodernist relativism began as an intellectual fashion in Western campuses, but it has seeped slowly into Western human rights practice, causing all activists to pause and consider the intellectual warrant for the universality they once took for granted.” (Ignatieff)
These are not viewpoints that support the potential that the Arab Spring represented. It is a relativism that means that one can easily look away from the fact that certain religions and cultures precisely restrict the human individual's right to “choose freely, and to exist,” as Malik put it.

Taking a Stand Against Religious Threats and Demands
A secular ethics emphasises that no sacred goal can justify an inhumane treatment of human beings. The secular state must remain independent of religious authority. Religion should be a private matter. States should therefore ensure that religious groups:

• do not practise what is forbidden to everyone else
• do not refuse obligations that apply to everyone else
• do not forbid what is otherwise permitted
• do not demand what is voluntary for others
• do not create inequality in the name of religion

Some states, such as France, have attempted to limit visible religious symbols in public institutions. These measures reflect the principle that limiting external manifestations of a religion does not infringe on the internal freedom of belief.
When one sees what conflicts just these simple examples of limitation of external manifestations of a fundamentalist religion can give rise to, one can fear a long-term conflict potential when it comes to resisting the more basic religious demands that conflict with the values and rules that otherwise apply in a secular state. These are conflicts related to freedom of expression and equality between the sexes, the freedom to change faith, to homosexuality, and access to divorce.
Here and in many other cases, the secular state must never give up the fundamental values and rights just to avoid conflicts with a fundamentalist religion. Often one talks about entering into a dialogue with fundamentalists, but it is in a way an enterprise that is doomed to fail. If tolerance enters into dialogue with fundamentalism, it is doomed beforehand to lose, for the compromise will always end up lying closest to the fundamental viewpoint. Something history should have taught us.
“Human rights defenders should not shirk in particular from insisting on a distinction between private religious morality and religiously motivated public policy that infringes rights. Public expression and political mobilization of religious groups or believers on matters of rights are legitimate. When private religious morality imposes itself on society and threatens to change public policy in a way detrimental to rights, however, the human rights movement should speak out and draw the line.”(Edward Said, ”Representations of the Intellectual,” 1994).
 
Note: Based  upon my April 2017 essay in Danish “Human values in conflict with the demands of a religion”

The two views present what appears, at first glance, to be an irreconcilable contradiction. On the one hand, “A State in Dire Straits” and its associated economic analyses describe a country structurally weakened by prolonged conflict: fiscally strained, demographically declining, socially destabilised, and politically repressive. On the other hand, “Preparing to Attack” advances a sober warning that Europe faces “its most precarious security period in decades,” requiring rearmament, industrial mobilisation, and a step change in defence posture in anticipation of possible Russian aggression within years.
Is Russia a declining state, as one view insists, or an ascendant military threat, as the other view suggests? Can a country whose economy is finally stagnating also plausibly prepare to test NATO’s Article 5 commitments?
This essay explores the paradoxical coexistence of these two views. An examination of the two narratives' internal logic, evidentiary bases, and implicit assumptions may uncover not merely a contradiction, but a deeper tension within contemporary strategic discourse.
 
I. Russia in “Dire Straits”: Economic Stagnation and Structural Erosion
This narrative presents an image of a state under profound strain. Its thesis is explicit: the “special military operation” has fundamentally altered the Russian social and institutional fabric, creating long-term structural challenges that will persist well beyond the cessation of hostilities.
 
Economic Destabilisation
The economic argument rests on several interlinked indicators. Military expenditure is estimated to consume 7.2% of GDP, but the German BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst) recently estimated that military expenditure for 2026 may reach 10% of GDP, or around 250 billion euros, 66% higher than officially declared, and accounting for about half of the state budget.
The 2025 budget deficit reached 2.5% of GDP, but the BND believes it has reached 3.6% of GDP. Energy revenues fell by approximately 18% in 2025 according to CREA (Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air). These figures are presented not as temporary fluctuations, but as evidence of systemic fragility. The state has responded by increasing VAT to 22% in January 2026 and raising corporation tax from 20% to 25%, while the central bank has maintained a key interest rate of 15.5% to combat inflation.
Growth projections have been revised downward to 0.8%. The earlier period of growth may be seen as a wartime surge—figures now suggest both artificial stimulation and an inevitable crash. Manufacturing outside military production is declining; civilian sectors are being crowded out. The economy is said to be dominated by low-productivity goods which contribute to GDP but do not improve long-term capital formation or civilian welfare. The underlying conclusion is unmistakable: Russia’s war economy is not sustainable. It is living off redirected resources, diminishing energy revenues, and aggressive taxation; the apparent stability masks erosion.
 
Glacial Russian Advance in Ukraine
According to a CSIS brief, cumulative Russian gains since January 2024 amount to less than 1.5 per cent of Ukrainian territory. In 2024, Russia seized 3,604 km² (0.6 per cent of Ukraine); in 2025, the figure rose marginally to 4,831 km² (0.8 per cent), plus the partial recovery of the Kursk oblast.
“In the high-profile Pokrovsk offensive (late February 2024 to early January 2026), forces advanced roughly 50 km at an average rate of only 70 metres per day. Other axes were even slower: Chasiv Yar at ~15 metres per day, Kupiansk at ~23 metres per day. Only the more recent Huliaipole push in Zaporizhzhia reached 297 metres per day—still modest by historical standards. These rates are slower than almost any major offensive of the past century, including the infamous Battle of the Somme in 1916.”
 
Demographic Collapse
The demographic argument deepens the sense of structural decline. Casualties since 2022 are estimated at “1.2 million,” including more than 300,000 fatalities. According to CSIS, “Combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties could reach 2 million by the spring of 2026” with a Russian-to-Ukrainian casualty ratio of at least 2 to 1. The fertility rate of 1.4 is far below the replacement level of 2.1. Projections indicate that the labour market will face a deficit of 2.4 million workers by 2030. These combined pressures threaten to reduce the national population by up to 50% by the end of the century. Even before such distant projections, the immediate labour crunch is evident: an unemployment rate of 2.2% in January 2026 reflects not economic health, but a manpower shortage. The war is not merely costly in fiscal terms; it is biologically depleting.
 
Social Dislocation and Crime
A RAND report describes how the return of “approximately 250,000 unemployed veterans” has been linked to rising violent crime and domestic abuse. Over “8,000 participants in the conflict” have been convicted of civil crimes, including “nearly 900 veterans involved in violent offences”. The implication is that militarisation produces internal instability.
 
Political Repression
A Foreign Affairs article describes how the Kremlin has expanded its repressive apparatus. The “foreign agent” list grew from 300 entities in 2022 to “over 1,100 by 2026”. New legislation empowers security services to disconnect communications. Civil society groups, feminist movements, and LGBT communities are targeted for “societal erasure”. The portrait is bleak: fiscal strain, demographic decline, criminality, repression. Russia appears brittle, internally stressed, and economically narrowing. One might reasonably conclude that such a state would be preoccupied with survival rather than expansion.
 
II. The Prophecies: Europe on the Brink
In sharp contrast, the other narrative frames the same Russia as a growing external menace with even greater force. It opens with the assertion that Europe has entered its most precarious security period in decades. The long era of the so-called “peace dividend” has ended. Russian military expansion and aggression necessitate a fundamental ‘step change’ in European defence posture. This narrative seems to be met with much greater responsiveness among European leaders.
In February 2026, the defence chiefs of the UK and Germany, Richard Knighton and Carsten Breuer, wrote a letter warning Europe against the Russian threats. They argued for strong military readiness, increased spending on defence, and wrote: “Our industries must be capable of sustained output – manufacturing the ammunition, systems and platforms our forces require at the pace modern conflict demands”. They demanded a “whole-of-society” approach, meaning that defence would be a task for every one of us. They even saw it as a moral endeavour: “Rearmament is not warmongering; it is the responsible action of nations determined to protect their people and preserve peace. Strength deters aggression. Weakness invites it”.
Before them, the French defence chief, General Fabien Mandon, had sparked controversy, first with a warning to expect Putin to act against Europe after Trump had made a non-aggression pact with Putin, and later by saying that France must “accept the loss of its children”. Others have chimed in. German defence minister Pistorius has warned that Europe may have had its “last peaceful summer”. NATO Secretary General Rutte warned that the forces of dark oppression are on the rise again and that we must prepare for war on a scale that our grandparents or great-grandparents endured. Even minor voices like Kaja Kallas see Russia as an existential threat, and Danish and Polish voices warn that Russia is preparing for war against Europe, with 2027 already being a critical year.
 
A Resilient War Economy
Far from collapsing, Russia is depicted as having successfully transitioned to a war economy, with defence spending reaching 10% of GDP. Despite severe losses in Ukraine, Russia under President Putin remains a determined adversary and is able to replace equipment with new  and older stocks. Military reconstitution is possible; Moscow may be raising an additional 150,000 troops and 15 divisions. Seemingly able to ignore Russia’s demographic problems, hybrid operations continue, including offensive cyberattacks, propaganda, and direct sabotage of undersea infrastructure. This is not the language of impending implosion; it is the language of adaptation and aggression by other means.
 
Nuclear and Conventional Capabilities
Russia maintains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. SIPRI has calculated that Russia has a total inventory of 5,459 nuclear warheads, including 1,816 non-strategic nuclear warheads, of which 1,718 are actually deployed. U.S. estimates suggest that the 1,718 deployed warheads are based on a triad of strategic delivery vehicles roughly consisting of 330 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 12 ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) with 192 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 58 strategic bombers.
A study published by the Atlantic Council in February 2026 outlined five concrete Russian attack scenarios, ranging from the occupation of Svalbard to a strike through the Suwałki Gap to create a land bridge to Kaliningrad. The analysis warns that NATO is currently ill-prepared for these contingencies. In the most aggressive scenario, the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army would sever the Baltic states from NATO allies. “A high-level wargame... suggests that Germany – and Europe more broadly – would struggle to respond quickly and decisively to such a Russian military escalation in the Baltics without clear U.S. backing and leadership” (Die  Welt).
 
Strategic Intent
It is asserted that Russian ambitions extend “significantly beyond the current borders of the Ukrainian conflict”. Motives include historical rights, rebuilding prestige, improving strategic posture, and delivering a fatal blow to NATO by testing Article 5. If taken at face value, this is not a country paralysed by stagnation; it is a country planning for contingencies.
 
III. The Paradox Exposed
Placed side by side, the two narratives appear mutually exclusive. But they may have a certain rhetorical force: portraying Russia as declining may reduce urgency, while portraying it as dangerous sustains cohesion.
The first view insists that Russia’s economy is stagnating, its manufacturing contracting, its demographic base shrinking, and its social cohesion fraying. The second view insists that Russia is reorganising its forces, expanding divisions, conducting hybrid operations, and contemplating multi-theatre aggression. How can both be true?
The paradox intensifies when one considers time horizons. The “dire straits” view emphasises structural challenges that will persist well beyond the cessation of hostilities. The “attack” narrative focuses on scenarios within five years.
The contrasting views do not offer a simple contradiction but a layered picture. Russia is economically strained, demographically challenged, and socially tense; it is also militarily mobilised, strategically assertive, and capable of either limited aggression or starting a nuclear world war. “Dire straits” captures structural erosion. “Attack” captures strategic possibility. Between them stands a sobering conclusion: decline does not eliminate risk. It may, under certain circumstances, intensify it. And so Europe is told, simultaneously, that Russia is running out of time and that Europe is running out of time. The symmetry would be amusing if it were not so consequential.
 
IV. Dissolving the Paradox: Diplomacy and a New Security Architecture?
The prevailing narrative that Russia is driven by an existential crusade against liberal democracy or a desire to resurrect the Soviet Empire is, in truth, an airy strategic self-deception. Rather than seeking a programme of conquest, Moscow’s primary objective is defensive: it aims to prevent neighbouring states, particularly in the post-Soviet space, from serving as military platforms for hostile alliances. There is, in fact, scant evidence to suggest that Russia intends to revise the territorial status of NATO members like Poland or the Baltic states; official Russian statements have consistently denied any plans to attack NATO territory.
Furthermore, recent armoured losses in Ukraine have underscored that the era of rapid, decisive breakthroughs has passed. Any move against NATO would be met by entrenched resistance and a rapid escalation to full engagement, making such an assault highly unlikely. Instead of acknowledging these realities, Europe has become arguably lazy in its approach to security, for a long time relying on the narrative of an implacable aggressor to justify a continued, comfortable dependence on the United States. By casting Russia as a permanent, existential threat, Europe avoids the more difficult task of constructing its own autonomous security framework.
However, this dependency is becoming increasingly unsustainable as the United States shifts its strategic priorities toward Asia and competition with China. A more mature, balanced partnership would see Europe take responsibility for its own neighbourhood, which would not only strengthen the transatlantic relationship but also allow for a more measured, rather than panicked, approach to continental defence.
The most logical path forward is to supplement independent military deterrence with sustained diplomatic engagement aimed at restoring strategic stability. A new, European-led security architecture—one that includes rather than excludes Moscow—could integrate Russia into a structured framework of arms control, verification, and calibrated force limitations. This would even fit the presumed intentions of President Trump. In fact, Trump has already talked about the need to reduce military spending in Russia, China, and thus also in the U.S. Trump even mentioned the idea of a summit with Putin and China's Xi Jinping. “When we straighten it all out, then I want one of the first meetings I have to be with President Xi of China, and President Putin of Russia. And I want to say, let's cut our military budget in half”.
He may also be aiming for new agreements on nuclear disarmament with Russia, the U.S., and China, and new agreements that would reduce missile threats, strategic as well as tactical. Bringing Russia in from the cold, after a peace in Ukraine, might make it a lot easier to agree on spheres of influence in the Arctic between the U.S. and Russia, and make it possible to counteract increasing Chinese influence and presence in the Arctic. This might also bring advantages for Europe, as friendly relations with Russia would allow secure future sea-transport connections with Asia via the Arctic route.
This is not merely about idealism; it is about geopolitical realism. A durable peace would also provide tangible benefits: it would likely entail the lifting of sanctions, allowing European (and U.S.) firms to return to the Russian market and enabling the restoration of vital energy flows, which have caused significant economic strain in nations like Germany. Finally, such a détente would have profound global consequences. By reducing Russia’s growing dependence on China, the West could gain greater leverage in managing Beijing’s rise. Crucially, moving toward this new architecture could help mitigate the current, genuine danger: that an unmanaged confrontation drifts toward nuclear brinkmanship in a world where the old, stabilising "rules of the game" have largely eroded.
 

President Donald Trump’s Use of Tariffs to Reshape U.S. Policy
When Donald Trump returned to the presidency in 2025, he moved swiftly to reassert a core theme that had defined his political identity since 2016: the belief that the United States had been systematically exploited through unfair trade practices and that conventional trade law had failed to protect U.S. sovereignty, manufacturing, workers, and security. What distinguished this phase of his presidency, however, was not merely the amount of the tariffs imposed, but the legal foundation he chose to invoke. Rather than relying on traditional trade statutes, Trump anchored major tariff actions in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA).
This approach marked a significant conceptual shift. Tariffs were no longer presented merely as tools of economic negotiation or industrial policy. Instead, Trump portrayed them as emergency countermeasures, necessary to confront external threats ranging from drug trafficking to chronic trade imbalances, to security and defense of the U.S itself. In doing so, he argued that as President he had not only the authority but the obligation to act decisively when Congress and existing trade frameworks proved inadequate.
This article represnts and attempt to illuminate and discuss these topics:
 
Trump’s Core Narrative: Security, Sovereignty, and Emergency
Impact of Trump’s IEEPA Tariffs on Trade and the Wider Economy
Overall Effects of Trump’s “Tariff Trade War”
Supreme Court Strikes Down Trump’s Tariffs
Trump’s “Tariff Reboot” Attempt 2026
 
Trump’s Core Narrative: Security, Sovereignty, and Emergency
Across speeches, executive orders, and official fact sheets, Trump consistently returned to three interlocking claims.
First, he asserted that the United States faced an external threat to public safety from the influx of illegal drugs, particularly synthetic opioids such as fentanyl. Second, he argued that large and persistent trade deficits constituted a structural danger to the nation’s economic security, industrial base, and long-term independence. Third, he maintained that foreign governments had failed—whether through neglect or design—to address these problems, leaving the United States with no choice but to act unilaterally.
To understand Donald Trump’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for tariffs, one must look beyond immediate trade balances. For Trump, arguments about trade deficits were symptoms of a deeper, more existential concern: the erosion of American sovereignty and national resilience through industrial decline.
In Trump’s framing, these were not ordinary policy disputes. They were extraordinary conditions, originating outside the United States, and therefore suitable for treatment under emergency powers. By repeatedly using the language of crisis—“national emergency,” “unusual and extraordinary threat,” and “economic sovereignty”—Trump laid the rhetorical groundwork for transforming IEEPA into a central instrument of trade enforcement.
 
IEEPA as Presidential Prerogative
Trump’s administration argued that Congress, in passing IEEPA, had granted the executive branch wide discretion to respond flexibly to evolving dangers. According to this interpretation, the distinction between sanctions and tariffs was secondary to the statute’s underlying purpose: empowering the President to shield the nation from external harm. If illicit drugs or systemic trade imbalances weakened American society, then restricting imports from responsible countries fell squarely within presidential authority.
This reading of IEEPA effectively elevated the presidency above the traditional boundaries of U.S. trade law. Tariffs were no longer confined to carefully enumerated statutory procedures. Instead, they became expressions of emergency governance, rooted in the President’s judgment about national survival and economic resilience.
 
Trade Deficits as an Economic Emergency
In April 2025, Trump issued a distinct emergency declaration focused explicitly on trade itself. He pointed to what he described as “large and persistent” U.S. goods trade deficits, highlighting figures exceeding one trillion dollars annually. According to Trump, these deficits were not benign accounting artefacts but evidence of systemic imbalance and exploitation.
He argued that non-reciprocal tariff structures, hidden subsidies, regulatory barriers, and currency practices had hollowed out American manufacturing, suppressed wages, and left critical supply chains vulnerable. In this narrative, decades of trade liberalisation had eroded national strength rather than enhanced it.
“The absence of sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity in certain critical and advanced industrial sectors—another outcome of the large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits—also compromises U.S. economic and national security by rendering the U.S. economy less resilient to supply chain disruption. Finally, the large, persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, and the concomitant loss of industrial capacity, have compromised military readiness; this vulnerability can only be redressed through swift corrective action to rebalance the flow of imports into the United States.” (Executive Order 14257, April 2, 2025)
By declaring the trade deficit an emergency under IEEPA, Trump reframed economic imbalance as a national security issue. Dependence on foreign production, he warned, left the United States exposed in times of crisis and undermined its ability to project power. Tariffs, therefore, were not merely corrective tools but defensive measures aimed at restoring autonomy and balance.
 
The Drug Emergency: Tariffs as Coercive Pressure
The first major invocation of IEEPA came in early February 2025, when Trump declared a national emergency tied to the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. He emphasised the devastating human toll of opioid addiction, repeatedly citing overdose deaths in the tens of thousands annually and describing fentanyl as a weapon crossing U.S. borders.
“The extraordinary threat posed by illegal aliens and drugs, including deadly fentanyl, constitutes a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).” (Fact Sheet, The White House, February 1, 2025).
Trump placed responsibility not only on traffickers, but also on foreign governments—specifically Canada, Mexico, and China—arguing that insufficient enforcement, regulatory gaps, and weak controls had allowed precursor chemicals and finished narcotics to reach American communities. In his view, diplomatic engagement and existing agreements had failed to produce meaningful results.
Under this emergency declaration, tariffs were presented as economic leverage rather than punishment. By imposing significant costs on imports, Trump argued, the United States could compel foreign governments to take stronger action against drug production and trafficking networks.
Concrete measures followed rapidly. Imports from Mexico and non-energy goods from Canada were subjected to tariffs as high as 25 per cent, while Chinese goods faced lower rates that were later increased. These actions applied broadly, affecting industries far removed from narcotics, yet Trump defended this breadth as necessary. Only measures large enough to command attention, he insisted, would force policy change abroad.
 
Some Concrete IEEPA-Based Tariff Actions
Following this declaration, the administration introduced a baseline tariff of 10 per cent on imports from most trading partners. Beyond this universal floor, higher “reciprocal” rates were imposed on countries with particularly large bilateral deficits with the United States. The logic, as articulated by Trump, was straightforward: nations that benefited most from asymmetrical trade would bear the greatest adjustment costs.
Unlike traditional trade remedies, these tariffs were not narrowly aimed at specific products or industries. They were systemic in scope, reflecting Trump’s belief that the problem lay not in isolated sectors but in the overall structure of global trade.
 
Reactions to Trump’s Tariffs
Domestic Political Reactions
Reactions within the United States quickly polarised along familiar political lines. Supporters praised the President for acting decisively where Congress had failed, arguing that emergency powers were justified by the scale of the challenges involved. Many within manufacturing communities and trade-skeptical circles welcomed the tariffs as tangible proof that the federal government was prioritising domestic industry and workers. Critics, however, warned that redefining trade disputes as emergencies risked eroding constitutional norms and destabilising economic relationships. Some lawmakers expressed concern that the use of IEEPA bypassed legislative oversight and concentrated excessive authority in the executive branch. Others focused on the economic consequences, cautioning that broad tariffs would raise consumer prices and provoke retaliation.
 
International and Expert Responses
Abroad, reactions ranged from sharp criticism to cautious engagement. Trading partners targeted by the tariffs rejected the premise that trade deficits or drug flows constituted emergencies justifying unilateral action. Several governments argued that the measures violated established norms of international trade and threatened global economic stability.
Trade experts and economists offered divided assessments. Some acknowledged that long-standing imbalances and enforcement failures had fuelled political backlash and required stronger responses. Others argued that tariffs imposed under emergency powers blurred the line between security policy and economic management, potentially undermining trust in the rules-based trading system.
Legal scholars focused on the precedent being set. Even without resolving the ultimate legality, many observed that Trump’s approach fundamentally reimagined the scope of presidential authority in economic affairs, transforming emergency law into a vehicle for sweeping trade policy.
 
Impact of Trump’s IEEPA Tariffs on Trade and the Wider Economy
 
How Trump’s Tariffs Affected Trade
A comparison of U.S. trade balances for 2025 and 2024 suggests that Trump’s tariffs had only a limited effect on the overall trade balance.(Data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, bea.gov).

The overall trade deficit in 2025 stood at –$901.5 billion, showing only a very slight reduction compared with –$903.5 billion in 2024.
In the goods category, however, the deficit increased from –$1,217.0 billion in 2024 to –$1,240.9 billion in 2025.
While the services balance improved from +$313.5 billion to +$339.5 billion.
Thus Trump’s  IEEPA  tariffs  did not have much positive impact on the overall trade balance. 
 
Bilateral Trade Balances with Key Partners
Thus Trump’s  IEEPA  tariffs  have had a big  impact on  bilateral  trade balances. Here the most important  changes:  
 
China: The goods trade deficit with China decreased by $93.4 billion, falling to $202.1 billion in 2025. Exports declined by $36.9 billion to $106.3 billion, while imports fell by $130.4 billion to $308.4 billion--a significant 32 per cent reduction in the goods deficit. Services data for 2025 are not yet available; in 2024, the services balance with China was positive at approximately $32 billion.
 
European Union: The goods trade deficit with the European Union declined from –$235.9 billion in 2024 to –$218.8 billion in 2025.
 
Mexico: The goods trade deficit with Mexico increased from –$171.5 billion in 2024 to –$197.0 billion in 2025.
 
Vietnam: The goods trade deficit with Vietnam rose from –$123.5 billion in 2024 to –$178.2 billion in 2025.
 
Taiwan: The goods trade deficit with Taiwan expanded sharply from –$73.8 billion in 2024 to –$146.8 billion in 2025.
Thus Trump’s  IEEPA  tariffs  have had a big  impact on  bilateral  trade balances. 
 
Revenue from Trump’s IEEPA Tariffs
The Tax Foundation estimates that the trade-weighted average applied tariff rate in 2025 rose to approximately 13.5 per cent, a drastic increase from the weighted average applied tariff rate of 1.5 per cent in 2022.
According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data and independent economic analyses from late 2025, IEEPA-based tariffs accounted for approximately 60 per cent of total tariff revenue from all trade enforcement actions in 2025.
 
While total tariff revenue for the 2025 calendar year reached roughly $287 billion, it was collected under several different legal frameworks:

Overall Effects of Trump’s “Tariff Trade War”
Trump’s tariff policy, in essence, combined an unorthodox fusion of trade policy, national security strategy, and law-enforcement objectives. By invoking emergency powers, tariffs were transformed from conventional economic instruments into tools of coercive pressure aimed at foreign governments.
 
Tariffs as Coercive Pressure in the War on Drugs
Trump framed the war on drugs—especially illegally produced fentanyl—as a national emergency and sought to use IEEPA-based tariffs to exert economic pressure intended to compel Mexican and Canadian authorities to tighten enforcement, disrupt cartel supply chains, and reduce drug inflows. The administration’s premise was that tariffs would have meaningful “leverage value” because:
Mexico and Canada are heavily trade-dependent on the United States, making loss of access economically painful. Thus the threat of sustained tariffs might prompt cooperation beyond existing bilateral agreements.
Did it work? Evidence suggests limited direct impact. Drug cartels operate outside regulated trade channels and do not export through normal customs processes subject to tariffs. U.S. demand for opioids and synthetic drugs remains a fundamental driver of trafficking. Enhanced intelligence sharing and law-enforcement cooperation might be more effective than trade sanctions. To date, there is no clear empirical evidence indicating that tariffs substantially reduced drug-trafficking volumes in 2025.
 
Indirect Effects and Diplomatic Pressure
That said, Trump’s aggressive tariff posture and repeated threats of border closures may have produced significant indirect effects. As reported by the New York Post:
“Mexico has quietly shipped nearly 100 suspected cartel drug traffickers to the US to stand trial after… The suspects include the brother of Nemesio ‘El Mencho’ Oseguera Cervantes—the brutal Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) leader who was killed by the Mexican army on Sunday. The Justice Department said many of the 92 defendants released to the Americans had US extradition requests that were not honoured during the Biden administration.” (nypost.com, February 23, 2026)
While causation cannot be conclusively established, the timing suggests that sustained economic pressure may have influenced Mexican enforcement decisions.
In a way the may also explain Mexico’s recent action that took down Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes himself. The operation marked a major escalation by the Mexican government perhaps a goaded by President Donald Trump’s monthslong campaign to pressure it to more aggressively fight drug cartels in its country.
 
Effects on trade balance and U.S. Econoomy
A central justification for Trump’s tariff strategy was the reduction of persistent U.S. trade deficits—particularly with China and Mexico—by increasing import costs and encouraging domestic production. In some instances, tariffs produced notable bilateral shifts.
As shown earlier, the U.S. goods trade deficit with China fell by more than 30 per cent in 2025, reaching its lowest level in nearly two decades. This reduction is often attributed to tariff pressure combined with bilateral negotiations. Although overall deficits remained very large due to broader macroeconomic forces, targeted reductions in bilateral imbalances may represent a partial policy success.
Economists, however, warn that tariffs cannot fundamentally correct trade deficits, which are driven primarily by macroeconomic factors such as savings-investment imbalances, exchange rates, and consumption patterns. Federal Reserve analyses indicated that American consumers and firms bore roughly 90 per cent of the tariff burden in 2025, effectively turning tariffs into a regressive domestic tax.
Despite bilateral improvements in some cases, structural trade imbalances persisted. Notably, the overall goods trade deficit reached record levels in 2025, driven in part by rising imports of technology components and capital goods.
 
Problematic Effects on Trade Malpractices
Tariffs were also presented as tools to counter what the United States regarded as unfair trade practices, including:
Foreign industrial subsidies
Weak labour and environmental enforcement
Intellectual-property infringement
In theory, tariffs could function as enforcement mechanisms, compelling trading partners to negotiate reforms. In practice, retaliation posed significant risks. Counter-tariffs imposed by affected countries threatened U.S. agricultural exports and manufactured goods, weakening American export competitiveness abroad. Moreover, the threat of sudden tariff changes risked eroding trust and predictability in the global trading system, making future cooperation more fragile and uncertain.
 
Reshoring and Foreign Direct Investment
One of the administration’s most visible policy goals was to encourage manufacturing investment in the United States by increasing the cost of importing finished goods. Tariffs, combined with federal subsidies and tax incentives, encouraged some multinational firms to reconsider supply-chain structures.
Evidence suggests a degree of reshoring and near-shoring occurred, particularly in advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, batteries, and energy-related industries. Firms re-evaluated supply chains, diversified production locations, and expanded U.S.-based capacity.
Trump’s tariff threats and strong-arm negotiating tactics appear to have contributed to a wave of investment pledges by both foreign governments and multinational corporations. The White House claimed a surge in private and foreign investment commitments totalling approximately $9.7 trillion, although questions remain regarding how binding these pledges are and when, or if, they will materialise.
Major announced commitments included:
Here just some of the major investment promises (whitehouse.gov):

Apple Inc. made an initial pledge of $500 billion in February 2025 and added $100 billion in August 2025, earmarked for concrete investments during 2025–2026. Announced initiatives included:
An American Manufacturing Program (AMP) to reshore supply chains through partnerships with U.S.-based firms such as Corning and Texas Instruments, alongside Taiwan’s TSMC.
A 250,000-square-foot facility in Houston producing advanced servers for “Apple Intelligence”, later expanded in early 2026 to include Mac mini assembly.
A commitment to hire 20,000 new employees, primarily in R&D, silicon engineering, and AI-related roles.
Component reshoring, including 100 per cent domestic production of iPhone and Apple Watch cover glass in Kentucky via Corning.
Despite these developments, reshoring effects were uneven. Modern manufacturing facilities are highly automated and generate fewer jobs than traditional plants. In some cases, firms relocated production to alternative low-cost jurisdictions rather than the United States. Higher input costs also offset some of the benefits of domestic investment.
 
Cost of Tariffs for U.S. Households
As of early 2026, the cost of tariffs to U.S. citizens has become a central economic and legal debate. While the Trump administration argues that tariffs protect domestic industry and raise revenue, non-partisan economic analyses indicate that the burden falls primarily on American households and businesses through higher prices.
Direct Cost to Households
Estimates vary. However, a broad consensus has emerged among economists. The average American household paid approximately $1,000 more in 2025 due to the first wave of broad tariffs.
Tariffs operate in practice as a tax on imports. Economic studies projected that higher tariffs would:
Increase U.S. inflation by approximately 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points in 2025, particularly in sectors reliant on imported inputs.
Reduce disposable income nationwide by an estimated $137 billion in 2026—equivalent to an average household burden exceeding $1,000.
The impact ihas been seen regressive, meaning it disproportionately affects lower-income households. Analysts estimate that the average federal tax rate rose by 1.1 percentage points for the bottom 20 per cent of earners, compared with 0.9 percentage points for the top 20 per cent
Finally, The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) projected slower global growth as a result of escalating trade barriers, including reduced growth in North America.
 
Supreme Court Strikes Down Trump’s Tariffs
On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 6–3 ruling, struck down the IEEPA-based tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump through a series of executive orders. The Court held that Trump lacked the authority he claimed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and that measures of such vast economic and political significance required explicit congressional authorisation.
Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion, concluding:
“The President asserts the extraordinary power to unilaterally impose tariffs of unlimited amount, duration, and scope. In light of the breadth, history, and constitutional context of that asserted authority, he must identify clear congressional authorization to exercise it. IEEPA’s grant of authority to ‘regulate . . . importation’ falls short. IEEPA contains no reference to tariffs or duties.
The Government points to no statute in which Congress used the word ‘regulate’ to authorize taxation. And until now no President has read IEEPA to confer such power.
We claim no special competence in matters of economics or foreign affairs. We claim only, as we must, the limited role assigned to us by Article III of the Constitution. Fulfilling that role, we hold that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.” (Supreme Court of the United States, decided February 20, 2026)
The ruling clarified that:
IEEPA does not authorise the President to impose broad, across-the-board tariffs on imports.
Tariffs constitute duties or taxes, powers that the Constitution assigns primarily to Congress.
Emergency declarations cannot substitute for explicit congressional authorisation when the executive seeks to exercise taxing authority.
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion did not dismantle presidential emergency powers, nor did it prevent Congress from authorising tariffs through other statutes. Instead, it reaffirmed a constitutional principle: Emergency authority has limits, and those limits are enforced through statutory interpretation and constitutional design.
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions of the Court
In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch provided a historically grounded and constitutionally based defence of Congress’s exclusive authority over tariffs, rejecting President Trump’s claim that IEEPA delegates sweeping tariff authority to the executive.
Referring to the Constitution’s Article 1’s Vesting Clause—“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives”—Gorsuch emphasised that the Constitution assigns legislative power, and especially the power to tax and impose duties, to Congress alone. When the President asserts an extraordinary delegated power of vast economic and political significance, Gorsuch argued, courts must require a clear and unmistakable statement from Congress.
He situated this reasoning within the modern “major questions doctrine”, under which Congress itself must decide matters of vast economic and political significance and cannot delegate such authority through ambiguous statutory language. Gorsuch stressed that this doctrine is not a judicial innovation, but a continuation of a long-standing clear-statement principle designed to prevent executive overreach.
Applying this framework to IEEPA, Gorsuch concluded that the statute’s authorisation to “regulate” imports could not plausibly be read to confer the power to impose tariffs of virtually unlimited scope. Such an interpretation would allow the executive to assume core legislative authority based on ambiguity, undermining the constitutional balance and rendering congressional recovery of that power practically impossible.
 
Justice Kavanaugh, nominated by President Trump in 2018, authored a dissenting opinion:
“The Court concludes that the President lacks authority under IEEPA to impose tariffs. I disagree. In accord with Judge Taranto’s careful and persuasive opinion in the Federal Circuit, I would conclude that the President’s power under IEEPA to ‘regulate . . . importation’ encompasses tariffs. As a matter of ordinary meaning, including dictionary definitions and historical usage, the broad power to ‘regulate . . . importation’ includes the traditional and common means to do so—in particular, quotas, embargoes, and tariffs.” (Justice Kavanaugh, J.)
 
These sharply diverging views suggest that the constitutional status of Trump’s emergency declarations and use of IEEPA was not as clear-cut as the majority ruling might suggest. The case also highlights the unusual reality that nine unelected justices are empowered to determine the limits of executive authority in matters of immense economic consequence.
As Justice Gorsuch himself acknowledged, however, the power to tax and impose duties belongs to Congress alone. One might argue that congressional silence and inaction contributed to the conditions under which an increasingly activist presidency sought to fill the vacuum. Now The Supreme Court may inadvertently have worsened emergencies that Trump fought to countact.
 
Trump’s “Tariff Reboot” Attempt 2026
With the Court striking down his primary economic instrument, Trump moved rapidly to identify alternative legal pathways for imposing tariffs.
True to form, the President’s initial reaction was one of public defiance. In a press conference on the day of the ruling, he described the decision as “deeply disappointing”, “ridiculous”, “poorly written”, “extraordinarily anti-American”, and a “terrible decision”. Nevertheless, he reiterated his belief in tariffs as essential tools of trade and diplomatic negotiation and promised immediate action using other statutory authorities, while acknowledging that these alternatives were slower and less efficient than IEEPA.
 
The “Bridge” Strategy: Section 122
On February 20, Trump signed an executive order imposing a temporary 10 per cent tariff surcharge on all U.S. imports (above existing duties) under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which permits such measures for up to 150 days to address balance-of-payments problems unless extended by Congress.
The following day, via a Truth Social post, he raised the rate to 15 per cent, citing a “thorough, detailed, and complete review” of the ruling and pledging to act “even stronger”.
Unlike IEEPA, Section 122 is specifically designed to address “large and serious balance-of-payments deficits”. By framing the approximately $1.2 trillion trade deficit as a payments crisis, the administration sought to preserve tariff revenue while operating within a more clearly trade-focused statutory framework.
 
New Boundaries and Institutional Constraints
The Supreme Court’s decision significantly narrowed the President’s room for manoeuvre:
The 150-day limit: Section 122 tariffs expire unless Congress votes to extend them.
The 15 per cent ceiling: Unlike IEEPA-based threats of tariffs exceeding 100 per cent, Section 122 imposes a hard cap.
Shift to investigations: The administration launched a wave of Section 301 and Section 232 investigations, requiring formal findings and slowing trade policy through bureaucratic processes.
 
The Refund Debate
One of the most contentious legacies of the Court’s ruling concerns the approximately $175 billion in IEEPA tariffs already collected. While the Court did not order immediate refunds, the ruling effectively rendered these duties unconstitutional taxes. As the administration sought to retain the revenue, thousands of businesses initiated claims before the Court of International Trade, setting the stage for prolonged litigation.
 
Conclusion – Underlying problems Unsolved
Donald Trump’s attempt to govern trade policy through emergency powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act represents one of the most controversial actions of his second presidency. By redefining trade deficits, drug trafficking, and industrial decline as elements of a unified national emergency, Trump sought to collapse the boundaries between economic policy, national security, and law enforcement, transforming tariffs from conventional trade instruments into tools of coercion and political leverage.
 
Measured narrowly, the policy produced mixed results. Certain bilateral trade deficits—most notably with China—declined significantly, while the overall U.S. trade imbalance remained largely unchanged and, in key categories, worsened. Tariffs generated unprecedented revenue but did so at the cost of higher consumer prices, regressive household impacts, and economic inefficiencies borne primarily by domestic actors. On the other hand Trumps threat of trade wars, must have contributed the long list of very large investment promises in the U.S.
Evidence that tariffs materially reduced drug trafficking as such is limited, but Trump’s tariff threats has led to targeted law-enforcement cooperation with Mexico and demand-side reform.
 
Institutionally, however, Trump’s expansive interpretation of IEEPA effectively claimed a presidential authority to tax, regulate trade, and restructure global economic relations unilaterally. The Supreme Court’s intervention did not merely invalidate a specific set of tariffs; it reaffirmed foundational limits on executive power and underscored that emergency declarations cannot circumvent the constitutional allocation of fiscal authority.
 
At the same time, the ruling exposed a deeper structural tension within American governance. Congressional inertia on trade imbalances, industrial decline, and border enforcement created the vacuum into which emergency governance flowed. Trump’s aggressive use of executive power, while ultimately constrained, reflected genuine political and economic anxieties that legislative institutions had struggled—or declined—to address.
With the Supreme Court’s decision U.S. trade policy enters a more procedurally constrained but no less contentious phase. Emergency shortcuts have been closed, yet the underlying pressures that produced them remain unresolved.
Whether President Trumps administration can get Congress to approve more durable, and economically coherent trade strategies will determine whether Trump’s tariff experiment will stand as a historical step in looming decline of U.S. hegemony or an annoying and complicated stumbling block that must be overcome by a president out preserve U.S. hegemony in the world.

Military Build-up
Donald Trump is currently threatening Iran with a "big stick", as speaking loudly does not seem to work. The current military build-up surrounding Iran represents one of the largest concentrations of U.S. forces in the Middle East since mid-2025. This deployment focuses clearly on preparations for a high-intensity interstate conflict, rather than mere symbolic deterrence.
Flight movements, tanker deployments, missile defence reinforcements, and naval assets suggest an orientation towards sustained offensive operations rather than a single limited strike, such as "Operation Midnight Hammer" in June 2025. During that operation, strikes on three nuclear sites were carried out by B-2 Spirit long-range bombers armed with GBU-57 MOPs (Massive Ordnance Penetrators) and two dozen Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from submarines.

1. Air Power: Strike, Suppression, and Air Superiority
The most visible component is the large-scale redeployment of US combat aircraft from bases in the United States and Europe to the region. Units involved appear to include:

• 
F-22 Raptors: Fifth-generation air superiority stealth fighters relocated via RAF bases—the same bases used prior to the strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.


• 
F-35A and F-35C Stealth Fighters: These aircraft are tasked with suppressing air defences and providing cover for strike forces. At least 30 aircraft have been drawn from RAF Lakenheath and the Vermont Air National Guard.


• 
F-16 and F-15E Units: F-15E Strike Eagles are used for long-range deep strike missions, while F-16s serve a multirole function. Many of these fighters are from specialised "Wild Weasel" squadrons dedicated to the Suppression of Enemy Air Defences.


• 
A-10 Thunderbolt II: Ground-attack aircraft whose presence points to planning for follow-on or prolonged operations rather than a brief overnight raid.


• B-2 Spirit:  Stealth bombers able to carry the heavy GBU-57Massive Ordnance Penetrators. As yet no rumours about these t Bombers, that may take off from the U.S. to attack Iran, flying non-stop east or west around half the World, or perhaps staging via Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.  

This combination is critical: stealth platforms clear the airspace, Wild Weasel F-16s neutralise Iranian air defences, and established fighter types provide the mass required for persistent operations.

2. Aerial Refuelling: The Quiet Indicator of Scale
Perhaps the clearest signal of intent is the exceptional concentration of tanker aircraft. Chinese commercial satellite imagery has confirmed a large  number  of KC-135 tankers at an Air Base in Qatar, with many more repositioned to Europe and the eastern
U.S. fighters—especially the range-limited F-35 and F-22—require extensive refuelling for deep or prolonged missions. Such tanker numbers are therefore necessary for extended, far-reaching strike campaigns. A comparable surge preceded the June 2025 strikes, underlining tankers as a key determinant of air campaign duration—potentially lasting days or weeks.

3. Intelligence, Command, and Control
The build-up extends beyond strike aircraft to include:

• 
RC-135 Rivet Joint: Signals-intelligence aircraft used to detect, identify, and geolocate signals throughout the electromagnetic spectrum; these have presumably shifted away from Qatar to reduce vulnerability.


• 
E-3 AWACS: Airborne early-warning and control platforms which play a critical role in managing the allied air battle and tracking Iranian threats, especially drones and cruise missiles.


• 
E-11 BACN: Communication-relay aircraft acting as a high-altitude, persistent communications bridge between ground troops, air assets, and command centres.


• 
P-8 Poseidon: Long-range maritime patrol aircraft able to monitor threats such as fast-attack boats or missile launchers.



Such assets indicate preparations for multi-day operations that demand real-time information fusion and resilient command structures.

4. Missile Defence and Base Hardening
A stream of C-17A Globemaster transport aircraft from the U.S. appears to have brought  equipment to bolster  defences at key locations. This includes Patriot air-defence batteries, yet questions remain about whether Patriot batteries alone could withstand a large-scale Iranian response.
Additionally, THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) systems are put up to protect the U.S. and its allies against advanced Iranian ballistic and hypersonic missile attacks, although their efficiency has been questioned.

5. Naval Power: Sustained Strikes from the Sea
The air build-up is complemented by a large naval presence. The USS Abraham Lincoln strike group is operating in the Arabian Sea. Its carrier air wing consists of F-18 Super Hornet multirole fighters, which may also be used to shoot down Iranian drones. Supporting assets include EA-18G Growlers for electronic warfare, E-2D Hawkeyes for early warning, and MH-60 helicopters with anti-submarine capabilities. The carrier is accompanied by Arleigh Burke-class destroyers armed with surface-to-air missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles.
Furthermore, the USS Gerald R. Ford strike group has been redirected from the Caribbean to the eastern Mediterranean. As the newest and most advanced U.S. carrier, its composition is similar to that of the Abraham Lincoln. Two carrier strike groups offer redundancy, enable round-the-clock flight operations, and reduce reliance on vulnerable land bases.

Covert Operations and Complications
Trump may also look for other ways to exert pressure, such as providing covert support for new forms of insurrection in Iran, taking a lead from earlier U.S. covert operations aimed at leadership change.
However, several factors complicate a decision to carry out a major attack: the reluctant attitude of Arab states and attempts by China and Russia to warn or complicate U.S. activities.
One might also ask: what is Israel’s role?

Strategic Implications and Risks
The deployment supports three main conclusions. First, It signals that Trump may not believe that ongoing talks will lead to a satisfactory result, the build-up holds a large stick hanging over diplomatic negotiations to extract concessions. Second, the scale far exceeds mere posturing. Third, the U.S. appears to be preparing for sustained action. Fourth, the build-up creates a "large stick" behind diplomatic negotiations to extract concessions. Nonetheless, the magnitude of forces heightens the danger. A single miscalculation could trigger a conflict that neither side originally sought. Trump’s policy combines intense diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions with credible military threats. While this echoes his style in Venezuela, the stakes here are far higher and the risks much greater. If diplomatic efforts fail, Trump must decide whether to risk a wide-ranging conflict or hold back, potentially leaving the Iranian position much stronger than before and giving off the wrong signals to future opponents.
Finally, one might ask if it would it not be smarter to first make sure to have some kind of deal with Russia, that would include Russia’s help to convince Iran to at least give up its nuclear ambitions
 
NB:  Information for this article gathered with the assistance of AI

This is an attempt to illustrate the differing views of the United States and Europe at the recent Munich Security Conference in the form of a fictional dialogue between Marco Rubio and Friedrich Merz. Based upon their speeches but adding additional evidence to support their respective arguments.

1. The International Order: Does Law Restrain Power?
Rubio: Friedrich, let’s stop pretending that rules restrain power on their own. Since 1945, there has not been a single durable international order without overwhelming military dominance behind it. Political scientist John Mearsheimer demonstrated decades ago that institutions reflect power; they do not replace it. When American relative power declined after 2008, enforcement collapsed. Ukraine is the empirical proof. Europe should prioritise national interest over abstract global governance and accept the necessity of hard power.
Merz: And yet the data also show that institutionalised cooperation reduces conflict among its members. European peace since 1945 is not a coincidence. NATO and the European integration project turned historic enemies into security partners. Alas, the war in Ukraine has forced us to return from our vacation from world history and confront these geopolitical realities.
Rubio: Europe stayed at peace because more than 300,000 US troops at the time stood between you and the Warsaw Pact. That’s not liberal theory — that’s deterrence theory. Remove American power, and institutional trust evaporates within a generation.

2. Military Spending and Deterrence Credibility
Rubio: Let’s talk numbers. In 2022, the United States spent over 3.4% of GDP on defence — more than the next ten countries combined. Germany, despite being Europe’s largest economy, spent about 1.5% of GDP at the time of Russia’s shock invasion of Ukraine. Deterrence theory is clear: adversaries respond to capability, not intention.
Merz: Germany is now committing hundreds of billions of euros to defence, launching major procurement projects in air defence, satellite technology, and deep precision strike capabilities, alongside a revival of the domestic defence industry, and deploying permanent forces on NATO’s eastern flank. The Bundeswehr will become Europe’s strongest conventional force. But deterrence also requires stability. Sudden militarisation without political control has historically increased the risk of escalation.
Rubio: Escalation risk rises when deterrence fails — not when it works. Every quantitative study on deterrence credibility shows that weakness invites testing. Russia invaded Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine only after concluding that the costs were manageable.

3. Deindustrialisation and Strategic Vulnerability
Rubio: Here are the facts: between 2000 and 2017, the United States lost over five million manufacturing jobs, largely due to asymmetric trade with state-subsidised economies. Studies from MIT and the Federal Reserve show that these losses permanently weakened entire regions. Strategic industries disappeared — and so did political stability.
Merz: Europe experienced similar effects — but the evidence also shows that open economies with strong welfare states absorbed shocks better than laissez-faire systems. The failure was not trade itself; it was the absence of strategic safeguards and investment in skills. Now a programme of economic resilience is reducing Europe’s dependencies and vulnerabilities to ensure that economic power continues to serve political freedom.
Rubio: That argument collapses when supply chains become weapons. Dependency theory now applies to advanced economies. When 90% of rare-earth processing and over 70% of battery supply chains are controlled by a strategic competitor such as China, welfare states do not restore sovereignty.

4. Migration, Cohesion, and Democratic Stability
Rubio: Let’s be empirical. Longitudinal studies across Europe show that rapid, large-scale migration correlates with declining trust in institutions, rising support for right-wing parties, and reduced social cohesion — especially where integration capacity is overwhelmed. Democracy cannot survive without consent.
Merz: Data also show that long-term integration succeeds where states invest in enforcement, education, and labour-market access. Europe’s mistake was not humanitarian openness; it was a failure of governance.
Rubio: But governance has limits. Samuel Huntington warned decades ago that excessive cultural fragmentation erodes shared civic identity. States cannot integrate endlessly without losing cohesion. You yourself spoke about this in your Stadtbild speech, referring to the visible problems linked to irregular migration and lawlessness in German urban areas.
Merz: Yes, the Stadtbild controversy both reflected and reinforced existing fears among large segments of the population. But Huntington also warned against defining civilisation so narrowly that it becomes exclusionary. German history shows where that road leads.

5. Climate Policy and Energy Security
Rubio: Energy realism matters. After Europe curtailed domestic energy production, it increased its dependence on authoritarian suppliers. When prices spiked, inflation surged, middle-class support collapsed, and populism rose. Energy studies repeatedly confirm this link.
Merz: We stand by climate agreements, arguing that global challenges require collective solutions. Climate–economics models show that delayed transition imposes far higher long-term costs — financial, environmental, and strategic. Europe’s approach is to industrialise decarbonisation, not to moralise it.
Rubio: Provided that competitors do not free-ride. If one side decarbonises while the other weaponises fossil fuels, the result is strategic self-harm.
Merz: Yes, supply chains and natural resources have become “bargaining tools”.

6. China and Systemic Rivalry
Rubio: Every serious strategic assessment now recognises China as a systemic challenger, not merely a trading partner. Its fusion of state power, industry, and military planning violates liberal assumptions. Engagement theory failed.
Merz: Engagement without leverage failed — yes. But decoupling theory shows that abrupt separation increases global instability and slows innovation. Europe chooses risk reduction, not rupture.
Rubio: Risk reduction without coercive leverage is wishful thinking. Power transitions are historically the most dangerous moments. Refusing to compete forcefully does not make competition disappear.

7. The Transatlantic Alliance: Who Needs Whom?
Rubio: Alliance theory is brutal: alliances survive only when all members contribute meaningfully to shared risk. The US electorate no longer accepts indefinite subsidisation.
Merz: Alliance history also shows that alliances collapse when trust erodes. NATO is not charity; it is a force multiplier. Even the United States will not be powerful enough to go it alone in an era of great-power rivalry. That is why we need a revival of transatlantic trust.
Rubio: The US is willing to act alone if necessary, but it prefers partnership. However, that partnership now requires reciprocity, sovereignty, cultural confidence, and defence capability. Leadership is not optional. Someone sets the tempo — or adversaries do.
Merz: Leadership without consultation becomes domination. Europe will not trade dependency on rivals for dependency on allies.

Impartial  Observer Conclusion:
For Rubio, power is primary, institutions are secondary, sovereignty precedes cooperation, and decline is the result of hesitation. History punishes societies that refuse to confront reality.
For Merz, power must be embedded, legitimacy preserved, escalation managed, and alliances stabilised through law and trust. History, he argues, punishes societies that confront reality without restraint.

Troels vs. Jester — with the World Pressing In
Troels Lund Poulsen, Danish Minister of Defense, had an article in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on Wednesday, February 11th, entitled “Ukraine should be supported even more.” I have previously written a kind of counter-view in “Caught in a war that might have ended in 2022 – Why?”
Here now an attempt to present our widely differing views in a stark dialogue between fictional Troels and Jester.
 
Troels (calm, deliberate, almost ceremonial):
Let me slow this down for a moment—because too much of the current debate rushes past what truly matters. We are not discussing abstractions. We are discussing whether Europe still believes that borders, sovereignty, and civilian lives are protected by law rather than brute force.
Yes, there is war fatigue. Yes, there is inflation, pressure on budgets, elections looming everywhere. But leadership does not consist in echoing exhaustion. Leadership consists in holding the line precisely when doing so becomes uncomfortable. (pauses)
If we fail here—if Ukraine is allowed to be ground down because the West grows tired—then every future security guarantee we offer becomes worthless. Who will believe us again?
 
Jester (leaning back, voice uneven, probing):
You say “holding the line” as if it were a neutral phrase. It isn’t. It hides a choice. Because holding the line in 2026 means something very different than it did in 2022. Then, it meant stopping collapse. Now, it means accepting a long war with no defined political endpoint. And that difference matters. (hesitates)
Look around. Germany debates conscription. France talks about troops, then retreats. The U.S. Congress drags its feet. Voters everywhere ask—not irrationally—how much longer?This isn’t moral weakness. It’s democratic pressure. And your text treats it like an inconvenience rather than a warning signal.
 
Troels (firmer now, defensive but controlled):
Democracy also means responsibility. Public opinion must be informed, not indulged. If leaders simply follow fatigue, then democracies become strategically incoherent. You mention escalation risk, NATO limits, proxy war logic—as if those were arguments against supporting Ukraine. I see them as arguments for clarity. The clearer our commitment, the less room there is for miscalculation in Moscow.
And let me address this obsession with 2022. You speak as if peace were waiting politely to be signed. It wasn’t. It was conditional on Ukrainian neutrality imposed under invasion. That is not peace—it is enforced vulnerability.
 
Jester (quickly, almost interrupting):
But vulnerability is exactly what Ukraine has now—just stretched out over time. You talk about clarity, but what the Kremlin sees is contradiction:
Weapons, but no troops.
Support, but no victory conditions.
Sanctions, but continued energy trade through proxies.
That ambiguity doesn’t deter—it invites testing. (softer)
And about 2022—no, peace wasn’t clean. It never is. But dismissing it entirely allows you to avoid the most uncomfortable question in today’s debate: Did Western encouragement raise Ukrainian expectations beyond what we were ever prepared to back with force?
 
Troels (long pause, then measured):
That is a serious accusation. And it risks sliding into moral relativism. Ukraine did not fight because we whispered illusions into its ear. Ukraine fought because it was invaded. Because cities burned. Because civilians were executed. If Western support strengthened Ukraine’s resolve, then good. A Europe that discourages resistance to aggression is not a Europe worth defending.
 
Jster (sharper, irony creeping in):
And yet Europe is defending itself by proxy. That’s the part no one wants to say out loud anymore. We reassure ourselves that this is “Ukraine’s choice,” while structuring incentives so that negotiation looks like betrayal and compromise looks like cowardice. Meanwhile, escalation is always “one more system away” from changing the battlefield—until it isn’t.
You call that leadership. I call it moral outsourcing.
 
Troels (voice tightening slightly):
That framing ignores the agency of Ukrainians themselves. They are not pawns. They are not naïve. They understand the cost better than anyone in this conversation. And yes—this is also about Europe. About whether we accept a sphere-of-influence logic returning to our continent. About whether force replaces law as the ultimate arbiter.
 
Jester (slow, almost weary):
But spheres of influence never disappeared. They were just politely denied. You speak as if acknowledging power realities equals endorsing them. It doesn’t. It means negotiating within them. Refusing to do so doesn’t abolish power—it just hands initiative to the strongest actor. (hesitation)
Look at the ongoing debate among strategists—not activists, not Kremlin apologists, but military planners: Ukraine cannot achieve full territorial restoration without either NATO entry or direct NATO war. And neither is coming. Everyone knows it. Including you.
 
Troels (after a pause, more reflective):
There are moments when history forces us to act without guarantees. The absence of certainty is not an argument for inaction. Yes, there are limits. Yes, escalation must be managed. But drawing lines too early—declaring outcomes impossible—creates self-fulfilling defeats.
And let me be blunt: what you call “ending the war” risks becoming ending Ukraine as a sovereign strategic actor.
 
Jester (quietly, then more assertive):
And what you call “supporting Ukraine” risks becoming ending it demographically, economically, psychologically—while sovereignty survives only on paper.
There is a reason “forever war” language has entered mainstream debate. There is a reason soldiers’ families speak differently than ministers. There is a reason even allies now talk about ceasefires they once rejected. (leans forward)
Wars don’t end because one side is morally right. They end when costs exceed expectations. Ukraine reached that point. Europe hasn’t admitted it yet.
 
Troels (slow, resolute):
Admitting that too soon would reward aggression. And once rewarded, it multiplies. If we hesitate now, the lesson learned—from the Baltics to the Balkans—is that endurance matters more than justice.
 
Jester (final, almost resigned):
And if you never hesitate, the lesson learned is that moral language can justify unlimited sacrifice—as long as it is someone else’s. That is the unresolved tension your text refuses to face:
Not whether Ukraine deserves support—but whether your strategy has an ending that does not depend on hope alone.
 

Listening to a fictionalised dialogue about possible reasons for the discord between Europe and Russia, ending slightly imbibed with a possible approach to overcome the discord.
 
Setting: Wine bar, Geneva.
Characters: Aleksey: Russian Diplomat (pragmatic, sardonic, relaxed). Jean-Luc Moreau: French MEP (witty, sharp, historically grounded).
 
Aleksey: (swirling his glass) "Jean-Luc, you have a terrible habit of making paranoia sound like poetry. 'Empire wearing a cheaper suit'? I must remember that one. But you are missing the economic point. I told you, occupying territory is a liability. We are capitalists now, my friend. We look at a balance sheet, not a map."
Moreau: (smiling) "And yet, Aleksey, capitalists usually acquire assets, they don't flatten them. You say you don't want the 'headache' of governing Europeans. We are relieved to hear it. But you don't need to own the house to control the neighbourhood. You just need to be the only one on the street with a sledgehammer. That is the 'cheap suit.' You want the obedience of an empire without the cost of the infrastructure."
Aleksey: "Obedience? No. We want predictability. You call it a 'hierarchy' where our safety outweighs yours. I call it basic physics. Big objects have gravity. You cannot pretend Russia is Luxembourg. When we move, the floorboards creak. You want to pretend the floorboards are silent? That is not agency, that is deafness."
Moreau: "The floorboards creak because you are jumping up and down on them to test their strength! You spoke of pivoting East, leaving us alone. You said we are afraid of being a 'rear flank'. Precisely! You want to neutralise us so you can look at Beijing. But 'neutralise' in Russian diplomatic speak usually means 'demilitarise and shut up'. As I said, we are not interested in being frozen just so you can feel warm."
Aleksey: (chuckling) "You Europeans and your 'sovereign choices'. You talk as if you are free agents. You are terrified of our 'energy leverage', yet you buy your security from Washington and your batteries from China. Is that independence? I offer you a twenty-year energy compact—guaranteed warmth—and you call it a trap. You would rather freeze in the name of 'diversification'."
+1
Moreau: "We would rather be cold than held hostage, Aleksey. That is the difference. You see gas as a molecule; we see it as a leash. You offer 'indivisible security'. It sounds lovely. But in practice, your definition of 'indivisible' means that if Ukraine buys a drone from Turkey, Moscow feels 'divided' and has to invade. Your security seems to be made of very fragile glass."
Aleksey: "And your security is made of paper treaties that America will tear up the moment the polling numbers change in Pennsylvania. You cling to these 'rules' like a religion. But look at the board, Jean-Luc. The rules were written when you were strong and we were on our knees in the 90s. Now we are standing up, and you are shocked that the suit doesn't fit us anymore."
Moreau: "Then tailor the suit, don't burn down the tailor's shop! You say the Bear just wants to hibernate [from Aleksey's monologue]. Fine. We love bears. We watch documentaries about them. But when the Bear insists that his cave extends into our living room because he needs 'strategic depth', we stop being naturalists and start buying locks. That isn't 'anti-Russian' hysteria. It is home insurance."
Aleksey: (raising his glass) "Touché. Home insurance. Very bourgeois. Very European. But remember, Jean-Luc, insurance only pays out after the fire. We are suggesting we simply remove the matches."
Moreau: (clinking his glass against Aleksey’s) "Then stop playing with them, my friend. Stop playing with them."
Moreau: "You speak of ‘indivisible security’ as a grand architecture. But let us be precise, Aleksey. When you say my security cannot come at the expense of yours, you are really claiming a permanent veto over our sovereign choices. If we decide to invite a neighbour into our house, you claim the right to block the door because the 'noise' makes you anxious."
Aleksey: "And if your 'neighbour' brings a battery of missiles to put on my doorstep, Jean-Luc, is that a 'sovereign choice' or a provocation? You call it a veto; I call it a boundary. You want the right to be unpredictable and call it 'freedom'. I am simply saying that in a crowded room, you cannot swing your arms and complain when you hit my nose."
Moreau: "We do not fear you because you are strong; we fear the unpredictability of your grievances. You want us to surrender our agency so you can feel comfortable. You describe your stance as a 'defensive crouch,' yet this 'defence' involves you deciding, entirely alone, where everyone else's alliances must stop."
Aleksey: "Your 'agency' is a charming fiction. You say Washington doesn't whisper in your ear? Please. You arm yourselves because they tell you to, with weapons they sell you. We offer you a partnership where the rules apply to the continent we share, not to an ocean away. Is a veto so bad if it prevents a fire?"
Moreau: "Peace is not preserved by hope or by giving one man the matches. It is preserved by rules that apply equally and borders that aren't revised by force. We will not build a 'fortress' with you if the entry fee is our right to choose our own arrangements. We’ve read the fine print, Aleksey. Your 'architecture' has no exits—only one master key, and it stays in Moscow."
Aleksey (after a long sip, voice lower):
“Jean-Luc, let us drop the choreography. You accuse us of seeking vetoes and buffers. Perhaps sometimes we do. But tell me honestly — does Europe truly believe it can become strategically autonomous while outsourcing its ultimate security decisions to Washington? You speak of sovereignty as a principle. Yet when the decisive phone call is made, it crosses an ocean. That contradiction is not theoretical. It shapes every calculation in Moscow.”
Moreau (measured, reflective):
“You are right about the contradiction. Europe knows it. Lives with it. Suffers it.
But understand this: autonomy cannot be built under pressure. Every time Russia presents Europe with a ‘choice’ framed as urgency — security now, sovereignty later — it delays the very emancipation you claim to want. Strategic adulthood is not achieved by being told when we may leave the house.”
Aleksey:
“And yet you remain in the house. Protected by American insurance. Supplied by Chinese manufacturing. You call this prudence. From where we sit, it looks like dependency disguised as virtue. Russia is told to accept limits forever, while Europe’s limits are treated as temporary inconveniences. That asymmetry breeds resentment — not paranoia.”
Moreau (nods): “Resentment is understandable. So is caution. Europe remembers what happened the last time resentment became doctrine. That is why we insist on process, verification, institutions. Not because we enjoy paperwork, but because power without procedure is indistinguishable from threat. When Russia acts first and explains later, you cannot be surprised that trust erodes.”
Aleksey (leans forward slightly): “And when Europe moralises first and negotiates later, you cannot be surprised that Moscow stops listening. You speak of rules. But rules, Jean-Luc, must evolve with power realities or they become liturgy. China understands this. America enforces it. Europe hesitates — and then wonders why it is sidelined.”
Moreau: “Because Europe is slow. Yes. Deliberate. Yes. But that slowness is not weakness. It is the price of consensus among sovereign equals. You see indecision. We see legitimacy. Any security architecture that excludes this reality will fail — because Europeans will not follow it when it becomes inconvenient.”
(A brief silence. The waiter refills glasses.)
Aleksey (softer): “Then perhaps the error has been trying to design stability through dominance — on both sides. Washington dominates through alliances. Beijing through economics. Russia… through geography. None of these alone are sustainable.”
Moreau (quiet: “Now we are speaking the same language.”
Aleksey:
“Russia does not want to be a frontier state between America and China. Nor do we want Europe to be a forward operating base for one against the other. A fractured Eurasia benefits only those who profit from managing crises they never have to live with.”
Moreau: “And Europe does not want to wake up in twenty years discovering it traded strategic relevance for comfort — dependent on American security guarantees that fluctuate with elections, and Chinese supply chains that fluctuate with loyalty.”
Aleksey (dry smile): “So we agree the centre of gravity is moving — and neither of us wants to be crushed under it.”
(They clink glasses, lightly.)
Moreau: “A security pact, then, cannot be about freezing history. It must be about managing change. Clear red lines. Mutual restraint. Real inspections. And above all — no assumptions of automatic hostility.”
Aleksey: “And no assumptions of automatic innocence. Russia would accept limits — genuine ones — if they applied symmetrically. Missiles, deployments, exercises. Transparency instead of theatre.”
Moreau: “And Europe would accept engagement — serious engagement — if sovereignty were not treated as a temporary privilege. If neighbours were subjects of law, not variables of strategy.”
Aleksey (after a pause): “That would require trust.”
Moreau (exhales): “No. It would require structure. Trust comes later. Europeans are engineers before they are romantics.”
Aleksey (laughs): “And Russians are romantics pretending to be engineers. A dangerous combination.”
(The wine is clearly working now.)
Moreau (standing, loosening his tie): “If we do nothing, the continent becomes a corridor —American security passing through, Chinese goods passing through, and Europeans wondering when history started happening again without them.”
Aleksey (stands as well, placing a hand briefly on Moreau’s shoulder): “And Russians wondering when partnership became a memory instead of an option.”
Moreau: “Then perhaps we begin modestly. Not with grand visions. But with fewer misunderstandings.”
Aleksey: “And more conversations like this — preferably with good wine and no microphones.”
Moreau (smiles): “Europe can agree to that.”
Aleksey (friendly backslap): “Careful, Jean-Luc. You are starting to sound Eurasian.”
Moreau (laughs, returning it): “Careful yourself. You are starting to sound European.”
 
(They part, unsteady but sincere, each pretending this was not the most constructive conversation of the evening.)
 
Note:  Made partly by letting two AI models argue against each other
 
 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/animated-discussion-europe-vs-russia-between-russian-french-petersen-beuge

Three Mutually Incompatible Strategies
National defence strategies are by definition not neutral documents. They are exercises in self-persuasion and self-assertion. Read side by side, the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy, Russia’s updated 2021 National Security Strategy, and China’s Defensive National Defence Policy  (2019 and 2025) reveal not merely different priorities, but three mutually incompatible conceptions of how power, security, and legitimacy operate in the international system.
The danger lies less in any single doctrine than in the way these strategies interact, misread one another, and heighten the margin for error. Each strategy claims realism. Each accuses others—explicitly or implicitly—of destabilising behaviour. Yet taken together, they describe a system in which peace depends on assumptions that none of the three powers actually share.

Theoretical Framework: Three Realisms, One Security Dilemma
At a theoretical level, the clash among U.S., Russian, and Chinese strategies can be understood as a confrontation between three distinct variants of realism, each operating with different assumptions in relation to power, time and risk, and they diverge sharply on how security is produced and sustained.

The United States: Offensive Realism Under Time Pressure
The National Defense Strategy, NDS 2026, argues that in January 2025, the U.S. found itself “Facing not only a world with individual regions at war or descending toward it but also increased risk of America itself being drawn into simultaneous major wars across theaters—a third world war, as President Trump himself warned. That is all changing now. Under President Trump’s leadership, consistent with his vision and direction as laid out in the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Department of War (DoW) is laser-focused on restoring peace through strength. As detailed in the NSS, the President’s approach is one of a flexible, practical realism that looks at the world in a clear-eyed way, which is essential for serving Americans’ interests.” (NDS2026).
This new U.S. strategy aligns most closely with offensive realism, particularly as articulated by scholars such as John Mearsheimer. It assumes that:

• The international system is anarchic.
• Great powers seek to maximise relative power.
• Decline is dangerous because it invites challenge.

What distinguishes the current U.S. approach is offensive realism under the perceived constraint of having limited time. It reflects a belief that the United States still possesses decisive advantages, but that these advantages are eroding. As a result, deterrence must be actively reinforced through denial strategies, alliance restructuring, and industrial mobilisation.
From a theoretical perspective, this may in itself create a problematic logic, as actions taken to preserve stability in the near term may increase instability by signalling urgency and resolve. Building deterrence, while rational within offensive realism, reduces strategic ambiguity and narrows escalation thresholds—especially when applied against peer competitors.

Russia: Defensive Realism with Regime-Security Characteristics
The preservation of sovereignty and internal unity of the Russian Federation is seen as the primary condition for ensuring national security. A detailed “Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation” (NSS) published in 2021 and later amended, states that “The goals of ensuring state and public security are the protection of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, ensuring its sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity,... protecting citizens and all forms of property and traditional Russian spiritual and moral values from unlawful encroachments.” (NSS, 2021).
The strategy argues that Russia is facing growing pressure from the United States and its allies, who seek to preserve their dominance by containing Russia: “The military-political situation in the world is characterised by the formation of new global and regional centres of power, and the aggravation of the struggle between them for spheres of influence. The importance of military force as an instrument for subjects of international relations to achieve their geopolitical goals is increasing. The intensification of military dangers and military threats to the Russian Federation is facilitated by attempts to exert forceful pressure on Russia, its allies and partners, the build-up of the military infrastructure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation near Russian borders, the intensification of intelligence activities, and the practising of the use of large military formations and nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation.” (NSS , 2021). Faced with such threats “the Russian Federation considers it lawful to take symmetric and asymmetric measures necessary to suppress such unfriendly actions, as well as to prevent their repetition in the future.”
In 2024 Russia updated its policy of nuclear deterrence, stating: “The Russian Federation reserves the right to employ nuclear weapons in response to the employment of nuclear and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction against itself and (or) its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) the Republic of Belarus as participants in the Union State with the employment of conventional weapons, which creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity.” (Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, 2024) .
Russia’s strategy fits most closely within defensive realism, but with a crucial modification: security is defined not only in territorial terms, but in terms of regime survival and societal cohesion. Key assumptions include:

• The primary threat comes from external interference rather than conquest.
• Power balances, not dominance, produce stability.
• Internal weakness invites external exploitation.

Unlike classical defensive realism, however, Russia’s approach accepts coercion and limited revisionism as stabilising tools. This produces a paradox: Russia claims to seek stability, yet embraces methods—militarisation, nuclear signalling, information warfare—that increase systemic volatility. Theoretically, Russia behaves as a status-insecure power: unwilling to accept marginalisation, yet unable to compete symmetrically. This drives a preference for escalation dominance and grey-zone operations, which defensive realism alone cannot fully explain without incorporating regime-security logic.

China: Structural Realism with Long-Term View
China argues that it pursues a national defence policy that is defensive in nature and adheres to the principle of peaceful development. When China published “China's National Security White Paper in the New Era” in 2025 (CNS 2025), it wrote: “The Global Security Initiative advocated by China addresses the urgent need of the international community to uphold world peace and prevent conflicts. It echoes the shared aspirations of the vast majority of nations for win-win cooperation over hegemony and bullying, aligning with humanity's common pursuit of lasting peace and universal security. The initiative offers a new pathway to eliminate the root causes of international conflicts, tackle global security challenges, and improve global security governance.”
The task of China’s national security is multi-faceted: “All kinds of risks must be prevented and controlled, but the focus is on preventing and controlling the overall risks that may delay or interrupt the great rejuvenation process of the Chinese nation. It is necessary to be highly vigilant against the "black swan" incident, but also to prevent the "grey rhino’s" incidents.”...We resolutely prevent foreign anti-China forces from implementing a strategy of Westernization and differentiation to China by promoting the human rights of Western democracy, freedom and the so-called "universal values.” (CNS 2025).
A 2019 version of “China’s national Defense in the new Era” emphasised: “It stands against aggression and expansion, and opposes arbitrary use or threat of arms. The development of China’s national defense aims to meet its rightful security needs and contribute to the growth of the world’s peaceful forces. History proves and will continue to prove that China will never follow the beaten track of big powers in seeking hegemony. No matter how it might develop, China will never threaten any other country or seek any sphere of influence” (National Defense, 2019).
Of course, Taiwan is something else. China resolutely opposes “taiwan independence,” striving for peaceful unification, but “never promised to renounce the use of force” and reserved the option of taking all necessary measures.
On the nuclear question, China has taken the stance that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and unconditionally pledged not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones.
In sum, China’s defence policy aligns with a structural realist framework emphasising balance, patience, and systemic adaptation. Its core assumptions are:

• Power transitions are dangerous but manageable if gradual.
• Security emerges from endurance, not dominance.
• Legitimacy is as important as capability.

China’s emphasis on “active defence,” no-first-use nuclear policy, and rejection of alliances reflects a belief that time is an asset, not a liability. Unlike the United States, China does not assume that windows close rapidly; unlike Russia, it does not assume permanent hostility. Theoretically, China seeks to normalise power growth without triggering balancing coalitions—a strategy that relies heavily on ambiguity, economic interdependence, and controlled military signalling. This approach is internally coherent but highly sensitive to external denial strategies, which threaten to collapse ambiguity into confrontation.

Strategic Implications of Theoretical Incompatibility
The interaction of these three realisms produces a security dilemma, not because intentions are aggressive, but because risk tolerances and time horizons diverge.

• The U.S. interprets delay and holding back as a danger.
• Russia interprets external pressure as an existential threat.
• China interprets attempts at containment as illegitimate.

In theoretical terms, the system lacks a shared understanding of what constitutes sufficient security. As a result, actions intended as stabilising within one framework are destabilising within another.

The United States: Strategic Urgency and the Fear of Lost Time
The 2026 U.S. strategy is defined by urgency. Its central premise is that the United States must reassert military, industrial, and alliance dominance before structural advantages erode further. The emphasis on homeland defence, Indo-Pacific denial, and defence industrial mobilisation reflects a belief that deterrence failure is approaching rather than hypothetical.
The strategy has four goals to be achieved without delay:

1. The defence of the Homeland is framed as the primary and non-delegable mission of the U.S. military. This goal encompasses border security, counter-narco-terrorism operations throughout the Western Hemisphere, protection of key geographic chokepoints such as the Panama Canal and Greenland, air and missile defence of the continental United States, modernisation of nuclear deterrence, cyber defence, and counterterrorism against groups capable of striking the U.S. directly. The Strategy revives and expands the logic of the Monroe Doctrine, asserting that American security requires denying adversaries influence and military presence anywhere in the hemisphere.
   
2. The deterrence of China in the Indo-Pacific is identified as the most pressing external challenge to American prosperity and long-term power. The Strategy does not frame China as an enemy to be defeated or humiliated, but as a peer competitor whose military build-up threatens to alter the balance of power in the world’s most economically vital region. The stated objective is to prevent any single power from dominating the Indo-Pacific.
3. The restructuring of alliances through burden-sharing. The Strategy asserts that U.S. alliances remain indispensable, but only if allies transition from dependency to partnership. It sets explicit defence spending benchmarks—most notably a global standard of 5% of GDP.
4. The revitalisation of the U.S. defense industrial base (DIB). Rebuilding industrial capacity, accelerating innovation, integrating advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, and coordinating production with allies are presented as prerequisites for credible deterrence and wartime endurance.

Ultimately, the 2026 National Defense Strategy seeks to redefine American leadership not as omnipresence or moral crusading, but as disciplined strength applied in defence of clearly defined national interests. Whether this ambition can be realised will depend less on declaratory policy than on sustained political will, allied compliance, and the United States’ ability to rebuild the material foundations of its military power under conditions of intense global competition. From a theoretical standpoint, the strategy’s greatest weakness is its reliance on preventive stability—the assumption that acting now will reduce future risk. History may indicate that preventive strategies often succeed tactically while failing strategically, particularly when adversaries interpret them as preparation for exclusion or coercion.

Russia: Security as Siege and Survival
Russia’s strategy reflects a worldview in which security is zero-sum and legitimacy is contested. Militarisation, autarky, and societal mobilisation are not temporary measures but structural adaptations to permanent confrontation. From an IR theory perspective, Russia exemplifies the security dilemma intensified by identity conflict: Western actions are interpreted not merely as threats to interests, but as threats to political and cultural existence. This makes compromise structurally difficult and escalation socially and psychologically tolerable.
The strategy’s goals:

• Preserve the Population and Develop Human Potential. A central goal is to “save the people of Russia” by reversing demographic decline and improving quality of life. This includes increasing birth rates and life expectancy, reducing poverty and inequality, strengthening healthcare and education, and supporting families, children, and the elderly.
• Defend Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and Statehood. The Strategy prioritises protection of Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity against external pressure. It emphasises military readiness, nuclear deterrence, mobilisation capacity, and protection of Russian citizens and interests abroad.
• Ensure State and Public Security. Maintaining internal stability through crime prevention, counter-terrorism, anti-extremism measures, border security, emergency preparedness, and combating corruption. Preventing foreign interference in domestic affairs is explicitly highlighted.
• Secure the Information Space. The Strategy aims to strengthen Russia’s “information sovereignty” by protecting critical information infrastructure, countering cyberattacks, limiting foreign technological dependence, and resisting what it defines as destructive information and psychological influence—especially on youth.
• Achieve Economic Sovereignty and Resilient Growth. Economic security is framed as reducing vulnerability to sanctions and global instability. Goals include technological self-sufficiency, diversification away from raw-material exports, import substitution, financial sovereignty, reduced reliance on the US dollar, and sustained growth exceeding global averages.
• Attain Scientific and Technological Independence. The Strategy seeks technological leadership as a foundation of national power. Goals include boosting research funding, developing advanced technologies (AI, quantum, biotech, aerospace, etc.), integrating science with industry, and preventing the outflow of critical knowledge and talent.
• Safeguard Traditional Values, Culture, and Historical Memory. Protection of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, cultural sovereignty, and historical truth. This includes strengthening patriotism, family values, the Russian language, and resisting perceived external ideological influence.
• Maintain Strategic Stability and Shape a Multipolar World Order. Preserve strategic stability, prevent major war, and oppose unilateral dominance. Russia positions itself as an independent global power advocating multipolarity, stronger roles for the UN, deeper ties with non-Western partners (notably China and India), and resistance to sanctions and coercive diplomacy.

The unifying goal is to ensure long-term national survival and development by integrating defence, economic resilience, societal cohesion, and value-based governance. Security is thus defined broadly—not just as military protection, but as control over political, economic, informational, cultural, and technological foundations of the state.
Russia seems to have further plans that might help achieve the goal of preserving and securing the strategic goals. In December 2025, the so-called Valdai Discussion Club (a Moscow-based international think tank) published ideas for a new Eurasian Security Architecture. The idea of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia refers to President Putin’s earlier ideas about the importance of forming a new framework of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia. This is supposed to be a security architecture that would span the entire continent. “The way Russia sees it, the issue is about the continent within its geographical boundaries and the complexity and diversity of the regions that make up Eurasia.”
The Valdai publication reveals that “Russian diplomacy is already acting on the idea of building Eurasian security architecture as a conceptual framework in its foreign policy planning. Isolated principles are reflected in bilateral and multilateral formats. The bilateral formats include new bilateral treaties between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and between Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Multilateral initiatives include the declaration adopted at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Astana in 2024.”

China: Patience, Power Accumulation, and the Language of Defence
China's National Security White Paper in the New Era” in 2025 (CNS 2025) is much more comprehensive than the U.S. Strategy but ambiguous; striving for a peaceful solution, but rigorous in readiness to achieve its many goals. Its success depends on others accepting ambiguity, gradualism, and restraint. U.S. denial strategies undermine this by forcing China to clarify red lines—especially on Taiwan—prehaps earlier than Beijing prefers. Theoretically, this risks transforming a power transition problem into a commitment problem, where neither side believes the other can credibly accept restraint.
China’s National Security Strategy is regime-centred, development-oriented, and comprehensive. Security is not limited to defence, but understood as the total set of conditions required for Party rule, national unity, economic growth, and global influence. Domestic stability and political control are treated as inseparable from China’s external behaviour and long-term strategic ambitions.
Here are some of its main goals:

• Safeguard Communist Party Leadership and the Socialist System. Political security—defined as regime stability and ideological control—is treated as the foundation of all other forms of security.
• Protect National Sovereignty, Unity, and Territorial Integrity. China prioritises defending its sovereignty and territorial claims, including Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and border regions.
• Ensure Conditions for National Rejuvenation and Development. The Strategy aims to provide a stable domestic and international environment that allows sustained economic growth, technological upgrading, and social modernisation.
• Build Comprehensive Military and Defence Capabilities. A central goal is developing a world-class military capable of safeguarding China’s interests at home and abroad.
• Maintain Social Stability and Internal Control. It prioritises domestic security governance, public order, surveillance capacity, and the ability to respond rapidly to crises that could threaten stability.
• Achieve Economic, Technological, and Industrial Security. China seeks to reduce vulnerability to external pressure by strengthening economic self-reliance, securing critical supply chains, and achieving leadership in key technologies.
• Secure the Information and Ideological Space. Another major goal is control over the information domain, as well as resistance to what China describes as Western “information infiltration.”.
• Promote Non-Traditional Security and Risk Management. The Strategy expands security to include public health, energy, food, climate, space, maritime, and biological security.
• Shape a Favourable International Security Environment. Internationally, China aims to oppose hegemony and bloc politics, promote multipolarity, and present itself as a provider of global public goods. It emphasises multilateralism, UN-centred governance, and security cooperation aligned with China’s interests.
  

Where Strategies Collide
Strategic documents do not cause wars directly. Wars emerge when strategies interact over time, generating feedback loops of fear, signalling, and misinterpretation. Viewed through a kind of Thucydidean lens, the interaction of U.S., Chinese, and Russian priorities points not to a single inevitable conflict, but to several plausible escalation pathways, each driven by different time and structural pressures.

Scenario 1: Taiwan as a Preventive War Catalyst (High Risk, High Impact)
The most direct and dangerous scenario remains a conflict over Taiwan. This pathway does not require a sudden Chinese decision for conquest, nor an explicit U.S. commitment to war. It emerges instead from mutual preventive logic. The United States, fearing that Chinese military capabilities will soon overwhelm denial strategies, accelerates forward deployments, arms transfers, and operational integration with Taiwan. Central to this effort is the construction of a “denial defense” along the First Island Chain (FIC), mainly consisting of the Kuril Islands, the Japanese Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and Borneo, thus closing off the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.
China, concluding that peaceful reunification is being structurally foreclosed, faces growing incentives to act before U.S. denial becomes insurmountable. Taiwan, sensing shrinking ambiguity, hardens its own political identity, further reducing diplomatic off-ramps. Each side believes delay worsens its position. Crisis stability erodes not because deterrence fails, but because deterrence becomes time-bound.
How to avoid a conflict over Taiwan? Let’s guess what this might be. Realising that the U.S. and China are about equal for the time being at least, war would be stupid. The alternative is dividing the world between them almost like in the olden days with the Soviet Union and the U.S. dividing the World in separate spheres of interest. What would that mean for Taiwan? Acceptance that it is part of China, on the condition unification would be by peaceful means and over time, remembering that Taiwan’s fab factories are still absolutely essential for the U.S.. With the U.S. resurrecting its own Monroe-Roosevelt doctrine under Trump, it seems reasonable to accept a kind of Chinese Monroe-like doctrine in relation to the South China Sea.
From China, the U.S. would need acceptance of non-military intervention in Taiwan for a set time (until some kind of substitute for Taiwan’s fab factories has been found), removal of all sorts of barriers creating disadvantages for U.S. companies in China, and possibly help in countering North Korean threats.

Scenario 2: Ukrainian Proxy  War Escalation (Medium Risk, Probability?)
Russia plays a critical, if indirect, role in shaping future conflict trajectories. A renewed or expanded European crisis—whether in Ukraine, the Baltic region, or the Arctic—could function as a strategic distraction rather than a primary theatre. In Europe, there is the deep but also wary and ambiguous involvement in the Ukrainian proxy war. Where various reciprocal escalations lead to the risk of a wider war.
This led President Trump to warn of the risk of a third world war: “Things like this end up in third world wars. And I told that the other day, I said, 'You know, everybody keeps playing games like this, you'll end up in a third world war.' And we don't want to see that happen.” (Newsweek, December 13, 2025) .
For Trump, a peaceful solution of this conflict means finding some arrangement with Russia, preferably something that would either satisfy or threaten Russia to such a degree that peace with Ukraine would result in long-term stability. If Trump and his henchmen (and -women) succeed, this will mean a chance for peace, security and a chance for economic recovery for Ukraine. Ukraine might lose 20% of its territory, but what is the alternative as things stand?. Sticking to the almost unbelievable stupid stand “That Ukraine wins the war” as uttered by the Danish Prime Minister recently?

Scenario 3: Managed Rivalry Gives Way to Accidental War (Medium Risk, Medium Probability)
A third scenario involves no deliberate decision for war at all. Instead, it reflects the consequences of persistent militarised proximity in the Indo-Pacific. Regular close encounters between naval and air forces increase. Cyber operations, space-domain interference, and grey-zone actions become normalised. Crisis-management mechanisms lag behind operational tempo. In this scenario, a collision, misinterpreted exercise, or cyber-induced escalation triggers a rapid spiral. The danger lies not in escalation dominance, but in compressed decision windows, where leaders must choose between backing down publicly or escalating privately. This scenario aligns closely with Thucydides’ insight that wars often begin without a clear moment of choice, emerging instead from accumulated mistrust and habitual readiness.

Scenario 4: Golden Dome and Renewed Nuclear Arms Race (Extreme Risk, Low probability?)
“On January 27, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 14186, titled The Iron Dome for America. The EO announced a shift in U.S. missile defense policy, expanding the scope of the homeland missile defense mission and directing the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop "a next generation missile shield" ..."Golden Dome for America."” (congress.gov).
The intention is to create an extremely costly shield protecting the U.S. against all kinds of missile, drone, and spaceborne threats. Such an attempt to shield the U.S. is already leading to potential conflicts, on a lower level; Trump’s wish to take over Greenland has led to disagreement with Europe. Far more dangerous is the risk that such a shield may lead to a new nuclear arms race, on earth and in space.
“Members of Congress have stated that some of these systems could adversely affect U.S. security by destabilizing nuclear deterrence relationships with U.S. strategic competitors and/or by contributing to a competition in nuclear-armed missiles. Congress may consider how China and Russia have responded to Golden Dome and may respond to future missile defense efforts.” (congress.gov) .
Especially now that as the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia, expired on February 5, 2026. President Putin had proposed in the autumn of 2025 a one-year extension of New START; Trump had been non-committal, but talked about the need for a new treaty to include China.  Now  “Axios” reveals that the U.S. and Russia are closing in on a deal to continue to observe the expiring New START arms control treaty beyond its expiration date. 
Apart from a possible new nuclear arms race between the big nuclear powers, there might be a growing risk of threats from Iran and North Korea. No wonder therefore that Trump has been so eager in his attempts to prevent Iran from reaching a stage where there would be a threat of nuclear-armed missiles.
Although Trump’s attempts to get the Golden Shield constructed raises the risks of new confrontations, he seems also to be eager to reduce the risk of a confrontation with Russia. Friendship with Russia might mean that Russia would be less inclined to become totally dependent on China, opening possibilities for both Europe and the U.S. to counterbalance China’s growing hegemonic striving. This would surely suit Trump. Trump has also expressed a wish for new agreements on nuclear disarmament with Russia, the U.S. and China, new agreements that would reduce missile threats, strategic as well as tactical. “When we straighten it all out, then I want one of the first meetings I have is with President Xi of China, President Putin of Russia. And I want to say, let's cut our military budget in half.”

Three Strategies Without a Shared Understanding of Stability
The most troubling conclusion from a theoretical comparison is this: the three strategies are not merely competitive—they are incompatible. Each rests on a different answer to the same foundational question: what makes a great power secure?

• The United States answers: dominance maintained in time. To guard against the loss of hegemony to China.
  
• Russia answers: survival preserved through resistance. Armed resistance against decline as a world power.
• China answers: continuity ensured through patience. Self-assured of being on a dominating path to hegemony.

All three strategies cannot be achieved simultaneously. Until this is realised, the international system will remain not just competitive, but structurally primed for conflict. In such a system, war is unlikely to be chosen—but increasingly likely to occur.

Introduction: The American Diagnosis of Civilisational Erasure
The overarching thesis of the this text rests upon a startling external diagnosis: the United States’ National Security Strategy of November 2024 views Europe not merely as a stagnant ally, but as a continent actively "sliding backwards" and facing the stark prospect of "civilisational erasure". This dismal assessment posits that without a radical correction in trajectory, Europe risks becoming unrecognisable within two decades. The analysis suggests that the United States no longer views the European Union as a peer competitor or a robust partner, but rather as a region requiring intervention to "promote a revival of spirit" through the support of so-called patriotic or right-wing parties.
The  following text is  a chronicle of European  decay, systematically dismantling the illusion of European resilience by examining structural failures in economics, demographics, social cohesion, and strategic autonomy.
 
1. Europe’s Relative Decline: From Post‑Cold War Hubris to Structural Stagnation
The starting point is Europe’s long-run loss of economic dynamism and global relevance. Once accounting for roughly a quarter of global GDP in 1990, the European Union now commands barely half that share. This decline is not presented as a natural consequence of global convergence or the rise of China alone, but as the outcome of deliberate regulatory, political, and ideological choices that have constrained productivity, innovation, and capital formation.
Productivity data underline the diagnosis. While large listed firms in the United States have seen productivity growth of roughly 40 per cent since the mid‑2000s, comparable European firms have stagnated. The gap is especially pronounced in frontier sectors—digital platforms, artificial intelligence, robotics, and advanced manufacturing—where the “United States creates, China scales, and Europe regulates.” The much‑celebrated European “values‑based” approach to technology governance, epitomised by the Digital Services Act and AI regulation, is portrayed less as a moral high ground than as a substitute for competitiveness.
Energy policy compounds these weaknesses. Europe’s self‑imposed energy cost disadvantage—driven by carbon pricing, premature de‑industrialisation, and the abrupt severing of Russian energy supplies—has eroded industrial competitiveness precisely at a time of intensifying global competition. The European Commission publicly laments high energy prices while simultaneously defending the policy architecture that produced them.
The cumulative effect is a continent that still speaks the language of economic power but increasingly lacks its substance. Europe remains wealthy, but no longer dynamic; regulated, but not competitive; morally assured, but strategically brittle.
 
2. Demographic Collapse and the Mirage of Migration as a Solution
Beneath Europe’s economic malaise lies a more intractable problem: demographic implosion. Fertility rates across the EU have remained well below replacement for more than four decades, hovering around 1.4 children per woman, with no major member state approaching demographic sustainability. Population ageing and rising old‑age dependency ratios threaten labour markets, public finances, and long‑term growth prospects.
The text forcefully rejects the comforting assumption that large‑scale immigration can function as a demographic panacea. While migrants are, on average, younger than the native‑born population, their labour‑market integration—particularly among non‑EU migrants—lags significantly behind. Employment gaps, welfare dependence, and uneven educational outcomes undermine the economic rationale often invoked to justify mass immigration as a substitute for native demographic renewal.
More controversially, the analysis insists that demographic questions cannot be separated from cultural and social cohesion. Immigration, especially from culturally distant societies, is said to generate trade‑offs that European elites have been unwilling to acknowledge. These trade‑offs manifest not only in fiscal terms, but in social trust, public safety, and political stability.
The demographic argument thus extends beyond numbers. It becomes a critique of Europe’s unwillingness to confront the civilisational implications of demographic change—and of its preference for moral reassurance over empirical scrutiny.
 
3. Cultural Self‑Erasure and the Politics of Tolerance
Perhaps the most provocative dimension of the text concerns what it describes as Europe’s “cultural self‑erasure”. Immigration from predominantly Muslim countries, combined with higher fertility rates among migrant populations, is projected—under certain scenarios—to radically alter Europe’s demographic and cultural composition over the long term. While it acknowledges the uncertainty and speculative nature of far‑future projections, it argues that the psychological and political impact of these scenarios is already real.
Public opinion data reveal widespread anxieties: fears of Überfremdung, declining public safety, and the erosion of national identity. These fears are not confined to fringe groups but extend deep into the mainstream electorate, particularly in Western Europe. The text argues that elite attempts to dismiss such concerns as irrational or xenophobic have only deepened mistrust.
At the heart of the argument lies a critique of what might be termed asymmetric tolerance. European societies, committed to liberal pluralism, have extended accommodation to illiberal norms in the name of inclusion. Yet tolerance, the text insists, becomes self‑defeating when it ceases to be reciprocal. When religious or cultural claims are treated as absolute and non‑negotiable, dialogue gives way to unilateral concession.
The result is not harmonious multiculturalism but growing fragmentation: parallel communities, value conflicts over gender equality, freedom of expression, and the rule of law, and a creeping sense that Europe no longer believes in the legitimacy of its own civilisation.
 
4. Free Speech, Judicial Expansion, and the Democratic Paradox
Another central theme is the tension between Europe’s self‑image as a bastion of liberal democracy and its increasingly restrictive approach to speech and political dissent. A dense web of EU directives, national laws, and informal codes—aimed at combating hate speech, disinformation, and social harm—has produced a chilling effect on public debate.
Survey evidence from Germany, the United Kingdom, and other states indicates that large portions of the population now self‑censor on politically sensitive topics, particularly migration and cultural integration. These trends do not amount to authoritarian repression in the classical sense. Rather, they reflect a subtler form of constraint, driven by legal ambiguity, social sanction, and institutional overreach.
Judicial mission creep compounds the problem. Decisions by supranational courts, particularly the European Court of Human Rights, are portrayed as increasingly encroaching on national sovereignty in areas such as migration control and criminal deportation. Political leaders across Europe—ironically including some of its most pro‑EU figures—have begun to question whether courts have drifted beyond their original mandates.
The paradox is stark: institutions designed to protect liberal democracy may, through overextension, be undermining its social foundations by delegitimising democratic choice and insulating contentious policies from political correction.
 
5. Polarisation, the Rise of the Right, and the Crisis of Political Legitimacy
The text situates Europe’s political turbulence within this broader context of economic stagnation, demographic anxiety, and cultural conflict. Rising dissatisfaction with democratic performance, measured across multiple surveys, coincides with accelerating political polarisation. Right‑wing and nationalist parties, once marginal, now command substantial shares of the electorate and, in some cases, parliamentary majorities.
Crucially, the analysis rejects the comforting narrative that these movements are merely products of misinformation or foreign interference. Instead, they are framed as endogenous responses to elite failure. Where mainstream parties refuse to articulate uncomfortable truths—or are perceived to govern through moralisation rather than problem‑solving—voters seek alternatives that promise clarity, even at the cost of liberal niceties.
Social media acts as an accelerant, amplifying grievances and bypassing traditional gatekeepers. Attempts to suppress or delegitimise alternative media voices, the text warns, risk reinforcing the very dynamics they seek to contain.
 
6. Leadership Vacuum and the Question of Europe’s Political Form
The final sections deliver a withering assessment of Europe’s political leadership. EU institutions are depicted as rhetorically ambitious yet strategically hollow, more adept at regulation than at decision‑making. Speeches substitute for strategy; consensus processes dilute responsibility; and no leader emerges with the authority—or legitimacy—to impose painful but necessary reforms.
This diagnosis leads to a radical, if speculative, conclusion: that Europe’s survival as a coherent actor may require a fundamental overhaul of its political architecture. Proposals for a United States of Europe, with streamlined institutions and genuine democratic accountability, are floated not as utopian dreams but as last‑ditch responses to institutional paralysis.
The alternative, the text implies, is not stasis but drift—towards irrelevance, internal fragmentation, and eventual subordination to external powers.
 
7. Strategic Myopia in a World of Great Powers
On the global stage, Europe appears simultaneously moralistic and powerless. The continent speaks fluently about values, norms, and international law, yet relies overwhelmingly on American power for its security. NATO is treated less as a strategic choice than as a metaphysical guarantee—one that absolves Europe from confronting its own military inadequacy.
The text is particularly critical of Europe’s Russia policy, arguing that perpetual confrontation, absent credible military autonomy, locks Europe into strategic dependency and fear. It provocatively suggests that a post‑Ukraine security settlement involving Russia could offer Europe an opportunity.
Most provocatively, the text calls for a complete reassessment of Europe’s security architecture. It labels NATO an "anachronism" that provides only an illusion of security while chaining Europe to American strategic interests. The proposed alternative is a pivot towards Russia—not as an adversary, but as a partner in a new "Eurasian" security framework. The text suggests that peace with Russia would secure energy supplies, open Arctic trade routes to Asia, and allow Europe to coordinate with Russia to stem migration flows from Africa. This stark realist conclusion posits that to survive the squeeze between US and Chinese superpowers, Europe must abandon its moralising posturing and ruthlessly pursue its own strategic autonomy, even if that requires dismantling the Atlantic alliance. to rethink its relationship with Russia—not out of naivety, but out of necessity in a multipolar world.
In this reading, Europe’s greatest strategic failure is not moral weakness, but intellectual inertia: an inability to imagine alternative futures once existing frameworks begin to fray.
 
Conclusion?
Taken together, the arguments amount to a deeply unsettling thesis: Europe is not collapsing because it lacks resources, talent, or history, but because it has lost the will to defend the conditions of its own continuity. Economic decline, demographic contraction, cultural uncertainty, and strategic dependency are not isolated crises but mutually reinforcing symptoms of a civilisation uncertain of itself.
Whether Europe chooses renewal, radical transformation, or managed decline remains an open question. What the text makes uncomfortably clear is that time—and complacency—is no longer on Europe’s side.
 
NOTE:  This text is a short version of the article “Europe Sliding Backward: A Chronicle of Decay.” produced with AI assistance.  Original can be found at:
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/europe-sliding-backward-chronicle-decay-verner-c-petersen-rjlxe
Or
https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/europe-sliding-backward-a-chronicle-of-decay
 

The U.S. Giving Europe a Jolt
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America published in November 2024 caused consternation in Europe, due to its dismal view of a Europe sliding backwards and risking civilisational erasure
Economic weakness: “Continental Europe has been losing share of global GDP—down from 25 percent in 1990 to 14 percent today—partly owing to national and transnational regulations that undermine creativity and industriousness. “
Civilizational erasure: The economic decline is “eclipsed by the real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure. The larger issues facing Europe include activities of the European Union and other transnational bodies that undermine political liberty and sovereignty, migration policies that are transforming the continent and creating strife, censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition, cratering birthrates, and loss of national identities and self-confidence.” In the view of the strategy, a continuation of these trends towards civilisational erasure would make Europe unrecognisable in 20 years or less.
Lacks confidence in its own power: Europe lacks self-confidence, not the least in relation to Russia, seeing Russia as an existential threat, although possessing a hard power advantage over Russia. Therefore “European relations with Russia will require significant U.S. diplomatic engagement, both to reestablish conditions of strategic stability across the Eurasian landmass, and to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.”
Lacks realism and has democratic deficits: The U.S. strategy also argues that “European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the war perched in unstable minority governments, many of which trample on basic principles of democracy to suppress opposition.”
U.S. promoting revival of European greatness: “Yet Europe remains strategically and culturally vital to the United States. Transatlantic trade remains one of the pillars of the global economy and of American prosperity. European sectors from manufacturing to technology to energy remain among the world’s most robust. Europe is home to cutting-edge scientific research and world-leading cultural institutions. Not only can we not afford to write Europe off—doing so would be self-defeating for what this strategy aims to achieve.” “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory, and in order to do that, the strategy wants encourage its political allies in Europe to promote a revival of spirit, and with the growing influence of so-called patriotic parties read right wing parties, in Europe, the strategy sees cause for great optimism."

Angry Retort by European Voices
Important European voices reacted with derision and derogatory comments.
Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister of Sweden, wrote: “The brief European section [ of the U.S. strategy] stands out from the rest in its blatant hostility, reinforced in the X post by the deputy secretary of state. It reads as if it has been hijacked by Vice-President JD Vance and his crew—JD Vance on steroids. In another part of the document there is a brief mention of “restoring Europe’s civilisational self-confidence.”
European Council President Antonio Costa said, ““What we cannot accept is this threat of interference in Europe’s political life. The United States cannot replace European citizens in deciding which are the right parties and the wrong parties.” He also wrote: “What I see is that there are so many people trying to undermine Europe. Why? Because the EU is strong. And we are working to make it even stronger. We have taken bold steps to build the Europe of defence and enhance our strategic autonomy."
In response to the new U.S. Security Strategy, the EU leaders cannot sit idly by. Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy is not a misunderstanding or a whim: it is a declaration of hostility against the European Union. Silence is not the solution. If we defend freedom, it is the freedom to legislate and defend our rules. “This is why the European project cannot be defended while making deals with Trump’s allies – as the EPP and its leader, Manfred Weber, are doing. When they ally themselves with extremists, they embrace Trump’s values.
Iratxe García, Leader of S&D (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats) in the European Parliament gave this angry retort to the U.S. Strategy’s concern and for and criticism of Europe: “The only possible response to Trump and Putin is to defeat flattery with strategic autonomy. Autonomy in defence, urgently implementing the EDIP programme and the SAFE instrument. Energy autonomy, with an immediate proposal to ban Russian oil, as we have already agreed with gas. Trade autonomy, concluding the agreement with Mercosur without further delay. And technological autonomy, unapologetically defending our digital sovereignty and our laws, such as the Digital Services Act. Strategic autonomy will not be possible without a strong Multiannual Financial Framework. Because cuts only benefit the enemies of the European project.”

Taking a realistic look at the signs of European decay
Instead of ridiculing and rejecting the U.S. Strategy’s view of Europe. This article finds it important to take a realistic look at the serious points the U.S. Strategy is raising. This study provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of nine structural critiques of the European Union’s economic, demographic, political, and strategic position. This involves a look at these challenges:
·Diminishing clout in economics and frontier technologies
Cratering Birth rates and ageing
Cultural self-erasure and a prospect of replacement
Censorship of critical voices and judicial mission creep
Growing dissatisfaction and polarisation
Growth of right-wing parties challenging mainstream politics
Self-righteously, moralistic but powerless in a world of superpowers
Lack of European leadership able to tackle the challenges decisively
Time for United States of Europe – or Eurasia?
The findings indicate that while the EU remains a globally significant actor, its relative power, growth potential, and strategic autonomy have eroded, reinforcing many of the critiques articulated in recent U.S. discourse on Europe’s problems

Diminishing clout in economics and frontier technologies

Declining Share of Global GDP
Continental Europe has been losing its share of global GDP—down from 25 percent in 1990 to 14 percent today—partly owing to national and transnational regulations that undermine creativity and industriousness.
The so-called Draghi Report on EU competitiveness confirms the pessimistic view found in the U.S .Strategy. Take this picture of the GDP evolution since 2002, which compares the U.S., China and the EU.
For 2026 the IMF

For 2026 the IMF estimate of shares of Global GDP, ppp, % looks like this: EU-27 13.77%, . 14.52% and CN 19.84%.

Lagging Productivity
IMF (The International Monetary Fund) has also shown that Europe is lagging behind the U.S. in productivity growth. Comparing productivity growth in the U.S. with the part of Europe consisting of Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland, shows shows that productivity in the U.S. for large listed firms has grown around 40 %, but remained stagnant in Europe.
Productivity of Listed Firms, 2005=100 (Compustat and IMF calculations):

Europe falling behind in frontier technologies
The gap is most visible in digital platforms, AI, and other frontier technologies, where U.S. firms dominate global market capitalization and investment flows. This has contributed to the migration of high-growth firms to U.S. capital markets and limits Europe’s ability to dominate frontier technologies
Global AI race –  The US Creates, China Copies, and the EU Regulates
In the sector of Artificial Intelligence, Europe has certainly also been lagging behind the US and China, but the European share of private AI investment has been rising lately . According to a report from Stanford’s Human Centred Artificial Intelligence, “U.S. private AI investment hit $109.1 billion in 2024, nearly 12 times higher than China’s $9.3 billion... The gap is even more pronounced in generative AI, where U.S. investment exceeded the combined total of that of China and the European Union plus U.K. by $25.4 billion, up from a $21.8 billion gap in 2023.” (https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2025-ai-index-report/economy).
 Number of notable AI models by select geographic areas 2024 (Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025):

Recognising the need to bolster its AI sector, the European Union has launched significant initiatives. In February 2025, the EU introduced Invest AI, a €200 billion programme aimed at enhancing AI infrastructure, research, and startups. This initiative includes €20 billion dedicated to building four AI gigafactories for training omplex models. (FinTech Weekly).

Robotics
Europe also lacking behind in Robotics (Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025):

Cratering European Birth rates and ageing
EU fertility rates have remained below replacement for over four decades. Population ageing is accelerating, raising old-age dependency ratios and exerting pressure on labour markets, public finances, and growth potential.
Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates. In 2025 the EU is hovering around 1.40 to 1.1.41 far below the replacement threshold of 2.1. No large EU member state currently exhibits replacement fertility. U.S. is only slightly better with a fertility rate of 1.6165 for 2023. While China has had even lower fertility rates than the EU, with a rate of 1.00 in 2023.
The consequences of cratering birth rates are projected to result in an ageing population, a growing old-age dependency ratio (defined as the number of individuals aged 65 or older per 100 people of working age, and a marked population decline towards the end of the century, especially in China and Europe.
Table showing median age and old-age dependency ratio for EU, U.S. and China:

Population projections indicate that low birth rates, aging and a declining population looks to become a problem especially for China, although recent changes may indicate that that China is actively seeking to promote higher birth rates.
 Population projections based upon UN assumptions:

One might think that migration would alleviate the problems related to lower birth rates in Europe, but as we shall see immigration results in new and serious problems in other spheres.

Cultural self-erasure and a prospect of replacement

Immigration
 Migration is transforming Europe, especially of course immigration from non-European countries. Data from the Eurostat publication “Migration and asylum in Europe – 2025 Edition” shows that in 2023, “4.4 million migrated to the EU from non-EU countries. This is 18% less compared with 5.3 million in 2022. In all EU countries except Luxembourg and Slovakia, the number of immigrants coming from outside the EU exceeded the number of immigrants coming from other EU countries in 2023.”
In absolute numbers, the most popular destination for immigrants from outside the EU in 2023 were:
 Spain (1 million people or 24% of all immigrants who came to the EU from non-EU countries):

Germany (925 000 or 21%)
 Italy (372 000 or 9%)
 France (308 000 or 7%)
 Poland (206 000 or 5%)

Migrants to these 5 EU member states represented 65% of all immigrants who entered the EU from non-EU countries in 2023. (ec.europa.eu/eurostat).
Other sources show that on 1 January 2024, 44.7 million persons born outside the EU were residing in an EU country, representing 9.9% of the 449.3 million people in the EU. This represents an increase of 2.3 million compared with the previous year.
In absolute terms, the largest numbers of foreign-born individuals living in EU countries on 1 January 2024 were found in Germany (16.9 million), France (9.3 million), Spain (8.8 million) and Italy (6.7 million). Foreign-born individuals in these 4 EU countries collectively represented 66.6% of the total number of foreign-born individuals living in the EU, while the same 4 EU countries had a 57.8% share of the EU's population.
A high relative share of foreign-born individuals within the total population is found in Ireland (22.6%), Austria (22.1%), Sweden (20.6%) and Germany (20.2%). By contrast, foreign-born individuals in Poland made up only 2.6% of its resident population on 1 January 2024, Romania (3.1%), Bulgaria (3.3%) and Slovakia (3.9%). Evidently there is a big European divide between and East and West in this regard
The foreign-born population in the EU is younger than the native-born population. This is shown in a comparison of population pyramids:

A first glance at these numbers may give the impression that younger people migrating to or seeking asylum in Europe might mitigate the low birth rates and ageing problems of the resident population. While this to certain degree might be correct, a closer look at the immigration and asylum of people from outside Europe might show that it gives rise to other problems, that in the long term may lead to serious internal problems in Europe.

Employment rates
 Comparing natives and EU immigrants with non-EU immigrants we find this picture, showing a significantly lower employment rates for non-EU immigrants (Rockwool Foundation, Berlin):

Crime rates
Using Germany an example, PKS (Police Crime Statistics) for 2024 show that 35.4 percent of suspects in 2024 were foreigners. Whie the proportion of foreign nationals in the total resident population in Germany is around 15 percent. (Bundeslagebild 2024, BKA). Foreign nationals are thus disproportionately represented in police crime statistics: Immigrants from the Maghreb states (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) as well as Libya and Georgia make up a particularly high proportion of repeat offenders, according to 2024 PKS.
Clan related criminality is seen as especially problematic and dangerous, and is related to migrants from non-EU countries and areas. The 2025 Factsheet “Clankriminalität” writes: “Compared to other federal states, in Berlin relevant individuals from criminal structures who have predominantly familial and social ties to the Mhallami-Kurdish, Lebanese, or Palestinian sphere have a significant impact on the phenomenon-related crime situation and therefore currently constitute a focus. Their migration biographies are often attributable to war-related flight from Lebanon.” (mediendienst-integration.de).

Überfremded, unsafe and fearing replacement
Taking Germany as an example of how people are feeling about security and migration, it is evident that anxieties about migration and security are pervasive. Around one-third of Germans (35.6 per cent) agrees that the country is“Überfremded” [over-foreignized] to a dangerous degree. An “ARD-Deutschlandtrend” found that about 50% of the respondents stated that they felt unsafe in public squares, streets, and on public transportation. Eight years ago, the corresponding figure was only half as high. Among men, 56% said they felt safe in public spaces, while 43% said they felt unsafe. Among women, 45% felt safe and 53% felt unsafe.
These perceptions, provided fertile ground for political rhetoric linking migration with urban disorder. In that sense, the recent Stadtbild controversy both reflected and reinforced existing fears among large segments of the population.

A negative view of certain immigrants
A YouGov survey of attitudes towards migrants in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Denmark and Poland indicates what the resident populations find especially negative in relation to migrants (yougov.co.uk):

A Muslim problem?
Apparently the YouGov survey did not ask for views on Muslim immigrants, perhaps studiously avoiding such a question. Other surveys have asked such questions. An INSA survey found that 52 percent believe Germany should stop accepting refugees from Muslim countries, while 54 percent feared demographic “replacement.” A survey conducted by Chatham House shows that there are many in Europe, who finds that further Muslim immigration to Europe should be stopped.
Below is how respondents in selected European countries have responded to the statement: "All further migration from predominantly Muslim countries should be stopped (chathamhouse.org):

A Muslim Europe?
When “The Atlantic” asked this question a few years ago, the answer might have been: "Not in a foreseeable future.” Today similar questions are being asked, meaning it might be relevant to take a closer look growing size of the Muslim population in Europe.
 In 2016, Pew Research presented this estimate of the Muslim share of the population in EU countries:

It is evident that at the time one could hardly see signs of a Muslim Europe. Note though the significant difference between Western and Eastern Europe. With countries like France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and the UK having a much larger share of Muslims in population than, say, Poland, Czech Republic Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.
That was the picture in 2016, However, what will it look like in the future? There has been a constant influx of Muslim refugees and migrants, and subsequent family reunifications since then. It is also known that the Muslim population in general has higher birth rates than the resident population. So, what does the future look like? A study from the MIWI institute, using a high Muslim migration scenario have calculated the Muslim share of the population in the EU using certain assumptions. (https://miwi-institut.de/archives/2461).
Map showing share of Muslim population in Europe in 2025, under a high immigration scenario (MIWI, Institut für Marktintegration und Wirtschaftspolitik):

According to this projection Western European countries may reach a strikingly large proportion of Muslims already in 2050. While Eastern Europe still will have a very small proportion of Muslims in the population. Perhaps due to their more stringent immigration policies, perhaps also due to Muslim immigrants finding countries in Western Europe more attractive and accommodating towards Muslims.
A research article in “PSU Review” has looked even further into the future. Using a midpoint scenario, the authors, reckon that 13 European countries may have a Muslim majority between 2085 and 2215:
“Cyprus (in year 2085), Sweden (2125), France (2135), Greece (2135), Belgium (2140), Bulgaria (2140), Italy (2175), Luxembourg (2175), the UK (2180), Slovenia (2190), Switzerland (2195), Ireland (2200) and Lithuania (2215). The 17 remaining countries will never reach majority in the next 200 years.”
Looking so far into the future of Europe would seem to reppresent no more than a guesstimate based on rather selective assumptions. But it may contribute to raising the fear of a Muslim Europe, contributing to the fear of a civilisational erasure the U.S. Strategy envisioned for Europe, and this may certainly lead to a demand for political actions to prevent this from happening.

Cultural self-erasure
The reasons for fearing Muslim Europe are of course related to deep cultural and historical differences between Europe and Muslim countries. Trevor Phillips, the former head of Britain’s Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), once claimed that Muslims are becoming “a nation within a nation” in the UK. Around the same time a YouGov opinion poll found that a majority of the population believes there is a fundamental conflict between Islam and the values of British society.
In their attempts to maintain social harmony, political and cultural leaders may emphasise accommodation and dialogue between differing value systems. Yet such efforts, while well-intentioned, can expose the fragility of the moral fabric rather than mend it.
The difficulty arises when tolerance encounters absolutism — when one moral framework regards its own precepts as divinely mandated and non-negotiable. In such cases, dialogue becomes strained, because the conditions of mutual understanding presuppose at least some recognition of reciprocity and fallibility. Without these, negotiation risks turning into unilateral concession. History shows that when one side holds moral claims as absolute and immune to reflection, compromise tends to favour rigidity rather than coexistence.
This does not mean that pluralism or religious conviction must threaten social cohesion. On the contrary, a robust secular order — one that guarantees freedom of religion as an individual right rather than a collective privilege—can sustain diversity without sacrificing the moral principles that underpin civic life. Freedom of religion should protect the inner domain of conscience, not the imposition of religious norms on public institutions or legal systems.
We have, to a great extent, and probably with the best of intentions, allowed and tacitly accepted that basic Western ideas and values ​​are gradually eroded and become frayed and blurred at the edges. To a great extent, we seem to be obsessed with the idea that problems with other cultures are due to our own lack of tolerance and discrimination against those who have different values. Why the solution to integration problems has been to demand more tolerance towards the intolerant, to bow to large and small demands from especially Muslim minorities, to try positive discrimination and demands for proportional quotas of people from these minorities in everything from films and TV series, to political representation to the police and military.
In reaction to this we now see the emergence of political movements that more or less articulately protest what they see as a misunderstood tolerance towards minorities, whose values, culture and religious beliefs quite simply constitute a threat to the silent norms, values, behaviour and way of life that we have so far taken for granted. Philips insists that we must confront “an inconvenient truth: that some minority groups hold very different values and ambitions than those commonly held amongst the dominant majority; that those values and ambitions are even further away from liberal ideals than the average; and that because they are sincerely held by those groups, they aren’t going to change any time soon…
Increasingly, the world-views of very different social identity groupings are colliding. Incompatible attitudes to sex, religion, belief and the rule of law are producing frictions for which the tried and trusted social lubricants seem just too thin.” (Trevor Philips, rota.org.uk).

Rising prospect of civil war somewhere in Europe?
In 2024, riots erupted in the UK after the murder of three young girls. “The rioting started on 30 July, a day after the attack, following misinformation being circulated online claiming the attacker was a Muslim asylum seeker [turned out to be false]. The claim was pushed by far-right social media accounts.
The disorder then spread across England and Northern Ireland, with riots in cities and towns including London, Manchester, Hartlepool, Sunderland, Liverpool, Blackpool, Rotherham and Belfast.
 Perhaps a sign of what may happen more often in a near future. Although such riots may still be quenched by strong government action, they may grow and become unmanageable.
 In the 2025 article “Civil War Comes to the West, Part II: Strategic realities professor Betz department of War studies at King’s College argues “The countries that are most likely to experience the outbreak of violent civil conflict first are Britain and France—both of which have already experienced what may be described as precursor or exemplary incidents of the kind discussed further below. The conditions are similar, however, throughout Western Europe ... Western governments under increasing structural civilisational distress and having squandered their legitimacy are losing the ability to peacefully manage
multicultural societies that are terminally fractured by ethnic identity politics. The initial result is an accelerating descent of multiple major cities into marginally ‘feral’ status.” Feral cities being cities that lost the ability to maintain the rule of law within the city.

Censorship of critical voices and judicial mission creep
 Over the years the EU and separate states have taken several initiatives to prevent the spreading of illegal hate speech, hate crime, and disinformation. This includes initiatives, are meant to prevent: The spreading of illegal content, as defined in national or EU laws; threats to fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression; threats to media freedom and pluralism, public security and electoral processes; gender-based violence, public health, protection of minors and physical and mental wellbeing.
 Here a list initiatives, codes and acts:
 2016: The EU Code of Conduct includes a series of commitments to combat the spread of illegal hate speech online in Europe.
2017: The German Network Enforcement Act (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz – NetzDG)
2018 The Code of Practice on Disinformation strengthened was first-of-its kind tool through which relevant players in the industry agree on self-regulatory standards to fight disinformation.
2021: Initiative to extend the list of ‘EU crimes' to hate speech and hate crime. Vice-President for Values and Transparency, Věra Jourová, said: “Hate has no place in Europe. It goes against our fundamental values and principles. We need EU action to make sure that hate is criminalised the same way everywhere in Europe.”
2022: The EU Digital Services Act (DSA) came into force in 2022, with its its rules becoming fully applicable across the EU in 2024
2025 Integration of the voluntary 2022 Code of Practice on Disinformation as a Code of Conduct on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA.
Now one may fear that lacking a precise and rigorous definition of illegal content, it might easily come into conflict with what is seen as the fundamental right to freedom of expression, media freedom and pluralism. Likewise, the attempt to protect of physical and mental well-being might easily come into conflict with freedom of expression, media freedom and pluralism.
A rather bizarre incident may help one understand why the U.S. in the National Strategy talks of European “censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition.” In the summer of 2024 Elon Musk announced that he would interview Donald Trump on X (formerly known as Twitter). The announcement alone led Thierry Breton, EU Commissioner for the Internal Market, to write a warning letter on X to Elon Musk. Referring to the planned broadcast of a live conversation with presidential candidate Donald Trump, he wrote:
 “As the individual entity ultimately controlling a platform with over 300 million users worldwide, of which one third in the EU... you have the legal obligation to ensure X’s compliance with EU law and particular the DSA in the EU. ... As the relevant content is accessible to EU users and being amplified also in our jurisdiction, we cannot exclude potential spillovers in the EU. Therefore, we are monitoring the potential risks in the EU associated with dissemination of content that may incite violence, hate and racism in conjunction with major political – or societal – events around the world, including debates and interviews in the context of elections.” (Thierry Breton, on X, August 12, 2024).
Elon Musk, of course, reacted with an angry outburst against Thierry Breton, using a rude expression, that surely could be seen as a “hate Crime” according to the EU codes. More seriously members of the US Congress’ House Judiciary Committee, objected to Thierry Bretons. meddling with U.S. freedom of expression. Jim Jordan, the chairman, wrote:
“Your letter, and for that matter the EC and the DSA, seems to miss a fundamental point about free speech—to oppose censorship of so-called “disinformation” is not to defend or to endorse the content. It is to respect the right and the ability of citizens to consume content and to make decisions about what speech is persuasive, what is truthful, and what is accurate. To oppose censorship is to acknowledge that a government with the authority to define disinformation will inevitably do so in a way that benefits those in power at the expense of the truth.” Jim Jordan, September 10, 2024).
In December 2025 the Trump administration hit Thiery Breton and 4 other Europeans with a travel ban they see as advocating for stricter regulations of the U.S. tech sector, thus engaging in censoring the U.S. and its big tech sector.
EU and national initiatives to prevent the spreading of illegal hate speech, hate crime, and disinformation, would certainly seem to have had a decidedly negative effect on freedom of expression. Take the example of Germany, where a recent survey conducted by the Allensbach Institute in 2025, found that 44 percent of respondents said one must be careful about expressing one's political opinion. Only 46 percent believed that political expression is free.
Another survey conducted by dimap for the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung for Freiheit, show a similar dismal picture of Germans declining belief in freedom of expression: Respondents were asked: Generally speaking: Are there specific socio-political or political topics where you feel you need to be more cautious with your opinion?

One may wonder why a topic relate to Muslim immigration did not show up in the survey, perhaps indicating that there are other reasons why one might feel cautious about voicing opinions.
Turning explanation for censorship of speech in Europe on its head, it may actually not be about DSA, and written codes, instead the DSA and the codes may have come about because of a much more general political motivated cautiousness to speak openly about problems afflicting present day Europe, especially among leftwing and left leaning political parties and movements, and possibly including the established media. Censorship of free speech for these reasons may be found to be especially pronounced in Germany, as a consequence of Germany’s historical past. This also includes attempts to silence the right-wing AfD party and its supporters. “Across political preferences, one group stands out clearly: AfD voters report feeling restricted in their freedom of expression most frequently in almost all areas. On the topic of refugees and migration, a staggering 91 percent state that they have to be careful with their opinions. This group reports perceiving or fearing negative reactions particularly often.” (freiheit.org/de/deutschland/umfrage) There are even attempts to ban the AfD party completely. A party that achieved 20,8 % of the votes in the 2025 elections for the Bundestag, and since then have achieved more than 25% in recent polls.
National attempts for limit free speech and freedom of expression are found other European countries.
In December 2023 liberal minded Denmark adopted the so-called “Koran law “stating that “anyone who publicly or with the intention of distributing it to a wider circle is guilty of improper treatment of a writing that has significant religious significance for a recognized religious community, or an object that appears to be such a writing, shall be punished.” It came about after altercations and protests after public burnings of the Koran. Although the law studiously avoids referring to the Koran. A minority of Political parties in the Danish Parliament, Folketinget, were against this new law. With one party arguing “that the law is putting an axe to freedom of expression, and we can unfortunately see that the government has succumbed to the protester’s veto, which now means that freedom of expression in Denmark and the framework for the extent of our rights is dictated by countries in the Middle East.” (Danmarks Demokraterne, November 23, 2023).
A UK inquiry in 1999 into to the murder of a black student by racist whites, led to a recommendation “that the police formally log “racist incidents” that do not reach the threshold of being a criminal offence. Subsequently expanded to cover other types of incidents, this code became known as Non-Crime Hate Incidents, or NCHI’s. In a Code of Practice NCHI’s are defined as “An incident or alleged incident which involves or is alleged to involve an act by a person (‘the subject’) which is perceived by a person other than the subject to be motivated - wholly or partly - by hostility or prejudice towards persons with a particular characteristic.” This would include race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity.
Overeager interpretation of utterances led to many attempts to limit free speech and free expression in the UK. A notable example being the case of the former police officer Harry Miller, whose lawfully posted tweets expressing gender-critical views were recorded as NCHIs, leading to police visits and a landmark court challenge that found the police guidance unlawful for its "chilling effect" on free speech. Between 2014 and 2024 “43 police forces across England and Wales recorded more than 133,000 of these non-crime hate incidents” (The Telegraph).
Critics had long argued that NCHI’s were a threat to free speech and expression, and it seems that a College of Police review in October 2025 has listened, since it now concludes “that the current approach and use of NCHIs is not fit for purpose and there is a need for broad reform to ensure that policing can focus on genuine harm and risk within communities.”

Unelected Judiciary Usurping the Role of National parliaments in Europe
An open letter initiated by Italy’s Giorgia Meloni and Denmark’s Mette Frederiksen, and signed by the leaders of Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, has argued that there is a need to examine how the European Court of Human Rights has developed its interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights. The leaders question whether the Court, in some cases, has extended the scope of the Convention too far compared with the original intentions, thus shifting the balance between the interests that should be protected.
The leaders believe that some of the ECtHR’s interpretations and decisions have limited their ability to protect their societies against new challenges, such as increased irregular migration. They highlight “cases concerning the expulsion of criminal foreign nationals where the interpretation of the Convention has resulted in the protection of the wrong people and imposed too many limitations on the states’ ability to decide whom to expel from their territories.
The court’s interpretations and decisions have extended to areas not foreseen when the ECHR was created, encroaching on nation-states’ ability to ensure safety and stability through their own democratic decision-making. Thus, an instrument designed to uphold and further human rights in signatory countries now imposes interpretations and decisions that endanger the safety and stability of those same countries, particularly in relation to irregular migration and the inability to deport migrants who have committed serious crimes.

Growing dissatisfaction and polarisation in Europe
An Ipsos poll from October 2025 indicate growing dissatisfaction with the way democracy is functioning in several European states and in the U.S. Marking a varied, but fairly general dissatisfaction.
 In the poll respondents were asked: this question: Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy is working in your country? ( https://www.ipsos.com/en/the-state-of-democracy-2025).

A policy brief from SUERF (the European Money and Finance Forum) from October 2025 attempts to measure the degree of political polarisation in some European countries. The measurements show a rapidly growing political polarisation in four major European Countries: Germany France, Italy and Spain.

Possible causes for the dissatisfaction and the growing polarization. Immigration of course, seen as leading to ethnic and religious based diversity. We have already seen how migration of other ethnic groups and Muslim refugees and migrants has led to a fear of Überfremdung, and cultural erasure. Polarised attitudes towards EU also plays a role.
In the article “Mismatch? Comparing elite and citizen polarisation on EU issues across four countries,” researchers have attempted to measure the degree of mismatch between elites (here seen as political parties) and citizens in these four EU countries. Citizen and party-level EU polarisation across four countries have also been measured in relation to three topics: The EU in general, the EU budget, and EU asylum policies (Journal of European Public Policy Volume 27, 2020 – Issue 2):

In general, the measurements indicate larger differences between parties and citizens in Germany (DE) and Spain (ES), and lesser differences in Hungary (HU) and the Netherlands (NL). In general terms the overall polarization in relation to these topics is most marked in Hungary, followed by the Netherlands and Germany. While Spain is different.
Looking instead at the polarisation between the parties and the citizens in the countries we get another picture: here the internal polarisation in Spain is markedly bigger than in the other countries, as measured by the compactness measure.
Except for Spain, the numbers prove that citizens are relatively more dispersed (polarised) in their positions toward specific EU policies than in their general EU opinions” (Journal of European Public Policy Volume 27, 2020 - Issue 2: Domestic Contestation of the European Union).

Social media supercharging the polarization
 With the rise of social media, established media like newspapers and public service radio and TV that have been the main channels for curated for information news and public political debates, are being challenged by the multitude of non-curated social media channels.
This means that all the topics giving rise to polarisation in society are now being discussed heatedly in the social media, with the different voices raising the possibility of supercharging angry views and their differences in a way that would be impossible in established media. Thus, contributing to self-escalating polarisation in society. Furthermore, in order to compete with social media, established media are finding it necessary to take up the issues talked up in social media, using almost similar methods to gain viewers and readers.
This again has raised the question of limiting and constraining free speech and free expression as we have seen previously.
Recently, Daniel Günther, Minister-President of the German Bundesland Schleswig-Holstein raised a small media storm when quoted for saying: “When the black-red coalition (The governing coalition of SPD, CDU/CSU), “got into trouble,” that was it always has to do with the influence and political goals of certain media. ... NiUS [a right-wing News portal] and such portals. There are members of my party who read such portals send something like that on.” ... “that this is our opponents and also the enemies of democracy.” He later argued: “It’s not just the job of politics to protect democracy. All civil organizations must also commit themselves to democracy.” ... But when you have the kind of influence that the media wields, then you have to adhere to certain quality standards.” ... “When I look at Nius articles that I have any connection to, I can only say that, as a rule, nothing in them is true. … But they give the impression that it’s something you’re allowed to say in the name of freedom of speech and expression.” (Cicero.de). Günther’s outburst against NiUS has been seen as an argument demanding that media must fulfil certain chosen criteria, leading to accusation that Günther is arguing for censorship of the media.

Growth of right-wing parties challenging mainstream politics
The dissatisfaction and the signs of growing polarisation are reflected in the growth of right-wing parties in several European countries. A graph from provides a view on some of the major right wing parties growing share of seats in parliaments (M. Mumford, Atlas Institute, March 1, 2025):

In the European parliament right-wing parties are having a growing share. The present right-wing party groups reach from the centre-right EPP, (European People’s Party), to the far-right ESN Europe of Sovereign Nations Group:
 Table showing Ideological spectrum of the European Parliament (wikipedia.or

A figure showing the distribution of the 720 seats in the European Parliament on party groups at the constitutive session on July 16, 2024 (European Parliament):

With the EPP aligning itself with the right-wing parties, the right-wing parties has 375 seats, thus resulting in a majority share of 52%. For the first time there is therefore a possibility of a right wing leaning European parliament. Note though, that the right-wing party groups have very different views on some of the most contentious issues discussed in the previous chapters.

Self-righteously, moralistic but powerless in a world of superpowers
“The overthinking and the politically correctness that characterises the Old Continent don’t help in today’s changeable world of Geopolitics, where things moving fast and in drastic ways, this which would require for the leading actors to make no popular decisions.” (M.H. Husillos, European Financial Review).
European political leaders may speak often loudly of “unity,” “values,” and “security,” but behind the polished statements and posturing lies a continent that has lost the ability to think strategically for itself. We cling to NATO as though it were a sacred relic, refusing to admit what has been obvious for years: the alliance no longer provides Europe with security. It provides us with an illusion of security, a dangerous illusion.
Newspapers and political parties warn that war with Russia may be inevitable. But almost nobody asks the most important question: What if the policy that makes war seem inevitable is the very policy that keeps us chained to this fear?
Europe today behaves as if history has stopped. As if borders, alliances, and power balances are eternally fixed. As if the United States will always be here to protect us, no matter how divided it becomes, no matter how its strategic priorities shift toward the Indo-Pacific, no matter how its electorate grows weary of financing European comfort.
It is a dangerous fantasy. We forget that demographic data, our energy balance sheets, our industrial decline, and our empty army depots, means that Europe cannot afford a great-power confrontation. But instead of walking away from that abyss, we march proudly towards it, and not a single thought is given to what will happen, when the American security umbrella frays, or when Russia decides that a cornered Europe presents a strategic threat it cannot allow to grow. The real problem is not Russia. It is that Europeans have stopped thinking. 

Lack of European leadership able to tackle the challenges decisively
On January 19, Prime Minister Robert Fico of Slovakia, wrote this on X, after talks with President Trump and Chancellor Merz: “The President of the United States is clearly pursuing the nation state interests of the U.S. If the EU acted in the same way, we would be in a completely different position than we are now. World leaders do not take the EU fully seriously, and this can be attributed to our nonsensical climate targets and our suicidal migration policy. In this spirit, I will send an open letter to the President of the European Commission tomorrow and inform all prime ministers and heads of EU member states.”
 If we assume that Robert Fico is right, and the evidence seems to confirm that, it would mean that world leaders like a Donald Trump or Xi Jinping are not taking the EU seriously. Perhaps because the political leadership of Europe have proven incapable of finding realist answers to challenges discussed in this article.
Let us start with the President of the European-Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. On July 18 2024, she presented her ambitions and visions for the next five years, with these words:
“Choices are the hinges of destiny. And in a world full of adversity, Europe's destiny hinges on whatwe do next. Despite the momentous things we have done and overcome, Europe now faces a clear choice. A choice which will shape our work for 5 years and define our place in the world for the next. The choice comes down to whether we will be shaped by events and the world around us or whether we will come together and build our future for ourselves. And that choice is ours. Europe cannot control dictators and demagogues across the world, but it can choose to protect its own democracy. Europe cannot determine elections across the world, but it can choose to invest in the security and defence of its own continent. Europe cannot stop change, but it can choose to embrace it by investing in a new age of prosperity and improving our quality of life.”
 Now, what ambitions and visions does she have in relation to overwhelming list of major challenges for Europe that have been discussed in the previous chapters? The answer can be short and brutal, she has none! Well, almost none:
 She mentions ambitions for lower energy prices, after having caused them to rise, as a consequence of the EU’s attempt to get rid of the dependence on Russian imports of energy. She actually also mentions a need for more investment, from farming to industry, from digital to strategic technologies. But nothing on ambitions or real initiatives, very different from a Trump on his first days in office. She mentions the need to invest more on defence. Well yes, but this was only supercharged, when President Trump in 2025 presented Europe with the demand to spend 5% of GDP. In relation to Europe’s demographic contraction, she had nothing to say. She talks of immigration, but take a listen to her vague arguments: “The Migration and Asylum Pact is a huge step forward. We put solidarity at the heart of our common response. Migration challenges need a European response with a fair and firm approach based on our values. Always remembering that migrants are human beings like you and me.”
Certainly not the answer to the fears and challenges brought about by refugees and immigration other ethnic groups and Muslims from non-European areas. Although she argues “Many pessimists thought that migration was too divisive to agree on. But we proved them wrong.” Only in her own distorted version, reality is much different as we have seen.
Other serious challenges are not addressed. There is nothing on the fears and challenges relating to cultural self-erasure and prospects of replacement due to immigration. Nothing on the silencing or censorship of free speech, or judicial mission creep that makes it difficult to deport criminal migrants.
Acknowledging the continuing polarisation of society and the growth of right-wing parties, but no answers. Just this “I will never stand by and watch it be torn apart from the inside or the outside. I will never let the extreme polarisation of our societies become accepted.” Apparently not realising that her own and the EU’s lack of response to the major challenges is causing the polarisation and the rise of right-wing parties. Certainly, pointing to greater challenges ahead for Europe
Instead, von der Leyen uses her speech to praise standard feel good topics. Like climate, women’s rights, social cohesion, protection of free media and civil society, the rule of law and the fight against corruption, and the protection of young people, “My heart bleeds when I read about young people harming themselves or even taking their lives because of online abuse.” Like other European leaders she is of course standing with Ukraine, and with Gaza. Although over the years it has become a rather empty mantra.
Von der Leyen is evidently not a European leader that has any idea of how to tackle the challenges we have discussed, she has no strategic vision, no ability to unite EU 27 on effective and realistic policies to make Europe great again to paraphrase Donald Trump. And neither is Kaja Kallas with simple one-liners on Russian belligerence.
 On the other hand, it is really doubtful if 27 European leaders and a divided European Parliament that seems to consists mostly of either inexperienced newcomers, or politicians having a kind of second political life, will ever under present structural limitations be able to choose someone as leader that would possess the realistic ruthlessness that existing super powers and adversaries possess.
Reading this, one gets the impression that von der Leyen epitomizes what is wrong with Europe and its political leadership and the way it is constituted. Indicating what may contribute to polarisation of society and rise of right-wing parties.
“Europe is paralyzed, crippled by a lack of strategic vision, the surge of far-right forces, and the multiplication of caretaker governments. To achieve the union’s geopolitical ambitions,” ... There is a long trail of hamstrung minority or caretaker governments across the union. Liberal democratic parties are no longer driving their countries’ agora, instead they are mostly playing defense and catch-up to confident alt- and far-right parties whose ideas have pervaded the public sphere” writes Ryon Montaz in the Carnegie Endowment publication “Europe’s Broken National Politics Hamper its Geopolitical Power”
No wonder perhaps that in European countries the present governments have lost the trust of their citizens.
Take the UK. The ruling Labour party in the latest elections in 2024 got 33.7% of the popular vote, and the Conservatives in second place won 23.7%. Now a YouGov poll shows right-wing Reform UK party in the lead with 33%, Labour reduced to 18% and the Conservatives at 16%.
 Take Germany. In the 2025 election the parties of the now governing coalition achieved these results CDU 22.6%, CSU 6.0% and SPD only 16.4%, together 45%. While AfD got 20,8% and “Die Grünen” 11.6%. A recent poll (January 17, 2026) shows these changes: AFD in the lead with 25.6% CDU/CSU together 25.1%, SPD 14.5 % and “Grüne” 12.4%. The governing coalition therefore now at only 39.6%.
Take France. The approval and disapproval ratings of Emmanuel Macron may indicate the dire position of the present political leadership. On January 7, 2026 Macron’s disapproval rating stood at 80% and his approval at a dismal16%.
 Three countries where the political leadership is no longer seems to have the trust of a majority of their population. Surely weakening their ability to act purposeful and decisively in relation to the challenges discussed.
The 27 EU countries show no real unity of purpose and decision making. For some time, it may have looked as if talks and agreements between German and French political leaders might bring about a little consistence and energy to solve the European challenges. But this did not hold for long, with Chancellor Merz and President Macron now squabbling about important issues.

Time for United States of Europe – or Eurasia?
To confront the serious challenges threatening what might be seen as essential and vital for a future Europe caught a spiral of internal and social erasure and squeezed between the self-conscious superpowers of USA and China. Europe would have to drastically augment the ability to stand on its own 27 feet. Strategic vision and simpleminded decision-making capacity are needed.
This will be impossible to achieve with the decision-making structures existing today. Many articles and voices have argued for the need to change EU decision-making. But most suggestions just seem to result in more and more wordy proposals, as the Europe has a fundamental problem illustrated by this illustration (Borrowed from European Financial Review, March 31, 2025 (Notice the persons mostly look away from us, perhaps because they are mainly occupied with themselves):

Recognising therefore that not much will happen unless the challenges become life threating for Europe as such, the following are just suggestions for what to do, when change becomes unavoidable

Redesigning decision-making in Europe (UK might even tag along)
Drawing up new and shorter European constitution for United States of Europe (or USE). Here some ideas for restructuring
A European Parliament with two chambers:
A lower chamber with elections every 4 -5 years with members selected by voting for candidates in new voting districts or constituencies, distributed equally all over Europe and having about the same number of potential voters. Perhaps candidates may even be elected according to the UK’s first past the post principle. As this might give direct clarity for the chosen candidate to whom he or she is responsible.
An upper chamber with say 3 members elected by each country, for a similar perio
Such a European Parliament would have to posses overall power on economic policy, science and technology policy, foreign trade policies, security and defence policies, foreign policy, and have the ability to choose a fitting judicial system. This proposal would reduce the national parliaments to the status of local parliaments like say in the German Bundesländer. This would also mean the demise of the present European Council (the heads of government) and the council of ministers. Which have contributed to make the present structure unworkable
Then there is the question of how a to choose a President (only one and not the five of present-day EU). This might done by universal suffrage in Europe, perhaps limiting potential candidates to some chosen by the parties in European parliament.
The reason for suggesting this radical change in the political decision-making structure is of course that this might the only way to make it possible for Europe to achieve the necessary decision-making power and the ability to act. Instead of just high-minded talking and regulating. Such a news political structure would make it possible to attack the challenges threatening all of Europe and perhaps avoid the decay of Europe, at least for some time into the future.

Europe and Russia – a new Eurasia 
At the moment, you are desperate in your attempts to find a European answer to the U.S. losing interest in Europe. With Friedrich Merz even wondering “Whether we will still be talking about NATO in its current form or whether we will have to establish an independent European defence capability much more quickly." At the moment even thinking wildly of some sort European nuclear umbrella. Perhaps by “Posting a few French nuclear jet fighters in Germany should not be difficult and would send a strong message” (The Telegraph, February 24, 2025).
Here it worth remembering that to Putin NATO became an anachronism the 1990’s. “There is only one bloc in the world that is held together by the so-called obligations and strict ideological dogmas and cliches. It is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which continues expansion to Eastern Europe and is now trying to spread its approaches to other parts of the world, contrary to its own statutory documents. It is an open anachronism.” (President Putin at the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi,2024). In fact, it was difficult to see the raison d’etre of NATO after the cold war. As we have argued in the blog “No need for NATO today, if dismantled in the 90s.”

New European security architecture supplanting NATO?
Instead of getting into a panic over the possibility that peace with Russia would permit the U.S. to leave NATO and its article 5 responsibilities you should eye the possibility that peace with Russia would allow you to build a new security architecture together with Russia, instead of against Russia. This might move Russia closer to Europe, and create further possibilities for peaceful interdependence

Reducing conflicts with Russia elsewhere
Lately, there has been a lot of talk on the Arctic, not least after Trump’s wanting to buy Greenland, a land and a sea area far too big for Denmark to provide with a credible defence. As long as Russia is seen as an adversary and with the Chinese also eyeing the Arctic, it is evident that the U.S. has a clear interest in establishing a bigger military presence in Greenland, with Trump of course also eyeing possible mineral resources there. Are we seeing another deal in the making?
Bringing Russia in from the cold, after a peace in Ukraine, might make it a lot easier to agree on spheres of influence in the Arctic between the U.S. and Russia, and make it possible to counteract increasing Chinese influence and presence in the Arctic.
This might also bring advantages for Europe as friendly relations with Russia, would allow secure future sea-transport connections with Asia via the Arctic route.
Less important to the U.S but really important to Europe, we might see a less belligerent Russia in Africa, perhaps even getting indirect help from Russia in stemming a future wave of migration from Africa.

At a fireside chat at the Hudson Institute Kaja Kallas was asked about her thoughts on PRC and China policy. She gave this rather strange answer – containing a kind of question that nobody according to her is able to answer:
“Well, we have of course the de-risking policies, so really not to make the same mistakes that we have done with Russia. But now, seeing America really bonding with Russia, then that of course raises a lot of questions regarding China as well. And of course, China is very friendly with us now, but we need to have the discussions on our China policy. So far it has been so that de-risking, really not to put all the eggs in one basket. De-risking in the areas, where the risks are higher, and cooperating in other areas with China. And of course, here, what America does plays a big role.
And by the way, one of the questions nobody is able to answer here about China. If I hear the statements by some American officials saying that you can’t possibly beat Russia. Russia is so much bigger, and you need to give in to Russia because it’s not beatable, which is not true, by the way. But then you’re trying to signal to your Asian counterparts that if China is attacking them, then you are there. But China is so much bigger economy than Russia is with so much bigger military than Russia is. So, if you’re saying that we collectively are not able to really pressure Russia so much that it would have an effect, then how do you say that you’re able to take on China risk? If somebody is able to answer me this question, I would be very happy.” [https://www.hudson.org/events/kaja-kallas-high-representative-european-union-foreign-affairs-security-policy-peter-rough).

A video of the fireside chat can be found at the same address (Her answer can be found at about 30.45).

Ah well, one might actually see simple answer to the question that no one has been able to answer. What about making peace with Russia using some of President Trump’s arguments for doing so and then being in better position vis-à-vis China? Of course, this is out of the question for the non-diplomat Kaja Kallas.

See also:"Kaja Kallas – wrong person in the right job?"
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/kaja-kallas-wrong-person-right-job-verner-c-petersen-xr67f
https://open.substack.com/pub/jesterdiary/p/kaja-kallas-wrong-person-in-the-right?r=7tim5&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true
 

Illusions Are Dangerous
European political leaders speak of “unity,” “values,” and “security,” but behind the polished statements and moral posturing lies a continent that has lost the ability to think strategically for itself. We cling to NATO as though it were a sacred relic, refusing to admit what has been obvious for years: the alliance no longer provides Europe with security. It provides us with an illusion of security, a dangerous illusion.
Newspapers and political parties warn that war with Russia may be inevitable. But almost nobody asks the most important question: What if the policy that makes war seem inevitable is the very policy that keeps us chained to it?
Europe today behaves as if history has stopped. As if borders, alliances, and power balances are eternally fixed. As if the United States will always be here to protect us, no matter how divided it becomes, no matter how its strategic priorities shift toward the Indo-Pacific, no matter how its electorate grows weary of financing European comfort.
It is a dangerous fantasy.
We forget that demographic data, our energy balance sheets, our industrial decline, and our empty army depots, means that Europe cannot afford a great-power confrontation.
But instead of creating a s away from that abyss, we march proudly towards it, and not a single thought given to what happens when the American security umbrella frays, or when Russia decides that a cornered Europe presents a strategic threat it cannot allow to grow.
The real problem is not Russia. It is that Europeans have stopped thinking.
 
The Old NATO Dependency Habit
The root of Europe’s strategic paralysis is not Russia. It is dependence.
NATO, originally conceived as a temporary alliance for a specific historical moment, has become the psychological foundation of Europe’s sense of safety—so essential that questioning it is treated as heresy. But what does that dependence really mean?
It means Europe has outsourced its survival to a power whose interests increasingly diverge from our own.
It means European defence ministries have grown accustomed to underfunding their militaries because “the Americans will take care of it.” It means Europe has d the ability to negotiate its own continental security architecture.
And perhaps worst of all, it has created a society where citizens can afford to be geopolitically illiterate—because someone else will fight, someone else will deter, someone else will take the necessary decisions for us.
Instead of asking how Europe can build a stable, sustainable security order, our elites busy themselves with confrontational rhetoric, expanding military budgets without any clear doctrine, and promoting the fantasy that NATO can or will wage and win a proxy war with Russia indefinitely, with no risk of escalation.
This is not strategy.
This is self-deception.
And self-deception, when played with nuclear-armed states, may be lethal.
If Europe continues to treat NATO membership as an excuse not to think, not to negotiate, not to reconcile, and not to rebuild its own capabilities, we will wake up one day to discover that NATO cannot save us, that America is otherwise occupied, and that Europe is standing alone, weak, unprepared, and surrounded by the consequences of its own complacency.
 
War Fever and the Sense of Inevitability
Something has shifted in Europe. Where we once spoke of peace, we now speak of war.
Where we once believed diplomacy was a European virtue, we now mock it as naïveté.
Headlines warn of Russian attack plans. Politicians casually mention conscription. Defence officials predict timelines for a war most Europeans do not understand and certainly do not want. The media treats escalation as a matter of fate, not policy choice.
This fatalism is not accidental—it is manufactured.
The narrative that “Russia will attack Europe next” supports the continuation of NATO dependence. If Russia is the unstoppable, irrational enemy, then NATO is the eternal saviour. But this story, repeated endlessly, prevents us from recognizing the equally plausible scenario:

Europe’s lack of strategic autonomy is what keeps the confrontation alive.
For thirty years, Europe has refused to build its own security order.
We expanded NATO but not diplomacy.
We expanded sanctions but not negotiation channelsexcept for some time after the collapse of the Soviet Union).
We expanded promises to Ukraine but not a peace framework.
We expanded confrontation but not capability.
In doing so, we backed Russia into a posture of permanent hostility — deliberately or through sheer negligence.

The insistence that “Moscow only understands force” is not strategic wisdom, it is an excuse for Europe’s unwillingness to engage in serious negotiation, to rethink its own security role, or to accept that Russia—whether we like it or not—is a permanent geographic neighbour whose complete isolation will never be sustainable.
War with Russia is not inevitable. But continuing Europe’s current policies makes it increasingly likely.
And yet, those who dare suggest diplomacy like Hungary’s Orbán, are dismissed as appeasers. Those who question NATO’s infallibility are smeared as extremists. Those who propose integrating Russia into a long-term security framework are decried as “Putenists.”
 
The Alternative Europeans Don’t Dare Imagine
There is an alternative: a European-led security architecture that reduces the likelihood of war instead of contributing to it.
But to even discuss such an architecture, Europeans must confront the taboo question:
What if long-term peace in Europe requires Russia inside a security framework rather than outside it?
We pretend this is impossible, that Russia is aneternal adversary, that dialogue cannot work. But this may be result of our own lack of confidence—not an eternal truth.
The reality is:
 
• There will be no lasting peace in Europe without Russia.
• There will be no reconstruction of Ukraine without Russian buy-in or at least Russian acceptance.
• There will be no sustainable European defence unless Europe itself—not Washington—designs it.
 
NATO cannot be the sole architecture forever. It was not designed for that. It has no real diplomatic wing, no economic integration mechanisms, no political legitimacy beyond its members, and no real capacity to manage continental disputes except through deterrence.
A new security architecture means building a parallel European capability—military, diplomatic, and industrial—that can eventually take the lead, while NATO disappears into history.
This new architecture would:
 
• Establish demilitarised or low-force zones where needed.
• Create Europe-wide verification and monitoring mechanisms.
• Set limits on forward deployment of offensive systems.
• Restore arms-control frameworks decimated over the last 20 years.
• Allow for progressive normalization of relations as compliance is proven.
• And above all, help give Ukraine a security solution that removes it from perpetual battleground status.
 
This is may be the only strategy that avoids perpetual confrontation.
 
 
The Ukraine Question: The Alternative Europe Refuses to Contemplate
Europe cannot have peace as long as Ukraine remains trapped in a war with no political plan for its end.
For three years, Europe has spoken only of military solutions, never of diplomatic ones. Leaders declare that “Ukraine must win,” but cannot define what victory means, what it costs, or how Europe will sustain the necessary fight without exhausting itself militarily and economically.
The current path—open-ended support tied to open-ended aims—leads nowhere except escalation.
Europe owes Ukraine something better than slogans. A real solution must include:
 
• A ceasefire with international monitoring.
• A territorial and political arrangement—not dictated by Moscow, but not dictated by maximalist fantasies either.
• A negotiated security status for Ukraine that protects sovereignty without turning the country into a trigger point for great-power conflict.
• A reconstruction plan funded by Europe and international partners.
• A role for Russia in the verification and stabilization framework, because any settlement that excludes Russia will collapse.
 
This is not “rewarding aggression.” It is recognizing the geopolitical reality that no durable settlement in Eastern Europe has ever been possible without involving Russia.
European leaders argue that a diplomatic settlement with Russia means abandoning Ukrainian sovereignty. But the opposite is true: endless war is what risks destroying Ukraine.
The necessary strategy is survival — Ukraine’s and Europe’s.
 
 
European Strategic Autonomy would actually suit the U.S.
Critics will claim that advocating European strategic autonomy undermines the transatlantic alliance. That building a parallel European defence identity weakens NATO. That creating a new security framework that includes Russia is naïve or destabilizing.
But this is the logic of a continent that has forgotten that their World has changed
The U.S. is shifting its focus toward Asia—its bipartisan consensus now revolves around China, not Europe. American military planners have been clear. Europe must take on more responsibility. Yet Europe continues to behave like a dependent frightened of being abandoned.
Strategic autonomy is not Anti-American, in fact,  the U.S. strategy is seeing it as a necessity
It is the only way to preserve a balanced partnership with the United States.

If Europe becomes capable of managing its own neighbourhood, America will not leave—it will cooperate.
If Europe builds strong, credible deterrence, the partnership with the U.S. will not crumble—it will become more effective.
If Europe negotiates its own security architecture, the U.S. benefits—because a stable Europe frees American resources.

The alternative—a Europe helpless without Washington—may ultimately mean American disengagement at the worst possible moment.
And then? Then we face Russia alone, unprepared, divided, and without a strategy.
Europe must learn once again to be an independent geopolitical actor. For decades, Europeans convinced themselves that history had ended, that geography no longer mattered, that defence could be outsourced, and that diplomacy was optional. It built a civilisation on comfort, not strength, on process rather than purpose.
But history has returned—with a vengeance.
We can no longer pretend that Europe is safe simply because we wish it to be.
We can no longer outsource our strategy to NATO.
We can no longer march toward war with Russia without a plan for peace.
And we can no longer act as if the United States will forever carry our burdens.
Europe must choose: Clinging to NATO as a safety blanket, and perhaps drifting toward a catastrophic confrontation— or a future where we become a sovereign civilization again, capable of defining, defending, and negotiating our own destiny.
This requires courage of its political leaders.
It requires imagination of its political leaders.
It requires admitting they have been wrong.
Most of all, it requires rejecting the fatalistic narrative that war with Russia is inevitable—and replacing it with a Europe-led security architecture grounded in realism, deterrence, and diplomacy.
 
 What we need is new alternative European Strategy, something that cannot be designed by the naive High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commissionthe, Kaja Kallas, or an E.U. Council plagued many selfish interests.  It would need something like an independent Draghi like person to draft a new coherent European strategy.

A High Representative  with Faulty Historical Awareness
Take a listen to Kaja Kallas, the baffling choice for High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission. Her task is to lead a more strategic and assertive foreign and security policy that enables the EU to pursue its strategic interests and shape the global system.
An important task indeed — but more and more she appears an odd choice to fulfil it.
At her press conference on 26 November, she spoke about the real threat posed by Russia, and then said:
 
“In the last 100 years, Russia has attacked more than 19 countries, some as many as three or four times. None of these countries has ever attacked Russia. So, in any peace agreement, we have to put the focus on how to get concessions from the Russian side that they stop aggression for good and do not try to change borders by force.”
 
The last hundred years? Among the countries attacked by Russia (or the USSR) is Nazi Germany — yet it was Nazi Germany that launched the enormous invasion of the Soviet Union, Unternehmen Barbarossa, on Sunday, 22 June 1941.
Finland is also listed among the countries attacked by Russia, referring to the Winter War that began with the Soviet invasion on 30 November 1939. Hostilities ceased with the Moscow Peace Treaty in March 1940.
But in 1941 Finland itself attacked the Soviet Union in the so-called “Continuation War,” coordinating with Germany’s Barbarossa campaign, albeit a few days after the initial German attack. These are two important examples of countries that did attack Russia in the last 100 years.
Did a hawkish attitude towards Russia — perhaps rooted in personal experience — distort Kaja Kallas’s historical judgement? Is this simply her one-eyed version of history? Or does she genuinely not know what happened? If so, one must worry about the role she is expected to perform for the European Union, especially the task of shaping a strategic and assertive foreign policy.
Some time earlier, in September 2025, at the EUISS Conference (European Union Institute for Security Studies) in Brussels, after a keynote speech Kaja Kallas spoke a kind of gibberish about how Russia and China supposedly believe they won the Second World War. According to a simple transcript (the video can be viewed on here:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6AKxO0zcEwU):
 
“Um I was in a… uh… meeting, and uh one thing what was interesting…
Uh you know that uh Russia was addressing China like you and uh and like Russia and China we uh you know fought the second world war we won the second world war we won the Nazism,... ( Emphasis added).
if you know history then you know it raises a lot of question marks…
But you know I can tell you nowadays people don’t really read and remember history that much, you can see that they buy these narratives. Chinese are organising events where they celebrate, you know, fighting the Japan like this is actually  like President Xi said to Putin in 2023: the changes not seen in 100 years are led by us together…”
 
Again, she seems to have a problem with her grasp of history. Is this really what she said — and meant? Is this the sort of incoherence one expects from “the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission”?
Ironically, she was saying this on the very day China was commemorating V-Day, the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.
 
In a press conference on 3 September 2025, Kaja Kallas was more coherent — apparently reading from a script — when she criticised the leaders gathering in China for V-Day:
“While Western leaders gather in diplomacy, an autocratic alliance is seeking a fast track to a new world order. Looking at President Xi standing alongside the leaders of Russia, Iran, and North Korea in Beijing today — these are not just anti-Western optics; this is a direct challenge to the international system built on rules. And it is not just symbolic: Russia’s war in Ukraine is being sustained by Chinese support. These are realities that Europe needs to confront.” (EEAS).
 
China was not amused.
On 4 September 2025, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun responded:
“It’s a disrespect to the history of World War II and harms the EU’s own interests. It’s wrongful and irresponsible. China firmly opposes and condemns that.
Eighty years ago, with enormous national sacrifice, the Chinese people made great contributions to saving humanity’s civilisation and defending world peace. Friends from Russia, the United States and some European countries offered precious assistance and support to the Chinese people in their resistance against aggression.
Only by remembering history can we truly uphold peace.”
 
EU’s Foreign Policy in the Wrong Hands?
Well, Kaja Kallas may not only struggle with history; she also demonstrates an embarrassingly naïve attitude regarding prospects for peace in Ukraine — perhaps misled by her problematic view of the past.
At a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels on 21 November — with rumours of a US peace plan circulating — she said:
 
“Our position has not changed. For any peace plan to succeed, it has to be supported by Ukraine, and it has to be supported by Europe. If Russia really wanted peace, they would have accepted the unconditional ceasefire offer already in March.”
She then added, rather naïvely:
“The EU has a very clear two-point plan: first, weaken Russia; second, support Ukraine.”
 
A week later she spoke of the concessions Russia must make in order to achieve a “just and lasting peace” in Ukraine. In her view a peace deal:
 
“must impose obligations on Russia, including curbing the size of its army and military spending. If you spend close to 40 per cent of total government spending on your military, you will want to use it again, and that is a threat to us all.”
(Politico, 26 November)
 
One wonders whether her naïve but always hawkish attitude toward Russia — and her unrealistic ideas of a “just and lasting peace” — will truly “enable the EU to pursue its strategic interests and shape the global system,” or whether her lack of historical and geopolitical realism will ensure that other global powers determine not only the outcome of the war in Ukraine but also the shape of the global system.

“Three Stooges attempting to influence the deciders”
At a gathering of EU foreign ministers in Brussels on Thursday—where rumours of a U.S. peace plan had begun circulating—Kaja Kallas stated: “Our position has not changed. For any peace plan to succeed, it has to be supported by Ukraine, and it has to be supported by Europe. If Russia really wanted peace, they would have accepted the unconditional ceasefire offer already in March.” She then added, rather naively one might think:
“The EU has a very clear two-point plan: first, weaken Russia; second, support Ukraine.”
But perhaps the Europeans are finally beginning to realise that their myopic views will not bring peace. They have now at least presented a 28‑point plan—essentially a modified version of the U.S. plan.
Here is a comparison between the U.S. 28‑point plan and the hasty counterproposal produced by Europe’s E3 powers: Britain, France, and Germany. (The text of the plans is based on versions published by Reuters.) In this essay, the plans have been broken up and rearranged according to the most important topics. European modifications that differ from the U.S. plan are shown in italics. Each topic is followed by comments on the differences between European and U.S. positions.
In general, Europeans still seem caught in their own myopic and unrealistic views of the proxy war in Ukraine. To understand the difference between Europe’s narrow perspective and Trump’s far broader and more realistic ambitions, this essay concludes with an earlier attempt to outline the “big deal” Trump may be aiming for. That section is drawn from “Trump aiming for mightier deals than myopic Europe,” first published in February and early March 2025.htier deals than myopic Europe.” First published in February and early March 2025
 
 
Comparing U.S. and European peace plans as they have been made public
 
Sovereignty, NATO, EU and territorial topics
1. Ukraine's sovereignty to be reconfirmed.
7. Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to pass in its bylaws not to accept Ukraine at any point in the future.
[7. Ukraine joining NATO depends on consensus of NATO members, which does not exist].
11. Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will get short-term preferred market access to the European market while this issue is being evaluated.
21. Territories:
a. Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk to be recognized De-Facto as Russian, including by the United States.
b. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to be frozen at the contact line, which would mean a De-Facto recognition at the contact line.
c. Russia to give up other agreed upon territories they control outside of the five regions
d. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk region that they currently control, and this withdrawal area will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.
[21. Territories
Ukraine commits not to recover its occupied sovereign territory through military means. Negotiations on territorial swaps will start from the Line of Contact].
22. Once future territorial arrangements have been agreed, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a breach of this obligation.
23. Russia shall not obstruct Ukraine's use of the Dnieper River for purposes of commercial activities and agreements will be reached for grain shipments to move freely through the Black Sea.
 
Comments
Evidently, Europeans still want to maintain the possibility that Ukraine may join NATO—despite the lack of consensus. The U.S., however, accepts that a major Russian demand is that Ukraine must renounce NATO membership and NATO must permanently close the door.
Given the current military situation, which appears dire for Ukraine, de facto recognition of Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk as Russian is the more realistic option.
The European modification of point 21 would almost certainly be rejected by Russia, prolonging the war—and potentially making it disastrous if Trump ends intelligence and material support.
 
Security and military limitations
2. There will be a total and complete comprehensive non-aggression agreement between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered resolved.
3. There will be the expectation that Russia will not invade its neighbours and NATO will not expand further.
[Point 3 Deleted]
4. A dialogue between Russia and NATO, moderated by the United States, will convene to address all security concerns and create a de-escalatory environment to ensure global security and increase the opportunities for connectivity and future economic opportunity.
[4. After a peace agreement is signed, a dialogue between Russia and NATO will convene to address all security concerns and create a de-escalatory environment to ensure global security and increase the opportunity for connectivity and future economic opportunity].
5. Ukraine will receive robust security guarantees.
6. The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be capped at 600,000.
[6. Size of Ukraine military to be capped at 800,000 in peacetime].
8. NATO agrees not to station any troops in Ukraine.
[8. NATO agrees not to permanently station troops under its command in Ukraine in peacetime].
9. European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.
[9. NATO fighter jets will be stationed in Poland].
10. The U.S. guarantee:
a. The U.S. to receive compensation for the guarantee;
b. If Ukraine invades Russia, it forfeits the guarantee;
c. If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a robust coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be restored and recognition for the new territory and all other benefits from this agreement will be withdrawn;
d. If Ukraine fires a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg then, the security guarantee will be considered null and void.
[10. US guarantee that mirrors Article 5
a. US to receive compensation for the guarantee
b. If Ukraine invades Russia, it forfeits the guarantee
c. If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a robust coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be restored and any kind of recognition for the new territory and all other benefits from this agreement will be withdrawn].
15. A joint US-Russian Security taskforce will be established to promote and enforce compliance with all of the provisions of this agreement.
[15. A joint Security taskforce will be established with the participation of US, Ukraine, Russia and the Europeans to promote and enforce all of the provisions of this agreement].
16. Russia will legislatively enshrine a non-aggression policy towards Europe and Ukraine.
17. The United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation control treaties, including the START I Treaty.¨
[17. The United States and Russia agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation and control treaties, including Fair Start].
18. Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state under the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons).
 
Comments
 
The European deletion of point 3 again shows a lack of realism. NATO expansion is central to Russia’s grievances, and ignoring that will almost certainly ensure continued conflict.
The European desire for a larger Ukrainian army (800,000 vs. 600,000) is questionable given Ukraine’s massive reconstruction needs.
Whereas the U.S. proposes a U.S.–Russian enforcement taskforce, the Europeans want a seat at the table—even though during the war they have produced no realistic peace proposals, while the Trump administration has made the only serious attempt.
 
 
Reconstruction, redevelopment, sanctions, and funds
12. Robust Global Redevelopment Package for Ukraine including but not limited to:
a. Creation of Ukraine Development Fund to invest in high-growth industries including technology, data centers, and AI efforts.
b. The United States will partner with Ukraine to jointly restore, grow, modernize, and operate Ukraine's gas infrastructure, which includes its pipelines and storage facilities.
c. A joint effort to redevelop areas impacted by the war to restore, redevelop and modernize cities and residential areas.
d. Infrastructure development.
e. Mineral and natural resource extraction.
f. A special financing package will be developed by The World Bank to provide financing to accelerate these efforts.
13. Russia to be re-integrated into the global economy:
a. Sanction relief will be discussed and agreed upon in phases and on a case-by-case basis.
b. The United States will enter into a long-term Economic Co-operation Agreement to pursue mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, rare earth metal projects in the Arctic as well as other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.
c. Russia to be invited back into the G8.
[13. Russia to be progressively re-integrated into the global economy
a. Sanction relief will be discussed and agreed upon in phases and on a case-by-case basis.
b. The United States will enter into a long-term Economic Cooperation Agreement to pursue mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, AI, datacenters, rare earths, joint projects in the Arctic, as well as various other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.
c. Russia to be invited back into the G8].
14. Frozen funds will be used as follows:
$100 billion of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a US-led effort to reconstruct and invest in Ukraine. The US will receive 50% of the profits from this venture. Europe will match this $100 billion contribution to increase the investment available to rebuild Ukraine. The European funds that are frozen will be released. The balance of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate US-Russia investment vehicle that will pursue joint United States Russia projects in areas to be defined. This fund will aim to strengthen the relationship and increase joint interests to build a strong motivation not to return to conflict.
[14. Ukraine will be fully reconstructed and compensated financially, including through Russian sovereign assets that will remain frozen until Russia compensates damage to Ukraine].
19. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be restarted under supervision of the IAEA, and the produced power shall be equitably in a 50-50 split between Russia and Ukraine.
12b. The United States will partner with Ukraine to jointly restore, grow, modernize, and operate Ukraine's gas infrastructure, which includes its pipelines and storage facilities.
 
Comments
The major European objection concerns frozen Russian assets and a reluctance to reintegrate Russia into the global economy.
Europe seems unable to recognise that many of its economic, industrial, and energy problems may stem from its own sanctions. Rapid reintegration of Russia would likely benefit Europe significantly.
 
Humanitarian issues
20. Both countries commit to education programs in schools and throughout their society that promotes the understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminates racism and bias:
a. Ukraine will adopt EU rules of religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities.
b. Both countries agree to repeal all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education.
c. All Nazi ideology or activity should be renounced and forbidden.
[20. Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities].
24. A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve open issues:
a. All remaining prisoners and bodies will be exchanged on the principle of 'all for all'.
b. All civilian detainees and hostages will be returned, including children.
c. There will be a family reunification program
d. Provisions will be made to address the suffering of victims from the conflict.
 
Comments
Here the European demands appear more realistic and constructive than the U.S. plan.
 
Elections, monitoring, amnesties and ceasefire
25. Ukraine to hold elections in 100 days.
[25. Ukraine will hold elections as soon as possible after the signing of the peace agreement].
26. All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for wartime actions during the war and agree not to pursue claims or further settle grievances.
[26. Provision will be made to address the suffering of victims of the conflict].
27. This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by a Board of Peace, Chaired by President Donald J. Trump. There will be penalties for violation.
28. Upon all sides agreeing to this memorandum, a ceasefire will be immediately effective upon both parties withdrawing to the agreed upon points for the implementation of the agreement to begin.
[28. Upon all sides agreeing to this memorandum, a ceasefire will be immediately effective upon both parties withdrawing to the agreed upon points for the implementation of the agreement to begin. Ceasefire modalities, including monitoring, will be agreed by both parties under US supervision].
 
Comments
A major problem for the Europeans is the demand for full amnesty for wartime actions. Here the myopic views of the Europeans come to fore again, perhaps influenced by the extremely one-sided reporting on possible Russian war crimes, while ignoring possible Ukrainian war crimes and attacks on civilians.
Europe again demands a ceasefire based on the frontline before negotiations—something Russia is unlikely to accept, especially while it is advancing.
 
 
Here the earlier attempt to show that Trump is aiming much higher than myopic Europe
[An essay “Trump aiming for mightier deals than myopic Europe,”  to be found at: (https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/trump-aiming-mightier-deals-than-myopic-europe-verner-c-petersen-fficf)]
 
This essay is a bold and perhaps unconventional attempt to uplift the gaze of myopic European leaders, encouraging them to consider the lofty goals that President Trump may be pursuing through his daring efforts to cut the tangled Gordian knots of global issues—knots you’ve found impossible to untangle.
 
Myopic European leaders stuck in the same rut
The majority of you had put a lot of false and ultimately disappointing hopes in a vengeful, but mentally frail and visibly aging President Biden and his clueless administration, that left you in a standing conflict with a close but mighty neighbour.
Then out of the blue came President Trump’s lightning strike at the Gordian knot of the Ukraine war.
You reacted with shock and loud indignation. Shell shocked you got together in hasty meetings, apparently intending to stick to the rut that Biden had left you in.
Scared by the prospect of Trump leaving you alone with a Russia, conjuring up the most frightening picture of continued Russian aggression towards the rest of Europe, you announced hasty decisions to spend much more on European defence, while promising yourself to continue to support Ukraine with military assistance packages. Not really having an idea of how to go about it, every one for himself or in some form of acting together.
Still voicing impossible promises and hopes in relation to Ukraine. Although “standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes,” is starting to sound rather embarrassing, but at the very least you insist that Ukraine, (read Zelensky,) must be part of peace negations, together with your own representatives.
At the Munich Security Conference (MSC), you were left stunned after President Trump’s strike, still not realising that the ground is disappearing underneath you:
“Ukraine seeks a just and lasting peace, one that ensures the horrors of recent years are never repeated,” declared Ursula von der Leyen.
“It is clear that any agreement made behind our backs will not work. You need Europeans; you need Ukrainians,” — Kaja Kallas.
“There will be no credible and successful negotiations, no lasting peace, without Ukraine and without the EU,” — António Costa.
 
Some of you are continuing to tread into even thinner air. In a panel discussion the Danish Prime Minister was asked what she hoped for Ukraine. Her answer: “That Ukraine wins the war.” Blue sky thinking, leaving any realism aside.
The Economist at least is coming to the realization that Trump’s political earthquake have caused the ground to shift permanently: “The PAST week has been the bleakest in Europe since the fall of the Iron Curtain. Ukraine is being sold out, Russia is being rehabilitated and, under Donald Trump, America can no longer be counted on to come to Europe’s aid in wartime. The implications for Europe’s security are grave, but they have yet to sink in to the you as leaders of the continent’s and its people. The old world needs a crash course on how to wield hard power in a lawless era, or it will fall victim to the new world disorder.” https://www.economist.com/leaders/2025/02/20/how-europe-must-respond-as-trump-and-putin-smash-the-post-war-order.
Friedrich Merz, the coming German Chancellor, at least seems to have understood part of the message: “It is clear that the Americans, at least this part of the Americans, this administration, are largely indifferent to the fate of Europe.” (Politico February 23, 2025)
As we argued elsewhere you as European leaders ought to ask yourself: What are you actually fighting for in Ukraine and elsewhere. Giving the disintegration tendencies in your own societies, and lacking behind elsewhere in relation to U.S. and China, you ought perhaps to concentrate more on managing your own affairs. See “The retreat of Europe …”
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/retreat-europe-verner-c-petersen-j391f
Yet most of you remain fixated on upholding values—'Werte'—that you seem to believe set a shining example for the world. In doing so, you overlook or dismiss how these ideals are fostering self-destructive tendencies in Europe. Take open borders for instance, they are creating significant challenges and causing profound demographic shifts in a rapidly aging Europe.
What you need is more realism, and the ability looked at little higher to get out of the rut.
 
Why peace is mostly a matter for U.S. and Russia
What you forget is that there might be reason for Russia’s brutal action, a reason related to the whole question of NATO membership for Ukraine. A prospect vehemently rejected by Russia. You have to realize that the question of NATO membership was the major bone of contention between the United States and Russia.
In essence we have a sudden built up of conflict between the U.S. and Russia over a possible NATO membership. To Russia Ukrainian NATO membership was totally unacceptable. Russian grievances and the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO explains why Russia handed the U.S. and NATO a draft proposal for a new treaty on security. (Dated December 17, 2021). Among the Russian demands is article 6:
 
“All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States.” (Emphasis added).
 
On January 26, 2022 the U.S. and NATO delivered their overly arrogant rejection of Russian demands without at the time publishing the content of their response. But from a speech by Secretary of State Blinken on the same day we get the first indication of the U.S. response.
The Russian demand for guarantees that Ukraine would be kept out of NATO is rejected.
Blinken: We make clear that there are core principles that we are committed to uphold and defend – including Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the right of states to choose their own security arrangements and alliances.”
Thus, the resulting war in Ukraine was surely a result of the United States’ attempt to push NATO further East and Russia’s attempt to prevent that. Meaning of cause that the war was in essence a proxy war between the United States and Russia, with Ukraine and Europe not having much of a say.
Therefore, it is in fact quite reasonable that Trump sees negotiations for peace in Ukraine as a mostly a question of the U.S. negotiating with Russia to achieve peace. Both Europe and Ukraine play second fiddle in such negotiations.
Given that you, the leaders in Europe, cannot even seem to be able get out of the rut Biden left you in, it seems evident that you are not yet ready to participate in Trump’s attempts to achieve some kind of peace. You do not seem to grasp the godsend possibility for getting out of the rut by Trump’s lightning strike.
 As for Ukraine, it seems evident that Biden and now you have done and is doing the country a disastrous disservice by enthusiastically supporting Zelensky in his unrealistic demands and pre-conditions for peace.
 
 Trump aiming much higher than you realize
What you, myopic and somewhat stunned European leaders, have not yet grasped is the possibility that Trump is aiming far higher, while you stare, mesmerized and frantic, at the predicament his lightning strike has thrust upon you.
Trump surely looking much further than peace in Ukraine, which might not even be his main goal. Although he may only have vague ideas of what he might be able to achieve, he is creating major upheavals in the World with his sudden actions and strange ideas. Looking at how he is acting one might expect that it is done on purpose, just beating the grass to see what new possibilities might emerge. In a way scaring the rest of the world to react, as in strange game. Seeing what may happen when you something outrageous, frightening or earthshattering and then taking advantage from it.
Just for illustration: Take his idea of creating a riviera out Gaza, which brought Arab states into action, bringing forth alternatives, like an Arabian plan for Gaza that may include up to $20 billion from the region for reconstruction.
 
U.S. demands on Ukraine
President Trump’s lightning strike to achieve peace in Ukraine will of cause come at a cost, presumably very high for Ukraine, losing perhaps one fifth of the country to Russian occupation, and now also being forced to accept a proposal for what may innocently enough be called a “Reconstruction Investment Fund.” To consist of a partnership between Ukraine and the U.S. to exploit Ukrainian resources. Especially rare earth of which Ukraine may possess 5 per cent of the world’s resources, metals, oil and gas resources, ports, other infrastructure etc. Meaning that the U.S. would receive 50% of the revenues from the extraction of those resources, while Ukraine keeps the rest for rebuilding the country.
According to the draft it would also mean that the U.S. would have first right to purchase exportable minerals, and perhaps even near total control of most of Ukraine’s commodity and resources economy. According the Telegraph “The fund shall have the exclusive right to establish the method, selection criteria, terms, and conditions of all future licences and projects.” Though President Zelensky may have been the first to propose the idea of “minerals for assistance,” Trump certainly has elaborated on the idea.
Harsh as it may sound and looking like the sort of deal Trump would find attractive, it now seems that Ukraine might be willing to sign such a deal.
Now, such an arrangement, presumably involving a lot of U.S. investment for extraction and utilization of these resources would at the very least mean civilian U.S. boots on the ground in Ukraine. Taking together this would represent a sort of implicit U.S. security guaranties for Ukraine, protecting it against any new invasion of Russian forces.
If Trump and his henchmen (and -women) succeeds, this will mean a chance for peace, security and a chance for economic recovery for Ukraine. Costing too much for Ukraine you might say, but what is the alternative as things stand? Sticking to the almost unbelievable stupid stand “That Ukraine wins the war” as uttered by the Danish Prime Minister recently? Guaranteeing a continuation of the war, at enormous cost in lives, and destruction?
 
Trump giving to Russian demands?
Creating peace in Ukraine means finding some arrangement with Russia, preferably something that would either satisfy or threaten Russia to such a degree that peace with Ukraine would result in long term stability.
A short while ago Trump’s henchman, Pete Hegseth, voiced Trump’s conditions:
 
A recognition that returning to Ukraine's pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective
 
NATO membership for Ukraine is unrealistic
 
Troops that be needed to secure a peace, will not include U.S. troops and will not be part of a NATO mission.
 
Giving in to Russia’s demands even before starting negotiations, you might say. Arguing that this is Munich 1938 again, with many of you loudly crying never again, seeing yourself as guardian of lofty ideals, while losing sight of the reality on the ground. No, it is nothing like Munich again. If you want to compare, it should be with the Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945, where new borders were drawn in Europe.
What you also forget is the above explanation for this unlucky proxy war. Ukraine in NATO, and NATO in Ukraine, Moscow’s reddest line. This is also how Trump sees it, and this is certainly appreciated by Foreign Minister Lavrov: "He is the first, and so far, in my opinion, the only Western leader who has publicly and loudly said that one of the root causes of the Ukrainian situation was the impudent line of the previous administration to draw Ukraine into NATO, …No Western leaders had ever said that, but he had said it several times. This is already a signal that he understands our position … (Reuters, February 19, 2025).
This is a vital question for Russia. In the talks in Riyadh they have demanded that NATO scrap the promise of future NATO membership for Ukraine giving at North Atlantic Council summit in Bucharest on April 3, 2008. Not much more is known about the first talks, but let us take a look at the possibilities.
 
Bringing peace to Europe and deals to the U.S.
Although it appears the U.S. is prepared to concede to Russian demands for peace in Ukraine—something you, leaders of Europe, find abhorrent and foolish—it may be your analysts and experts who are naïve and perhaps even misguided.
You should lift your gaze and see what immense possibilities may result from peace in Ukraine and wider accommodations between Trump and Putin.
This must certainly be what Trump and present administration have set their eyes upon, and the reason they are ignoring Ukraine demands, as well your constant wailing.
Accepting Russia’s red line demands will surely make it possible to reduce the talked up Russian threat, that is scaring you as leaders of Europe. Try to stretch your minds instead and you might also see the possible benefits that Trump may eying in relation to peace between the U.S. and Russia.
 
Reducing Russia’s military threat
Befriending Russia would enable the U.S. to cut back military obligations in Europe and withdraw U.S. troops. Making U.S. forces able to concentrate on the Pacific or at the very least save resources. Would it also mean closing the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe? Yes, why not`
This of cause would force Europe to be solely responsible for the defence of Europe, forcing it to augment military spending. But peace with Russia might actually make your calls to “buy, buy, buy weapons,” like Danish Prime Minister Frederiksen is yelling, sound rather stupid. Coordination with U.S. would allow a process where U.S. forces and equipment in Europe is slowly being supplanted by European troops and equipment. This would reduce cost, give time to build up competence and presumably allow European defence industries to offer alternatives to hasty contracts with U.S. weapon producers.
Peace with Russia would certainly be advantageous for Europe as they could forget the scary ideas of war with Russia. Investing again in Russia, and getting access again to cheap resources and a fairly large market for their goods. Reviving the idea of “Wandel durch Handel.”
 
New European security architecture supplanting NATO?
At the moment you are desperate in your attempts to find a European answer to the U.S. losing interest in Europe. With Friedrich Merz even wondering “Whether we will still be talking about NATO in its current form or whether we will have to establish an independent European defence capability much more quickly." At the moment even thinking wildly of some sort European nuclear Umbrella. Perhaps by “Posting a few French nuclear jet fighters in Germany should not be difficult and would send a strong message” (The Telegraph, February 24, 2025).
Here it worth remembering that to Putin NATO became an anachronism the 1990’s. “There is only one bloc in the world that is held together by the so-called obligations and strict ideological dogmas and cliches. It is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which continues expansion to Eastern Europe and is now trying to spread its approaches to other parts of the world, contrary to its own statutory documents. It is an open anachronism.” (President Putin at the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi,2024). In fact, it was difficult to see the raison d’etre of NATO after the cold war. As we have argued in the blog “No need for NATO today, if dismantled in the 90s.”
Instead of getting into panic over the possibility that peace with Russia would permit the U.S. to leave NATO and its article 5 responsibilities you should eye the possibility that peace with Russia would allow you to build a new security architecture together with Russia, instead of against Russia. This might move Russia closer to Europe, and create further possibilities for peaceful interdependence
 
Economic deals with Russia
This is surely having a large place in Trump’s mind, given his what’s it in for U.S. stand, and it must certainly also be important for Russia, giving the constantly expanding sanctions regime. As part of peace process and an enduring peace, sanctions on Russia must of cause come to a stop.
 As a result of these sanctions many U.S. and European companies have either been compelled or chosen to leave Russia. The Yale School of Management’s tracking of companies having left Russia, indicate the scale. “Over 1,000 companies have publicly announced they are voluntarily curtailing operations in Russia to some degree beyond the bare minimum legally required by international sanctions — but some companies have continued to operate in Russia undeterred.”
The head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund. Kirill Dmitriev, taking part in the meeting in Saudi Arabia, has referred to U.S losses: “US companies have lost $324 billion by moving out of Russia - which has the world's biggest reserves of natural resources. … Lots of assets were sold at basically, very cheap valuations, a huge discount" (tbsnews.net).
 In an interview on CBS on February 23, Steve Witkoff, President Trump's special envoy to the Middle East and apparently also to Russia, where he had a 3.5 hours long meeting with President Putin, said that if “a peace deal is reached, there would be an expectation that American companies could return to the country to do business.” (CBS interview February 23, 2025). In addition, there would be new possibilities for sorely needed investments in Russia, not only from the U.S. but also from Europe.
Sanctions meant curtailing Russian energy exports to Europe, with the share of Russia’s pipeline gas imports into the EU dropping from over 40% in 2021 to about 8% in 2023. This has led to high energy prices, one of the probable causes for economic decline in Germany.
With peace and the lifting of sanctions both Europe and the U.S. might be able to take advantage of the enormous natural resources that Russia has to offer. Not only by expanding gas imports again, resulting in cheaper energy especially for Europe, relying as they are at the moment on costly U.S. and Arabian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports. Peace and loosening of sanction might mean more pipeline gas from Russia to Europe, and may of cause also lead to investment in those Russian resources.
 
Dealing with global conflicts
Here we get to really global consequences of Trump’s lightning strike, so let’s see what might become possible. The possibilities may be grouped under these topics:
 
Reducing Russian dependence on China
 
Making new disarmament agreements
 
Solving Middle East problems
 
Reducing conflicts with Russia elsewhere
 
Reducing Russian dependence on China
On Trump’s mind something else might also come to fruition. Friendship with Russia might mean that Russia would be less inclined to become totally dependent on China, opening possibilities for both Europe and the U.S. to counterbalance China’s growing hegemonic striving. This would surely suit Trump.
 
Making new disarmament agreements
It seems probable that Trump will also be aiming for new agreements on nuclear disarmament with Russia, the U.S. and China, and new agreements that would reduce missile threats, strategic as well as tactical. In fact, Trump has already talked about reducing military spending in Russia, China and thus also in the U.S. Trump even mentioned the idea of a summit with Putin and China's Xi Jinping. “When we straighten it all out, then I want one of the first meetings I have is with President Xi of China, President Putin of Russia. And I want to say, let's cut our military budget in half.”
 
Solving Middle East problems
On Trump’s mind might something more pressing. Perhaps it is no accident that he talked about meeting Putin in Saudi Arabia, as Putin and Russia might make it possible for Trump to checkmate adversaries in the Middle East, and cut the complicated Gordian knot there too.
With Russia’s help Trump would perhaps be able to make something out of his lofty but cloudy ideas of rearranging things in the Middle East. Keeping Iran in place, balancing Turkey’s influence in Syria, solving the Palestinian problem, and enlarging upon the previous genial Abraham accords.
 
Reducing conflicts with Russia elsewhere
Lately there has been a lot of talk on the Arctic, not least after Trump’s wanting to buy Greenland, a land and a sea area far too big for Denmark to provide with a credible defence. As long as Russia is seen an adversary and with the Chinese also eyeing the Arctic, it is evident that U.S. has a clear interest in establishing a bigger military presence in Greenland, with Trump of cause also eyeing possible mineral resources there. Are we seeing another deal in the making?
Bringing Russia in from the cold, after a peace in Ukraine, might make it a lot easier to agree on spheres of influence in the Artic between the U.S. and Russia, and make it possible to counteract increasing Chinese influence and presence in the Arctic.
This might also bring advantages for Europe as friendly relations with Russia, would allow secure future sea-transport connections with Asia via the Arctic route.
Less important to the U.S but really important to Europe, we might see a less belligerent Russia in Africa, perhaps even getting indirect help from Russia in stemming a future wave of migration from Africa.
 
Creating a new world order
In a speech at Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi in 2024 President Putin made this prophesy: “There comes, in a way, the moment of truth. The former world arrangement is irreversibly passing away, actually it has already passed away, and a serious, irreconcilable struggle is unfolding for the development of a new world order. It is irreconcilable, above all, because this is not even a fight for power or geopolitical influence. It is a clash of the very principles that will underlie the relations of countries and peoples at the next historical stage.”
Putin is not alone with the view that a new world order is emerging.
As early as 2019, a Chinese white paper on defence argued that international security "is undermined by growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism and constant regional conflicts and wars." The US and the NATO are causing tensions to rise. The US "has provoked and intensified competition among major countries, significantly increased its defense expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defense, and undermined global strategic stability. " While NATO "has stepped up military deployment in Central and Eastern Europe, and conducted frequent military exercises."
President Putin is right “The former world arrangement is irreversibly passing away. The U.S. is realising that its once almighty hegemony is threatened in several areas by a Chinese striving for hegemony, and it certainly does not help that Russia has become closer and closer to China, not the least as a result of President Biden’s dumb act of picking a proxy fight with Russia in Ukraine.
Now Trump is in command, and he evidently sees the stupidity of picking fights with Russia, when a mightier conflict might be brewing with China. And with his attempt to cool the conflict with Russia, and lure it into a deal that would be advantageous to both the U.S. and Russia, Russian conditions for peace in Ukraine is a price he is willing to pay to achieve something more important to the U.S.
Peace with Russia, would allow the U.S. to concentrate on China. But remember Trump does not want war. War would destroy the possibility of a good deal. So, what might he be aiming for? A god bargain of cause, the biggest ever.
Let’s guess what this might be. Realising that U.S. and China are about equal for the time being at least, war would be stupid. The alternative is dividing the world between them almost like in the olden days with the Soviet Union and the U.S. dividing the World in separate spheres of interest.
 What would that mean for Taiwan? Acceptance that it is part of China, on the condition unification would be by peaceful means and over time, remembering that Taiwan’s fab factories are still absolute essential for the U.S. Acceptance of a kind of Chinese Monroe-like doctrine in relation to the South China Sea. Acceptance of U.S. non-interference in internal Chinese matters like human rights and the Uyghurs.
From China the U.S. would need acceptance of non-military intervention in Taiwan, for a set time (until some kind of substitute for Taiwan’s fab factories have been found) Removal of all sorts of barriers creating disadvantages for U.S. companies in China, and possibly help in countering North Korean threats.
All with the aim of preserving advantageous good relations between what would be the only superpowers of the world for some time.
Such a balancing act between the U.S. and China, would mean lesser powers becoming semi-independent, but important powers. These important powers would presumably include Russia, Europe, and India.
The result would be a new multipolar world, in which the semi-independent powers may contribute to upholding the balance between the U.S. and China. Playing them against each other so to speak
 Well, what are the chances of the of such a non-belligerent reordering of world-power at present? They look slim, like pipe dreams, but Trump is a non-smoking realist. What is important though that Trump’s actions at the very least represents attempts to realize such grand deals, while the present myopic stance of you, the leaders of Europe, might prevent the realisation of such grand deals.
 

A Country Looking in the Mirror
In October 2025, a political and social storm erupted in Germany when Chancellor Friedrich Merz used the term “Stadtbild”—literally “cityscape”—to describe what he viewed as visible problems linked to irregular migration and lawlessness in German urban areas. What might have been intended as an observation about public order rapidly developed into a national debate on race, integration, and political rhetoric. The controversy reached across the German political spectrum, provoked demonstrations in several cities, and resonated internationally during Merz’s subsequent visit to London.
This essay reconstructs and analyses the Stadtbild controversy as reflected in the available material. It outlines the sequence of events, the political and public reactions, the ensuing protests, and the broader implications for social cohesion and party politics. The discussion also considers how the controversy revealed underlying tensions in German attitudes towards migration and security, as well as the strategic challenges facing the Merz government.
 
How “Stadtbild” became a Battleground
The controversy began at a press conference in Brandenburg in mid-October 2025, when Chancellor Merz was asked how he intended to reduce the appeal of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). In his response, he emphasised that migration remained a central concern for many citizens and pointed to the visible impact of immigration on urban life. He then said:
“Bei der Migration sind wir sehr weit… Wir haben natürlich immer im Stadtbild noch dieses Problem…”
By linking “migration” and “problem” to the cityscape--Stadtbild—Merz appeared to imply that migrants themselves were an aesthetic or social disturbance within public space. Although he immediately referred to the government’s commitment to increased deportations and law enforcement, the phrase resonated negatively. Critics interpreted it as an attempt to associate visible difference—skin colour, clothing, or cultural markers—with disorder and crime.
Perhaps Merz took his que from President Trump’s attempt to clean up the streets of Washington DC: "We're going to be removing homeless encampments from all over our parks, our beautiful, beautiful parks, which a lot of peoplecan't walk on, they're very dirty” (NPR August 10, 2025).
Merz’s statement was quickly reported and dissected in major German media outlets. Opponents accused Merz of evoking visual tropes historically used to stigmatise minorities. The Die Zeit article of 20 October 2025 recorded Merz’s defiant reaction to early criticism: "Ich habe gar nichts zurückzunehmen ... Im Gegenteil, ich unterstreiche es noch einmal: Wir müssen daran etwas ändern und der Bundesinnenminister ist dabei, daran etwas zu ändern, und wir werden diese Politik fortsetzen."
Merz also said: Wer Töchter habe, werde auf die Frage, was er mit seinen
Äußerungen gemeint habe, vermutlich "eine ziemlich klare und deutliche Antwort" bekommen.”
This refusal to retract or clarify the remark reinforced perceptions that the Chancellor was deliberately engaging in populist rhetoric designed to appeal to right-leaning voters concerned about migration.
By invoking fear of public disorder, Merz appealed to visceral emotions of insecurity and visual discomfort. His emphasis on what people see and feel in cities translated social phenomena into immediate experience.
Critics argue that such framing reduces migration to visibility, turning difference itself into a them and us problem. And this in fact a serious problem as shown in a previous essay: There will be fundamental differences between different cultures. Conflicts that cannot simply be erased by considering culture to be transient and able to be remodelled. The moral fabric of society is neither an illusion nor a divine commandment; it is a human achievement—woven from biological predispositions, social interactions, and symbolic imagination. It evolves through countless acts of imitation, reflection, and cooperation. (The moral fabric of society – ripped apart?).
 
Escalation and Public Backlash
By 19 October, the backlash had reached the streets. Thousands gathered in Berlin under banners organised by groups such as Eltern gegen Rechts and Hand in Hand: Wir sind die Brandmauer. Estimates varied between 1,800 participants (police) and 5,000 (organisers). Protesters accused Merz of racism and of legitimising far-right narratives by conflating migration with criminality. Demonstrations soon spread to other cities—Munich, Hamburg, Potsdam, Essen,Bonn, und Münster each under slogans reclaiming the word Stadtbild in opposition to Merz.
In Hamburg, several thousand demonstrators rallied under the motto “Wir sind das Stadtbild!” (“We are the cityscape!”). Placards declared “Merz raus aus unserem Stadtbild!” The phrase had been turned back against its author, transforming into a symbol of resistance to perceived discrimination and social division.
Social media channels amplified the outrage, spreading clips of the Chancellor’s remarks alongside comparisons to right-wing nationalist rhetoric. The momentum of protest suggested that the controversy had tapped into wider anxieties about identity, belonging, and political discourse in Germany.
 
Merz: Renewed Justification and Further Clarification
Rather than softening his language, Merz revisited the subject during an official visit to London to meet Prime Minister Starmer on 22 October 2025. There, he attempted to clarify his meaning, insisting that his comments referred only to irregular migrants—those without residence status or employment who failed to respect German laws. He argued that such individuals were responsible for creating a threatening atmosphere in parts of German cities: “Viele von diesen bestimmen auch das öffentliche Bild in unseren Städten… Menschen haben einfach Angst, sich im öffentlichen Raum zu bewegen… Das betrifft Bahnhöfe, U-Bahnen, bestimmte Parkanlagen.”
The clarification did little to calm the debate. By specifying “those without legal status or work”, Merz appeared to narrow his target, but the underlying message remained one of visible exclusion. For many critics, his insistence that certain groups “determined the public image” of urban spaces confirmed that his concern was not purely about crime, but about who visibly belonged in the national landscape.
 
Merz accused of “Volksverhetzung”
As the protests intensified, political opponents took further action. The Green Party’s local branch in Berlin’s Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg district filed a criminal complaint against the Chancellor for Volksverhetzung—incitement to hatred. Their submission argued that Merz’s comments equated the appearance of individuals who “do not look like the majority society” with criminality and deportability. The complaint explicitly linked his words to historical propaganda, citing Joseph Goebbels’s statement that Jews “pollute not only the cityscape but also the spiritual climate”.
Such comparisons underscored the symbolic weight of Stadtbild. In German historical memory, the visual coding of undesired groups had been a prelude to systematic persecution. Although few expected the complaint to result in prosecution, it served to dramatise the moral stakes of the debate and to remind the public of Germany’s responsibility to maintain vigilance against racialised discourse.
 
Feminist Responses and Open Letter
A particularly striking reaction came from prominent women’s groups and public figures who published an open letter addressed to Merz. Referring to his suggestion that fathers of daughters would understand his concerns about safety, they accused him of instrumentalising women’s security to justify racist narratives. The letter began:
“We would like to talk seriously about safety for daughters, that is, for women—but not as a cheap excuse when racist narratives are being justified.”
The authors proposed ten concrete demands for women’s safety: improved prosecution of sexual and domestic violence, better lighting of public spaces, legal recognition of femicide, reliable data on gendered violence, adequate funding for women’s shelters, protection against online and racist abuse, reform of abortion law, and measures to ensure women’s financial independence and security in old age.
By reframing the issue, the authors exposed how the Chancellor’s rhetoric diverted attention from structural problems of gender violence and policing towards ethnic scapegoating. Their intervention repositioned the “safety of daughters” as a feminist rather than xenophobic concern.
 
Protests and Cultural Counter-Narratives
As the demonstrations continued, creative forms of resistance emerged. Feminist rallies adopted the slogan “Wir sind die Töchter” (“We are the daughters”), explicitly opposing the Chancellor’s invocation of fatherly concern. Activists transformed public squares into symbolic counter-cityscapes through art, music, and banners proclaiming inclusivity.
The protests transcended party politics, uniting liberal, leftist, feminist, and migrant-led organisations under a shared message: that diversity itself constituted the authentic Stadtbild of modern Germany. The phrase “We are the cityscape” inverted the Chancellor’s imagery, presenting urban plurality not as a threat but as a collective identity.
In doing so, civil society demonstrated the capacity of language to be reappropriated—a dynamic characteristic of post-war German political culture, where public discourse often revolves around the contestation of words and symbols.
Mainstream åpublic media ( Ard and ZDF) in Germany seem mainly to have followed the view of the protesters, been keeping their viewers and readers in the dark with regard to alternative views, focusing instead on painting a more positive view of the German Stadtbild. Trying to “Entzauber,” or break the spell of Merz Stadtbild view and trying to convince the public of a more positive view of migrants and refugees in Germany..
 
Divided Political Reactions
Within the governing coalition and the broader political field, reactions split sharply along ideological lines. The Social Democratic Party (SPD), Merz’s coalition partner, condemned the remarks. SPD General Secretary Tim Klüssendorf described them as “schwer erträglich” (“hard to bear”) and warned that constant linkage of social problems to migration “divides and destroys trust”. For the left-of-centre opposition, the episode exemplified a deliberate strategy to normalise right-wing narratives under the guise of realism.
Conversely, conservative allies rallied around the Chancellor. CSU Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt asserted that illegal migration had indeed altered the appearance of German cities, describing the observation as “a fact corresponding to the normal perception of many people”. CDU parliamentary leader Jens Spahn likewise maintained that Merz had voiced what “the majority of Germans think” and dismissed the “left-wing outrage circus” as detached from reality. Bavarian Minister-President Markus Söder denounced critics for “word-picking” and suggested that integration had evidently failed in some urban areas.
This polarisation demonstrated the deep cleavage within German political culture regarding migration: between those viewing open discussion as a democratic necessity and those perceiving it as a cover for racism.
 
Public Opinion and Polling supporting Merz’s view
Surveys conducted in late October 2025 painted a paradoxical picture. Despite the uproar, a ZDF Politbarometer poll found that 63 per cent of respondents considered Merz’s statements “correct”. His subsequent clarification—that his criticism targeted only undocumented migrants who neither worked nor obeyed the law—appears to have aligned with widespread public sentiment about migration control.
Broader polling suggested that anxieties about migration and security were indeed pervasive. Around one-third of Germans (35.6 per cent) agreed that the country was “Überfremded” [over-foreignised] to a dangerous degree.
An ARD-Deutschlandtrend survey found that one in two respondents stated that they feel unsafe in public squares, streets, and on public transportation. Eight years ago, the corresponding figure was only half as high. Among men, 56% said they felt safe in public spaces, while 43% said they felt unsafe. Among women, 45% felt safe and 53% felt unsafe.
These perceptions, provided fertile ground for political rhetoric linking migration with urban disorder. In that sense, the Stadtbild controversy both reflected and reinforced existing fears among large segments of the population.
An INSA survey found that 52 percent believe Germany should stop accepting refugees from Muslim countries, while 54 percent feared demographic “replacement.”
Critics counter that Merz is exploiting fear rather than addressing causes: underfunded police, youth marginalization, and social housing shortages.
Yet the Chancellor’s political calculus seems to work. Despite the uproar, the majority still backs his stance—and his poll numbers have held steady.
 
Crime Statistics Indicating a Problem
Official figures from 2024 indicated that non-German nationals accounted for 35 per cent of criminal suspects, while representing only about 15 per cent of the population. Such numbers are frequently cited in political discourse, yet criminologists caution that they cannot be interpreted simplistically.
Demographic factors: More than three-quarters of immigrant suspects were male, and over half were younger than 30. While those aged 21 to under 30 comprise 18.6% of the refugees residing in Germany, they accounted for 33.7% of immigrant suspects. (Kriminalität im Kontext von Zuwanderung; Bundeslagebild 2023).
Moreover, certain groups, such as individuals from the Maghreb states are overrepresented among repeat offenders. The proportion of suspected offenders from the Maghreb states (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) was significantly higher at 8.9% than their proportion of refugees residing in Germany, which was 0.6%. A similar pattern was observed for Georgian offenders (2023: 3.9% vs. 0.6%) and Moldovan (2023: 1.7% vs. 0.3%) immigrants. (Kriminalität im Kontext von Zuwanderung; Bundeslagebild 2023).
Some might argue, correlation does not prove causation: economic marginalisation and residence insecurity contribute to higher risk exposure and contact with law enforcement. By omitting such contextual nuances, political actors risk turning structural problems into ethnic narratives—a pattern critics saw in Merz’s remarks.
 
 The Numbers and the Gender Problem
 When Merz insisted that his comments referred only to irregular migrants—those without residence status or employment who failed to respect German laws, he touched upon a real problem for his Government, the number of “Ausreisepflichtige” and their gender.
This refers to rejected asylum seekers as well as foreign students, workers, or tourists whose visas have expired (so-called overstay). This also includes all persons with a temporary suspension of deportation (Duldung), who make up a large proportion of departure permit holders. As of June 30, 2025, 225,506 people in Germany were departure permit holders. The proportion of rejected asylum seekers among them was 58 percent in June 2025 (131,911 people).
Approximately 82 percent of those deemed "immediately required to leave the country" have a temporary suspension of deportation (Duldung) (approx. 184,988 people). This means: They have been ordered to leave the country, but cannot be deported for factual or legal reasons.
At the moment though much of the discussion is centered about the possibility of Syrian refugees in Deutschland returning to Syria after a it has achieved a kind of peace. According to the Ausländerzentralregister there are 948,000 Syrian nationals in Germany (as of the end of September 2025), of these around 667,000 had a temporary residence permit. While 10,500 Syrians were “Ausreisepflichtige.”
 These large numbers represent a real problem for a government that has promised to speed up repatriation, but until now has not really been able to much to much about it.
 In relation to the Stadtbild and Merz’s concern for “the daughters “ it may also be important that around two thirds of the refugees/migrants are younger males. They represent the problems seen at railway stations,  U-Bahnen, parks, and swimming pools.
 
The Broader Political Context
The Stadtbild debate unfolded against a backdrop of declining public satisfaction with the Merz-led coalition. Surveys indicated that only 22 per cent of Germans were content with the government, while both coalition partners—CDU/CSU and SPD—faced stagnating or falling poll numbers.
An INSA poll for Bild placed the Union at 24 per cent, trailing the AfD at 26 per cent. Interestingly, the AfD did not seem gain much from the controversy, suggesting that Merz’s attempt to outflank the far right on migration produced neither electoral benefit nor ideological containment. Instead, the debate appeared to deepen perceptions of governmental paralysis and division.
Within this tense environment, the Stadtbild controversy became both symptom and catalyst of the coalition’s malaise: a dispute about language that symbolised deeper policy and identity conflicts, between the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Socialdemocrats (SPD) in the governing coalition.
 It is evident that Merz’s coalition partner the SPD will not accept the Stadtbild view or that any form of drastic action in relation to repatriations would be necessary.
 The AfD might certainly be willing to help , but Merz has categorically upheld the Brandmauer against the AfD. Media commentary are therefore now speculating about a potential minority government or coalition collapse. A minority government punching a hole in the Brandmauer by relying to the votes of the AfD? Perhaps it is time for German democracy to get rid of fears stemming from its history and become more like the democracy of its neighbours.
 

“A nation within a nation”
Trevor Phillips, the former head of Britain’s Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), once claimed that Muslims are becoming “a nation within a nation” in the UK. Around the same time a YouGov opinion poll found that a majority of the population believes there is a fundamental conflict between Islam and the values of British society.
On paper, one might imagine a solution to such conflicts. The so-called Parekh report envisioned a rethink of “both the national story and national identity" by assuming "the transitional nature of all identities." Rethink identity and, so to speak, remodel it.
This is where they are wrong. The social and moral fabric of a culture is so deeply entrenched that you cannot simply rethink and remodel it in an arbitrary way from the top down.
There will be fundamental differences between different cultures. Conflicts that cannot simply be erased by considering culture to be transient and able to be remodelled.
The moral fabric of society is neither an illusion nor a divine commandment; it is a human achievement—woven from biological predispositions, social interactions, and symbolic imagination. It evolves through countless acts of imitation, reflection, and cooperation.
 
An attempt to understand the moral fabric
How did we become both the weavers and the threads of the social and moral fabric and why do some of our fundamental cultural perceptions have origins hidden so deeply in our development that we can only pass them on from generation to generation as habits and inclinations we are not even aware of — and if we are, then we cannot give any explanation for them?
We can, of course, speculate about their purpose and function, but in reality, it might be more difficult to explain why we have certain cultural inclinations than to explain why we have the morphology that people have today.
These patterns, furrows, or imprints are indescribable and silent, just as part of our knowledge is. We only experience the imprints, not the reasons, not the explanations. These imprints are perhaps such an important part of what it means to be human that we do not really think about them or question them. These elements of culture may be considered immutable and natural.
The fabric holds us, yet we also hold it together. When we recognise its fragility — its susceptibility to tearing under the weight of ideology, indifference, or clashes with other cultures change — we glimpse the depth of our moral dependence on one another.
 
The fabric seen only when it tears
We rarely notice the moral fabric that binds our societies together — until it rips. Only when the norms, values, and tacit understandings that govern daily life begin to unravel do we become conscious of their presence. This “moral fabric” is the invisible structure that makes social life coherent. It shapes our judgements of right and wrong, our sense of justice, and the mutual expectations that allow us to live with others.
Yet the moral fabric is not static. It is woven, torn, and rewoven through history, moulded by social structures, individual experiences, and cultural evolution. The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche warned that moral systems are human creations, not divine gifts — “Wahrlich, die Menschen gaben sich alles ihr Gutes und Böses” — truthfully, humans gave themselves their good and evil. To understand morality, we must therefore understand how we weave our shared values into being.
 
The basic strands of morality: sympathy, reciprocity, and reflection
To understand morality’s structure, we must examine its “basic strands.” Drawing on primate studies by Frans de Waal and cognitive anthropology by Terrence Deacon, it may be argued that the moral fabric has both biological and symbolic roots.
Among primates, we find precursors of morality: reconciliation after conflict, sharing of food, and punishment of cheaters — forms of proto-moral behaviour. These behaviours function to preserve group cohesion and cooperation. Yet, as Deacon notes, human morality differs fundamentally: it depends on symbolic reflection — the ability to imagine others’ perspectives, anticipate reactions, and act according to abstract principles rather than immediate drives.
Symbolic reflection transforms instinctive reciprocity into ethical deliberation. Through language and representation, humans can simulate others’ minds, foresee consequences, and experience genuine moral conflict — feeling both compassion and resentment simultaneously. This “what-now dilemma” is uniquely human and defines ethical agency.
The table below summarises the core strands of the moral fabric as outlined in the original essay.

These strands form the warp and weft of all moral systems. They are not cultural inventions but human capacities — neural, emotional, and symbolic — that make morality possible.
 
The social weave of morality
Émile Durkheim’s sociology provides the framework for understanding how individual moral strands become a collective weave. In primitive societies, Durkheim argued, morality was inseparable from religion—anchored in duties toward sacred norms that bound the community. As societies evolved, moral obligations became more abstract, moving from divine commandments to social consciousness.
Durkheim called this collective moral awareness la conscience collective—a shared, largely subconscious system of beliefs and values that directs individual behaviour. Each person internalises the voice of society, which speaks as the “voice of conscience” or even as “the voice of God.”
In modern societies, the growth of individualism reflects a loosening of the collective weave: as duties become abstract, personal freedom expands. Yet this freedom depends on the invisible fabric of shared moral assumptions. We see them only when they no longer fit — when, for instance, technological change creates new possibilities that moral norms cannot yet accommodate.
Durkheim’s concept of anomie — a mismatch between societal structures and moral expectations — describes the tearing of the moral fabric. When collective norms fail to regulate behaviour, individuals lose orientation, and moral confusion ensues.
 
Layers of the moral fabric: From universal strands to cultural codes
A layered model of morality. Like a woven carpet, morality has deep, invisible threads supporting colourful surface patterns. The deeper the layer, the more universal its content; the closer to the surface, the more relative and culture-bound the moral code.

The integrity of morality depends on the connection between layers. When surface-level ideologies lose touch with their universal substratum — when political or legal systems disregard empathy or reciprocity — the moral fabric disintegrates.
This model also explains moral pluralism: different societies may weave diverse surface patterns, yet all are constrained by the deep strands of human moral capacity. Absolute relativism is impossible because certain conditions — attachment, empathy, reflection — are biologically and psychologically universal.
 
The transmission of values: From children’s play to collective identity
How are moral strands transmitted across generations if they cannot be fully articulated? The essay draws on developmental psychology, especially the work of Judy Dunn and Jean Piaget, to show that morality is not taught through explicit instruction but learned through interaction.
From early childhood, children display awareness of agency, responsibility, and fairness. They seek approval, imitate emotional reactions, and negotiate social rules through play. Children learn morality by participating in everyday life, not by memorising commandments. Piaget distinguished two forms of morality: the morality of constraint (obedience to authority, learned from parents) and the morality of cooperation (negotiation and fairness, learned from peers).
This interplay of imitation, emotion, and reasoning creates tacit moral understanding—embedded in habits and expectations rather than explicit doctrines. Values thus reproduce themselves without being codified.
The following table summarises the key mechanisms of moral transmission described in the text.

These mechanisms form a living process of constantly re-weaving the moral fabric. Each generation inherits the implicit values of the previous one, modifies them through experience, and passes them on through behaviour rather than doctrine.
 
Mimicry, situated learning, and the tacit moral grammar
Beyond childhood, moral learning continues through social participation. Drawing on Lave and Wenger’s concept of “situated learning,” the essay argues that ethical competence —  like craft mastery— is acquired through legitimate peripheral participation. Apprentices learn by observing masters; citizens learn morality by watching how others act in context.
Explicit ethical instruction (“dictionary ethics”) cannot substitute for immersion in moral practice. A person may memorise moral principles yet lack the capacity to apply them, just as one might memorise a foreign language without understanding its meaning. Moral knowledge is tacit, context-dependent, and embodied.
Moral understanding is transmitted through narrative — the stories we tell about heroes, villains, and justice. Law, myth, and fiction serve as moral mirrors that reaffirm or challenge our collective identity. These stories do not impose rules; they invite interpretation, allowing individuals to internalise moral lessons through reflection and empathy. Thus, the moral fabric persists through continuous narrative reconstruction — each generation interpreting the weave anew while preserving its underlying threads.
 
Mending the tear in the moral fabric – Between tolerance and conviction
In their attempts to maintain social harmony, political and cultural leaders may emphasise accommodation and dialogue between differing value systems. Yet such efforts, while well-intentioned, can expose the fragility of the moral fabric rather than mend it.
Public discourse in recent decades has frequently focused on how secular societies respond to Muslim communities that maintain strong internal norms — particularly when these norms appear to conflict with liberal democratic principles. The willingness to adapt civic practices to accommodate such communities is often presented as evidence of tolerance and inclusivity.
However, tolerance, when understood merely as the acceptance of what one disapproves of, can become a passive virtue: it risks slipping into moral indifference if it is not anchored in shared ethical foundations.
The difficulty arises when tolerance encounters absolutism — when one moral framework regards its own precepts as divinely mandated and non-negotiable. In such cases, dialogue becomes strained, because the conditions of mutual understanding presuppose at least some recognition of reciprocity and fallibility. Without these, negotiation risks turning into unilateral concession. History shows that when one side holds moral claims as absolute and immune to reflection, compromise tends to favour rigidity rather than coexistence.
This does not mean that pluralism or religious conviction must threaten social cohesion. On the contrary, a robust secular order — one that guarantees freedom of religion as an individual right rather than a collective privilege—can sustain diversity without sacrificing the moral principles that underpin civic life. Freedom of religion should protect the inner domain of conscience, not the imposition of religious norms on public institutions or legal systems.

Doorstep to escalation
On September 17, a hawkish and puffed up Danish Prime Minister announced that Denmark must possess longer ranging offensive weapons.
After a historic investment of 58 billion Danish Kroner, or around 9 billion USD, in ground-based air defence systems, her government has decided that a paradigm shift in Danish defence policy is necessary. For the first time Denmark will get offensive long-range precision weapons.
The arguments for this important paradigm shift.
The Prime Minister refers to the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS), which has warned that Russia “within about two years will be able to pose what is called a credible threat to a NATO country and be ready for a regional war in the Baltic Sea region.” (Doorstep, Statsministeriet, September 17). This intelligence evaluation is crucial because it gives the government a rationale for emphasizes deterrence through strength as the central principle of Denmark’s new defence strategy.
With long-range precision weapons, the defence will be able to hit targets at great distances and, for example, also combat enemy missile threats. “Unfortunately, it is also a necessary step because we can see that Russia is currently and constantly and continuously moving the borders. One only has to look at Ukraine to understand the consequences of this.” (Prime Minister Frederiksen, Statsministeriet, September 17)
Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen at the same doorstep underscored that investing in long-range precision weapons such as missiles or drones is not an act of aggression but a necessary step for deterrence and defence. These systems would enable Denmark not only to protect its territory but also to engage threats before they materialize. He described this as a transformation from a purely defensive posture to one capable of preventive or preemptive action, thereby strengthening overall deterrence, giving Denmark both a shield and a sword. Poulsen linked this directly to recent experience in Ukraine, where the ability to strike deep against enemy logistics and launch sites has proven decisive. (Emphasis added). (Troels Lund Poulsen, Statsministeriet , September 17).
 At the same doorstep, Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen used a rather simple metaphor to argue for the importance of long-range offensive weapons, “taking down the arrows aimed at Denmark, with long-range precision weapons giving the capacity to strike the bows.” One wonders, does he really argue for a first strike capability?
He also referred to attempts to support Ukraine including the relocation of a Ukrainian defence company to Denmark, to ensure safe production away from active war zones. Arguing that shows the government’s intention to integrate national defence, industrial policy, and international solidarity.
 
The drone scare – did Denmark just provoke Russia?
Just days after the doorstep announcement of the decision to buy longer ranging offensive weapons, Denmark saw drones everywhere. On September 22, drones were observed over Copenhagen Airport, and then in other places including over the Danish airbase where it’s F-35 fighters are abased.
Although neither able to confirm that it really were drones that were sighted, nor able confirm that they were Russian, the immediate assumption was that Russia was somehow attempting to intimidate Denmark.
Even leading some journalists to ask if Denmark with its decision to buy weapons able to strike Russia, might have gone too far in its attempt to deter Russia.
Prime Minister Frederiksen’s angry retort:
"Some believe it's the wrong way to prioritize, others that the rhetoric has been too harsh. It almost suggests that we only have ourselves to blame because we - it is said - have provoked Russia. I very, very much disagree ... if we become afraid of what Russia thinks. Then everything stops, ... “If we let the hybrid attacks scare and intimidate us. If we first start to give in. Then it will be the beginning of the end.”
 Well, at the very least the drone scare has led to frantic activity to get hold of anti-drone technology, and with the scare spreading to other countries, it has led to a concerted EU efforts to build a drone wall, whatever that this, although anti-drone umbrella would seem to be more relevant.
Denmark is not alone in escalating with offensive weapons. Close neighbours like Norway, Sweden and Germany are frantically trying to enhance deterrence against Russia with all kinds of long-range offensive weapons in the air, land and sea. Although less hawkish in their verbal announcements than Denmark’s Prime Minister Frederiksen.
What escalation are we talking about? Which new, longer ranging weapons are meant to enhance deterrence against Russia?
 
Offensive weapons meant to deter Russia
Air-launched weapons
As early as April 2025 Norway’s Minister of Defence could announce: “Norway has become the first country to receive the full delivery of all its planned F-35 fighter jets. The acquisition is a true success story. Today, the Armed Forces have also received their first super missile from the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency and Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace (KDA). Work will now begin to stockpile the JSM missile at Ørland Air Base’, (Minister of Defence Tore O. Sandvik).
 The JSM (Joint Strike Missile) can be seen as an example of the kind of longer ranging offensive weapon that would suit the Danish decision.
 The JSM is high-subsonic missile which can be carried by F-35 strike fighters internally to preserve stealth. Made by Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace in Norway it has the ability to strike against sea and land targets, with excellent penetration capability against advanced enemy air defence systems and autonomous target recognition (ATR). It has a range of more than 350 Kilometres, with a low altitude penetration, and a 416-kilograms warhead. “So, we are talking about an incredibly flexible, near dream-like weapon here. But the most intriguing part of all is that it isn’t just an anti-ship cruise missile—it is also fully capable of attacking targets on land.” (The War Zone).
One may assume that this is also the longer ranging offensive weapon that Denmark is striving to acquire. An article in Scandinavian Military studies from December 2022 indicates that this may indeed be the case. The article looks at “the strategic, operational and tactical consequences for Denmark if the Air Force acquires the Norwegian 5th generation air-launched missile - Joint Strike Missile (JSM) - for the Air Force's F-35A fighter aircraft... The analysis also shows that the tactical and operational consequence of this new weapon system is the ability to neutralize targets located much deeper into enemy territory, which may be guarded by very capable air defence systems ...” Furthermore, the acquisition of the JSM for the F-35 means a higher level of credible threat to Russia” (K. Maarup et at. Scandinavian Military Studies; December 2022).
It is worth noting that article warns “that an exaggerated and offensive ‘posture’ with the F-35 and JSM... may contribute to raise the potential for conflict. “If the threat of a military response from Russia increases, the likelihood that Denmark will be forced to use the capability will also increase.”
Although one may assume Denmark will see its decision to adopt JSM missiles as just a contribution to a collective NATO deterrence, and thus so to speak hide under the broader NATO umbrella. At the very least it can argue that that Germany also has selected the JSM for its F-35 fighter jets.
Sweden is preparing to acquire the much talked about Saab/MBDA Taurus KEPD-350 air-launched missile for its Saab JAS 39 Gripen fighters. Again, a missile with the purpose of escalating deterrence against Russia. MBDA describes the missile as having a range in excess of 500 km, unmatched penetration capabilities, precise and jamming resistant navigation, including terrain-following capability below 50 metres, GPS independence, with 4 separate guiding systems, and a layer counting fuse. The last characteristic means that the missile after diving vertical in the last phase, will be able penetrate layers of hardened bunkers, counting the number of layers penetrated. The missile’s physical specs: Length 5m, width about 1m, weight 1400kg, with a warhead weighing 480 kg.
 
Land-based long-range weapons
Air-launched weapons like Taurus is not enough deterrence for Germany it seems. During the Biden administration it was decided to augment deterrence against Russia by placing longer ranging missiles like SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles in Germany, sometime in 2026 I believe. Not a decision greeted by everyone in Germany
Now the new German Government itself seems eager to escalate deterrence against Russia, by requesting U.S. long-range weapons.
“The German government this week notified Pentagon leaders of an interest to buy the U.S. Army’s Typhon missile launcher system, which can fire missiles with a range of 2,000 kilometres, while a European initiative to make such weapons continues to ripen.” (defencenews.com, July 16, 2025).
A Typhon launcher is used to fire SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles. Although the SM-6 evolved as a ship-based missile, it may now be used as land-based Mach 3 missiles, with a range of around 370 kilometres and a rather small warhead of around 64 kilos. Not really relevant as a German based deterrence against Russia.
As an aside it is noted that the U.S. Navy recently deployed two containerized SM-6 missile launchers during an exercise in Denmark on the island of Bornholm, and thus quite close to Russia.
The Tomahawk or TLAM (Tomahawk Land Based Missile) is something else. Originally also evolved as ship-based missile, and with a nuclear warhead, later only meant to carry a conventional warhead, it now has versions to be fired from the land-based Typhon launcher. The later versions BGM-109 Advanced Tomahawk has a range of up to around 2,500 kilometres, with various conventional 450 kilos warheads.
 
Sea-based long-range weapons
Here we find the sea-based SM-6 and Tomahawks. At the moment only the U.S. and the UK possess warships with Tomahawks and the necessary launchers. While Danish frigates with the Mk41 VLS (Vertical Launch system) may perhaps be adapted to fire SM-6 sea-launched missiles with a range of around 400 kilometres, they would lack the systems necessary to fire long-range Tomahawks.
 
Further weapons for long-range deterrence
Elsewhere we find signs of new European attempts to augment the deterrence against Russia with new long-range missile developments.
 The Ukraine war and the imagined threat of Russia being able to strike somewhere in Europe within the next two to five years has led to frantic developments of new longer ranging weapons like Anlo-French-Italian STRATUS (cruise/antiship missile with a range of 1,600 kilometres; Taurus Neo with a range of 700 kilometres and further enhancements; a UK/German Deep Precision Strike Missile with a 2,000 km range; while The ELSA ( European Long Range Strike Approach) is new project initiated by France, Germany and Italy. Later joined by several other countries.
 
Trump’s ongoing back and forth on Tomahawks for Ukraine
The Europeans are not alone in their attempts to escalate. In September President Zelensky in an interview uttered this cryptic warning to Russia, saying “if Russia won't end the war, officials working in the Kremlin should make sure they know where the nearest bomb shelter is.” (Axios September 25, 2025). Zelensky mentioned that he had asked President Trump for a new weapon system that would hasten the end of the war, by forcing President Putin to come to the negotiation table. ““sober the Russians up a bit, bringing them to the negotiating table.” (Politico).
 We now know that Zelensky was talking about the Tomahawk intermediate range missiles system.
Trump’s reaction, “well maybe or maybe not”. But he seems to have accepted Zelensky’s premise that giving Ukraine the ability to use U.S. supplied Tomahawks might put a scare into President Putin. Asked by reporters, Trump did not rule out providing Ukraine with Tomahawks, but he also said "I think I want to find out what they're doing with them, ... Where are they sending them? I guess I'd have to ask that question ... I would ask some questions. I'm not looking to escalate that war" (Reuters, October 7, 2025).
Trump had new ambiguous words on Tomahawks for Ukraine on Sunday October 12: "We'll see... I may". The missiles would be "a new step of aggression" in Ukraine's war with Russia.” Marking his impatience with Russia by saying: "I might tell them [Russia] that if the war is not settled, that we may very well, we may not, but we may do it, ... Do they want Tomahawks going in their direction? I don't think so," (BBC, Tuesday, October 14, 2025).
Trump may be right, Russia does not want Tomahawks in Ukraine pointing in the direction of Russia. When President Putin was asked for his reaction to the potential escalation of providing Ukraine with Tomahawks he said:
“This is something dangerous. Regarding the Tomahawks, this is a very powerful weapon, even if, truth be said, it is not exactly up to date, but it is still a formidable weapon that does pose a threat ... Will this damage our relations considering that we have finally started seeing light at the end of tunnel? Of course, this would be detrimental to our relations. How can it be otherwise? You cannot use the Tomahawks without the US military personnel’s direct involvement. This would signal the advent of a totally new stage in this escalation, including in terms of Russia’s relations with the United States.” (en.kremlin.ru, October 2, 2025).
Here map showing how far Tomahawk could penetrate into Russia :

Putin is right Tomahawk is a formidable weapon that would be pose a threat very far into Russia with a range of up to 2,500 km. Although it must be remembered that the U.S. Navy fired least 80 Tomahawks (according to Military.com) against Houthi’s, and the Houthi’s still seem to be a real threat.
But Putin is also right: The Typhon system used to launch Tomahawks is big complicated system, that certainly has to rely on U.S. intelligence to have any real effect.
Note that Tomahawk missiles are relative slow compared to say modern hypersonic missiles. Meaning that a Tomahawk fired at say Moscow, from around Kyiv would take almost an hour to reach its goal.
It is assumed that the U.S. would at the most send 20 to 50 Tomahawks to Ukraine, and if that does not force Russia to change its stance, one must ask what the next escalation step might be, from the West and from Russia.
So does Trump really want to risk more direct U.S. involvement in the proxy war in Ukraine? It would see be contrary to his wish for making peace, having better U.S. relations with Russia, and his focus on the Pacific and China.
So, does he dare ....?
Perhaps a meeting between Trump and Zelensky on Friday, October 17, will reveal his decision. But perhaps the Tomahawk threat is less than he want’s Russia to believe. A recent article in “Reponsible Statecraft” assumes that Trump cannot be serious, arguing that “talk of providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles is fanciful and detached from military realities, and Putin clearly knows this.” (Responsible Statecraft, October 8, 2025). The article argues the U.S. only possess two working land-based Typhon systes for launching Tomahawks, with a third in progress, and these systems are earmarked for use elsewhere. So, it would take time to make further systems available for Ukraine, even if perhaps others sytems could be modified to launch Tomahawks.
If Trump somehow could make Tomahawks available for Ukraine, and their use would become a serious threat for Russia, the potential for nuclear escalation could become intolerably high.
 
Going nuclear – the ultimate deterrence against Russia?
While Europe no doubt has the capability to enhance deterrence against Russia with advanced conventional offensive weapons. Europe’s ability to escalate deterrence against Russia has a serious problem.
Either the effectiveness of the European deterrence based upon conventional weapons must ultimately rely on the assumption that a possible armed conflict with Russia would stay below the nuclear threshold, which might be doubtful, giving the verbal Russian warnings and the revised Russian nuclear doctrine. Or that Europe could be sure that any use of nuclear weapons by Russia would trigger U.S. retaliation, which lately has become more and more doubtful.
What has led to this doubt? Well, the obvious explanation is of course President Trump’s various back and forth statements, combined with growing conviction that the U.S. is half turning its focus away from Russia in order to concentrate on China.
This has certainly been felt in Europe: “Since the beginning of Donald Trump's second term as US president, transatlantic relations have noticeably deteriorated. Against this backdrop, some European heads of state and government have expressed doubts about the US's extended nuclear deterrence—that is, about Washington's willingness to use American nuclear weapons in an emergency to protect its allies in Europe. Others emphasized that the US's nuclear role remains undisputed. Many analyses now also assume that Europe must develop its own nuclear deterrence capability.” (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 26, 2025).
Among the last we find the German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who early on declared his conviction that President Trump was “largely indifferent.” with regard to the fate of Europa.
What the Europeans seem to have overlooked is another explanation for a growing U.S. reluctance to provide a nuclear backstop for Europe. Precisely the recent willingness of European leaders to escalate deterrence against Russia with new long-range offensive weapons, may increase certain European leader’s willingness to risk confrontation with Russia. The new arsenal of European long -range missiles which will be able to strike the European part of Russia, may actually lead to a heightened risk of Russia going nuclear, thus potentially demanding U.S. retaliation.
“In a NATO border crisis with nuclear threats from the Kremlin, a Polish government could, for example, use conventional long-range weapons to target important targets in the Russian hinterland – including facilities essential to Russia's strategic nuclear deterrence. Following this logic, Moscow would have to preemptively attack Polish targets, thereby crossing US red lines. This could deter Russia from the outset, but would limit the United States' room for maneuver. Against this background, it is not surprising that various US administrations in the past have resisted their allies' efforts to develop independent long-range capabilities.” (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 26, 2025).
 Thus, one could argue that raising the level of conventional deterrence as Europe is doing, combined with doubt relating to U.S. back stop guarantees, must led to a demand for some kind of independent European nuclear deterrence.
Macron had previous talked of the possibility that France’s independent nuclear umbrella consisting of land- and carrier-based Rafale aircraft armed with nuclear tipped missiles, and a submarine force armed with nuclear ballistic missiles, might be extended to its European neighbours.
In March 2025 Macron announced that he had decided “to open debate on the protection by our deterrence of our allies on the European continent, ... Our nuclear deterrence protects us, it is complete, sovereign, French from end to end, This protects us much more than many of our neighbours.” (CNN March 6, 2025). France could station part of its land-based nuclear force in other European countries., Germany has been mentioned. Thereby helping to extend the French nuclear umbrella to more of Europe.
In the so-called “Northwood Declaration” by President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer in Juli 2025, they state “Our nuclear weapons exist to deter the most extreme threats to the security of our nations and our vital interests. Our nuclear forces are independent, but can be coordinated and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance, and to the peace and stability of the Euro Atlantic area.” And they agreed “that there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by our two nations.” (gov.uk, July 10, 2025).
The real danger: Some European leaders speak loudly, but carry a small stick
Mostly just words combined with never ending consultations. But an independent European nuclear deterrence? Not really. Even if France has an independent nuclear force with a certain credibility, more than Macron’s assurance would be needed given that “the decision has always remained and will remain in the hands of the president of the Republic.” Future political constellations in France might actually want to de-escalate the weapons race against Russia, and thus presumably be more reluctant to extent nuclear deterrence to other European countries. The next U.K. government might have a similar attitude, also seeking de-escalation with Russia. By the way, it must be assumed that British nuclear forces involve so much U.S. equipment that it may not really be that independent.
Then of cause, there is also the question of quantity. The total inventory of French nuclear warheads is assumed to number 370, while the UK possess around 225. This is dwarfed by the size of the Russian inventory of up to 5,459 nuclear warheads, and even more by destructive capacity of the warheads. Furthermore, Russia is modernizing its nuclear forces. So, no contest.
Just take the much talked about the Russian hypersonic medium range Oreshnik (hazel tree) missile. It certainly seems to represent a large stick in the Russian arsenal. A mobile, solid-fuel, intermediate range hypersonic ballistic missile, capable of reaching Mach 10, able to carry nuclear armed MIRV’s (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles), and with range said to be up to 5,000 kilometres.
It would be nearly impossible for a foreseeable time to defend Europe against such Russian missiles?
Remember that the Danish argument for investing in longer ranging airborne missiles used the image of striking the man with the bow instead of just the arrow. This would mean that the West would have to strike at say Russian Oreshnik and other missile bases before they could launch missiles. Not really a plausible possibility, and even if possible rather dangerous given the total number of Russian intermediate and global nuclear missiles.
Even though new programmes are initiated in order to create some kind of defence against Russian missiles. Take Germany who has decided to procure the state-of-the-art Arrow 3 missile system from Israel. A decision demonstrating the urgent need for defence capabilities against Russia’s ballistic missiles. Arrow 3 is meant to enable exoatmospheric interception, meaning the ability “to intercept missiles in space before they reach Earth's atmosphere, neutralizing the threat early, without leaving debris or explosives over populated areas.” (bundeswehr.de).
 There is also a European initiative to called Odin’s Eye (multinatiOnal Development INitiative for a Space-based missilE earlY-warning architecturE). At the moment the project seems mostly consist of a text description infested with cryptic acronyms: “ODIN’s EYE II contributes to the further development of a European space-based missile early warning (SBMEW) architecture initiated under EDIDP. The target system addresses timely warning, technical intelligence, missile defence systems against ballistic, hypersonic and anti-satellite (ASAT) threats as well as proliferation control. The project will leverage and consolidate collabourative efforts by entities from EU Member States in developing a common SBMEW capability to respond to the current andfuture security threats. Related PESCO project: Timely Warning and Interception with Space-based Theater Surveillance (TWISTER)” (https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/ODINS%27EYE%20II-Factsheet_EDF22.pdf).
 
The madness of it all ...
One wonders how presumably sober European leaders have reached the conviction that their ongoing attempts to escalate deterrence against a Russia will contribute to keep an uncertain kind of stand-off situation for Europe.
The continuing spiral of escalation would seem to contribute to the opposite, a growing risk of some kind of incidence that would call forth a rapidly escalation of actions and re-actions.
Remember the steps of escalation in Ukraine- From the HIMARS systems first armed with GMLRS (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System) for shorter ranges, then with ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) for its longer-range, and then The British and French Storm Shadow and SCALP air-launched longer -range missiles.
 And now the talk of U.S. Tomahawks, perhaps forcing Germans also to cave in and deliver Taurus missiles.
Continuing a spiraling escalation, is that the way to end the proxy war, or is it the steps to a wider war, even a nuclear one. “It is now 89 seconds to midnight, closer than ever.” The Bulletin of the Atmoc Scientists fear in their 2025 Doomsday statement.
This essay has at least tried to show that the desire to raise deterrence with conventional weapons will lead to the risk of an outright war with Russia, a war that would might be fatal for Europe. So much for often repeated argument “To prevent war we must prepare for it.”
Instead there is a need for diplomacy, a need for listening to Russia’s grievances and not only to Presidents Zelensky’s constant attempts to involve the rest of Europe more and more in the proxy war. Instead, European leaders ought to support President Trump’s initial attempts to inject more realism and diplomacy in the exchanges with President Putin.
 It is striking that many European leaders have been so eager to contribute the the continuing military escalation in order to deter the imagined threat of Russia making ready to attack Europe in two to five yeas time, while seeemingly ignoring a much more realistic threat of ongoing internal decay, related to real challenges— economic stagnation, political distrust, social tensions, demographic shifts, and environmental pressures, all contributing to Europe having in reality a rapidly diminishing power and influence in the World.
It is actually rather funny to read President Putin’s view of what European leaders are doing. Here his views in a speech at the latest Valdai meeting:
“The ruling elites of united Europe continue to whip up hysteria. They claim that war with the Russians is almost at the doorstep. They repeat this nonsense, this mantra, over and over again.
Frankly, when I sometimes watch and listen to what they are saying, I think they cannot possibly believe this. They cannot believe when they are saying that Russia is about to attack NATO. It is simply impossible to believe that. And yet they are making their own people believe it. So, what kind of people are they? They are either entirely incompetent, if they genuinely believe it, because believing such nonsense is just inconceivable, or simply dishonest, because they do not believe it themselves but are trying to convince their citizens that this is true. What other options are there?
Frankly, I am tempted to say: calm down, sleep peacefully, and deal with your own
problems. Look at what is happening in the streets of European cities, what is going
on with the economy, the industry, European culture and identity, massive debts
and the growing crisis of social security systems, uncontrolled migration, and rampant violence – including political violence – the radicalisation of leftist, ultra-liberal, racist, and other marginal groups ... Take note of how Europe is sliding to the periphery of global competition.” (http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78134).
This of cause is Putin’s version of the story, but why do Western Leaders and media always assume that his version is the wrong one, and that the story told by Western leaders is the correct one? A dig into back into their own history suggests that both sides are to blame.

 
The talks that might have ended hostilities in early 2022
The first round of Russia -Ukraine talks after the Russia invasion on Thursday, February 24, 2022, actually took place just a few days later on Monday February 28 in Belarus, not far from the border with Ukraine.
The talks apparently focused on the possibility for a ceasefire. “The Ukrainian side, ... looking for an immediate ceasefire and the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops … the Russian side, looking for guarantees about Ukraine’s neutrality and that it would never join NATO.” (Al Jazeera, 28 February, 2022)
These talks were followed by talks in March, first in Belarus, and later in Turkey, while continuing to search for possible conditions for halting hostilities. The negotiations then ended with a “draft treaty” dated the April 15, 2022.
The draft treaty represents the only serious attempt to negotiate a framework for peace during the first year of the invasion. Understanding the positions of both Russia and Ukraine in these talks provides insight into their strategic priorities and reveals why a compromise proved elusive. Understanding the conflicting positions may be important to understand what is happening in today’s search for a ceasefire and a possible peace agreement after more than three years of war.
The April 15 draft treaty is entitled: “Treaty on Permanent Neutrality and Security Guarantees for Ukraine (Istanbul Treaty Final Draft) (2022).” Apart from the preamble it includes 17 articles and 6 annexes specifying the conditions for a deal between Russia and Ukraine,
 Here an overview of the most important conditions specified in the draft treaty (https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a456d6dd8e27e830/e279a252-full.pdf).
 
Draft treaty demands with some of most important demands on Ukraine:
 
Permanent neutrality
1. Ukraine undertakes to support its permanent neutrality, which is declared and
enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine.
2. The guarantor states recognize, respect and guarantee the status of Ukraine
as a permanently neutral state, and undertake to ensure that this status is observed at
the international level.
3. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, Ukraine, as a permanently neutral
state, undertakes:
a) not to engage in activities that would be contrary to the international legal
status of permanent neutrality;
b) to terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with
permanent neutrality
 
No NATO membership
d) not to join any military alliances; not to conclude military agreements, the
implementation of which would contradict Articles 1 and 2 of this Treaty and/or harm the security of other Parties;
 
Strict limitations on foreign military cooperation:
e) not to allow entry into the territory of Ukraine or deployment in any form on its
territory, including temporarily, of foreign weapons , including missile weapons of any
type, armed forces and formations; not to allow foreign military personnel to remain on
the territory of Ukraine if this contradicts Articles 1 and 2 of this Treaty and/or harms the
security of other Parties.
 
Compliance with Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT):
l) To strictly comply with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons ( NPT), prevent the training of its military personnel in the use of
nuclear weapons, the deployment on its territory of nuclear weapons of foreign states
and their means of delivery, as well as the creation of infrastructure for the deployment
or maintenance of nuclear weapons foreign states and means of its delivery;
 
These demands were followed by several other demands. All consistent with Russia’s broader objective: to halt further NATO enlargement and re-establish a sphere of influence over its neighbour.
 
Strict limits on armed forces of Ukraine
 Annex 1 specifies in details the limits on the armed forces of Ukraine, but it also reveals disagreement between the parties .
Apparently Russia wanted to limit the armed forces to 85,000 people, but the treaty also shows an alternative limit of 250,000. The same disagreement is found in limits specified for equipment, say tanks (342 vs 800), Armoured vehicles (2400 vs 1029, Guns (1900 vs 519) , MLRS with max range of 280 km, ( 600 vs 96), Anti-aircraft missiles with max range up to 75km (190 vs200), Combat aircraft (160 vs 102), combat helicopters (144 vs 35), Warships with displacement up to 3,200 tons (8 vs2 ).
 
Allowing membership of the EU
Article 3 of the draft treaty: The Parties to this Treaty share the understanding that Ukraine’s status as a permanently neutral state is, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, compatible with Ukraine’s possible membership in the European Union, as well as its participation in UN, OSCE or EU peacekeeping missions.
 
Security for Ukraine
Great Britain, China, the Russian Federation, the United States, the French Republic, (Republic of Belarus, Republic of Turkey), are the guarantors of the security of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state.
 
Article 2 of the draft treaty list some of conditions:
1. Pursuant to Article 1, the Guarantor States and other States that are Parties to this Treaty undertake:
a) to respect and observe the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine;
b) to terminate international treaties and agreements that are incompatible with the permanent neutrality of Ukraine;
c) not to enter into military alliances with Ukraine; not to enter into military agreements with it, the implementation of which would contradict Articles 1 and 2 of this Treaty and/or harm the security of other Parties;
d) not to carry out activities contrary to Ukraine’s international legal status of permanent neutrality;
e) to refrain from direct or indirect interference in any form in the internal affairs of Ukraine;
f) to refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine, its sovereignty and independence, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
 
Article 5 Guarantor states actionsin event of an armed attack on Ukraine
The Guarantor States and Ukraine agree that in the event of an armed attack on Ukraine, each of the Guarantor States, after holding urgent and immediate consultations (which shall be held within no more than three days) among them, in the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of a decision agreed upon by all Guarantor States, will provide (in response to and on the basis of an official request from Ukraine) assistance to Ukraine, as a permanently neutral state under attack, by immediately taking such individual or joint action as may be necessary.
 
Territorial demands
The difficult issues relating to Crimea and the Donbas are mostly missing in the draft treaty.
Only indirectly do we get some clues as what is going on. Article 8 and Article 9 of the draft treaty specifies that the important articles we have just gone through, “shall not apply to the territories indicated on the map in Annex 6.”
This map is apparently not to found in any the published material connected to meetings between Russia and Ukraine in 2022. Thus, the exact content of the map remains undisclosed in public sources, as neither Russia nor Ukraine has released it. Both parties may have been reluctant to share the full details due to the sensitive nature of the territorial issues involved, particularly regarding Crimea and the Donbas region.
 According to Ivan Grek, Director of the Russia Program at the George Washington University, sources have since revealed that Russia and Ukraine had agreed that there would be no negotiations about Crimea for the next 10-15 years, while the so-called people’s republics of Luhansk and Donetsk might get a special political status.
 
Demands related to language and de-nazification
Annex 2 On the importance of the status of the Russian language in Ukraine.
Annex 3A series demands relating to what is called “Purification of Power, ” meaning a kind of de-nazification of Ukraine
 
 Why did the peace talks fail in 2022?
Sometime after the April 15, 2022, Ukraine unilaterally withdrew from the talks and never went back. What made them withdraw from talks that might have ended the War in the spring of 2022?
What had happened that made them chose to continue fighting a war with enormous human and material costs for the past three and half years?
Several possible explanations may be offered.
 
Russian Blitzkrieg advances creating panic
 During the first days of the Russian invasion from North, East and South it looked as if Russia was carrying out a blitzkrieg that would overwhelm the Ukrainian forces. Russian troops began the invasion from multiple directions into the Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk, Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Kyiv regions.
A map of Russian advances on late February 26, 2022, showed the Russian advances:

On the same day CNN reported that the U.S. had offered to evacuate President Zelensky from Kyiv, perhaps to form a government in exile. Zelensky rejected the offer, saying ““The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride.”
Even so there must have been a whiff of defeatism during the first few days, not only in Ukraine but in the West. Perhaps remembering the strange attitude of President Biden in January 2022, when he had said: "I think what you're going to see is that Russia will be held accountable if it invades. And it depends on what it does. It's one thing if it's a minor incursion and then we end up having a fight about what to do and not do." (npr.org. January 20, 2022).
But it was no small incursion. In the late February and in March Russia besieged Mariupol, launched massive missile attacks on Kharkiv, entered Kherson and seized the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
 This also marks the period of the negotiations, when Ukraine might perhaps have been inclined to accept severe Russian demands for some kind of peace.
As late as March 29, 2022, after talks in Istanbul on March 28, Vladimir Medinsky, a senior advisor to the Russian president and lead negotiator could report: "Yesterday, the Kyiv authorities, for the first time in all of the previous years, declared their readiness to reach agreements with Russia. They gave us the written principles of a possible future agreement, ... "We think that we have worked through enough material so that a meeting between the presidents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation can be made possible (Quoted from WBUR, May 6, 2024).

Russia getting bogged down and Ukraine regaining some ground
 Then on March 31, 2022, Ukrainian forces reclaimed Bucha, and Russian forces were leaving the Kyiv region. “And as the Russian troops retrieved, the whole world saw the horror of Russia’s war crimes.” In early April Chernihiv and the Sumy regions were also reclaimed from Russian troops with Ukrainian reclaiming these areas. .
 By April 15, 2022, the situation for Ukraine war certainly look very different from the situation on february 26, just take a lok at this map dated April 15, 2022.

It has been assumed that the hoorror of Bucha and the withdrawal of Russian forces may have hardened Ukrainian resolve and led to their withdrawal from the negotiations with Russia.
 
Growing Western support and Prime Minister Johnson interference
Rapidly growing Western material support may have contributed to the hardening of the Ukrainian resolve and to the decision to leave the negotiations.
It has also been suggested that Prime Minister Johnson of the UK may contributed directly to the break down of the peace negotiations.
A commentary published by H-Diplo/RJISSF looks at the questions “Did Boris Johnson prevent and early end to the war in Ukraine?”
 What is known is that Prime Minister Johnson secretly visited Kyiv on April 10, 2022, and met with President Zelensky.
“During their bilateral meeting, Johnson apparently advised Zelensky not to entertain a compromise peace nor to offer Russia Ukrainian neutrality to end the war. Instead, Johnson encouraged Zelensky to continue fighting to decisively defeat Russia. Subsequently, Johnson was blamed for having encouraged Zelensky to ignore the opportunity to end the war within two months of Moscow’s invasion.” (The Times , January 11, 2024).
It is also rumoured that Prime Minister Johnson would have refused to let the UK become a guarantor to the possible Russia-Ukraine agreement resulting from the ongoing negotiations.
There is no doubt that Prime Minister Johnson advocated hard attitude towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine, taking his inspiration from Churchill and it possible that this might have stiffened a Churchillian like resolve in President Zelensky to continue the war and leave the negotiations.
 
After three years of war no end in sight
More than three years after the Russian invasion the war has become a continuously escalating proxy war between between Russia and West, consisting of the U.S. and the other members of the enlarged NATO, with no end in sight. Diplomatic efforts to somehow restart arminstice or peace negotiations during the Biden administration were non-existent and the few attempts, say by President Macron or Prime Minister Orban were mosty viewed as some sort of treason against the united front of U.S. and European leaders, with their senseless repetitive mantra of “Standing with Ukraine for as long it takes.”
This standing with Ukraine has only resulted in an escalating war of attrition, with very little movement on the front in Ukraine, after the first surprising Ukrainian success of pushing the Russian trops back, and the invasion of a small part of Russia. In 2025 Ukraine was pushed back over the border. Elsewhere Russia have achieved small and costly advances along the frontline.
For more than three and a half year European leaders do not seem to have had any positive idea of how to end the war, with naive souls like the Danish Prime Minister even entertaining the view that Ukraine must win.
Mostly though the Western alliance under Biden just kept plodding along with round after round of sanctions, and injections of more advanced weapons in Ukraine. But evidently scared of overstepping some invisible line that would involve them in a direct war with Russia.
 
Trump’s mercurial efforts to end the war
Two days after taking up office on January 20 President Trump in his usual style took to Truth Social to urge Russia to make a deal to stop the war:
 
“I’m going to do Russia, whose Economy is failing, and President Putin, a very big FAVOR. Settle now, and STOP this ridiculous War! IT’S ONLY GOING TO GET WORSE. If we don’t make a “deal,” and soon, I have no other choice but to put high levels of Taxes, Tariffs, and Sanctions on anything being sold by Russia to the United States, and various other participating countries. Let’s get this war, which never would have started if I were President, over with! We can do it the easy way, or the hard way - and the easy way is always better. It’s time to “MAKE A DEAL.” NO MORE LIVES SHOULD BE LOST!!!”
 
Probably not the way to get Russia and Ukraine to the negotiation table. At the time he may only have had vague ideas of what he might be able to achieve. Looking at how he is acting, one might expect that it is done on purpose, just beating the grass to see what new possibilities might emerge. In a way scaring the rest of the world to react, as in strange game. Seeing what may happen when you do something outrageous, frightening or earthshattering and then take advantage from it.
 On February 12 , 2025 he really started to beat the grass, startling his European partners. In a Ukraine Defence Contact Group in Brussels his loyal henchman, Hegseth, had this stark message to his European colleagues:
 
A recognition that returning to Ukraine's pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective
NATO membership for Ukraine is unrealistic
Troops that be needed to secure a peace, will not include U.S. troops and will not be part of a NATO mission.
 
 On the same day Trump called President Vladimir Putin in what may have been his first talk with Putin after taking office again.
According to Putin “The leaders also discussed a possible Ukraine settlement. Donald Trump spoke in favour of stopping the hostilities as soon as possible and solving the crisis peacefully. In turn, Vladimir Putin pointed out it was necessary to eliminate the root causes of the conflict and agreed with Donald Trump in that a sustainable settlement could only be reached via peaceful negotiations” (kremlin.ru February 12, 2025).
That may be said to have started a flurry of diplomatic and non-diplomatic activity. Mostly without Ukrainian or European participation.
The diplomatic activity involved U.S.-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia, Wittkoff’s repeated talks with Putin, meetings of Russia-Ukraine delegations, that resulted in prisoner exchanges.
The un-diplomatic activity being the chaotic Zelensky-Trump altercation in the Oval Office on February 28.
Followed by even more intense diplomatic activity in the coming months back and forth talks both with Zelensky and Putin in order to make possible a ceasefire. Trump himself pushing for a face-to-face meeting between Putin and Zelensky as a abrupt way to end the fighting
 Trumps mercurial diplomatic and un-diplomatic activity certainly led to activity among European leaders, not the least the creation of a Coalition of the Willing, although rather unsure what they were willing to do, except for showing their eagerness to be involved in Trump’s attempts to create peace, and their continuing verbal “standing with Ukraine for ..., for what and for how long?
 
Russian and Ukraine pressed to initiate talks in May/June 2025
In 2025 President Trump played a decisive role in pushing for talks between Russia and Ukraine, urging both sides to negotiate to end “the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II.” His administration’s involvement, including the presence of U.S. officials like Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, and special envoys, underscored his interest in a rapid resolution.
For talks on in Istanbul on June 2, 2025, Ukraine and Russia seem to have prepared proposals, or should one say repetition of old demands.
Ukraine with a roadmap for peace negotiation, that first and foremost demanded a “full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.” (Reuters, June 1, 2025).
 Russia with a memorandum outlining conditions for ending the war. One option apparently containing these demands: “Kyiv to completely withdraw from the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, which Russia partially occupies but claims as its own territory. A 30-day ceasefire would enter into force once this troop withdrawal begins, the memorandum says. Ukraine would also be required to relocate its military to an agreed distance from the Russian border.” (The Moscow Times, June 2, 2025).
 No wonder that the Ukraine-Russian talks did not get very far, but an agreement on prisoner exchanges were reached before talks ended again.
 Next comes the Alaska summit.
 
Alaska summit of President Trump and President Putin
Before the meeting in Alaska on August 15, Trump’s had focused heavily on achieving an immediate ceasefire, describing it as his top priority and warning of “severe consequences” if Putin did not comply. He expressed confidence in his ability to broker a swift deal, citing his personal rapport with Putin and his belief that the war would not have started under his presidency.”
After the meeting, Trump downplayed the need for a ceasefire, stating on Truth Social that “It was determined by all that the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a Peace Agreement, which would end the war, and not a mere Ceasefire Agreement, which often times do not hold.”
After the Alaska summit Trump seems to have warmed to a deal involving a peace agreement, accepting Putin’s demand to address “root causes” and supporting territorial concessions or land swaps. Involving that Ukraine would have to give up the not yet Russian occupied parts of Donbas, in exchange for as yet unspecified areas of land occupied by Russia.
Trump also later implied that Putin would be willing to accept Western involvement in security guarantees for Ukraine.
 The Alaska Summit certainly alarmed Ukraine and the Coalition of the Willing. Particularly trump’s endorsement of territorial concessions and de-emphasis on a ceasefire. Zelensky reiterated that ceding land, such as the rest of the Donbas, would weaken Ukraine’s defences and violate its constitution. European leaders, including those from Britain, France, and Germany, issued statements emphasizing Ukraine’s territorial integrity and threatened increased sanctions on Russia if the war continued.
Their alarm and anger over Trump seemingly becoming more aligned to Putin’s view may understandable. What they forget is that there is a reason for the war in Ukraine, a reason related to the whole question of NATO membership for Ukraine. A prospect vehemently rejected by Russia. Therefore, it is in fact quite reasonable that Trump sees negotiations for peace in Ukraine as a mostly a question of the U.S. negotiating with Russia to achieve peace. Both Europe and Ukraine play second fiddle in such negotiations.
 
A senseless escalating war continuing in 2025
Given that Russian and Ukrainian demands haven’t changed a much since the 2022 draft treaty. Here a look at today’s demands and positions compared to the 2022 draft treaty proposal and the negotiations that Ukraine left in 2022.
 
Permanent neutrality
 In the June 2024 so-called peace memorandum Russia still demands that Ukraine becomes a neutral state
Putin has reportedly softened on this issue, expressing openness to Ukraine receiving some form of security guarantees, though specifics remain unclear and are likely tied to restrictions on Ukraine’s military and NATO exclusion. This shift may reflect diplomatic efforts to appear more conciliatory, particularly in talks with Trump.
 
No NATO membership
Putin continues to demand that Ukraine abandon its NATO aspirations and that NATO provide legally binding guarantees against further eastward expansion. This remains a core condition for peace, with sources indicating Putin seeks a written pledge to halt NATO’s growth and exclude Ukraine from the alliance.
 In an NBC interview on August 24, 20225, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov touched upon the NATO question: “The violation of Russian security interests was one of the root causes of what has happened. And this relates to many years of lies when we were promised, starting from 1990 and then many times we were promised that NATO would not be expanding. And the OSCE summit documents, which I quoted, said in the past, and nobody cancelled it, that no organization must claim superiority in Europe, and NATO has been doing exactly the opposite.”
With Trump’s rejecting a possible NATO membership for Ukraine, it looks as if this condition must also be accepted by Ukraine, thus opening the possibility of a deal.
Except that is, that Ukraine demands for robust security guarantees including from the U.S. and other NATO members in some kind of NATO Article 5-like guarantee.
 
Strict limits on armed forces of Ukraine
 In the June 2024 Russian peace memorandum still demand “a cap on Ukraine’s military capabilities and capacity, and for a dissolution of “Ukrainian nationalist formations” within the military.” (lawfaremedia.org July 11, 2024).
This is certainly not what Ukraine and the Coalition of the Willing is aiming for. Instead they want Ukraine to posses such a military capability that would it represent a deterrent against a new Russian attack, and thus this in itself represent a security guarantee.
In early 2014 Ukraine may only have had an army of 130.000 although also having large number reservists. Now, according to Statista Ukraine has 900,000 active soldiers in 2025, with a reserve force of 1.2million and 100,000 in paramilitary units.
To solve the problem of security for Ukraine a compromise is needed. Russia might have to give up demanding a limit on Ukrainein forces and accept that Ukraine itself would have the troops and weapons necessary to assure their own future security.
 
Allowing membership of the EU
 In 2022 Russia was already accepting that Ukraine might apply for membership of the EU, and this is still the case. Thus, having the same position as in 2022 draft treaty.
 
Security for Ukraine
This is the other big issue, but the Russian demands may have softened on this issue, expressing openness to Ukraine receiving some form of security guarantees, though specifics remain unclear. This shift may reflect diplomatic efforts to appear more conciliatory, particularly in talks with Trump.
In the recent interview Foreign Minister Lavrov actually harked back the 2022 draft treaty:
“As regards the security guarantees for Ukraine, those principles proposed by the Ukrainian delegation, I underline this once again, they provided for the creation of a group of guarantors, this group containing permanent members of the Security Council: Russia, U.S., China, UK and France, plus they mentioned Germany, Turkiye and any other country which would be interested to join this group of guarantors. And the guarantors would be guaranteeing the security of Ukraine, which must be neutral, which must be non-aligned with any military bloc and which must be non-nuclear.”
Now what Ukraine and the Coalition of the Willing is something rather different, in a way more one-sided.
In the Coalition of the Willing Prime Minister Starmer and President Macron had floated the idea of deploying around 30,000 Western troops on the ground in Ukraine after an armistice or peace deal. Now, this actually mean much more 30.000, as many more are required for sustained rotation. Later talks have been about a much smaller number of troops.
Since then the whole question of guarantees involving troops in Ukraine has become really confused.
While the Coalition of the Willing includes 31 countries, only 10 are apparently willing to send troops to Ukraine when the war ends. But according to Ursula von der Leyen European capitals are working on “Pretty precise plans” for sending troops to Ukraine.
Then Chancellor Merz said that this was not correct, and spoke out against discussing ground troops in Ukraine for the time being. According to Merz “Niemand redet über Bodentruppen in der Ukraine zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt.” For now, there is only a discussion about security guarantees in the event of a ceasefire. Only then can "many things" be implemented. (ZDF Sommer interview, August 31, 2025). Recently German media has even mentioned that Germany might only be willing to pay for Ukrainian troops, and not be prepared to commit own Troops.
Any way both the Coalition of the Willing and Ukraine insist that the U.S. must be involved in providing security guarantees.
With little apparent interest in getting the U.S. really involved, Trump has said "We'll give them (Ukraine) very good protection, very good security." Since then, some vague ideas of U.S support has been aired by Trump an interview on Fox News: “When it comes to security, they’re [ The Coalition of the Willing] willing to put people on the ground ... We’re willing to help them with things, especially — probably you could talk about by air, because there’s nobody that has the kind of stuff we have, really they don’t have. But I don’t think it’s going to be a problem.”
Not really enough for Zelensky and the Coalition of the Willing, they want something more concrete and binding, while the U.S. does not want to become involved.
It must also be remembered, that Russia is not willing to accept troops from NATO countries in Ukraine. A week ago, repeating the position by rejecting “any scenarios involving the deployment of NATO troops in Ukraine." (cbc.ca August 20, 2025). Perhaps understandable as this as this would seem to undermine the Russia’s No-NATO demand. One of root causes of the war.
 Now, according to Financial Times, Trump is said to have proposed that Chinese peacekeepers might help monitor a neutral zone along a possible armistice line in Ukraine, that might be the result of a peace deal. While troops from non-NATO countries may satisfy Russian demands everything still seems to very much up in the air.
One might argue that having troops in Ukraine with a strong mandate, would in itself represent an increased risk of a wider war, involving Western guarantor states. This would also seem to be the view of the more unwilling of the Coalition.
A less risky solution would involve re-arming Ukraine as much as possible with weapons and material support from the Coalition of the Willing, but no foreign troops. This in itself would make it costly for Russia to re-open hostilities.
It might be accompanied by something like the Russian demands for guarantor states somewhat like in the 2022 draft treaty, which was to involve Great Britain, China, the Russian Federation, the United States, the French Republic, (Republic of Belarus, Republic of Turkey). What may have been forgotten is that Russia may be interested in guarantees against a situation in which Ukraine later is feeling strong enough to re-enter the war to regain territory that has have been lost.
 
Territorial demands
In a so-called peace memorandum in June 2024, President Putin still wanted Ukraine to withdraw and cede the four big territories of Donetsk, Luhansk (the Donbas), Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, before any peace negotiations.
With the summit in Alaska, it sems that President Putin has compromised on his earlier territorial demands. Now he wants Ukraine to withdrew completely from Donetsk and Luhansk. Although at present Russian forces only control around 99% of Luhansk and 75% of Donetsk. In return he would freeze the front in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson and hand over occupied areas in the regions of Kharkiv, Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk.
 It would mean that Ukraine would have to give up territory not yet control by Russian troops. Thereby giving up an important line of strong defences especially in the Donetsk.
These Russian demands for a peace deal have been vehemently rejected by President Zelensky, arguing that giving up the fortress belt in the Donbas would make parts of Ukraine defenceless.
Zelensky argueing: "If we're talking about simply withdrawing from the east, we cannot do that, ... It is a matter of our country's survival, involving the strongest defensive lines." (reuters.com, August 22, 2025).
 President Trump meanwhile seemed to have accepted the necessity of some kind land swapping deal between Russia and Ukraine, arguing that it would be “good” and “bad” for both countries.
 
Here a map of the areas involved , showing how much has been occupied by Russia and marked the unoccupied areas of Luhansk and Donetsk:

In order to help understand the Russian demands it may be important take a look at ethno- linguistic make up of Ukraine as shown in this Wikimedia Commons map, although it may now be somewhat outdated.

 
 In relation to questions of historical creation of Ukrainian borders, another map may also help understand the territorial problems:

Note that border defined in 1922 may have have less to do with what one may see as ethnic Ukrainian and more with defining the big very import industrial areas of the Donbas.
Note also that it was Khrushchev who decided to cede the Crimea to Ukraine in 1954.
 
Demands on related to language and de-nazification
Russia is still demanding that Ukraine accepts Russian as the second state language and “ensures “full rights, freedoms, and interests” of the Russian and Russian-speaking population in Ukraine” together with a ban on “heroization and propaganda of Nazism” and on nationalistic parties.” (lawfaremedia.org July 11, 2024).
According to the Human Rights Research Center (HRRC) “Ukraine has steadily enacted legislation for the “de-russification” of Ukraine. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, these linguistic changes have been applied alongside de-communization efforts, like renaming streets and even cities that previously bore Soviet-era historical references in 2015. The Law on State Language passed in 2019, making Ukrainian the only official language, stipulating its use in public life, from usage by public sector workers and government institutions to a 90% quota of national television and radio airtime.” (HRRC September 11, 2024)
 A Wikimedia Commons has this old map Russian language support in Ukraine:

“Maybe they will have to fight a little longer”
 In an interview with The Daily Caller in late August President Trump still talked of the possibility of a trilateral meeting between himself, Putin and Zelensky
“A [trilateral] would happen. A [bilateral], I don’t know about, but a tri will happen. But,
you know, sometimes people aren’t ready for it. ” Using the analogy of two boys fighting in the playgound he argued: ““After a little while, they’re very happy to stop. Do you understand that? It’s almost that way. Sometimes they have to fight for a little bit before you can get them to stop.” (Emphasis added). Well, they have now fought for more than three years... so perhaps it is time for the weakest to give in, just like in the playground.
 While there is no doubt that Trump is striving to find a way to stop the fight, in his own mercurial back and forth way, one wonders if European leaders are not time and time again throwing a proverbial spanner into Trump’s plans for a deal. Not really accepting that standing with Ukraine for as it takes, they may just prolong a senseless war of immense human and material costs and make the risk of a wider war even greater.
Arguing that the defence of Ukraine is the defence of the whole of Europe, they are willing to buy arms that the U. S. will no longer deliver for free , like more Patriot systems and missiles or the latest 3,350 RAMS (Extended Range Attack Munitions). Consisting of air launched missiles with longer range than the Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles delivered in smaller numbers by UK and France.
What do they hope to achieve? What would now be different from earlier escalations meant to force Russia back or at least to negotiating table? How would supporting and strengthening President Zelensky in his impossible demands make peace possible?
What is ignored except by a few European leaders, is that Europe with the escalation and the rapid built up of European forces and military capabilities make war with Russia more possible, contrary to what they are postulating, when arguing that “kriegstüchtigkeit” will prevent a Russian invasion of some other part of Europe within 3 to 5 years.
 
Bringing peace to Europe and deals to the U.S.
Although it may appear that President Trump is prepared to concede to Russian demands for peace in Ukraine—something the leaders of Europe, find abhorrent and foolish—it may be them that are naïve and perhaps even misguided.
European leaders should lift their gaze and see what immense possibilities may result from peace in Ukraine and wider accommodations between Trump and Putin.
This must certainly be what Trump and present administration have set their eyes upon, and the reason they seem to be ignoring Ukraine demands, as well their constant wailing.
Accepting Russia’s red line demands will surely make it possible to reduce the talked up Russian threat, that is scaring leaders of Europe. They should instead try to stretch their minds and eye the possible benefits also for Europe that President Trump may eying in relation to peace between the U.S. and Russia. See also “Trump aiming for mightier deals than myopic Europe” (https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/trump-aiming-mightier-deals-than-myopic-europe-verner-c-petersen-fficf).

 Why cannot the EU and the UK follow the Australian “Operation Sovereign Borders” example?
In 2013 Australia launched “Operation Sovereign Borders” (OSB). This military-led initiative aimed to secure Australia’s borders by stopping all refugees and migrants attempting to reach Australia illegally, particularly by boat from Indonesia.
Operation Sovereign Borders continues to be Australia's policy framework for managing maritime border security and unauthorized maritime arrivals (UMAs).
 With success as this diagram shows:

On August 17, 2016 I wrote the following article arguing the need for an Australian inspired solution to secure European borders. It may still be relevant, as irregular migration is still crossing the Mediterranean and land borders, and neither the EU nor the UK has found an alternative to combat irregular migration as effective as the Australia's “Operation Sovereign Borders.”  
 
 
The Need for a Pacific Solution in Europe 
17 August 2016
(https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/-the-need-for-a-pacific-solution-in-europe)
 
The Tampa Incident
 
In August 2001, the fishing vessel Palapa 1, carrying over 400 asylum seekers, encountered distress 85 nautical miles from the Australian territory of Christmas Island. Australia’s Rescue Coordination Centre issued a request for nearby ships to assist. The nearest vessel was the Norwegian ConRo (Container and Roll-on/Roll-off) ship MV Tampa, which responded to the call. Captain Arne Rinnan took 438 asylum seekers and crew members on board.
 
Australia attempted to transfer responsibility for the rescue to Indonesia’s BASARNAS search and rescue agency. After negotiations, Indonesia offered to allow the shipwrecked passengers to be taken to the Indonesian port of Merak, a 12-hour journey. However, the predominantly Afghan asylum seekers refused to return to Indonesia, reportedly threatening suicide and displaying large signs reading “SOS” and “HELP” on the deck.
 
Captain Rinnan deemed it unsafe to sail to Merak with so many passengers and instead decided to head for Christmas Island, where the asylum seekers could receive medical attention. Australia’s then Prime Minister, John Howard, refused to allow the asylum seekers to land on Christmas Island and threatened to board the ship if it attempted to dock. However, Howard’s efforts to keep the ship away from Christmas Island ultimately failed. Captain Rinnan “waited outside territorial waters for three days as the health situation on board deteriorated until he decided he had to reach Christmas Island.” Meanwhile, the Norwegian government protested strongly, and the situation became increasingly embarrassing for Australia in the international media.
 
After several days of standoff, John Howard was forced to find a solution. “International media, human rights groups, and world leaders pressured Australia to act, and after eight days, Howard reached an agreement whereby the Australian Navy would transport the refugees to Nauru, a Pacific island nation, where they would be held in camps while their asylum applications were processed.”
 
The Pacific Solution in Australia
 
This marked the beginning of Australia’s immigration policy known as the “Pacific Solution.” Howard introduced the Border Protection Bill, which stipulated that only asylum seekers reaching the Australian mainland could apply for asylum in Australia. Surrounding islands, particularly the remote Christmas Island, closer to Indonesia, were excluded from this provision. Asylum seekers arriving at Christmas Island or other Australian islands could not apply for asylum and faced detention in Nauru or Papua New Guinea (PNG). The Australian Navy was also authorised to intercept asylum seekers’ boats at sea.
 
The result was striking: in 2002, only one asylum seeker reached the Australian mainland, and only 57 did so over the next five years. In 2007, the Labour Party won the election, and the new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, fulfilled his campaign promise to reverse his predecessor’s strict asylum policy, halting detentions in Nauru and PNG.
 
The consequences were soon evident. In 2009, 60 boats carrying asylum seekers arrived, followed by 134 in 2010 and 69 in 2011. However, not all who attempted the journey succeeded. Many perished in unseaworthy boats, during storms, or when vessels were wrecked against the coast. “Labour’s abandonment of John Howard’s proven border protection policy opened the doors to people smugglers. The result: 50,000 unauthorised arrivals on 800 boats, 1,200 deaths at sea, over 8,000 children in detention, 17 detention centres opened, and an $11 billion border protection budget blowout.”
 
After the 2010 election, Julia Gillard led a Labour minority government, prompting a review of Rudd’s asylum policy. It was decided that even asylum seekers reaching the Australian mainland could not apply for asylum in Australia. Instead, all those illegally crossing into Australian territory would be deported to a “regional processing country.”
 
Revision of Migration Legislation
 
In 2013, the Australian Senate passed the Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Bill 2012. The legislation stated:
 
a) People smuggling and its undesirable consequences, including loss of life at sea, are major regional problems that need to be addressed; 
b) Offshore entry persons, including those to whom Australia has or may have protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol, should be taken to any country designated as a regional processing country; 
c) The designation of a country as a regional processing country is a matter for the Minister and Parliament; 
d) The designation of a country as a regional processing country need not be determined by reference to the international obligations or domestic law of that country.
 
For a country to be designated a “regional processing country,” it is sufficient that it is deemed to be in Australia’s national interest, provided the country agrees to the designation. Australia must also ensure that the country treats refugees in accordance with international conventions, such as not returning them to a country where they face persecution.
 
The legislation grants authorities the following powers:
 
...an officer may, within or outside Australia: 
(a) place the offshore entry person on a vehicle or vessel; 
(b) restrain the offshore entry person on a vehicle or vessel; 
(c) remove the offshore entry person from: 
(i) the place at which the person is detained; or 
(ii) a vehicle or vessel; 
(d) use such force as is necessary and reasonable.
 
As a result, detention centres in Nauru and PNG were reactivated, and an agreement was made to relocate asylum seekers to Cambodia. The plan was that “1,000 refugees currently held in detention on Nauru would be transferred to Cambodia. In exchange, Cambodia would receive financial aid, reportedly A$40 million ($37 million).” However, this plan has largely failed, with only a few refugees resettled in Cambodia.
 
Operation Sovereign Borders
 
Following the 2013 election, Tony Abbott led a Conservative-Liberal National Coalition government, which soon launched Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB). This military-led initiative aimed to secure Australia’s borders by stopping all refugees and migrants attempting to reach Australia illegally, particularly by boat from Indonesia. The policy comprises four main elements:
 
- External disruption and deterrence measures with regional partners to combat people smuggling; 
- Detection and interception of Suspected Illegal Entry Vessels (SIEVs) and the safe transfer of passengers to a location outside Australia; 
- Detention of SIEV passengers in third countries for assessment of their refugee claims; 
- Return of SIEV passengers who are not refugees to their country of origin. For those recognised as refugees, resettlement in a third country is the primary option. As a last resort, resettlement in Australia is administered through Temporary Humanitarian Concern visas only.
 
The Australian Navy and customs service were authorised to conduct “push-back” operations against asylum seeker boats “when it is safe to do so.” If intercepted boats are unseaworthy, passengers may be placed in seaworthy, enclosed lifeboats and towed back to Indonesian waters. “News reports indicate that since 5 January 2014, asylum seekers attempting to reach Australia by boat from Indonesia have been intercepted, loaded onto single-use lifeboats, and towed back to just outside Indonesian waters.” This policy was not well-received by the Indonesian government.
 
There were also plans for a “boat buy-back scheme” to incentivise owners of unsafe boats to sell them to government officials rather than people smugglers. To protect its borders, Australia stationed ships and liaison officers in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia.
 
If asylum seekers cannot be returned to their point of departure, they are detained in centres in third countries, such as Nauru or PNG’s Manus Island. In these centres, their refugee status is assessed. Those not recognised as refugees are returned to their country of origin, while recognised refugees are prioritised for resettlement in third countries. Only as a last resort are they granted temporary stay in Australia.
 
In July 2016, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull declared Operation Sovereign Borders a significant success: “Since OSB commenced, 700 people from 28 people-smuggling ventures have been returned to their countries of departure. Settlement in Australia will never be an option for people who attempt to travel illegally by boat. There are no exceptions.” In 2016, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection Peter Dutton added, “Nobody has drowned at sea under Operation Sovereign Borders.” A fact-check by a newspaper confirmed this claim for Australian waters, though it is unclear how many, if any, may have drowned in Indonesian waters while attempting to reach Australia.
 
Based on the figures provided, Operation Sovereign Borders has been a success, particularly when compared to the numbers during Kevin Rudd’s tenure.
 
The Darker Side of OSB
 
Operation Sovereign Borders has faced significant criticism. In early 2016, Amnesty International wrote: “Australia continued its punitive approach to asylum seekers arriving by boat by pushing them back at sea, returning them to countries of origin without proper assessment of asylum claims, creating a risk of refoulement, or by transferring them to Australian-run facilities in Nauru or Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island.”
 
Amnesty highlighted an independent investigation into the Nauru detention centre, which documented serious issues, including cases of rape, sexual assault, and physical attacks. “In October, the Nauru government announced that asylum seekers would no longer be detained in the centre, which would become an open facility. It also announced that the remaining 600 asylum claims would be processed ‘within a week.’ By the end of December, processing still had not been completed.”
 
Amnesty noted a “wall of secrecy” surrounding the centre, with staff facing penalties for discussing conditions. Nevertheless, on 10 August 2016, The Guardian reported that 2,000 incident reports from the Nauru centre had been leaked, detailing abuses similar to those reported by Amnesty, including brutal treatment of detainees and bullying of schoolchildren by the local Nauru population.
 
Why a Pacific Solution When Australia Accepts Thousands of Refugees Every Year?
 
The answer may simply be that Australia wants to be the sole “decider” regarding who is allowed to enter the country, to use a phrase coined by George W. Bush. It should not be determined by asylum seekers who happen to have the resources and luck to board a smuggler’s boat, nor by people smugglers, nor by favourable winds and weather. As former Prime Minister John Howard stated: “It should be our government that decides who comes to this country, not a free-for-all scramble for a place on a leaky boat.”
 
Asylum seekers should not gain an advantage by bypassing regular migration processes. The Sydney Morning Herald recently noted that among those opposing boat arrivals are former asylum seekers who entered Australia legally and are now settled there. Finally, it must be acknowledged that even Australia can only accept a limited number of asylum seekers each year to avoid serious integration issues or even open conflicts between population groups, such as the Cronulla riots in 2005.
 
“Taking a large proportion of would-be Australian migrants from Indonesia would only induce more to follow; very soon there would be far more than any orderly migration programme could accommodate. The Indonesians and Malaysians would not thank us for that. That’s why we source so much of our refugee intake from camps close to where they’ve fled from: Somalis and Sudanese from Kenya, Afghans from Pakistan.”
 
Australia therefore supports a system where asylum seekers can only enter through resettlement programmes, allowing control over who comes, why, and how many. This is seen as fairer to refugees and more humane, as entire families can be included, and individuals posing security risks can be screened out. Australia has had negative experiences with unrestricted entry, such as with Lebanese refugees, where such controls were absent.
 
When weighing the arguments and the success of Operation Sovereign Borders against the criticism of Australia’s asylum policy, Australia’s approach appears well-founded. Very few now attempt to reach Australia illegally, significantly reducing the influx. No drownings have been reported since the programme’s implementation, and fewer people are detained in processing centres like Nauru or PNG’s Manus Island.
 
This does not excuse the issues in these centres, which Australia should address. However, Australia is not alone in facing challenges in refugee centres, as European experiences demonstrate. Australia’s asylum policy—rejecting illegal arrivals while accepting significant numbers of refugees through resettlement programmes—appears far more consistent, fair, and humane than the EU’s indecisive and wavering approach. For example, the EU’s reliance on paying an authoritarian and unpredictable Erdogan to manage refugees or allowing thousands of illegal asylum seekers to cross the Mediterranean, aided by Operation Sophia, while thousands still drown, is far less defensible.
 
The Largest Disaster to Date in the Mediterranean
 
On 20 April 2015, media reported that yet another boat carrying migrants and refugees from Africa had capsized in the Mediterranean. It soon became clear that the tragedy was catastrophic, with 800 people believed to have drowned and only 28 rescued. An outraged Italian Prime Minister Renzi compared the tragedy to Srebrenica: “Twenty years ago, we and Europe closed our eyes to Srebrenica. Today it’s not possible to close our eyes again and only commemorate these events later.”
 
For UNHCR High Commissioner António Guterres, the tragedy underscored the urgent need for a robust search-and-rescue mission and legal pathways to Europe. The EU eventually decided to take action to prevent such tragedies, but, as usual, the response was half-hearted and inadequate. A strict reaction, like Australia’s response to the Tampa incident, was unthinkable.
 
On 18 May 2015, the European Council established Operation Sophia “to respond to the surge of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya.” The stated aim was to disrupt people smugglers, reduce the flow of refugees and migrants, and prevent large-scale drownings through closer monitoring and more effective rescue operations. However, the operation has failed to curb people smuggling, with only a few smugglers apprehended. The flow of migrants has not decreased either: in 2016, 101,485 refugees and migrants arrived in Italy. Worse still, Operation Sophia has not prevented drownings. According to UNHCR, as of 15 August 2016, 3,151 people had drowned or gone missing that year.
 
Operation Sophia cannot be considered a success. As previously noted, it contributes to sustaining and possibly exacerbating the problem. A fleet of ships ready to rescue stranded migrants just off North Africa’s coast does little to disrupt the smugglers’ business model. On the contrary, migrants and refugees may feel encouraged by the prospect of being rescued, but the ships cannot be everywhere, and drownings continue.
 
The EU’s response to the initial major Mediterranean disasters was a delayed mission that enables the continued flow of illegal migrants and refugees. While currently primarily an issue for Italy, this problem will soon affect other countries. In Africa, hundreds of thousands are waiting for their chance. In contrast, Australia’s response to the first major influx of shipwrecked refugees led to effective solutions, interrupted by a period of increased arrivals under Rudd, but now reduced to almost nothing, with no drownings.
 
Yet, many European policymakers hypocritically believe that the EU’s approach to the refugee crisis is humane, while Australia’s is abhorrent and inhumane.
 
Recommending a Pacific Solution for Europe?
 
“All countries that say ‘anyone who gets here can stay here’ are now in peril, given the scale of the population movements that are starting to be seen. There are tens—perhaps hundreds—of millions of people living in poverty and danger who might readily seek to enter a Western country if the opportunity is there,” said former Prime Minister Tony Abbott in a 2015 speech in London.
 
He urged Europe to emulate Australia’s policy to prevent illegal migrants and refugees from crossing the sea. The task is not to accept everyone who wishes to live in a wealthy Western country but to assist those fleeing life-threatening persecution. “This means turning boats around, for people coming by sea. It means denying entry at the border for people with no legal right to come; and it means establishing camps for people who currently have nowhere to go... It will require some force; it will require massive logistics and expense; it will gnaw at our consciences—yet it is the only way to prevent a tide of humanity surging through Europe and quite possibly changing it forever.”
 
I believe he is right. The EU’s current policy—or lack thereof—is incapable of securing external borders. It does not stem the flow of refugees and migrants but accepts that thousands perish in the attempt to reach a Europe, where integrating them—educationally, professionally, culturally, and socially—is extremely challenging.
 
Unlike Australia, Europe fails to make decisions and cannot independently determine who enters. This is left to refugees and migrants with resources, young men leaving others behind, people smugglers, chance, and the weather. It is time for Europe, or individual European countries, to decide who is allowed to enter, who needs help, or who requires safe refuge. Countries should also determine who can join the workforce and fit into the culture. This is not happening now, nor did it happen when Merkel opened the borders to all who arrived.
 
Rescue at Sea Is Not a Ticket to Europe
 
Austria’s outspoken Foreign Minister, Sebastian Kurz, is one of the few to openly advocate a different approach. In a June 2016 interview with Die Presse, he argued for a deterrence strategy, proposing that people smuggler boats in the Mediterranean be intercepted and their passengers immediately returned to their point of origin or, if that is impossible, detained on islands like Lesbos—a proposal that has not been well-received by Lesbos residents.
 
Kurz is clearly inspired by Australia and Spain, which, as previously described, has quietly implemented a similar approach with considerable success. Kurz also references historical US immigration controls, such as the processing of immigrants on Ellis Island. However, he primarily draws on Australia’s experience, particularly its significant reduction in illegal asylum seekers and the complete elimination of drownings, unlike in Europe.
 
Refugee organisations and politicians lacking insight but aligned with prevailing opinions were quick to criticise Kurz, pointing to the reportedly appalling conditions in the Nauru detention centre. However, what is their “humane” alternative? Allowing the current situation to continue with its evident consequences? Critics seem unable to offer better solutions, and only the most naive or cynical representatives of refugee advocacy groups dare suggest fully opening borders and granting free legal access to Europe for Africans by plane or ship. The rest focus on vague notions of addressing the “root causes” of migration, which often translates to funnelling more money to authoritarian regimes in Africa—a solution reminiscent of paying protection money to Erdogan.
 
Secure External Borders Reduce the Need for Internal Surveillance
 
Secure external borders are essential to maintaining a free and open society with high mutual trust and self-regulating order based on shared values, with minimal surveillance and control of individuals, businesses, transactions, and communications. A country without secure external borders, however, is forced to maintain internal order through extensive explicit regulations, internal surveillance, and control.
 
To secure external borders, the Schengen Border Code must, at a minimum, be upheld. For third-country nationals, this entails:
 
- Thorough checks, including verification of entry conditions and, if necessary, consultation of the Visa Information System (VIS). 
- For stays of up to 90 days within any 180-day period, third-country nationals must: 
  - Possess a valid travel document. 
  - Hold a valid visa, if required. 
  - Provide evidence of the purpose of their stay and sufficient means of subsistence. 
  - Not be listed in the Schengen Information System (SIS) as undesirable. 
  - Not be considered a threat to public order, internal security, public health, or international relations of EU member states. 
 
Third-country nationals who do not meet these conditions may be refused entry, subject to specific provisions (e.g., humanitarian grounds).
 
Given the massive refugee flows of recent years and ongoing crossings from North Africa, these requirements are clearly not being met. People have streamed across Europe’s borders without meeting third-country national criteria. The same applies in the Mediterranean today. Indecisive policymakers and naive humanitarians tell a bewildered public that we must accept these people because they are traumatised refugees or because we are bound by various conventions. Some, like Merkel, even claim that borders cannot be secured with fences and surveillance.
 
The consequence of such attitudes is that the entire Schengen Area has become a region without secure external borders, necessitating increased internal controls, such as border checks and heightened surveillance, which may erode the freedoms we take for granted. These problematic attitudes risk creating significant internal issues in Europe, including conflict, civil war-like conditions in some areas, welfare challenges, unemployment, and disputes over values previously considered self-evident.
 
Securing External Borders and Establishing External Processing Centres
 
A strict interpretation of the Schengen Border Code and a new framework for humanitarian exceptions are essential. First, the flawed argument that borders cannot be secured must be dismissed. Experiences from Hungary, Macedonia, Spain, and Australia demonstrate that external borders can be secured if there is political will.
 
Second, the requirements for third-country nationals must be enforced. Under no circumstances should entry into the Schengen Area be possible without meeting these criteria. The humanitarian exception should be revised so that those arriving from safe countries are returned, and those coming directly from war or conflict zones are detained in external “regional processing centres” wherever possible. From there, they should either be returned to their country of origin or offered residence in a refugee camp. Processing centres should ideally be established outside EU borders, preferably in agreement with relevant neighbouring countries, with EU funding. Inspiration could be drawn from the camp established in Nouadhibou, Mauritania, in 2006 with Spanish assistance, known as “Guantanamito.” Others have advocated for such arrangements: “For several years, politicians have pushed for EU refugee camps in North Africa. Following Australia’s model, which uses its coastguard to keep illegal immigrants at bay, asylum applications would be processed there. Additionally, recognised refugees could be deported from Europe to these camps. Germany, the UK, Austria, France, and the Czech Republic support the plan.”
 
Refugee organisations and self-appointed NGOs, which increasingly attempt to influence Europe’s refugee and migration policy in undemocratic ways, will undoubtedly oppose such measures. However, they have failed to propose viable alternatives. The current situation is unsustainable, and EU policymakers cannot simply let it continue as predicted here. Individual countries are attempting to ensure internal security and order by establishing their own border controls and increasing internal surveillance, which restricts freedoms.
 
If the Schengen Area’s borders were secured, internal controls and enhanced surveillance could be reduced. Each EU country could then, as in Australia and to some extent the UK, determine how many refugees they can accept directly from refugee camps. This would fulfil John Howard’s demand: “It should be our government that decides who comes to this country, not a free-for-all scramble for a place on a leaky boat.”
 
Such an Australia-inspired policy would have positive effects:
 
- A significantly reduced possibility of illegal entry into the Schengen Area. “Push-back” operations and detention in processing centres, for example, in North Africa, would, as in Australia, deter many from attempting to cross the Mediterranean. 
- Consequently, drownings would likely be eliminated or greatly reduced, based on Australian experiences. 
- Arbitrary factors such as physical condition, resources, people smugglers, weather, or the chance of being rescued would no longer determine who reaches Europe. 
- Control over who enters the Schengen Area as refugees or migrants would be regained, likely based on each country’s capacity and willingness to accept them. Resettlement programmes directly from refugee camps would prioritise those most in need, keep families intact, allow background and eligibility checks, and consider cultural compatibility and integration potential. 
- For migration, selection could be based on labour market needs, past employment rates for specific groups, and integration potential.
 
Some may ask, “What about the millions in Africa who cannot earn a living and want to come to Europe?” The answer is that Europe cannot solve Africa’s problems, such as population growth. As previously argued, only Africa can address these issues. As for those who are difficult to integrate due to significant cultural differences, fundamentalist religious ideologies, or demands for unreasonable accommodations, they must be rejected as migrants. As refugees, they should only expect temporary stay in Europe without the possibility of permanent residence. The rationale is that large cultural differences and fundamentalist ideologies are incompatible with core European values. Experience shows the consequences: parallel societies, unreasonable demands, and heightened potential for internal conflicts, possibly resembling the conditions refugees fled. This underscores the need for secure external borders to preserve the values that enable free and open societies.

Abstract
This article critically examines the growing discontent among European political leaders toward the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and its dynamic interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It argues that the Court's expansive jurisprudence—particularly concerning migration, deportation of criminal foreign nationals, and interim Rule 39 measures—has restricted national sovereignty, undermined democratic decision-making, and compromised public safety and social cohesion. The text highlights concerns over “mission creep,” whereby the ECtHR has extrapolated new rights not foreseen in the original treaty. A critique of judicial overreach underscores the tension between human rights enforcement and democratic legitimacy. Broader concerns are raised about Europe’s demographic changes, cultural relativism, and rising political instability due to immigration pressures. The article concludes that unless reforms are made, the ECtHR risks turning human rights into tools that erode the democratic and cultural foundations of the states it was designed to protect.
 
Questioning the Role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
In an open letter initiated by Italy’s Giorgia Meloni and Denmark’s Mette Frederiksen, and signed by the leaders of Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, it is argued that there is a need to examine how the European Court of Human Rights has developed its interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights. The leaders question whether the Court, in some cases, has extended the scope of the Convention too far compared with the original intentions, thus shifting the balance between the interests that should be protected.
The leaders believe that some of the ECtHR’s interpretations and decisions have limited their ability to protect their societies against new challenges, such as increased irregular migration. They highlight “cases concerning the expulsion of criminal foreign nationals where the interpretation of the Convention has resulted in the protection of the wrong people and imposed too many limitations on the states’ ability to decide whom to expel from their territories.”
Believing that the safety and stability of their own societies should take precedence, they argue:
 
- We should have more room nationally to decide when to expel criminal foreign nationals, for example, in cases concerning serious violent crime or drug-related crime. By its nature, such crime always has serious implications for victims.
- We need more freedom to decide how our authorities can keep track of, for example, foreign criminals who cannot be deported from our territories—criminals who have taken advantage of our hospitality to commit crimes, causing public unease.
- We need to be able to take effective steps to counter hostile states that are trying to use our values and rights against us, for example, by instrumentalising migrants at our borders. (Lettera aperta, May 22, 2025).
 
While their letter focuses on the ECtHR limiting their ability to deport criminal migrants, the ECtHR also restricts their capacity to counter attempts by unfriendly states to push irregular migrants over their borders.
 
The leaders signing the letter are not alone in arguing that the ECtHR limits their ability to protect their societies against new challenges. In an interview in 2025, former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak argued that the ECHR “does need to reform, or we should leave.” He added: “If I was forced to choose between staying in the ECHR  [The European Convention on Human Rights] or being able to properly secure our borders, our security, and tackle illegal migration, then I would choose the latter. The right thing is for them to reform. And if they don’t, we should leave.” (The Telegraph, 5 March 2025). He expressed support for Kemi Badenoch, the current leader of the Conservative Party, should she wish to take the UK out of the ECHR.
While leaving the ECHR does not seem to be contemplated by the current government under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the idea has been championed by Suella Braverman, former Conservative Secretary of State for the Home Department, in her publication “Why and How to Leave the European Convention on Human Rights.” The publication lists the following problems caused by adhering to the ECHR [and the ECtHR]:
 
Asylum 
“HM Government’s ability to detain and deport illegal immigrants has been badly affected by the ECHR, particularly Article 3, which forbids torture and inhumane conditions, and Article 8, which protects the right to a family and private life. Together with maritime law, such as SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea) and UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), the ECHR has played a major part in the small boats crisis in the English Channel.”
 
Policing 
“Although police powers must be carefully limited in a democratic society, in recent years, the ECHR has impeded the police’s ability to maintain order, placing the rights of a minority of protesters above those of the law-abiding majority.”
 
Northern Ireland Veterans 
“British soldiers can now expect to be chased through the courts for decades-old events.”
 
Extra-territoriality 
“Although the ECHR’s jurisdiction is primarily territorial, in Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom (2011), it was ruled that it could apply extraterritorially whenever a High Contracting Party exercised ‘effective control’ over an area. The Al-Skeini case refers to an episode during the US and British occupation of Iraq in 2003, involving British soldiers’ actions in a shooting and mistreatment episode.”
 
Rule 39 Orders
“Rule 39 allows the ECtHR to recommend interim measures before proceedings in a court. This was used to frustrate the Rwanda Plan in 2022, when a single anonymous judge at the ECHR disregarded a Supreme Court judgement and prevented the deportation of one of those scheduled to go. This had the effect of grounding all potential flights, halting the policy.”
 
Green Action 
“A special case, as it does not involve British participation, but it demonstrates a kind of ECHR ‘mission creep’: the ECtHR found in favour of a group of elderly Swiss women who argued that the Swiss Government’s failure to take action on climate change breached the ECHR, despite this effectively overturning the results of a Swiss referendum on the subject.”
 
The Origin and Laborious Process Resulting in the ECHR and ECtHR
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its judicial body, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), were established after the Second World War.
As early as 1943, Winston Churchill proposed a Council of Europe to ensure the continent would never again see the injustices that allowed the Nazis to take over Germany and impose fascism across Europe. In a 1946 speech in Zürich, he proposed a “remedy which, if it were generally and spontaneously adopted, would as if by a miracle transform the whole scene, and would in a few years make all Europe, or the greater part of it, as free and as happy as Switzerland is today.” A first practical step would be to form a Council of Europe.
In 1948, Churchill presided over the Congress of Europe in The Hague, bringing together parliamentarians from across Europe. The European Movement emerged from this meeting, with a commitment to achieving greater European unity and adopting a human rights charter. (M. Torrance, Law Society of Scotland, 2011).
The Hague Congress later led to the foundation of The Council of Europe by the Treaty of London on 5 May 1949, initially with 10 member states (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), later joined by Greece and Turkey.
The Council consisted of a Committee of Ministers, overseeing the creation of a draft for a European Human Rights Convention, inspired by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and heavily influenced by UK and French delegates. The creation of the Convention was not without problems, as opinions were divided regarding the content, the precise definition of rights, how binding they should be, and whether there should be a right to individual petition.
After compromises, the resulting European Convention on Human Rights was signed in the Palazzo Barberini in Rome on 4 November 1950, although the president of the assembly, Paul-Henry Spaak, reportedly remarked: “Not a very good Convention, but it is a lovely palace.”
This reflects differing opinions about the Convention from the outset, with the UK apparently having strong misgivings. After the requisite number of ratifications, the ECHR came into force on 3 September 1953. Further ratifications were sluggish; France ratified the Convention on 3 March 1974, but over time membership grew to 47, with Russia being a signatory from 1998 until 2022, when it was forced to leave after its invasion of Ukraine.
As early as 1952, an additional protocol was added to the ECHR, expanding the scope with new rights and modifying existing ones, reflecting a dynamic interpretation of human rights within the Council of Europe framework. Key areas addressed included the right to property, the right to education, and the prohibition of discrimination. Some argued that the protocol’s scope was too broad, potentially leading to an “explosion of litigation” and encroaching on national legislative powers. Over time, 16 additional protocols with contested provisions were added to the original ECHR Convention, along with an abuse clause.
Initially, there was no ECHR court; instead, a commission created by the Council of Europe oversaw the application of the ECHR. In 1959, the Council of Europe established the European Court of Human Rights. Initially, it had limited impact, but after 1970, the Court became increasingly interventionist. Acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction and the right to individual petition became compulsory, and countries gradually adopted the Convention’s rights into their domestic laws. From a contested beginning and sluggish acceptance, the ECHR (Convention and Court decisions) has become highly influential, not least due to an accelerating mission creep.
 
Compliance
“Where the ECtHR finds a violation of an ECHR right, the state has an obligation under the ECHR to remedy the problem(s)” (Donald and Grogan, 2025). Compliance with ECtHR judgements may not be straightforward. While states must take steps to remedy violations, this may involve measures such as compensating victims whose rights have been violated or implementing broader reforms to laws or practices that led to violations of the Convention. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers is tasked with overseeing whether states are taking the necessary actions to comply with the Court’s decisions. However, enforcement can be complicated and depends on political will and various constraints.
 
Problematic Issues in Relation to the ECHR and ECtHR
There are at least two major issues raised by the leaders behind the Meloni/Frederiksen letter and the British criticisms:
 
The ECtHR’s Mission Creep: The Court’s interpretations and decisions have extended to areas not foreseen when the ECHR was created, encroaching on nation-states’ ability to ensure safety and stability through their own democratic decision-making.
 
Human Rights Turned Against Ourselves: An instrument designed to uphold and further human rights in signatory countries now imposes interpretations and decisions that endanger the safety and stability of those same countries, particularly in relation to irregular migration and the inability to deport migrants who have committed serious crimes.
 
The ECtHR’s Mission Creep: Endangering Democracy Itself?
In a series of lectures titled “Law and the Decline of Politics,” Lord Sumption, a former senior judge on the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, addressed the question of universal rights and democratic legitimacy.
He argued that in a democracy, “differences of opinion on what rights ought to exist are resolved politically through legislation,” while human rights theory seeks to insulate certain rights from political change. Modern international law aims for “certain fundamental rights [to] have a higher status than ordinary laws so that they cannot readily be dislodged politically, even with the authority of a democratic legislature.” In principle, “democracies can enact whatever rights they like,” but human rights law ensures “they get certain rights, whether they like them or not.”
Sumption describes the ECHR as a “dynamic treaty” that not only prescribes rights but provides a mechanism for future legal development, defined as a “supranational mechanism for altering and developing in future.”
With the Human Rights Act (HRA), the UK incorporated key rights from the ECHR into UK law, allowing individuals to seek redress in UK courts for violations of these rights. The HRA “domesticates” the ECHR, making its protections directly enforceable within the UK legal system. British courts must interpret and, if necessary, strike down domestic laws to ensure compliance with the Convention. Even Acts of Parliament can be declared incompatible, prompting legislative amendments. Crucially, British judges are required to “take account of rulings of the Strasbourg Court” (The European Court of Human Rights). In practice, this means Strasbourg has the final word on Convention interpretation: defying it would breach international obligations.
This gives the Strasbourg Court extraordinary power. Sumption argues that it has “transformed [the Convention] into a dynamic treaty” by treating the text as a “living instrument.” The Court actively extrapolates new rights beyond the original text, effectively legislating new rights based on its vision of justice. Sumption acknowledges that some evolution of meaning is unavoidable (e.g., applying abstract terms to new facts), but he warns that the Court has gone far beyond this, creating rights not even hinted at in the treaty’s language.
 
Lord Sumption uses Article 8 of the Convention to demonstrate the mission creep of the European Court of Human Rights. Article 8, titled “Right to respect for private and family life,” states:
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety, or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
 
Article 8 was originally intended as a safeguard against totalitarian surveillance and arbitrary interference. However, the Strasbourg Court has developed it into a principle of personal autonomy, extending it to “potentially cover anything” that intrudes upon a person’s autonomy unless strictly justified. Virtually any law or policy touching individual behaviour has been held to relate to Article 8.
Sumption lists a vast range of issues deemed protected under Article 8, including the legal status of illegitimate children, immigration and deportation, extradition, criminal sentencing, the recording of crime, policing of public demonstrations, employment and social security rights, environmental law, planning law, noise abatement, eviction for non-payment of rent, abortion, artificial insemination, homosexuality and same-sex unions, child abduction, and more. He argues: “None of them is to be found in the language of the Convention. None of them is a natural implication from its terms. None of them has been agreed by the signatory states. They are all extensions of the text which rest on the sole authority of the Judges of the Strasbourg Court. This is, in reality, a form of non-consensual legislation.” (The Reith Lectures 2019, Law and the Decline of Politics).
 
Judicial Legislation vs. Democratic Decision-Making
Sumption warns that the modern human rights regime has drifted into judicial lawmaking. By extending rights through court decisions, the legal system usurps political choices. He states: “The main problem about human rights law is that it does this too readily. It transforms controversial political issues into questions of law for the Courts. In this way, it takes critical decision-making powers out of the political process.” When courts treat policy disputes as legal imperatives, they effectively disempower the electorate and their representatives, undermining democratic legitimacy. Sumption argues that the ECtHR’s activism has transformed the Convention “from an expression of noble values… into something meaner,” making it a “template against which to assess most aspects of the ordinary domestic legal order.” This, he warns, “devalues the whole notion of universal human rights” by associating rights with judicial controversy rather than broad consensus.
Following Sumption’s critique, it may be concluded that the interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument leads to:
 
A dangerous potential for judicial overreach, encroaching upon the essence of democracy and parliament’s legislative power.
A problematic expansion of what one might term secondary, subjective social rights, as their subjective nature makes it difficult to see them as universal rights.
An undermining of the sovereignty of nation-states, leading to a transfer of national powers to international bodies.
A risk of turning human rights against the democracies that created them, endangering their safety and foundation.
 
Turning ECHR’s Human Rights Against Ourselves
The European Convention on Human Rights, interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as a “living instrument,” has resulted in “the protection of the wrong people and imposed too many limitations on the states’ ability to decide whom to expel from their territories.” The consequences of these expanding limitations may mean that the nation-states tasked with upholding the ECHR’s living instrument interpretation are undermining the very principles they seek to uphold.
Here are some of the dangers:
 
Inability to Prevent Irregular Migration 
For example, irregular migration over the Polish border with Belarus has been instrumentalised by Belarus since 2021, pushing migrants across the border. The Polish Border Guard recorded 110,595 attempts to cross this border since 2021, highlighting the scale of the challenge facing Poland and other countries, such as Finland and Greece, dealing with unfriendly border states. In February 2025, Poland introduced a law to temporarily restrict irregular migrants’ right to apply for protection. However, these actions have raised concerns under ECHR law, particularly regarding potential pushbacks and denial of asylum procedures. The ECtHR has intervened with interim measures, indicating potential violations of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment and the principle of non-refoulement, creating exceptions to Poland’s restrictions.
 
In the UK, the former government under Prime Minister Boris Johnson sought to address irregular migration via small boats crossing the Channel from France. On 14 April 2022, Johnson announced the Rwanda solution, known as the Migration and Economic Development Partnership, stating that “anyone entering the UK illegally – as well as those who have arrived illegally since 1 January 2022 – may now be relocated to Rwanda.” The plan aimed to send irregular boat migrants to Rwanda for their asylum claims to be processed.
In June 2022, the UK was ready to send the first asylum seekers to Rwanda after the UK’s High Court and Court of Appeal refused to grant an injunction to halt the first flight. However, the ECtHR received an urgent request on behalf of an Iraqi individual facing removal and issued a Rule 39 interim measure to stop the flight until three weeks after the final domestic decision in ongoing judicial review proceedings. The flight was halted.
Later, the UK Supreme Court, referring to the Human Rights Act (HRA), which incorporates ECHR rights into UK law, deemed the Rwanda plan unlawful. Although Parliament enacted new legislation that might have allowed the plan to proceed, the new Labour Government scrapped it, adhering to ECHR limitations.
Meanwhile, boats continue to arrive, with nearly 37,000 irregular migrants crossing the Channel in 2024, and around 170,000 since the crossings began in 2018. Migrants leave France, a safe country, on unsafe boats to seek asylum in the UK, and ECtHR interpretations largely prevent the UK from stopping, turning back, or deporting these migrants to France. This has fuelled calls to leave the ECHR in the UK.
 
Demographic “Suicide” of European Nation-States 
A significant challenge is posed by the ageing and declining populations of European countries, alongside ongoing irregular migration from Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East. Europe’s ethnic composition is undergoing a significant transformation due to migration, with immigrant populations and their descendants becoming a more prominent part of many European societies, particularly in urban areas. In February 2025, The Guardian published scenarios for Europe with and without continued migration:

Tacitly, Europe seems to have chosen the “with migration” scenario, which may have serious consequences for its future. David Coleman from Oxford University’s Migration Observatory has warned: “On current trends, European populations will become more ethnically diverse, with the possibility that today’s majority ethnic groups will no longer comprise a numerical majority in some countries.” At the Budapest Demographic Summit in September 2019, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated: “If Europe is to be populated by non-Europeans, and we accept this as natural, we will effectively consent to population replacement.”
These changes may occur sooner among younger populations or in major cities. “If current trends continue, the so-called majority-ethnic group in the UK - white British - will become a minority before 2070" (Professor David Coleman from Oxford University's Migration Observatory in The Independent, May 4, 2013). Similar trends are forecast for Denmark before the next century (Politiken, June8, 2025). While The Robert Schuman Foundation has warned of “a deafening silence surrounding Europe’s demographic suicide, projected for 2050.” (Robert Schuman Foundation, February 12, 2018)
 
Cultural Relativism Undermining Social Cohesion 
In any culture, people internalise norms and values tacitly through imitating acts and rituals in families, educational institutions, workplaces, and social groups. This social transmission mechanism means each generation carries an extensive package of tacit norms and values, transmitted to the next generation and, to some extent, to people from other cultures through behaviour and rituals. This package evolves over time, adapting to changing social and environmental conditions. While these norms and values may once have been explicit, they are now embedded in the deep layers of the mind, manifested only in actions and rituals. (This process is explained in  the book “Beyond Rules in Society and Business,” Part Two: Tacit Foundations.)
With relatively rapid immigration into Europe of people from different cultures or religions, these deeply ingrained norms and values may differ significantly from those evolved in Europe, leading to serious conflicts that undermine social cohesion. Simple integration efforts, such as specifying shared rules, are insufficient to integrate cultures with vastly different tacit norms and values into existing European culture.
Europe is succumbing to kind of cultural relativism, eroding the values and norms that underpin its culture, democracy, and society. Failing to prioritise ingrained Western values over conflicting value systems or religious requirements neglects the fact that values are sustained through practice, not mere statements.
This is a growing problem in Europe, as “the dimension of common values and a civic culture is closely linked with other attitudinal aspects of social cohesion. From the common values perspective, social cohesion emerges from society members’ mutual sharing of a set of values and moral principles” (Seongha Cho, Social Cohesion, Social Capital and the Neighbourhood, 2025).
Europe is therefore experiencing an erosion of the central aim of the Council of Europe: “to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.” (Emphasis added).
Perhaps Oswald Spengler’s predictions are now being realised: “Values built up and maintained within the culture begin to fall away.”
 
Growing Social Fragmentation and Political Instability 
This demographic shift occurs amid political silence, with leaders praising diversity while ignoring its potential consequences. These tectonic population changes could challenge Western achievements such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. Rising inequality and eroding social cohesion, as seen in historical analyses of civilisational collapse, weaken Europe’s social fabric. Growing political division, with protest parties rising and traditional parties declining, signals potential intercultural conflicts or even civil wars within Western civilisation.
 
Sweden, which historically enjoyed high levels of social cohesion due to a strong welfare state and a relatively homogeneous population, now faces new complexities from increased immigration and ethnic diversity. Challenges include social and spatial segregation, perceptions of inequality, and the potential for increased social divisions, marked by the rise of the Sverigedemokraterna (SD) party, which secured 20.5% of the votes in the last election to the Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen).
 
Germany is also experiencing social fragmentation and political instability, manifested by the rapid rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party, which seeks to “regulate migration, close the ‘asylum paradise’ down, operate a tougher returns policy, push for integration, and attract skilled migrant labour.” In the latest Bundestag election, AfD secured 20.8% of the votes, coming second after the CDU. These are just two examples of a rising wave of right-wing parties in Europe, with curbing irregular migration, particularly from Muslim-majority countries, as a key political goal.
 
Recognising the Problem – The Zugspitze Declaration 
On 18 July 2025, ministers responsible for migration from six countries, plus the EU, met at Germany’s Zugspitze and reiterated their commitment to reducing illegal migration. In the Declaration, they wrote:
 
Recognising that the European Union serves as an area of freedom, justice, and security not only for Union citizens but also for third-country nationals in need of protection;
- Underlining that irregular migration in the European Union remains a complex phenomenon that does not follow a standard pattern and involves routes and methods that frequently change;
Reaffirming that effective migration management is a constant challenge, particularly as irregular migration often involves people who are not in need of protection and is driven by organised crime networks of migrant smugglers;
Recalling the recent European Council conclusions, which invite Member States to intensify work on all strands and build upon the Commission’s proposals on returns, the safe third country concept, and safe countries of origin;
Aware of the large number of migrants who have entered Europe illegally in the past ten years, creating considerable pressure on national systems of asylum, reception, and integration, including challenges to internal security and contributing to growing polarisation in our societies;
Determined to counter this trend reliably and sustainably. (Zugspitze Declaration).
 
This represents a limited and fragile attempt by some European countries to recognise the dangers of undermining democratic decision-making through the judicial fiats of the ECtHR’s “living instrument” approach, which has long limited their ability to address an irregular migration that creates instability, endangers social cohesion, and contributes to the decline of Europe.