Trump causing startled cackling in the European political henhouse A collective gasp followed by upset cackling of European political leaders was heard, when President Trump suddenly made ready to wield his newfound power to slice through the tangled knot of promises made to Ukraine, the continued cries of the allies to stand fast behind Ukraine “for as long as it takes, and the solemn promises of no negotiations with Russia without involving Ukraine. The first visible attempt of cutting the knot was made by President Trump’s rather embarrassing henchman, the new Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth, with his opening remarks at the meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contract Group: President Trump has been clear with the American people – and with many of your leaders – that stopping the fighting and reaching an enduring peace is a top priority. We want, like you, a sovereign and prosperous Ukraine. But we must start by recognizing that returning to Ukraine's pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective. Chasing this illusionary goal will only prolong the war and cause more suffering. [T]he United States does not believe that NATO membership for Ukraine is a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement. Instead any security guarantee must be backed by capable European and non-European troops. If these troops are deployed as peacekeepers to Ukraine at any point, they should be deployed as part of a non-NATO mission. And they should not covered under Article 5. To be clear, as part of any security guarantee, there will not be U.S. troops deployed to Ukraine. Safeguarding European security must be an imperative for European members of NATO. As part of this Europe must provide the overwhelming share of future lethal and nonlethal aid to Ukraine. Loud and clear and destroying any European pretense of standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes. Not all got the message. After the meeting, the Danish Minister of Defense, Troels Lund Poulsen, was still repeating the empty mantra, “We have decided to offer Ukraine NATO membership. But it is also clear that we must all agree on it if it is to happen.” Empty and nonsensical words, meaning of cause that it is not going to happen in a foreseeable future. So much for the pretense. Trumps wielding the sword himself Later in the day it was announced that the first attempt to cut the Gordian knot had been made by President Trump himself. He had held a 90-minutes long phone call with President Putin. As for the content we have but a short read out on Truth Social, but it reveals Trump’s attempt to slice through the Gordian knot: We both reflected on the Great History of our Nations, and the fact that we fought so successfully together in World War II, remembering, that Russia lost tens of millions of people, and we, likewise, lost so many! We each talked about the strengths of our respective Nations, and the great benefit that we will someday have in working together. But first, as we both agreed, we want to stop the millions of deaths taking place in the War with Russia/Ukraine. President Putin even used my very strong Campaign motto of, “COMMON SENSE.” We both believe very strongly in it. We agreed to work together, very closely, including visiting each other’s Nations. We have also agreed to have our respective teams start negotiations immediately, and we will begin by calling President Zelenskyy, of Ukraine, to inform him of the conversation, something which I will be doing right now. Trump also revealed that he would ask Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Director of the CIA John Ratcliffe, National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, and Ambassador and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff to lead negotiations with Russia – and one would expect with Ukraine also. Witkoff had already been in Moscow in connection with the release of the detained American Marc Fogel. Note though that this negotiating team does not include Trump’s Ukraine envoy, retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg. One wonders if he perhaps has talked too much about escalating the pressure on Russia, an idea that may no longer fit Trump’s agenda. Later in the day Trump announced that he would be meeting with President Putin in a “not too distant future,” although no date was given. He also said: “We think we’re going to probably meet in Saudi Arabia, the first meeting, … We know the crown prince, and I think it’d be a very good place to be.” As for inviting President Zelensky of Ukraine, President Trump again made clear who was going to decide fate of Ukraine, as he evidently did not expect Zelensky to partake in the first meeting with Putin: “Probably we’ll have a first meeting and then we’ll see what we can do about the second meeting.” Trump apparently does not think that Zelensky is all that popular in the Ukraine: “you know, his poll numbers aren't particularly great.” Reading between the lines one gets the idea that Zelensky might not be the right person to take part in the final negotiations. Perhaps this means that Trump finds that it will be necessary to hold elections in the non-occupied part of Ukraine in order to see who will emerge as the partner that will contribute to, or at least accept the U.S. led solution to the Gordian knot problem. Trump leaving indecisive European leaders no alternative It remains to be seen what will come of Trumps knot cutting attempts, but for the moment at least it leaves European political leaders confused and cackling in the unruly European hen house. Being more or less forced to follow the openings by Trump. On their own they would not be able to do much else. They simply cannot uphold Ukrainian pressure on Russia with military assistance, if U.S. decides to withdraw their support. Ah well, Trump would surely still want them to continue to buy U.S. weapons, just so that they can make sure of their own security. In the longer run we might see the Europeans realize that they will be solely responsible for their own security. While the U.S. turn their attention towards the East (or West as it would be when looking from the U.S.). Cutting the knot of the Ukrainian proxy war means stopping the war. For the time being in the shape of an armistice, with the hope of later having a negotiated peace. A peace that would probably solve Russia’s problem with Ukraine and the West: Leaving them with parts of Ukraine, and the assurance that the rest of Ukraine would not be able to join NATO. Ukraine meanwhile would get the necessary peace to be able to concentrate on reconstruction with the help from EU, and it might even be able to strive for membership of the EU. The necessary security guarantees might involve only Europe, while the U.S. would strive stay out of any future fray. Trump may have much bigger ideas with his sudden thrust Now what may lie behind President Trump’s attempt to cut the Gordian knot on his own, apart from trying to stop the proxy war in Ukraine? May he not in fact have much grander ideas, perhaps not in the shape of plans, but seeing much larger possibilities, bigger than European politicians would dare to entertain, even if they had thought about them? Some of the much larger ideas Trumps may entertain: Befriending Russia would enable the U.S. to cut back military obligations in Europe, withdrawing U.S. troops. Making U.S. forces able to concentrate on the Pacific or at the very least save resources. In fact, later in the day Trump talked about bringing Russia back into G7 and reducing military spending in Russia, China and thus also in the U.S. Trump also mentioned the idea of a summit with Putin and China's Xi Jinping. “When we straighten it all out, then I want one of the first meetings I have is with President Xi of China, President Putin of Russia. And I want to say, let's cut our military budget in half.” Friendship with Russia would mean lowering or abolishing sanctions, which would be a boon to U.S. investments and make certain Russian resources available to the U.S. Peace would certainly also be advantageous for Europe as they could forget the scary ideas of war with Russia, and like the U.S. invest in Russia, have access again to cheap raw resources and find a fairly large market for their goods. Reviving the idea of “Wandel durch Handel.” On Trump’s mind might something more pressing. Perhaps it is no accident that he talked about meeting Putin in Saudi Arabia, as Putin and Russia might make it possible to for Trump to checkmate adversaries in the Near and Middle East, and cut the knot there too. With Russia’s help Trump would perhaps be able to make something out of his lofty but cloudy ideas of rearranging things in the Near and Middle East. Keeping Iran in place, balancing Turkey’s influence in Syria, solving the Palestinian problem, and enlarging upon the previous genial Abraham accords. On Trumps mind something else might also come to fruition. Friendship with Russia might mean that Russia would be less inclined to become dependent on China, again opening possibilities for both Europe and the U.S. to counterbalance China’s growing hegemonic striving. Less important to the U.S but really important to Europe, we might see a less belligerent Russia in Africa, perhaps even getting indirect help from Russia in stemming a future wave of migration from Africa. Open your eyes Europe! You had put a lot of false and ultimately disappointed hopes in a vengeful, but frail and aging President Biden, that ended you in a conflict with a close but mighty neighbour. Now you have a chance to turn around the whole scary perspective of being left alone with an angry and dangerous enemy in the shape of Putin, because of the U.S. initiated proxy war. With President Trump’s brash attempt to cut through the dangerous knot European politicians found impossible to untangle, Europe has a chance to achieve some of the same lofty goals that President Trumps may be striving for with his daring attempt to cut the knot with a proverbial sword thrust Just added: No wonder Zelensky must have felt left out, leading him to seek to talk to European political leaders before the Munich Security Conference taking place on February 14-16. Here his comment on X after talking to Poland’s Donald Tusk: Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський I spoke with Polish Prime Minister @donaldtusk. We discussed the conditions needed for a lasting and real peace in Ukraine and agreed that no negotiations with Putin can begin without a united position from Ukraine, Europe, and the U.S. I informed the Prime Minister about my conversation with President Trump, and we discussed key messages and the need to coordinate the positions of all Europeans to achieve successful outcomes for the whole of Europe. I emphasized that Ukraine must negotiate from a position of strength, with strong and reliable security guarantees, and that NATO membership would be the most cost-effective for partners. Another key guarantee is serious investment in Ukraine’s defense industry. I also warned world leaders against trusting Putin’s claims of readiness to end the war. 5:57 PM · Feb 13, 2025 on X In his inaugural speech President Trump declared that “from this day it will henceforth be the official policy of the United States government that there are only two genders: male and female.” (Emphasis added). Day one executive order defending women from gender ideology extremism and restoring biological truth to the Federal government Excerpts from President Trump’s executive order: “Across the country, ideologues who deny the biological reality of sex have increasingly used legal and other socially coercive means to permit men to self-identify as women and gain access to intimate single-sex spaces and activities designed for women, from women’s domestic abuse shelters to women’s workplace showers. This is wrong. Efforts to eradicate the biological reality of sex fundamentally attack women by depriving them of their dignity, safety, and well-being. The erasure of sex in language and policy has a corrosive impact not just on women but on the validity of the entire American system. Basing Federal policy on truth is critical to scientific inquiry, public safety, morale, and trust in government itself. … This unhealthy road is paved by an ongoing and purposeful attack against the ordinary and longstanding use and understanding of biological and scientific terms, replacing the immutable biological reality of sex with an internal, fluid, and subjective sense of self unmoored from biological facts.” Actions: “Under my direction, the Executive Branch will enforce all sex-protective laws to promote this reality, and the following definitions shall govern all Executive interpretation of and application of Federal law and administration policy:" (a) “Sex” shall refer to an individual’s immutable biological classification as either male or female. “Sex” is not a synonym for and does not include the concept of “gender identity.” (b) “Women” or “woman” and “girls” or “girl” shall mean adult and juvenile human females, respectively. (c) “Men” or “man” and “boys” or “boy” shall mean adult and juvenile human males, respectively. (d) “Female” means a person belonging, at conception, to the sex that produces the large reproductive cell. (e) “Male” means a person belonging, at conception, to the sex that produces the small reproductive cell.” “Each agency and all Federal employees shall enforce laws governing sex-based rights, protections, opportunities, and accommodations to protect men and women as biologically distinct sexes. Each agency should therefore give the terms “sex”, “male”, “female”, “men”, “women”, “boys” and “girls” the meanings set forth in … this order when interpreting or applying statutes, regulations, or guidance and in all other official agency business, documents, and communications.” “Agencies shall remove all statements, policies, regulations, forms, communications, or other internal and external messages that promote or otherwise inculcate gender ideology, and shall cease issuing such statements, policies, regulations, forms, communications or other messages. Agency forms that require an individual’s sex shall list male or female, and shall not request gender identity. Agencies shall take all necessary steps, as permitted by law, to end the Federal funding of gender ideology.” “The Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that males are not detained in women’s prisons or housed in women’s detention center. The Attorney General shall ensure that the Bureau of Prisons revises its policies concerning medical care to be consistent with this order, and shall ensure that no Federal funds are expended for any medical procedure, treatment, or drug for the purpose of conforming an inmate’s appearance to that of the opposite sex. Agencies shall effectuate this policy by taking appropriate action to ensure that intimate spaces designated for women, girls, or females (or for men, boys, or males) are designated by sex and not identity.” See also this essay: The confusing entanglement of sex and gender https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/confusing-entanglement-sex-gender-verner-c-petersen In his inaugural speech President Trump promised to “end the government policy of trying to socially engineer race and gender into every aspect of public and private life… We will forge a society that is colorblind and merit-based.” He also declared that “from this day it will henceforth be the official policy of the United States government that there are only two genders: male and female.” (Emphasis added). “And I will sign an order to stop our warriors from being subjected to radical political theories and social experiments while on duty. It’s going to end immediately…. Our armed forces will be freed to focus on their sole mission: defeating America’s enemies.” Later in the day he signed two executive actions, one rescinding DEI programs in the federal sector and one with the object defending women from “gender ideology.” Presidents Trump’s executive action on ending radical and wasteful government DEI programs and preferencing Excerpts from President Trump’s executive order: “The Biden Administration forced illegal and immoral discrimination programs, going by the name “diversity, equity, and inclusion” (DEI), into virtually all aspects of the Federal Government, in areas ranging from airline safety to the military. This was a concerted effort stemming from President Biden’s first day in office, when he issued Executive Order 13985, “Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government.” This ordered every federal agency and entity to submit ““Equity Action Plans” to detail the ways that they have furthered DEIs infiltration of the Federal Government. The public release of these plans demonstrated immense public waste and shameful discrimination. That ends today.” Actions: President Trump ordered “the termination of all discriminatory programs, including illegal DEI and “diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility” (DEIA) mandates, policies, programs, preferences, and activities in the Federal Government, under whatever name they appear. To carry out this directive, the Director of OPM, with the assistance of the Attorney General as requested, shall review and revise, as appropriate, all existing Federal employment practices, union contracts, and training policies or programs to comply with this order. Federal employment practices, including Federal employee performance reviews, shall reward individual initiative, skills, performance, and hard work and shall not under any circumstances consider DEI or DEIA factors, goals, policies, mandates, or requirements.” Furthermore he ordered termination within 60 days “to the maximum extent allowed by law, all DEI, DEIA, and “environmental justice” offices and positions (including but not limited to “Chief Diversity Officer” positions); all “equity action plans,” “equity” actions, initiatives, or programs, “equity-related” grants or contracts; and all DEI or DEIA performance requirements for employees, contractors, or grantees.” This was followed a set of instructions: To asses “whether these positions, committees, programs, services, activities, budgets, and expenditures have been misleadingly relabeled in an attempt to preserve their pre-November 4, 2024 function.” Presumably in order to help guarantee that each and every variant of programs would be terminated. Friedrich Merz, who reckons that he will soon become Bundeskanzler, now wants to bring up his drastic Trump like 5 points plan on illegal migration in an expanded petition (Antrag) on Wednesday in the present Bundestag (See petition below).
Though important parts of his petition look suspiciously similar to some AfD proposals, Merz still rejects any cooperation with the AfD. Surprisingly therefore that he wants to bring forward the petition on Wednesday, as he must assume that it may only be passed with the votes from AfD. One would expect that most of members the Social Democrats (SPD) , the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and the small remnants of the left (Die Linke) would vote against his petition. Meaning it may only be passed with the votes from FDP, BSW and surprise, the AfD. Just take a look at the distribution of the present 733 seats in the Bundestag SPD 207 CDU/CSU 196 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 117 FDP 90 AfD 76 Gruppe Die Linke 28 Gruppe BSW 10 Fraktionslos 9 CDU/CSU, FDP, BSW and AfD would potentially represent 372 votes in favour of Friedrich Merz’s petition. Which would allow the petition to pass. Merz own comment: “Mir ist völlig gleichgültig, wer diesen Weg politisch mitgeht. Ich sage nur: Ich gehe keinen anderen” One wonders what might happen after the election in February. How would a victorious CDU/CSU, with Merz, be able to form majority coalition that would include SPD or Greens, or a combination. Does he really expect to be able get them to accept a drastic execution of his 5 points plan? Or would he continue to rely on the votes of AfD, BSW and FPD (if they get in). In other words, is the “Brandmauer “getting holes? Yesterday (January 29, 2025) the petition was passed in the Bundestag. Of the 903 members present 348 voted in favour and 344 against. (In favour: 187 CDU/CSU, 80 FDP, 75 AfD, and 6 not members of a party). The result is not binding for the present govern ment, but was met with anger from the still governing parties SPD and the Greens. The petition The newspaper “Bild” on January 26, 2025, published a copy of what might be the full text of the petition Merz aims to bring up in the Bundestag on Wednesday: Antrag (petition) der Fraktion der CDU/CSU Fünf Punkte für sichere Grenzen und das Ende der illegalen Migration Der Bundestag wolle beschließen I Der Bundestag stellt fest: Die abscheuliche Mordtat von Aschaffenburg, bei der zwei kleine Kinder Opfer eines brutalen Messerangriffs wurden, hat Trauer und Bestürzung in ganz Deutschland ausgelöst. Der Mord an einem der Kinder sowie an einem erwachsenen Mann, der helfen wollte, verdeutlicht eine neue Dimension der Gewalt, die Deutschland zunehmend erschüttert. Sie reiht sich ein in die Terroranschläge von Mannheim und Solingen und den Angriff auf den Weihnachtsmarkt von Magdeburg. Der Deutsche Bundestag weigert sich anzuerkennen, dass dies die neue Normalität in Deutschland ist. Bei dem Täter handelt es sich um einen 28-jährigen afghanischen Asylsuchenden ohne Schutzanspruch, der ausreisepflichtig war. Er war zuvor bereits mehrfach durch Gewaltakte auffällig geworden; trotz vorübergehender Einweisung in psychiatrische Einrichtungen und bestehender Ausreisepflicht lief er frei herum. Die aktuelle Asyl- und Einwanderungspolitik gefährdet die Sicherheit der Bürgerinnen und Bürger und das Vertrauen der gesamten Gesellschaft in den Staat. Sie wird von ganz überwiegenden Anteilen der Menschen in Deutschland abgelehnt. Die Politik der letzten Jahre hat es versäumt, Kontrolle über die Migration zurückzugewinnen und zu erhalten. Sie hat es versäumt, das geltende nationale Recht durchzusetzen, klare Regeln zu setzen und Fehlanreize für illegale Migration – wie etwa überhöhte Sozialleistungen – zu beseitigen. Sie hat es auch versäumt, innerhalb der Europäischen Union den verbreiteten Bruch des gemeinsamen Rechts durch andere Mitgliedstaaten deutlich zu verurteilen. Die bestehenden europäischen Regelungen – die Dublin-III-Verordnung zur grundsätzlichen Zuständigkeit des Ersteinreisestaates, das Schengen-Abkommen zu den offenen Binnengrenzen, und die Eurodac-Verordnung zur Registrierung von Asylsuchenden – sind erkennbar dysfunktional. Die Migrationskrise geht maßgeblich aus vom syrischen Bürgerkrieg, den der russische Diktator Wladimir Putin über Jahre angefacht und verlängert hat. Bis heute instrumentalisiert der russische Diktator Wladimir Putin Migration als hybride Waffe, indem er jeden Monat hunderte Menschen über die belarussische Grenze nach Europa sendet. Aufgrund des völkerrechtswidrigen russischen Angriffskrieges sind mehr als eine Million Ukrainer nach Deutschland geflohen. In dieser Gesamtsituation ist es die Pflicht Deutschlands und damit der Bundesregierung, nationales Recht vorrangig anzuwenden, wenn europäische Regelungen nicht funktionieren – so wie es in den Europäischen Verträgen für außergewöhnliche Notlagen vorgesehen ist. Deutschland muss die Abwehr von Gefahren und die Sicherheit der Bürgerinnen und Bürger an erste Stelle setzen und entschlossen handeln. Es sind sofortige, umfassende Maßnahmen zur Beendigung der illegalen Migration, zur Sicherung der deutschen Grenzen und zur konsequenten Abschiebung vollziehbar ausreisepflichtiger Personen, insbesondere von Straftätern und Gefährdern, erforderlich. Wer die illegale Migration bekämpft, entzieht auch Populisten ihre politische Arbeitsgrundlage. Die AfD nutzt Probleme, Sorgen und Ängste, die durch die massenhafte illegale Migration entstanden sind, um Fremdenfeindlichkeit zu schüren und Verschwörungstheorien in Umlauf zu bringen. Sie will, dass Deutschland aus EU und Euro austritt und sich stattdessen Putins Eurasischer Wirtschaftsunion zuwendet. All das gefährdet Deutschlands Stabilität, Sicherheit und Wohlstand. Deshalb ist diese Partei kein Partner, sondern unser politischer Gegner. II. Der Deutsche Bundestag fordert die Bundesregierung auf, unverzüglich folgende Maßnahmen umzusetzen: 1. Dauerhafte Grenzkontrollen: Die deutschen Staatsgrenzen zu allen Nachbarstaaten müssen dauerhaft kontrolliert werden. 2. Zurückweisung ausnahmslos aller Versuche illegaler Einreise: Es gilt ein faktisches Einreiseverbot für Personen, die keine gültigen Einreisedokumente besitzen und die nicht unter die europäische Freizügigkeit fallen. Diese werden konsequent an der Grenze zurückgewiesen. Dies gilt unabhängig davon, ob sie einen Schutzgesuch äußern oder nicht, sofern europäischen Nachbarstaaten sie bereits sicher aufgenommen haben. 3. Personen, die vollziehbar ausreisepflichtig sind, dürfen nicht mehr auf freiem Fuß sein: Sie müssen unmittelbar in Haft genommen werden. Die Anzahl an entsprechenden Haftplätzen in den Ländern muss dafür signifikant erhöht werden. Der Bund wird die Länder dabei unterstützen und schnellstmöglich alle verfügbaren Liegenschaften, darunter leerstehende Kasernen und Containerbauten, zur Verfügung stellen. Die Zahl der Abschiebungen muss deutlich erhöht werden. Abschiebungen müssen täglich stattfinden. Abschiebungen auch nach Afghanistan und Syrien werden regelmäßig durchgeführt. 4. Mehr Unterstützung für die Länder beim Vollzug der Ausreisepflicht: Der Bund soll die Länder auch weiterhin beim Vollzug der Ausreisepflicht – etwa durch Beschaffung von Reisepapieren und der Umsetzung von Rückführungen – unterstützen. Diese Unterstützung muss weiter ausgebaut werden. Überdies werden Bundesausschreibungen geschaffen, um Rückführungen zu erleichtern. Die Bundespolizei muss die Befugnis erhalten, bei im eigenen Zuständigkeitsbereich aufgegriffenen, ausreisepflichtigen Personen auch selbst und unmittelbar Haftbefehle für Abschiebehaft oder Ausreisegewahrsam beantragen zu können. 5. Verschärfung des Aufenthaltsrechts für Straftäter und Gefährder: Ausreisepflichtige Straftäter und Gefährder sollen in einem zeitlich unbefristeten Ausreisearest bleiben, bis sie freiwillig in ihr Heimatland zurückkehren oder die Abschiebung vollzogen werden kann. Aus diesem Arrest ist die freiwillige Ausreise ins Herkunftsland jederzeit möglich. Nicht mehr möglich darf hingegen eine Rückkehr nach Deutschland sein. A few days ago, Friedrich Merz, who seems destined to become the next German chancellor, presented five concrete points for a turnaround in German migration policy. "The measure is finally full," he argued after the recent knife attack in Aschaffenburg. "We are facing the shambles of an asylum and immigration policy that has been misguided in Germany for ten years."
Merz promises to implement these five points:
German politics in a serious predicament due to AfD A comparison of an INSA opinion poll for the upcoming Bundestag election with the latest Bundestag election result indicate serious upheavals in the “Parteienlandschaft” for Germany as a whole. Neueste Wahlumfrage von INSA Sonntagsfrage #btwahl 2025-01-06 Suddenly the AfD with 21.5% is in second place after the CDU with 31,0%, and lo and behold in front of the social democratic SDP party, which only got 15.5%, and far above the Green party with 13,5%. BSW (Bündniss Sahra Wagenknecht) seems to have lost the sudden attraction it got, when it was formed by Sahra Wagenknecht, former leading figure in the Linke, in January 2024. Given that Bundestag elections have a 5% election threshold, the polling results may indicate that FDP and die Linke might not make it. How could a majority government then be created? Well, there might be these coalition possibilities according to dawum.de (Numbers represent the probable share of a new Bundestag, limited now to a total of 630 seats): Neueste Wahlumfrage von INSA Sonntagsfrage #btwahl 2025-01-06 Here is the problem created not the least by possible AfD and BSW results. The established parties have promised that they will uphold a “Brandmauer” or fire-proof wall against any AfD participation in government. The former dominating parties, CDU/CSU and SPD have all attempted to demonstrate that the “Brandmauer” is intact and will stay intact after the coming Bundestag election on February 23. A recent study by Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin seem to confirm that “Brandmauer” is intact and stable: “Insgesamt ist die Brandmauer weitaus stabiler, als vielfach vermutet wird” (Zeit Online). This means that all coalitions with AfD is out of the question. Before the February election at least. The problem is that the remaining coalition possibilities do not look especially attractive, meaning that the “Brandmauer” against AfD has given German politics a serious problem. It would in this case only leave coalitions with CDU/CSU and SPD, or CDU/CSU and the Greens. Now the first coalition would represent a kind of forced return to the GROKO, the great coalition of the blacks, CDU/CSU, and the reds, SPD, apparently not something that the two parties are wishing for, and not something that the voters would like. It might lead to a kind lethargic political staleness. Being mostly a soft mid-position leaning a little more to the right than the present government. Probably not strong enough to solve Germany’s present, economic, structural, migration, and security problems. And how would such a coalition be able to agree on how to tackle the Ukraine proxy war or expected Trumpian policies? A coalition of CDU/CSU with the Green party, has been categorically rejected by CSU’s Markus Söder, and now apparently also by CDU’s Friedrich Merz, although he seems some-what less categorical, eyeing as he must the limited possibilities for a coalition government. Here similar problems would manifest themselves, as the Greens have their share of responsibility for the present German misery, and they certainly don’t seem to see eye to eye with CDU/CSU on the immigration issue. The means that German politics has landed itself in serious quandary, that may make it impossible to find the necessary drastic solutions to the serious problems manifesting themselves in Germany now. Problems that lead to the demise of the traffic light coalition (the Red, Yellow and Green parties). The serious problem of finding governing coalitions is already seen in a lesser format in the recent local state elections. AfD’s and BSW’s hard impact in recent local state elections The latest local state elections in Germany taking place in the eastern part of the country show that AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) is making major inroads in the traditional party landscape in Germany, together with new formed BSW (Bündniss Sahra Wagenknecht). Here the recent results of Landtag elections in Thyringia, Saxony and Brandenburg in 2024 (in percentages). Thyringia (selected results): The AfD trumped all other parties with 32.8 %. Social democrats (SPD) only got 6.1%, while the CDU (Christian Democratic Union achieved a respectable 23.6%. The new BSW party trumped die Linke, the left party they broke out from. It may seem strange that there has been no attempt to create a local government with participation from the AfD, when almost a third of population who voted chose AfD. But all the other parties have erected what they call a “Brandmauer” or fireproof-wall against the AfD, doing everything they can to make it impossible for the AfD to gain influence. With the other parties ganging up against the AfD, difficult negotiations resulted in a so-called Brombeer (Blackberry) coalition government consisting of CDU, BSW and SPD. Saxony (selected results): In Saxony the AfD with 30.6 % of the votes is getting very close to the established CDU with 31.8% of the votes, while BSW made its entry with 11.8%. This resulted difficult negotiations before a minority government consisting of CDU and SPD came about. Everything was also done here to keep the AfD from gaining influence. Brandenburg (selected results): The AfD with 29.23 % is suddenly almost equal to the social democrats’ (SPD) 32.8%, while the BSW has overtaken the CDU (Christian Democratic Union). A red-black-green coalition consisting of SPD, CDU and Die Grünen/B90 make up the new government. Again, a coalition with express purpose at keeping out the AfD. While AfD and BSW is capturing large shares of the votes in these three local states in eastern Germany, they have had far less attraction in western parts of Germany. Still, on the national level they may really be causing trouble for the old established parties as indicated by the national opinion polls before the upcoming elections to the Bundestag on February 23, 2025. What, a “Brandmauer” against a large part of the population? After the local state elections in Thyringia and Saxonia Chancellor, Scholz was depressed: “The AfD's performance in the state elections in Thuringia and Saxony with more than 30 percent "depresses me greatly," … "The fact that populism is now receiving so much support is not good. And now we all have to see what we are doing … " (Zeit Online). Friedrich Merz from the CDU agrees with the chancellor. After the local state elections, he again rejected any coalition with the AfD. “The AfD is so clearly and unambiguously against everything the CDU stands for that cooperation in any form is unthinkable.” (swr.de). Merz even appeals to the SPD, Greens and FDP to help "bring people back to the political center and to get them more enthusiastic about our democracy again." (swr.de). Before Chancellor Scholz’s government coalition, consisting of SPD, the Greens and FDP, broke up in the fall, there was even a serious attempt to ban the AfD. Representatives from SPD, the Greens, Linke, CDU and SSW (Südschleswigscher Wählerverband, representing a Danish minority in northern Germany) got together to file a petition in the German Bundestag, with object of proving the possibility of simply banning the AfD. In the petition they wanted the Bundestag to decide that the party “Alternative für Deutschland” is unconstitutional, and to confiscate the assets of the “Alternative for Germany” for the benefit of the Federal Republic of Germany for charitable purposes. They would in fact ban the influence of voters electing the AfD. Expressly wanting to preserve and guard a special German idea of democracy, by eliminating or ostracizing what might after all represent up to one fifth of the German population. Among CDU initiators of the petition in the Bundestag, is Marco Wanderwitz, who might argue that the Bundessamt für Verfasssungsschutz (The German domestic intelligence services) have classified AfD as a suspected right-wing extremist case (Rechtsextremistischen Verdachtsfall), in a local state case even as “Gesichert Rechtsextrem.” Now the word “Wanderwitz” in German would be “running gag” in English, and though the attempt to ban the AfD might not be a gag, others have warned against the initiative to ban the AfD. Both Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) and CDU leader Friedrich Merz have warned of the risks that a rejection of a ban by the Federal Constitutional Court would entail. Similar objections have been raised by the Greens. The attempt to ban the AfD may of cause have more do with a troubled part of German history, than with the idea of democracy. But it seems funny that a German attempt to have an election system designed to make sure that Germany would have a kind of model democracy, is precisely what allows the AfD to gain influence. Apart from the rule that parties must obtain a minimum of five percent of the vote to be represented in the Bundestag, albeit with certain exceptions, there is the special one ballot two votes system (“Erst und Zweitstimme”). With the first vote (Erststimme) a voter may choose a favourite candidate, with the second vote on the ballot (Zweitstimme) the voter chooses a favourite party. The second vote determines the percentage of seats for each party. Perhaps seen as a fair system compared with the UK’s first-past-the-post voting, it allows AFD and BSW to gain seats in Bundestag, whereas a UK system might have left the parties in the cold. Elon Musk prodding and stirring up German politics “Only the AfD can save Germany,” Elon Musk asserted on X in December. This was his first jab at the prodding opinion in Germany. Next followed the op-ed in Die Welt, a major German newspaper belonging to the Axel Springer group. That really stirred up the beehive of German politics, and no wonder. Musk started out by arguing: “The Alternative for Germany (AfD) is the last spark of hope for this country. Here some of his arguments. In relation to Germany’s economic woes. To Musk AfD is a party that understands the importance of economic freedoms, the necessity to reduce bureaucracy, lower taxes and deregulate markets. Principles that had make Tesla successful. In relation to migration. “Germany has opened its borders to mass migration, which, while humanitarian in intent, has led to significant cultural and social tensions. The AfD advocates for a controlled immigration policy that prioritizes integration and the preservation of German culture and security. This is not about xenophobia but about ensuring that Germany does not lose its identity in the quest for globalism” (Elon Musk, translation by Martin Varsavsky). On energy and energy independence. In Musk’s view Germany’s present energy policies are seen as economically costly and politically naïve. In contrast the AfD is seen as pragmatic, and apparently Musk hopes that this means that the AfD will advocate nuclear power, together with battery energy, that would act as storage able to act as buffer for large swings in electricity usage. Now Musk is actually in the business of proving such storage solutions, as he has done for instance in Australia. On political realism. Musk believes that traditional parties have failed Germany, leading to economic stagnation, social unrest, and dilution of national identity. Whereas AfD would offer a political realism resonating with many Germans, that have been constrained by political correctness. The labelling of the AfD as far-right, Musk dismisses in a curious way, by noting that that Alice Weidel, one of the leaders of the party, is living with a same sex partner from Sri Lanka! On innovation and future. Innovation requires freedom from constraints. The AfD visions is aligned with this ethos. “They push for educational reforms that encourage critical thinking over indoctrination and support tech industries which are the future of global economic leadership.” To Musk the AFD is thus the only party can save Germany from becoming a shadow of its former self. By the way Musk is not the only American to see AfD as the only party that can save Germany. David P. Goldman, U.S. strategist and editor of “Asia Times” wrote an article arguing that AfD is the key to European defence. That may come as surprise to many. But in Goldman’s view AfD is right when it argues against supporting Ukraine with weapons and advocates for a negotiated peace solution, wanting instead to concentrate on Germany’s and Europe’s own defence. Goldman here also refers to a survey showing that AfD members would actually be willing to fight for their country in contrast to members of the Green party. Musk as well as Goldman have touched upon a series of problems that ruling Germans parties have proven unable to solve, and rightly raised the question of why the established parties have been so eager to silence the views and positions found in AfD, and keep them out of public discourse. Although the AfD may actually have at least part of the answer for solving the present German misery. Angry reactions to Musk article One might actually argue that Musk’s criticism and his defence of AfD viewpoints, is confirmed by the angry reactions to his views. Friedrich Merz, the CDU’s candidate for the next chancellor uttered harsh critique of Musk’s interference in German politics. He criticized Musk’s "Welt am Sonntag" op-ed article in favour of the AfD as "intrusive and presumptuous." He could not remember “a comparable case of interference in the election campaign of a friendly country in the history of Western democracies, the CDU's candidate for chancellor told the newspapers of the Funke Media Group.” (deutschlandfunk.de). To Merz it was evident that Musk must have overlooked that with AfD in power he would never have been able to build a Tesla Plant in Brandenburg, and also that AfD ïs in favour of leaving the EU, which would hurt German Economy massively. Chancellor Scholz also argued against interference by tech billionaires “One had to stay cool … I find it much more worrying than such insults that Musk is supporting a party like the AfD, which is in parts right-wing extremist, preaches rapprochement with Putin's Russia and wants to weaken transatlantic relations," (spiegel.de). The strange censoring role of German media In the paper “Die Welt,” the accept to publish Musk’s article created furore among the journalists, and one of lesser editors announced that she would leave in protest. The furore and the editor protest show that the Musk article really represented a breach in German mainstream medias own “Brandmauer” against the AfD. Public broadcasting channels and printed media have long assisted in the attempt to uphold the “Brandmauer” and has attempted to warn and scare their viewers and readers against the AfD and its views, always remembering to mention AfD as rechtsextrem or rechtsradikal. In an interview with the well-known German magazine “Der Spiegel,” one of moderators of the news program in ARD, Caren Miosga, explained why she did not invite main political actors from the AFD, but only less important members. Her strange argument: "We are facing elections in Saxony, Thuringia and Brandenburg. The AfD is ahead in all three federal states, so we have to invite them. However, that does not apply to everyone from this party. Quite a few of them are masters at building a web of lies. As a moderator, you cannot keep up with checking the statements live. It would be a stupid game: no, yes, not true, it is true. And there are those in this party who are so blatantly right-wing extremist that they will not get an invitation either. … I don't think they need ARD and ZDF. They find their voters without us, via social media." (medium.de) No wonder that AfD has been very critical of German mainstream media, and the cry “Lügenpresse” has often been heard in social media. The deplatforming of AfD by public broadcasting stations like ARD and ZDF is borne out by Statista in a “Comparison of the party affiliation of politicians in the political talk shows of ARD and ZDF and the share of seats in the German Bundestag in the year 2024.” In the diagram blue columns represent participation in political talk shows, and black column share of seats in the Bundestag. https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/954672/umfrage/parteizugehoerigkeit-der-politiker-in-talkshows-vs-sitzanteil-im-bundestag/ The fact that the main public broadcasting channels of ARD and ZDF have been deplatforming the AfD is not exactly a sign of a democratic and political neutral attitude in the media.
Essentially mainstream media in Germany has been keeping their viewers and readers in the dark with regard to AfD views, focusing instead on painting a clearly negative picture of the AfD. Trying to “Entzauber,” or break the spell of AfD and re-educate people that may have got more positive views of the AfD from social media. “This assumes that the AfD is concealing its true goals and is essentially deceiving voters. And I believe this is a very fatal assumption that is also widespread in journalism” it was argued in Deutschlandfunk (deutschlandfunk.de). Punching a hole in the “Brandmauer”? Elon Musk has tried knock down at least part of the “Brandmauer,” first by his article in “Die Welt,” and now by heaving price on Alice Weidel , co-chair of the AfD, in long talk with her on his X Media. (A version of the talk with German subtitles can be found at https://x.com/Alice_Weidel/status/1877475125970211197). Looking at German media, this talk has mostly had a negative reception in German media. But it as Alice Weidel said, it is the first interview where she was not interrupted all the time, as it would happen in German media. Perhaps Elon Musk, in his own eccentric way has contributed to a break in at least the media’s “Brandmauer” against AfD in Germany. It has simply become necessary to open a discussion about media treatment of important actors in German politics, and likewise about the protective and censoring attitude of the EU. The former French EU-commissioner Thierry Breton actually warned Alice Weidel before her talk with Musk. Referring to the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) he took to X, writing: “As a European citizen concerned with the proper use of systemic platforms authorized to operate in the EU under the strict respect of our law (#DSA), especially to protect our democratic rules against illegal or misbehavior during election times, I believe it's crucial to remind you: 1) That you will be offered by your counterpart (210 million followers) during this exercise a significant and valuable advantage over your competitors; 2) That your counterpart should, once again, fully respect all its obligations under our EU law, particularly during this exercise as already publicly expressed in comparable situations, notably last summer. His warning that Alice Weidel and AfD might get undue media presence and attention is really bizarre in light of Germans mainstream media’s deplatforming of AfD and Alice Weidel and shows that there exists really seriously censorship of free speech, not only in Germany, but in the EU as well. Enforcers of the DSA are on their toes in relation to Weidel’s talk with Musk: Politico wrote that “A team of up to 150 European Commission officials in Brussels and Seville will help scrutinize whether Musk’s social media site plays by the European Union’s tech rules. They wield far-reaching investigative powers that allow them to visit X’s offices and request access to its algorithm and internal correspondence.” (Politico. January 9, 20225) Perhaps Germany and EU should follow the sarcastic advice of Berthold Brecht, the German poet. The Berthold Brecht solution to an impossible quandary? The attempts to keep AfD from gaining influence may remind one of the poem “Die Lösung” by Berthold Brecht, written after the rebellion in East Germany on June 17, 1953. The poem takes up the possibility of dissolving the people, when it has lost the trust of government: “The solution After the uprising of June 17th, the secretary of the Writers' Union had leaflets distributed on Stalinallee, which read that the people had lost the government's trust and could only win it back by working twice as hard. Wouldn't it be easier if the government dissolved the people and elected another one?” (Bertholdt Brecht, deutschelyrik.de/die-loesung.html) It seems that attempts to ban a party representing one fifth of the population or at the very least the attempt to ostracize it to keep it from any kind of influence, is in a way similar to the suggestion in Brecht’s poem. Although it may not dissolve the people, it certainly wants to reduce the choices for one fifth of the people that have fallen prey to ideas and opinions that would threaten the ruling parties’ idea of German democracy. Is this democracy? Or is it a democracy perverted by fear lingering as a result of Germany’s past? Limiting present day German democracy in a way that in itself dangerous for democracy. Perhaps it is time for German democracy to get rid of fears stemming from its history and become more like the democracy of its neighbours. The attempt to isolate the German version of democracy from right-wing influences like the AfD and the votes of one fifth of the population may prove to become increasingly impossible to uphold. Germany politics just has to look to its neighbours to see that democracy may in fact include right-wing views and parties. This at least seem to be the case with the rising wave of right-wing parties among Germany’s neighbours. Like the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands government; Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in Austria, that is at this moment attempting to form a coalition government dominated by them; Rassemblement (RN) in France; Fratelli d’Italia (Fdl) und Lega Nord per l'indipendenza della Padania (Lega) in the Italian government. In general, it looks as if right-wing parties are having or gaining influence in many countries in Europe. Do established German parties really believe that they can establish a ban or limit on people’s democratic choices or continue to gang up against and ostracize a party like AfD. Perhaps recent happenings in Austria may indicate how difficult that would be. The attempt of the losers of the recent Austrian elections to form a government coalition and keep out the winning right-wing FPÖ party have gone awry, as we have just seen. As a consequence the leader of right-wing FPÖ Herbert Kickl, has got the task of trying to form a new Austrian coalition government, consisting of his FPÖ party and ÖVP, the Christian – conservative party. Perhaps after the German election, even German parties like CDU/CSU will be forced to change their minds, although it might prove difficult for them. At least even established German parties and public opinion are now challenged by Donald Trump as U.S. President, supported as he is by the likes of Elon Musk, who has had the temerity to interfere with European politics and politicians. In theory at least in the mid-nineties. On the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII on May 9-10, 1995, President Clinton visited Moscow. In meetings with President Yeltsin NATO expansion was discussed. In preparation for Clinton’s meeting, Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, had provided Clinton with a memorandum, with the stark title “May 10: Moment of Truth,” outlining the U.S. and Russian positions on NATO expansion: “At your September Summit with Yeltsin in Washington, you got him to accept the proposition that NATO would, over time, bring in new members. You assured him that the process would be governed by the four "no's": no rush (expansion would be gradual, no surprises (it would be transparent), no threat (it would take account of Russia's legitimate security interests), and no exclusion (Russia would be, at least in theory, eligible for membership someday). There's a fifth "no" as well: no veto.” (Emphasis added). (Declassified document found at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/27170-doc-16-strobe-talbott-memorandum-president-moment-truth). But Russia may actually have wanted to joinNATO President Putin brought up the idea that Russia should join NATO at a couple of occasions. During a series of interviews with Oliver Stone, Putin recounted that in 2000 he had said to President Clinton “Let’s consider an option that Russia might join NATO,” and that Clinton had said: ”Why not? But the U.S. delegation got very nervous.” https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/stone-interviews-putin-says-asked-russia-joining-nato According to an interview with former Secretary General of NATO, George Robertson, Putin later also brought up the idea of Russia joining NATO. Putin had argued “I want my country to be part of Western Europe” and expressed the wish to join NATO. In the interview Robertson says that he found Putin to be quite sincere, but that the Busch/Cheney administration at the time were clearly not interested in the idea. See and hear the interview with George Robertson at https://www.channel4.com/news/did-nato-get-putin-and-ukraine-wrong More on the U.S. push for NATO expansion in the essay “Containment and messianic NATO expansion.” https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/containment-of-russia-and-messianic-nato-expansion or https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/containment-russia-messianic-nato-expansion-verner-c-petersen-g6tif This essay represents an attempt to show the reasoning behind U.S. policies to contain the Soviet Union after WWII and during the cold war period. Followed by the story, as far as it be ascertained, of NATO’s eastward expansion and Russia’s angry reactions. A story that may help understand the reasons behind present proxy war in Ukraine. A wise man on Russia The wise man in question was George Frost Kennan, a U.S. diplomat and scholar (1904-2005). His first claim to fame came in 1946 when he as he minister-councilor to the U.S. ambassador in Moscow dictated the famous “Long telegram” in answer to Washington’s request for an analysis of Russian intentions. The “Long telegram” together with his 1947 article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” published in Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym X, is said to have had a decisive influence on the U.S. policy of containment directed towards the Soviet Union for half a century after WWII. Kennan’s influence on U.S. foreign policy may seem to have only historical interest today. But his views are relevant even today, because of his enormous insight into how Russia would see and react to U.S. foreign policies. It may even help us understand why Russia is so acting belligerent against NATO’s eastward expansion and against Ukraine, as we shall see later in this essay Shaping U.S. policy towards Russia after WWII According to Kennan’s analysis of the Soviet Union’s postwar outlook, it saw itself threatened by a capitalist encirclement. Quoting Stalin, Kennan wrote: “In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world." (G.F. Kennan, Telegram to Secretary of State, February 22, 1946). Kennan saw the Kremlin’s antagonistic outlook as being the consequence of a “traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area.“ (Ibid.) But Kennan also argued that it was not the outlook of the Russian people. To him they “were friendly to the outside world eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing.” In conclusion Kennan argued that in the Soviet Union “we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi … if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism.” (Ibid.) How to cope with the Soviet Union’s outlook was therefore in Kennan’s view the main task for U.S. diplomacy, or in his words: “Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict.” (Emphasis added). Part of Kennan’s answer to the problem seems to build upon his observation that Soviet policy “is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.” (Emphasis added). (Ibid.) But Kennan also emphasizes that the U.S. “must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.” (Ibid.). In other words, keep its own house in order and be an attractive model for other nations. In July 1947 Kennan followed up his thoughts and recommendations with an article in Foreign Affairs with the title “The sources of Soviet conduct from Foreign Affairs.” Again, he warned “that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet régime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.” (Foreign Affairs, July, 1947). But Kennan also regarded the Soviet Union as the weaker part in the rivalry between the two systems. Prescient he also judged that over time the inherent deficiencies in in the Soviet society would “eventually weaken its own total potential.” The weaknesses of the Soviet Union in relation to the West and the inherent deficiencies “would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.” … The United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. (Emphasis added). (Ibid.). Kennan is mostly taking about a non-military containment, “it is clear that the mean element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward “toughness.”” (Ibid.) For Kennan containment of the Soviet Union was not enough. The U.S. would have to present itself as a shining example of a better alternative to the communist word: It is … a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow’s supporters must wane” (Ibid.). George F. Kennan’s influence For people with influence in President Truman’s administration, the analysis and recommendations of the “Long Telegram” were found to be so important that Kennan was recalled from Moscow and given a position as Deputy Commandant for Foreign Affairs, in the newly created National War College. “The State Department also “dispatched him on a lecture tour to instruct the public on the true nature of the Soviet threat. At the War College, he lectured on international relations to military, State Department, and Foreign Service officials. Kennan’s own comment: “I seem to have hit the jackpot as a ‘Russian expert,’ ” (Louis Menand, The New Yorker, November 2011). In 1947 Kennan was made chief of the new Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, where he “became the principal source of policy ideas for Marshall and for the National Security Council, and thus for the President … For two years, he essentially formulated American foreign policy.” (Louis Menand, The New Yorker, Nov 2011). And, superficially at least Kennan’s containment policies certainly seemed to fit the Truman doctrine, as formulated in President Truman’s message to Congress in March 1947. Although the doctrine came about as result of the need to help Greece and Turkey, after the U.K. no longer was able to provide economic support to the two countries. In his message Truman argued that the U.S. must provide such support, but he also argued more broadly for broadly for U.S. objectives. “One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion … I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.” (National Archives, Milestone Documents). This became the Truman doctrine. Kennan was also involved in the creation of the Marshall plan. “Marshall and Kennan criticized Truman’s reliance on superficial rhetoric rather than clear, extended economic plans for European recovery, which prompted both to investigate what the best forms of aid would be.” (The Marshall Plan and Postwar Economic Recovery, The National WWWII Museum). Superficial rhetoric and idealistic policies did not go down well with Kennan. “Get real” was his message. It is said that the Atlantic Charter “seemed to him not only utopian and unenforceable, but dangerously restrictive on a government’s scope of action.” (Louis Menand, The New Yorker, November 2011). His “Get real” appeal may be just as important in relation to the relation between the West and Russia today. Especially in relation to NATO’s eastward expansion and the present proxy war in Ukraine as we shall see. U.S.’s hegemonic drive Let us have a look at U.S. promises, behind the scenes activities, and the back and forth with Russia about the plans for a Partnership for Peace, more or less in competition with U.S. plans for the eastward expansion of NATO. The earlier promises of NO NATO expansion Declassified material now found in a National Security Archive show at least part of the story of broken promises behind the NATO expansion eastwards. When U.S. secretary of State James Baker met with Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, he was one in a long row of Western leaders to assure the new Russia that NATO had no plans for an eastward expansion. “Not one inch eastward” Baker assured Gorbachev. Three times Baker is said to have assured Gorbachev that there would be no NATO expansion: “Neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place, … not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.“ (National Security Archive). During an Open Skies Conference in Ottawa in 1992, Baker also assured Russian Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: “And if U[nited] G[ermany] stays in NATO, we should take care about non-expansion of its jurisdiction to the east.” (Notes from the meeting, National Security Archive). “The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels.” (National Security Archive). Non-expansion may have been the position of George Bush, President from 1989 to 1993. But elsewhere in the U.S. administration much more aggressive ideas for an enlarged NATO. found a more positive reception when Bill Clinton became president in 1993. Ideas for NATO expansion in the early 1990s On March 1-3, 1993, Manfred Wörner, the German General Secretary of NATO, visited the new Clinton administration to discuss the need for a new NATO summit to determine the course of NATO’s development. “The main idea behind the need for the NATO summit is the future security arrangements in Europe at a time when many people questioned the rationale for NATO’s existence after the Cold War. (Emphasis added). Woerner encourages Christopher [U.S. Secretary of State] to look more closely at the East European countries and to think about how to integrate them into European security structures.” Wörner’s argument for such integration into NATO, was remarkable, as he argued that “East European leaders are less concerned about the military threat from Russia and rather hope that “NATO membership can help stave off the return of authoritarian forces” in their own countries.” (Emphasis added). (nsarchive.gwu.edu). Declassified documents show that at least a part of the Clinton administration had wide ranging Ideas for NATO expansion in 1993. A document from the State Department presents a strategy for a coming NATO summit. “A more fundamental transformation would be for NATO now to commit to expansion. The NATO Summit would announce criteria for membership … These would be couched in a way that does not a priori exclude Russia, Ukraine and other NIS [Newly Independent States] … New NATO arrangements with Russia and Ukraine, would be designed to take away the sense that NATO expansion was directed against them.” (nsarchive.gwu.edu). While State Department was arguing eagerly for NATO expansion towards the East using similar arguments to General Secretary Wörner, others in the Clinton administration were less eager. The Department of Defense proposed that the U.S. should instead focus on a “Partnership for Peace” formula which would include Russia. In October 1993 President Boris Yeltsin send President Clinton a letter stating his uneasiness about NATO plans, “as the discussion of how NATO might evolve is centering with increasing frequency on the scenario of quantitative expansion of the alliance by adding East European countries. I tell you plainly that we favored different approach, one that leads to a truly Pan-European security system. ”… a step that could be perceived” as a sort of neo-isolation of our country in diametric opposition to its natural admission into Euro-Atlantic space.” (Emphasis added). (Description of Yeltsin’s letter on NATO expansion, National Security Archive.) At a later meeting on October 22, 1993 President Boris Yeltsin was led to believe that the new concept of a “Partnership for Peace” would include Russia on equal footing, as U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher had said that “There could be no recommendation to ignore or exclude Russia from the full participation in the future security of Europe… A Partnership for Peace would be recommended to the NATO Summit.” To which Yeltsin is said to have responded “This is brilliant idea, it is a stroke of genius.” Later Warren would argue that Yeltsin had misunderstood him, being drunk at the time. But in a phone call in July 1994, Clinton told Yeltsin he would like us to focus on the Partnership for Peace program and not NATO. “At the same time, however, “policy entrepreneurs” in Washington were revving up the bureaucratic process for more rapid NATO enlargement than expected either by Moscow or the Pentagon, which was committed to the Partnership for Peace as the main venue for security integration of Europe, not least because it could include Russia and Ukraine.” (NATO expansion – The Budapest Blow up, nsarchive.gwu.edu Apparently, Yeltsin suspected that the sweet talk was not entirely sincere, that NATO expansion was being prepared by the U.S. And Yeltsin was right wasn’t he, as it seemed that the U.S. had already committed itself to a NATO expansion towards the East. After a NATO summit in January 1994, the heads of state reaffirmed that NATO “remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process.” (www.nato.int). At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Budapest, December 1994, Yeltsin blew up, accusing a domineering U.S. of trying to “split the continent again” through NATO expansion. On the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII on May 9-10, 1995, President Clinton visited Moscow. In meetings with President Yeltsin the NATO expansion was discussed. “No agreement was reached about enlargement of NATO, Russia agreed to take part in the Partnership for Peace program, while President Clinton agreed to promote "a special relationship between NATO and Russia." (U.S. Department of State, Archive). In preparation for Clinton’s meeting, Strobe Talbott, new Deputy Secretary of State, had provided Clinton with memorandum, with the stark title “May 10,– Moment of truth,” outlining the U.S. and Russian position on NATO expansion, and the possible outcomes of Clinton’s meeting with Yeltsin. The memoranda stated premises and backgrounds (/nsarchive.gwu.edu): “Since your trip to Europe and the former Soviet Union in January 1994, you and the rest of your Administration have been consistently asserting a determination to enlarge NATO ("not a matter of if but when") and also to advance the goal of an integrated, undivided Europe ("for the first time in a millennium...")… At your September Summit with Yeltsin in Washington, you got him to accept the proposition that NATO would, over time, bring in new members. You assured him that the process would be governed by the four "no's": no rush (expansion would be gradual, no surprises (it would be transparent), no threat (it would take account of Russia's legitimate security interests), and no exclusion (Russia would be, at least in theory, eligible for membership someday). There's a fifth "no" as well: no veto. (Emphasis added) At a NATO meeting in Brussels in June 1996, it becomes clear that Russian protests against a NATO expansion eastward is brushed aside, and a commitment to invite new members is reaffirmed, as can be seen from the final communique: “We reaffirmed our commitment to open NATO to new members, initiated by the meeting of NATO Heads of State and Governments in January 1994. The intensified dialogue with interested Partners now under way is an important step in this process. We welcomed the progress to date in this dialogue…” (www.nato.int). The relations with Russia were also discussed at the meeting: “In keeping with Russia's weight and importance, the development of a stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is an essential element in the security of the Euro- Atlantic area … We recalled the Alliance's proposals made last September for an enhanced dialogue and for a political framework to guide our security co-operation and consultations; and would welcome the development of permanent mechanisms for political consultations.” (Ibid.). That Russia is still against NATO’s plans is evident from these excerpts from Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov’s memo, dated January 1997 (Excerpts from Evgeny Primakov Memo to Gennady Seleznev, "Materials on the Subject of NATO for Use in Conversations and Public Statements): “1. Our position with regard to NATO expansion remains invariably negative. We oppose these plans and especially the possibility of moving NATO’s military infrastructure to the East. The main reason for our negativism comes down to the fact that realization of these plans, objectively, regardless of whether anybody sets this goal or not, will lead to the establishment of new dividing lines in Europe, [and] deterioration of the entire geopolitical situation globally. We cannot agree with the statements that behind these plans of expansion there is no intention to create alienation between the European states. [NATO] expansion will inevitably create such alienation if one takes into account the psychological, political and military aspects connected to it; [it] could lead to a slide into a new confrontation, and an undermining of trust between Russia and the Western States. (Emphasis added). 2. We consider the entire rationale of NATO expansion unconvincing. In 1990-1991, the leadership of Western countries assured us that NATO would not move “one inch” to the East, and that accepting new members from Central and Eastern Europe into the alliance was completely ruled out. A question arises—does today’s Russia represent a greater threat than the Soviet Union did at the time?” (Emphasis added). Fast forward to the NATO summit in Madrid on June 8-9, 1997, when the first batch of East-European countries were invited to join NATO: “Today, we invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO. Our goal is to sign the Protocol of Accession at the time of the Ministerial meetings in December 1997 and to see the ratification process completed in time for membership to become effective by the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty in April 1999.” (Madrid Declaration). At the summit NATO also reaffirmed that “NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic-area.“ (Ibid.). Inclusion of further countries is apparently seen as contributing to political and strategic interest of the alliance as well as enhancing security and stability. Russia certainly did not see it in this way. A fateful error Let’s see how the aging George Kennan looked at the dangers related to NATO’s eastwards expansion, the reasons for Russia’s belligerent attitude, and the causes for the proxy war in Ukraine. “A Fateful Error” was the title of an article George Kennan wrote in the New York Times in February 1997. He was absolutely against further NATO expansion eastward against Russia. “In late 1996, the impression was allowed, or caused, to become prevalent that it had been somehow and somewhere decided to expand NATO up to Russia's borders” (Kennan, NYT, February 5, 1997). In the views of Kennan, and others with an intimate experience of Russia, “…Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East- West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.” (Emphasis added). To Kennan it was “unfortunate that Russia should be confronted with such a challenge at a time when its executive power is in a state of high uncertainty and near-paralysis. And it is doubly unfortunate considering the total lack of any necessity for this move. Why, with all the hopeful possibilities engendered by the end of the cold war, should East-West relations become centered on the question of who would be allied with whom and, by implication, against whom in some fanciful, totally unforeseeable and most improbable future military conflict? (Emphasis added). (Ibid.). Kennan argues that Russians will be “little impressed with American assurances that it reflects no hostile intentions. They would see their prestige (always uppermost in the Russian mind) and their security interests as adversely affected.” (Ibid.). Kennan was absolutely right, “there was the total lack of any necessity for this move.“ A move including the eastward expansion of NATO. A move that the U.S. had begun discussing in the early 90’s, a move that led to a kind of resuscitation of a NATO, and the cooling of relations with Russia. On April 22, 1997, Kennan writes the U.S. Deputy Head of State, Strobe Talbott, in order to convince the Clinton administration that the NATO expansion might be a fateful error. He is convinced that a side effect of NATO’s first batch of enlargements will “impose a good deal of instability onto the positions of the various countries which … have not yet been invited to become members of NATO. Almost prescient Kennan refers to Ukraine’ s position: “Nowhere, and for very good reason, does this choice appear more portentous and pregnant with fateful consequences than in the case of Ukraine.” (Emphasis added). Alas, the almost messianic NATO project of the U.S. at time did not heed the words of warning from the old diplomat and historian. The messianic project of the U.S. and NATO Kennan’s warning that the NATO expansion would be a fateful error, was apparently taken seriously enough to earn a reply, and Strobe Talbott’s reply is important. In his long reply we glimpse the overriding drive behind the U.S.’s eagerness to expand NATO eastwards, the almost missionary zeal of President Clinton to make sure that Europe would move in the direction of democracy, civil society, market economics and harmonious interstate relations. While the warnings from Russia and the likes of George Kennan and others in West are simply brushed away. Let’s take a closer look at the Clinton Administrations arguments as found in Talbott’s reply to Kennan (Draft Letter from Strobe Talbott to George Kennan, February 9, 1997). The security argument: “He President Clinton) was concerned about essentially three contingencies: 1. Intra-European regional conflict, stemming from ethnic and other tensions arising primarily inside and between the post-Communist states. 2. External threats from the Middle East of the Gulf. 3. A resurgent menace from the East, if Russia or other post-Soviet states were to regress toward dictatorship and return to a foreign policy of expansionism and intimidation” To have a military machine like NATO to deal with any external threats, “will diminish the chances that such a threat might arise” The messianic argument: “He (President Clinton) was mindful of a key, but underappreciated aspect of NATO's history and nature. NATO has never been solely a military instrument. From its inception, even as it was attending to its principal job of deterring the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO has served a political function as well.” In this function it can “concentrate its energies increasingly on the political dimension of its mission. Indeed, it can extend that mission to the former member states of the Warsaw Pact —and of the Soviet Union itself. “ Meaning that it would help to ensure that Europe “continues to evolve in the direction of democracy, civil society, market economics and harmonious interstate relations.” Talbott argues that East-European countries eagerness to join NATO, has resulted in internal changes and reforms that shows how NATO’s political mission can bring about exactly these political gaols. The rejection of Russian concerns: Finally Talbott turns to Kennan’s argument against enlargement, that “Russia deeply distrusts NATO and fears enlargement; the "specter," as it seen, of NATO "encroaching" on Russia's western borders plays into the hands of ultranationalists.” In Talbott’s answer to this warning we find the Clinton administration’s arrogant rejection of Russia’s concern. “Once again, for the President, a profoundly difficult issue came down to a starkly simple choice: should Russia's acute aversion to enlargement keep the process from going forward? Yes or no? The President decided the only right answer was no. He believed, and continues to believe, that the arguments in favor of enlargement were sufficiently compelling to outweigh the negative of opposition in Russia” Talbott also argues that President Clinton thinks “it should be possible to work out with the Russian leaders a set of understandings and arrangements that will answer their legitimate political and security concerns.” Behind all the arguments lie the U.S. realisation that it has become the undisputed hegemon, the superstate, able to dominate everywhere. Intoxicated with its power, it would tend to disregard Russian aversions to its ideas and plans. Going back to 1992 we find the U.S. argument for its new hegemonic role in the world: “First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” (Defence Planning Guidance in February 1992. A secret memorandum by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz). Fulfilling the mission – the continuing ¨NATO expansion The expansion eastwards may have been welcomed by the new members as a way to guarantee their inclusion into the rest of Europe and the West. To paraphrase former President Clinton, the eastward expansion of NATO will help secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe, and provide a secure climate where freedom, democracy, and prosperity can flourish. It was a hope shared by most countries in Europe and the West at the time. At a Washington NATO Summit in 1999 “three former Partners – Czechia, Hungary and Poland – took their seats as full Alliance members following their completion of a political and military reform programme. (A short history of NATO- declassified, nato.int). When the U.S. Senate in 1998 overwhelmingly approved the eastward expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech, Senator Joseph Biden Jr. argued: “…this, in fact, is the beginning of another 50 years of peace, … "In a larger sense," he added, "we'll be righting an historical injustice forced upon the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians by Joseph Stalin." (Washingtonpost.com). No prescience in Biden’s statement, and he, himself, as president was later the one to break the peace. In March 2004 NATO moved even closer to Russia’s borders. Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became members of NATO. On April fool’s day in 2009, Albania and Croatia became NATO members. Fast forward to June 2017, when Montenegro became a member, and in 2020 Northern Macedonia, after Greece had finally accepted that it could become a member. The next step my prove to have been a step to far for the U.S. and NATO. Ukraine NATO-membership? At the North Atlantic Council summit in Bucharest on April 3, 2008, passionate members encouraged Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP. (NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008). Encouragement came from a George W. Bush administration eager to expand NATO. Ignoring warnings from Russia that Ukrainian membership would force Russia to treat Ukraine as an enemy. Some western leaders still lacked conviction, with Germany and France blocking Ukrainian membership of NATO, arguing that Ukraine was not ready and perhaps also heeding Russian warnings. French Prime Minister Fillon arguing: “We are opposed to the entry of Georgia and Ukraine because we think that it is not a good answer to the balance of power within Europe and between Europe and Russia.” The issue of NATO membership then lay more or less dormant until the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the fighting in the Donbas. Previous lukewarm Ukrainian public support for NATO membership slowly changed to public support for membership. Leading to Ukraine’s passionate press for NATO membership. In 2019 “The Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, … approved in its final reading a constitutional amendment that reflects the country's strategic goal of becoming a member of NATO and the European Union.” (Radio Free Europe). When President Zelensky visited President Biden in September 2021, he pressed Biden on the issue of NATO membership saying: “I would like to discuss with President Biden here his vision, his government’s vision of Ukraine’s chances to join NATO and the timeframe for this accession, if it is possible; and the role the United States can play being involved in a peaceful settlement in Donbas that we would like to reach.” (The White House). Biden at the time seemed to lack conviction and remained noncommittal. Later becoming more passionate he voiced support for the Ukraine’s wish. In December 2021 Zelensky’s chief of staff told Reuters: "President Biden said very clearly that the decision on Ukraine's accession to NATO is the decision of the Ukrainian people only, this is a sovereign and independent Ukrainian state." An attitude certain to encourage Ukraine and anger Russia. Harsh Russian reaction May be found in two Russian draft proposals for future treaties between Russia and NATO and the United States, published on December 17, 2021. The NATO-Russia treaty draft The first concern measures to ensure the security of The Russian Federation by keeping NATO at bay. The most important Russian demands are found in proposed agreements articles 4 to 7. Article 4 The Russian Federation and all the Parties that were member States of the North Atlantic Atlantic Treaty Organization as of 27 May 1997, respectively, shall not deploy military forces and weaponry on the territory of any of the other States in Europe in addition to the forces stationed on that territory as of 27 May 1997. With the consent of all the Parties such deployments can take place in exceptional cases to eliminate a threat to security of one or more Parties. (Emphasis added). Article 5 The Parties shall not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach the territory of the other Parties. (Emphasis added). Article 6 All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States. (Emphasis added) Article 7 The Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct any military activity on the territory of Ukraine as well as other States in the Eastern Europe, in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia. The essential Russian demands are quite clear: Withdraw NATO forces to where they were in 1997, and refrain from any further enlargement of NATO. Ukraine would therefore not be able to join NATO, and neither would Finland and Sweden. Other demands may seem to constrain Russia just as much as NATO. The US-Russia treaty draft The second set of demands is found in the shape of a proposal for a treaty between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. In the treaty proposal the main Russian demand is that neither the U.S. nor Russia shall use the territories of other States to prepare or carry out an armed attack against the other Party. In other words Russia demands that the U.S. shall refrain from establishing a military presence in states formerly members of the USSR. Here two of the most important articles of the treaty proposal. Article 4 The United States of America shall undertake to prevent further eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and deny accession to the Alliance to the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The United States of America shall not establish military bases in the territory of the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, use their infrastructure for any military activities or develop bilateral military cooperation with them. (Emphasis added). Article 6 The Parties shall undertake not to deploy ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles outside their national territories, as well as in the areas of their national territories, from which such weapons can attack targets in the national territory of the other Party. (Emphasis added). Russian threats While the demands in Russia’s two draft proposals could be seen to represent a clear starting point for a serious dialogue with NATO and the U.S. Russia found it necessary to accompany the proposals with a military posture that can only be seen as a threat of military intervention into the Ukraine. There was a build-up of Russian troops all along Russia’s border with Ukraine. Later apparently followed by movement of Russian troops into Belarus. There were even some Russian forces in Transnistria (the breakaway state from Moldova), and Russian units in the Mediterranean were entering the Black Sea. In effect Russian Troops encircled and threatened all of Ukraine’s northern, eastern and southern borders. Following the Dec. 30, 2021, phone conversation between Biden and Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia would move to “eliminate unacceptable threats” if the United States and NATO did not respond to the Kremlin’s security demands, Al Jazeera reports. Arrogant rejection of Russian demands On January 26, 2022 the U.S. and NATO delivered their written response to the Russian demands, without at the time publishing the content of their response. But from a speech by Secretary of State, Blinken, on the same day we get the first indication of the U.S. response. The Russian demand for guarantees that Ukraine would be kept out of NATO is rejected. Blinken: We make clear that there are core principles that we are committed to uphold and defend – including Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the right of states to choose their own security arrangements and alliances.” Later the written answers to the Russian demands were leaked to the Spanish newspaper El Pais. With respect to Russia’s demand that NATO refrains from further enlargement, the U.S. states: “The United Sates continues to firmly support NATO’s Open Door Policy” With regard to some of the other Russian demands for Russian security Blinken indicated that it might be possible to find areas where agreements could be reached. Blinken: “We’ve addressed the possibility of reciprocal transparency measures regarding force posture in Ukraine, as well as measures to increase confidence regarding military exercises and maneuvers in Europe. And we address other areas where we see potential for progress, including arms control related to missiles in Europe, our interest in a follow-on agreement to the New START treaty that covers all nuclear weapons, and ways to increase transparency and stability.” In essence the U.S. flatly rejected Russia’s most important demands, while offering to have a dialogue about other subjects related to a mutual interest in security and transparency. Blinken said that NATO would deliver their own response, indicating that the U.S. and NATO responses would be reinforce each other, with “no daylight “between the U.S. and its allies. This is confirmed by the leak to El Pais in which NATO “reaffirm our commitment to NATO’s Open Door policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.” Thus, rejecting Russia’s main demand. NATO also expresses regret that “Russia has broken the trust at the core of our cooperation and challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture.” In a press conference on January 26, 2022, Blinken was asked: “Do you have any channel that is open to Vladimir Putin right now to communicate about any way to end this war?” He just answered: “Well, various leaders, countries have sought to communicate with him, may even remain in communication with him. Of course, the Ukrainians are talking to the Russians.” Showing the abysmal level of U.S. non-diplomacy in the Biden administration. Russia reacted angrily to the U.S. and NATO rejection of their proposals. On February 17, 2022 the U.S. ambassador to Russia was handed their reaction. “Russia is concerned about the increasing US and NATO military activity in the direct vicinity of Russia’s borders, whereas its “red lines,” core security interests, and sovereign right to defend them continue to be ignored… Given the lack of readiness on the part of the United States and its allies to come to terms on firm and legally binding guarantees on Russia’s security, Moscow will have to respond, including by implementing certain military-technical measures.” (https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1799157/). Just a few days later they implemented their threat of military-technical measures, invading Ukraine on February on 24, 2022. The result, an escalating proxy war Instead of a situation like in the 90’s really advantageous for creating a new security architecture with Russia as an equal partner, we now have proxy war in Ukraine. A proxy war that is more or less a direct result of the resuscitation of a NATO, a NATO that might have become irrelevant. In a sense the resuscitated NATO now seems to be slipping back into its old role as guardian against Russia, forcing unity on its members, and demanding “kriegstüchtigkeit.” Arming itself against self-imagined threat from a Russia, that has become the new old enemy. So much for peace after the demise of the Soviet Union. The present war in Ukraine seems to the be a further result of the U.S.’s messianic striving to bring peace and democracy, by imprinting its idea of rules-based order upon the rest of the World. A few weeks after the new Secretary of State, Blinken, had been sworn in, he outlined his idea of “A Foreign Policy for the American People.” Saying: “We will renew democracy, because it’s under threat…But we will not promote democracy through costly military interventions or by attempting to overthrow authoritarian regimes by force. (Emphasis added). We have tried these tactics in the past. However well intentioned, they haven’t worked. They’ve given democracy promotion a bad name.” (Secretary of State Blinken, March 3,2021). A year later the U.S. is fighting a proxy war in Ukraine, to save what U.S. sees as a Ukrainian democracy, but perhaps first and foremost to humiliate or overthrow a Russian authoritarian regime by military means. So much for avoiding costly military interventions. Since the war began the West has time after time transgressed their own red lines in what has become a continuous escalation of military support for Ukraine, and anxious probing of Russia’s red lines. Here a look at some of the latest examples of ongoing and what might be coming contributions to Ukraine. In the apparently unending sequence of western leaders first rejecting Ukraine demands, then realising that Ukraine might be in dire straits, and therefore persuading themselves to dare escalate after all. Fearing evidently that the U.S. led proxy war might be lost, and that all previous help would have been in vain. ATACMS Among Ukraine’s demands is the long time clamouring for another kind of a long-range missile that can be fired from the HIMARS and MLRS they already have. On November 17, 2024 President Biden finally caved in to Ukraine’s clamouring for authorization to strike Russia proper with ATACMS missiles, although for the time being limited to strikes in the Kursk region. No wonder perhaps that a beleaguered Biden, humiliated in his Afghanistan withdrawal, involved in a Ukraine proxy war with no clear end and conflicts and wars in the Near, Middle and Far East, and clearly afraid of having to admit another defeat, again crosses his own red lines in relation to Russia. “A Telegram channel affiliated with the Ukrainian military posted a video Tuesday [November 19] that it says shows U.S.-supplied ATACMS missiles being fired from an undisclosed location in Ukraine.” (AP). Apparently, a volley of 6 ATACMS were fired at a location in the Kursk region. The ATACMS missile has almost the same size (4meter long) and weight (1300-1700 kilograms) as the Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles, but it is ground-based and can be fired from a modified launch pod mounted on a HIMARS or MLRS. Several different versions have been produced over time. From MGM-140A, MGM-140B to MGM-168A with different warheads, a range of 70 to 300 km’s, and warhead of 160 to 591kg. During flight they may reach Mach 3. Meaning Russians forces only have minutes to react. The MGM-140A version may carry 950 M74 APAM (Anti-Personnel Anti-Material submunitions), cluster munition that scatter in mid-air and able to cause destruction of personnel and light material over an area of 33,000 m2. MGM-140B carries the same submunition but only around 300, while other versions may carry Brilliant Anti-Tank (BAT) guided submunitions to destroy moving armoured units or stationary missile/rocket vehicles. Finally, there is a unitary warhead with higher precision, presumably resulting in less collateral damage. “While the ATACMS does assume a ballistic arc to its target, it also performs a series of rapid and sudden turns and course corrections on the way to its aimpoint. This is a deliberate function of the ATACMS, as this seemingly erratic flight behavior makes it exceptionally difficult to track or intercept.” (militarytoday.com). Illustration showing ATACMS being fired from a HIMARS vehicle, diagram of the weapon and a photo of single M74 submunition. M74 is a ball-like aerial dispersed, centrifugally armed, high-explosive, anti-personnel (AP) submunition. Sources: Army Recognition and cat-uxo.com Storm Shadows/ SCALP’s Ukraine has long pleaded for long-range missiles, not the least to be able to strike Russia in Crimea. The UK were the first to cave in to their pleading and provide an unknown number of the so-called Storm Shadow missile, followed by France with their variant of the same missile, called SCALP (Système de Croisière Autonome à Longue Portée – Emploi Général). The missile is made by MBDA, a European consortium made up of Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo. The Storm Shadow/ SCALP missile is a fairly long-range deep strike precision weapon, conventional armed. Used against fixed or stationary targets such as hardened bunkers and key infrastructure. Usually operated from aircrafts it is said to possess exceptional accuracy due to its advanced navigation system that combines INS (Inertial), GPS and terrain following systems. Basic specs: Weight 1300 kg, 5 meters long, with a conventional warhead of 450kg, and a range said to be around 250 km’s. Looking like a submarine, this is a picture of Storm Shadow/SCALP missile mounted on an aircraft pylon (MBDA). Source: MBDA https://www.mbda-systems.com/product/storm-shadow-scalp/ Ukrainian Airforce’s Soviet-era SU-24M Fencer combat aircraft have been adapted to carry this heavy missile. It has been used by the Ukrainians to strike deep behind Russia’s frontlines, and is assumed to have been used in deep strikes on infrastructure in Crimea and on the Russian navy in Sevastopol. Eurasian Times reports that 11 Storm Shadow missiles were used in the September 13, 2023 strike on the naval port of Sevastopol, although apparently only 3 missiles slipped through Russian defences hitting a submarine and a landing ship in drydock. On September 20 Ukraine made a new attempt to strike an airbase in Crimea with 8 Storm Shadow missiles, with no missiles striking the target according to Eurasian Times. Later Ukraine struck again: “at around noon on Friday, September 22, Ukraine's Defense Forces successfully struck the Russian Black Sea Fleet Command HQ in temporarily occupied Sevastopol.” (Ukrinform). In November 2024 Ukraine got permission from the UK to use Storm Shadow missiles to strike into Russia proper, into the region of Kursk, and on November 20, 2024, Ukraine apparently fired the first batch of Storm Shadows into that region. Territorial defense forces in Russia claims that 12 Storm Shadow missiles were launched at around 2:50 p.m. in the direction of Bryansk. Taurus stand off missile Storm Shadow /SCALP missiles and ATACMS’s have not been enough for Ukraine. For some time, they have had their eyes on the German made longer ranging missile “Lenkflugkörper Taurus KEPD-350.” About the same size as Storm Shadow/ SCALP, it may be used for even longer range precision strikes on hardened structures like bunkers etc. MBDA describes the missile as having a range in excess of 500 km, unmatched penetration capabilities, precise and jamming resistant navigation, including terrain-following capability below 50 meters, GPS independence, with 4 separate guiding systems, and a layer counting fuse. The last characteristic means that the missile after diving vertical in the last phase, will be able penetrate layers of a bunker with hardened penetrator, counting the number of layers and voids penetrated. See illustration of the concept at https://taurus-systems.de/#penetration The missile's physical specs: Length 5m, width about 1m, weight 1400kg, with a warhead weighing 481 kg. Examples of Taurus target attacks: Now why would Ukraine want Taurus missiles. It may be because the Taurus has a longer range of around 500 km, and it might also be more efficient against certain structures. Realizing that Ukraine has been eager to attack the Kerch bridge and made several attempts to put it out of action, one might guess that Taurus missiles would be used to attack the bridge due their longer range. Of course, it would also be possible to strike into Russia itself supplementing the more primitive drone strikes carried out by Ukraine. For this reason, the possible delivery of Taurus missiles is a very sensitive topic in Germany. While some politicians are eager to provide Ukraine with the Taurus, Chancellor Scholz and others are having serious misgivings. Just the thought of German missiles hitting somewhere in Russia make them shudder, and for now hold back. In order to somehow satisfy the Ukrainian demands it has been the suggested that technical alterations of the Taurus might limit their range to something like the Storms Shadows, in order to make sure that Russia would be out of range, but this has been met with the counter argument that it would demonstrate that Germany did not trust Ukraine. Evidently the use of Taurus would require close German assistance. A discussion among German officers reveals the dilemma related to German support “Politicians may be concerned about the direct closed connection between Büchel [German airbase in Rheinland-Pfalz, where the US has placed nuclear weapon] and Ukraine, which could become a direct involvement in the Ukrainian conflict.” With the German election on February 23, 2025, it is to expected that Merz of the CDU party will become Chancellor, and he has said that he would support the delivery of Taurus missiles to Ukraine under certain conditions. But would a President Trump want Germany to escalate the war in Ukraine? Russia’s ballistic response and harsh warning The first Russian reaction to the ATACMS and Storm Shadow attacks came almost immediately. On November 21 Dnipro in Ukraine was hit by a ballistic missile apparently fired far away from Russia’s Astrakhan region. At first the Ukraine said they had been hit by an ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile). Later it turned to be an intermediate range ballistic missile. Clip from video supposedly showing warhead explosions from the ballistic missile attack During a public address on the same day President Putin denied that Russia had used an ICBM, instead he said “In combat conditions, a test of Russia's new medium-range missile system was conducted. In this case, the missile was equipped with a non-nuclear payload," The medium range missile is said to have been the 9M729 Oreshnik, although the number seems to belong an older ballistic missile.
According to Putin the ballistic missile attack on Ukraine was in response to Ukrainian attacks on Russia using the ATACMS and Storm Shadow missile days before. Arguing that "From that moment, as we have repeatedly underscored, a regional conflict in Ukraine previously provoked by the West has acquired elements of a global character." Putin further warned that any escalation by the West would be followed by a decisive Russian response, and it might not be limited to Ukraine: “We consider ourselves entitled to use our weapons against the military facilities of those countries that allow their weapons to be used against our facilities, … If anyone else doubts this, then they are wrong - there will always be a response." What’s Next – apocalypse now? President Zelensky’s first reaction “Today, Putin admitted to taking a second step this year toward escalating and expanding this war. A new ballistic missile was used. Putin struck our city of Dnipro, one of Ukraine’s largest cities. This is a clear and severe escalation in the scale and brutality of this war—a cynical violation of the UN Charter by Russia.” Well, what did he expect…? What happened follows the muster we have seen almost since the beginning of the proxy war. Escalation and counter escalation in a growing spiral of escalations as we have shown in earlier blog essays. True to form Zelensky is now demanding decisive reactions from the West, although that would surely get us closer to open war between Russia and the West. The danger is certainly evident. The US DOD (Department of Defense) is apparently considering changes to the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review from 2022. With the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy (N-CWMD) Richard C. Johnson arguing: “"We are now in a world where we're facing multiple nuclear competitors, multiple states that are growing, diversifying and modernizing their nuclear arsenals and also, unfortunately, prioritizing the role that nuclear weapons play in their national security strategies." So, what’s next. No idea, but perhaps the West is beginning to realise the dangers related to a continued escalation, and an ongoing war. Until Ukraine is bled out, to put it bluntly, or some miracle make Russia give up, or some unintended mishap or provocation leads to open war between NATO and Russia – or until the West finally demands that Ukraine must accept some kind fait accompli like a DMZ. The last possibility would of cause be the least dangerous way out of the present stalemate. For now, apart from some desperate last-minute action from a fast-aging President Biden, we have will to wait and see what intentions and plans President Trump has in relation to Ukraine. A long speech on the order of world
Early in November 2024 at 21st meeting of the so-called Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi, President Vladimir Putin held a very long speech on his views of the World and World order today. Yes, I know today the western media has an obsessive focus on president elect Donald Trump, what he is saying, what he is doing, all the time trying to second guess what he will do and what it will mean for the rest of the world. But perhaps it is almost as important to have a look at what President Putin of Russia has to say about a changing world and an emergent new world order. Here a look at some aspects of Putin’s speech at the Valdai meeting (http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75521). The dissolution of a Western order Putin argues that the existing world order is dissolving and that modern world has become increasingly unpredictable: “There comes, in a way, the moment of truth. The former world arrangement is irreversibly passing away, actually it has already passed away, and a serious, irreconcilable struggle is unfolding for the development of a new world order. It is irreconcilable, above all, because this is not even a fight for power or geopolitical influence. It is a clash of the very principles that will underlie the relations of countries and peoples at the next historical stage” Interestingly and perhaps rather surprising to western eyes, Putin sees the west as increasingly dominated by totalitarian ideologies, while we tend to think of Russia and China as dominated by totalitarian thinking. Putin’s argument: “Modern Western liberalism, in my view, has degenerated into extreme intolerance and aggression towards any alternative or sovereign and independent thought … Increasingly often, democracy is being interpreted not as the rule of majority but of minority. Traditional democracy and the rule of the people are being set against an abstract notion of freedom, for the sake of which, as some argue, democratic procedures, elections, majority opinion, freedom of speech, and an unbiased media can be disregarded or sacrificed.” Somehow his view of western liberal democracy as degenerating into a kind of rule by minorities and driven by identity politics seems to rhyme with the views of Donald Trump, and it may even by part of the explanation why he won of the recent election, to the surprise of whining western mainstream media. The Western attempt to defeat Russia Putin argues that red lines have been reached in the present struggle with the West: “The former hegemons, who have been accustomed to ruling the world since colonial times, are increasingly astonished that their commands are no longer heeded. Efforts to cling to their diminishing power through force result only in widespread instability and more tensions, leading to casualties and destruction. However, these efforts fail to achieve the desired outcome of maintaining absolute, unchallenged power … Instead of recognising the futility of their ambitions and the objective nature of change, certain Western elites seem poised to go to any lengths to thwart the development of a new international system that aligns with the interests of the global majority. In the recent policies of the United States and its allies, for instance, the principle of “You shall not belong to anyone!” or “You're either with us or against us” has become increasingly evident.” Putin warns that the West’s global messianism is dangerous: “The West’s calls to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, a nation with the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, reveal the reckless adventurism of certain Western politicians. Such blind faith in their own impunity and exceptionalism could lead to a global catastrophe.” Strong words and while many in the West believe that Putin is wrong, when he sees the present proxy fight against Russia as part of such a messianic struggle, it is in fact possible to find evidence indicating that he may be right. Western hybris at the end of the cold war “In the mid-1990s and even in the late 1990s, a US politician remarked that, from that point on, they would treat Russia not as a defeated adversary but as a blunt tool in their own hands. That was the principle they were guided by … . By distorting the results of the Cold War to suit their interests and reshaping the world according to their ideas, the West displayed flagrant and unprecedented geopolitical greed.” Here some evidence showing that Putin may be right in his view of the West’s, and especially of cause the United States of America’s intentions and convictions. After 1990 the U.S. realized that it had become the undisputed hegemon, the superstate, able to dominate everywhere. Intoxicated with its power it made plans for a “Pax Americana. Just listen to this: "Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia … There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” (pbs.org). This is an excerpt from a Defence Planning Guidance in February 1992, a secret memorandum by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz. The secret Wolfowitz 1992 memorandum, now partly de-classified, also states that “after the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States may be said to be the world’s sole superpower, enjoying a predominance on the world political-military stage that is unprecedented in the last century” (Wolfowitz, National Security Archive, gwu.edu). Causing conflicts today Similar views may underlie the conflicts we are witnessing in today’s world. To Putin “It is a conflict between the overwhelming majority of the global population, which wants to live and develop in an interconnected world with a great deal of opportunities, and the global minority, whose only concern, as I have said, is the preservation of its domination.” Putin recognizes that West has “amassed significant human, intellectual, cultural, and material resources which enable it to thrive as one of the key elements of the global system,” But instead of using their formidable achievements to strive to preserve their global hegemony, Putin argues that the West’s efforts should be directed towards “addressing the common problems that concern everyone, from demography and social inequality to climate change, food security, medicine and new technology.” Putin’s six principles for a new world order Looking for an alternative to the present conflicts Putin is proposing six principles that in his view ought to underpin relations in a multipolar world. First principle: Open interaction “Openness to interaction stands as the paramount value cherished by the overwhelming majority of nations and peoples. The endeavour to construct artificial barriers is not only flawed because it impedes normal and advantageous to everyone economic progression, but also because it is particularly perilous amidst natural disasters and socio-political turmoil, which, unfortunately, are all too common in international affairs.” Second principle: A polyphonic world order Emphasising “the diversity of the world as a prerequisite for its sustainability.” Meaning that we must avoid a scenario “where the model of one country or a relatively minute segment of humanity is presumed universal and imposed upon others … it is untenable to adopt any conventional, albeit democratically developed code, and dictate it as an infallible truth to others in perpetuity.” Instead, one has to embrace a world system that is polyphonic “one in which all voices are heard and, most importantly, absolutely must be heard. Those who are used to soloing and want to keep it that way will have to get used to the new “scores” now.” This means that in Putin’s view a UN Charter written by the victorious countries must undergo changes. Putin does not say how this is supposed to happen, except that is must be done carefully. Third principle: Inclusion Putin argues that it must be avoided that hegemonic powers believe that they are entitled to dictate to others what their interests are. Instead, his alternative sounds almost like modern days DEI policies (Diversity, Equity and Inclusion) practiced on a world of countries and peoples. Funny, seeing that DEI principles in organisations seems to day seem to be losing their attractiveness Rather vaguely Putin argues “As the world transitions to a multipolar reality, we must develop mechanisms to broaden the application of such principles. In each instance, decisions must not only be collective but must also involve those participants capable of making a meaningful and significant contribution to resolving the issues at hand. These are primarily the actors with a vested interest in finding a positive resolution, as their future security – and, consequently, their prosperity – depends on it.” Fourth principle: Finding security without NATO’s bloc policy “The key principle of security for all without exception is that the security of one nation cannot be ensured at the expense of others’ security. I am not saying anything new. It has been set out in OSCE documents. We only need to implement them.” Says Putin, his errand here sems to deride the bloc policy of NATO: “There is only one bloc in the world that is held together by the so-called obligations and strict ideological dogmas and cliches. It is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which continues expansion to Eastern Europe and is now trying to spread its approaches to other parts of the world, contrary to its own statutory documents. It is an open anachronism.” To Putin NATO would have lost the only reason for its existence, when the cold war ended, but the U.S. kept it alive in order to exercise command in its zone of influence. In fact, it was difficult to see the raison d’etre of NATO after the cold war. As we have argued in the blog “No need for NATO today, if dismantled in the 90s.” The Soviet Union was rapidly dissolving and descending into something that could not be seen to as threat to Europe or the U.S. Nationalist militarism in Europe had long disappeared, and European political integration was seen as having a glowing future, now that the Soviet Union had disappeared and Eastern Europe was poised to participate in the European political integration. Remnants of former times only remained in the Balkans. This is how a former CIA analyst and areas expert on Russia, with 30 years of experience, saw the time when the Iron Curtain came down: “As the Iron Curtain came down and the Soviet empire began disintegrating, the opportunity to construct a post-Cold War peace was there for the taking. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker assured Gorbachev in a Feb. 9, 1990 meeting that, following the unification of Germany, NATO would expand “not one inch eastward”… It’s difficult now to describe the feeling of those halcyon days.” No wonder therefore that Putin thinks “It is obvious that military-political and ideological blocs are yet another form of obstacles created to hinder a natural development of a multipolar international system. I would like to point out that the notion of a zero-sum game, where only one side wins and all the others lose in the end, is a Western political creation.” Instead, Putin is looking to the BRICS, the international organization originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, but now also including Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. Today even Turkey, a NATO member, seems eager to join. In Putin’s view “BRICS serves as a strong example of genuinely constructive cooperation in today’s evolving international landscape. Additionally, BRICS platforms – where entrepreneurs, scientists, and intellectuals from our countries meet – can become spaces for deep philosophical and foundational insights into the current global development processes. This approach embraces the unique characteristics of each civilisation, including its culture, history, and traditional identities.” Fifth principle: Justice for all In Putin’s view “Inequality is the true scourge of the modern world. Countries face social tension and political instability within their borders due to inequality, while on the international stage the development gap that separates the so-called Golden Billion from the rest of humankind may not only result in more political differences and confrontation, but also, and even more importantly, exacerbates migration-related issues” Here the term “Golden Billion” refers to the fringe theory that “a cabal of 1 billion global elites seeks to hoard the world's wealth and resources, leaving the rest of the planet to suffer and starve.” (npr.org). Putin does not seem to have any clear idea of how the inequality can be alleviated or erased. “Of course, there is no magical cure for this ill. It requires a long-term, system-wide effort, beginning with the creation of the necessary conditions to remove artificial, politically-motivated development barriers.” Sixth Principle: A vaguely holistic view of the world This just sems to be another variant of Putin’s main concern. This time again talking about Western arrogance, “which translates into a desire to condescendingly lecture others, endlessly and obsessively … There is supposedly a developed world, progressive society and some universal civilisation that everyone should strive to join – while at the other end, there are backward, uncivilised nations, barbarians. Their job is to listen unquestioningly to what they are told from the outside, and to act on the instructions issued by those who are allegedly superior to them in this civilisational hierarchy.” Again, Putin just talks vaguely of the alternative. A polycentric world, in which the West does not have a hegemonic role: “The modern world tolerates neither arrogance nor wanton disregard for others being different. To build normal relationships, above all, one needs to listen to the other party and try to understand their logic and cultural background, rather than expecting them to think and act the way you think they should be based on your beliefs about them. Otherwise, communication turns into an exchange of clichés and flinging labels, and politics devolves into a conversation of the deaf.” Yes, but how does he propose to achieve what he calls a normal relationship. Realistically, we might see that hegemonic power is shifting east, to Asia and China, but this would just become a new hegemonic power, different from the existing but declining Western hegemony. It would certainly not realise Putin’s DEI concepts for countries and nations. Perhaps not, but this is the misguided opinion voiced in the Guardian on November 7. “There is nothing but bad news for Europe in Donald Trump’s US election victory. The only question is just how bad it will get. Europeans stand to suffer strategically, economically and politically from his “America first” policies, as well as from his unpredictability and transactional approach to global affairs. The undermining of Nato, the emboldening of illiberal nationalists everywhere, a transatlantic trade war, and a battle over European regulation of US social media platforms, AI and cryptocurrencies are just some of the major risks of a second Trump presidency.” (The Guardian, November 7, 2024). The same wailing was heard during Trump’s first period as President, meaning that Europeans still do not realise that Trump then and now may have a point or two with his America first policies and its relation to European woes. Wonder why Europe did not realise that, given that Trump had almost the same views in 2017. To show that this was indeed the case, take a look at an English translation of essay published in Danish on January 20, 2017. That’s right 2017, almost eight years ago. But then apparently not everyone got the message at the time, neither in the US nor in certain European countries. So today we may see several replays. Here the essay from 2017: Trump may have a point when he trumps conventional thinking January 20, 2017, https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/trump-may-have-a-point-when-he-trumps-conventionel-thinking Consternation, rejection and Trump bashing That was the general European reaction to Trump's many, partly contradictory statements in the interview he gave to Bild Zeitung and The Times. "Schwachsinn" (stupid nonsense), " Wir müssen auf das Schlimmste gefasst sein" said the chairman of the European Parliament's foreign affairs committee, Elmar Brok, commenting on Trump's statement that "the EU was formed, partially, to beat the United States on trade." President Hollande was a little more diplomatic in his criticism of Trump: "Europe will be ready to pursue transatlantic cooperation, but it will based upon its interests and values ... It does not need outside advice to tell it what to do" In a similar way, Chancellor Merkel reacted: "Also, ich denke, wir Europäer haben unser Schicksal selbst in der Hand." With economic strength and efficient decision-making structures, the EU can cope with the fight against terrorism, digitalization and other problems, Merkel argues. A new version of "Wir schaffen das"? Now Europe must stand together was the keynote of many of the comments. "Dies ist jetzt die Stunde der Europäer" was the warning from Elmar Brok, because if Europe does not succeed in standing together in foreign and security policy, a new world order will emerge under Russian President Putin and President Trump. Much of the criticism from Europe has been characterized by what the Germans would call "Überheblichkeit" (arrogance that is supremely condescending) in relation to Trump's statements. This also applies to most media outlets, which have had an extremely critical view of Donald Trump. Trump bashing has been a popular activity, and it has also been a relatively easy matter to find cause for Trump bashing, from his boastful manner, lack of rhetorical skills, to hurried Twitter announcements and his other escapades. One has stereotypically subscribed to what we might call common correct political opinions, in a version in which truth seems to be defined in a self-referential spiral of mutual affirmation that continues without the slightest thought ad absurdum. On Friday, however, Donald Trump will enter as the next U.S. president, so instead of the media's parrot-like and unreflective Trump bashing, there is reason to see if there is actually some meaning in the madness. Therefore, rather than simply repeating the almost identical criticism of Trump's view of the world, we will try to see if Trump's many, often contradictory, statements can still make sense and indicate the future direction of his presidency Making sense of Trump's confusing statements The interview with Trump touched on many topics, large and small, global on the one hand and personal little things on the other. Here we will try to focus on some of the overall themes as we have seen them: America first Partnership with Russia NATO and US interests Break-up in the EU, German dominance and Brexit Fair trade or free trade America first! "Make America great again" was the message from Trump during the election campaign, and although it can be dismissed as a campaign slogan, it may also contain an important core of Trump's view of the world. Anything that serves the interests of the United States must be promoted and anything that in any way threatens these interests or diminishes the role of the United States in the world is problematic and must be rejected or fought. However, Trump has not presented grand visions or long-term strategies. "For some observers, this suggests an untutored or incoherent approach to foreign policy, derived largely from news headlines and his experiences as a globetrotting businessman," but in "Le Monde Diplomatique" one can find a completely different assumption: "Donald Trump has a clear-eyed view of the world and America's place within in it — and in some respects his perceptions are far more attuned to world realities than those of well-regarded pundits and policymakers in Washington." Therefore, one should not be seduced by Trump's lack of rhetorical skills and his incoherent speech, but rather see him as the grubby little boy who is the first to see that the emperor is wearing no clothes. It can hardly be said that President Obama has had much success in his foreign policy. To a large extent in this area, he has been a weak president, weakening the United States in the face of more determined and unscrupulous players on the world stage. This applies in relation to Putin's Russia, it applies to relations with China and Syria's Assad. Weak leaders in the United States and Europe, feeling in a kind of self-perceived and assertive sense that they at least had the right values, have largely stuck to complacent rhetoric with little consistency and little effect. They have ended up in a kind of insoluble put-in-cold storage-situation with Russia, have had immensely little influence in the Syrian conflict and apparently have no idea what to do with the refugee problem, with Africa, or all the other problems in the world for that matter. Then comes the businessman from the outside, the man who does not follow the conventions, a man who, in his own immediate, and very undiplomatic way, names problems that are otherwise wrapped up in euphemisms. We see it in statements about Obama's foreign policy problems. "Afghanistan is, is not going well. Nothing's going well — I guess we've been in Afghanistan almost 17 years — but you look at all of the places, now in all fairness, we haven't let our people do what they're supposed to do" Or about the most important military priority, where Trump's answer is simply: "Isis." Or Syria, where "we had a chance to do something when we had the line in the sand and it wasn't — nothing happened ... That was the only time — and now, it's sort of very late." Le Monde notes: "The aim of US foreign policy in this environment is to advance America's interests above all else, and frustrate the designs of all those who seek advantage at its expense. In this competitive environment, where every government will be judged solely by what it can do to further America's interests or impede its progress, Trump will use every tool at his disposal to reward partners and punish opponents. Willing collaborators can expect state visits to the White House, favourable trade deals and exemption from human rights considerations; adversaries will face high import tariffs, diplomatic isolation and, in case of extreme provocation, military action." Partnership with Russia During the election campaign, Trump said "When you think about it, wouldn't it be nice if we got along with Russia?" ... "Wouldn't it be nice if we got together with Russia and knocked the hell out of ISIS?" (Reuters). One could argue that this is what Kerry and Obama somewhat half-heartedly tried, but where the attempt ended up creating a much greater distance from Putin. On the whole, it is undeniable that relations with Russia have deteriorated in recent years, both in terms of relations with the United States and relations with the European Union. Putin, on the other hand, has been able to exploit the situation, especially during Obama's last "lame duck" period, when Putin pushed through his Syria policy. The Crimean annexation and the Donbass conflict are apparently frozen on the surface, but under the ice hot local conflicts continue. The poor relationship with Russia is reflected in the Gallup poll in the United States, where Russia and North Korea take turns being the main enemy. The result is remarkable if we compare with previous measurements, but the change in relations with Russia is of course related to the Crimean invasion and the Donbass unrest. Now we have a situation where people seem to fear what Russia might do to the Baltic countries. With a quiet mutual escalation as a result, in which Russia complains that NATO is moving closer, but deploys Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave, while the United States and Europe send smaller military forces to Poland and the Baltic countries. Perhaps the West's reaction to Russia has been downright foolish and at the same time so weak that Russia has been able to take advantage of the situation to cunningly occupy Crimea. Now they are faced with the risk of increased confrontations. The alternative must be to seek a good relationship with Russia from a power base, in a something-for-something policy. And isn't that what Trump is proposing? Firstly, by seeing Russia not as a main enemy to be isolated, but as a possible partner. Like negotiations between two large competing companies competing for markets and market shares. Here's what Trump answered, when asked if he supports European sanctions against Russia: "Well, I think you know — people have to get together and people have to do what they have to do in terms of being fair. ENDORSEMENT? They have sanctions on Russia — let's see if we can make some good deals with Russia. For one thing, I think nuclear weapons should be way down and reduced very substantially, that's part of it. But you do have sanctions and Russia's hurting very badly right now because of sanctions, but I think something can happen that a lot of people are going to benefit." Trump claims in three consecutive tweets from early January that only stupid people or fools would argue that a good relationship with Russia would be stupid: "Having a good relationship with Russia is a good thing, not a bad thing. Only "stupid" people, or fools, would think that it is bad! We ... have enough problems around the world without yet another one. When I am President, Russia will respect us far more than they do now and... both countries will, perhaps, work together to solve some of the many great and pressing problems and issues of the WORLD!" January 7, 2017 Unlike other Western decision-makers, Trump sees opportunities for a partnership with Russia, rather than mutual escalation. Trump is not bound by other politicians' quick assertion that Russia after the Crimean annexation and Syria intervention is the main enemy. Putin has similarly expressed a desire to normalize relations with the United States "and pursue constructive cooperation on the widest possible range of issues." "If anything is likely to change during the early days of a Trump administration, it is the US's relations with Russia. Trump spoke on several occasions of his admiration for Vladimir Putin, offering to meet him in an effort to improve bilateral relations." Putin has also stayed on the mat while he waits for Trump. "But it would be a mistake for Putin to assume that any honeymoon in Russian-American relations will prove lasting. As Trump has made very clear, his primary interest is to promote US interests above all else, and this will not allow for any arrangement that could be interpreted as surrendering America's dominant position on the global chessboard. We cannot foresee at what point assertive Russian action in eastern Europe might test that stance, but Trump will not allow the US to be branded as indecisive or weak-willed in any such confrontation." Now it becomes so speculative. What can a deal with Russia consist of? What could Russia, for example, give in return for the lifting of sanctions and the acceptance of the annexation of Crimea and some referendum in Donbass (a la the referendum in Schleswig after the First World War) in which the people vote on affiliation and status? A cooperation to fight Isis or Daesh and otherwise terror is certainly not enough. More is needed in a "grand bargain" with Russia, nuclear disarmament, a stop to further Russian expansion, cooperation on Middle East problems, advantageous trade agreements, a common front against Chinese expansion. In the long term, it is probably essential that Russia, Europe and the United States must have a minimum of cooperation in order not to be too weak in the face of an increasingly self-confident China, to ensure that disputes in the Middle East do not spiral out of control, resulting in new refugee flows and, finally, to contribute to stability in Africa. NATO and US interests When asked if Trump can understand why Eastern Europe fears Putin and Russia, he answers somewhat incoherently by criticizing NATO. "Sure. Oh sure, I know that. I mean, I understand what's going on, I said a long time ago — that NATO had problems. Number one it was obsolete, because it was, you know, designed many, many years ago. Number two — the countries aren't paying what they're supposed to pay. I took such heat, when I said NATO was obsolete. It's obsolete because it wasn't taking care of terror. I took a lot of heat for two days." It is a criticism that leads German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to describe "astonishment" and "agitation." After a meeting with the NATO Secretary General he expresses that Trump's announcement was received with concern. Steinmeier also believed that Trump's statements contradicted what Defense Secretary-designate James Mattis had said during his "confirmation hearing." What, then, is behind Trump's criticism of NATO for being outdated? Here we must remember what he had previously said. NATO is "obsolete because it wasn't taking care of terror." and then "NATO designed many, many years ago." Western politicians have before Trump mentioned that NATO should cooperate with Russia, and there have also been questions about NATO's legitimacy after the end of the Cold War. A fundamental question is therefore whether Trump is not to some extent right, that NATO is obsolete. NATO is not an equal partnership, despite the musketeer oath. NATO is a cheap insurance for Europeans, paid for by the United States. For a very long time, Europe has failed to ensure its own effective defence (with a few exceptions such as the UK). Instead, Europe has been hiding under the protective wings of the US-American eagle. Therefore, it is basically only the United States that decides in NATO. It may seem absurd that a European Union of 500 million inhabitants should leave it to the United States, with some 320 million, to intervene alone. This was true of the Balkan conflict, it is largely true of current terrorism and it is still true when you feel threatened by Russia. Some might argue that NATO partners certainly helped the United States, when NATO's musketeer oath was triggered after the 2001 World Trade Center attack. In reality, it was the mouse helping the elephant. We have to note that when the relationship between the NATO partners is extremely unequal, it is not inconceivable to imagine that the United States would demand that Europe (or the EU) should build its own effective defence. In the "Bild" and "The Times" interview, Trump also comes back with another criticism: "the countries aren't paying their fair share so we're supposed to protect countries, but a lot of these countries aren't paying what they're supposed to be paying, which I think is very unfair to the United States. In the best Trump style, he then adds, "With that being said, NATO is very important to me." And Trump is certainly right. Here is the share of GDP that each country pays. The inequality is even greater when we look at what you contribute in absolute amounts. NATO's defense spending in 2016 totaled USD 918,298 million, of which the United States accounted for USD 664,058 million. Germany contributed only $40,663 million. The UK, on the other hand, with 60,347 million USD. Trump may be quite right in his criticism of NATO as outdated and that the partners get far too cheap insurance. Perhaps it is in the awareness that this discrepancy between the obligations and services of Europe and the United States cannot last, and probably also a fear, what Trump might come up with, that Europeans have begun to talk about a European defence and a European army. However, it is not imminent, for the time being they are content with various proposals for better coordination of, among other things, missions outside Europe: "EU states in November agreed to create a new military headquarters inside Federica Mogherini's foreign service and to make joint "battlegroups" ready for action. The European Commission also unveiled proposals for a joint military research and procurement fund." In an article in the EU Observer, a title from Magritte's picture of a pipe is used to characterize the EU's plans: "Ceci n'est pas une EU army." No, it’s just the idea of it. The break-up of the EU and German dominance From Trump's answer to the question of how he sees the future of the EU and whether he expects more countries to leave the union, one gets the feeling that it is not exactly a topic he is particularly interested in. "I think it’s tough. I spoke to the head of the European Union, very fine gentleman called me up." The gentleman in question turned out to be Jean-Claude Juncker. For Trump, it doesn't matter if there is a strong union or a collection of strong nation-states: "Personally, I don't think it matters much for the United States. I never thought it mattered. Look, the EU was formed, partially, to beat the United States on trade, OK? So, I don't really care whether it's separate or together, to me it doesn't matter." It is clearly a view marked by his experience as a businessman, as he embarks on a slightly rambling review of his own experience of business in Europe. However, he is not entirely consistent, because in other parts of the interview he quite clearly supports the idea of a state that one can identify with. A national state with clear borders, which also fits better with his own "USA first" venture. "People, countries want their own identity and the UK wanted its own identity but, I do believe this, if they hadn't been forced to take in all of the refugees, so many, with all the problems that it, you know, entails, I think that you wouldn't have a Brexit. It probably could have worked out but, this was the final straw, this was the final straw that broke the camel's back." Now, it's not that the UK was exactly flooded by the refugee wave in 2015, so here he mixes things up. Still, he may still be right. As we have previously tried to demonstrate in the blog post "Merkel, last one standing? – you must be mad!" Chancellor Merkel's insistence on free movement of labour in the EU made it difficult for Cameron to argue that he had achieved anything in his negotiations with the EU. Her refugee policy has not exactly been attractive to many Britons either. This may have meant that the "Leave" movement just gained the extra votes that led to Brexit. If that is the case, Trump's statement makes sense after all. Which brings us to his attack on Merkel's refugee policy. "I felt she was a great, great leader. I think she made one very catastrophic mistake and that was taking all of these illegals, you know taking all of the people from wherever they come from. And nobody even knows where they come from." He sees Merkel as a great leader who made a catastrophic mistake when she opened the borders back in the fall of 2015. Today, it is probably a view that many share. Merkel made a mistake. A mistake Trump does not want to make, and it is probably in that light that one should see his comments about better control of Muslim immigration to the United States. "We don't want people coming in from Syria who we don't know who they are. You know there's no way of vetting these people. I don't want to do what Germany did." This will probably also be an opinion shared by most decision-makers in Europe today, and Merkel has also begun to realize that it was a problematic decision she made. So even though Trump is somewhat incoherent in his arguments, you can probably say that he is hitting the nail on the head here. Trump also sees problems related to Germany's influence in Europe. "Cause you look at the UK and you look at the European Union and its Germany. Basically, a vehicle for Germany. That's why I thought the UK was so smart in getting out." In the blog post "The spectre of German dominance in the EU" we found arguments for the same view, that Europe had become "a vehicle for Germany". The Financial Times writes: "... power within Europe has shifted sharply towards Berlin. Mrs. Merkel is widely seen as the continent's most important politician. In Beijing or Washington, DC, the question: "Where is Europe going?" has become synonymous with: "What do the Germans want?" ... Bureaucrats in Brussels talk ruefully about Berlin becoming the capital of Europe. "When the German position changes on an issue, the kaleidoscope shifts as other countries line up behind them," says one official. "That's unprecedented in the history of the EU." (FT) Quoting the New Statesman: "A spectre is once again haunting Europe – the spectre of German power." Free trade or fair trade Trump's many announcements about unfavourable or downright stupid trade agreements and his Twitter threats against companies that move jobs to low-wage countries have caused some nervousness across large parts of the world and have even had immediate effects on the decisions of large companies. Many comments have been that Trump's ideas, because plans can hardly call them, are expressions of an unwise protectionism that harms free trade, leads to trade wars, and will ultimately cause everyone to experience reduced economic development, which will also have negative effects on the workers whose jobs Trump claims to secure. In the interview, Trump's criticism reads: "The problem is the US is always taken advantage of — we have hundreds of billions of dollars of trade deficits with China — we have $805 billion in trade deficits with the world — ya almost say, who's making these deals when you're losing that kind of money, right — we actually have almost $800 billion — almost $800 billion in trade deficits with the world." Trump may be exaggerating a bit and using, as far as it can be estimated. In 2015 when the U.S. deficit on "U.S. trade in goods with World, Seasonally Adjusted" was $745.660 billion. For 2016, it appears to have been reduced to $666.117 billion. Still a huge deficit! Among those who, according to Trump, exploit the United States the most are China and Germany. The United States had a deficit against China in 2015 of just over USD 367 billion and against Germany of just under USD 75 billion. By 2016, however, these deficits had been reduced. Trump wants a better balance in trade. He is not alone in this. The United States has previously sought to pressure both China and Germany, for example, to do something to reduce the imbalance. In 2016, the United States decided to put China, Germany and three other countries on a watchlist, meaning that "the US Treasury Department [will] increase its monitoring of trade partners with excessive budget and trade surpluses, which Washington suspects are behaving unfairly to support their economies." ... Three criteria help define the lack of fairness: "maintaining a significant trade surplus with the United States, maintaining a current account surplus larger than 3.0 percent of the country's GDP, and repeated intervention in the foreign exchange market to keep its currency from appreciating." The purpose of the list is to draw attention to the problem, to try to persuade the countries concerned to do something to reduce the imbalance. If not, "the countries could face a greater threat of sanctions in the future." Well, and that's probably exactly what can be expected with Trump's announcements. With "America first" and "fair trade" ideas and Twitter threats, Trump is also seeking to preserve jobs in the United States. In the interview, Trump once again warns car factories against moving parts of their production to Mexico. "I would tell them, don't waste their time and money — unless they want to sell to other countries, that's fine — if they want to open in Mexico, I love Mexico, I like the president, I like everybody — but I would tell BMW if they think they're going to build a plant in Mexico and sell cars into the US without a 35 per cent tax, it's not going to happen, it's not going to happen." With BMW, Trump may not choose the best example. Because the German CAR institute can actually demonstrate that BMW only sells 1% more cars in the US than they produce there. On the other hand, it looks quite different for VW, which otherwise has plenty of problems, because VW sells 626% more cars in the US than it produces there. Trump's notions of a better trade balance and securing U.S. jobs have been accompanied by significant verbal threats and tweets that have already had an effect on a number of companies' decisions not to move production from the U.S. to Mexico.
In the "World Economic Forum," which is being held in Davos these days, the message has also been heard and there are indications that it is being taken seriously. Reuters reported here on January 19: "Davos CEOs 'go local' on supply chain in Trump era" and continues: "Business leaders in Davos, traditionally the high priests of globalization, are talking up the benefits of local production this week to shield themselves from criticism from incoming U.S. President Donald Trump." However, many media outlets have also made a point of reporting Xi Jinping's speech in Davos, because the Chinese leader's speech actually contained a defence of globalization and a more or less direct warning about the danger of protectionism under a future President Trump. Perhaps it should have been noted instead that China, which has pursued a protectionist policy of first, is now agitating for free trade, while the United States, which has been in favour of free trade, is now seen as heading towards protectionism. Perhaps Trump's threats have affected China, because Xi Jinping also promised that China would become more open to outside investment: "We will expand market access for foreign investors, build high-standard pilot free trade zones, strengthen protection of property rights, and level the playing field to make China's market more transparent and better regulated" Xi Jinping also said that the exchange rate of the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) would not destabilize the world economy: "China has no intention to boost its trade competitiveness by devaluing the RMB, still less will it launch a currency war." Perhaps these parts of Xi Jinping's speech should be seen as an admission that China has so far acted quite differently. He has got a point or two, hasn't he? Don't we have to conclude that Trump, despite his difficulty in expressing his ideas in a coherent and diplomatic manner in interviews and tweets, "has got a point or two"? He touches on a number of important problems that decision-makers in the United States and Europe have neither been particularly willing to acknowledge nor have been able to solve. Now, despite the almost allergic reactions of many politicians, various think tank experts and the increasingly breathless (or is it spiritless) media's almost allergic reactions to his ideas and not least his way of expressing them, Trump has burst various boils. Whether Trump and his new team will be able to find solutions to the problems remains to be seen. What can be left in doubt, however, is that his announcements have had effects even before he takes office as president. BTW: Trump and Trumping have several meanings. Here we have thought about the meaning of trump we find in "Oxford Learners Dictionaries": "Trump something (with something) (in some card games) to play a trump card that beats somebody else's card," "Trump something/somebody to beat something that somebody says or does by saying or doing something even better" Others might think that an old French meaning of "trumper" would be more appropriate: "Properly to play the horn, alluding to quacks and mountebanks, who attracted the public by blowing a horn, and then cheated them into buying; To cheat." Wrote the NZZ (Neue Zürcher Zeitung), on November 8, 2024, after Trump again surprised politicians, media and commentators everywhere with his convincing election victory over Kamala Harris. After the election the NZZ commentator like many others suddenly realise there might actually be a reason for his astounding victory: “The Republican is the most sensitive seismograph of our era. The man who exaggerates and exaggerates everything to the point of caricature, whose speeches are full of gaffes, baseless allegations and crazy exaggerations, has a fine sense of perception. He recognized the enormous upheaval in Western industrial societies earlier than others.” (NZZ, November 8, 2024) Wonder why they did not see that coming, given that Trump did exactly the same thing in 2016. To show that this was indeed the case, take a look at an English verbatim translation of essay published in Danish on November 30, 2016. That’s right 2016, eight years ago. But then apparently not everyone got the message, neither in the US nor in certain European countries. So today we have several stronger replays. Here the 2016 essay: Seismic upheavals in the West November 30, 2016 openthoughts.eu The ominous signs of seismic activity "Everybody was wrong. Again. When Election Day dawned, almost all the pollsters, analytics nerds and political insiders in the country had Hillary Clinton waltzing into the White House." (Politico) Media and commentators cannot hide their astonishment and almost indignation at the U.S. election of Trump as president: "How could a man who many voters considered mentally, morally, and too temperamental to lead the country be elected president of the United States of America, with enormous power capable of wreaking national and international havoc" (Forbes). Surprise and disappointment also characterized the reactions in the media after the Brexit vote. BBC: "Brexit: Europe stunned by UK Leave vote ... news that one of the bloc's largest members is leaving will come as a shock, with real implications for the country's own political debate." In Germany, the established parties have been challenged by the AfD (Alterative für Deutschland), which has made significant gains in the most recent parliamentary elections in 2016. In Saxony-Anhalt they reached as much as 24.3 percent of the vote, in Rhineland-Palatinate 12.6 percent, Baden-Württemberg 15.1 percent, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 20.8 percent, and finally Berlin 14.2 percent. The surprises can be seen as a long series of seismic tremors in the political landscape in recent years. Tremors that have caused the ground to move under a relatively immobile political landscape of old parties and fixed agendas with, for example, more EU, with more free trade, with growth and globalization, with pluralism. In a previous blog post "A crumbling European Union? From June 21st we wrote about "Too many cracks to count..." We saw a tendency for a bottom turn. Where politicians, who do not want to give air (oxygen) to the population's concerns, instead have to put up with the fact that what they consider to be abominably smelling opinions and statements keep bubbling up from the depths of the people. Protest parties such as the AfD in Germany, on the other hand, have not been slow to give oxygen to the opinions that bubble up, while established parties are trying to push them back to earth with verbal contempt and holding their noses. That is hardly enough to keep them down, because in recent years we have seen a general increase in support for alternative parties in Europe. In countries like Greece and Spain, with new left-wing parties that turn against the established political system and against the dictates of the EU. In Greece, represented by Syriza. In Spain, represented by the party at Podemos, which in the June 2016 elections obtained 21.1 percent of the votes cast, which was admittedly disappointing for themselves, but nevertheless represents more than one in five voters. In Greece, the party Syriza, which won 35.5 percent of the vote in the September 2015 elections. Otherwise, it is mainly right-wing parties that have created a break in the party landscape in many places in Europe. Only parties that have recently gained more than 10 percent support in elections or in opinion polls are included. This means that the "Vlaams Belang" from Belgium, which has plunged sharply in opinion polls and Greece's "Golden Dawn" is not included. Should we continue to hold our noses over the politics of these parties? Based on the idea that they represent smelly bubbles from people without the right values and without the right attitudes. People who cannot comprehend the grandeur of the magnificent and humanistic project that the self-affirming and self-proclaimed elite with the right opinions stand for. In "A crumbling European Union?" from June 21, we wrote about "too many cracks to count..." There are simply too many, from a lack of economic growth accompanied by austerity policies, high unemployment in southern Europe, increasing problems in a large economy like France, Grexit, Brexit and Nexit dangers, and an increasingly sinister German dominance. More intangible problems are the democratic deficit, the Eurobureaucracy and the opacity of decision-making processes. There is an inability to deal with the crises that arise from the outside. The conflict with Russia, a very poor ability to influence conflicts in the Middle East, and increased Muslim-inspired terrorism. At the moment, there is the refugee crisis, which is being tried to reduce by pandering to authoritarian regimes. Who is causing the tremors? Who is creating the surprises? Who is demonstrating? Is it just smelly "pack" that some German politicians have talked about? The people who have not understood everything? People without education and education? People who just follow empty slogans and easy answers to problems? With the surprising election of Trump, many attempts have been made to explain who might elected him, so to speak despite the prevailing opinions of the mainstream media. Otherwise, they would hardly have been so surprised. We can try to create a picture of who actually elected Trump in the US and who, chooses the AfD in Germany and UKIP in the UK An exit poll from CNN shows something about those who voted for Hilary Clinton and Donald Trump, respectively. Where Trump has had a significant predominance is among whites without higher education, men and here mainly the slightly older generation. The predominance of the vote for Clinton is mainly found among non-whites, women and the younger generation. This has led some to talk about the outcome of the election as a "whitelash," i.e., an election in which the white, less educated part of the population fights back against everything a President Obama has stood for. But as can be seen, that is not the explanation, because other groups have certainly voted for Trump as well. The picture is therefore more nuanced than that. If we look at the correlation between education and who people voted for, it is clear that Trump has caught more whites with a higher education by a margin of 4 points compared to Clinton. However, the margin is much larger when it comes to whites with less education or no education. Pew Research has also looked at how whites, blacks and Hispanics have voted in current and previous presidential elections. Here you can see that the positive democratic margin for "blacks" and "Hispanics" has become smaller than in the previous presidential election, when Obama was re-elected to a second term. Trump has thus also conquered both "black" and "Hispanic" votes, even though most have voted for Clinton. A similar picture emerges for the correlation between age group and preference. Trump has also won over younger voters, although Clinton retained a large margin, her margin is clearly diminished compared to the election of Obama. Curiously, Trump's superiority among older voters actually seems to have diminished a bit compared to the last election of Obama. Where does the support for the AfD come from? Who are the dissatisfied? A study states "that although blue-collar workers have an above-average affinity to the party, AfD is not the party of the ordinary people. The AfD draws voters from all the other parties but the shares vary. The ideological position of its voters is more to the right than the population as a whole, but the majority does not show an extreme right-wing belief system." That the AfD does not only attract from the group of workers is underlined by an electoral analysis from Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, which shows that the AfD attracts protest voters from across the spectrum: All in all, however, the picture is somewhat more nuanced than the simple explanation that the election of Trump is the uneducated white man's revenge on all the others. Who will elect the AfD in Germany? In connection with the refugee crisis, the protest party AfD (Alternative for Germany) gained momentum, while the ruling coalition's parties, the CDU/CSU, had declining support in opinion polls. An opinion poll from November 11, 2016 shows this picture of the current support for the parties, where the AfD competes with the Greens for third place: Where does the support for the AfD come from? Who are the dissatisfied? A study states "that although blue-collar workers have an above-average affinity to the party, AfD is not the party of the ordinary people. The AfD draws voters from all the other parties but the shares vary. The ideological position of its voters is more to the right than the population as a whole, but the majority does not show an extreme right-wing belief system." That the AfD does not only attract from the group of workers is underlined by an electoral analysis from Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, which shows that the AfD attracts protest voters from across the spectrum: Where do we find Ukip supporters? According to an opinion poll reproduced in the Huffington Post in 2015, the following characterization applies: “Ukip supporters are more likely to be male, and to be older. Those aged 45 or older - and particularly those aged 65 and above - are more likely than average to support Ukip. Geographically, Ukip support is higher in Eastern England, Yorkshire & Humberside, and the Midlands. Support is noticeably weaker in Scotland, as well as in London.” The signatures DE to AB stand for social class, where A and B make up the upper end and D and E unskilled workers, the unemployed and pensioners. We can see that support is particularly found among older men from one of the lower social classes, and then we can see a geographical concentration of Ukip voters. An expanding doughnut with a growing hole in the middle Now we have a number of more or less reliable indications of who is helping to create tremors in the established political landscape. We might say that the indicators suggest that it may be especially true of those who may feel that they are about to fall off an increasingly fast-spinning hamster wheel of economic, social and value changes. In his speech on election night, Trump said: “I pledge to every citizen of our country that I will be president for all Americans,... The forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer.” Perhaps he has an important explanation for what swept him to power. Our own assumption is that the fundamental social problems in large parts of the Western world can be illustrated by the fact that a previously cohesive mass is becoming an expanding doughnut, where a more diverse and self-confident periphery runs with all the attention, while one has an eye for the expanding hollowing out in the middle. The expansion is so strong that the periphery itself is splitting into separate parts. The picture is intended to illustrate the idea that society is disintegrating into all kinds of special interest groups. It is the expanding periphery of the doughnut. In the ever-widening empty hole in the middle, we find the forgotten parts of society. On the periphery we find the noisy, loud, wildly gesticulating, groups of focused opinions, all seeking to attract maximum attention, with the aim of achieving their own good regardless of the consequences for society. In the middle we find large numbers of isolated people, those without organization, without the ability to gather in powerful movements, without the ability to articulate their wishes and demands in well-articulated explanations and justifications. But today we have begun to hear them, because now they are noisy. They make their mark in protest parties and they mark themselves with silent votes on a ballot paper. We hear their inarticulate shouts, incantations, protests and actions captured by protest parties all over the Western world. Admittedly, they are often dismissed as “Pack”,”not house-trained,” “right-wing radical,” “xenophobic,” opponents of development in general, of globalisation, of multiculturalism. Their demands are incomprehensible and unacceptable. What are they shouting about? The cries that are heard in the German protests can be seen in the AfD's interpretation in their party program: Referendums modelled on the Swiss model A distancing from the EU, with more focus on the national and the nation state A significantly greater focus on internal security A focus on the family and children Strengthening culture, language and identity Strengthened educational efforts As far as research is concerned, they want to abolish "gender research" And here comes one of the main pillars: No irregular immigration, " Die überkommene Politik der großzügigen Asylgewährung im Wissen um massenhaften Missbrauch führt ... zu einer rasanten, unaufhaltsamen Besiedelung Europas, insbesondere Deutschlands, durch Menschen aus anderen Kulturen und Weltteile" If we look at UKIP's interpretation of the murmuring murmurs and protests of the forgotten middle, it relates to the following themes: Identity politics in the US
To understand the protest, we need to see how the hollowed-out center differs from the colorful and articulate periphery that runs with attention. We can do this by looking at what has been called identity politics in the United States. "The laden phrase "identity politics" has come to signify a wide range of political activity and theorizing founded in the shared experiences of injustice of members of certain social groups. Rather than organizing solely around belief systems, programmatic manifestos, or party affiliation, identity political formations typically aim to secure the political freedom of a specific constituency marginalized within its larger context. Members of that constituency assert or reclaim ways of understanding their distinctiveness that challenge dominant oppressive characterizations, with the goal of greater self-determination." (Stanford) For Mark Lilla, the progressive US liberals have been preoccupied with and praised diversity, or multiculturalism. For the past several years, progressives in the U.S. have been frantically preoccupied with identity issues related to racial inequality, gender, and sexual identity. They have been morally, ideologically and politically preoccupied with issues of so-called marginalized groups and interests belonging to the expanding periphery and more or less ignored the gap left by the expanding periphery in the middle. Hillary Clinton's campaign is an example of this focus: “She tended on the campaign trail to lose the large vision and slip into the rhetoric of diversity, calling out explicitly to African-American, Latino, L.G.B.T. and women voters at every stop. This was a strategic mistake. If you are going to mention groups in America, you had better mention all of them. If you don't, those left out will.” This preoccupation with identity and self-assertion of African-American identity, of the Spanish minority, of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transsexuals, of women's identity and equality, has meant that in a sense they have lost sight of coherence, the common, even society itself. The focus has more or less become on what separates the different identities, not on what is common. In this way, they contribute to the expanding periphery that moves out from the center. A periphery that is split into separate parts, in the struggle for identity, in diversity, in separation, not community. It is the “I” that is important, not the “We.” This focus on what separates us in the many separate identities can have bizarre results, at least if you look at them from within the almost by definition not progressive, conservative middle, which represents what remains. One of the bizarre outcomes is known as "The Bathroom Bill." At a school in North Carolina, a female student, who claimed to be a boy, had asked for permission to use the men's restroom. However, the school decided to advocate a policy where men's and women's toilets might only be used by students of the gender for which they are intended. In addition, the school chose to have single-room toilets that could be used by everyone and thus also by the student in question. The student did not want to accept the decision and referred to the fact that the US Department of Education had recommended that students should be treated in accordance with their gender identity, i.e. the one they themselves believed to have. Later, the state of North Carolina passed the now herostratically famous "Bathroom Bill," which entitled: "Single-Sex Multiple Occupancy Bathroom and Changing Facilities. – Local boards of education shall require every multiple occupancy bathroom or changing facility that is designated for student use to be designated for and used only by students based on their biological sex." The law resulted in a storm of criticism directed at the law and its defender, Governor Pat McCrory. The criticism came from many sides. More than 90 prominent business leaders from companies including Apple, Facebook, Airbnb, Yahoo, Twitter, Salesforce, Marriott, Pfizer and Levi Strauss signed a letter calling on Gov. Pat McCrory (R) to repeal the law entirely. Today, it is debated whether this particular law caused MacCrory to lose the governorship in the recent election. For the protesters, the many protests against the law and the threats of boycotts in North Carolina, is seen a progressive wave that contributes to the safety of, suppressed and overlooked minorities, like the girl who felt like a boy. For others, it represents an example of the bizarre detours that identity politics leads to. And we're not done at all. In New York City, there are so far 39 recognized gender identities. The problem is of course not that there should not be room for them, the problem is the exaggerated focus on such aspects of identity, where one gradually seems to completely lose an understanding of society as a "Gemeinschaft" where the “We” creates coherence and the "I" creates division. Safe spaces, trigger warnings and microaggressions– the language of separation Identity politics is accompanied by other phenomena that hardly contribute to holding a society together. These are phenomena such as "safe spaces, trigger warnings and microaggressions." "Safe Spaces." was originally associated with places where minorities, such as gays and lesbians, could avoid condemnation, without having to defend their identity to others. Today, there are "safe spaces" at many universities in the United States, where they have become the term for places, where students are not confronted with statements and opinions that may worry or disturb them. “Safe spaces are an expression of the conviction, increasingly prevalent among college students, that their schools should keep them from being "bombarded" by discomfiting or distressing viewpoints.” Kansas State University's “safe spaces” program “provides safe zones throughout campus where individuals can find support and assistance while escaping homophobia, hateful acts and sexual violence. This is done by placing the SafeZone symbol on office doors, desks, backpacks, etc” "Trigger warnings" were probably originally such warnings as you can experience in news broadcasts, where warnings are given about images that can be disturbing, but "trigger warnings" are used today about the warnings teachers are expected to use, if something in their teaching might give rise to strong emotions or trigger trauma in pupils and students."The Great Gatsby portrays misogyny and physical abuse, so that students who have been previously victimized by racism or domestic violence can choose to avoid these works, which they believe might "trigger" a recurrence of past trauma" "Microaggressions" are small phrases or actions that, without thinking about it, can be perceived as derogatory, aggressive or disruptive by others. The New York Times quotes an example of microaggression: "Saying "you guys", since the phrase could be interpreted as excluding women." Yes, that's how far out on the exaggeration you are actually getting. For the part of the population in the overlooked hole in our doughnut, it will be seen an expression that is not associated with aggression or prejudice. Finally, we can mention "cultural appropriation," where something that may constitute a characteristic of one culture is copied or used by another culture. It is seen as a kind of cultural exploitation. Bizarre examples have been mentioned, such as the Western world's adoption of yoga or of African hairstyles. Such attempts to take into account a multitude of different minorities and identities risk undermining what they are trying to achieve, a kind of mutual consideration. Instead, the result will be a splitting of the expanding doughnut into more and more peripheral groups of opinions that will not hear other opinions. Admittedly, the University of Chicago recently tried to do away with such trends in a message to new students: "Our commitment to academic freedom means that we do not support so called 'trigger warnings,' we do not cancel invited speakers because their topics might prove controversial, and we do not condone the creation of intellectual 'safe spaces' where individuals can retreat from ideas and perspectives at odds with their own." The result was to be expected, protests not only from students, but also from teachers. Self-proclaimed progressives today seem almost morbidly preoccupied with what we have called the periphery, with diversity, with multiculturalism, with the different, the oppressed, and with voting and promoting action in every way to promote diversity, while ignoring what is supposed to make diversity function as a society. Curiously, Senator Bernie Sanders, who lost the race to Hillary Clinton, seems to be on the same track when he recently expressed in a speech that Democrats need to get over "identity politics" to connect with a larger part of the electorate, saying, "It's not good enough for somebody to say, 'I'm a woman, vote for me.' That is not good enough." Sanders sees Clinton's focus on identity politics, on what we have called the peripheral groups of the doughnut, as a problem and as the reason why the Democrats lost the presidential election to Trump. Even language and forms of expression are perhaps becoming something that divides instead of being something that essentially serves to unite. "I come from the white working class, and I am deeply humiliated that the Democratic Party cannot talk to the people where I came from" (Bernie Sanders). Here one can add that it was perhaps exactly what Donald Trump was able to do, speak a language where everyone could understand what he said, and then it became less important in relation to the opponent whether what he said was always consistent or true. Isn't it becoming a general problem that a "snapchattering class of people" uses language that doesn't make sense to many others and expresses opinions that can eventually only be accepted by themselves. The loss of security in the middle of the doughnut "The working class of this country is being decimated — that's why Donald Trump won ... And what we need now are candidates who stand with those working people, who understand that real median family income has gone down." Said Bernie Sanders recently. Israeli attacks on UN peacekeepers in Lebanon On October 1O, 2024 UNIFIL (the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon) reported that a Merkava tank belonging to IDF (Israel Defense Forces) had fired at a UNIFIL observation tower at its headquarters in Naqoura, thereby injuring two UNIFIL peacekeepers. On October 13 UNIFIL reported that two IDF Merkava tanks had forced the main gate and entered UNIFIL’s position in Ramyah near Lebanon’s border with Israel. After UNIFIL protests the tanks left the position 45 minutes later, without injuring anyone. Later the UNIFIL position reported that several rounds had been fired 100 meters from the position, that smoke from the gun rounds had drifted into the UNIFIL position, causing fifteen peacekeepers to suffer skin irritation and gastrointestinal reactions (whatever that means). Elsewhere IDF soldiers also stopped a critical UNIFIL logistical movement, meaning that the critical movement could not be completed. International condemnation of the IDF “attacks” This seems to have been the most serious IDF attacks on UNIFIL peacekeepers in the past days. Does not really sound very serious, does it? But the incidents lead to a barrage of condemnations from the UN and many countries, presumably including those countries having soldiers among the multinational UNIFIL peacekeepers. In a statement UN General Secretary Guterres said: “UNIFIL personnel and its premises must never be targeted, … Attacks against peacekeepers are in breach of international law...(and) may constitute a war crime." Condemnation also followed from EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell: “Such attacks against UN peacekeepers constitute a grave violation of international law and are totally unacceptable. These attacks must stop immediately.” In a statement 40 countries "strongly condemn recent attacks on UNIFIL peacekeepers,"… Such actions must stop immediately and should be adequately investigated” Arguing that “UNIFIL's role as particularly crucial in light of the escalating situation in the region.” Prime Minister Netanyahu’s reacted to the widespread condemnation in a video, arguing that Israel had asked UNIFIL several times to leave, arguing that their presence provided the Hezbollah with human shields. “Your refusal to evacuate the UNIFIL soldiers makes them hostages of Hezbollah. This endangers both them and the lives of our soldiers.” He then addressed Guterres directly in English: “Mr Secretary General, get the UNIFIL forces out of harm's way. It should be done right now, immediately," (France 24, October 13, 2024). Soon after Guterres rejected Netanyahu’s call to evacuate UNIFIL from Southern Lebanon. His spokesperson saying “Peacekeepers remain in all positions and the UN flag continues to fly.” (Jerusalem Post, October 13, 2024). Is UNIFIL shielding Hezbollah? Netanyahu may have a point when he argued that UNIFIL by their physical presence has provided Hezbollah with a kind of human shield. Sunday, October 13, the IDF took some journalists on a tour near the UNIFIL outposts, showing that them that Hezbollah had built military infrastructure in the vicinity of the outposts, thereby using them as a kind of cover. Wall Street journalist, Dov Lieber, in a video showed a Hezbollah tunnel entrance in visible range of UNIFIL outpost. Here a clip from the video showing the tunnel entrance with a UNIFIL observation tower in the background. Source WSJ October 13 , 2024 This raises important questions! Why is there a UNIFIL mission in Southern Lebanon? What is UNIFIL’s mission as peacekeepers in Lebanon? What are UNIFIL actually doing to fulfil its mission? And finally: Is UNIFIL unable to fulfil its purpose and ought to be withdrawn? UNIFIL Background We have to go back to 1978 to understand the background for the UNIFIL mission. On March 11, 1978, a terrorist group consisting of 11 members of Fatah (a Palestinian nationalist party) came ashore in Northern Israel from a base in Lebanon. The captured an Israeli civilian bus, murdered 35 civilians and wounded around 70. The attack is known as the “Coastal Road Massacre.” “Three days after the” Massacre of the Coastal Road, on the night of March 14th, 1978, the IDF decided to retaliate, and launched a vast operation in southern Lebanon” (idf.il).” Operation Litani had the objective of destroying PLO bases south of the Litani river in Lebanon in order to restore security for Northern Israel. Just like todays Lebanon invasion. The day after the IDF invasion, Lebanon called for intervention from the UN Security Council. Just days later the Security Council adopted resolutions 425 and 426 calling upon Israel to cease its military invasion in Lebanon and withdraw its forces from Lebanon.The Security Council also decided to create a peacekeeping force for Lebanon. This became the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, known as UNIFIL. The first elements of UNIFIL arrived as early as March 23, 1978 in Lebanon. The UNIFIL first mission: Confirming the withdrawal of IDF. Restoring international peace and security. Assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of effective authority. Looking back, one has to conclude that UNIFIL did not succeed in restoring peace and security or ensure the effective authority of the Lebanon government in Southern Lebanon. There may have been periods of relative peace, but they were always broken by renewed border conflict. No wonder that the Security Council had to extend the UNIFIL mandate again and again. The 1982 invasion and the rise of Hezbollah In 1982 Israel again invaded Lebanon, following renewed conflict, this time involving PLO- guerrillas. The invasion that was to last until 2000 forced the PLO to leave Lebanon. Defence minister Ariel Sharon, the architect of the 1982 invasion exclaimed “The PLO has lost its kingdom of terrorism, from which it carried out the cruelest, most atrocious terrorist actions against Israel and throughout the world,” (The Washington Post. August 21, 1982). Alas, the invasion in 1982 gave rise to another terrorist group in Lebanon, Hezbollah (known as the party of God). The IDF invasion this time lasted for 18 years until 2000. During this time the UNIFIL was of cause unable to fulfil its full mission. “Instead, the Force used its best efforts to limit the conflict, contribute to stability in the region and protect the population of the area from the worst effects of the violence.” (https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-background). On April 17 2000, Israel formally announced withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon by July 2000, “in full accordance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).” In order to determine that Israeli forces had been redrawn fully from Lebanon the so-called blue demarcation line was established by the UN in July 2000. The withdrawal led to a period of calm, although there were numerous minor violations of the blue Line. 34 days of war in 2006 The relative calm was not to last. After several incidents where a strengthened and armed Hezbollah exchanged fire with IDF, a serious crises erupted on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah launched a barrage of rockets at Israel. Hezbollah members also crossed the blue line attacking an IDF patrol, killing 8 soldiers and abducting two IDF soldiers. In response Israel immediately launched a massive bombing operation against Hezbollah and infrastructure targets, almost like today’s air operations against Hezbollah. With the UNIFIL mandate expiring on July 31, 2006, the UN Secretary General recommended a one month’s extension, while other options were considered. During this time UNIFIL peacekeepers were again limited to military observations, humanitarian efforts and medical assistance. On August 14, 2006 a ceasefire was established, that formally ended 34 days of war. A resolution indirectly calling for disbandment of an armed Hezbollah Before the ceasefire August 11, 2006, the Security Council unanimously adapted resolution 1701. The 19 articles of the resolution not only call for a permanent ceasefire, they also call for a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements: "Full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), requiring the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so there will be no weapons or authority in country other than that of the Lebanese State no foreign forces in Lebanon without the Government’s consent no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorised by its Government provision to the UN of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel’s possession full respect by both parties for the Blue Line and security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Lebanese authorities and UNIFIL between the Blue Line and the Litani River" With resolution 1701 it was also decided to authorize an increase in the strength of UNIFIL up to a maximum of 15,000 troops, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations. In addition to carrying out its original mandate under resolutions 425 and 42, the enlarged UNIFIL should also: Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, Help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons. Assist the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area. Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel. (Emphasis added). Later Security Council resolutions like 1773 (2007), 2373 (2017), 2433 (2018) 2485 (2019) and 2695 (2023) called for deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in Southern Lebanon and increased UNIFIL support of and coordination with LAF. Here a map of the area south of the Litani river where the present multinational UNIFiL force of consisting of 10,058 peacekeepers (as of September 2, 2024) is stationed. UNIFIL has never able to fulfil its mission
A recent UN report on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701, dated March 8, 2024, reveal how little UNIFIL has been able to achieve in relation to its overall mission, especially of cause in relation to the calls for “disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon.” The Report makes this abundantly clear: “No progress was achieved with respect to the disarmament of armed groups. Since 8 October 2023, Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups have repeatedly demonstrated their military capabilities in strikes from southern Lebanon into Israel (see para. 3). Anti-tank guided missiles, artillery, offensive drones, mortars, rockets and surface-to-air missiles have been used in such strikes. The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hizbullah and other groups in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) continues to restrict the State’s ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.” (Emphasis added). Neither has UNIFIL been able to fulfill its mission in relation to border control and the arms embargo. The careful worded report explains: “Allegations of arms transfers to non-State armed actors continued and remain of serious concern. If confirmed, such transfers would constitute a violation of resolution 1701 (2006) … While it takes allegations of arms transfers seriously, the United Nations is not in a position to substantiate them independently.” One would think that the enormous number of rockets and missiles that Hezbollah possesses and uses would not has escaped the watchful eyes of UNIFIL, if they had dared to look for them. Instead Hezbollah’s Nasrallah boasted of the military support from Iran: “If the resistance in Lebanon or in Palestine or other resistance movements are strong, this is primarily due to the material, military and financial support, in addition to political and moral support, from Iran” Thus, indicating that UNIFIL had never been able to “prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel. Further evidence of the presence of armed forces and weapons not belonging to LAF is found in exchange of fire between Lebanon and Israel: “On several occasions, individuals carried out attacks against Israel from the vicinity of UNIFIL positions, drawing return fire by the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL protested these actions endangering peacekeepers and UNIFIL premises in letters to the Lebanese Armed Forces and Israel Defense Forces, and initiated patrols around UNIFIL positions to prevent hostile activity.” What this force of around 10,000 has been able to do is thus fairly limited as evidenced from the UN report. UNIFIL activity therefore seems to have been limited to activities like these: Registration transgressions of the blue line, counting fire exchanges between armed non-LAF forces from Lebanon and from Israel. They state that they have carried out security and liaison activities. For instance, stating: “UNIFIL facilitated or coordinated 366 events in support of civilian and humanitarian activities in areas close to the Blue Line, including to facilitate agricultural harvests, funerals, repair of civilian electricity and communications infrastructure, and movement of civilians, including journalists.” UNIFIL also helped to deal with mines and unexploded ordnance in the area. Apart from helping population in the areas UNIFIL have also been busy protecting its own forces and civilian personnel. In several case UNIFIL has been hindered in carrying out some of its tasks by threats and attacks from individuals and groups clad as civilians, but suspected of belonging to Hezbollah or one of the other armed groups. Here just a few examples from 2022/2023: In December 2022, an Irish peacekeeper from the UNIFIL was killed southern Lebanon by people suspected of belonging to Hezbollah. Hezbollah later brought one of the suspected killers to LAF. “On 28 October, two Observer Group Lebanon patrols faced incidents in Sector West. In the first incident, three men with a pickup truck on the road west of Jumaymah asked what the patrol was doing and asked it to leave the village. The patrol left the village and continued its itinerary. In the second incident, six men with scooters on the road south-east of Tayr Falsay asked a patrol to leave the area. The patrol left the village and continued its itinerary.” “On 1 November, eight individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Tiri (Sector West) and told peacekeepers that they were not allowed to proceed without the Lebanese Armed Forces. Upon arrival of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the peacekeepers returned to a United Nations position and then resumed the patrol.” “U.N. reports tell a harrowing story of a spike in the pattern of harassment and assaults on the force. These threats and violence, typically perpetrated by men in “civilian clothes,” effectively deny UNIFIL access to Hezbollah’s military sites in south Lebanon.” (washingtoninstitute.org). Lebanon’s Armed Forces (LAF) is supposed to assist UNIFIL in its mission. Instead, it seems to have done what it could to hinder UNIFIL in carrying out important parts of its mission. For instance, by preventing UNIFIL from entering certain areas, where Hezbollah may be operating, using the excuse that these areas were private property or exclusive LAF areas. According to UNIFIL’s own statements and the revelations in the WSJ video referred to in the beginning, it has not even been able to prevent armed individuals from Hezbollah other armed groups from operating in the vicinity of UNIFIL posts. This means that UNIFIL involuntarily has acted as a shield for armed groups and their activities, thus actually confirming Israeli accusations, and explaining why IDF has to carry out operations that may have endanger UNIFIL personnel. Making the condemnations of IDF’s so-called attacks on UNIFIL post rather hypocritical. It must be concluded that UNIFIL has been completely impotent to fulfil the most important parts of its mission, and that it has met resistance in carrying even mundane patrol tasks. Examples also indicate that the cooperation with LAF has been limited and in some cases rather precarious. For what it is worth the impression is supported by statement from an unnamed member of the Finish contingent to UNIFIL in 2023-2024: “In my own personal opinion, I think UNIFIL is a failure. A lot of the forces are composed of 3rd world countries who are there merely because the UN pays them. They drive around in MRAPS or other armored vehicles with bad visibility, foot patrols were no longer allowed after the conflict started so they cant see shit on their patrols. Some countries were also not performing their patrols, they would drive somewhere and wait for a few hours, then drive back to base and say the completed the patrol. We were tasked on a few occasions to patrol the sectors of other countries and report how many patrols we saw because the higher ups in Naqoura HQ didnt trust them. The Lebanese army is incapable of stopping Hezbollah. They drive in humvees that break down uphill or cant drive too slowly because the car will die otherwise. Some guys were actually competent, but there were guys that seemed to not want to work with us. They would refuse to drive certain paths claiming it was dangerous, they would take wrong turns, they got mad when we took photos of weapons we found. Also all patrol paths are sent to the Lebanese army, they know which route and which time well drive it. This information is almost certainly relayed to Hezbollah, so they know to avoid us or hide their stuff. To my understanding Israel is also informed about our patrols as to avoid them shooting at us. The most UNIFIL has done is stimulate the local economy. Also the CIMIC guys are able to help out local villages with infrastructure and projects. The whole operation is a taxpayer funded holiday.” (Reddit October 2024). (https://www.reddit.com/r/geopolitics/comments/1g1ze2p/what_falls_under_unifils_responsibility_why_is_it/). UNIFIL has lost its purpose and ought to be withdrawn From what we have seen it is evident that UNIFIL has never been able to fulfil its mission, especially the most important parts of the mission called for in resolution 1701. One may thus conclude that although UNIFIL’s mission ought to have been extremely important to help preserve the peace in the area, they have never had the wherewithal and the ROE’s (Rules of Engagement to fulfil this mission) to fulfil their mission as peacekeepers. This also seems to be the view of Italy’s Defence Chief of Staff, General Luciano Portolan: “The mandate issued for UNIFIL is adequate. What is not adequate, and what has often created frustration for me, including with the local population, are the rules of engagement, which are not proportional to the tasks assigned to the force, including the capacity and the need to disarm armed groups in Lebanon, in this case Hezbollah," (Interview Rai's 'In Mezzora' program, on Sunday October 13, 2024). Still, the presence UNIFIL and its interaction with the warring parties and Lebanese authorities, may have acted as damper on the ongoing conflict between armed groups in Lebanon and Israeli forces. Although this effect clearly has clearly been inadequate, as evidenced by the flare up of the conflicts time after time. In fact, the main dampening effect on the conflict, may not have been UNIFIL, but the existence of a kind of scary balance between Israel, wanting to prevent a constant Hezbollah barrage of rockets raining down over Israel’s north, and on the other hand a Hezbollah and their main supporter Iran, being scared of all-out war with Israel, as it might mean their loss of power in Lebanon or even their destruction. As perhaps evidenced in the fights going on today. So, in a possible future after the existing conflict, the Security Council would either have to think and plan for a much more forceful UN force in Lebanon, able to carry out its mission to much larger degree than the present UNIFIL force. Or alternatively pull out impotent UNIFIL force, leaving perhaps just a group able to continue humanitarian assistance to people in Southern Lebanon. Is the IDF operation providing UNIFIL with a chance to fulfil its mission? In fact, if IDF forces during the ongoing conflict succeeds in rooting out vital parts of Hezbollah’s armed forces in Southern Lebanon (like the PLO in 1978), it might actually provide the Security Council with the possibility of establishing a UNIFIL force with a strong ROE, and a much greater chance upholding peace in Southern Lebanon after Israel’s withdrawal. Perhaps this might actually be what Israel wants to achieve with the present operation. Removing the essential threat from Hezbollah’s armed wing, and providing a new UNIFIL with the possibility of establishing a real peacekeeping UNIFIL mission, instead of having it acting as an impotent replica of real peacekeepers. Perhaps this is exactly the intention behind Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz’s October 16 Tweet on X: “The State of Israel places great importance on the activities of @UNIFIL_ and has no intention of harming the organization or its personnel. Furthermore, Israel views UNIFIL as playing an important role in the "day after" following the war against Hezbollah. It is the Hezbollah terrorist organization that uses UNIFIL personnel as "human shields," deliberately firing at IDF soldiers from locations near UNIFIL positions in order to create friction So, instead of hypocritically condemning Israel’s present actions and stubbornly attempting to keep in place an impotent UNIFIL force, that has to hide in protective bunkers during the conflict, one could argue that UNIFIL should be pulled back, and not be used to obstruct the present IDF operation in Lebanon. A cabal suddenly dumps Biden A cabal is defined as a small group of people, who are involved in secret plans to get political power, and lo and behold a small cabal of Democrats suddenly decided to give up all previously orchestrated pretence of unity behind Biden, shortly after having democratically chosen Biden as their Presidential nominee. The cabal gave up pretence that president Biden was mentally fit for a second term as president, even though they must have known for long time that he certainly was not fit for four more years. When people began to question the wisdom of pretending that President Biden was fit for office and even for four more years, liberal media and even members of the cabal scolded those daring to question Bidens mental acuity. On June 4, 2024 the Wall Street Journal dared question Biden’s ability to stand four more years, arguing that behind closed doors people were seeing that Biden showed signs of slipping. Nancy Pelosi immediately sprang to the defence of Biden, even though she must have known better. On X/Twitter she wrote “Many of us spent time with @WSJ to share on the record our first-hand experiences with @POTUS, where we see his wisdom, experience, strength and strategic thinking, … Instead, the Journal ignored testimony by Democrats, focused on attacks by Republicans and printed a hit piece.” Then came the infamous Biden vs Trump debate on ABC on June 27. After that all pretence was in vain, denial was tried, but no one seem to listen anymore. The Bifurcation jump The Democratic cabal (members would have included Pelosi and the Obamas), suddenly realised that there was no chance that Biden would win the election, leading them to hasty nefarious action. It certainly cannot have been their realization that Biden was not fit for office, as they must have known for some time that he wasn’t. Instead, they now must have realised that the game was up, that they could no longer cheat the voters, that the Democrats had no chance of winning with Biden. And thus, the cabal went into action. Forcing an angry Biden to give up and stand down, and pulling like magician a Kamala Harris out of a hat, that most believed was completely empty. She hadn’t stood as a candidate for nomination, but was pushed upon the stage accompanied by the cabal’s appeal that everyone help to confirm her as a presidential candidate. Democracy and the usual presidential nomination process was pushed aside, timing was everything. The strange process was criticized rather eloquently by nonother than the man hiding a dead bear pup in the park, Robert F. Kennedy: “How did the Democratic Party choose a candidate who has never done an interview or a debate during the entire election cycle? We know the answers. They did it by weaponizing government agencies. They did it by abandoning democracy…They did it by silencing the opposition and by disenfranchising American voters. What most alarms me isn’t how the Democratic Party conducts its internal affairs or runs its candidates. What alarms me is the resort to censorship and media control and the weaponization of federal agencies.” (Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (New York Post, August 25, 2024). Right, one might get the impression that what happened, looked strangely like the secret leader selection processes in autocratic countries. The cabal’s hasty choice of Kamala Harris must mean that they hoped that Democrats in desperation would be willing to take the proverbial “Leap of Faith,” where you want the people to believe in something that is not easily to be believed for a rational mind. But that’s what the cabal did, and as it seems for the moment with some success, although it is still a very flimsy construction of positive sounding verbiage and vibe, that may expand like a lighter than air hot air balloon. An up-up-and-away-the-air thing, where substance presumably will follow. Like a contest among children in a playground … The presidential election campaign in the U.S. seems unbelievable childish, funny perhaps, but certainly lacking in substance. Take an example from the Trump-Biden presidential debate, where they suddenly discussed their proficiency playing golf. Ending with Trump saying: “let’s not act like children”, and Biden retorting: You are a child.” A visible confused and angry Biden later even calling Trump “sucker” and “loser.” Well, the change to a Trump- Harris fight does not seem to have elevated the interchange much from a playground level. At his recent new press conference at Bedminster, flanked by grocery items like Wonder Bread and Campbell’s Soup, wanted to attack Kamala Harris for not tackling the recent inflation, certainly a relevant subject. But then he descended into child mode here and there, when calling Kamala Harris “not smart.” When asked if he wasn’t expected to focus on policy. He actually argued like child might have done, that she had attacked him personally, thus “I think I'm entitled to personal attacks.” On the other side the Harris campaign had already chosen child mode, when sending out fake a “Media Advisory” with this headline: “Donald Trump to Ramble Incoherently and Spread Dangerous Lies in Public, but at a Different Home.” Afterwards the Harris campaign also posted this: “We aren’t sure what we just watched and neither is America,” (The Hill) Wonder if this is how the rest of the presidential campaign is going to be conducted. Which in a way would be rather stupid, as both candidates seem to have large fairly loyal groups of partisan voters, while the election may be decided by those who are less partisan, those having not made up their mind, and thus perhaps susceptible to more hardnosed political and factual arguments. For the moment though it looks as if the campaigns of Harris and Trump is like jousting match on very small horses, armed rubber lances. Unfortunately, it seems as if mainstream media is enjoying the joust, just playing along and focusing on the most outrageous childish displays by the two candidates and their veeps. But there are important differences between the combatants, with Harris seemingly acting with what must be for Trump an almost unbearable lightness, while Trump seems to rely on his well-worn boisterous aggressiveness. The lightness of Kamalaon changes When Kamala (lotus flower in Sanskrit) apparently pronounced “comma-la” suddenly and rather unexpectedly entered the presidential campaign, it was if collective sigh of relief was heard from the Democrats, and suddenly the presidential campaign evoked youthful enthusiasm. Animated in curious way by Charli XCX, an English hyperpop singer/songwriter, when she tweeted “kamala IS brat.” Suddenly it seemed it could be a very light hearted funny lime-green brat summer. Not the least on Tik Tok. What is a brat? An unruly badly behaving child, like spoiled brat? No, it must be the Charli XCX brat: “You’re just like that girl who is a little messy and likes to party and like maybe says some like dumb things sometimes who like feels herself but then also maybe has a breakdown but then kinda like parties through it, is very honest, is very blunt, a little bit volatile, yeah, like does like dumb things, but like it’s brat, you’re brat, that’s brat.” (Charli XCX). Then there is the unbelievable stupid coconut meme thing. In a 2023 speech Kamala Harris wanted to emphasize the importance of being part of a community, rather than in an isolated silo. Taking an argument for her mother: “My mother used to—she would give us a hard time sometimes, and she would say to us, ‘I don’t know what’s wrong with young people. You think you just fell out of a coconut tree?’” Perhaps fittingly the quote is from Glamour magazine. The result, coconut memes all over the place, mostly completely meaningless, but sense does not seem to be necessary in young people’s exuberance While this also rather child-like brat thing and non-sensical coconut memes may have created a ballooning enthusiasm among young voters and people too young to vote, one would hope that something else explains the current democratic high-spirited enthusiasm. Is it a kind re-enacted “California dreaming” thing? During the Biden Trump jousting match, the outlook for Biden turned increasingly sinister, more and more it looked as if Trump might win the election in November. The mood among Democrats turned sour, they were looking a kind cold, grey and losing future. The mood must have hit rock-bottom after the Biden-Trump debate, when the careful constructed Potemkin facade of Biden’s phenomenal mental abilities crashed to the ground. A Democratic cabal in desperation then pulled VP Kamala Harris out of hat, and oh wonder, suddenly within days the dark mood lifted, a new sunlit California Dreaming vision exploded with a laughing, high spirited happy Kamala, probably unable to grasp what just happened. Trump – From a shot in ear to sombre aggressiveness On July 13 Trump was speaking a campaign rally in Butler Pennsylvania, when the Gods were smiling at him, or was it just a coincidence, that the sniper just hit Trumps right ear? Any way what is remembered from the shooting, is Trump’s fast reactions, with blood gushing down from his ear, he pushed himself from the tight protective embrace of secret service agents, raised his right fist in air, from some angles with stars and stripes seen in air behind him, and [inaudible] yelled “fight” three times, while pumping fist in the air. To some a sign of an irrepressible fighter, symbolized in so many Hollywood movies, that it would have stirred the hearts and minds of many, and of one in particular, Elon Musk, who took to X writing “I fully endorse President Trump and hope for his rapid recovery.” The shot in the ear brought a new enthusiasm social media and in the Trump campaign just up to the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee. There was even talk of a changed Trump “GOP allies, in roughly a dozen interviews, used words like “emotional” and “serene” — even “spiritual” — to describe Trump in the days since the attempt on his life. A person close to the former president’s family described him taking on “humility, in the biblical sense.” (Politico). With Biden torn to shreds in mainstream media after their sudden irreversible 180 degree turn on Biden, the shot in ear and the new Trump enthusiastic VP candidate, the prospect were starting to look bright for the Trump campaign, to dismay of liberal media, now grudgingly preparing themselves, like political leaders everywhere for a future Trump presidency. Then on July 21 the pin prick from President Biden in letter on X, announcing his standing down as presidential candidate, and later his short text endorsing Kamala Harris to the nominee. The pin prick announcement first meant little, but days later changed the whole mood of the Trump campaign, after the wave of enthusiasm following Kamala Harris. With little political noise and mostly welcomed by liberal media, a virtual rollcall confirmed Kamala Harris as the Democratic presidential nominee, on August 2. No wonder that Trump felt cheated by a Democratic cabal forcing Biden off the race and lifting VP Kamala Harris up upon the stage. The Trump campaign lashed out almost immediately: “Kamala Harris — the least popular vice president in modern US history — has just officially been installed as the presumptive Democrat nominee for president without a single vote cast in her name,” it said. “In a process more reminiscent of communist China, Democrat elites deposed their previous nominee when their coverup of his decline was no longer tenable, then coronated Kamala in the least democratic way possible,” (News 18, August 3, 2024) Trump himself, no longer serene and spiritual, lashed out in anger in a mass email: “24 HOURS UNTIL WE UNLEASH HELL. At this time tomorrow, Crooked Kamala’s worst nightmares come true. When I take the rally stage in DEEP BLUE Atlanta to a packed house with THOUSANDS of MAGA Patriots, she won’t be able to hide from the truth any longer. Tomorrow, I step on stage and deliver Open Border Czar Kamala Harris the WORST defeat of her failed political career.” The old boisterous aggressive Trump was certainly back at the rally in Atlanta on August 4: “If Harris wins this election, you will quickly have a Kamala economic crash. You’re going to have a crash. You could also have a crash like in 1929, more specifically, because that’s where we’re headed. When we win, you will rapidly see a brand new Trump economic boom. It’s going to be booming like it was four years ago … But with four more years of Kamala the California socialist, you know she destroyed San Francisco? Then she destroyed the whole state. Look at what’s going on in California, with your family and our country, it’ll never recover”… Harris has the most ultra-left-wing agenda of any presidential candidate ever in history. There’s never been anybody like this. She is considered more left-wing than crazy Bernie Sanders. Look at her. She’s worse than Bernie, and she happens to be really a low-IQ individual. She really does. She has a very low IQ.” (Transcript of Trump’s speech in Atlanta) Calling her and her team grossly incompetent, he warned that we would end up in World War III, no less. Trump back in his old form, denigrating, personal, and abhorrent to many. Will it work like in 2016 or more like in 2020? Scaring away the undecided voters, and only reinforcing the views of the already die-hard Trumpian voters? A hasty superficial glance at the campaigns here in August shows a sunlit ballooning of enthusiasm for Kamala Harris and a red faced, angry and gloomy Trumpian campaign appearing to have lost momentum, slowly sinking backwards in the polls. The Wall Street Journal, even doubting the energizing effect of Trumps foremost tools, in the shape of campaign rallies. “Trump rallies have become like Grateful dead concerts, with many of the same deadheads, now Trumpians showing up.” “Is the game over for Donald Trump?” The Hill asked in an opinion piece on August 14, pointing to Trump’s decline in the polls “After a year and a half commanding the headlines and coasting toward a general election victory, Trump’s campaign now seems to be falling apart in every way imaginable. Judging by his private fury, Trump is well aware that his moment is slipping away.” (The Hill, August 14, 2024.). It might look that way. Mainstream media, that a short time ago were getting used to Trump winning the presidency, now eyeing the distinct possibility that he might lose, and mainstream liberal media is ready contribute in any way possible to his downfall. Getting back in their old role of supreme Trump bashers. Suddenly giving their best to elevate a former colourless and drab VP Kamala Harris to level, they would have sworn she could never achieve. Just take look back to June 2024. At the time a “POLITICO/Morning consult poll reveals that only a third of voters think it’s likely Harris would win an election were she to become the Democratic nominee, and just three of five Democrats believe she would prevail. A quarter of independents think she would win.” (Politico, June 12, 2024). She had the same poor rating as President Biden, with Kamala Harris at 52% unfavourable, and 42% favourable. A recent poll also showed that voters strongly disapprove her handling of the job as VP. Now, suddenly liberal media accept to support a very light and flimsy, almost not there Kamala political agenda. Doesn’t matter that substance is lacking, as long it helps bring Trump down in the polls. And it works, doesn’t it? Just take a look at polls. Ballooning Kamala enthusiasm in the polls? Well, polling is here to stay so let us see what they say about the combatant at this moment in time. Later we will take a lot at the substance, that is to say what Kamala Harris and Trump have to say on topics important to the voters. With Kamala Harris as the Democratic nominee, it is as if a spring of enthusiasm among Democrats has been released. Take a lot at the Monmouth University polling in August: Enthusiasm among voters in general has jumped from lacklustre 48% in June to 68% in early August. And democratic voters have almost gone through the roof with a jump from 46% to 85%. Even among independents enthusiasm is on the rise. While the previous existing high level of enthusiasm among the Republicans has turned flat at the high level of 71%. PEW Research have also looked at the favourability of the Kamala Harris and Donald Trump among U.S. adults. Here the percentages who say they have a favourable or unfavourable opinion of Kamala Harris and Donald Trump: It evident that the favourability of Kamala Harris Kamala Harris has taken a decisive upturn in August, while Trumps jump favourability is less pronounced. Looking at democratic and Republican voters, the changes become more pronounced. More like the enthusiasm picture in the Monmouth poll. What is evident is the polarization among Democrats and Republican. Kamala Harris judged by Republicans results in unfavourability rating of 89%, while Trumps unfavourability among democrats stand at 92%. The Economist election tracker hub show the changes in voting intention over time showing the abrupt change when Biden left the field. Here the version from August 29. The euphoric rise for Kamala Harris is evident, while the intention to vote for Trump takes a dip. A another look at who at who is leading overall in the polls at the moment confirms a steadily rising lead for Kamala Harris, While Donald Trump seems to tread water at the same level or even lower level. Here view of changes up to the August 18. (New York Times, (September 1, 2024): Kamala Harris at 49%, with Trump trailing at 46%, but note the spread in the polls. The picture confirms what we have seen above, a very marked rise for Kamala Harris compared to earlier. While Donald Trump seems to slide downwards ever so slightly since Kamala Harris became Democratic nominee. What have here is just today’s overall picture, and it just shows that the expected euphoric rise for the surprise nominee, after a Democrat cabal pulled their rabbit-out-of-the-hat trick. And a lightweight it certainly is. The euphoria may wear out in the coming days when Kamala Harris will have to put some substance into the euphoria. The overall poll of voting intentions may not even be very interesting giving that each party is counting on a number of safe states, meaning that election may be decided in the so-called battleground or swing states. This is where the real battles for votes take place. In 2024 there seems to be 7 to 10 battleground states. Often emphasized are Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, Georgia. In addition, it is important to remember the special electoral college system used to decide the presidential election. When voters in each state vote for a Presidential candidate, they aren’t actually voting for President. They instead telling the State which candidate they want your State to vote for at the meeting of electors. The States use these general election results (also known as the popular vote) to appoint their electors. Every State is allocated a number of electoral votes equal to the number of Senators and Representatives in its U.S. Congressional delegation—two votes for its Senators in the U.S. Senate plus a number of votes equal to the number of its Congressional districts, with District of Columbia allocated 3. There are thus 538 (100 + 435 +3) electors in the college. Meaning that a majority of 270 is required to elect the President. Five battleground states have the following numbers of electors Pennsylvania 19, Michigan 15, Wisconsin 10, Arizona 11, and Georgia 16. But they have inordinate influence on the election. What is picture for Kamala Harris and Donald Trump in the battleground states at this moment in time? New York Times had the following picture on August 14 (NYT, August 14, 2024). If the Kamala Harris and Donald Trump win in their so-called safe states, it would mean that Kamal Harris would need 44 electoral votes from the Toss up battleground states, while Donald Trump would need only 35. (According the New York Times). On September 1 it would seem that Harris may for the moment have a little advantage in some of the swing states, but it remains a tossup. Meaning that the whole election is still up in the air. That’s why it may be more important to see, how they are polling on issues important to the votes. Polling everywhere – all the rage and no regrets? “Kamala Harris is more trusted than Donald Trump on the US economy!” says a Financial Times polling (FT headline, August 11, 20224). A small sensation that was repeated everywhere in the media. Now what did poll the Financial Times-Michigan Ross Nationwide poll conducted in beginning of August, actually show? Actually, Trump scores about the same as earlier. New is that Kamal Harris scores somewhat higher than Biden earlier, even though they must have represented the same economic policies. So, what is new? Perhaps the voters have caught a glimpse of Kamala Harris vague, but rather light blue from the sky promises in relation to combatting inflation, while Trump is messing about in the same way he always does. On the other hand, and perhaps a little confusing take a look at the following: Compare this with: Although the topic has changed, it does look a little different, as opinion here has shifted back to Trump. How about other important subjects. Well, an Associated Press/NORC Research Center Survey also found surprising results, when asking how Democrats and Republicans viewed Kamala Harris and Donald Trump on series of subjects. For instance in these rankings: Take Honesty, where just 52% of Republicans would describe Donald Trump as honest, while 79% of Democrats would describe Kamala Harris as honest. A similar spread is found i relation to Committed to democracy and being Disciplined, less distance in relation Cares about people like you. The distance narrows for Vision for the country, and Capable of handling crises. Astonishing, only 71% of Republicans see Trump as a Strong leader, while 85% the Democrats now see Harris as a Strong leader. Less astonishing are the next scores on topics like Issues related to race and racial inequality with Trump at 60% and Harris at 89% No surprises in relation to Abortion, but take a look at next topics, where it certainly looks as if Democrats, previously having a rather low opinion of Kamal Harris abilities, have undergone a volte-face or had a great revelation (perhaps even an epiphany) in their view of Kamala Harris Take the War in Ukraine, suddenly the Democrats seem to see competence, although where this comes from remains a mystery The score on Crime might explained by her previous role as Attorney General in California. But look at the sensational values for The economy, Immigration and even The war in Gaza, where Republicans are less optimistic with regard to Trump, than the suddenly exuberant Democrats are in relation to Kamala Harris abilities. Now take a look back a few months and remember how Democrats rated Kamala Harris VP. “Harris faces pessimism about her future role in the party from a bloc of Democrats and a far larger share of independents. The poll found that a majority of voters don’t view Harris as a strong leader (48 percent to 42 percent). Nor do they see her as trustworthy (46 percent to 43 percent). She performed relatively well on popular liberal issues like Health care, Gender inequality and LGBTQ+ rights, but is well below a majority in terms of how much voters trust her to handle Immigration (40 percent), Relations with China (37 percent) and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (35 percent).” (Politico, June 12, 2024). The ugly duckling has metamorphosed into a marvelous, cackling swan, with an unbelievable sudden spread of imaginary wings effortless carrying the swan higher and higher. Within a span of few weeks Kamala Harris became a political star, igniting a kind of Kamalamania: “Political power of joy, giving rise to effervescent vibes. Democrats resigned to a “grim death march” toward certain defeat, as one national organizer put it, felt their gloom replaced by a jolt of hope.” (A democratic organizer in The Hill). Is that what it is, are these strange vole-faces in the polls, simply indicating jolts of hope, not founded on experience and acts, but on sheer vibes. Leading to a re-invention of Kamala Harris, that conveniently erases her past as ugly duckling VP. And polls like these may in fact reinforce the vibe. In that their eye-catching headlines in liberal media may influence opinion, and help persuade undecided voters to trust Kamala Harris more with almost every topic rated in this selection of polls and surveys. There is a clear risk, that such headline reporting, will confirm beliefs that might actually be based more on wishful thinking, than factuals, leading/persuading undecided voters to trust something that has the eerily quality of a dream. Meaning that unfounded ideas and opinions reflected in polls may have a real effect on facts so to speak, and if that happens it would be a problem, confirming voter’s belief in unfunded political statements and their positive representation in the media. In essence making such polls strengthen superficial vibes and trends, confirming fiction as facts, while journalistic focus, reality and objectivity will be pushed into background. A somewhat different picture is painted in a Redfield& Winton/ The Telegraph poll on a series of important issues in the battleground states (Redfield& Winton Strategies, August 19, 2024).. The contrast to the previous survey it is evident. Now the result sems to confirm the previous prejudices in relation to Kamal Harris and Donald Trump. Perhaps even having a female/male slant. Harris and Trump on high priority issues for voters Let us see what policies and promises Kamala Harris and Donald Trump are serving us and the voters in relation the issues that are important to the voters. From the previous Financial Times-Michigan Ross Nationwide poll conducted in beginning of August we get this list prioritized issues (FT headline, August 11, 2024): Let us take a look at the how the Kamala Harris and Donald Trump have treated and are treating a few of these important issues. Kamala Harris on the economy: Strange ideas and loose promises Inflation has been and continues in certain areas to be a big issue, even though overall inflation is declining, as can be gleaned from this graph. Inflation rate (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics): But it might be important to have a look at the components. This table from Tradingeconomics.com, shows high core inflation (where food and energy prices are taken out,) and even higher rent inflation: What does Kamala Harris, VP have to say about inflation and how to fight it. Here her convoluted and unbearable light on substance answer as VP in 2021: "Let's start with this: Prices have gone up, and families and individuals are dealing with the realities of — that bread costs more, that gas costs more," Harris said. "And we have to understand what that means. That's about the cost of living going up. That's about having to stress and stretch limited resources. That's about a source of stress for families that is not only economic but is on a daily level something that is a heavy weight to carry … So that is something that we take very seriously, very seriously. And we know from the history of this issue in the United States that when you see these prices go up, it has a direct impact on the quality of life for all people in our country. So it's a big issue, and we take it seriously, and it is a priority, therefore." (Fox Business, August 5, 2024). So, has she since then become any clearer on inflation and economics? On Friday August 16, 2024, she at least revealed some of her plans for economic policies. On inflation she seems to rely on a rather simpleminded approach. Here in her own words from the rally in Raleigh on August 16. “When I am elected president, I will make it a top priority to bring down costs and increase economic security for all Americans. As president, I will take on the high costs that matter most to most Americans, like the cost of food … A lo- — a loaf of bread costs 50 percent more today than it did before the pandemic. Ground beef is up almost 50 percent. Many of the big food companies are seeing their highest profits in two decades. And while many grocery chains pass along these savings, others still aren’t. As attorney general in California, I went after companies that illegally increased prices, including wholesalers that inflated the price of prescription medication and companies that conspired with competitors to keep prices of electronics high. I won more than $1 billion for consumers. So, believe me, as president, I will go after the bad actors. And I will work to pass the first-ever federal ban on prou- — price gauging [gouging] on food. My plan will include new penalties for opportunistic companies that exploit crises and break the rules, and we will support smaller food businesses that are trying to play by the rules and get ahead.“ (Transcript from Kamala Harris Raleigh speech). So, inflation is caused by bad actors, not by government polices (like for instance the Inflation reduction Act?) initiated by the Biden/Harris. Strange? And her remedy is even stranger. Apparently, she sees some price rises as resulting from some kind of criminal activity, and exploitation by big companies. The remedy according to her, would seem to include some kind of price control, fixed prices, and criminal investigation of what she calls illegal conspirations to raise prices. “Notice there is no talk about disinflation, but an ambition to bring down prices and some specific areas where Harris would like to act. Taken literally, this is a call for the Fed and other parts of government to lower the price level and seek deflation. If this were literally true, the only valid response would be, “you cannot be serious”. (FT, August 13, 2024) Still convoluted and unbearable light on substance, it is no wonder that her suggestions have been torn apart. Wall Street Journal writing: “Fixing prices is a recipe for shortages, as controls would discourage grocery suppliers. Voilà, empty store shelves. Price controls have led to shortages everywhere they’ve been tried, from Moscow to Caracas.” Kamala Harris has also proposed remedy for many young families unable to afford a home due to the Biden/Harris inflation, is simple. “Harris wants to provide $25,000 in down payment assistance for first-time home buyers and is calling for the creation of three million new housing units within the next four years, proposing a tax credit for developers who build starter homes and investing $40 million in an innovation fund to tackle the housing crisis.” (Forbes, August 16, 2024) Conveniently forgetting or not realizing that this may drive home prices even higher. Like a proverbial Father Christmas Kamal Harris continues in a verbal gift giving or rather promising mood. She wants to provide families with an expanded $3,600 child tax credit with an extra bonus raised to $6,000 for new-borns. Costing according to WSJ more than $1.2 trillion over a ten-year period. Ah, taxes, she will also lighten taxes for low-income jobs, and stealing a popular idea from Donald Trump, she also wants to get rid of taxes on tips, although it would seem only to a certain degree. And there is more. On health care she also wants to lighten burden with expanding subsidies for Affordable Health Care plans. Then there are ideas for paid leave, and minimum wages, and price limits on prescription drug prices. In Economics at least we may conclude that is she still just as convoluted and unbearable light on substance, as when she got entangled in her own explanation of inflation. No wonder that most commentators seem to agree with Wall Street Journal’s conclusion: “The ideas she claimed as her own Friday reveal a candidate whose economic judgment is deeply flawed.” (WSJ, August 16, 2024). Over to Trump on inflation and economic plans Donald Trump on the economy – exclamation marks and much more The short version of Trumpnomics is found in a Bloomberg interview (Bloomberg Businessweek, July 16, 2024), which actually was quite sensible, with less rambling than usual. Here in nutshell are some Trump’s economic plans: “Low interest rates and taxes, low taxes, tremendous incentive to get things done, and to bring business back to our country. And if you have to use tariffs and other economic means to do it, that’s fine. We have to do to other countries what they’ve been doing to us for 50 years, for 100 years. We have to bring business back to our country.2 (Bloomberg Businessweek, July 16, 2024). What Trumps plan is sorely lacking are concrete measures and policies. Take inflation for instance. Trump’s plans for curbing inflation, have had little substance, they are more a kind of one-line shouts. To curb price rises on gasoline, his simple solution has been to shout “drill baby, drill” to promote the U.S. oil production. Since gasoline prices have actually come way down, and inflation on the whole seems to declining in the U.S. at the moment. something else might in fact be needed. No matter. In very strange ways Trump serves us with outburst on inflation with curious focus on the price of bacon in one instance and on typical groceries in his Bedminster talk, where groceries were arranged on tables beside his desk, although he did not actually talk much about groceries and the prices. In Trumps long talk with Musk, they actually talked about inflation. Musk providing several relevant cues related to problem with inflation to Trump, arguing that inflation is effectively “a tax on people that save money, who ran off course with them. “ (Bloomberg interview). And of cause Trump has strong words on inflation: “It’s a disaster with inflation, the inflation. It doesn’t matter what you make. The inflation is eating you alive. If you’re a worker or if you’re a just a middle-income person, you can’t afford, you know, four years ago, five years ago, people were saving a lot of money. Today, they’re using all their money and borrowing money just to live. It’s a horrible thing that’s happening. And we’ll end that.” Then he got the price of bacon: “You know, when I look at bacon costing five, four or five times more than it did a few years ago, when you look at some of the food products and groceries, those people go, they can’t believe it. They used to be able to buy a whole cart and today, you know, a lot of people just don’t have the money. They go in and they can’t buy anything.” Now it might interesting to hear how Trump would bring an already sinking inflation down and keep it down. What we have found are arguments that might actually bring inflation up, and at the same time some loose ideas for bringing inflation down. Trump the businessman is all for deregulation to bring prices down and promote growth. For making housing more affordable as “So 50% of the housing costs today and in certain areas like, you know, a lot of these crazy places is environmental, is bookkeeping, is all of those restrictions. Building permits. Tremendous [restriction].” We get it, deregulation in housing market and in business is one of Trumps solutions to bring prices down. Here Trump certainly has point, but deregulation may be a very difficult political project to carry out. Then we have one of Trumps big pet projects. Trump’s plans for high tariffs on Chinese goods. A 50% and 60% tariff has been mentioned in the media. The problem is that a high tariff on cheap Chinese goods, would result higher prices for. U.S. consumers having to spend more to buy the Chinese goods or finding costlier U.S. made goods. Thus, contributing to inflation. But perhaps Trump tariff plays are not quite as simple-minded as those criticizing his ideas think. “Tariffs do two things. Economically, they’re phenomenal. And a lot of people will say, Oh, that’s terrible. It’s very dangerous when you say that because you probably have your views and a lot. I can’t believe how many people are negative on tariffs that are actually smart people. It does two things: Economically, it’s great. And man, is it good for negotiation. I’ve had guys, I’ve had countries, that were potentially extremely hostile coming to me and say, ‘Sir, please stop with the tariffs. Stop.’ They would do anything.” (Bloomberg Businessweek, July 16, 2024). Perhaps this is where we find the real Trump advantage in relation to economics. He is playing a pragmatic power game to bring about the best possible deal. And remember the Biden administration actually continued the Trumpian tariff play. So maybe there is more to Trump, than boisterous blustering and exaggerating his case. Whether it’s about bacon or China tariffs. Perhaps this is also the case with his much criticized talk about having a say in The Fed’s (The Federal Reserve Board) interest rate setting. Trump arguing at Mar-a-Largo press conference: “I feel that the President should have at least say in there, yeah, I feel that strongly, … I think I have a better instinct than, in many cases, people that would be on the Federal Reserve, or the chairman.” As usual Trump is wont to go too far in loud exaggerations and exclamations. No wonder The Economist thinks that Trumps‘s comments on inflation and the Fed thing can be summarized by the phrase: “I’m the best.” (Economist, August 13, 2024). Kamal Harris on the border – change of policies and empty promises On March 24, 2021 President Biden officially tasked VP Kamala Harris “to lead our efforts with Mexico and the Northern Triangle…in stemming the movement of…migration to our southern border.” Making her the “border czar.” Thus, giving her the responsibility to alleviate the long-standing border problem related to the growing number of illegal immigrants. The border czar failed miserably in the task allotted to her. All she did apparently was telling people not to come. It is evident that her “Don’t come” warning did not work. The stats for the number of encounters at the borders from 2021 to 2024, stands little more that 8 million. Which certainly might be seen as a serious problem FY Southwest land Border Encounters for the years 2021 to 2024 (cbp.gov): So, what is her plans, now she has become Democratic presidential nominee? In a rally at Glendale in Arizona on August 9, 2024 she ignored her own failings as border czar and tried to convince people that as president she would go tough on the border. To help in her efforts to convince people she played the tough public prosecutor. “I was attorney general of a border state. I went after the transnational gangs, the drug cartels and the human traffickers, … I prosecuted them in case after case and I won, so I know what I’m talking about.” She confessed that the present immigration system was broken and argued that she knew what it would take to fix it. A comprehensive reform with strong border security and an earned pathway to citizenship.” Why people should now believe that she would do a better job as president on migration, than when the border problem was more or less her only major task, beggar’s belief. What she and her team is doing is trying do is to paint a completely new version Kamal Harris, with carefully orchestrated airy string of Potemkin like promises, and with her strutting on scene full of words and sound that actually signify … nothing. Trump as drastic as ever on migration and the border First the famous chart made by Trump assistants that apparent saved his life, as he turned to point at a board showing this chart, at the moment the shots were fired at the Butler rally. The Chart demonstrates Trump had more success limiting the border encounters than President Biden and his border czar administration. One caveat though, the low point marked with red arrow, is found during the Corona epidemic, which lowered border crossings.
And trump certainly still has his focus on the migrants streaming across the Southern land border. In the Bloomberg interview he again went over the top, when getting to migration: “Now, one of the things happening is that millions of people that are flowing in are costing the country a fortune, on top of all this. This is a new phenomenon. And I would say, you know, some people say it’s 16 million, 17 million, some people say it’s 9 million, 10 million. The 9 million, 10 million are way off 1. It could be much, it could be more than 17. It could be 20 million, but it certainly will be probably 20 million by the time this character, who’s the worst president in the history of our country. He’s destroying our country.” (Bloomberg Businessweek, July 16, 2024). As we seen during the Biden administration the number of encounters is a little more than 8 million. Sometimes Trump reminds me of the gas guzzling US cars from the say the sixties, big flashy, covered in chrome, over the top, always exaggerating, just like Trump. And he continues, when characterizing the illegal immigrants streaming over the border, “You have a lot of people that just shouldn’t be. I think it’s a much bigger number than you think. They’re allowing people from their jails. And if you were running one of these countries where they’re coming from, you would have had all of them.” (The Musk-Trump talk). No wonder then that he wants to strengthen the border, but what is he going to do? In interview with Time in April 2024, he vowed he would use drastic remedies, including the largest deportation operation in U.S. history. “Because we have no choice. I don't believe this is sustainable for a country, what's happening to us, with probably 15 million and maybe as many as 20 million by the time Biden's out. Twenty million people, many of them from jails, many of them from prisons, many of them from mental institutions.” (Time April 30, 2024). Trump even wants to the use the National Guard in the operation. Surely, he must realize that that such operation would be almost impossible, politically, legally, and perhaps even stupid. When asked if this is really what he wants, giving this might result in a shortage of workers in several sectors of the economy, he shows a different side. Trump is actually all for immigration: “I want them to come in. I want a lot of people to come in, but they have to come in legally.” And they have to be checked. Of cause, he is also back to his border closing program and wall building to prevent migrants from crossing the border illegally. Remember what he said, when if he wanted to a dictator. “Only for one day. I want to close up the border … After that, then I never want to be a dictator.” (Time April 30, 2024) One gets the impression some of his wild statements is just his kind bravado, his way of showing (off) that he really intends to do something. And perhaps using all the exaggeration he is in a way talking like the way Americans see themselves in movies brash, loud, confident used to having their it their way, Meaning the Trump’s brashness might rime with very well with his core voters. And for them he certainly leaves the impression that he is going to do something, about their big issues like illegal migration. Contrary to Kamal Harris he can also point to his previous border actions like wall-building, stay in Mexico and Title 10 actions to prove that he means business. Kamala Harris on foreign policy, war and peace – and the Schrödingers cat problem? The Biden administration is leaving a trail of serious foreign policy problems, open fires, smouldering war and peace problems in their wake. What has been Kamala Harris’ role in Biden’s policy and actions, if any, and most importantly how would she handle all these problems and wars if she became President? Mostly we are looking at empty space, there is little to show what her role has been in Biden’s foreign policy. While we are mostly in the dark in relation to Kamala Harris possible future foreign policies and war and peace arrangements, it would seem that as VP she has mostly been replicating simple versions of Biden’s dismal foreign policy efforts, the ongoing an escalating proxy war against Russia in Ukraine, the to and fro support for Israel’s war against Hamas and Hezbollah, the uncertain ambiguousness in relation to Iran, the lingering prospect of trade war with China, the loss of influence in Africa, South America and the Middle East, the miserable and unfortunate policies and actions forcing Russia and China closer together, and the inability to do much about North Korea etc. etc. Not really a glowing success of war and peace for the Biden administration. What then is Kamala Harris views, if she any of her own. What we find first seems to paraphrase the Biden position. Looking at Kamala Harris speech at the Munich Security conference in February 2024. First, she asked these rhetorical questions: “Whether it is in America’s interest to continue to engage with the world or to turn inward. Whether it is in our interest to defend longstanding rules and norms that have provided for unprecedented peace and prosperity or to allow them to be trampled. Whether it is in America’s interest to fight for democracy or to accept the rise of dictators. And whether it is in America’s interest to continue to work in lockstep with our allies and partners or go it alone.” (Transcript of Kamala Harris’ speech Munich Security conference in February 2024). Then she answered all positive questions with the expected positive statements. Yes, she believes it is in the fundamental interest of the American people for the United States to fulfil our longstanding role of global leadership. Followed by these assurances and self-gratulatory statements. Commitment to build and sustain alliances that has helped the USA to become the most prosperous and powerful country. An economic vision that has ensured that America’s economy remains the strongest in the world Managed competition with China, standing up to Beijing when necessary and also working together when it serves our interest. “In the Indo-Pacific, we have invested heavily in our alliances and partnerships and created new ones to ensure peace and security and, of course, the free flow of commerce.” Standing with Ukraine: “The skill and the bravery of the people of Ukraine, along with the leadership of President Zelenskyy and the 50-nation coalition the United States has led, has allowed Ukraine to achieve what so many thought was impossible.” Except the outcome is very unsure and the conflict is escalating and getting more dangerous at the moment. On NATO: “NATO is central to our approach to global security. For President Biden and me, our sacred commitment to NATO remains ironclad. And I do believe, as I have said before, NATO is the greatest military alliance the world has ever known.” On Israel “we are working to end the conflict that Hamas triggered on October 7th as soon as possible and ensure it ends in a way where Israel is secure, hostages are released, the humanitarian crisis is resolved, Hamas does not control Gaza, and Palestinians can enjoy their right to security, dignity, freedom, and self-determination.” In addition, the U.S. will work to counter Iran aggression. In passing Kamala Harris also talks about strengthening partnerships in Africa and in the Caribbean. Now Kamala Harris has surprisingly become the Democrats presidential nominee, and in the meantime the conflicts and problems she touched upon in Munich remain not only unresolved, but are becoming more fiery and dangerous, and other smouldering pyres are cropping up here and there with the Houthis, Hezbollahs, Iran and in Africa’s Sahel region. So, what is Kamal Harris stance now. Not much to go on, but some topics popped up in her speech at the Democratic convention in August. Mostly reassuring non-substantial repetitions, though this this time elevating her own foreign credentials. Like this: “We must also be steadfast in advancing our security and values abroad. As vice president, I have confronted threats to our security, negotiated with foreign leaders, strengthened our alliances and engaged with our brave troops overseas. As commander in chief, I will ensure America always has the strongest, most lethal fighting force in the world. And I will fulfil our sacred obligation to care for our troops and their families, and I will always honor and never disparage their service and their sacrifice.” As president she will stand strong with Ukraine, mentioning that she helped mobilize a global response to Russia’s invasion. She will “always stand up for Israel’s right to defend itself,” but we are working to end this war “such that Israel is secure, the hostages are released, the suffering in Gaza ends and the Palestinian people can realize their right to dignity, security, freedom and self-determination.” An endeavour that has proved impossible to realise since 1948. Finally, she vows to stand against the tyrants and dictators of this world: I will never hesitate to take whatever action is necessary to defend our forces and our interests against Iran and Iran-backed terrorists. I will not cozy up to tyrants and dictators like Kim Jong-un, who are rooting for Trump. Who are rooting for Trump. Because, you know, they know — they know he is easy to manipulate with flattery and favors. They know Trump won’t hold autocrats accountable because he wants to be an autocrat himself.” This is what we know about her expressed stance on foreign policy, on war and peace, and mostly it is verbiage, supporting popular liberal Democratic views, but avoiding the difficult question, how she would be able to extricate herself from Biden’s misguided diplomatic efforts and his glaringly lack of success in creating peace, instead leaving the next president ongoing wars, and the smouldering fires in several places. Apart from the saying she will stand up to tyrant dictators, she leaves us guessing how would handle China, the possibly growing problems in relation to Taiwan, not to mention North Korea and Iran. She has many blind spots, and giving her real lack of foreign policy substance, one might expect others will have to fill her empty foreign policy vessel. She might be influenced by the Diplomate Philip H. Gordon, who actually is since 2022 has been serving as “Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to the Vice President of the United States, Kamala Harris.” It would seem that he might have a different view of America’s role in world giving his writings, and thus perhaps indicate that Kamala Harris might be influenced by ideas that might lead her to a revised foreign policy and war and peace approach. As an example, take Philip Gordon’s view of misguided U.S. polices and wars in the Middle East. “The U.S. policy debate about the Middle East suffers from the fallacy that there is an external American solution to every problem, even when decades of painful experience suggest that this is not the case, … And regime change is the worst “solution.” (Philips Gordon, (Quoted inn Boston Review August 26. 2024). Gordon also has suggested new strategies for confronting challenges in the Middle East, including two state solution to Israel Palestine problem, diplomacy to contain Iran, a secure Iraq and Afghanistan, and more outreach to Turkey as a stabilizing force. Perhaps showing the possibility of a different, more realistic foreign policy, more aware of the real limits to a forceful, overconfident and interventionist U.S. foreign policy. But we do not know giving the limited foreign experience of Kamala Harris. That is why we refer to the Schrödinger’s cat-in-box thought experiment used to illustrate a problem in quantum theory. German physicist Erwin Schrödinger imagined placing a cat in a sealed box along with a poisonous substance, that has an equal chance of killing the cat—or not—within an hour. After an hour the cat could be said to be both alive and dead, in a superposition of states, until the box is opened, That act of observation randomly determines whether the cat is alive or dead. Perhaps drawn out a little too far, but it would seem that a future President Kamala Harris foreign policy and much else about her policies would seem at the moment to be in a kind of superposition, being both a Biden continuation with all its problems and something new that even she has no idea about, until and if she opens the foreign policy Schrödinger box as President of the USA. Donald Trump – the surprising peacemaker? In contrast to Kamala Harris, a Donald Trump often portrayed a giving in to seemingly irresponsible and impulsive actions, we at least have his previous foreign policies as guidelines, from which to judge his present ideas. While it is to be expected that a President Kamala Harris in reality will have to be dependent on others to make a foreign policy for her. There is no doubt about who will decide a President Trump’s foreign policy – he will. No doubt his foreign policy will marked by strong words, but given what we have seen in 2017-2020 he will leave no one in doubt that there is a also big stick somewhere. Trump excels in threatening language a lot, but evidently Trump also avoid costly wars. Perhaps we can paraphrase what Trump said about tariffs. “Strong threats do two things. They get attention. And man, is it good for negotiations.” Let us take a look at the present catalogue of war and peace problems and see his ideas for how to handle them. Ukraine war and Russia. First his usual exaggerating boasts on how fast and simply he would end the costly proxy war in Ukraine. “Trump’s proposal consists of pushing Ukraine to cede Crimea and the Donbas border region to Russia, according to people who discussed it with Trump or his advisers and spoke on the condition of anonymity because those conversations were confidential. That approach, which has not been previously reported, would dramatically reverse President Biden’s policy, which has emphasized curtailing Russian aggression and providing military aid to Ukraine.” (Washington Post April 7, 2024). His rather simple solution seems to be that he will be pressuring both parties to negotiations. Russia will be threatened with more support for Ukraine. While Ukraine will be threatened with diminishing support, in order to force them to negotiate. Perhaps we may conclude that for a Trump/Vance administration, the fate of Ukraine will be far less important that other foreign problem areas, which in itself will make Ukraine more likely to accept giving up land for peace. In Trump’s game the Europeans don’t have a say, except perhaps supporting the rebuilding of what is left of Ukraine. The Europeans, who until now have slavishly followed Biden’s “standing with Ukraine as long as it takes,” Trump’s drastic policies may be embarrassing for present leaders in Europe, but they have never presented any good alternative for ending the war, except perhaps longing secretly for some policy an end to a war. A war that may no longer be supported by the people. The NATO question? According to talks with insiders in the Trump campaign, “Trump would not only expect that European countries drastically increase their spending on NATO — his main complaint when he was president — but also undertake what one defense expert familiar with the thinking inside Trump’s national-security advisory circle, Dan Caldwell describes as a “radical reorientation” of NATO.” (Politico July 2, 2024). This plan might include that U.S. keeps its nuclear umbrella over Europe, and keep its main bases. While, the bulk of infantry, armour, logistics and artillery would ultimately pass from American to European hands. It is all a bit speculative, but it seems to fit the Trump/Vance global refocusing on other areas of the World. Especially of cause China. And strangely we may actually judge what a Trump Presidency would mean in relation to China, by looking at what the Chinese would expect. “In the current Chinese assessment, a second Trump term will most likely see a tougher U.S. stance on trade and economic relations with China, leading to further decoupling of the two economies. Earlier this year, Trump floated tariffs of 60% or higher on all Chinese goods and a 10% across-the-board tariffs on goods from all points of origin, as part of his campaign rhetoric.” (Bookings commentary, May 31, 2024). Then there is the Taiwan problem. In the previous mentioned Bloomberg interview Trump was asked: “Would you defend Taiwan against China? Trump: “Look, a couple of things. No. 1, Taiwan. I know the people very well, respect them greatly. They did take about 100% of our chip business 1. I think. [92% of advanced chips]. Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything. Taiwan is 9,500 miles away. It’s 68 miles away from China. A slight advantage, and China’s a massive piece of land, they could just bombard it.” Perhaps we should take that to mean that Trump would find it unrealistic for the U.S. to defend Taiwan, and perhaps even more important, indicating Trumps preference for deals rather than wars. He would presumably focus more on trade deals with Chin, than getting involved in a very risky war to defend Taiwan. Perhaps arguing like Churchill: “Meeting jaw to jaw is better than war.” The Middle East and Israel During Trumps presidency he was a very strong supporter of Israel, tending to ignore the plight of the Palestinians. What he did was something almost magical giving the morass of problems that has confounded every attempt to create solution. Bypassing the Palestinians and going to decisive Arab countries his team brought forth the famous Abraham accords, that would seem to point to a way to create calm in this part of the World. Attempting to establish better relation between Israel and Arabian states, might mean the Palestine problem might be pushed into a calmer negotiation arena, decided not in direct negotiations with the Palestinians, which have never worked, but with Arabian states whose support of lack of it might help create a viable peace. Notice how Trump could give Israel a free hand in some of the occupied areas, and even move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, without actually creating much uproar. Well, then there is Iran, where Trump dropped the JCPOA (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) and instead went for sanctions on Iran. Asked about Iran in the Bloomberg interview Trump referred to his previous actions “When I came in, I saw what was happening, they were on the path to a nuclear weapon. I ended the Iran nuclear deal, which was very important to do, It was the stupidest deal. The problem is Biden has done nothing with it. I ended it. He’s done nothing with it. But we would have had a deal. So they were broke. They didn’t have any money for Hamas. And they had no money for Hezbollah or any of the 28 they call them—organizations of terrors.” (Bloomberg, July 16, 2024). This might not be enough in possible second Trump term. Remembering that now we now have a dangerous, loose axis of US-hostiles consisting of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. What we are missing in Trump’s foreign policy is also the rest of the Worlds big regions, what about the Indian subcontinent, what about Africa, remembering Trump’s previous disinterest, and likewise South America, and the Pacific. What is important to remember is that Trump did not start any new wars, in marked contrast to Biden, but instead negotiated a planned closing of the Afghanistan war with U.S. arch-enemies, the Taliban. No wonder that a Foreign Affairs article concludes: “Trump was a peacemaker—a fact obscured by false portrayals of him but perfectly clear when one looks at the record. Just in the final 16 months of his administration, the United States facilitated bringing peace to Israel and three of its neighbors in the Middle East plus Sudan; Serbia and Kosovo agreed to U.S.-brokered economic normalization; Washington successfully pushed Egypt and key Gulf states to settle their rift with Qatar and end their blockade of the emirate; and the United States entered into an agreement with the Taliban that prevented any American combat deaths.” Until the botched Biden withdrawal that is. Kamala Harris Psych profile – dominant, outgoing, but light on substance? In 2020 The department of psychology at Saint John’s University took detailed look at the political personality of Kamala Harris. In their preliminary study they find: “Harris’s personality composite can be characterized as high-dominance charismatic — charismatic by virtue of the elevated Ambitious–Outgoing amalgam. “Dominant individuals enjoy the power to direct others and to evoke obedience and respect; they are tough and unsentimental and often make effective leaders. Ambitious individuals are bold, competitive, and self-assured; they easily assume leadership roles, expect others to recognize their special qualities, and sometimes act as though entitled. Outgoing individuals are dramatic attention-getters who thrive on being the center of social events, go out of their way to be popular with others, and have confidence in their social abilities.” “Harris’s major personality strengths in a political role are her confident assertiveness and personal charisma (rooted in dominant, ambitious, and outgoing qualities). Her major personality-based shortcomings (rooted in an outgoing tendency in concert with low conscientiousness) are likely to be a diminished capacity for sustained focus, insufficient attention to detail, and occasional lapses in emotional restraint.” (Emphasis added). (https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/psychology_pubs/131/). From sample observations at time, they find that “Harris has at times compensated for her lack of precision and detailed policy prescriptions by lapsing into prepared remarks, turning to legislation she supports — even when it indirectly relates to the question — and leaning on anecdotes to connect with audiences.” (Emphasis added). A recent example of that is found in her first interview at CNN after she became nominee. In relation to the ongoing war Israeli-Hamas war, she is asked “Would you do anything differently? For example, would you withhold some US weapons shipments to Israel? Her non-answer “I say today, Israel had a right — has a right to defend itself. We would. And how it does so matters. Far too many innocent Palestinians have been killed. And we have got to get a deal done.” (CNN August 29, 2024). On the other hand: “she has some of that ‘it’ — the smile, the joyous laugh, the ability to intersperse inspiration with policy responses. ... She doesn’t get lost in airy platitudes or in the weeds of policy.” But then as a non-deliberative leader Kamala Harris might be inclined ““to force decisions to be made prematurely,” lose sight of her limitations, and place “political success over effective policy”” Take the strange answers in the CNN interview relating to her changing views on fracking. She had previously argued, when asked if she would ban fracking “There’s no question I’m in favor of banning fracking. So yes,” Now she will not ban fracking. Asked what changed her mind, she gave this confusing answer: “Well, let’s be clear. My values have not changed. I believe it is very important that we take seriously what we must do to guard against what is a clear crisis in terms of the climate” and then began to talk about “The Inflation Reduction Act.” Looking at her potential qualities as a prospective a President of the U.S. the study conclude: “By dint of her dominant, ambitious, and outgoing qualities, Kamala Harris’s major personality strengths in a political role are her confident assertiveness and personal charisma. Her major personality-based shortcoming, rooted in a distinctive outgoing tendency, in conjunction with low conscientiousness, is likely to be a predisposition to occasional lapses in emotional restraint or self-discipline.” In the CNN interview she certainly want to convey the conviction that she is up to it: “You know, I — listen, I am running because I believe that I am the best person to do this job at this moment for all Americans, regardless of race and gender. “(CNN, August 29, 2024). For those who doubt that Kamala Harris has certainly become the best person to be President of the U.S. and so-called leader of the free World, they will see that although her unbearable lightness might lift the spirit among voters, spirit is not enough. What is lacking is conscientiousness, he quality of doing things carefully and correctly. In fact, one may get impression that she might the spirited, good natured, laughing, assertive leader, with no real consistent, well founded, convictions and policies of her own. An almost empty vessel, influenced by spur of the moment ideas and “directed” by an as yet unknown number people. Directing her like an ambitious movie director in a Hollywood movie would do. But then we are back with the Shrödinger box’s uncertainty, until opened. Donald Trump psych profile – narcissist with a strange aggressive charisma An article in The Atlantic, which certainly is trying to find fault with Donald Trump, carries this characteristic: “Trump’s personality is certainly extreme by any standard, and particularly rare for a presidential candidate; many people who encounter the man—in negotiations or in interviews or on a debate stage or watching that debate on television—seem to find him flummoxing.“ Indicating that Trump is a riddle, not easy to characterise… Trump plays his role in an outgoing, exuberant, and socially dominant manner. He is a “dynamo—driven, restless, unable to keep still.” (The Atlantic, June 2016). The same institution that made a psych profile of Kamala Harris, has also done one for Donald Trump. In their summary they write: “Trump’s executive leadership style in office has been bold, competitive, and self-assured (i.e., ambitious); tough and directive (i.e., dominant); impulsive and undisciplined (i.e., outgoing); and disruptively tradition-defying, with an inclination to shade the truth and skirt the law (i.e., dauntless). (https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/psychology_pubs/129/). On the other hand, they find this is greatest strengths: “By dint of his outgoing personality in concert with supreme self-confidence, is mobilization, which will be instrumental in rallying, energizing, and motivating his supporters. In the sphere of orchestration, Trump’s dearth of personality traits related to conscientiousness (e.g., diminished capacity for sustained focus and insufficient attention to detail), along with his extravert’s impulsiveness and susceptibility to boredom, may serve as an impediment to presidential performance. Finally, his ambition and dominant personality attributes, including the drive to excel, goal-directedness, and proficiency in taking charge and seeing that the job gets done, will serve Trump well in the arena of consolidation, potentially augmenting his outgoing, “retail” politician’s skills in consummating his policy objectives.” (https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/psychology_pubs/129/). In relation to Trump’s leadership qualities the study finds that he is “As an extraordinarily confident individual with an unshakable belief in his own talents, leadership ability, and potential for success, a quest for power will be the prime motivator for Trump’s leadership behavior, punctuated by a need to control situations and dominate adversaries. Furthermore, Trump’s outgoing nature suggests concern with popular approval and a striving for self-validation to affirm his inflated self-esteem. In addition, he will likely be more pragmatic than ideological in pursuing his political objectives.” (Emphasis added). And just as in The Atlantic article, this study finds that a President Trump would be tireless, committed, and energetic as a President. The study certainly also hits the mark, when it expects that Trump will have a tumultuous relationship with the media, “Trump’s sensitivity to personal slights.” The study (remember this is 2017) has this view of Trump as President: “the matter of greatest concern regarding President Trump’s fitness to govern is the question of temperament.” Combined with “a perilous combination of sparse political experience and the potential for a level of impulsiveness and hubris rarely… seen in occupants of the Oval Office.” Well now the world has had the experience of a President Trump, and lo and behold, without any sort of catastrophe, in contrast to Bidens’ four years, with no new wars, and a long war being closed down in negotiation with the U.S. arch-enemies. There was a cause of lot of uproar especially over his foreign policy actions, not the least in relation to Europe and the NATO question. But the legacy of President Trump is also polarization. A Brookings scoring of U.S. political polarizing show Donald Trump as the most polarizing, a step above even President Lincoln. And the polarizing effect of Donald Trump is also marked in academic circles. A recent scoring of best and worst presidents by a number of historians ranked President Trump at bottom with a score of 10.92 (how precise can you really be?) and President Biden above the medium 50, at 62,66. But historians judging the present would seem to a rather stupid activity for historians. The problem with these scores is that they may not only relate to qualities of the president scored, but to polarization in the U.S. populace itself, and media opinions. Meaning that scores may by almost meaningless in themselves. Just an example, a February 2020 rating Trump’s approval rating stood at 49% according to Statista, but in December 2020 it stood at 34%. Perhaps not really reflecting President Trump, but the dire Covid 19 situation. Let’s finish with the polarizing French author Michel Houellebecq and his view of President Trump in an article in Harper’s Magazine in 2019. “President Trump seems to me to be one of the best American presidents I’ve ever seen. On the personal level, he is, of course, pretty repulsive.” But “You have to get used to the idea, worthy American people: In the final analysis, maybe Donald Trump will have been a necessary ordeal for you.” Trump and Harris: The short version and strangeness of the fight Kamala Harris is letting up liberal and woke hot air balloons filled with mint green promises, that may be deflated by the sharp edges of an uncompromising reality. Her light touch and confusing views of reality means that she really may turn out to be as superficial as her Brat like characteristic in her lack of convictions. Like a Brat saying maybe some dumb things sometimes, but then kind of like laughing through it, bit volatile, yeah, like does like dumb things.” In interview in the Elle Magazine Harris once said: “Optimism is the fuel driving every fight I’ve been in.” And looking at the polls it seems that her optimism is taken seriously, by voters and liberal media, while her literally unbearable light and shifting political views, should not be taken seriously. Trump’s realism and an important pragmatism, is hid under his barrage of foul-mouthed gross distortions fired shotgun like against those who don’t agree. Underneath there seem to be a harsh realism, disturbing to a liberal, educated crowd, but perhaps more realistic in real world politics, where the U.S. dominated rules-based views have a rapidly declining influence in the world. In an old article in The Atlantic, a commentator wrote: “The press takes [Trump] literally, but not seriously; his supporters take him seriously, but not literally.” Last, but not least it is a strange fight, where both Harris and Trump seem to add to a further polarisation of the U.S. populace, by living up their own caricatures in the media and to the views of their stalwart supporters, while the election is decided by the as yet undecided but persuadable minority of voters in the swing states. Perhaps 10% on each side or there abouts, that are looking for something that might persuade them to vote for one of the candidates. Nej, sørme nej, hvis man skal fremtrædende danske medier. For Berlingske mener at Mette Frederiksen ikke er naiv ”Det er måske en af statsministerens største styrke.” Thomas Bernt Henriksen i samme avis hævder endda, at Ukraine krigen er Mette Frederiksens største bedrift som statsminister (jeg tror dog ikke at han mener at hun er ansvarlig for den). Hun er modsætningen til socialdemokraternes tidligere mere neutrale ageren i forhold til f.eks. NATO. Agere hurtigt og håndfast uden at se sig tilbage er da også næsten et kendetegn for Mette Frederiksen, er det ikke? Tænk Corona nedlukning, Mink aflivning og Bededags afskaffelse. Men kan hurtige og håndfaste meninger og beslutninger i relation til Ukraine krigen ikke vise sig at være dumdristige og naive, problematiske og farlige på sigt? Ikke for mainstream medier i hvert fald, de agerer næsten kun som ekkorum for hendes ageren i forhold til Ukraine. Her er så til gengæld et forsøg på en mere kritisk tilgang. Rusland skal bare undskylde og trække sig tilbage… I forbindelse med det besynderlige topmøde i Schweiz om muligheden for fred i Ukraine, hvor Rusland var udelukket og ledere som Biden fandt noget andet at tage sig til, var Mette Frederiksen på banen med følgende udsagn: ”Hvis Rusland ikke vil have fred, får vi jo ikke noget ud af, at de to sidder over for hinanden, siger statsminister Mette Frederiksen (S) på vej ind til fredstopmødet. Vi kan kun opnå fred, den dag Rusland siger, at "selvfølgelig var det forkert at gå i krig, vi trækker vores tropper tilbage og lader være med at slå civile ihjel." (DR 15. juni). Var det udtryk for klogskab og et vigtigt led i hendes store indsats for Ukraine? Eller var det ikke snarere et eksempel på en hastig, tankeløs og naiv reaktion? Hvad er mon chancen for at det skulle ske, i en krig med en sådan indsats af menneskeliv på begge sider? Lig nul, javel, men det synes at være et her og nu syn på sagen fra Mette Frederiksen. Vi har alle været for naive … eller snarere for overmodige I et interview med Financial Times hævder Mette Frederiksen at Europe har været for naiv. “We have been too naive, and in the western part of the world we have been too focused on getting richer, and therefore we also have built up dependencies on countries that we should not be dependent on — gas from Russia, and new technologies from China.” Og tilføjer, at der er på tide at have en “discussion with our populations . . . in general we haven’t paid a price for our freedom the past 30 years.” Det naïve Europa må undgå fejlene fra 1030’erne og “step up and scale up” forsvarsindustrien for kunne stoppe et imperialistisk Rusland, hvor Ukraine blot er det første mål. To påstande her: Det var naivt at gøre sig afhængig af gas fra Rusland og teknologi fra Kina og naivt ikke at opbygge et forsvar mod et imperialistisk Rusland. Et i sig selv yderst naivt og overfladisk syn på tiden efter Sovjetunionens sammenbrud. Dengang så man det i hvert fald som noget positivt, klogt bidrag til fred i verden, fredelig sameksistens med ”Wandel durch Handel” og Wandel durch Annäherung.” Mette Frederiksen berører jo slet ikke, hvad der gik galt med denne sameksistens politik og hvorfor den var naiv. Hovedårsagen til proxy-krigen i Ukraine skal slet ikke findes i en genoplivet Russisk imperialisme, men i stedet i en U.S. amerikansk ”imperialisme,” styrket af selvtilstrækkeligt overmod over, at USA nu stod som den eneste stormagt i Verden. “After the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States may be said to be the world’s sole superpower, enjoying a predominance on the world political-military stage that is unprecedented in the last century.” Beruset af sin magt opstod der forestillinger om et "Pax Americana, hvor det første mål var at forhindre opkomsten af en ny rival: “With the Soviet Union gone, the United States had a choice. It could capitalize on the euphoria of the moment by nurturing cooperative relations and developing multilateral structures to help guide the global realignment then taking place; or it could consolidate its power and pursue a strategy of unilateralism and global dominance. It chose thelatter course.” (A secret memorandum by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz, 1992). Husk hvad overmodet senere førte til. Ved Det Nordatlantiske Råd i Bukarest den 3. april 2008 blev Ukraines og Georgiens euro-atlantiske forhåbninger om medlemskab af NATO opmuntret. "Vi aftalte i dag, at disse lande bliver medlemmer af NATO" (NATO Bukarest-topmødeerklæring 2008). Opmuntringen kom især fra Bush-administrationen, der ivrig efter at udvide NATO. Man Ignorerede advarsler fra Rusland om, at et ukrainsk medlemskab ville tvinge Rusland til at behandle Ukraine som en fjende. Tyskland og Frankrig blokerede dog i 2008 for planerne om ukrainsk medlemskab af NATO, argumenterede for, at Ukraine ikke var klar og lyttede åbenbart til russiske advarsler. Premierminister Fillon fra Frankrig argumenterede: "Vi er imod Georgiens og Ukraines indtræden, fordi vi mener, at det ikke er et godt svar på magtbalancen i Europa og mellem Europa og Rusland." Senere vendte stemningen åbenbart. “President Biden said very clearly that the decision on Ukraine's accession to NATO is the decision of the Ukrainian people only, this is a sovereign and independent Ukrainian state.” (Reuters). For Rusland var et ukrainsk NATO-medlemskab uacceptabelt. Muligheden for Ukraines optagelse i NATO førte til at Rusland overrakte USA og NATO et forslag til en ny traktat om sikkerhedsgarantier (dateret 17. december 2021). Hverken USAs Biden eller Europas ledere lyttede til den vrede russisk modstand mod et Ukrainsk NATO-medlemskab. De russiske krav blev afvist af Blinken og NATO, hvilket viste vise sig at være hverken klogt eller diplomatisk. Det er her vi skal finde den væsentligste direkte årsag til den russiske invasion i Ukraine. Så modsat Mette Frederiksen var det ikke sameksistenspolitikken, der var naiv, det var den naivt overmodige tro på, at Rusland ville acceptere, at den fortsatte ”åh så fredelige” NATO-udvidelse mod øst nu skulle omfatte Ukraine. Bøh! Angsten for det russiske monster Efter Ruslands invasion i Ukraine bredte en imaginær men selvforstærkende kollektiv frygt sig blandt Europas ledere. Frygten for at den aggressive russiske bøhmand i skikkelse af Præsident Putin, kunne udfordre og angribe andre dele af Europa. Hør blot Mette Frederiksen: “I see a more aggressive Russia in all aspects, not only in Ukraine. And I think we have to ask ourselves: is it the final destination for Russia? Or part of what they want to achieve in building a Greater Russia again?”… “They are building a war economy now in Russia and in a few years they will be able to attack or challenge a Nato country if we are not able to do deterrence and defence and if we are not united in Nato,” …. “What we have to do in the coming years is to ensure it will not happen.” (FT, February 27, 2024). Mette Frederiksen er ikke alene om at fremmane den russiske bøhmand/monster. Hvad skal man så gøre denne frygt? Hos børn, der er angste for monstre i mørket kan det måske hjælpe at tænde lyset, men hvad gør vi med vestlige ledere der er bange for det mørke Rusland? Kritiske stemmer og medier burde måske bidrage til at skaffe lys, men slukker i stedet lyset for rationelle argumenter og bidrager til at øge frygten. Lad os så forsøge med lidt lys i stedet. For det første er det evident at Rusland har svært ved at nå i mål med sin invasion i et Ukraine støttet af Vesten, hvorfor det forekommer rigeligt naivt at forestille sig at Rusland skulle vove at angribe militært andre steder i Europa (måske med undtagelse af Moldova). I øjeblikket er det i hvert fald for svagt militært til at udgøre en konventionel militær trussel mod andre dele af Europa. Men så i en nær fremtid da? Også her viser den militære balance mellem Rusland og NATO at det forekommer usandsynligt. Det mener også chefen for den UK’s forsvarsstab, Admiral Radakin: ”The inescapable fact is that any Russian assault or incursion against NATO would prompt an overwhelming response. The thousands of Allied troops currently stationed in Poland and the Baltic states could draw on the 3.5 million uniformed personnel across the Alliance for reinforcement. … With a collective GDP twenty times greater than Russia. And a total defence budget three-and-a-half times more than Russia and China combined. Plus NATO has the additional strategic depth of a population of over 1 billion. And sitting above all of this is NATO as a nuclear alliance. The biggest reason that Putin doesn’t want a conflict with NATO is because Russia will lose. And lose quickly.” (UK Defence Journal. March, 2024). Dermed burde der lys nok til at vise, at frygten for den russiske bøhmand er overdrevet, i hvert fald når det gælder konventionelle militære angreb på andre del af Vesten. Alligevel holdes den mytiske bøhmand/monster i live. Med gentagne påstande om at Putins Rusland vil angribe andre lande i Europa, hvis ikke det bliver stoppet effektivt i Ukraine. En påstand, der også hyppigt benyttes også af Zelensky, der så naturligvis kan hævde, at Ukraines forsvarskrig mod den russiske invasion er en krig til forsvar for resten af Europa, hvorfor den naturligvis kræver massiv støtte fra Europa. Mette: Mere tempo, mere F16, færre røde linjer Mette Frederiksen er naturligvs upåvirket af forsøg på at mindske frygten for bøhmanden og følger derfor også Zelenskys argumenter for en stærkere indsat mod Rusland. Europa må sætte tempoet op i sin oprustning og samtidig øge indsatsen for og i Ukraine. ”Vi må sætte tempoet op i Europa og opskalere indsatsen. Jeg er enig med amerikanske præsidenter – Biden, Trump og Obama – som alle har sagt, at Europa ikke har gjort nok, og at vi skal gøre mere for vores egen sikkerhed. Jeg er enig med dem.” (Mette Frederiksen citeret i JP d. 9. juli 2024). Hun vil derfor ikke udelukke at man skal hæve forsvarsbudgettet endnu mere for at sikre ”at Putin ikke vinder krigen i Ukraine og herefter går videre til andre lande.” Større indsats fra et Danmark, der allerede ”punches above its weight” i sin støtte til Ukraine. Her en oversigt fra Udenrigsministeriet, dateret 11. juli 2024. Har der været nogen skjulte overvejelser bag det, at Danmark ”punches above its weight” i sin Ukraine støtte? Er det for at sikre at landet står sig godt i relation til USA, og givet fald hvorfor? Er det en slags nyfunden krigeriske begejstring i udenrigspolitikken, eller har (skam få tænke derom) Mette Frederiksen og Lars Løkke haft egne personlige bagtanker med deres krigsbegejstring.
Hvad støtter den danske befolkning? Tjah, i hvert fald ikke Mette Frederiksen, selvom det ikke nødvendigvis måtte skyldes hendes Ukraine støtte, for medierne formidler jo uafbrudt at hun har ret. Men med den voldsomme tilbagegang for Socialdemokratiet i meningsmålinger og hendes bund-score i målinger af popularitet, kan man næppe sige at hun taler på alles vegne. Danske F 16 mod mål i Rusland? Mest omtalt lige nu er støtten i form af aldrende danske F 16 jagerfly og den vel efterhånden afsluttede, men ifølge rygter utilstrækkelige uddannelse af Ukrainske piloter til flyve dem. Ved NATO-topmødet i Washington i juli blev det i en fælles pressemeddelelse lovet at danske og hollandske F16 fly kommer i luften over Ukraine i løbet af sommeren. ”Regeringerne i Danmark og Holland har igangsat processen med at donere amerikanskproducerede F-16-fly til Ukraine med støtte fra USA. Processen med at overføre disse F-16 er i gang, og Ukraine vil kunne flyve operationelle F-16 denne sommer. Vi kan ikke give yderligere detaljer for nuværende på grund af operationelle sikkerhedshensyn (JP 10. juli 2024). Senere har USA lovet at levere passende ammunition til flyene. Hvordan indsatsen konkret skal foregå vides ikke, men der har været rygter om at F16 flyene kunne stationeres i Rumænien for at sikre dem mod russiske angreb. ”Der er et vist antal fly, der vil blive opbevaret på sikre luftbaser uden for Ukraine, så de ikke er mål her. Og det vil være vores reserve, hvis det er nødvendigt, til at erstatte defekte fly, som er under rutinemæssig vedligeholdelse,” siger en Ukrainsk officer (JP. 12 juni, 20224). Måske mener at F 16 flyene vil være udenfor Ukraine, når de ikke er på mission? Og hvad i øvrigt med logistisk støtte? Mette frygter ikke Rusland og har ingen røde linjer Indsatsen af F16 jagerfly betragtes naturligvis som en eskalation i Rusland, så meget mere som Mette Frederiksen i et interview i Die Welt siger ”Ich habe nie rote Linien für die Ukraine gezogen. Das gibt Russland eine zu gute Position” (Die Welt 12. July, 2024). På spørgsmålet om det også gælder indsatsen af F 16 flyene, svarer hun: “You cannot put that question and expect simple answers because it all depends on the circumstances. It has to be according to international law. … "But it is possible also to reach targets outside Ukraine, yes" (The Kyiv Independent July 12, 2024). Gentaget i Berlingske: ”Vi har sagt fra dansk side, at de våben, vi donerer, skal bruges i Ukraine. Men de kan også bruges ind i Rusland, hvis det er inden for international lov, og det eksempelvis er til at ramme militære mål. Jeg har det selv sådan, at jeg synes, vi har brugt for lang tid i Europa på at diskutere, hvad Ukraine kan og ikke kan. Jeg vil langt hellere fokusere på, hvad der skal til for, at Ukraine snart vinder denne krig, siger Mette Frederiksen.” Berlingske 12. juli, 2024). Er du ikke bange for at eskalere krigen i Ukraine? Mette Frederiksen: ” Nej, det er jeg ikke. Og jeg anerkender ikke, at det er os, der eskalerer krigen. Vi skal minde hinanden om, at der kun er én aggressiv part. Det er ikke Nato, det er ikke Ukraine, det er Rusland. (Berlingske 12. juni, 2024). Et næsten barnligt synspunkt a la ”det var ikke mig der begyndte så …” For siden krigens start har der været en gensidig eskalering in ”fits and starts.” Ser man tilbage på de tidligere runder af først nej, derefter måske, og til sidst ja, af eskalerende leveringer af forskellige slags våben, der skulle give en afgørende fordel for Ukraine, er det indlysende, at de ikke har bragt nogen afgørende fordel. Det, de måske har gjort, er at holde Ukraine i spillet, ikke vinde deres kamp, men heller ikke tabe. Resultatet er en farlig fortsættelse af den igangværende kamp, med russiske mod-eskaleringer. Så hvad kan den næste runde af eskalationer blive? For nylig argumenterede Mette Frederiksen for at slå hårdere tilbage mod Rusland. Vi er nødt til at slå hårdere tilbage … Spørger du mig, har vi ladet denne her krig køre for længe (DR 9.juli, 2024). Det er vanskeligt at se det som andet et argument for endnu mere vestlig eskalation, hvormed hun jo så modsiger sig selv. Nej, Mette Frederiksen ser ikke, at hun med hurtige verbale håndkantslag og naive argumenter for mere eskalation ikke bidrager til skabe en fred i Ukraine. Hvad kan forventes, hvis den lovede støtte ikke er nok. Hvad mere kan eller vil Vesten være i stand til at gøre? Flere moderne fly, mere personel hjælp? ”Boots on the ground?” Ingen idé, men måske er Vesten begyndt at indse farerne forbundet med en fortsat eskalering og en igangværende krig. Faren for at Ukraine ”bleeds out”, for nu at sige det ligeud, eller et uheld eller provokation fører til åben krig mellem NATO og Rusland, eller at Ukraine tilsidst må acceptere en slags fait accompli som f.eks. oprettelse af en DMZ (Demilitarized zone). Den sidste mulighed ville muligvis være den mindst farlige vej ud af det nuværende dødvande. Ser Mette Frederiksen ikke faren for at en trængt Biden eller måske en præsident Kamala Harris, med USA’s ydmygende Afghanistan tilbagetrækning i erindringen, involveret i en proxy krig uden tydelig ende og konflikter og krige i det nære, mellemste og fjerneste østen, og tydeligt bange for at måtte erkende et nyt nederlag, kan finde på at overskride de sidste røde linjer for Rusland, hvis ikke Europa holder igen i meget større grad end de har gjort. Eller tag et andet scenarie, hvor Donald Trump, som vinder af præsidentvalget, vil true med at nedtrappe engagementet i Ukraine. En stor del af republikanerne ville jo støtte dette og befolkningen tilsyneladende også. Hvilket lidt skarpt sagt ville lade et fuldstændig uforberedt Europa stå alene i Ukraine, med en krig som aldrig har været i Europas interesse. Påstanden om at Rusland ikke vil forhandle ”Europa har forsøgt dialogens vej med Putin og Rusland. Det virkede ikke. I stedet angreb Putin et europæisk land. Og man kan ikke forhandle fred med en mand, der ikke ønsker at forhandle fred” (Mette Frederiksen, JP 16. juli, 2024). Hvad er det mon en dialog, der ikke virkede? Forslag fra russisk side blev afvist af Bidens og Blinkens udiplomatiske linje. USA afbrød simpelthen dialogen før krigen startede. Kort om forløbet. December 17, 2021 fremsatte Rusland et forslag til en aftale. Forslaget indeholdt en række krav, bl.a. dette: Article 4 The United States of America shall undertake to prevent further eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and deny accession to the Alliance to the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The United States of America shall not establish military bases in the territory of the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, use their infrastructure for any military activities or develop bilateral military cooperation with them. (Emphasis added). Først den 26. januar 2022 afleverede USA og NATO deres skriftlige svar på de russiske krav uden på det tidspunkt at offentliggøre indholdet af deres svar. Fra en tale af udenrigsminister Blinken samme dag får vi den første indikation af det amerikanske svar. Det russiske krav om garantier for, at Ukraine ville blive holdt uden for NATO, afvises. Blinken: Vi gør det klart, at der er kerneprincipper, som vi er forpligtet til at opretholde og forsvare - herunder Ukraines suverænitet og territoriale integritet og staters ret til at vælge deres egne sikkerhedsarrangementer og alliancer." Senere blev de skriftlige svar på de russiske krav lækket til den spanske avis El Pais. I relation til det russiske krav om at stoppe yderligere NATO-ekspansion mod øst, hedder det ifølge El Pais: ”The United States continues to firmly support NATO’s Open Door Policy.” En utvetydig afvisning af det russiske krav. Svaret fra NATO er naturligvis det samme, NATO ”reaffirm our commitment to NATO’s Open Door policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.” Kort sagt, en kontant afvisning af det russiske forslag/krav. Man kan næppe hævde som Mette Frederiksen gør, at man har forsøgt dialogens vej med Rusland med så kontante afvisninger af Ruslands forslag. Den 24. februar 2022 invaderer Rusland så Ukraine. Det er ikke svært at forestille at invasionen er en direkte følge af den U.S. amerikanske og NATOs afvisning af forhandling om det russiske krav og i den sammenhæng spiller Europa tilsyneladende blot rollen som USA’s tro, men ilde forberedte væbner, uden nogen selvstændig holdning. Allerede i de første måneder af krigen forsøger både Rusland og Ukraine at afslutte krigen med bistand af mæglere. Senere er papirer fra disse forhandlinger mellem Rusland og Ukraine blevet offentlige. I forhandlingerne synes man at være nået frem til, at Ukraine vil erklære sig neutral, men få mulighed for at ansøge om medlemskab af EU. I et udkast fra dateret 15. april 2022 hedder det: “The Parties to this Treaty share the understanding that Ukraine's status as a permanently neutral state is, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, compatible with Ukraine's possible membership in the European Union.” (New York Times). Der er stadig strid om andre punkter, bl.a. i relation Ukrainske krav om en sikkerhedsaftale og vi ved jo at forhandlingerne bliver afbrudt. Om det skyldes, som påstået, premierminister Johnsons løfte om støtte til Ukraine, ny udvikling på slagmarken, eller andet vides ikke. Umiddelbart er det i hvert fald svært at forstå, hvorfor invasionen ikke umiddelbart fører til en vidtrækkende og selvstændig Europæisk diplomatisk indsats for at skabe fred. Hvad vi ser er kun nogle få europæiske ledere, der hver for sig forsøger sig. Udefra set virker det unægtelig som om Europa blindt følger i Biden/Blinken administrationens uforsonlige spor. Den tyste erkendelse …? Nu, hvor det efter Biden påtvungne afkald på at være demokraternes kandidat til præsidentvalget, er blevet særdeles usikkert hvordan USA vil agere i fremover i relation til Ukraine, synes Europæerne i det skjulte at være kommet på andre tanker. Med henvisning til kilder i Bruxelles skriver Die Welt under overskriften ” Die düstere Ukraine-Realität, über die Nato-Insider nur anonym sprechen wollen,” skriver avisen: ”I Bruxelles forventer næsten ingen mere, at Ukraine vil få sine tabte områder tilbage. Men ingen vil tale om det - i hvert fald officielt. WELT har talt med en række insidere, der begrunder deres dystre udsigter med kendsgerninger som Europa selv har skabt. (Die Welt, 30. juli 2024). Hvad skal vi så sige om Mette Fredriksens påstande om ingen forhandling og fremfor alt hendes krigeriske snak om en hårdere linje over for Rusland med mere støtte til Ukraine, eller hendes intention om at vi skal kræve at Rusland skal sige, "selvfølgelig var det forkert at gå i krig, vi trækker vores tropper tilbage og lader være med at slå civile ihjel.” Mette er stadig overbevist, hør blot: »Det, der ligger tekstmæssigt nu, er: Det ligger fast, at Ukraine hører til Nato. For det er det, de ønsker at gøre. Der er ikke noget, der kan stoppe den rejse«, (Politiken, 10. juli, 2024). Hun vil åbenbart ikke erkende at der er meget der kan stoppe denne rejse. Hvor er den kritiske presse? Er hendes holdning ikke både dumdristig og naiv på hele Danmarks vegne? Repræsenterer den virkelig den danske holdning, støttet af fuldstændig ukritiske medier, der slet ikke længere optræder som en ”fjerde statsmagt. Hvor det måtte gælde, at en kritisk presse ”holding those in power to account” og agerer objektivt, upartisk, med forsøg at belyse også kritiske synspunkter. I stedet agerer danske medier, måske med Zetland som en undtagelse, som klakører, der opildner synspunkter som Mettes. De synes at se sig selv meningsdannere, opdragere af befolkningen til det rette synspunkter, der i dette tilfælde synes at overlappe fuldstændigt med den nuværende regerings. Ukraine parallellen til Biden løgnen? Ved Nato-topmødet Washington introducerede Biden Ukraines Zelensky med ordene: “And now I want to hand it over to the president of Ukraine, who has as much courage as he has determination, ladies and gentlemen, President Putin." Det blev naturligvis rettet men skaden var sket. Igen havde Biden vrøvlet. Ved samme topmøde sagde han ved en presse konference “Look, I wouldn't have picked Vice President Trump to be vice president if she was not qualified to be president. So start there," som svar på et spørgsmål. Da Mette Frederiksen senere bliver spurgt om Bidens markante fejltagelser, siger hun: ”Det er en talefejl, og vi kan allesammen komme til at sige noget forkert. Jeg tror, den eneste, der glæder sig over, at det her fylder så meget, er Putin. ” Hun udtrykker også, at hun er tryg ved Præsident Biden. I meget lang tid gælder det samme for andre vestlige ledere og størstedelen af pressen. Uanset hvor forvrøvlet Biden udtrykker sig, uanset at han tilsyneladende skal forsynes med detaljerede cue-cards, når han skal møde prominente besøgende i Det Hvide Hus, afviser mainstream medier tegn på at han ikke længere vil være i stand til at varetage arbejdet som præsident eller stå som kandidat til valget i november. Man taler om ondsindet sladder og fake videos, når Biden med et tomt blik fryser i sekunder. Formentlig agerer medierne mod bedrevidende, formentlig i følge deres egne forestillinger i en bedre sags tjeneste. Objektivt og neutralt er det i hvert fald ikke. The tipping point for Biden – og for Ukraine? Pludselig vælter læsset så og den lange løgn om Bidens mentale kapacitet afsløres for alle. Debatten med Trump afslører hvor slemt det står stil. I første omgang forsøger man sig med forklaringsforsøg og afvisninger a la Mette Fredriksen, men den løgn som mainstream medier og vestligere ledere har søgt at holde i live, falder pludselig sammen som en punkteret ballon. Hvad vil jeg med dette? Såmænd blot antyde at det samme pludselige omslag i meninger kan ske i relation til proxy-krigen i Ukraine. At man må erkende at det var en utopi at man kunne tvinge Rusland i knæ, eller at Rusland skulle kunne tvinges til at sige: "selvfølgelig var det forkert at gå i krig, vi trækker vores tropper tilbage og lader være med at slå civile ihjel.” Hvorfor holder politikere som Mette Fredriksen og vestlige medier fast i en utopi, bidrager til eskalering, til tabet af tusinder af menneskeliv, til et billede hvor Ukraine modstanden er vigtigere end næsten alt andet, hvilket må forekomme besynderligt for resten af verden. Samtidig med at risikoen for en storkrig stiger med hver eneste eskalering. Vedligeholder de i fællesskab ikke en ny fælles løgn, hvor de nødvendigvis må forsøge holde kritiske stemmer ude, ved at latterliggøre dem som putinister og moskvatro, ved miskreditere dem og ved at ignorere dem. Forhåbentlig brister løgnen før vi i en stigende spiral af eskalation ender i en storkrig. Husk at den nuværende Biden administration vil stationere mellemdistanceraketter som Tomahawk (rækkevidde 1.300 km) og fremtidige Dark Eagle hypersoniske missiler (rækkevidde >3.000km) i Tyskland fra 2026. Rusland vil selvfølgelig vil opstille tilsvarende med retning mod Europa. Hvor er de fredsbevægelser, der råbte op sidste gang det skete? Hvad får løgnen og utopien til at bryde sammen? Ukraines ”bleeding out of manpower,” fulgt af et omslag i stemningen i Ukraine. Nye højre-politikere i Europa, der er kritiske over for Ukraine-krigen. Ekstrem og akut fare for atomkrig ved en fortsat eskalering. Eller en Præsident Trump, der støttet af sit republikanske parti, dekreterer nok er nok, Ukraine må tvinges til forhandling med Rusland og utopien om at generobre alt tabet land må opgives. Se også: Åbent brev til Mette Frederiksen https://dk.linkedin.com/pulse/%C3%A5bent-brev-til-mette-frederiksen-verner-c-petersen-tctof No need for NATO today, if dismantled in the 90s https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/need-nato-today-dismantled-90s-verner-c-petersen-e0imf or https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/no-need-for-nato-today-if-dismantled-in-the-90s Freezing the war in Ukraine? https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/freezing-the-war-in-ukraine Rules-Based Disorder of a weakened U.S. hegemon https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/rules-based-disorder-of-a-weakened-US-hegemon Biden, the most dangerous man for peace in Europe? https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/biden-the-most-dangerous-man-for-peace-in-europe Proxy war in Ukraine because Biden and Blinken bear a grudge? (11/03/22 ) https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/proxy-war-in-ukraine-because-biden-and-blinken-bear-a-grudge? RN Rassemblement National did not go from landslide victory to defeat We did not get a fair interpretation in mainstream media of the recent French election. The jubilant cry “La France dit non au RN” does certainly not paint the correct picture of the election result. A result marred by attempts to influence voter’s choice in the second round. Let’s take a look at the simplistic views found in a large part of mainstream media, and a closer look at what really happened, and the reaction, not the least from the instigator himself. “The landslide” victory of RN in Round 1 on June 30. Here the official results from the first round from Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Outre-mer (with a cutoff at 1 percent): Voter turnout in the first round reached 64.98 per cent RN Rassemblement National is evidently in front, with more than 9.3 million voters, representing 29.26 per cent of the votes. Second came the popular front UG Union de la gauche who got 8.99 million votes, representing 28.06 percent. In third place ENS Ensemble (Macron party) with 6.4 million votes, or 20.04 percent. We may also note that 37 RN candidates achieved over 50 per cent in the first round, compared to only 2 of the ENS candidates. The sensation was that RN went from a share of 18.68 percent in 2022 to nearly one third in the first round in 2024. Mainstream media reacted with alarm and called for a united front against the RN Rassemblement National in the second round: Aujourd’hui screamed “The RN at the gates of power” on a mostly black frontpage. Les Echos with a resigned and a defaitist sounding “The end of an era.” The left wing Libération with a loud call to arms: “Aprés le choc Faire Blog.” An appeal to form a block against the RN. L’Humanite with the similar appeal “Faire Front.” Make a front against the RN. La Croix warning of a decisive week before the second round. The Times writing that “The French right humiliates Macron.” Die Zeit saw the result as “Ein Blick in unsere düstere Zukunft” (A view into our dark future). The dirty work to create a bulwark against RN For the runoff on July 7 the rules state that unless one candidate wins the first round by getting more than 50 percent of ballots cast, the two highest-placing candidates go through to a runoff. But the rules also allow candidates to participate in the runoff, if they win the votes of at least 12.5 percent of the electorate. Three candidates would be a triangular, four candidates a quadrangular. Now “So-called "triangular" runoffs typically result in a win for whichever party came top in the first round, since the opposition is split. But two-way contests are more closely fought, especially when voters are galvanised. Polling conducted before the first-round vote suggests that a large majority of left-wing voters would be willing to back another bloc to keep the RN out of government, as would a smaller majority of centrists.” (rfi). https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20240701-the-three-way-factor-that-makes-france-s-election-results-so-unusual The left UG Union de la gauche and Macron’s centrist ENS would not normally be expected to band together, but in order to have chance to defeat the RN they strived to withdraw their own respective candidates, if for instance they had come third in the first round, in order to make the second round a two-horse race with their respective best placed candidates. Thus around 220 candidates from either the left union or from the centrists withdrew. In this way many voters in the second round would often only have the choice of a RN candidate and either a candidate from the left union or the ENS. The two antagonistic political parties from the left popular front and Macron’s centrist ENS were only united in their eagerness to do what they could to build a bulwark against RN and the right-wing parties. With no thought lost on the undemocratic implications of their attempts or what they would afterwards do if they succeeded. It turns out that given the reduced election choice “Almost three out of four left-wing voters in the first round turned to the macro-diste candidate, which is massive.” And “Half of the people who voted for the Republicans also gave their vote to Ensemble, and a quarter to the RN.” (Ipsos and Le Parisien). Defeat for RN in the second round on July 7? A resounding French NO! to RN, that is the impression one gets from the media on the day after the second round. From a landslide victory to just a third palace in the election. Looking at the impression in the media one gets the impression that French voters must have had second thoughts and voted to create a bulwark against a new success for the RN. From landslide to a defeat for RN: Liberation: In big letters shouting “C’est Ouf!” for the amazing victory for the UG Union de la gauche printed over a picture of the left celebrating the popular front’s victory. L’Humanité showing the great wave of the popular front on its front page using a picture of the famous Japanese print of “The great wave of Kanagawa” colored red, and the text L'espoir Renaît, for reborn hope. La Croix wrote “La France dit non au RN” with a picture of a young woman (a reference to the French Marianne?) wrapped in the French flag. Les Echo with a triumphant “La Claque” or “The slap” to the RN’s young hope for prime minister, Jordan Bardella. Le Figaro: “Le RN en échec, la gauche s'impose à Macron” or “The RN failed, the left imposes itself on Macron.” Similar reactions in foreign media. With Reuters writing “French voters deliver a win for the left, a blow for Le Pen and a hung parliament” BBC: “What just happened in France's shock election? … It was the left who had clinched it, and Emmanuel Macron's centrists - the Ensemble alliance - had staged an unexpected comeback, pushing the far-right National Rally (RN) into third. Defeat for RN – is that what the numbers say? Here the official results for the second round from Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Outre-mer (with a cutoff at 1 percent): Voter turnout almost equal to the first round at 62.96 per cent. Surprise for those just listening to mainstream media: The ranking in the second round, looks actually similar to the first round: RN Rassemblement National still in front with 8.7 million votes, representing an even bigger share of all votes than in the first round at 32.05 percent. Second is the popular front, UG Union de la gauche, with 7 million votes and a smaller share of the votes at 25.68 per cent Third ENS Ensemble (Macron party collection) with 6.3 million, and a share of 23.14 percent. Why then did mainstream media talk of La claque or the slap to RN? Looking at the numbers the RN got even more votes than in the first round, and is still in the first place. Why does this no longer represent a landslide for the party? To understand that we have to look at the candidates who won in the election districts. Here the explanation for the strange excitement of the popular front, the satisfaction of the Macron’s ENS and their united expression of glee over the slap for RN.
Looking at the candidates who won in the second round the ranking has really changed. Now the new popular front (NFP) is in front so speak, winning 182 Députés (or 32% of the seats in the Chamber. The ENS ensemble second with 168 Députés (29% of the seats). While the first ranked in total votes, ending in an embarrassing third place with just 143 Députés (or just 25% of the seats, including LR’s seats). Distorting the will of the people? It is apparent that the bulwark strategy of those parties only united in their wish to keep the RN from winning worked. At least for now, the jubilant RN from the first round were cut down to size in the second round. Naively one might have believed that having a second round might help express the will of the people more fairly than having just one round with its “First-past-the-post voting.” But evidently it also leaves open the possibility of two unlike parties gathering together in the attempt to prevent the majority of a third party. Thereby subverting the election processes and the power of voter choice. To the Figaro the end result seemed paradoxical. “Favoured in many polls in between laps, the Rassemblement national became only the third force of the Chamber. The first in number of votes cast, the RN was third in number of seats. A result celebrated on the left, as in the voice of the ecologist Marine Tondelier, for whom “the people have won.” Did it now? With Jordan Bardella’s camp raising 10 million voters (36% of the votes), compared to 7.5 million for the left-wing coalition (25%), and 7 million for the presidential camp (23%). The reaction of RN and its voters were captured by Le Monde immediately after the second round: “The party leaders, aware of the defeat, isolated themselves in an upstairs space. What remained were well-dressed militants frozen in front of the big screen. Their distress was captured by cameras that thought they had come to film shouts of joy. There were murmurs: "Dammit, we're third..." "It's a load of rubbish, they've cheated." One woman, who has endured other defeats, blamed the usual suspects: "The French are idiots! A people of morons!" Later on the TV channel France 2, the re-elected RN lawmaker Julien Odoul expressed his bitterness: "They're going to pay the price for this submission. They're going to pay the price of this non-choice." (Le Monde, July 8). Macron actions leaving French politics in a limbo The present limbo was set in motion by President Macron. With his rash reaction to the French results of the EU elections on June 9. Which the RN won with 31.37 per cent. In what can only be seen as an angry and hasty personal reaction, President Macron one day after the EU election dissolved the French Parliament and called for elections later in June. He argued that “For me, who has always considered that a united, strong and independent Europe is good for France, it’s a situation that I cannot come to terms with, … The rise of nationalists and demagogues is a danger to our nation. And also for France’s position in Europe and in the world” What he may have forgotten in his rash decision to call for elections is that the result of the French EU election may have all to do with his own actions and inactions as a sitting president. According to Jamil Anderlini, Editor-in-chief, of Politico Europe “Macron shocked even his closest advisers by calling a snap election … Relying almost entirely on his own counsel, the incredibly unpopular president took a great gamble, one that has thrown the country’s politics into chaos.” (Politico July 8). One wonders if this really is the kind of leader that France or Europe needs, but that is what we have got. A Macron believing almost Napoleonic in himself, castigating politicians and voters with other views as nationalists and demagogues is a danger to our nation. The result is an unresolved limbo in France with a Parliament split mainly in three enemy camps that won’t be able to agree on much more than to disagree: The New popular Front with almost 32% of the seats, the Macron’s ENS 29% and RN together with LR making up the right with nearly 25% of the seats. Macron imperial “Je demande” Macron took his time, but three days after election he wrote a letter to the French people, finishing it by claiming “Last Sunday, you called for the invention of a new French political culture. For you, I will take care of it. On your behalf, I will be the guarantor.” “French dear French, dear French, On 30 June and 7 July, you went to the ballot box in large numbers to choose your Members. I welcome this mobilization, a sign of the vitality of our Republic, from which we can, it seems to me, draw some conclusions. First, there is a need for democratic expression in the country. Then, if the far right came first in the first round with nearly 11 million votes, you clearly refused to allow it to accede to the Government. At last, no one won. No political force alone achieves a sufficient majority, and the blocs or coalitions that emerge from these elections are all in the minority. Divided in the first round, united by mutual withdrawals to the second, elected by the votes of the voters of their former adversaries, only the Republican forces represent an absolute majority. The nature of these elections, marked by a clear demand for change and power-sharing, forces them to build a broad gathering. President of the Republic, I am both a protector of the best interests of the nation and a guarantor of the institutions and respect for your choice. It is in this respect that I ask all the political forces that are appreciative in republican institutions, the rule of law, parliamentarianism, a European orientation and the defence of French independence, to engage in a sincere and fair dialogue in order to build a solid, necessarily plural majority for the country. Ideas and programmes before the posts and personalities: this gathering will have to be built around a few major principles for the country, clear and shared republican values, a pragmatic and readable project and take into account the concerns you expressed at the time of the elections. It must ensure the greatest possible institutional stability. It will bring together women and men who, in the tradition of the Fifth Republic, place their country above their party, the nation above their ambition. What the French have chosen through the polls – the Republican front, the political forces must realize it by their actions. It is in the light of these principles that I will decide on the appointment of the Prime Minister. This means giving some time to the political forces to build these compromises with serenity and respect for everyone. In the meantime, the current Government will continue to exercise its responsibilities and will be in charge of day-to-day affairs, as is the case in the Republican tradition. Let us place our hope in the ability of our politicians to show a sense of concord and appeasement in your own interest and that of the country. Our country must be able to live, as so many of our European neighbours do, this spirit of overcoming that I have always called for. Your vote requires everyone to live up to the moment. To work together. Last Sunday, you called for the invention of a new French political culture. For you, I will take care of it. On your behalf, I will be the guarantor. In confidence. Emmanuel Macron” (Le Parisienne July 10, 2024) A simple comment in Le Parisien may indicate how the letter from the “Guardian of French political culture” was seen: “We have done everything possible to thwart and frustrate the will of the people, and now we are playing the frightened virgin and we ask for respect for the institutions.” Perhaps the French elites and their representation in mainstream media have a serious problem with reality. Being caught in their own imagined of ideology and besserwissen, they ignore real problems seen by voters, denigrating them instead and arguing like Macron, that “the rise of nationalists and demagogues is a danger to our nation.” A situation they cannot come to terms with, therefore trying to distort the will of the people. Condemnation raining down on Israel Francesca Albanese, the Italian layer and UN Special Rapporteur on Palestine does not mince words in her continuing one-sided condemnation of Israel and its actions. After the recent Israeli bombing run on two prominent members of Hamas, that led to a horrible fire and the death of dozens of civilians, she once more took to X, writing: “More horror in the #GazaGhetto. The Israeli occupation forces have bombed a camp for displaced Palestinians in #Rafah, causing plastic tents to catch fire and tragically burning people alive. This cruelty, along with blatant defiance of the int'l law and system, is unacceptable. The #GazaGenocide will not easily end without external pressure: Israel must face sanctions, justice, suspension of agreements, trade, partnership and investments, as well as participation in int'l forums.” (X, May27, 2024). The activist rapporteur has been a consistent critic of Israel, not losing many words on Hamas’ atrocities. Soon after the October 7 abominations, she warned that Palestinians were in grave danger of mass ethnic cleansing, arguing according to the Palestinian Chronicle that “There is a grave danger that what we are witnessing may be a repeat of the 1948 Nakba, and the 1967 Naksa, yet on a larger scale. The international community must do everything to stop this from happening again,”… noting that Israeli officials have openly advocated for another Nakba” (Palestinian Chronicle October 14, 2023). Francesca Albanese’s voiced her extreme views soon after the October 7 massacre and the hostage taking, but similar thoughtless shooting-from-the-hip condemnation is now raining down on Israel, its leadership and its attempts to eliminate Hamas. Like many others UN’s Antonio Guterres took to X to write: ““I condemn Israel’s actions which killed scores of innocent civilians who were only seeking shelter from this deadly conflict. There is no safe place in Gaza. This horror must stop.” EU Foreign Policy chief Josep Borrell: “Horrified by news coming out of #Rafah on Israeli strikes killing dozens of displaced persons, including small children. I condemn this in the strongest terms. There is no safe place in Gaza. These attacks must stop immediately. ICJ orders & IHL must be respected by all parties.” Emmanuel Macron joined the chorus of lamenting voices: “Outraged by the Israeli strikes that have killed many displaced persons in Rafah. These operations must stop. There are no safe areas in Rafah for Palestinian civilians. I call for full respect for international law and an immediate ceasefire”. Not to outdone Erdogan promised: “We will do everything possible to hold these barbarians and murders accountable who have nothing to do with humanity.” (Strangely he wasn’t thinking of Hamas, …) While the Palestinian Authority accused Israel of “deliberately targeting” the tents of displaced people, and said the perpetration “of this heinous massacre by the Israeli occupation forces is a challenge to all international legitimacy resolutions.” These immediate unthinking reflex-like condemnations show world leaders giving up all pretense of fairness. Justitia’s scales are longer balanced, un-reflected opinion is weighing the Israeli side down. World leaders have evidently sunk to the level of the widespread student protests against Israel. Perhaps even taking their lead from the protests and their reflections in mainstream media? Not all have yet sunken to the level of Yolanda Diaz, Minister of Labor and Social Policy of Spain, who recently tweeted “We welcome today the fact that Spain recognizes the State of Palestine, but we cannot stop there. Palestine will be free from river to the Sea” (Emphasis added). A few are holding back apparently still remembering why Israel is attacking Hamas in Gaza and even wanting to know what really happened on the that fateful Sunday on May 26, when dozens were killed. Among them a surprisingly subdued response from an U.S. official and even from an UN official. From the U.S. Biden is taking his time, leaving a first response to a national security council (NSC) official who said: "Israel has a right to go after Hamas, and we understand this strike killed two senior Hamas terrorists who are responsible for attacks against Israeli civilians. But as we've been clear, Israel must take every precaution possible to protect civilians." Later White House spokesperson John Kirby, indicated the strike did not cross a red line for the U.S. “As a result of this strike on Sunday, I have no policy changes to speak to. It just happened. The Israelis are going to investigate it. We’re going to be taking great interest in what they find in that investigation. And we’ll see where it goes from there.” While Volker Turk, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, is noting “that the IDF has announced a review, but what is shockingly clear is that by striking such an area, densely packed with civilians, this was an entirely predictable outcome. It is crucial that such reviews lead to accountability and changes in policy and practices.” Adding that “Palestinian armed groups must stop the firing of rockets which are inherently indiscriminate, in clear violation of international humanitarian law. They must also unconditionally release all hostages at once.” Preliminary response from Israel In Israel Netanyahu has said “Despite our best effort not to harm those not involved, unfortunately a tragic mistake happened last night. We are investigating the case. On May 28 ABC news is reporting that “the U.S. received information from the Israelis overnight that they believe shrapnel or something else from the strike ignited a fuel tank 100 meters away, which engulfed a tent, creating a massive fire, according to a U.S. official.” While it may explain the devastating fire, it would seem that something else must have happened, to explain the horrible carnage. A secondary explosion perhaps? IDF spokesperson, Rear admiral Hagari, later tried to provide a little more detail. Explaining that IDF had taken a number of steps before the strike to eliminate the two Hamas commanders Yassin Rabia and Khaled Najjar, in order to avoid civilian casualties. Using two small missiles with a 17 Kilogram warhead (might indicate the use of U.S. made GBU39 missiles), and waiting till the area around the strike was clear. Hagari also provided IDF infographics indicating that the IDF the strike was hitting in an area 180 meters distant from the tent shelters. While Hamas claims the strike hit the tent area. IDF has also been accused of striking an area designated as a humanitarian safe zone. Here Hagari again used an IDF infographic to show that the strike hit more than a kilometer outside the humanitarian safe zone at al-Mawasi. In relation to the possibility of a secondary explosions causing the devastation Hagari referred to what he called phone call intercepts, between two Palestinians in Gaza apparently heard saying: “"Yes, this is an ammunition warehouse. I tell you it exploded. The Jewish bombing wasn't strong, it was a small missile, because it didn't create a large hole. And afterward a lot of secondary explosions.” That is what Hagari had to say on May 28. Independent verification is not possible Still investigations are ongoing, meaning that hasty conclusions like the ones provided by certain political leaders ought to be avoided. While this might explain the tragedy, it may indicate that Israel now is being judged before we know what happened. Perhaps this is also the case in relation to the cases against Israel in The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and The International Criminal Court (ICC). In the following focusing on the ICC’s action against Israel. The sensational ICC application for Israeli arrest warrants On may 20 Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan of the International Criminal Court in The Hague announced he was filing applications for warrants to arrest Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, and Yoav gallant, Minister of Defence of Israel. In the same announcement he also sought warrants to arrest three prominent members of Hamas. Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masuri and Ismael Haniyeh. Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan certainly succeeded in lighting a media explosion with this sensationalist announcement. Three prominent members of Hamas or Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (Islamic Resistance Movement), an organization that is designated as a foreign terrorist group by the U.S. and found on the EU terrorist list, suddenly listed and grouped together with the two most prominent ministers of the only democracy in Middle East, a “Rechtsstaat” characterized by the rule of law. Grouping them like in a Western in your face “Wanted poster.” One may certainly ask why they grouped together in the prosecutor’s application, and may also ask, why the Karim Khan has not sought arrest warrants for the members of Hamas much earlier, after all they have made no heal of their involvement in in the October 7 barbarism. Or why he is now ready to file warrants for arrests of Netanyahu and Gallant? Does he have any clear evidence that they have committed crimes against humanity.
Let’s see his arguments especially in relation to Netanyahu and Gallant. With reference to the so-called Rome-Statute he argues that they after October 8, 20223, bear criminal responsibility for the following war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on the territory of the State of Palestine (The Rome Statute can be found at https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf). It is important to remember that Israel is not among the 124 signatories, and neither is the U.S. Raising the question of the ICC jurisdiction. There is also the question of jurisdiction over Gaza, a non-state. Apparently, the Prosecutor believes he has jurisdiction in relation to crimes against humanity in both Gaza and the Hamas attacks in Israel. Here the accusations against the two Israeli leaders: Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare as a war crime contrary to article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Statute; Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health contrary to article 8(2)(a)(iii), or cruel treatment as a war crime contrary to article 8(2)(c)(i); Wilful killing contrary to article 8(2)(a)(i), or Murder as a war crime contrary to article 8(2)(c)(i); Intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as a war crime contrary to articles 8(2)(b)(i), or 8(2)(e)(i); Extermination and/or murder contrary to articles 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(a), including in the context of deaths caused by starvation, as a crime against humanity; Persecution as a crime against humanity contrary to article 7(1)(h); Other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity contrary to article 7(1)(k). Karim Khan “submits that these acts were committed as part of a common plan to use starvation as a method of war and other acts of violence against the Gazan civilian population as a means to (i) eliminate Hamas; (ii) secure the return of the hostages which Hamas has abducted, and (iii) collectively punish the civilian population of Gaza, whom they perceived as a threat to Israel.” And the evidence…? Karim Khan says that applications for arrest warrants were “the outcome of an independent and impartial investigation by my Office. Guided by our obligation to investigate incriminating and exonerating evidence equally, my Office has worked painstakingly to separate claims from facts and to soberly present conclusions based on evidence to the Pre-Trial Chamber.” In his statement on May 20, 2024, he does present any facts at all! What he does is listen the kind of evidence that has been collected, consisting of “interviews with survivors and eyewitnesses, authenticated video, photo and audio material, satellite imagery and statements from the alleged perpetrator group.” He also asserts that 1.1 million people in Gaza are facing catastrophic hunger. Sounds more like a postulate, as evidence is again lacking in the statement. Karim Khan states that he convened a panel of experts on international law “to support the evidence review and legal analysis in relation to these arrest warrant applications.” He argues that since last year he has warned Israel to take immediate action to allow access to humanitarian aid in Gaza at scale, threatening that those who do not comply “should not complain later when my Office takes action. That day has come.”“That day has come.” Strange expression from someone who should sound objective. It sounds ominously as if ICC prosecutor is finally ready to seek revenge for Israel’s disobedience. A kind of Israeli doomsday, where they are to be judged not by God, but by a small earthly group of men and women, that may have all sorts of politically motivated biases. Let us have a look at the prosecutor’s backing group A “Panel of Experts” chosen by a prosecutor out to get Israel The panel convened by Karim Khan consisted of 6 experts in international law, and two extra advisors. The panel was asked in January 2024 “to provide an opinion on whether there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that the persons named in the warrants have committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.” The panel agrees that ICC has jurisdiction “relation to crimes committed on the territory of Palestine, including Gaza,” and likewise that ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed by Palestinian Nationals in Israel. This is a consequence of an earlier Palestinian acceptance of ICC having that jurisdiction. Here the panel argues that Palestine including Gaza is a state for the purpose of the ICC statute. Not a view one would expect to find with all legal scholars. A UK government spokesperson reiterated the UK’s opposition to the ICC’s jurisdiction: “… we do not think the ICC has jurisdiction in this case. The UK has not yet recognized Palestine as state and Israel is not a State Party to the Rome Statute.” Among the panel’s review of the separate charges brought by the prosecutor we find some strange examples, where beliefs seem to play the role of evidence. Take this one: “… based on a review of material presented by the Prosecutor, the Panel assesses that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Netanyahu and Gallant formed a common plan, together with others, to jointly perpetrate the crime of using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. (Emphasis added). Don’t we need more than believes to accuse Netanyahu and Gallant of crimes against humanity? Or take this one: “The Prosecutor has also sought charges against Netanyahu and Gallant for the war crimes of willful killing or murder and intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, as well as the crimes against humanity of extermination or murder and persecution for deaths resulting from the use of starvation and related acts of violence including attacks on civilians gathering to obtain food and on humanitarian workers.” Again supported by belief: “In the Panel’s view, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects committed these crimes. The Panel also considers that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the crimes were committed in the context of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Gaza, pursuant to State policy.” (Emphasis added) Really? Are these and other similar beliefs enough to provide legal support to the prosecutor Karim Khan’s seeking arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant? Apparently in the panel’s own unified view they are. For having examined the warrants applications and the underlying evidence, with no evidence presented in the panel’s report, they conclude that “the Panel is satisfied that the process was fair, rigorous and independent and that the Prosecutor’s applications for arrest warrants are grounded in the law and the facts.” Among the members of the panel, we find the starlike media celebrity quality of Amal Clooney, Adjunct Professor at Columbia Law School and a Senior Fellow at the Columbia Law School Human Rights Institute. Co-founder of the Clooney Foundation for Justice, which provides free legal support to victims of human rights abuses in over 40 countries. On May 20 she wrote an article in the Financial Times about her reason for joining the panels and referred to the panel’s unanimous conclusion that supported the ICC’s prosecutor’s application. According to Amal Clooney “we felt we had a duty to accept the invitation to provide an impartial and independent legal opinion based on evidence. We were selected because of our expertise in public international law, international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law, and, in the case of two of us, experience as former judges of international criminal tribunals. Our common goal is advancing accountability and we have reached our conclusions based on an assessment of the warrant applications against an objective legal standard.” She also argued that the step taken by the ICC prosecutor “is a milestone in the history of international criminal law.” And a legal exclamation mark it certainly was, but perhaps also millstone around the international criminal law. Inadvertently she is giving rise to our suspicion by saying out loud “The law we apply is humanity’s law, not the law of any given side.” Somehow Amal Clooney’s “law of humanity” seem to transcend the earthly influence of states and power or might, seemingly locating humanity’s law in political appointed institutions with a few earthly members, ready to provide justice to the world, like the ICC. Other scholar warns: Recently, some publicists have started to speak of the “law of humanity” in order to challenge the role of nations and states in determining the world’s legal order. While this new usage captures the necessary universalism of supranational justice, it also threatens the premise that support just institutions, by confusing the nature and purposes of law, nations, peoples and the state.” (M.N.S Sellers “Republican Principles in International Law”). Does grandstanding and prejudice play a role? Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan certainly seems to be a man with a mission. While the ICC has been accused in the past of having mainly focused on Africa, Karim Khan created quite a stir when turning his focus other parts of the World. In 2022 he sought arrest warrants against President Putin and the Kremlin official Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Commissioner for Children’s Rights, over their involvement in the deportation of Ukrainian children. He has faced controversy in his earlier work, for instance as defender of the Kenyan President William Ruto, where accusations of witness intimidations led the ICC to drop charges. He has also done work for the sect like Ahmadiyya Muslim community, of which he is a member. Amal Clooney had been silent on Israel Gaza, until it was revealed that she had been member of Karim Khan’s panel. Activists expecting her to take side for the Palestinians and against Israel. Venting their anger on social media and elsewhere. “This so called ‘humanitarian lawyer’ vocally stood up for Ukraine but is dead silent on Gaza,” a social media user wrote. When she showed up at British fashion awards, another wrote “arriving at the british (Sic) fashion awards, but hiding from genocide”. Perhaps these comments show what social media masses had expected from Amal Clooney. Now with her presence in panel revealed and her article in the Financial Times, it suddenly turned out that she had not disappointed them. Indicating perhaps on which side of Justitia’s scales she put her weight. Among the other members of the panel convened by the Karim Khan are Baroness Helena Kennedy KC, lawyer and human rights activist, who quite early seems to made up her mind in relation to Israel. In an interview in already October 2023 she condemned the atrocities committed by Hamas, but she also warned Israel against collective punishment saying that Gaza is being reduced to rubble” and condemned Israel’s actions to cut off water supply. “Water is a basic human right and its denial violates international law. It is a war crime.” The flimsy argument for claiming ICC jurisdiction over Israel Karim Khan’s simultaneous application for arrest warrants for Hamas terrorists and leaders of democratic state might have been made to sound impartial and to demonstrate that nobody is above the law. This has the appalling consequence of equating democratic leaders of state with an apparently well-functioning legal system and independent courts with a terrorist regime in a non-state acting without regard for legal and moral constraints. This seems to be legally and morally abhorrent, and destroying the credibility of the ICC. Here it is important to remember what the The Rome Statute says about jurisdicion: Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; ( Article 17, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). This can of cause only mean that the ICC normally would not have jurisdiction over a state, where state in questions has showed that it willing and able to prosecute in cases involving its own citizens if involved crimes against humanity. To Israel itself and a neutral outsider it would seem that Israel with its legal systems and independent courts has shown that it is both willing and capable of prosecuting crimes against humanity on its own turf, and against invading terrorists. Meaning that either ICC and its prosecutor have some kind of knowledge or is it just the belief that Israel is not willing to punish crime against humanity and/or are incapable of doing so. Past experience does not seem to confirm Israel is either unwilling or incapable of doing so. This would mean that ICC and Karim Khan are acting outside the stated jurisdiction of ICC. With a fig leaf of an argument, the ICC prosecutor seems to believe he has found reason for the ICC’s jurisdiction: “The Government of The State of Palestine lodged a declaration under article 12(3) of the Rome Statute accepting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court ("ICC") over alleged crimes committed "in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014" Fine, then seek warrants for prosecution for members of Hamas, for in Gaza there is neither the willingness nor the capability for Hamas to prosecute itself for crimes against humanity. And as for “The State of Palestine” it would seem that this is not a state in the usual understanding of what constitute a state. North South division loading on Justitia’s scales Underlaying all this may a divisive struggle between what can be loosely seen Northern states and the Global South. One has to remember the sequence of events: On November 23 South Africa wrote Karim Khan, requesting the prosecutor to investigate the situation in Palestine “for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with commission of such crimes” (South African Embassy, The Hague, November 17, 2023). South Africa acting on behalf of The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, The Plurinational State of Bolivia, The Union of the Comoros, and The Republic of Djibouti. At the other side of the division, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak condemned the prosecutors’ decision: “There is no moral equivalence between a democratic state exercising its lawful right to self-defence and the terrorist group Hamas … This is a deeply unhelpful development. Of course. it is still subject to a final decision, but it remains deeply unhelpful nonetheless.” (Rishi Sunak, May 21, 2024) The speaker of the House of Representatives, Michael Johnson, voiced a fiery attack on the ICC’s action. “America should punish the ICC and put Karim Khan back in his place …If the ICC is allowed to threaten Israel’s leaders, we know that America will be next … There is a reason that we’ve never endorsed the International Criminal Court, because it is a direct affront to our own sovereignty… We don’t put any international body above American sovereignty, and Israel doesn’t do that either” (Michael Johnson, May 23, 2024). On May 28 the South African Minister of International Relations, Naledi Pandor, replied by saying “Of cause!” Countries aiding Israel should be liable for ICC prosecution. The German government first tried a little fence sitting. Letting The Federal Foreign Office comment on the ICC prosecutor’s decision: “Durch die gleichzeitige Beantragung der Haftbefehle gegen die Hamas-Führer auf der einen und die beiden israelischen Amtsträger auf der anderen Seite ist der unzutreffende Eindruck einer Gleichsetzung entstanden.“ (Auswärtiges Amt, May 21, 2024). Then the spokesperson for the Government, Steffen Hebstreit, really waded into dangerous water, when asked if Germany would arrest Netanyahu on a visit to Germany, if the ICC prosecutor actually got his arrest warrants. His answer “„Natürlich, wir halten uns an Recht und Gesetz” (Hebestreit, May 22, 2024). An answer resulting in a strong reaction form the leader of the opposition: “Ein Scandal.” ICC on the verge of destroying its legitimacy? Prosecutor Karim Khan evidently attempted to demonstrate impartiality, that nobody is above the law. But his attempt to demonstrate that ICC is not only an institution with single minded focus on injustice in Africa may be doing the ICC a serious disservice. Explicitly equating Israel political leaders with leaders of the terrorist group of Hamas, looks legally, morally and politically outrageous, for the reasons we have discussed. The prosecutor attempts to cloak his applications for the simultaneous arrest warrant against Israeli leaders and Hamas leaders under the guise of equality before the law, arguing “if we do not demonstrate our willingness to apply the law equally, if it is seen as being applied selectively, we will be creating the conditions for its collapse. …This is the true risk we face in this moment.” (Karam Khan, Statement, May 20, 2024). In reality he seems to do the opposite, applying his view of the law equally to extremely unequal cases. This must have been done for ideological and political reasons, and does certainly not demonstrate impartiality. One is tempted to ask if the prosecutor is waging a novel kind of lawfare under the thin guise of impartiality? The prosecutor and perhaps the ICC as such is on the verge making a grave error of judgement. It will certainly be seen divisive, with supporters of Hamas and a non-existing state of Palestine greeting the so-called impartiality, while the other side will see it as ideological and political decision destroying the legitimacy of the ICC. Wahrlich, die Menschen gaben sich alles ihr Gutes und Böses. Wahrlich, sie nahmen es nicht, sie fanden es nicht, nicht fiel es ihnen als Stimme vom Himmel. Werthe legte erst der Mensch in die Dinge, sich zu erhalten, - er schuf erst den Dingen Sinn, einen Menschen-Sinn! Darum nennt er sich "Mensch'', das ist: der Schätzende … Wandel der Werthe, - das ist Wandel der Schaffenden. Immer vernichtet, wer ein Schöpfer sein muss. Friedrich Nietzsche “Also sprach Zarathustra” HABITS OF THE MIND Suppose for a moment that making a moral judgement is in some way analogous to recognising a face of a person we knew a long time ago. It may seem strange, but please humour me for a moment. It is rather difficult to know the particulars of what makes us recognise a face that we have never seen in exactly this shape before, perhaps because it is 20 years ago that we saw this face last. We are of course presuming that the person in question does not have some very recognisable feature, like a large mole on the tip of his nose. That would give the game away. We are also able to recognise a whole range of facial expressions, although we may not be able to state the particulars of this process. We just do it. If routine moral judgements are made in the same way, we may not be able to give a lot of reasons for our judgements; we may just be able to state that we feel that this would be the right or the wrong thing to do. When asked why this would be right or wrong, we are unable to appeal either to universality, utility or any other criterion. To us it might be evident almost in the same way that it would be evident that this is the face of Peter. A simpler example might involve discerning between a genuine smile and a faked smile. I suppose that almost everyone would know immediately what I mean by a genuine and a faked smile. Not that most people know anything about the muscles of face; we just say that a faked smile would be revealed by the eyes. Damasio has the story of the particulars. A smile of real joy requires the combined involuntary contraction of two muscles, the zygotic major and the orbicularis oculi. We can wilfully control the first while the orbicularis oculi is beyond wilful control. Normally we would not be able to explain that, but we recognise the effect. We see the smile of joy. In other words, we are able to recognise faces, genuine smiles, faked smiles, chairs, sexual harassment, and make judgements on things and behaviours violating our moral sense. To argue why this is possible we have to show the plausibility and importance of a tacit and ineffable foundation of our value judgements. We begin with the tentative list of sources for the habits of the mind outlined in this table: THE INTERNAL CAUTIONER Some inside cautioner warns me to stay in my place in spite of the urge I feel, like the cautioner in Baudelaire’s poem: Each man who’s worth the name must know A yellow Serpent is at home Within his heart, as on a throne, Which, if he says: ‘I want!’ says: No!’ Written rules and explicit threats of external sanctions prohibiting or limiting a certain kind of behaviour would never be able to equal the internal tacit cautioner saying “no” to me. Is this perhaps the only place where we can locate our much sought after individual sense of responsibility? We shall see. Perhaps we may glean some insight on this internal cautioner by employing Damasio’s concept of somatic markers. Instead of committing the mistake of believing that we act as advanced electronic calculators when faced with an ethical dilemma, Damasio almost follows Dennett in believing that our minds rapidly create sketches of multiple scenarios of possible responses and actions. In the case of an ethical dilemma, a silent patron of our minds may help us produce and evaluate the multiple fleeting sketches of possible decisions and actions, before we reason consciously about what we do. This production and evaluation seem to happen before any conscious reasoning. It comes preselected to our conscious mind. Preselected perhaps with the aid of somatic markers. A somatic marker may force “attention on the negative outcome to which a given action may lead, and functions as an automated alarm signal which says: Beware of danger ahead if you choose the option which leads to this outcome. The signal may lead you to reject, immediately, the negative course of action and thus make you choose among other alternatives.” The important lesson we can draw is that a somatic marker may kick in, before any conscious reasoning about the problem. This marker represents a more sophisticated version of what we may call gut feeling. The unpleasant feeling that shows that we may not be comfortable with a certain decision or action. This also seems to be the reason for the name ‘somatic marker’. ‘Soma’ for body, or bodily reactions and ‘marker’ because it marks the sketches of the mind. A somatic marker may act more subtly than that, no queasy feeling in the stomach is necessary, the uneasiness may show itself in a bias that we are unaware of. It may reveal itself in no more than the expression: “I feel it would be right.” This fits well with the way somatic markers are supposed to be created. “When the choice of option X, which leads to bad outcome Y, is followed by punishment and thus painful body states, the somatic marker system acquires the hidden, dispositional representation of this experience-driven, non-inherited, arbitrary connection.” It does not have to be punishment; many diverse experiences such as displeasure, acceptance and praise may of course lead to the creation of somatic markers, which are activated automatically before and during our reasoning process. Somatic markers represent special feelings generated by emotions, a conditioned feeling that we have somehow learned, and which guide and restrict our judgements. We may think of them as biasing devices; they do not put us on a kind of autopilot, but subtly guide and restrict us in our judgements as well as in our actions. Somatic markers may be felt when we talk about a certain action giving us a bad taste, or a queasy feeling in the stomach. In ways we cannot individually understand and explain they signify a bias of our feelings, and there is not much we can consciously do about that. Deacon does not talk about somatic markers, but his arguments in relation to the role of emotion in reasoning made us aware of how somatic markers may play a role in reasoning. “Powerful mental images can elicit a vicarious emotional charge that makes them capable of outcompeting current sensory stimuli and intrinsic drives for control of attention and emotion, resulting in a kind of virtual emotional experience.” During our reasoning we may thus be emotionally influenced by the images that are evoked. It is not just any emotion that is allowed to pass through and influence actions. We are talking about conditioned feelings, feelings like embarrassment, shame and remorse. Feelings “acquired by experience, under the control of an internal preference system and under the influence of an external set of circumstances which include not only entities and events with which the organism must interact, but also social conventions and ethical rules.” Perhaps these feelings and markers are also what compel us to act, making us feel that we have to, almost without thinking. The internal cautioner may in some cases urge us to act, in other cases put up a warning sign saying: “No way!” Any reference to Kantian principles or any calculation of pros and cons will not be enough to compel us to act. This may bring us an accusation of subjectivism. Not so, there might be a kind of non-subjective common foundation for the biases and somatic markers that we possess, without being able to state explicitly what these biases are. THE SOCIAL ETHICAL GRAMMAR We shall argue that moral judgements are made according to what might be seen as a social and ethical grammar. Here we use both terms, social and ethical, because we want to underline the social part of this grammar, realising of course that certain parts of the grammar may be social, but not necessarily have anything to do with ethics. Table manners, dress codes and so on come to mind as something that may belong to a social grammar, but have little relevance for ethics and morals. Perhaps our concept of grammar may have more in common with Wittgenstein’s “Sprachspiele.” In Philosophischen Untersuchungen he writes “Grammatik sagt nicht, wie die Sprache gebaut sein muß, um ihre Zwecke zu erfüllen, um so und so auf die Menschen zu wirken. Sie beschreibt nur, aber erklärt in keiner Weise, den Gebrauch der Zeichen.” A small example from Cosmides and Toby may demonstrate how such a grammar might work. We have to consider two sentence samples: 1 If he’s the victim of an unlucky tragedy, then we should pitch in to help him out. 2 If he spends his time loafing and living off others, then he doesn’t deserve our help. Contrast this with: 3 If he’s the victim of an unlucky tragedy, then he doesn’t deserve our help. 4 If he spends his time loafing and living off of others, then we should pitch in to help him out. I suspect that most readers would find nothing wrong with sentences 1 and 2, while sentences 3 and 4 may seem rather odd or disturbing. Why should anyone want to say something like that? In a sense sentences 3 and 4 are as good as the first two sentences. What is wrong is that sentences 3 and 4 state something that seems unjust to our moral senses, perhaps leading to us to blurt out: “This wouldn’t be fair would it?” Presumably most people intuitively see these sentences as stating something that would be unjust. It would be seen as evident, not as something that had to or could be explained. What is happening may be analogous to what is happening when we recognise a face. We cannot tell what particulars are involved, we just recognise it. It may be in this sense that the two sentences violate an ineffable grammar of ethical and social reasoning. Our biases and somatic markers may be based on a shared social and ethical grammar, which may reveal itself in the feeling that there is something odd about sentences 3 and 4. This is the kind of grammar that may lead us to nod approvingly at sentences 1 and 2, and to feel that there is something strange about sentences 3 and 4. It is a grammar that consists partly of overt rules and examples and partly of covert norms and predispositions, making us able to judge and act in relation to specific cases, almost in the same sense that we are able to construct sentences, without looking up explicit rules or making prolonged calculations. “In the study of reasoning, a grammar is a finite set of rules that can generate all appropriate inferences while not simultaneously generating inappropriate ones. If it is a grammar of social reasoning, then these inferences are about the domain of social motivation and behaviour; an ‘inappropriate’ inference is defined as one that members of a social community would judge as incomprehensible or nonsensical.” Or, may we add, unethical. We assume that a social grammar would be characterised by being: • layered, and contingent, not derivable from simple principles; • shared as a collective conscience, internalised by individuals; • generative and non-determinative. Layered We presume that parts of the social grammar may be found in the explicit rules regulating and limiting the behaviour of people in a community, all the way from the Declaration of Human Rights, parts of national constitutions, via specific laws against corruption or sexual harassment, to family and personnel policies. These rules would seem to represent a surface layer of explicit ethical norms that either have or can be given a written expression. The explicit rules of the surface layer would then represent the upper tip of a whole root-like structure of ethical norms, experiences and knowledge. When we discuss the foundations of these norms, we are in a way attempting to follow the reasoning down along the roots, trying to understand the foundation of these rules. On the intermediate level we might find vaguely defined expressions like fairness. On the next level we argue that ethical judgements apparently involve much more than following written ethical codes and laws regulating behaviour. It involves as we have seen an internalised ethical grammar, or a set of tacit norms, and a certain level of knowledge. At this intermediate level judgements seem to relate to some vaguely defined norms that we can only talk about in a roundabout way. They are not usually written down, but are expressible in a general way, like fairness or justice. They may also be likened to the tacit rules of a moderately skilful chess player, who according to Black is “guided by memories of his own previous successes and failures and, still more importantly, by the sifted experience of whole generations of masters. The accessible tradition supplies defeasible general maxims, standardised routines for accomplishing particular subtasks, detailed models for initial deployment of pieces ... and much else.” We can think consciously about the norms and values, and they seem to be part of our common sense. Maybe this is the level where we can locate the philosophical discussions of ethics and instances of ethical appeal. Maybe this is the level where we can find expressions like: “It is in the interest of all ... that this kind of behaviour is not condoned.” At this level we are still able to give some kind of reason for the judgements we make, although the arguments may be rather philosophical. An even deeper level would represent the really unconscious layers of the mind, containing ethical norms and feelings, inclinations and emotions that belong to the collective unconscious. In our conception we see no need for complete hierarchical consistency, only an overall coherence, anchored in decentralised way in the collective unconscious. There is no single overriding principle either Kantian or utilitarian, only a tacit consistency between a multitude of possible practical judgements on the surface and the deeper layers; like a linguistic grammar a social grammar is in no need of a single overriding principle. What we have instead are mutually supporting decentral elements. According to our model Kant and Mill may respectively have distilled as it were some of the general elements that seem to belong to reasoning on the basis of these layers, but their ethical principles cannot be used the other way round to determine practical ethical judgement. This would be an attempt to make them into first principles, first principles that would tear up a much more subtle decentralised structure, in effect making them sterile and impotent as principles for judging concrete cases. Shared and silent Angell argues that every group of people have to share something in the nature of moral order. “People cannot work together without overt or tacit standards of conduct corresponding to their common values.” He argues that even a family would not be held together solely by mutual affection; there has to be some moral integration, consisting of shared views of what it means to be a family and what is proper conduct for family members. Perhaps this may represent what Durkheim has called the collective conscience of a society. Here we want to emphasise something else, something we might for want of better expression call the collective unconscious. The unconscious part of this consists in “everything of which I know, but of which I am not at the moment thinking; everything of which I was once conscious but have now forgotten; everything perceived by my senses, but not noted by my conscious mind; everything which, involuntarily and without paying attention to it, I feel, think, remember, want, and do; all the future things that are taking shape in me and will sometime come to consciousness: all this is the content of the unconscious.” The unconscious may partly be personal, partly shared and thus collective. We want to emphasise the collective part of the unconscious, the part that is shared across a community of individuals, and owes its existence not to the single individual but like a linguistic grammar is shared collectively. A community would expect that the grammar they are using would be shared by everyone else in the community, so that when they act according to the grammar, they can count upon the other members of the community. We must have this implicit faith in judgement and actions of our fellow human beings or we would have no community. “A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs.” In fact it is the tacit belief that others will do their part that will help create the fact that will be desired by all. Or as James would have said: “There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming. And where faith in a fact can help create the fact …” To use a grammar is to observe and follow a certain social habit, usage or “rule.” “Ist, was wir ‘einer Regel folgen’ nennen, etwas, was nur ein Mensch, nur einmal im Leben, tun könnte? … Es kann nicht ein einziges Mal nur ein Mensch einer Regel gefolgt sein. Es kann nicht ein einziges Mal nur eine Mitteilung gemacht, ein Befehl gegeben, oder verstanden worden sein, etc. – Einer Regel folgen, eine Mitteilung machen, einen Befehl geben, eine Schachpartie spielen sind Gepflogenheiten (Gebrauche, Institutionen).” There are social limits to the values that individuals and groups can hold if the community in question has to survive as a community. This is a problem of coherence. Different groups and communities may have different grammars, but only to a certain degree, and like Cosmides, Tooby and Aitchison we assume that there are elements of a universal grammar in all the local grammars. We may guess that there has to be a certain universality in every community of people. Examples of widely held grammars or collective consciences might be the protestant ethic described by Weber as characterising a certain period in Western capitalism, while Confucianism might point to some of the basic elements of an Eastern grammar. Generativity We do not have to learn a preconceived set of sentences by heart, we form our own sentences. As long they are formed according to more or less tacit demands of the grammar, they may be regarded as instances of well-formed sentences. We can form sentences never heard before, and still they would be recognised as applications of the grammar. In a way it may be like playing according to well-understood general rules of a game. They define the game, but they do not define the individual actions. This shows the general generativity of a linguistic grammar. A generative grammar is thus a set of explicit and tacit rules that can be used to create new sentences, which would be regarded as well-formed and grammatical in a given language. A generative grammar will not allow the generation of sentences that are ungrammatical, meaning that they would be regarded as ill formed in a given language. Practices showing up in social habits, habitus, rituals and so on are all part the imprints left in us of the evolution of man and community. GROSSVATERS ZOPF Writing about our virtues, Nietzsche looks to their origin. He asks “What does it mean to believe in one’s virtue?” and whether this “isn't this at bottom the same thing that was formerly called one's "good conscience," that venerable long pigtail of a concept [Begriffs-Zopf] which our grandfathers fastened to the backs of their heads, and often enough also to the backside of their understanding? So, it seems that however little we may seem old-fashioned and grandfatherly-honorable to ourselves in other matters, in one respect we are nevertheless the worthy grandsons of these grandfathers, we last Europeans with a good conscience: we, too, still wear their pigtail.” We still carry our grandfather’s pigtail of virtue on and especially in our heads. One may wonder whether Nietzsche already had a notion about the importance of amygdala for emotions that we cannot explain and now perhaps even virtues. We are looking for the origin of the social grammar. Perhaps this pigtail of history and evolution shows where the social grammar originates, in the history of man’s development, in the evolution of man and of community. Parts of our social grammar may consist of remnants of values that evolved in periods during the evolution of communities that we have either no evidence or only very circumstantial evidence of. The deepest and most durable elements of our social grammar may very well be a result of this evolution, all of it. Some of our fundamental notions of and feelings about morality will have origins hidden so deep in our evolution that we can only transmit them from generation to generation as habits and inclinations we are not even aware of, and if we are, then we cannot give any explanation for them. We may of course guess as to their possible purpose and function, but in fact it might be even more difficult to explain why we should have certain moral dispositions than it would be to explain why we have the morphology that most human beings have today. Why this relation among the different parts of our bodies and not another? Why this number of fingers, this placement of the eyes, the larynx and so on. Such a question might even sound curious, but a similar question with regard to our basic moral dispositions would sound even curiouser. Might we not be fairly confident in assuming that, although many other configurations might have been possible, the configuration that we have is consistent and important to a degree that we may only begin to comprehend. It is not arbitrary; there is a “reason” but we may never be able to comprehend it. The “reason” has been produced and reproduced during man’s evolution, transmitted from generation to generation, leaving an echo in somatic markers, deeply held convictions and in cultural habits. This reason is not transcendental, is not given a priori and it does not represent a decree from God. It is located on the earth, in man. Like God and the transcendental this reason has been produced by man, but we can have no recollection of the process; we may only carry the faint imprint in our feelings and reactions. This does mean that this reason is innate; it may be imprinted in other ways, and if it is hardwired in any sense it might be in the neural network of our brain. This reason acts as the field of an invisible magnet on iron particles, orientating us into patterns or into grooves that we cannot comprehend. These patterns, grooves or imprints are ineffable and tacit, in the same way that a part of our knowledge is. We only experience the feelings, not the reasons, not the explanations. These imprints may be so much part of what it means to be human that we cannot really think about them or question them; they make themselves felt in the way they influence our thoughts. The elements of the grammar we become aware of may likewise be regarded as “natural” intuitions, natural in the sense that we suppose they are shared by other human beings. Perhaps we assume that we may be able to learn an infinite number of social grammars, but the one we learn is the one characterising our community. In this way social and ethical grammar come to be shared among the members of a community. Like the linguistic grammar it is neither freely chosen nor arbitrary, but the result is that “human thoughts … run along pre-ordained grooves.” It is in these “natural” imprints we locate the roots of those intuitions that philosophers have grappled with and attempted to anchor in first principles; attempts that we have to regard as rather futile in the light of our theses. If the imprints are not a result of transcendental a priori categories, or God-given commands, or innate dispositions, they have to stem from somewhere else. The imprints we are talking about seem to exist independent of any specific individual, but where do they originate, and what has kept them alive during the evolution, if they are not located in the genes? The answer is of course the values instilled and transmitted from grandfathers to fathers, to sons and to their sons; the values instilled by a community of grandfathers – and grandmothers. This points to the importance of symbolic representations, of rituals, of religious convictions and of ideologies This would mean that repetition of rituals, the meaning of which might elude us, would by the sheer repetition lead an individual subject to these repetitions to absorb the general aspects of the social grammar, without being able to explain what they are. This represents once again a parallel to the first acquisition of linguistic grammar. In a sense it can be said that we learn the grammar by repetitive use of a language based upon this grammar. We seem able to generalise from this repetition, but we may never have understood explicitly any of the fundamental rules underlying our use of the language. We do not learn the grammar directly by being taught social grammatical rules; we learn it indirectly from people who use it, by imitating, by approval and disapproval, expectations, praise, and so on.66 The importance of ritual is also underlined in Bourdieu’s writings. His concept of habitus represents a set of dispositions that disposes an individual member of a community to judge, act and react in certain way. “Symbols are the instruments par excellence of ‘social integration’: as instruments of knowledge and communication …, they make it possible for there to be a consensus on the meaning of the social world, a consensus which contributes fundamentally to the reproduction of the social order. ‘Logical’ integration is the precondition of ‘moral’ integration.”68 Social inculcation through participation in a collective practice produces habitus “that are capable of generating practices regulated without express regulation or any institutionalized call to order.” Practices showing up in social habits, habitus, rituals and so on are all part the imprints left in us of the evolution of man and community. This essay is based upon an excerpt from my book “Beyond rules in society and business” Edward Elgar 2002 & 2204. Was überzeugt mich denn, daß der Andere ein gewöhnliches Bild dreidimensional sieht? – Daß er’s sagt? Unsinn–wie weiß ich denn, was er mit dieser Versicherung meint? Nun, daß er sich darin auskennt; die Ausdrücke auf das Bild verwendet, die er auf den Raum anwendet; sich vor einem Landshaftsbild benimmt, wie vor einer Landschaft, etc. etc. Ludwig Wittgenstein Hog futures have declined in sympathy … The subtitle is taken from a radio announcement in DeLillo’s book White Noise.1 It made me wonder how much knowledge is taken for granted.2 Most educated people at least in the developed countries would probably have some gist of understanding what this announcement could mean and be able to attach some sense to it. A child listening to an announcement like this might only understand the expression “hog,” and part of the rest of the expression, which ends with: “adding bearishness to market.” An educated person might understand most, but have some trouble with futures, perhaps having only the vague notion that it is somehow related to the stock exchange, to certain television programmes and special pages in the newspaper. “Bearishness” might also give trouble, but with all the interest in prices of shares and derivatives, he or she might even have an understanding of that. To those selling and buying futures the announcement is immediately understandable, although perhaps they wonder with what the futures have declined in sympathy. The announcement might lead them to take action in reaction to the news, selling their futures, whatever. To a farmer in the hog business the announcement might mean something else, and might even galvanise him into action, perhaps leading him to make decisions resulting in long-term changes in the production of hogs. There are many levels of understanding, and it would seem that in order to understand the announcement the recipient would have to draw on a vast storage of preconceived notions. The announcement may be compared to a coded message that can be picked up by a recipient with the right decoding apparatus; not only an apparatus that would make it possible to make sense of the phonemes. The apparatus would have to consist of stored knowledge that would make it possible to understand the meaning of expressions like hog, hog futures, decline, sympathy, bearishness and market, and the possible relations between these expressions. The argot of the stock exchange demands an implicit understanding with the recipient, because such an announcement is usually not accompanied by a very detailed explanation of what hogs, futures and sympathy means, or indeed what the whole expression might mean. Some sort of taken-for-granted knowledge is necessary in all human communication. There is never enough information in the expressions we use to make them self-explanatory.3 Context and prior knowledge are necessary. This goes to show that our everyday language rests upon a lot of built-in tacit assumptions or we would not even know what it means when someone says: “It is raining.” In order to understand common expressions we have to possess some kind of taken-for-granted knowledge. Usually we do not have to think about this knowledge, it just seems to be readily available. Knowing more than one can say … Take a look at a skilled mountain biker, picking his way down a difficult slope. Does he know what he is doing? In a particular sense certainly, or he would not be able to stay on his bike. In another sense perhaps not. He may not be able to explain what he is doing very well. He is speeding down a complicated cross-country track without really thinking about what he is doing, letting some part of his mind and body adjust to the varying conditions without consciously thinking about what should be done. If he had to think of how a sudden obstacle could be tackled, he would either react too late or attempt an evasive manoeuvre bound to result in a fall. This I believe to be a plausible result taking into account the time it takes for the obstacle to register in the brain, the time to think consciously about the problem and then react by transmitting messages to various parts of the body, causing muscles to contract, making the knees bend, and the body sway this way or that, ultimately shifting balance and so on. He seems to have the problem well in hand. In fact it is as if he is thinking with his hands or perhaps the whole body, without being involved in too much conscious thought. Libet’s experiment in the 1980s confirms at least part of this supposition. Libet made experiments in which he asked volunteers move their hands whenever they wanted to, while he was measuring the activity of the test subject’s brain. It turned out that brain impulses associated with the movement of the hand began a few hundred milliseconds before the test subject reported any intent to make a movement. This would mean that the “voluntary action did not originate consciously.”7 In the case of the skilled mountain biker it would seem that part of the brain handles processes and initiates actions independently of conscious thought. This seems to happen all the time when we move around, pick up things, write, play an instrument. A special report on this phenomenon in the New Scientist carried the heading: “Don’t look now there’s someone else running your body.”8 In a fairly naïve way this is evidently right, at least for some of our motoric activity; we do not have to think consciously about walking in order to walk, except possibly when inebriated or handicapped in a certain way. We are interested in other aspects though, such as the tacit foundation of our knowledge and judgements. “We say: ‘Take this chair’ and it doesn’t occur to us that we might be mistaken, that perhaps it isn’t really a chair, that later experience may show us something different.”9 But ask someone to describe a chair, and he might get into trouble. When asking this question, or rather asking in Danish for a general description of a stol, typical answers range from “Something to sit on” to “A horizontal plane supported by four legs, and perhaps with a back.” Often the respondents describe a chair as consisting of a seat back, a seat and maybe four legs. This does not characterise all chairs. Some modern chairs have one or three massive legs for instance, in fact the definition found would exclude a lot of chairs. Sometimes chairs might be so strange that we only recognise them as chairs in relation to their surroundings, in their context so to speak. What is important is that we may not be able to give a general description of a chair that would cover all chairs. In order to recognise something as a chair we need a lot of context and some tacit, gestalt-like perception of what we have come to regard as chairishness. Even the chair legs themselves would be impossible to define if they are not seen in relation to the rest. We really would not know what was meant. Legs are only relevant in relation to the rest, to the context. That means we only understand them as attached to chairs, tables, persons or as the legs of a journey. In fact we rely on something reminding us of a gestalt or a patterned definition, perhaps like the way a chess player may describe patterns in a game of chess.12 This means that our concept of what constitutes a chair refers to a whole gestalt-like complex of meanings and interpretations relating to it. Recognising something as a chair fit for sitting on demands more than just recognising the chairishness of the form. Somehow we also seem able to see that a certain configuration has a certain solidity. I am not sure that a chair constructed of single sheets of normal copying paper glued together in the shape of a chair would be seen as chair. Instead it might be seen as a model of a chair, a paper chair, or perhaps as a piece of art. The notion of solidity is presumably based on former experience with the solidity of materials like the ones apparently used for constructing the object, the chairishness of which we are judging. Somehow our skill to judge the ability of a chair to support our weight must be based on all sorts of hands-on experience and tacit calculations that we are unaware of. “The expert performer knows how to proceed without any detached deliberation about his situation or actions, and without any conscious contemplation of alternatives.”13 This fits well with Polanyi, who asserts that it is a well-known fact “that the aim of skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the person following them.”14 This is exactly the level of performance most of us have attained in order to cope with everyday problems. We recognise patterns, pictures, signs, faces and facial expressions without thinking and analysing at length.15 “When we turn our eyes to the face of another human being, we often seek and usually find a meaning in all that it does or fails to do. Grins, sneers, grimaces, and frowns, fleeting smiles and lingering stares, animated faces and poker faces are not merely utilitarian contractions and relaxations of the muscles, but glimpses into the heart of the other – or so it seems.”16 We may understand “fleeting” and “lingering” in relation to facial expressions, but can we explain what the expressions mean precisely? Presumably not and still we seem to be able to read a lot into a facial expression, and make some quick inferences. That facial expressions are understood may be inferred from the reactions we show, looking for dangers if we see fear in another face, reacting with fear if we see angry expression or echoing the knowing smile of someone who sees the same joke that we did.17 We understand words and noises without usually having to think consciously about their meaning. We use a large part of native language as expert performers. We drive bikes, and cars, like expert performers, negotiating every day obstacle courses without much conscious thought. Spending much of our time thinking that some of our fellow rush-hour travellers are morons driving with their heads under their arms. What these examples indicate is that from a certain level of performance we all depend upon some kind of tacit knowledge we are not really aware of. “In some cases, we were once aware of the understandings which were subsequently internalized in our feeling for the stuff of action. In other cases, we may never have been aware of them. In both cases, however, we are usually unable to describe the knowing which our action reveals.”18 In a study of the professional knowledge of nurses Josefson describes a case involving a middle-aged nurse, with many years of experience. In this case a man is admitted to her ward after surgery. After having a short conversation with the patient the nurse concludes that there is something wrong with him, although she cannot put her finger on what exactly it is that has convinced her of that. She calls a doctor, apparently someone with only little experience. He checks the patient’s vital signs and finds nothing wrong. “Later in the day, the patient died, and the post mortem uncovered a complication that could not have been diagnosed by an examination of his vital signs. The nurse’s comment was that she noticed something was out of the ordinary, but could not explain how she had arrived at this conclusion.”20 Previous experience was a decisive factor. Care is central in a nurse’s profession and Josefson mentions that nurses receive theoretical training that inculcates important medical knowledge and information. But this is not enough in a non-routine situation, or as Josefson sees it, when there are unexpected complications. “To deal with this degree of complexity nurses must have the ability to make a reasonable interpretation of events not covered by the descriptions in the rule book. This requires multi-faceted practical experience, through which the information acquired through formal training can be developed into knowledge. That knowledge is built up from a long series of examples which give different perspectives on an illness.”21 One may ask whether we can learn this kind of knowledge. Wittgenstein’s answer is: “Yes; some can. Not, however, by taking a course in it, but through ‘experience’. – Can someone else be a man’s teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right tip – This is what ‘learning’ and ‘ teaching’ are like here. – What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgement. There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating rules.”22 Recent research on what has been called naturalistic decision making seems to confirm that Wittgenstein had the right idea. In empirical research it has been shown that situated and contextual learning are important for developing expertise, and insight. “[C]ontext provides examples of the conditions that call for actions, the range of permissible actions, and the consequences of actions. It provides opportunities to develop tacit knowledge about subtle features of the situation …”23 “But I have it in my hands” the branch manager of a Danish bank exclaimed after showing the miserable result of an attempt to write a description for making a Windsor knot in a tie. He was frustrated because he knew how to tie his tie into a Windsor knot, but he was not able to make a description of how it was done, even though his hands seemed to know what to do. The tie problem may seem naïve compared with the problems that branch managers and employees of banks have to solve every day, but when they are deciding whether to lend money to a given customer or not, they apparently often find it necessary to go beyond the written instructions, and use knowledge based on experience, vague perceptions and impressions. “It is very difficult just to walk through the swing door and rate a company the first time. One has to have some experience, some knowledge, one has to have some understanding, some impression of what kind of company it is …”26 A branch manager agrees: “As I am often saying, this it not something that one can pronounce, it consists in looking at people, look deep into the eyes, what kind of person is this?”27 Experience, knowledge, understanding, impression, a look deep into the eyes. The terms used are fairly vague. It is not something that can be easily incorporated into a set of guidelines or rules for credit-rating. In fact some of the employees interviewed said that in their opinion they had to go beyond the written instructions, when credit-rating a company. “… much of it is subjective reflections.”28 It is based on a judgement involving written instructions, impressions and inexplicable notions. An area manager talks of the need to be able to get a scent, almost like a tracker dog, when talking to the customer, apparently also listening for the things that are not said. “I am in the habit of saying that one shouldn’t rely on what one is seeing. No, one must use all one’s senses, it has to include Fingerspitzengefühl. The hairs at the back of one’s neck have to bristle, when sitting with someone who is dangerous.”29 Dangerous in the sense that the bank may lose money on that person, if they are persuaded by his business plan. In another bank an employee says that making decisions “has much to do with trust, and this here ‘Fingerspitzengefühl’, also in everyday transactions.”30 Scents, impressions at the tip of one’s fingers, bristling hairs at the back of one’s neck, trust, what kind of knowledge is that? Even CEOs seem to rely on such strange sensations. The CEO of one Danish bank trusts his nose and his guts to give him an idea of how well a branch is run. He talks of relying on structured and unstructured information, from many sources when judging the branches and their managers. All these structured and unstructured impulses decide “whether I have or I haven’t a good feeling in the gut.”31 It would seem that when judging a customer and credit rating a company, bank managers and employees rely on aspects of knowledge they cannot really explain, but which manifest themselves in feelings, impressions and physical signs like bristling hair, conditions of the stomach and taste; in a way thinking with their hands and judging with their guts, as if they possessed some kind of body knowledge. It is important to note though that the impressions and feelings influencing credit rating were apparently used alongside more explicit information and knowledge when making a decision. When stating the reasons for the decisions in writing the emphasis would be on the formal knowledge, on the reference to rules, guidelines and numbers so to speak. In fact one sometimes got the impression that the decision of whether to lend money to certain customers would be based mostly on impressions, experience with the customer and be clothed in more rational terms afterwards, with explicit references to credit instructions and so forth. Bristling hair, Gefühl, gut feelings and taste are translated into terms of formal knowledge and almost algorithm-like reasoning. In this way the decisions are seen as resulting from such algorithm-like reasoning processes, but it is important to remember that these reasons are constructed after the decisions have been made. It would seem that tacit knowledge is important for making professional decisions, but one feels weary using this knowledge in arguments for a certain decision. Instead making it look as if explicit or formal knowledge is the only form of knowledge used in making the decisions. Pointing to something that one cannot put one’s finger on, or using expressions that may sound as if one’s body and not the brain is the place where the ability to make judgements resides, somehow seems irrational and must be covered up in the written reasons given for a decision. Tentative knowledge of knowledge While writing about all these examples and reading and thinking about them at the same time, hitherto strange, unconnected lumps of knowledge about knowledge seemed to coalesce in ways beyond the control of my consciousness. They popped up and disappeared, combined and separated and made new conscious blobs of often fleeting thoughts, like the kind of tentative drafts that emerge, are pushed about, connected and correlated with what one already knows. Often the whole process involves the physical action of finding a theoretical fragment in an article or book, and/or actually the drawing of sketches of what might be termed a semantic network, or in a modern parlance mindmap, looking for relationship, inconsistencies, while the mental sketches change, under the influence of what is now stated on a piece of paper or a computer screen. During one of the sketch drawing sessions, the thought that this could somehow be related to Dennett’s multiple drafts model of consciousness also popped up. “According to the Multiple Drafts model, all varieties of perception – indeed, all varieties of thought or mental activity – are accomplished in the brain by parallel, multitrack processes of interpretation and elaboration of sensory inputs. Information entering the nervous system is under continuous ‘editorial revision’.”34 Dennett’s examples concern perception, for instance visual perception. Most of these multiple drafts or sketches as we call them “play short-lived roles in the modulation of current activity.”35 These sketches, hastily caught on pieces of paper and in elaborate verbal sketches on the computer screen, somehow lead to new sketches, alas often only vaguely related to each other. Even so the sketches seem to contain bigger and bigger lumps, and what emerges is a tentative structure for discussing the different aspects of knowledge in a more systematic way. The tentative typology containing some of the aspects we find important is shown in Table 4.1. Table 4.1 Tentative typology of knowledge What we can say In some of the former examples we have tried to show that one can know more than one can say. Let us now take a look at a kind of knowledge, where one can say what one knows. This knowledge is formal and can be stated explicitly. Declarative knowledge may be represented by statements about facts, relationships, causes and states. An example of a propositional statement might be the expression “the melting point of x-material is y-degrees.” Facts and formal rules used in building radios may represent propositional knowledge. Explicit procedural knowledge describes actions, for instance encoding how to achieve a particular result. An example might be the “Sieve of Eratosthenes,” a simple but tedious method for finding prime numbers.36 Although rather simple for people conversant with mathematics, many may have a problem understanding the meaning of a propositional statement and the Sieve of Eratosthenes may mean nothing to them, which just goes to show that although declarative or propositional knowledge can be expressed very explicitly, it stills demands a kind of implicit or taken-for-granted knowledge. What characterises formal knowledge is that it is overt and almost tangible, it can exist independently of an individual mind, as an expression in a book, or at an obscure Internet address. “The important thing about it is that, being formulated in texts, equations, and the like, it can be discussed, criticized, amended, compared, and rather directly taught. All this is in sharp contrast to the other kinds of knowledge …”40 There is no doubt about the importance of formal knowledge in modern society where most of the knowledge is “outsourced” and located outside us, in all sorts of storages. The question is instead whether the emphasis on formal knowledge erodes the more tacit parts of knowledge that we all depend on, but cannot see or touch or transmit or store in the same way that we can with formal knowledge. I believe that this actually is happening at the moment, as a result of the current emphasis on the explicit and algorithm-like aspects of knowledge. The silent patron In Fodor’s Modularity of the Mind we may find an illustration of the kind of knowledge that does not seem to be formal, although it is stated in a textbook. “Whether John’s utterance of ‘Mary might do it, but Joan is above that sort of thing’ is ironical, say, is a question that can’t be answered short of using a lot of what you know about John, Mary and Joan. Worse yet, there doesn’t seem to be any way to say, in the general case, how much, or precisely what, of what you know about them might need to be accessed in making such determinations.”41 The kind of knowledge that one would need in order to judge whether John’s utterance was meant ironically is difficult to state as formal declarative knowledge. It may represent an informal knowledge that a good friend of John, Mary, and Joan would possess, without really being able to state it explicitly. Most of the knowledge would also be tied to the specific relationships with the involved persons. Someone able to judge whether John’s utterance was meant ironically might not be able to do it if some unknown person had said it; meaning that the knowledge would be situated, except of course for a general ability to discern an ironical tone or lack of same, in an utterance, if we hear it spoken out aloud. In a series of lectures Polanyi in the 1960s tried to work out a whole structure of tacit knowing.42 His starting point is somewhat like ours, that we can know more than we can say. Polanyi shows that there is a certain structure to tacit knowing. Polanyi would say that we attend from the silent perception of the sounds to the meaning of the expression. Or in face recognition, from the silent recognition of particular features of the face to the face. We somehow use the elementary features of sounds or faces to get at their joint meaning. What Polanyi seems to be saying is that we go from particulars to what may be seen as a gestalt. We perceive the particulars of a chair, the legs, seat, back, size, material and so on, without conscious thought and from them we move to the overall gestalt, to the phenomenon, and to the meaning of these perceptions, to the chair. We recognise the chair as a chair without recounting all these particulars, which might be dissolved in even more particular particulars, if we start thinking about what makes up a chair. Now perhaps it is understandable that we have difficulties in giving an all encompassing definition of a chair. Even if we would somehow be able to recount all the tacit from relations, the particulars that give rise to the impression of a chair, we would have difficulty in defining a chair. We tacitly seem to integrate the particulars to a whole, a chair or whatever. “Since we were not attending to the particulars in themselves, we could not identify them.”45 Polanyi draws the conclusion that too much lucidity can in fact be counter-productive. “Scrutinize closely the particulars of a comprehensive entity and their meaning is effaced, our conception of the entity is destroyed. … Speaking more generally, the belief that, since particulars are more tangible, their knowledge offers a true conception of things is fundamentally mistaken.”46 In our chair example this would presumably mean that an attempt to define a chair by recounting all the features, the particulars as it were, would lead to a loss of comprehension of what a chair might be. Perhaps we may also hazard the hypothesis that an attempt to isolate and enumerate the qualities of leadership might lead to a loss of comprehension of leadership and even quality. Somehow those who see different chairs just as chairs must be able to ignore many aspects of the chairs. It is almost as if they reduce or discard information that is irrelevant to the problem at hand without being able to explain how they do it. I wonder whether this ability hints at an important aspect of expertise.48 In fact the breakdown of the world into particulars, legs, seat backs and seats may get us close to a kind self-willed autism. Autistics who have become able to describe their experience reported that they could not make sense of the world. They were focused, nay obsessed with the particulars of the world and these particulars represented meaningless fragments. An article in the New Scientist tells how a sufferer “could not see faces, just collections of noses, eyes and mouths. Words were just strange noises.”49 In other cases it looks as if missing parts are filled in in order to see something. This apparently happens when making sense of sentences that have lost parts in transmission. It may look as if the mind recognises something in a jumble of words or suddenly sees a meaning in an incomplete sentence, usually without much in the way of explicit analysis. With these qualifications in mind it is important to emphasise that attempts to list all the particulars would be futile. On every level and in every profession explicit knowledge rests on tacit knowing. This assertion is important because it flies in the face of many attempts of modern science, including social science and management science. “The declared aim of modern science is to establish a strictly detached, objective knowledge. Any falling short of this ideal is accepted only as a temporary imperfection, which we must aim at eliminating. But suppose that tacit thought forms an indispensable part of all knowledge, then the ideal of eliminating all personal elements of knowledge would, in effect, aim at the destruction of all knowledge.”50 Lumpy knowledge The knowledge of building radios may be distributed over many individual minds, and in books and articles and other repositories of knowledge. When we are building a radio, we are not just assembling bits and pieces of transistors, resistors, diode and so on, but also lumps of knowledge that we cannot explain, like the knowledge of constructing a transistor or a diode.The engineer constructing a radio must somehow operate withthese lumps of knowledge that has to be taken as given. The people designing the cabinet operate with other lumps of knowledge, while those responsible for the production and sale of the radio operate with their specific lumps of knowledge. Going in the other direction, we can see that integrated circuits are constructed and produced using lumps of knowledge that may be found in the construction and production of transistors. This knowledge may again include the lumps of knowledge of physicists working with basic research in different fields. Using the concept of stratified knowledge and hierarchy we can argue that when we are for instance talking or writing, we use knowledge of principles belonging say to phonetics or grammar, without thinking about it. It seems to be a kind of taken-for-granted knowledge that allows us to concentrate on expressing a thought while a more tacit part of our mind takes care of grammar, spelling of words, phonemes and so on, and our hand presses keys that make some filtered version of our thoughts appear on screen, without much conscious intervention from us. Polanyi sees this stratified knowledge as a hierarchy of entities, in which the laws, rules or principles of one level operate under the control of the level above. The voice is shaped into words belonging to a vocabulary, while the vocabulary is shaped into sentences according to the rules of a grammar, and so forth. It is important to note the use of the word “shaped.” This means that the lower level is somehow controlled by the next higher. If the sentences lose control of the words the succession of words may become meaningless. The vocabulary cannot be accounted for by the laws governing phonetics, but in order to talk, the laws of phonetics must somehow be observed. “Accordingly, the operations of a higher level cannot be accounted for by the laws governing its particulars forming the lower level. You cannot derive a vocabulary from phonetics; you cannot derive the grammar of a language from its vocabulary … it is impossible to represent the organizing principles of a higher level by the laws governing its isolated particulars.”51 Knowledge of the radio “shapes” the use of integrated circuits and transistors. A jumble of integrated circuits or transistors would not work as a radio, unless we were very lucky. A chair cannot be derived from particulars of legs, seats, knowledge of materials and so on, because “it is impossible to represent the organizing principle of a higher level by the laws governing its isolated particulars.” Poincare once said that science is built up with facts, as a house with stones. But a collection of facts is no more a science than a heap of stones is a house.52 Emergence Emergence describes the phenomenon that patterns, structures and properties can arise in a way that cannot be adequately explained by referring only to the pre-existing components and their interaction. All the same a radio, as well as a chair, emerges from the local interactions between the already known components. Even so a radio cannot be adequately explained by components like transistors, resistors or other of the components it may include. Emergent patterns are unpredictable and not deducible from the preexisting components. Many social phenomena seem to be a result of emergence, for instance markets, states, communities, cultural and social trends. Somewhat analogous to the example with speech we may presume that the higher levels have to obey the laws of the components, but at the same time the higher level influences the lower level components. The market is a collection of individual agents and behaviours but it also influences the behaviour of these agents.55 Perhaps emergence may in some vague way help us to understand the emergence of new knowledge, beginning with a hunch. Often when attempting to get to grips with something we have a hunch, but what kind of knowledge is a hunch? Apparently it just pops up like a flickering will-o’-the-wisp. When we attempt to follow the weak light, it may turn out to be nothing, or it may be the first step we are aware of when solving a problem or understanding something for the first time. It is as if a hidden and silent patron in one’s mind wants to help, by leaving a clue here and there for me to see, the me that is aware, to pick up and work with. Or by collecting a ready-made solution from some forgotten shelf of one’s memory and leaving it at the doorstep of my consciousness, for me to use, without offering any further explanation. Or by suddenly presenting a new thought in one’s consciousness. While being immersed in an attempt to understand something, for instance tacit knowledge, a new idea suddenly presents itself, a thought one has never had before makes itself heard in the cacophony of thoughts.56 In relation to a question concerning values Polanyi argued that “when originality breeds new values, it breeds them tacitly, by implication; we cannot choose explicitly a set of new values, but must submit to them by the very act of creating or adopting them.”57 Just now I have a hunch that the whole concept as presented here, simple and complex at the same time, is perhaps not entirely convincing. While writing this I was having fragments of several thoughts alternating in the mind at the same time, but one thing is certain I was not thinking about the computer I am sitting in front of, the keyboard, the keys, the work of my hands and fingers, nor the construction of words and sentences according to I know not what rules. This all seems to works automatically without intruding upon the conscious thoughts that I have. This cannot be said to represent a from–to relation in Polanyi’s sense. In fact this seems closer to the thoughts on thinking and knowing in Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. For instance when he writes: “Beobachte dich beim Schreiben, und wie die Hand die Buchstaben formt, ohne daß du es eigentlich veranlaßt. Du fühlst wohl etwas in deiner Hand, allerlei Spannungen und Drücke, aber daß die dazu nötig sind, diese Buchstaben zu erzeugen, davon weißt du nichts.”58 In a way I am moving in the opposite direction of the from–to relation, from the to part, the gestalts in the shape of my thoughts, to the from part, the particulars, the hand and finger movements, the words on the screen, the checks of spelling and grammar. My thoughts somehow dissolve in the intricate workings of tacit skills, using the keyboard, tactile and visual feedback, to adjust position and place letters on the screen, where they assemble in expressions that seem to result from my thoughts, although in an odd way they seem to be a little different from what I was thinking. Grammar, syntax and other things may influence what I am writing, filtering out thoughts that are difficult to express or form into sentences. Perhaps this explains why the thoughts appear to come out different than the thoughts I seem to be aware of. Community and heritage At least part of the knowledge that we find in our use of a common language seems to be based upon a kind of shared common or social knowledge. We usually come to think of the same things when we hear certain words in a certain context. “It is raining;” “This is a luxury car;” “I noticed the bike was yellowish;” “It bubbled like boiling water.” In this case we are able to “make inductions in the same way as others do in the world of concerted action.” 61 In some way it would seem that almost all of our knowledge is social. “Luxury”and “yellowish” would seem to be expressions that rely on some kind of common conception of what is meant. Wittgenstein gives support to this idea. “Wenn die Menschen nicht im allgemeinen über die Farben der Dinge übereinstimmten, wenn Unstimmigkeiten nicht Ausnahmen wären, könnte es unseren Farbbegriff nicht geben. Nein: – gäbe es unsern Farbbegriff nicht.”62 But is that not the case for most of what we call knowledge? This community aspect of knowledge also seems to be implied in common sense. Several times we have asked participants in our courses on value-based leadership and management to answer the question: What is “sound reason?” They were also asked whether it was common to all. Many answered that sound reason was individually determined and different from person to person. Others realised that there was an element of community in it, with quiet adjustments to the views of the majority, as can be seen from the answer: “Sound reason can be said to be the decision, that will win general approval with the great majority of a representative sample of a population.”64 Still the majority felt that their sound reason was individual and different from the sound reason of others, perhaps in a curious way this is an impression they also have from the community they are living in and the organisation they are working in. It has become part of their shared and tacit cultural knowledge. One is reminded of a chorus of people shouting: “We are all individuals,” in a Monty Python movie. “Cultural skills include the ability to make inductions in the same way as others in the world of concerted action. It is our cultural skills that enable us to make the world of concerted behaviour. We do this by agreeing that a certain object is, say, a Rembrandt, or a certain symbol is an s. That is how we digitize the world. It is our common culture that makes it possible to come to these agreements that comprises our culture.”65 “Our faith is faith in some one else’s faith, and in the greatest matters this is mostly the case. Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for each other – what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire, in which our social system backs us up?”66 It is supposed that most of the shared or social knowledge described here would consist of tacit taken for granted knowledge. But knowledge is not only social; in our view it is also inherited from earlier generations, like the language we use, the traditions we observe, the rites we follow, the values we hold, the culture we express. Wittgenstein expresses the idea like this: “Mein Weltbild habe ich nicht, weil ich mich von seiner Richtigkeit überzeugt habe; auch nicht weil ich von seiner Richtigkeit überzeugt bin. Sondern es ist der überkommene Hintergrund, auf welchem ich zwischen wahr und falsch unterscheide.”68 The cell walls of our minds I wonder whether there is another sense in which knowledge might be said to be tacit than the ones we have discussed up until now. Think for instance of standing in the kitchen mixing some ingredients. Often it is important that the mixture has the right degree of viscosity, or fluidness, but when is that achieved and how does one achieve the right viscosity by adding more ingredients? The answer might be that one learns to sense when this is the case almost in the same way that one learns to tie a knot in a tie. But might there not be a something else helping us, perhaps even the mixture itself? To Brown et al. the answer to this question is affirmative. They see problem solving as being carried out in conjunction with the environment, not solely inside the heads of the problem solver. “Instead of taking problems out of the context of their creation and providing them with an extraneous framework, JPFs [Just Plain Folks] and practitioners seem particularly adept at solving them within the framework of the context that produced them. This allows them to share the burden – of both defining and solving the problem – with the task environment as they respond directly to emerging issues. The adequacy of the solution they reach becomes apparent in relation to the role it must play in allowing activity to continue.”72 Bates mentions the examples somewhat like these and called them cooking problems. The examples are from the work of Lévi-Strauss and concern the seemingly deep principles that underlie cooking and eating of foods across cultures. Bates concludes by noting “that the universal facts reside in the structure of the cooking problem, and not in the environment per se. Such task structures … lie neither in the organism nor in the environment, but at some emergent level between the two.”73 The classic example would be the creation of the hexagonal structure of the honeycombs found in beehives. This almost perfect hexagonal structure need not depend on a kind of architectural intelligence, or innate geometrical instinct of the bees. Instead it is the inevitable outcome of the packing principle, the physical laws governing the behaviour of spheres being packed under pressure from all sides. “The bees ‘innate knowledge of hexagons’ need to consist of nothing more than a tendency to pack wax with their hemispherical heads from a wide variety of directions.”74 Could this perhaps be compared to for instance the operation of the market. No one needs to have much tacit nor explicit knowledge of the market. Market forces determine the result behind the back of the individual actors in a market. On the basis of these arguments might one dare suggest that an attempt to substitute the packing principle or the market would demand, in the case of the bees, that every bee be endowed with a sense of geometry, and ability to calculate even better than it already can (for instance when communicating the distance and direction to flowers to other bees of the hive), and in the case of the market that human beings be endowed with an extremely comprehensive knowledge of economic relations and fantastic calculating abilities in order to create a command economy that would outperform the market. This essay represents work from my book “ Beyoond rules in society and business” Edward Elgar 2002 & 2004 . Notes 1 DeLillo (1984/1986) p. 149. 2 Before attempting to show the importance of tacit knowledge it is important to emphasise that when we are talking about knowledge we are painting with a broad brush, partly taking for granted what is meant by knowledge. In order not to leave too much to interpretation a few hints may be necessary though. In common usage one might discern between “know about” or knowledge and “knowhow” or skill, in other words between Wissen and Können. Here we see Wissen and Können as different aspects of knowledge and include both meanings. Ryle discusses “knowing how” and “knowing why” and shows the differences and parallelism in small examples. We may forget how to tie a reef knot, and forget that the German word for knife is Messer (Ryle 1949). According to the German Duden dictionary “können” may be regarded as “erworbenes Vermögen, auf einem bestimmten Gebiet mit Sachverstand, Kunstfertigkeit o. Ä. Etwas [Besonderes] zu leisten: sportliches, handwerkliches … While “Wissen” includes “Gesamtheit der Kenntnisse” that someone has, but also “Kenntniss, das Wissen von etw.: ein wortloses, untrügliches Wissen” (Duden 1996). Bereiter and Scardamalia mention that to a cognitive psychologist, knowledge would be formal or declarative knowledge, while skills would represent procedural knowledge (Bereiter & Scardamalia 1993). In Philosophische Untersuchungen Wittgenstein writes: “Die Grammatik des Wortes ‘wissen’ ist offenbar eng verwandt der Grammatik der Worte ‘können’, ‘imstande sein’. Aber auch eng verwandt der des Wortes ‘verstehen’ (Eine Technik ‘ beherrschen’).” (Wittgenstein 1953) part I, p. 150. 3 The letters in “It is raining” do not contain enough information to understand the expression without prior knowledge. It seems to be just a kind of shorthand convention. To see this one only has to read the absurd conversation about whether it is raining or not in DeLillo’s White Noise, (DeLillo 1984/1986), pp. 22–25. 7 Reported in Holmes (1998), p. 35. 8 New Scientist (5 September 1998). 9 Wittgenstein (1976), p. 397. 12 Black (1990). 13 Dreyfus (1987), p. 51. See also the discussion in Dreyfus (1997) and in Bereiter & Scardamalia (1993). 14 Polanyi (1958/1962), p. 49. 15 I suddenly see that what I have written here is similar to a thought found in Wittgenstein’s later work: “Wer ein Blick für Familienähnlichkeiten hat, kann erkennen, daß zwei Leute mit einander verwandt sind, ohne sagen zu können, worin die Ähnlichkeit besteht…” Wittgenstein (1980), p. 97. 16 Russell & Fernández-Dols (1997a), p. 3. 17 Frijda & Tcherkassof (1997), pp. 85ff. Compare with Wittgenstein’s remarks in Wittgenstein (1980), passim. 18 Schön (1983), p. 54. 20 Josefson (1987), p. 27. 21 Ibid., p. 26. 22 Wittgenstein (1958), parts II/XI. 23 Beach et al. (1997), p. 33. 26 Quoted in Petersen (1997). 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Quoted from interview made by members of CREDO in Jyske Bank A/S 1996. 31 Quoted from interview with the CEO of Jyske Bank A/S 1996. 34 Dennett (1991), p. 111. 35 Quoted in Dennett (1991), p. 258. 36 Hoffman (1998). 40 Bereiter & Scardamalia (1993), p. 62. 41 Fodor (1983), p. 88. 42 Polanyi (1967). 45 Polanyi (1967), p. 18. 46 Ibid., p. 18–19. 48 Expertise is discussed in a series of articles in Chi et al. (1988). 49 McCrone (1998). 50 Polanyi (1967), p. 20 51 Ibid., p. 36. 52 This is mentioned in Aitchison (1996), p. 12. 55 As an example of how individuals and community interact one may use the following: “When ants are looking for food, they walk to a certain distance from their nest, and then they go about randomly. When one of them finds food, it goes back to the nest, dispersing pheromones on its way. These pheromones attract other ants, which disperse more pheromones, and so on. In this manner, an organized ant-trail is formed, although no-one planned it in advance. It emerges from the collective behaviour of the individual ants. A significant point is that pheromones evaporate quickly, so that once the food is finished, the trail disappears. Perhaps we should learn from this how to let go of accepted institutions and modes of thinking once they have stopped serving their original purpose” (From an interview with C. Langton from the Santa Fe Institute found at http://www.santafe.edu/~cgl/). 56 A similar idea based on somewhat different arguments is presented by many cognitive scientists. Jackendorff argues that what happens in the brain is mostly unconscious. We only become aware of the result of the activities, or as Jackendorff would have it, computations. See for instance Jackendorff (1987) and Jackendorff (1994). 57 Polanyi (1967), p. xi. 58 Wittgenstein (1980), part II/49. 61 Collins (1990), p. 109. 62 Wittgenstein (1970), p. 351. 64 Results from a questionnaire used in Course 2 on Value-based leadership and management, Jyske bank A/S, 24. Silkeborg, November 1997. In a way they were saying in chorus, like the mob in Monty Python’s Life of Brian, “We are all individuals”. 65 Collins (1990), p. 109 66 James (1896/1987), p. 206. 68 Wittgenstein (1969), p. 15. See also Haller (1981), p. 65. 72 Brown et al. (1988), p. 14. 73 Bates (1984), p. 189. The is a topic that touches upon developmental psychology, as represented in the classical ideas of Waddington, Piaget and Vygotsky, and modern attempts as found in connectionist perspectives on development. See for instance Waddington (1957), Piaget (1952), Vygotsky (1978) and Elman et al. (1996). 74 Bates (1984), p. 189. Ship of fools by vcp, with inspiration from a “Springbrunnen” in Nuremberg Narrenschyff ad Narragonia
In the “The ship of fools,” published more than 500 years ago, Sebastian Brant, is imagining that mankind is assembled on a ship sailing through the sea of time bound for the imaginary land of Narragonia, the land of fools. Brant entertains his readers with more than a hundred small poems illustrating the follies of the people on board. Brant paints a picture of human beings acting not out of any greater sense of purpose, but out of self-love, low motives and stupidity. Fools giving in to the most base instincts and motives. Today’s Narrenschiff The fools occupying important positions on the present ship sailing through the sea of time bound for the imaginary land are the foolish and arrogant leaders of Western nations engaged in a proxy war in Ukraine. It is President Biden, with no real guts, but daring anyway, spurred on by his two whisperers, Blinken and Sullivan, with Biden acting “like a feather pillow, bearing the impression of the last person who sat on him.” President Macron with lots of exuberant verbal activity and little else. A confused and bewildered NATO General Secretary Stoltenberg, standing or rather bowing to Ukraine. A Mark Rutte tacking along, looking for a new job. A reluctant and anxious Chancellor Scholz, trying to sound more warlike that he is. Aggressive leaders of countries with no real influence on the ship of fool’s manoeuvres, like the Nordic countries, the Baltic states, and several other lesser gestalts. All accompanied by mainstream media screaming the “1984” slogan “War is Peace. More war then meaning more peace or what? No one taking notice of President Orban, or Premier Fico loudly yelling “Dangerous storm ahead,” or the ragged collection of miscellaneous out of tune academics. Let’s take a look at direction the ship of fools is heading. Pushing new assistance to Ukraine With the adoption of “H.R.8035 - Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024” in the House of Representatives on April 17, nearly 61 billion dollars has been made available for various kinds of U.S. support for the proxy war in Ukraine. Of cause, this also means a significant boost for the U.S. armament industry. On April 24 the Biden administration could therefore announce the first deliveries of significant new security assistance for Ukraine to tune of $1 billion, meaning new weapon deliveries. It “includes capabilities to support Ukraine's most urgent requirements, including air defense interceptors, artillery rounds, armored vehicles, and anti-tank weapons.” (see details below). Earlier NATO General Secretary Stoltenberg, had aired a proposal of “creating a 100 billion-euro ($108 billion), five-year fund for Ukraine in a push to get the alliance more involved in sending weapons to Kyiv.“ (Radio Free Europe). Boots on the ground? While Western leaders vehemently rejected President Macron’s ideas of troops on the ground in Ukraine, it is evident that there are already troops on the ground assisting Ukraine. This was also revealed in the Russian eavesdropping on the German officers discussing a Taurus missile deployment in Ukraine. Now Politico can reveal that the U.S. is considering sending more military advisors to Ukraine. Their mission: “The additional troops will support logistics and oversight efforts for the weapons the U.S. is sending Ukraine, according to four U.S. officials and a person familiar with the plans, who were granted anonymity to speak about a sensitive topic.” (Politico April 20, 2024). According to rumours there is talk of sending about 60 U.S. troops. Others have talked of sending European troops in similar roles. Not to be seen as troops from NATO, but as individual countries’ contributions to help Ukraine in unknown ways to make the most of the weapons sent to Ukraine. Just recently Stoltenberg admitted that military personnel was present in Ukraine, attached to their respective embassies. Various NATO members seem surreptitiously to put boots on the ground in Ukraine. Indicating that the U.S. and NATO are getting more involved in the war efforts in Ukraine. Are Western troops perhaps directly involved in using the sophisticated weapons system to hit Russian troops? Only letting Ukrainian troops push the final firing button. If that is the case, NATO troops must be seen as directly involved in fighting Russia. Fighter planes and rockets in the air Ukraine is waiting for the F16 fighter planes. According to Le Monde “The Netherlands has pledged to provide 24 units, Norway 22, Denmark 19 and Belgium an unspecified number. The first deliveries are expected in mid-2024”. Now it seems that the Ukraine pilots training to fly and fight with F16’s, are found to be relatively inexperienced. They are taking longer time to train. What is next, if that means that they won’t be able to fight the Russians effectively? Surreptitiously also putting western pilots, who may officially have left the service, into those planes. Again, involving NATO members directly in the fight against the Russians. Some time ago it was revealed that the U.S. had given in to Ukraine’s clamouring for long range ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) that can be used by the HIMARS rocket launchers already in Ukraine. The have a range up to 300 kms carrying a heavy warhead. For a long time, the U.S. has apparently warned Ukraine against attacks in Russia proper. Evidently the Ukrainians are not listening, and now there they are giving more weapons that can be used for such attacks. Nuclear weapons getting closer The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently told of a Polish bid to allow nuclear weapons in Poland. “This could happen several ways, including by hosting B61 nuclear weapons on its territory, certifying its F-35A aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, or assuming a more significant role in decision-making regarding NATO’s nuclear doctrine.” It is certainly not unexpected that such plans have led to a Russian reaction, with Russia threatening to attack Poland. “It is not difficult to assume that if American nuclear weapons appear on Polish territory, the corresponding objects will immediately join the list of legitimate targets for destruction in the case of direct military conflict with NATO,” said Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, according to Reuters. On a fool’s errand On gets the impression that Western leaders not have any kind of idea of how to end the war in Ukraine, are embarking on a fool’s errand like those in Sebastian Brandt’s “Ship of fools.” Not really knowing what they are doing and for what ulterior purpose. But their creeping escalation is in a struggle that involves combatants possessing the world’s biggest nuclear arsenals. Thus, their aimless escalating struggle may end in something destroying everything. Time to turn the ship around and find ways to de-escalate, and like we have argued previously, aim to freeze the war, perhaps agreeing to a kind of Korean solution, in order to change the dangerous course of the “ship of fools.” BTW, The Springbrunnen i Nuremberg carries this inscription: “Gewalt+Teknik und Resignation zertören das Leben, der Tod lacht Hohn.” New security assistance for Ukraine to tune of $ 1 billion Biden Administration Announces Significant New Security Assistance for Ukraine April 24, 2024 Today, following the passage of the national security supplemental which the President just signed into law, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced a significant new security assistance to urgently meet Ukraine's critical security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration's fifty-sixth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories to Ukraine since August 2021. This Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package has an estimated value of $1 billion and includes capabilities to support Ukraine's most urgent requirements, including air defense interceptors, artillery rounds, armored vehicles, and anti-tank weapons. The capabilities in this announcement include:
This package will surge munitions, weapons, and equipment forward to support Ukraine's ability to defend its frontlines, protect its cities, and counter Russia's continued attacks. With the bipartisan support of Congress, Ukraine can count on strong and resolute U.S. leadership to provide consistent security assistance support – together with some 50 Allies and partners – to ensure its brave defenders receive the critical capabilities needed to fight Russian aggression. (https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3754238/) ParaPumping up NATO with lofty words Stronger, bigger, and more united than ever? Secretary Blinken self-gratulatory view on the eve of NATO’s 75th anniversary: “The work tomorrow, the work at the summit is really about the next 75 and everything that we need to do now to ensure that this Alliance remains what it has been – as Jens [Stoltenberg] said, the most successful in history – a defensive alliance with no designs on the territory of any other country but with a determination to protect the territory of each of its members, and to do it in a way that is – has been unique in human history, based on the principle that we have each other’s backs, that if one of is the victim of aggression, all of us will be in to help. And that’s the most effective way to actually prevent aggression from happening in the first place, and to create an environment in each of our countries where people don’t have to worry about security in that sense and they can make the most of their lives and reach their full potential.” (state.gov.) No surprise that Russia has a different view of the alliance. Foreign Ministry spokeswomen saying “Today, in relations with Russia, the bloc has returned to Cold War settings” arguing that the NATO alliance had no place in today’s multipolar world. In one sense she is right isn’t she, today NATO – Russia relations have certainly returned to a cold war, a cold war that is as close as it has ever been to a hot war. And as for Blinken’s argument about an alliance preventing aggression and creating security, the opposite seems to be the case today. In fact, the foremost or perhaps only reason for seeing a need for the NATO alliance today is that that it wasn’t abolished, when it had become obsolete. At the time after dissolution of the Soviet Union, the opening up of Eastern Europe, the German re-unification and the possibility of an entente with Russia, supported by a belief in “Wandel durch Handel/Wandel durch Annäherung.” To see what happened take a look at these topics: NATO obsolescence years ago U.S. – bully in the schoolyard of nations NATO resuscitation with eastward expansion U.S. getting caught in its own trap The trap clicking shut with a world war looming NATO obsolescence years ago In 2017 President-elect Donald Trump certainly got the attention of political leaders in Europe when he said that NATO was obsolete. Apparently, his concern was not Russia, but the Europeans. They did not contribute their fair share to NATO. And he was right, wasn’t he? The NATO umbrella over the members countries in Europe was first and foremost a U.S. umbrella. Paid to large degree by U.S. tax payers. Trump’s grievances were perhaps not really with NATO, but with its freeriding European members. Later, in 2019, President Macron argued that NATO was “brain dead.” He was worried that Europe could no longer depend on the U.S. Arguing that Europe stood on “the edge of a precipice”, and that it needed to start thinking of itself strategically as a geopolitical power. Otherwise, we would “no longer be in control of our destiny.” (The Economist November 7, 2019). President Macron later argued that Europe should gain “military sovereignty” and open a dialogue with Russia. Failing to do so would be a great mistake. But NATO had lost its purpose much earlier and for a different reason. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the opening up of Eastern Europe, it had lost the reason for its own existence in the 1990s. According to NATO’s own historic reasoning “the Alliance’s creation was part of a broader effort to serve three purposes: deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration.” (nato.int) Looking at the 1990’s one might argue that there was no longer a need to deter Soviet expansionism. The Soviet Union was rapidly dissolving and descending into something that could not be seen to as threat to Europe or the U.S. Nationalist militarism in Europe had long disappeared, and European political integration was seen as having a glowing future, now that the Soviet Union had disappeared and Eastern Europe was poised to participate in the European political integration. Remnants of former times only remained in the Balkans. This is how a former CIA analyst and areas expert on Russia, with 30 years of experience, saw the time when the Iron Curtain came down: “As the Iron Curtain came down and the Soviet empire began disintegrating, the opportunity to construct a post-Cold War peace was there for the taking. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker assured Gorbachev in a Feb. 9, 1990 meeting that, following the unification of Germany, NATO would expand “not one inch eastward”… It’s difficult now to describe the feeling of those halcyon days. We who had chosen careers in the U.S. security apparatus enjoyed a sense of euphoria. The Cold War was coming to a peaceful conclusion without a catastrophic conflict, and we had played a small part in that historic turn of events. After the initial celebration, we increasingly realized that the world we had been born into had reached its end. It was time to rethink what national security meant in what was already being described by foreign policy wonks as a “unipolar world,” with the United States as the lone and dominant world power.” (Allensworth, Chronicles Magazine, March 2024). In other words, time to dismantle a NATO, as its original purpose had disappeared. Time for thinking of a whole new peace architecture in Europe, involving not the least the remnants off the former Soviet Union. Alas, although “the NATO bureaucracy lost the reason for its existence in the early 1990s”… [it] “carried on anyway, as bureaucracies are prone to do.” (Allensworth). Instead of a new peace architecture involving a Russia on equal footing, a totally obsolete NATO carried on, but at least peace was in the air, and thus NATO found a limited purpose for itself in creating something called “Partnerships for Peace” under its auspices. “On 27 May 1997, NATO leaders and President Boris Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act, expressing their determination to “build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.” The Act established the goal of cooperation in areas such as peacekeeping, arms control, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and theatre missile defence. In the Founding Act, NATO and Russia agreed to base their cooperation on the principles of human rights and civil liberties, refraining from the threat or use of force against each other or any other state.” (nato.int) Meanwhile the U.S. as the dominant force in NATO had it its own ulterior motives and plans for upholding and enlarging NATO as we shall see. U.S. – bully in the schoolyard of nations After 1990 that the U.S. realized that it had become the undisputed hegemon, the superstate, able to dominate everywhere. Intoxicated with its power it made plans for a “Pax Americana. Just listen to this: "Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia … There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” (pbs.org). This is an excerpt from a Defence Planning Guidance in February 1992. A secret memorandum by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz. The secret Wolfowitz 1992 memorandum, now partly de-classified, states that “after the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States may be said to be the world’s sole superpower, enjoying a predominance on the world political-military stage that is unprecedented in the last century” (Wolfowitz, National Security Archive, gwu.edu). But it had a choice… “With the Soviet Union gone, the United States had a choice. It could capitalize on the euphoria of the moment by nurturing cooperative relations and developing multilateral structures to help guide the global realignment then taking place; or it could consolidate its power and pursue a strategy of unilateralism and global dominance. It chose the latter course.” (Wolfowitz memorandum). Also, in relation to Europe, as it can gleaned from the memorandum: “The end of the Warsaw Pact, unilateral Soviet force reductions, and the CFE agreement [Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1992] go a long way towards increasing stability and reducing Soviet military threat to U.S. interests in Europe. The emergence of democratic, increasingly Western-oriented states in Eastern Europe is a development of immense strategic significance, and it is critical to U.S. interests in Europe to assist the new democracies in East/Central Europe to consolidate their democratic institutions and national independence. In this regard we must give particular attention to the problems of security and political and economic stability in Eastern Europe, in order to remove the potential for regional instability or Soviet reentry into the region.” (Wolfowitz memorandum). The memorandum foresees that developments in Eastern Europe will lead to different kinds of friction and an “appreciable risk of conflict” in the future. Conflicts that may not be contained to the conflicting parties alone, meaning presumable that the U.S. (and NATO) might become involved. Therefore, the memorandum argues, “A substantial American presence in Europe and continued cohesion within the western Alliance remain vital. This presence will provide reassurance and stability as the new democracies of Eastern Europe that are integrated into a larger and evolving Europe. While its mission may be changed in this new area, the North Atlantic Alliance remains indispensable to peace and stability in Europe.” (Wolfowitz memorandum). An article based upon classified material in the Washington Post in March 1992 entitled “Keeping the U.S. first,” reveals some of the scenarios that seem to have been almost prescient. Envisioning for instance a conflict involving an American led defense of Lithuania and Poland against an invasion by Russia. NATO resuscitation with eastward expansion Declassified material now found in a National Security Archive show at least part of the story of broken promises behind the NATO expansion eastwards. When U.S. secretary of State James Baker met with Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, he was one in a long row of Western leaders to assure the new Russia that NATO had no plans for an eastward expansion. “Not one inch eastward” Baker assured Gorbachev. Three times Baker is said to have assured Gorbachev that there would be no NATO expansion: “Neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place, … not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.“ (National Security Archive). During an Open Skies Conference in Ottawa in 1992, Baker also assured Russian Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: “And if U[nited] G[ermany] stays in NATO, we should take care about non-expansion of its jurisdiction to the east.” (Notes from the meeting, National Security Archive). “The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels.” (National Security Archive). German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, heavily involved in the German Re-unification process, made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.” (National Security Archive). Genscher may have been sincere and believed in the guarantees, others less so. At a decisive meeting in Moscow on February 10, 1990, between Chancellor Kohl and Gorbachev, Kohl achieved “Soviet assent in principle to German unification in NATO, as long as NATO did not expand to the east.” (National Security Archive). French President Mitterand also chimed in, arguing that he was personally in favour “gradually dismantling the military blocs” and demanded that the West should “certainly not refuse to detail the guarantees that he [President Gorbachev] would have a right to expect for his country’s security.” Prime Minister Thatcher seemed to be in favour of a transformation of NATO “towards a more political, less militarily threatening, alliance instead as a kind of umbrella and giving Russia the assurance that its security would be assured.” Finally, President Bush in a phone call assured Gorbachev: “So what we tried to do was to take account of your concerns expressed to me and others, and we did it in the following ways: by our joint declaration on non-aggression; in our invitation to you to come to NATO; in our agreement to open NATO to regular diplomatic contact with your government and those of the Eastern European countries … We also fundamentally changed our military approach on conventional and nuclear forces. We conveyed the idea of an expanded, stronger CSCE with new institutions in which the USSR can share and be part of the new Europe.” (George H.W. Bush Presidential Library). Thus, there were certainly enough verbal and written assurances from Western leaders, that President Gorbachev, and later Russian leaders, were led to believe that NATO would not expand eastwards. Taking a look back at the U.S. Pax Americana visions, one may suspect that the U.S. had ulterior designs for Europa and NATO, “Inside the U.S. government, a different discussion continued, a debate about relations between NATO and Eastern Europe. Opinions differed, but the suggestion from the Defense Department as of October 25, 1990 was to leave “the door ajar” for East European membership in NATO.” Though it seems that this a view was not shared by President Bush in 1990. Later though “leaving the door ajar” later became “an open door,” accompanied by a widening set of invitations to join NATO as we have seen. NATO expansion eastwards “Some say we no longer need NATO because there is no powerful threat to our security now. I say there is no powerful threat in part because NATO is there. And enlargement will help make it stronger. (President Clinton). “In 1991 as in 1949, NATO was to be the foundation stone for a larger, pan-European security architecture. In December 1991, the Allies established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. This forum brought the Allies together with their Central European, Eastern European, and Central Asian neighbours for joint consultations. Many of these newly liberated countries – or partners, as they were soon called – saw a relationship with NATO as fundamental to their own aspirations for stability, democracy, and European integration.” (A short history of NATO-declassified, nato.int). Here NATO found it new raison d'être, its new calling so to speak, given it a renewed vitality. A few years later the first countries from Eastern Europe joined NATO, apart from Eastern Germany that somehow became included in the re-unification. In 1997 President Clinton gave voice to NATO’s new mission: “To build and secure a new Europe, peaceful, democratic, and undivided at last, there must be a new NATO, with new missions, new members, and new partners. We have been building that kind of NATO for the last 3 years with new partners in the Partnership for Peace and NATO's first out-of-area mission in Bosnia. In Paris last week, we took another giant stride forward when Russia entered a new partnership with NATO, choosing cooperation over confrontation, as both sides affirmed that the world is different now. European security is no longer a zero-sum contest between Russia and NATO but a cherished common goal. In a little more than a month, I will join with other NATO leaders in Madrid to invite the first of Europe's new democracies in Central Europe to join our alliance, with the consent of the Senate, by 1999, the 50th anniversary of NATO's founding.” (presidency.ucsb.edu). The expansion eastwards may have been welcomed by the new members as a way to guarantee their inclusion the rest of Europe and the West. To paraphrase former President Clinton, the eastward expansion of NATO will help secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe, and provide a secure climate where freedom, democracy, and prosperity can flourish. It was hope shared by most countries in Europe and the West at the time. At a Washington NATO Summit in 1999 “three former Partners – Czechia, Hungary and Poland – took their seats as full Alliance members following their completion of a political and military reform programme. (A short history of NATO- declassified, nato.int). In March 2004 NATO moved even closer to Russia’s borders. Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became members of NATO. On April fool’s day in 2009, Albania and Croatia became NATO members. Fast forward to June 2017, when Montenegro became a member, and in 2020 Northern Macedonia, after Greece had finally accepted that it could become a member. The next step proved to have been a step to far for the U.S. and NATO. U.S. getting caught in its own trap Instead of a situation in 90’s really advantageous for creating a new security architecture with Russia as an equal partner, we now have proxy war in Ukraine. A proxy war that is more or less a direct result of the resuscitation of a NATO that had become irrelevant. In a sense the resuscitated NATO now seems to be slipping back into its old role as guardian against Russia, forcing unity on its members, and demanding “kriegstüchtigkeit.” Arming itself against self-imagined threat from a Russia that has become the new old enemy. So much for peace after the demise of the Soviet Union. How did that happen? The sad history of NATO and Ukraine At the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008 passionate members encouraged Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. “We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO …Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP [Membership Action Plan]. Therefore, we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications.” (NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008). Encouragement came from the Bush administration now eager to expand NATO. Ignoring warnings from Russia that Ukrainian member ship would force Russia to treat Ukraine as an enemy. Some western leaders still lacked conviction, with Germany and France blocking Ukrainian membership of NATO, arguing that Ukraine was not ready and perhaps also heeding Russian warnings. French Prime Minister Fillon arguing: “We are opposed to the entry of Georgia and Ukraine because we think that it is not a good answer to the balance of power within Europe and between Europe and Russia.” The issue of NATO membership then lay more or less dormant until the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the fighting in the Donbas. Previous lukewarm and Ukrainian public support for NATO membership slowly changed to public support for membership. Leading to Ukraine’s passionate press for NATO membership. In 2019 “The Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, … approved in its final reading a constitutional amendment that reflects the country's strategic goal of becoming a member of NATO and the European Union.” (Radio Free Europe). When President Zelensky visited President Biden in September 2021, he pressed Biden on the issue of NATO membership saying “I would like to discuss with President Biden here his vision, his government’s vision of Ukraine’s chances to join NATO and the timeframe for this accession, if it is possible; and the role the United States can play being involved in a peaceful settlement in Donbas that we would like to reach.” (The White House). Biden at the time seemed to lack conviction and remained noncommittal. Later becoming more passionate he voiced support for the Ukraine’s wish. In December 2021 Zelensky’s chief of staff told Reuters: "President Biden said very clearly that the decision on Ukraine's accession to NATO is the decision of the Ukrainian people only, this is a sovereign and independent Ukrainian state." An attitude certain to encourage Ukraine and anger Russia. Blind passion and ill-advised belief Is the present war in Ukraine a result of the U.S. almost messianic striving to bring peace and democracy by imprinting its idea of rules-based order upon the rest of the World? A few weeks after the new Secretary of State, Blinken, had been sworn in, he outlined his idea of “A Foreign Policy for the American People.” Saying: “We will renew democracy, because it’s under threat…But we will not promote democracy through costly military interventions or by attempting to overthrow authoritarian regimes by force. We have tried these tactics in the past. However well intentioned, they haven’t worked. They’ve given democracy promotion a bad name.” (Emphasis added). (Secretary of State Blinken, March 3,2021). A year later the U.S. is fighting a proxy war in Ukraine, to save what U.S. sees as a Ukrainian democracy, but perhaps first and foremost to humiliate or overthrow a Russian authoritarian regime by military means. So much for avoiding costly military interventions. How did that happen? When the U.S. Senate in 1998 overwhelmingly approved the eastward expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech, Republican Senator Joseph Biden Jr. said: “…this, in fact, is the beginning of another 50 years of peace, … "In a larger sense," he added, "we'll be righting an historical injustice forced upon the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians by Joseph Stalin." (Washingtonpost.com). No one listened to warnings of someone like George F. Kennan, the American diplomat and historian, who saw the expansion as a fateful error. “The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.” (NYT 1996). Wise words, but no match for the U.S. eagerness to bring democracy peace and prosperity to the eastern European states. Especially for the new Biden administration with its inexperienced but aggressive and un-diplomatic believers in Pax Americana. Thus, the question of Ukrainian NATO membership propped up again in 2021. A few days after President Biden had spoken to President Putin in an attempt to defuse the situation at Ukraine’s border, he assured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy that Kyiv's bid to join the NATO military alliance was in its own hands. Russian demands and NATO/U.S. arrogant rejection To Russia Ukrainian NATO membership was unacceptable. Russian grievances and the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO explains why Russia handed the U.S. and NATO a draft proposal for a new treaty on security guarantees (Dated December 17, 2021). Among the proposals is article 6: “All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States.” The leaked written answers to the Russian proposals from NATO and the U.S. gave no indication that Russia’s demands would be taken seriously. Here is part NATO’s reply to article 6 of the Russian Proposal: “All states respecting the right of other states to choose and change security arrangements, and to decide their own future and foreign policy free from outside interference. In this light, we reaffirm our commitment to NATO’s Open Door Policy under Article of the Washington Treaty.” (El País). The U.S. own reply likewise continued to firmly support NATO’s Open Door Policy In his reaction before the invasion of Ukraine, a visibly angry President Putin stated: “I would like to be clear and straightforward: in the current circumstances, when our proposals for an equal dialogue on fundamental issues have actually remained unanswered by the United States and NATO, when the level of threats to our country has increased significantly, Russia has every right to respond in order to ensure its security. That is exactly what we will do.” (en.kremlin.ru). Next, we had the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the strong reaction from U.S., followed a little later more timidly by Europe. The trap clicking shut with a world war looming A few days after Putin’s statement Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24,2022. The U.S. and NATO was drawn into a proxy war with Russia, leading to the re-revitalization of NATO eagerly promoted by the Biden administration and its suddenly scared European partners. Pumping up NATO with strong worded lofty statements, and setting aside billions for new armament. A dangerous escalation race is now on, spurred along by passionate and irresponsible voices. Take a speech by the Chair of the NATO Military Committee, The Dutch admiral Rob Bauer, in a security conference in Berlin: “For NATO, Russia’s pattern of aggressive and ruthlessly destructive behaviour has ushered in a new era of collective defence … We have developed several military strategies and plans that outline how we will protect ourselves - now and in the future - against the two main threats listed in the new Strategic Concept: Russia and Terrorist Groups.” What is new, and certainly scary, is that in order to strengthen collective defence and support Ukraine in its existential fight “we need a whole of society approach … We need public and private actors to change their mind-set, from an era in which everything was plannable… foreseeable… controllable… to an era where anything can happen at any time … Ready for war. Fit to fight.” With the West playing a major role in this escalation, stationing more and more troops and equipment closer to Russia’s borders. In Poland, in the Baltic region, in Romania, In Italy, In Spain and in the United Kingdom. For 2024 NATO is preparing to engage in large exercises like NATO’s “Steadfast Defender” with upwards of 90,000 soldiers involved and running for months. Or take the announcement that the U.S. is planning to place nuclear warheads at the RAF Lakenheath Airbase in the UK, in addition modernizing the nuclear arsenal placed in Belgium, Germany and elsewhere. In Orwell’s “1984. Oceania’s motto was “war is peace” We are getting there, with recent clamouring for involving all of society in preparations for war to avoid war. “This is our 1937 moment. We are not at war - but we must act rapidly so that we aren’t drawn into one through a failure to contain territorial expansion” (British Chief of the General Staff, Sir Patrick Sander, June 28, 2022). We know the result of such attitudes in 1914 and in 1939, so what can we expect now…? A change of attitude needed urgently. See for instance: Freezing the war in Ukraine? https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/freezing-the-war-in-ukraine Stalemate in Ukraine – and doubt is creeping in https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/stalemate-in-ukraine-and-doubt-is-creeping-in "Getting out of the Ukrainian quagmire? Part One" Part 2 https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/getting-out-of-the-ukrainian-quagmire-part-two "Getting out of the Ukrainian quagmire? Part One" https://wahrnehmungen.weebly.com/blog/getting-out-of-the-ukrainian-quagmire-part-one No Taurus for Ukraine? On Thursday March 14, 2024, The German Bundestag again discussed the Taurus for Ukraine question, after Chancellor Scholz continued refusal to send long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine. After attacks from the CDU/CSU led opposition, the leader of SPD (The Social Democratic Party) in Bundestag, Dr. Rolf Mützenich, defended Chancellor Scholz’s decision not to send Taurus to Ukraine and derided the opposition. Freeze the War In a “don’t mention the war” moment he said: “I think we should focus on more important things… I also say in your direction – especially to those who to feel addressed by it –: Don’t we also need a clever debate on how we can involve countries, who interpret or instrumentalize the war in Ukraine differently from us, towards the goal of ending the war. Unfortunately – and we have to say this – Outside of Europe, many countries have a different look at this war. And that brings me to the question – in the Bundestag this is obviously often seen as shameful just to ask it –: Isn't it time we didn't just talk about how to wage a war, but also think about how one can freeze a war and later also end it? Aren't these questions also politically important?” (Emphasis added). (From Plenarprotokoll 20/157, Deutsche Bundestag). Mützenich also argued that support for Ukraine and the Zeitenwende for the West should not be subject to political games. Instead, reason, prudence and clarity were needed. “The Chancellor has supported Ukraine from the start and guaranteed the national security of our country. He has achieved both, and that needs appreciation and support and not insult, ladies and gentlemen. That's why I say it very clearly: “Zeitenwende” is not something for political games. Reason, prudence and clarity are needed, and that is what the Federal Chancellor has to consider in the decisions he has to make. To put it a little more clearly, so that you from the opposition can understand what it is all about… In October 2022, the American government feared the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine [By the Russia of cause]. That should make us sit up and take notice. Some were convinced back then that this possibility had to be taken into account… and we can be grateful that there is an American President in the White House, who, I believe, has sent all the necessary signals to Moscow. That's why I say very clearly: my group [in the Bundestag] provides the Chancellor with space for such prudent decisions and also for prudence in the international politics; because the contribution to international national security, and the security of Ukraine is bigger than any discussion about any weapon system, dear colleagues.” (Plenarprotokoll 20/157, Deutsche Bundestag). Outrage in Germany Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, chairman of the Bundestag Defence Committee, member of the FDP and thus belonging to the government coalition, was outraged. During the war in Ukraine, she never left anyone in doubt that she would support Ukraine with everything they might wish for and then some. Called “Kriegstreiberin” by her adversaries at the time of the Taurus debate, she prominently displayed a Taurus illustration on her blouse. She did not mince her words: “If that is the attitude of the Social Democrats, we will of course clarify that internally, then it is a paradigm shift … I am sure that Ukraine was just as horrified as all of us in the Bundestag when we heard that.” (Rheinische Post). The Green Party, with roots in earlier peace movements, but now almost as warlike as Strack-Zimmermann also criticized Mützenich. Green Party chief Nouripour: “Ukraine is not only defending itself, but also the security of Europe from the next Russian aggression ...We should be very clear about what is at stake: our peace and security in Europe.” (Rheinische Post). Annalena Baerbock from the Greens and Foreign Minister in the Scholz government had this somewhat strange argument against freezing the war in Ukraine: “What a freeze means for all the people who still have to live under Russian violence every day and every night…Women in particular repeatedly report about night time crimes committed by the Kremlin troops: "They don't know whether Russian soldiers will come to rape them again." That's why everything is being done to ensure that Ukraine can defend itself better” (t-online). Even Defence Minister Boris Pistorius from SPD distanced himself from Mützenich’s words about the war in Ukraine. “Freezing the conflict "would only help Putin in the end," said the SPD politician during a visit to the Polish capital Warsaw. It must always be about bringing about peace, "but there must not be a dictated peace," nor a "ceasefire or a freeze in which Putin emerges stronger in the end and continues the conflict whenever he pleases.” (Der Spiegel. March 18, 2024). Most disgusting German politician The always aggressive and outspoken former Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany, Andrij Melnyk, wrote this on X targeting Mützenich: “This guy was and remains the most disgusting German politician. Forever and ever.” (Dieser Typ war und bleibt der widerlichste deutsche Politiker. Für immer und ewig). Ridiculous discussion Chancellor Olaf Scholz, days later: “The debate in Germany cannot be surpassed in terms of ridiculousness,” said the Chancellor on Tuesday at the Europe 2024 conference in Berlin. “This is embarrassing for us as a country.” The discussion, which is primarily about the delivery of Taurus cruise missiles, is not understood outside of Germany. Scholz pointed out that Germany is Ukraine's second largest arms supplier. This must first be recognized, he demanded. He would like to see a debate in Germany that does not discredit prudence as hesitation.” (FAZ, March 19, 20224) Shifts in German opinion Perhaps Mützenich’s talk about freezing the war in Ukraine was a shrewdly calculated move, that may even have had the tacit backing of Chancellor Scholz. It could indicate that the Social Democrats have finally become aware that opinion about the war is shifting in Germany. A recent poll (Meinungsumfrage) may indicate this shift. In February 2024 64% of the population indicate that they think that the war in Ukraine is lost. Only 28% believe that a Ukrainian victory is possible, an opinion mostly found among supporters of the Greens. (Die Welt, February 13, 2024). A more recent poll also indicate another decisive shift. In answer to the question “Should Ukraine stick to the attitude, that negotiations with Russia should only take place after Russia returned the occupied areas of Ukraine? 45% said “Yes,” while 46% said “No, they should negotiate even though Russia might still occupy large areas of Ukraine.” Looking at answers from supporters of some of the parties we get this: (Source RTL Deutschland, March 19, 2024): AfD or Alternative für Deutschland is the right-wing party that has achieved around 18-19% in recent polls, more than the SPD, which has declined to around at 15-16%. The new socialist/realist BSW party (Bundniss Sarah Wagenknecht) sees rising acceptance, hovering around 7%. Both AfD and BSW are against sending weapons to Ukraine, instead they argue in favour of some kind of armistice followed by negotiations.
Leading Social Democrats may have seen the writing on the wall, and decided to test the waters, having Mützenich airing ideas of freezing the war in order to make negotiations possible. Evidently the Scholz government’s Ampel-coalition has serious a problem in relation to Ukraine support. With Social Democrats in population rather split on Ukraine. The Greens having a much more warlike attitude, advocating for weapons to Ukraine including Taurus and no negotiations. The third member of the so-called Ampel-coalition, FDP, also have views contrary to SPD, but due to their overall lack of support in the population (hovering about 4%), they may be less important. One wonders how this may play out. For the moment at least Chancellor Scholz is still using the often repeated, but increasingly meaningless words of support for Ukraine. In a Regierungserklärung in the Bundestag on March 20 he: “We will support Ukraine for as long as it is necessary. At the same time, we will ensure that NATO does not become a party to this conflict. And we will not accept a dictated peace at the expense of Ukraine. - These are the common three points that we have noted.” (Plenarprotokoll 20/159, Deutsche Bundestag). Note that he said “necessary” not the more usual “as long as it takes.” In the meantime: What is going on Ukraine? Those supporting Ukraine not least because it is a “real” democracy, may be erring. In The Freedom House measure of Ukraine’s democracy, the country achieves a score of 39,29 out 100, meaning that it characterized as a “transitional or hybrid regime.” (Freedom House, 2023). Thus, certainly not a real democracy. In a University of Würzburg ranking of “Quality of Democracy” Ukraine ends up as number 92 and is seen as a hybrid regime. Scoring below Burma/Myanmar, but above Sri Lanka – somewhat curious companions in democracy. The reality of those scoring measures may be in doubt, but this what we get from recent rankings. Even worse is the corruption ranking, with Ukraine ending up as number 104 out of 180 countries (https://cpi.ti-ukraine.org/en/). According to a recent article in Le Monde the Ukrainian opposition is increasingly critical of the Zelensky administration, which presumable means they are critical of President Zelensky “In recent months, several lawmakers belonging to the opposition parties Holos and European Solidarity (of former president Petro Poroshenko) have publicly complained that they have not received the authorization required by the authorities to attend an international event. In power from 2014 to 2019 and now a member of parliament, Poroshenko even went so far as to send a letter, at the end of February, to the European commissioner for neighborhood and enlargement, Oliver Varhelyi, to contest the "misuse" of martial law and war with the aim, in his view, to "cleanse the political field from opposition and isolate it from international communication." Emphasis added. (Le Monde March 19, 2024). At the very least this might indicate that Verkhovna Rada, the parliament, is losing parliamentary control to President Zelensky. Which might indicate authoritarian tendencies. In earlier essays we have tried to argue that the West’s cozying up to President Zelensky is problematic and perhaps not in the best interest of Ukraine and the West. Taurus Marschflugkörper over Kerch Bridge (based upon ESA sat photo from 2020) The Russian wiretapping
Last Friday Margarita Simonyan, editor at the Russian TV-Network RT, revealed the Russian wiretapping of four German Luftwaffe officers during a secret meeting on February 19. At the meeting it was discussed how the German Taurus missile might be used by Ukraine, and how direct assistance by specialists from the Luftwaffe might be concealed. To understand the importance of the Russian intercept of the discussion that took place on WebEx, it is relevant to know more about the Taurus missile, why Ukraine has been clamouring for Taurus missiles, and reactions to the leak. Before taking a look at excerpts from the wiretapping. Taurus capabilities The Taurus KEPD 350 air to ground missile is made by Taurus Systems, a joint venture between Saab and MBDA Deutschland. It is “designed to penetrate thick, hardened air defences via a very low-level terrain following flight. Day or night and in any weather, it neutralises its targets through its highly effective 481 kg dual-stage warhead system, MEPHISTO. TAURUS KEPD 350 combines outstanding penetration of hard and deeply buried targets, and blast and fragmentation of high-value point and area targets with exceptional bridge-and-runway-target kill capacity. The system remains the only stand-off missile programmable for effect at a specific pre-selected floor. This extraordinary feature is achieved by applying layer counting and void sensing technology. (Saab. Com Prospect). MBDA describes the missile as having a range in excess of 500km, unmatched penetration capabilities, precise and jamming resistant navigation, including terrain-following capability below 50 meters, GPS independence, with 4 separate guiding systems, and a layer counting fuse. The last characteristic means that the missile after diving vertical in the last phase, will be able penetrate layers of hardened bunkers, counting the number of layers and voids penetrated. See illustration of the concept at https://taurus-systems.de/#penetration The missile physical specs: Length 5m, width about 1m, weight 1400kg, with a warhead weighing 481 kg. Ukraine’s clamouring for Taurus Ukraine has long demanded deliveries of long-range air launched precision missiles from the West. Until now they have got Storm Shadow missiles from the UK and SCALP missiles from France, in essence the same missile with a range of around 250 Kms. They have been used for some time to strike high values targets in Crimea, including bridges. For almost a year Ukraine had also been clamouring for deliveries of the longer ranging and more advanced Taurus missile. Presumably with the intention to use such missiles in their attempt to destroy the Kerch Bridge connecting the Taman Peninsula of Krasnodar Krai in Russia and the Crimean Kerch Peninsula. Germany’s rejection of Taurus deliveries Until now the German government under Chancellor Scholz has declined to send Taurus missiles to Ukraine. On February 22, the opposition consisting of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) bloc brought forward a motion in the Bundestag calling on the Bundesregierung to provide Ukraine with Taurus missiles. “Die Ukraine durch unverzügliche Lieferung von erbetenen und in Deutschland verfügbaren Waffensystemen (u.a. TAURUS) sowie Munitionssorten im Kampf gegen Russland zu unterstützen und dabei europäische Führung und Koordinierung zu übernehmen” (Bundestag). The motion was defeated in the German Bundestag with 182 voting in favour, 480 against and 5 abstaining. Instead, the Bundesregierung brought a motion calling for providing Ukraine with additional, necessary long-range weapons systems and ammunition. In German: " erforderliche weitreichende Waffensysteme." What long-range weapon systems were not specified, but Taurus missiles were certainly not meant, instead it might mean further deliveries of the MARS II systems. 382 voted in favour of the government motion, 284 against and 2 abstained. Reactions to the wiretapping revelations German Defence minister Pistorius: “"The incident is much more than just the interception and publication of a conversation ... It is part of an information war that Putin is waging," (DW). During visit to the Vatican Scholz told reporters the security breach would be “investigated very meticulously, very intensively and very quickly” Other are demanding a thorough investigation and possible consequences. There is fear that Russia might have much more wiretapping material, to be released when it might have a negative effect on the West’s unity in their support for Ukraine. At a recent visit to Prague President Macron indirectly chastised the Germans, saying "Europe clearly faces a moment when it will be necessary not to be cowards." He later added that it was necessary to shake up France’s allies. Sometimes Macron is taking very loud but providing Ukraine a very small stick. Germany is in fact the second largest contributor to Ukraine after the US. While France apparently contributes less than Finland, according the support tracker at Kiel Institute for World Economy. It is also speculated why the Russia has revealed the wiretapping now, as it will presumably result in Germany taken more stringent measures to guard against wiretapping. Perhaps the Russian rationale is somewhat like this. If we release the conversation of this meeting it might have these important consequences. First it might convince Bundeskanzler Scholz that he must to stick to his “njet” to Taurus deliveries, as it seems to be difficult to avoid direct German or perhaps British participation in Taurus mission planning, if one wants to make sure of hits on the Kerch Bridge. It must be remembered that Scholz is afraid that Ukraine could attack goals inside Russia, which might be a red line for Russia, with the risk of war with Germany and NATO. Perhaps to reinforce this impression Russian officials attacked Germany for discussing detailed attacks on Russian targets and threatened with retaliation should Germany become part of the war effort” (WSJ March 4. 2024). Secondly, the revelation that British and U.S. specialists are directly involved in helping Ukraine to use the sophisticated western weapons is sure to annoy German allies. About the wiretapped meeting A transcript of the conversation between high-ranking Bundeswehr officers dated 02/19/2024 was published by Margarita Simonyan, editor at The Russian TV-Network RT, on vk.com. (https://vk-com.translate.goog/@m_s_simonyan-rasshifrovka-razgovora-vysokopostavlennyh-oficerov-bundesver?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp). The transcript used here is from a Substack article at https://karlof1.substack.com/p/german-military-going-against-its The date The meeting of the German Luftwaffe officers is said to have taken place on February 19, which means that practicalities in relation to a possible delivery of Taurus Missiles to Ukraine toke place a few days before the discussion and the votes in the Bundestag. The use of Webex Normally one would not expect Russia to be able eavesdrop on a meeting of high-ranking German officers. Perhaps the wiretapping was made possible because they were using Webex “a multi-functional desktop Video/Audio Conference call application,” with one of the participants staying at the Marina Bay Sands in Singapore. With one of the others impressed and asking “the one with three towers and swimming pool at the top.” The officer might have been in Singapore for the Airshow. The participants Generalleutnant Ingo Gerhartz - Inspekteur der Luftwaffe General Frank Gräfe - Brigadegeneral der Luftwaffe der Bundeswehr, Abteilungsleiter für Einsätze und Übungen im Kommando Luftwaffe in Berlin. (General Gräfe apparently participating from Singapore). Oberstleutnant Florstedt Oberstleutnant Udo Fenske Excerpts from the wiretapped meeting Purpose of the meeting Listening to General Gerhartz is becomes clear that the officers are meeting to prepare a presentation for defence minister Pistorius, looking at problems and possibilities in relation to a possible delivery of Taurus missiles to Ukraine. Gerhartz: “Okay. We need to verify the information. As you have already heard, Defense Minister Pistorius intends to carefully consider the issue of supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine. We have a meeting planned with him. Everything needs to be discussed so that we can start working on this issue. So far I do not see that the start date of these deliveries has been indicated. It was not like the chancellor told him: “I want to get information now, and tomorrow morning we will make a decision.” I haven't heard anything like this. On the contrary, Pistorius evaluates this entire ongoing discussion. Nobody knows why the Chancellor is blocking these supplies.”… ”It is necessary to show what the missile can do, how it can be used. It is necessary to take into account, if we make a political decision on the transfer of missiles as assistance to Ukraine, what consequences this may lead to. I would be grateful if you could tell me not only what problems we have, but how we can solve them. For example, when it comes to delivery methods.” Revealing that allied partners have people on the ground in Ukraine Gerhartz: “I know what the English do. They always transport them in Ridgeback armored vehicles. They have a few people on the ground. The French don't do that. He later also mentioned that “it is known that there are many people in civilian clothes who speak with an American accent. ” Thus, he confirmed what many had already expected, that Ukrainian forces get assistance on the ground in order to use the sophisticated weapons they have got from the West. Delivery times and delivery systems to be used Gräfe: “If the Chancellor now decides that we should supply missiles, they will be transferred from the Bundeswehr. Good, but they won't be ready for use until eight months later. Secondly, we cannot shorten the time. Because if we do that, there could be a misuse, a missile could fall on a kindergarten, there would be civilian casualties again. These aspects must be taken into account. It should be noted during the negotiations that we will not be able to do anything without the manufacturer. They can equip, re-equip and deliver the first missiles. We can catch up a little bit, but we shouldn't wait until we have 20 pieces, we can transfer five at a time” Gräfe then touched upon the question delivery system: “What weapons systems will these missiles be attached to?” Gerhartz thought this was a problem that could be solved by the Taurus manufacturer: “TSG [Taurus Systems Gmbh] has said that they can solve this problem within six months, it doesn't matter if it's a Sukhoi or an F-16.” Questions related to training With the British already in Ukraine they might also be able to help Ukraine to use Taurus missiles. Thus, avoiding having their own German specialists on the ground in Ukraine. Gräfe: “I have already said that we are cooperating with a missile manufacturer. They teach the maintenance of these systems, and we teach the tactical application. It takes three to four months. This part of the training can take place in Germany. When the first missiles arrive, we need to make a quick decision on mounts and training. Perhaps we will have to turn to the British on these issues and take advantage of their know-how. We can provide them with databases, satellite images, and planning stations.” (Emphasis added). Gerhartz: “We need to imagine that they can use aircraft with mounts for Taurus missiles and for Storm Shadow. The British were there and equipped the planes. The systems are not so different, they can be used for the Taurus as well.” How to conceal technical and mission planning support? Fenske: “If we are talking about combat use, then in this case, de facto, we will be advised to support at least the first group. It's difficult to plan, it took about a year to train our staff and we are now trying to reduce that time to ten weeks and hope that they will be able to race off-road in a car designed for Formula 1. A possible option is to provide scheduled technical support, theoretically this can be done from Büchel [German airbase in Rheinland-Pfalz, where the US has placed nuclear weapons], provided that a secure connection with Ukraine is created.” Gerhartz interrupted: “Wait a minute. I know what you're saying. Politicians may be concerned about the direct closed connection between Büchel and Ukraine, which could become a direct involvement in the Ukrainian conflict.” This led to a discussion of how assistance for mission planning might be concealed. Fenske: “The question will arise as to where the information is coming from. If we are talking about information about targets, which ideally includes satellite images that provide a maximum accuracy of three meters, then we must first process them in Büchel. I think that, regardless of this, it is possible to somehow organize the exchange of information between Büchel and Schrobenhausen [Where TSG is located], or it is possible to work out the possibility of transferring information to Poland, to do it where it is possible to reach by car.” How many Taurus could be delivered? Fenske: “If you give 50 pieces, they will be used up very quickly” Gerhartz: “Exactly, it won't change the course of the war. So we don't want to hand them all over. And not all at the same time. Maybe 50 in the first tranche, then maybe there will be another tranche of 50 missiles. This is perfectly understandable, but all this is big politics. I guess what's really behind it.” (Emphasis added). What goals to hit with Taurus? Frostedte: “I came to the conclusion that there are two interesting targets - the bridge to the east [The Kerch Bridge] and the ammunition depots, which are located above. The bridge in the east is hard to reach, it's a fairly small target, but the Taurus can do it, ammunition depots can also hit. If you take all of this into account and compare it to how many Storm Shadows and HIMARS were used, then I had a question: "Is our goal a bridge or military depots?" Fenske: “I would like to say one more thing about the destruction of the bridge. We have been working intensively on this issue and, unfortunately, have come to the conclusion that the bridge is similar to a runway due to its size. Therefore, it may not require 10 or even 20 missiles.” … “All they can do is make a hole and damage the bridge.” Gerhartz: “We all know that they want to destroy the bridge, that it ultimately means how it is guarded, not only because it has an important military-strategic significance, but also because it has a political significance. Although they now have a land corridor as well. There are certain concerns if we have a direct connection with the Ukrainian armed forces. Therefore, the question will arise - is it possible to use such a trick and send our people to the MBDA? Thus, there will be a direct connection with Ukraine only through the MBDA, which is much better than if such a connection exists with our Air Force.” Gräfe: “Gerhartz, it doesn't matter. We need to make sure that there are no formulations from the very beginning that make us a party to the conflict.” …” At the very beginning, we identified this as the main element of the "red line", so we will participate in the training. Let's say that we will prepare a "road map". It is necessary to divide the learning process into parts. The long track will be designed for four months, we will train them thoroughly, including working out the option with a bridge. The short one will be designed for two weeks so that they can use the missiles as soon as possible. If they are already trained, we will ask if the British are ready to take them up at this stage. I believe that such an action would be correct.”… “And if, at the first stage, the task is to hit ammunition depots, and not such complex objects as bridges, then in this case you can proceed to an abbreviated program and get a quick result.” Waiting for a decision (quoted from the VK transcript) Gräfe: “I want to say, the longer they take to make a decision, the longer it will take us to implement all this. We need to divide everything into stages. First, start with the simple ones, and then move on to the complex ones. Or can we turn to the British, can they provide us with support at the initial stage and take on planning issues? We can force what lies within our area of responsibility. The development of mounts for missiles is not one of our tasks; Ukraine must resolve this issue independently with manufacturers.” Gerhartz: “We wouldn't want to get into trouble right now because of the budget commission. This may make it impossible to start construction work at the Büchel airbase in 2024. Every day now counts in the program.” Hvad bliver det næste? I et kort essay d. 2. marts 2023 skrev jeg ”Hvad er det næste, hvis Leoparder og endda kampfly ikke er nok? I det skjulte indsætte vestlige "boots on the ground " for at forstærke ukrainsk modstand?” (It is time for some hard questions! March 2, 2023). Knapt et år senere kan man så opleve Præsident Macron hævde, ”at udsendelse af vestlige tropper til Ukraine ikke burde udelukkes i fremtiden,” ved et pressemøde efter støttekonferencen for Ukraine. Han tilføjede ganske vist: "Der er ingen konsensus i dag om at sende landtropper ... Men i dynamisk situation bør intet udelukkes. Vi vil gøre alt, hvad der er nødvendigt for at sikre, at Rusland ikke kan vinde denne krig.” (Le Figaro 26. februar, 2024) Muligheden for vestlige ”boots on the ground” i Ukraine skal åbenbart bidrage til at skabe en slags strategisk tvetydighed i proxy-krigen mod Rusland. ”Jeg vil ikke fjerne tvetydigheden i aftenens debatter ved at oplyse navne. Jeg siger, at det blev nævnt blandt mulighederne… Mange mennesker, der siger aldrig, aldrig i dag, var de samme mennesker, der sagde 'Aldrig tanks, aldrig fly, aldrig langdistancemissiler for to år siden'." (Macron i Le Figaro 26. februar, 2024). Her skal man dog lige huske, at Frankrig ikke er har været blandt de fremmeste til at støtte Ukraine med meget mere end svulstige vendinger. Macron’s udtalelser vakte naturligvis den tilsigtede opsigt, for vestlige ”boots on the ground” i Ukraine ville i sandhed være en afgørende rød linje. Forbavsende nok har en første reaktion fra Rusland været relativ stilfærdig. Måske fordi man er vant til urealistiske ideer fra Macron, der afvises af alle andre. Kreml’s Dmitry Peskov understregede dog som svar på et spørgsmål: ”I så tilfælde taler vi ikke om sandsynligheden, men om uundgåeligheden af direkte konflikt.” Næste dag kom så reaktionen fra Bundeskanzler Scholz. Den var afvisende, for også i fremtiden er der enighed om, at der hverken fra europæiske stater eller fra NATO vil blive sendt landtropper til Ukraine. ”Auf der Pariser Ukraine-Konferenz habe Einigkeit geherrscht, ”dass es keine Bodentruppen, keine Soldaten auf ukrainischem Boden geben wird, die von europäischen Staaten oder von Nato-Staaten dorthin geschickt werden.“ (Die Welt, 27.februar 2024). Andre er også i fuld gang med at afvise Macon’s prøveballon. Lige fra USA til Finland. ”Totalt vanvid” lød det også fra Jean-Luc Mélenchon fra det franske venstrefløjsparti ”La France Insoumise:” "At sende tropper til Ukraine ville gøre os til krigsførende … Den krigeriske verbale eskalering af en atommagt mod en anden stor atommagt er allerede en uansvarlig handling" (Le Figaro, 26. februar, 2024). Marine le Pen fra Rassemblement National var lige så kritisk. For hende udgjorde forslaget "en eksistentiel risiko for 70 millioner franskmænd, og vores væbnede styrker, der allerede er udstationeret i Østeuropa." (Le Monde 28. februar 2024). En hastig test (ikke repræsentativ) viste den franske befolknings holdning til spørgsmålet: ”Er du for at sende franske landtropper til Ukraine?” Ikke overraskende var flertallet imod. 76,02 % der var imod, mens 23,98 %, var for. ( https://video.lefigaro.fr/figaro/video/etes-vous-favorable-a-lenvoi-de-troupes-francaises-au-sol-en-ukraine/). Selvom Macron således ikke finder støtte i befolkningen, er det alligevel ganske overraskende at se, at næsten en fjerdedel er for at sende franske landtropper til Ukraine. Har mainstream mediers ustandselige råben ”ulven kommer” (eller i dette tilfælde den russiske bjørn), virkelig gjort næsten en fjerdedel af den franske befolkning ivrige efter at føre krig? Og hvis det er tilfældet, hvad så med resten af Europa? Er det virkelig ved at være tænkeligt, at der kan opstå en begyndende accept af at man kan gå mere direkte i krig med Rusland? I realiteten er det vel ikke helt forkert at antage, at de første skjulte støvleskridt kan være taget for længst. At mandskab fra vestlige militære enheder og efterretningstjenester allerede på forskellig vis er mere eller mindre direkte involveret i proxy-krigen mod Rusland i Ukraine. Ved flere af de mere spektakulære ukrainske aktioner må man antage at vestlige enheder har været dybt involveret, f.eks. ved indsættelse af AWACS-fly og droner. New York Times skrev for nylig, at CIA er involveret i et netværk af 12 hemmelige C.I.A. baser langs med den russiske grænse. Det vel heller ikke utænkeligt, at Ukraine i praksis får direkte hjælp fra vestligt mandskab i form af vejledning og instruktion i betjening af myriaden af avancerede vestlige våben. Jamie Shea med en fortid i NATO hævder ”Der har uden tvivl været vestlige specialstyrker i Ukraine siden krigens begyndelse, de kan give træning til ukrainske specialstyrker og hjælpe med at planlægge sabotage- og kommandooperationer, " (euobserver, 27. februar 2024). Hvis ikke det hele skal ende i en storkrig er der således snarere brug for mere ”Kriegsmüdigkeit” end ”Kriegstüchtigkeit” i Vesten. Måske er det også erkendelsen hos nogle republikanske senatorer i USA. Hør blot senator Marco Rubio (R-Fla), der er viceformand i The Senate Intelligence Committee: "The reality at this point that we have to confront is that that war ends with a negotiated settlement … And the question is — when they finally figured that out — when we finally get to that point, who has more leverage —Putin or Ukraine?” (Politico, 27. februar, 2024). |
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Verner C. Petersen Archives
February 2025
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